Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada

THE ACTIVIST AND THE OLIVE TREE: NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE SECOND INTIFADA

Julie M. Norman

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School oflnternational Service

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

International Relations . ' Chair: MJrQ i 1 1g='& 4 cJ ~ Moh~amed Abu- imer t~4 '

j .f]},i;o vJ (9.m~ Susan Shepler/ o(aJl of the chool oflnternational Service IS r i I Date 2009 American University Washington, D.C. 20016

AMERK;AN UNIVERSITY LIBRAHr q-1 o{o

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Julie M. Norman

2009

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To all who struggle for peace with justice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE ACTIVIST AND THE OLIVE TREE: NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

IN THE SECOND INTIFADA

Julie M. Norman

ABSTRACT

This study examines the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance in the West Bank

during and after the second intifada. The primary research question asks, to what extent

does a space exist for the (re)emergence of a popular nonviolent movement in the post

Oslo context? Specifically, the paper (1) identifies episodes of nonviolent activism in

the West Bank from 2000 to 2008, 2) investigates the fragmented, localized nature of

popular resistance during this period, 3) explores popular attitudes towards violent and

nonviolent resistance, and 4) examines how individual and collective activist identities

inform participation in popular resistance.

The study indicates that, despite the prevalence of violent resistance during the

second intifada, numerous episodes of nonviolent activism did and continue to take place

in the West Bank in the form of direct actions (such as protests and demonstrations),

NGO initiatives, media efforts, youth projects, and everyday acts of resistance. However,

a widespread, unified movement has yet to emerge due to both internal and external

factors, including differences between activists, divisions within Palestinian politics and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. civil society, and Israeli measures such as the separation barrier and checkpoints that

hinder travel and limit points of contact.

Despite the current fragmentation of the movement, the paper illustrates that there

is significant public support for nonviolent resistance amongst youth in particular, while

support for militant attacks on Israeli civilians is declining. These findings suggest that

there is a potential space for the reemergence of a nonviolent movement in the West

Bank in the current context, but its realization depends largely on the realignment of

nonviolence with individual and collective constructs of activist identity. Specifically,

mobilization depends on the association of nonviolent activism with the local acts of

popular resistance dominant in the first intifada, over the conceptualization of

nonviolence as a western paradigm imposed under Oslo.

The study is based on semi-structured interviews with grassroots activists, NGO

practitioners, and community leaders; surveys with youth ages 14-34 years; and extensive

participant observation. The findings bring attention to the growing phenomenon of

nonviolent activism in Palestine, which has been overshadowed by violent resistance and

in the academic literature and mainstream discourse.

lll

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the many individuals who provided

me with support, advice, guidance, and inspiration throughout the process of completing

this project.

Thank you to the countless activists, students, community leaders, and others who

participated in the research and shared their time, thoughts, and stories with me.

I am grateful to Mohammed Abu-Nimer, my dissertation chair and mentor, whose

work on nonviolence and peacebuilding continues to inspire me and countless other

students, scholars, practitioners, and activists, and who provided invaluable support and

feedback throughout the Ph.D. experience. Many thanks also to my other committee

members, Julie Mertus and Susan Shepler, who guided me through the dissertation

process with their insights and encouragement. Thank you also to Dean Louis Goodman

for his assistance, feedback, and mentorship.

This project would not have been possible without the generous support of the

School of International Service at American University. Thank you also to the

Palestinian American Research Council (PARC), which supported me during the

fieldwork and writing stages; the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Jerusalem

2050 initiative, which supported me during the revision process; and the Dickey Center

for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, which supported me in finalizing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the manuscript for publication. I am also grateful to Gene Cohen and the Jessica Jennifer

Cohen Foundation (JJCF) family for their kind support of my work in the Middle East.

Thank you to Fatemah B. for her kindness, friendship, and assistance on this

project in the West Bank. Thank you also to Philip Rizk and Alex Baramki, both of

whom assisted with much of the translation throughout the research period.

I am grateful to Mark and Susanne Brown for their boundless warmth, hospitality,

and friendship in Jerusalem.

Thank you also to Rachel Kliewer, my teacher who first sparked my interest in

this part of the world, and who remains my close friend and mentor.

A special thanks to Tazreena Sajjad, who provided the initial comments on the

first draft, and who continues to dazzle and inspire as a scholar, activist, and dear friend.

Finally, thank you to my family: My sister, Cara Heuser, who has always been

there for me; and my brother-in-law, Ryan Heuser, and my nephew, Joseph "Joey"

Heuser, who have brought so much joy to my life.

Lastly, thank you to my parents, Mark and Deborah Norman. I cannot thank them

enough for the love and support they have given me throughout this process, and in every

aspect of my life.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iv

ILLUSTRATIONS ...... viii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

PART I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT ...... 12

Chapter 1. Literature Review ...... 13

Chapter 2. Historical Background and Research Context ...... 51

Chapter 3. Lenses of Inquiry: Methodology and Research Design ...... 77

PART IL ACTIVISM AND ATTITUDES ...... 119

Chapter 4. "A Color Other Than Blood": Nonviolent Resistance in the West Bank...... 120

Chapter 5. "Youth Will Be the Lifeblood": Re-examining Youth Attitudes toward Popular Resistance ...... 167

PART III: SOURCES OF FRAGMENTATION ...... 192

Chapter 6. Ineffective Resource Mobilization ...... 193

Chapter 7. Political Constraints ...... 218

Chapter 8. Lack of Resonant Movement Frames ...... 238

Chapter 9. Identity and Collective Action ...... 257

CONCLUSION ...... 280

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Appendix A. Field Sites ...... 301

Appendix B. Sample Interview Questions ...... 306

Appendix C. Preliminary Survey (2006) ...... 308

Appendix D. Youth Survey (2007) ...... 310

Appendix E. Additional Case Studies of Village-Based Direct Action ...... 315

Appendix F. Youth Media ...... 326

Appendix G. Recommendations: Reframing Nonviolence ...... 332

REFERENCES ...... 345

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Figures

1. Youth Participation in Resistance ...... 176

2. Contextualizing Support for Violent Resistance ...... 180

Tables

1. Interview Participants: Gender and Location ...... 90

2. Interview Participants: Date and Organization ...... 91

3. Nonviolent Activism in the West Bank, 2000-2008 ...... 164

Vlll

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. INTRODUCTION

There is a story in Palestine about an old man who was planting the seed for an

olive tree next to a road. A child passing by saw the old man and asked him why he was

planting something of which he would never see the fruits. The old man replied that he

was not planting the tree for himself, but for future generations, that they might thrive

and find sustenance in the future.

This anecdote was referenced multiple times by different individuals during my

fieldwork, and came to serve as a metaphor for the generational transition of resistance

that I was witnessing in Palestine. Like the olive trees, popular resistance is rooted in

Palestinian history and tradition, and the olive tree is often used as a symbol of

Palestinian sumoud, or resilience. In the current context however, the uprooting of olive

trees under the Israeli occupation 1 mirrors the apparent splintering of popular resistance

during the second intifada.2 In contrast to the first intifada, in which nearly all

1 In this study, the term "occupation" refers to Israel's military occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. These areas (as well as the Sinai peninsula, which was returned to Egypt in 1979 through the Camp David I Accords, and the Golan Heights of Syria) were captured by Israel in the 1967 war (also called the Six Days War). The Israeli government declared the areas to be "territories under custody," in which military rule would apply, and re-named them "administrative territories" in 1968. The term "occupied territories" is the most common name for the areas, both locally and internationally. The term "occupation" is also sometimes applied to Israel's seizure of Palestinian land in 1948, but in this study, the term refers to the 1967 occupation, unless otherwise noted.

2 The Arabic term "intifada" literally means "shaking off." References to the first intifada refer to the period of Palestinian uprising against the occupation from 1987 to 1993, while the second intifada (or Al-Aqsa Intifada) refers to the period of resistance between 2000 and 2008, although the exact ending point of the second intifada is still contested. 1

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Palestinians participated in the uprising, action mobilization in the second intifada was

significantly limited, especially in terms of youth participation. Thus, many first intifada

generation activists have taken the lead in reclaiming a space for nonviolent resistance,

hoping to engage youth in the popular struggle and sow new seeds for creative activism.

I first observed this phenomenon during my initial visits to Palestine in the

summers of 2005 and 2006, during which I worked with a human rights organization and

a youth media non-governmental organization (NGO) respectively, meeting numerous

activists participating in and advocating for nonviolent resistance. Most of these activists

were in the age demographic of late thirties or forties, having been youth leaders or active

participants nearly twenty years earlier in the first intifada from 1987-1993. In

conversations with these individuals, I learned that many had seen their activist

involvement decrease during the second intifada, which they described as being

"hijacked" by extremist groups employing militant means of resistance, including suicide

bombings. However, a number of these activists were attempting to recreate a space for

popular resistance in the second intifada context through the coordination of direct

actions, the re-establishment of popular committees, and the engagement of the general

public, particularly youth,3 through nonviolence trainings and workshops.

Despite these efforts, which I set out to observe during my fieldwork from March-

August 2007, it was clear from conversations with activists and community leaders that a

viable "movement" had yet to emerge, consisting instead of a fragmented series of

nonviolent actions and episodes. Such conversations led me to question why popular

3 The term youth (sha 'b) is distinct from children (attfaal) in Palestine, referring generally to young people between the ages of 14 and 34 years of age.

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participation in nonviolent resistance was so widespread in the first intifada, yet so

limited in the current context. In particular, I was interested in how older activists, many

now working with NGOs, were attempting to revive the spirit and tactics of the first

intifada by engaging present-day youth in nonviolence.

The Emergence of the Research Questions

I began my fieldwork by speaking with program coordinators, most from the first

intifada generation, in various NGOs focusing on youth and nonviolence, to better

understand the state of nonviolence and youth participation. However, through various

contacts, I soon found myself having more conversations with grassroots activists, who

introduced me to a different dimension of resistance than I had been exposed to through

my earlier work within the mid-level NGO sphere of civil society, despite their frequent

overlap. These interactions challenged some of my assumptions and re-directed my

research in several ways.

First, these conversations prompted me to reconsider both the scope and form of

nonviolent resistance during the second intifada. While activists unanimously agreed that

nonviolence was overshadowed by militant resistance since 2000, they challenged the

assumption in the public discourse both inside and outside Palestine that nonviolence was

nonexistent during this period. On the contrary, I was introduced to narratives recounting

numerous episodes of nonviolent resistance throughout the West Bank from 2002 to the

time of the interviews in the spring and summer of 2007. Furthermore, I learned that

these episodes consisted of what activists termed "real resistance," or direct action, at the

village level, in contrast to the urban-based trainings and workshops emphasized by the

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NGOs. These accounts and, subsequently, direct observations, of village-based popular

resistance prompted me to shift my primary level of analysis from the mid-level to the

grassroots level in order to better identify and explore these stories that were previously

ignored in both the academic literature and mainstream media.

While investigating these various episodes, it became clear that, despite the scope

of nonviolent resistance, the struggle remained largely fragmented and localized. I

decided to probe this phenomenon further in my conversations with activists, who

volunteered a range of factors to account for the lack of widespread mobilization and

cohesion. My own observation of limited youth involvement in the leadership and

coordination of nonviolent campaigns prompted me to raise that issue as a possible factor

in the overall lack of mass mobilization, and while some activists agreed, I was surprised

at the majority who dismissed youth participation, presuming that youth were either

passive on the one hand, or attracted solely to violent resistance on the other hand. I thus

decided to investigate this claim by going directly to the youth to survey their attitudes

towards both violent and nonviolent resistance. My findings indicated that the majority

of youth, like the majority of activists, were more likely to support action, be it violent or

nonviolent, than inaction, which many equated with nonviolence in theory, if not in

practice. This suggested that the meaning and nature of nonviolence in Palestine was

more complex than I originally assumed, and implied that "commitments" to either

violence or nonviolence were more fluid and nuanced than I had anticipated.

These findings prompted me to consider why, if both older activists and youth

shared a common attraction to resistance (or what I termed "activist identity"), why was

the older generation so much more visible than youth in organizing nonviolent struggle?

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I thus started to probe how the collective memory of the use of nonviolence in the first

intifada shaped older activists' perception of popular resistance on the one hand, and

how, on the other hand, the characterization of "nonviolence" as normalization4 during

the Oslo period informed the young generation's perception of nonviolent actions. This

led me to formulate my research questions to investigate, first, why popular participation

was so limited and fragmented during the second intifada, and second, if a nonviolent

movement, dependent on the reframing of nonviolence in accordance with the collective

identity of resistance, was feasible in Palestine in the post-Oslo context.

Overview of the Research

Succinctly stated, the dissertation examines the phenomenon of popular

nonviolent resistance in the West Bank during the second intifada. The primary research

questions ask: (1) What was the state of nonviolent resistance in Palestine during the

second intifada? (2) Why, despite episodes of nonviolent resistance, did the second

intifada never realize the mass mobilization for popular struggle witnessed in the first

intifada, especially among youth, even as the scope of grievances expanded and

intensified? (3) To what extent does a space exist for the (re)emergence of a popular

nonviolent movement in the post-Oslo context? Specifically, the research (1) identifies

episodes of nonviolent activism in the West Bank from 2002 to 2008, (2) explores

popular attitudes towards violent and nonviolent resistance, (3) investigates the

4 The term "normalization" in this context refers to the normalizing of relations between Palestinians and Israelis. The term has a negative connotation in Palestine, as "normalization" generally implies accepting the status quo of the occupation rather than challenging or resisting it.

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fragmented, localized nature of popular resistance during this period, and 4) examines

how individual and collective identities inform participation in popular resistance.

The research indicates that, despite the prevalence of violent resistance during the

second intifada, numerous episodes of nonviolent activism did take place in the West

Bank in the form of direct actions (such as protests and demonstrations), NGO initiatives,

media efforts, youth projects, and everyday acts of resistance. In addition, there was

significant public support for popular resistance, while support for militant attacks on

Israeli civilians declined throughout the course of the intifada. However, a widespread,

unified movement has yet to emerge due to both internal and external factors, including

differences between activists, divisions within Palestinian politics and civil society,

Israeli policies, and international pressures. I thus argue that nonviolent resistance is a

natural fit in the Palestinian activist toolbox, but it has been hindered during the second

intifada by inefficient mobilizing structures, political constraints, and ineffective

movement frames.

These findings suggest that there is a potential space for the reemergence of a

nonviolent movement in the West Bank in the current context. In contrast to the

assumptions of some local activists and many external skeptics, there is in fact significant

public support for nonviolent tactics, even among youth. However, the realization of

such a movement depends largely on the alignment of nonviolence with individual and

collective constructs of activist identity. Specifically, mobilization depends on the

association of nonviolent activism with the local acts of popular resistance dominant in

the first intifada, over the conceptualization of nonviolence as a western paradigm

imposed by Oslo.

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Mixed Methodology Approach

The primary fieldwork for the study was conducted between March and August

2007, with preliminary research conducted in the summers of 2005 and 2006, and follow-

up research conducted in the summer of 2008. Data collection was based on a mixed

methodology approach, incorporating narrative research, quantitative and qualitative

surveys, and participant observation, which enhanced the validity and reliability of the

study by allowing for both depth and scope. First, I spoke directly with activists,

community leaders, and popular committee members primarily at the grassroots level,

and secondarily at the mid-level NGO sector. I did not focus my interviews on these

populations with the assumption that they would be representative of the mainstream

public; on the contrary, I wanted to better understand how and why they decided to

employ nonviolent resistance in the context of the second intifada, in which nonviolence

not only faced the challenge of the occupation, but internal opposition as well. To be

sure, nonviolence received little support from top-level officials,5 or from the majority of

the public. Even within the "nonviolence camp," the extent of internal fragmentation

and, at times, animosity, was notable, with many activists outspokenly critical of the

approaches used by others. In particular, there was significant tension between

independent activists and voluntary community-based organizations (CBOs) on the one

hand, and professional, salaried NGOs on the other hand. I thus included conversations

5 The visible exception to this observation was Dr. Mustafa Barghouthi, Information Minister in Mahmo.ud Abbas' administration through June 2007, and also the head of Al-Mubadara, the Palestinian National Initiative, a political movement/party focused on resisting the occupation and halting construction of the separation barrier. Barghouthi was a frequent presence at nonviolent actions.

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with both sectors in my research, to provide a more balanced and nuanced picture of the

scope, as well as the depth, of nonviolence.

While relying on in-depth interviews with activists to better understand the state

of nonviolence in Palestine, I also drew from surveys and conversations with youth ages

14-34 years of age to gauge general attitudes towards popular resistance. The findings

indicated widespread support for nonviolence in practice, but not in theory; and

widespread support for violence in theory, but not in practice. In addition, youth

responses indicated nuanced understandings of the concepts of violence and nonviolence,

indicating a greater potential space for youth participation in popular resistance than

assumed by some activists.

I examined the data inductively, concluding that a space for nonviolence exists in

the current Palestinian context, as illustrated by local episodes and indicated by public

opinion, but a cohesive movement has not yet emerged due to both internal and external

factors. I argue that popular participation can be enhanced by re-aligning nonviolence

with tactics employed in the first intifada, thus re-conceptualizing nonviolence as a

strategy of resistance, in accordance with individual and collective constructions of

activist identity.

Assumptions and Clarifications

My dissertation is grounded in the assumption that "violent" and "nonviolent" are

not necessarily distinct or bounded constructs of identity. Rather, both violence and

nonviolence are constantly being negotiated within and between individuals in the

broader conceptual sphere of action; also, an individual or group may bear traits of each,

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or act both violently and nonviolently. Thus, it is difficult to label a certain individual or

group of people as purely "nonviolent" or "violent."

Furthermore, I assume that individual and collective perceptions of violence and

nonviolence are influenced by the ever-changing dynamics of the conflict itself, with

historical, political, social, economic, cultural, and territorial contexts, as well as events

and trends in the broader realm of international relations, constantly reshaping popular

understanding of and attitudes towards different forms of resistance. For this reason, it is

inaccurate to portray individual or collective support for violence or nonviolence as a

zero-sum equation, suggesting that individuals are either violent or nonviolent, or that

Palestinians favor either violence or nonviolence. Instead, I suggest that attitudes

towards particular methods of resistance are better understood as emerging from, and

being sustained by, the association of such methods with effective activism, as informed

by historical and socio-political contexts, promoted by organizational structures, and

defined by cultural framings.

Despite the predominance of militant resistance in the second intifada, many

activists and organizations continued to employ strategic nonviolence to resist the

occupation. I refrain from referring to these individuals and groups as peace activists,

although in seeking to end the occupation they could be described as working towards a

just peace or "positive peace" (Galtung 1996). However, the activists themselves

generally refrained from using the word "peace," which had become almost synonymous

with normalization during the Oslo period. The term "nonviolence" (la 'anf) was

sometimes used by activists to describe their activities, but was also usually eschewed for

its similar association with submission and passivity under Oslo. Activists instead

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described their work publicly as "popular resistance" (muqa 'uma sha 'bia) or "civil-based

resistance" (muqa 'uma mudania) (CBR), though they sometimes used the term

nonviolence in conversation. In this dissertation, I will use the term "nonviolence" as a

synonym for "popular resistance," unless otherwise noted, in accordance with its pre-

Oslo reference to strategic activism. It should be noted that my use of the word

specifically refers to strategic, or pragmatic, nonviolence, rather than principled, or moral

nonviolence, unless otherwise stated.6 While a few activists did approach nonviolence

from a principled perspective, they rarely used the moral argument in their trainings,

meetings, or actions.

In the dissertation that follows, I do not seek to idealize nonviolence, or condemn

violence, or those who practice each, respectively. Nor do I seek to "solve" the problem

of fragmentation or the challenge of mobilization experienced by nonviolent activists in

the West Bank, much less suggest that a revision of the nonviolent movement would end

the occupation or result in the establishment of a just peace. I do seek to broaden the

discourse on Palestinian resistance by identifying episodes of nonviolence during and

after the second intifada, examining the attitudes of youth specifically towards violence

and nonviolence, discussing the factors hindering widespread participation, and analyzing

how the perceived "fit" of nonviolence with individual and collective activist identities

influences mobilization. I hope that by better understanding the mechanisms that

influence decisions to participate in nonviolent resistance, we can better understand the

process of sustained popular struggle, and the potential role of youth within that process.

6 For further discussion of pragmatic and principled nonviolence, see the section on nonviolence literature in Chapter 1.

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Outline

The dissertation that follows is divided into three main parts: the first section

(Chapters 1, 2, and 3) frames the study within the literature related to social movements,

nonviolence, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; establishes the historical and geographic

context of the research; and explains the methodological approach of the project. The

second section (Chapters 4 and 5) identifies and categorizes the episodes of nonviolent

resistance that occurred between 2000 and 2008, and investigates popular attitudes

towards different methods ofresistance. The third section (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) examines

internal and external factors inhibiting movement cohesion and widespread participation,

in terms of mobilizing structures, political constraints, and movement frames. Chapter 9

then explores the construct of individual and collective activist identities, and analyzes

how the perceived compatibility of nonviolence with those identities informs

mobilization, particularly for the second-intifada generation of youth. The study

concludes by synthesizing the findings and analyses, discussing the contributions of the

project, and exploring possibilities for future research.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PART I

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Popular resistance in Palestine is typically framed in the context of militant

violence, 7 despite the traditions of nonviolence and limited violence thr?ughout

Palestinian history.8 Especially since the start of the second intifada in 2000, most

policymakers, scholars, and practitioners of conflict resolution have largely overlooked

nonviolent resistance. The mainstream media, including print, electronic, and visual

sources both inside and outside the region, has focused primarily on suicide bombings

and rocket attacks, while academic literature on Palestine in recent years has also

concentrated on violent extremism, typically situating Palestinian resistance in the realm

of terrorism (Moghadam 2003; Pedahzur et al. 2003; Kimhi and Even 2004; Bloom

2004). These studies and many others, while useful for understanding some aspects of

resistance, contribute to a dominant discourse of Palestinian extremism that neglects

other dimensions of popular struggle.

The second intifada erupted in late September 2000, following seven years of the

flawed Oslo Peace Process, which began with the signing of the Declaration of Principles

7 According to Tuastad, Palestinians are victims of symbolic violence due to the '"terrorist' stigma, with which the occupying power has labeled all Palestinian resistance organisations, if not the whole Palestinian population" (2003, 591). See also Hallward (2006), who notes a "large silence in the mainstream media ... and in the International Relations literature on ... nonviolent activism" in Palestine (16).

8 See Chapter 2 for a historical discussion of nonviolence in Palestine. 13

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(DOP) by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in

1993. While the DOP was intended to shift Israeli-Palestinian relations by developing a

system of Palestinian semi-autonomous rule, both parties' failure to implement the

agreement effectively diminished rather than enhanced mutual trust, and the final status

negotiations alluded to in the DOP never occurred.9 Increasing disillusionment amongst

many Palestinians with the "peace process," largely instigated by expanding Israeli

settlements in violation of the Oslo Accords, and seemingly permanent postponement of

final status talks, gave way to outright cynicism with the collapse of the Camp David II

peace talks in August 2000. Thus, tensions were high in September when Ariel Sharon

visited the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount complex with an armed escort, sparking

protests that launched the second intifada.

The second intifada was characterized by heightened use of violence from both

sides, resulting in the deaths of 4,826 Palestinians and 482 Israelis (as of December

2008), many of whom were civilians, with thousands more wounded. 10 Israeli strategies

included military raids and incursions, air strikes, and targeted assassinations, as well as

home demolitions, curfews, arrests, detentions, and use of checkpoints, while Palestinian

tactics included suicide bomb attacks, as well as the use of imported assault rifles, hand

grenades, and homemade Qassam rockets. Despite the prevalence of armed resistance,

Palestinian nonviolent activism was by no means absent during the second intifada, and

support for violent resistance became increasingly tempered and nuanced in the later

9 For more on the failure of the Oslo Peace Process, see Usher 1999; Slater 2001; and Weinberger 2007.

10 See B'tselem, Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, Fatalities, http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties.asp (accessed 10 December 2008).

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years of the intifada. However, widespread popular participation in nonviolent resistance

remained fragmented and limited, in stark contrast to the mass mobilization of the first

intifada. To better understand the phenomenon of nonviolent resistance during the

second intifada, as well as its fragmentation, it is helpful to draw on the social movement,

nonviolence, and Palestine literatures.

Grounding Palestinian Resistance in Social Movement Literature

Most analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are grounded in the disciplines of

political science or international relations (IR), with some recent studies on suicide

bombing reflecting a psychological or psycho-social approach. While traditional IR

approaches may be useful for analyzing top-level dynamics, such as the failure of the

Oslo Accords, and psychological frameworks may give insights into individual

behaviors, such as the motivations of suicide bombers, neither can explain the group

dynamics of Palestinian grassroots activists, civil society, and the mainstream public. For

this level of analysis, it is helpful to integrate a sociological approach, specifically the

literature on social movements.

Although social movement literature typically focuses on contention within states,

while international relations theory focuses on associations between states, the unique

case of the Israeli occupation of Palestine includes elements of both interactions. First,

Palestine's semi-autonomy in some areas allows it to function like a state in some

respects, 11 yet in lacking independence, it is still subject to the control of the state of

11 Under the DOP, Palestine was divided into Areas A, 8, and C, with Area A referring to Palestinian urban areas where the Palestinian Authority (PA) has full autonomy, including civilian and

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Israel. In this way, the case oflsrael-Palestine challenges the usual boundaries of inter-

state and intra-state relations, requiring analysis based in a literature like social

movements that bridges both dimensions. Moreover, despite the murkiness of the "state"

label in Israel-Palestine, the salient national identities oflsraelis and Palestinians does

render the conflict as an international issue. In this case of two nations and one

(recognized) state, the social movement perspective is helpful for understanding how

popular struggle functions as a mechanism in international, if still intrastate, relations.

Social movement theory is particularly relevant to this research for assessing how and if

recent episodes of Palestinian popular resistance in the second intifada might constitute a

more cohesive movement. In this section, I discuss how the social movement literature

can inform understanding of Palestinian resistance, which largely influences the relations

between Israel and Palestine.

Cycles of Contention

According to Charles Tilly, a social movement consists of three elements: a

campaign, or sustained and organized public effort; a repertoire of actions, such as

protests, demonstrations, and petitions; and representations of worthiness, unity,

numbers, and commitment (WUNC) (2004, 3-4). Although popular resistance in

Palestine contains some of these elements, most notably a visible repertoire of actions,

the organization and sustainability of the campaign is arguable, and representations of

police powers; Area B referring to Palestinian rural areas where the PA has jurisdiction but no police powers; and Area C referring to areas under complete Israeli control.

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WUNC are inconsistent, leading many activists to question the applicability of the term

"movement" in regards to the current struggle.

Rather than conceptualizing resistance in this way as a definable event, it may be

more useful to think of Palestinian resistance as a process, in accordance with Sidney

Tarrow's notion of "cycles of contention," described as

... phase[ s] of heightened conflict across the social system: with a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a rapid pace of innovation in the forms of contention; the creation of new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities. (1998, 142)

In applying Tarrow's definition to this study, I accept the general focus on variation

across sectors implicit in cycles of contention, but also extend the scope to include

temporal variation as well (Snow and Benford 1992, 142). Viewing Palestinian popular

struggle as a cyclical dynamic, rather than a singular movement, is more useful for this

study in understanding how various episodes of popular resistance across both time and

space interact with and inform each other to shape collective identity and contentious

action.

The cycles of contention model also allows for the necessary integration of

various approaches to studying social movements that are sometimes viewed as distinct;

namely, political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (Tarrow

1998; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). While this study places particular emphasis

on framing processes, each of these interactive factors is relevant to the research.

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Political Opportunity Structures

Political opportunities refer to the "changes in the institutional structure or

informal power relations of a given national political system" (McAdam, McCarthy, and

Zald 1996, 3), which either create opportunities that "encourage people to engage in

contentious politics" (Tarrow 1998, 20), or create constraints that discourage contention.

This structural approach focuses primarily on the emergence of social movements, guided

by the idea that movements "are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and

opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded" (McAdam,

McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3). Political opportunities and constraints might include

dynamic factors such as the level of political access, shifting alignments, united/divided

elites, influential allies, and the degree of repression/facilitation; 12 while stable aspects

might include the level of state strength and prevailing modes of systematic repression

(Tarrow 1998). In the case of Palestine, Israel's state strength, support from the United

States, and tradition of suppressing resistance represented constraints to contention, in

combination with the problematic PA structure and divisions among Palestinian elites.

However, at the same time, increasing frustration and disillusionment in response to both

the Israeli and Palestinian political structures and the Oslo "peace process" facilitated

opportunities for contention, manife_sted in the second intifada.

12 According to Tilly, "repression is any action by another group that raises the contender's cost of collective action. An action which lowers the group's cost of collective action is a form of facilitation" (1978, 100).

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Resource Mobilization

While the political opportunities approach provides valuable insight into the

structural conditions that facilitate or constrain resistance, structural vulnerabilities are

"but a necessary prerequisite to action. In the absence of sufficient organization ... such

opportunities are not likely to be seized" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 8). To be

sure, while a structural approach may indicate when conditions are ripe for contention, a

different framework is necessary for analyzing if and how social movements actually

form and function. For this analysis, scholars have examined mobilizing structures, the

"collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and

engage in collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3). This dimension of

analysis includes resource mobilization theory, which examines mobilization in the

context of professional social movement organizations (SM Os) (McCarthy and Zald

1973, 1977); and the political process model, which examines the role of informal,

grassroots institutions as mobilizing entities. The mobilizing structures approach is

particularly relevant to this research for its focus on movement goals, which Palestinian

activists have yet to collectively articulate; attention to effects of extremists, which is

significant in Palestinian resistance in terms of the role of Hamas and other militant

groups; and perhaps most importantly, analysis of tactics, which allows for a deeper

investigation into the strategy of nonviolence. 13 In addition, the distinction between the

SMO focus of the resource-mobilization model and the grassroots focus of the political

13 See Part III for further discussion on movement fragmentation.

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process model allow for analysis of both the complementary and competitive efforts of

mid-level NGOs and grassroots-level CBOs in Palestine.

Cultural Framings

While political opportunities and mobilizing structures identify some factors for

potential collective action, they overlook the salience of ideas, meaning, and identity in

individual and collective decisions to resist. As McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald

summarize, "people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and

optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem" (1996, 5). The

presence or absence of those perceptions is informed by the social construction of

movements, or cultural framings, which link the individual to the structural, and build a

bridge between movement emergence and dynamics.

Movement Frames

According to Snow and Benford, a frame is "an interpretive schemata that

simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding

objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or

past environment" (1992, 13 7). Collective action frames in particular serve to underscore

unjust or immoral conditions, attribute blame to an identifiable agent for those conditions,

and articulate or "package"(Gamson 1988) an experienced reality (Snow and Benford

1992). Movement leaders use processes of "frame alignment" (Snow et al. 1986) to

"orient their movements' frames toward action in particular contexts and fashion them at

the intersection between a target population's culture and their own values and goals"

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(Tarrow 1998, 110). In this way, movements link cultural frames to a particular

grievance ("frame bridging"), magnify frames related to that grievance ("frame

amplification"), connect the grievance to broader issues and frames ("frame extension"),

and, when effective, inspire action for social change to address the given issue or

grievance ("frame transformation") (Snow et al. 1986, 467-476). Movement

entrepreneurs thus both use existing cultural frames and construct new collective action

frames to mobilize support and participation. In the case of Palestine, many activists rely

on resistance frames that highlight the legacy of Palestinian struggle, while many civil

society practitioners are constructing democracy, human rights, and self-determination

frames to gamer support for a Palestinian state.

The American civil rights movement provides a notable empirical example of

framing, with black Americans' use of the "rights" frame. According to Tarrow, the

"equal opportunity" approach served bridging, amplification, and extension functions,

first by linking the movement to previous court victories that preceded the cycle of

contention in the 1960s, and second by resonating with, and thus bridging, the

movement's two main constituent groups, black middle class southerners and white

liberal supporters ( 1998, 117). However, it was the practice of nonviolent direct action

utilized by the movement that ultimately transformed the rights frame into a broader

collective action frame (Tarrow 1998, McAdam 1996, Snow and Benford 1992). In these

ways, black leaders used the familiar American political rhetoric of rights to identify,

articulate, and attribute the grievance of unequal opportunity in the Jim Crow south,

made dramatically visible during the process of struggle in such a way that transformed

the language of rights into a call for action.

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When considered in the context of Tarrow's cycles of contention, frames can be

re-conceptualized as "master frames" (Snow and Benford 1992), which perform the same

functions (punctuation, attribution, and articulation) as movement-specific frames, but do

so on a larger, more general scale, and can extend both within and between cycles of

contention. To return to the example of the civil rights movement, the focus of Martin

Luther King, Jr. and his associates on equal rights and opportunities through nonviolent

means can be seen as a master frame unifying the originally independent frames of the

movement's primary organizing groups, 14 thus indicating how a master frame can emerge

within a cycle of contention (Snow and Benford 1992, 145). At the same time, following

the groundbreaking victories of the civil rights movement, rights became a master frame

for other movement groups, including feminists, homosexuals, disabled persons,

environmentalists, the elderly, and children, framing their grievances in the language of

"rights" (Hamilton 1986, 246; Tarrow 1998, 118). In this way, the master frame of one

movement or cycle of contention can be adopted as a master frame by other movements.

For the purpose of this study, the master frames concept is most useful when

applied within a cycle of contention, allowing for temporal variation. According to Snow

and Benford (1992), master frames are linked to the emergence, dynamics, tactics, shape,

and decline of cycles of protest, as reflected in the contentious cycle of Palestinian

resistance from the first intifada to the present (1987-2008). Indeed, both the ideational

and tactical dimensions of the master frame of Palestinian liberation evident during the

14 The equal rights approach created a master frame that managed to bridge the different missions of the four main civil rights organizations of the time, the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

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first intifada proved to be both facilitating and constraining in the second intifada, as

political opportunities shifted and meanings were re-negotiated.

To clarify, it is helpful to refer to Gamson's understanding of collective action

frames as consisting of three components: injustice, agency, and identity (1995, 1992).

According to Gamson, the salience of the injustice aspect depends on the framing of the

issue, while the agency and identity components depend on the framing of the movement.

In the case of Palestine, the framing of the issue of the occupation has maintained

potency due to its empirical credibility (evidential basis), experiential commensurability

(direct impact on everyday life), and narrative fidelity ("fit" within a larger belief system)

(Snow and Benford 1992). However, competing frames introduced by shifting political

contexts have threatened the framing of the movement by changing perceptions of the

relevance of certain tactics, including nonviolence in particular.

Gaps in the Cultural Framing Literature

The social construction/cultural framing approach connects the political

opportunity and resource mobilization theories in a way that is useful for this study,

allowing for the integration of those models with closer attention to culture, identity, and

everyday actions of movement participants (McAdam 1996, 339). However, gaps still

remain in the framing literature, which this research aims to address. First, as McAdam

notes, "the literature on framing processes has been long on ringing, programmatic

statements, and short on the kinds of detailed empirical applications that would allow for

a real assessment of the worth of the concept" (1996, 354). Indeed, in-depth applications

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of the framing theory to real-world examples are rare, 15 with few studies examining

contemporary movements or international contexts. By focusing on Palestinian

resistance in the second intifada, this study extends framing to a current cycle of

contention in a non-western case study. As McAdam suggests, grounding case studies in

the framing literature is necessary for assessing, adapting, and further improving the

theory.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, framing has mostly been equated with

ideational expressions of cycles of contention, reflecting what McAdam sees as a

"pronounced 'ideational bias' inherent in our current usage of the concept" (1996, 354).

Indeed, despite brief reference to the influence of master frames on tactics in Snow and

Benford (1992), most of the framing literature focuses on the framing of the issues or

ideology of the movement, rather than the framing of the tactics or the movement itself

(but see McAdam 1996). As McAdam emphasizes however, "it is impossible to fully

understand the 'signifying work' of a movement group without close attention to its

tactics and the actions in which it engages" (1996, 354; emphasis added). It is thus my

intention in this research to examine how the framing of tactics, namely nonviolent

strategies, shape collective action and inform participation in the context of Palestine.

Collective Identity

While political structures, resource mobilization, and cultural framings all give

insight into the opportunities and constraints that influence social movements, gaps in the

literature still remain. According to Polletta and Jasper, the emphasis of those models on

15 See McAdam 1996 for a framing approach to the American civil rights movement.

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"the how of mobilization over the why of it, their focus on the state as target of action,

and their dependence on rationalistic images of individual action [leave] important issues

unexamined" (2001, 283). A collective identity approach can be useful for addressing

some of those shortcomings.

The concept of collective identity is important in this research, as I argue that a

national Palestinian identity of resistance both informs and is informed by participation in

popular struggle, yet that identity has different meanings and associations across

generations. According to Melucci (1995), collective identity is best conceptualized as a

process that extends across time and space, involves a network of active relationships,

and contains a sense of emotional investment that establishes a common unity between

individuals. This process-based conceptualization is in accordance with Tarrow's cycles

of contention model, such that collective identities can be understood as enduring over

time, while shifting and adapting to changes at the individual and structural levels. Yet,

as the case of Palestine warrants, the mere presence of a collective identity does not

necessarily translate into collective action.

It is thus helpful to draw again from Gamson, who extends Melucci further by

linking collective identity to solidarity and political consciousness, noting that "collective

identity is a concept at the cultural level, but to operate in mobilization, individuals must

make it part of their personal identity" (1992, 74). This finding is particularly relevant to

the mobilization of Palestinian youth in nonviolent resistance, as many allude to a

national identity of struggle yet fail to personally engage.

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Collective Action

The extension from collective identity to collective action is especially germane

to this study for understanding how and when the shared Palestinian activist identity

mobilizes individuals to participate in resistance, and likewise, how such resistance

further informs identity. It is thus useful to adopt Klandermans' conceptualization of

collective action as both an independent and dependent variable. According to

Klandermans, "On the one hand, the social construction of meaning precedes collective

action and determines its direction; on the other, collective action in its turn determines

the process of meaning construction" (1992, 82). This interactive dynamic suggests that

meanings are (re )constructed and (re )negotiated at the structural level of public discourse,

at the organizational level of communication within movement groups, and at the

individual level through the raising of consciousness during participation (Klandermans

1992). 16 Both collective and individual identities thus motivate individual participation, 17

while participation likewise shapes identity. Considered over time, this interactive

identity-action dynamic fits well within the cycles of contention model, and is directly

relevant to the reconstitution of activist identity and patterns of popular resistance in

Palestine between the first and second intifadas.

Polletta and Jasper provide a useful model for applying the collective identity lens

to understanding "the creation of collective claims, recruitment into movements, strategic

and tactical decision making, and movement outcomes" (2001, 285). Their analysis is

16 See also Tarrow 1992 for a similar framework that identifies meaning construction through societal mentalities, political cultures, and collective action frames.

17 See Friedman and McAdam 1992 on identity incentives; see also McAdam 2003 and McAdam and Paulsen 1993 on identity-movement linkage.

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particularly insightful in that they do not see collective identity as distinct from political

structures, resource mobilization, or cultural framing approaches, but rather as

intertwined with those processes. As they state, "The best recent research ... avoids a

priori assumptions about causal mechanisms and allows for a number of different

relationships between cultural and discursive practices on the one hand, and legal,

political, economic, and social structures on the other" (2001, 285).

This study adopts a similar integrative approach, and further enhances research in

this area by grounding analyses in the empirical example of Palestine. As Polletta and

Jasper note, further research is needed on the role of collective identity in specific case

studies, especially in non-Western movements which "expose us to different

understandings of the relationship between self and other, and to different dynamics of

collective identity formation and contestation" (2001, 300). This study thus extends

collective identity theory to a new case study, while also examining collective identity's

relationship to, rather than distinction from, political structures, resource mobilization,

and cultural framing approaches. In this way, it answers Polletta and Jasper's challenge

to "identify the circumstances in which different relations between interest and identity,

strategy and identity, and politics and identity operate, circumstances that include cultural

processes as well as structural ones" (2001, 285).

Indeed, although the social construction approach to social movements provides a

loose umbrella for analyzing framing, collective action, and identity, few studies

deliberately link these concepts. Indeed, Snow et al. typically describe collective action

frames as drawing from a society's cultural symbols or beliefs, rather than from a

common identity. While culture and identity certainly overlap, I aim to look specifically

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at the relationship between both collective and individual identity and action frames,

arguing for greater attention to "collective action identity." In this model, it can be said

that Palestinian youth and older activists share a common collective identity, based on the

salience of the framing of the issue/grievance, but typically only older activists share a

collective action identity, based on their participation in the first intifada. Thus, their

master frame includes both ideas and tactics related to resistance, while youths' master

frame is based on ideology only. In other words, while the framing of Palestinian

grievances still resonates with youth, the framing of the tactic of nonviolence has failed

to mobilize youth for a widespread movement. Indeed, whereas nonviolent tactics

constituted an independent variable catalyzing frame transformation in the civil rights

movement, they represent a dependent variable requiring an innovative framing in the

context of Palestine to resonate with the collective identity, which in turn can motivate

individual participation.

Further Extensions of Social Movement Theory

Media Discourse

The framing discussion above is directly related to another dimension of social

movement theory relevant to this research, namely, media discourse. The media can be

instrumental in social movements in multiple ways, by functioning as a means for

reaching the public and mobilizing potential participants, connecting movements with

other social and political actors, and providing a sense of solidarity or support for

members (Klandermans and Goslinga 1996, 319; Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986). In light

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of the above discussion, media can also play a significant role in framing an issue or

movement, which may or may not support the frames sought by movement leaders.

Thus, while the media may frame movements, movements also work to shape media

coverage, resulting in a "complicated double role of the media" (Gamson and Meyer

1996, 287). As Gamson and Meyer explain, "On the one hand, the media play a central

role in the construction of meaning and the reproduction of culture, ... develop[ing]

arguments and images that support particular frames. On the other hand, the media are

also a site or arena in which symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors

of meaning, including movements" (1996, 287). In other words, frames are structured to

a certain extent by the media, but movement participants are also involved in constructing

them (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 276).

In addition, as Gamson (1995) notes, and as discussed above, the media can

influence the framing of both the movement and the issue. For the sake of this study, it is

important to note the role that media coverage plays in terms of framing tactics,

specifically nonviolence, particularly the Palestinian media at the local level and the

international media at the global level. As Gamson & Meyer state,

Violent action in particular has ... [the] media valued elements. Fire in the belly is fine, but fire on the ground photographs better. Burning buildings and burning tires make better television than peaceful vigils and orderly marches. The media, then, are relatively more open to extrainstitutional than to institutional action and this bias in tum structures the strategic choices of movement actors (1996, 288).

This media preference for visible spectacle in general, and for violence in particular, is

relevant to the Palestinian case in which activists struggle to increase media coverage of

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nonviolent actions. The lack of coverage of such events makes it difficult for movement

leaders to use the media to "package"(Gamson 1988) the movement effectively. 18

Most of the literature on media and social movements to date has focused on the

mass media, including mainstream print, television, radio, and electronic media sources.

However, little research has yet been conducted on the role of alternative media, such as

documentary films, grassroots news channels and websites, and blogs, all of which are

currently being used in the context of Palestine to increase coverage of nonviolent

resistance efforts. 19 In addition, many Palestinian NGOs and CBOs are starting to

coordinate participatory media projects, sometimes called "citizen journalism," in which

groups participate in trainings in documentary video, photography, or oral history, and

produce their own media projects, which then can function as tools for transnational

activism or advocacy.20 One of the aims of this study is to analyze the ways in which

unconventional media functions as a form of nonviolence, and how that media strives to

(re )frame the situation in Palestine.

Transnational Activism

According to McCarthy et al. (1996), movements often use the mass media as a

tool to reach larger audiences and attract third parties to the cause. Indeed, both

mainstream and alternative media are proving to be instrumental in the phenomenon of

transnational activism, especially in the Palestinian case. Tarrow describes transnational

social movements as "sustained contentious interactions with opponents-national or

18 See also Bishara 2008.

19 For more on the role of alternative media in Palestine, see Chapter 4. 2°For more on participatory media initiatives, see Appendix F.

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nonnational-by connected networks of challengers organized across national

boundaries" (1998, 184). Although this research focuses primarily on Palestinian

resistance within the West Bank, this cycle of contention cannot be fully understood

without at least acknowledging the international movement of solidarity with Palestine.

The literature on transnational contention and global activism is useful for

understanding how the international dimension of struggle informs the shape of the

movement within Palestine. However, this study enhances the existing literature on this

topic in several ways. First, rather than focusing on transnational networks solely as the

independent variable, this research instead examines how national social movements

utilize the international arena. Second, this study explores the challenges that ensue

when international networks develop frames that clash with local frames and identities,

again focusing on how framings of tactics may defer, even when framings of the issue are

relatively consistent. Third, this research seeks to fill a gap in the empirical literature on

transnational activism, which tends to focus on transnational movements for global issues

(such as women's rights, human rights, and the environment), rather than transnational

movements for a national issue like Palestine.

In the case of Palestine, international solidarity with Palestinians developed

during the first intifada, in which images of stone-throwing youth confronting Israel

Defense Forces (IDF) tanks and armed soldiers garnered increased sympathy with the

Palestinian cause. However, in the second intifada nonviolent leaders started to

intentionally target the international community. While direct actions against Israeli

soldiers and settlers still continued, the limited number of contact points between

Palestinians and Israelis, due to increased movement restrictions and the construction of

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the separation barrier during the second intifada, was one factor that prompted activists to

start pressuring Israel indirectly through the international arena. 21

This appeal to the international community manifested itself in several different

ways. First, movement leaders sought to amplify the issue of the occupation on the

international stage through the process of scale shift (McAdam, Tarrow, Tilly 2001, 331;

McAdam and Tarrow 2005, 125), or spreading contention beyond its local origins.

According to McAdam and Tarrow, this extension of contention can be driven by non-

relational diffusion, the transfer of information through impersonal challenges such as the

media; relational diffusion, the transfer of information through established lines of

communication; and brokerage, the transfer of information through the linkage of

previously unconnected actors (2005, 127). These different dimensions of scale shift are

evident in the Palestinian case, in which activists rely heavily on media coverage of both

Israeli abuses and nonviolent actions (non-relational diffusion); utilize existing

relationships with diaspora networks, activist groups, and religious institutions to raise

awareness about Palestine (relational diffusion); and coordinate alternative tourism

programs, exchanges, conferences, and speaking tours to link with unconnected sites

(brokerage). Though each of these paths requires different actions, it is evident that all

three dimensions of scale shift depend on nonviolent strategies, a fact which informs the

tactical decisions of movement leaders in Palestine.22

21 For more on the effects of movement restrictions on activist strategies, see Chapter 4.

22 However, despite the scope of scale shift in terms of nonviolent resistance in the second intifada, the extent of scale shift remained relatively small in comparison to similar historical models used by activists, including the international BDS campaign of South Africa in the 1980s to end apartheid (Zunes 1999), and the participation of white northerners in demonstrations and marches during the American civil rights movement in the 1960s (McAdam 1988).

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In addition to appealing to global networks for solidarity and transnational

contention, movement leaders are also reaching out to international institutions and

organizations to put pressure on Israel. This strategy is similar to the "boomerang"

model identified by Keck and Sikkink, in which transnational advocacy networks (TANs)

"use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the information and

value contexts within which states make policies" (1998, 16). In this model, movement

leaders concentrate their efforts on the strategies of persuasion, socialization, and

pressure, with specific tactics including information politics (creating and utilizing

politically influential information), symbolic politics (using symbols or stories to clarify a

situation for others), leverage politics (calling upon powerful actors to affect a situation in

which weaker members lack influence), and accountability politics (holding powerful

actors accountable for stated policies and principles). According to research conducted

for this study, these tactics were reflected in second intifada nonviolent resistance in

Palestine through activists' intentional use of mass media (information politics),

participatory arts and media (symbolic media), international advocacy and solidarity

(leverage politics), and legal paths (accountability politics). Indeed, this shift in

Palestinian struggle to appeal more to international advocacy networks than to Israel

directly is natural in situations like Israel-Palestine in which "channels between domestic

groups and their governments are blocked or hampered, or where such channels are

ineffective for resolving a conflict" (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 12).

However, the size and scope of the international advocacy arena can lead to

complicated relationships between local/national movements and transnational networks.

As Tarrow notes, TANs, though effective in their own right, are distinct from

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transnational social movements, in that they "lack the drama, the deliberate

contentiousness, and the broad goals of transnational movements" (1998, 189). Indeed,

TANs generally involve actors from nongovernmental, governmental, and

intergovernmental organizations, and are often dependent on funding from foundations

and support from western governments (Tarrow 1998, 188-189). In the case of Palestine,

many activists perceived that it was these actors, and their respective donors and

governments, who largely redefined "nonviolence" during the Oslo period and the second

intifada in the frame of peacebuilding and dialogue, rather than resistance. This research

thus aims to examine the tensions that can emerge when national movements and

transnational networks adopt competing frames.

In summary, the current dynamic in Israel-Palestine requires movement leaders to

focus their efforts on the international arena, as well as on Israel itself. The choice of

tactics both influences and is influenced by this transnational strategy, reflected in

movement leaders' preference for nonviolent direct actions, as well as unconventional

forms of activism such as legal cases and use of the mainstream and alternative media.

However, the transnational element also creates a tension for some movement

entrepreneurs in terms of their framing of the movement and the issues at both the

international level and the local level.

The social movement literature clearly has valuable insights and useful theoretical

frames for this research. The cycles of contention model, when modified to allow for

temporal variation, provides a useful framework for assessing shifts in activism between

the first and second intifada. Furthermore, the political opportunities, resource

mobilization, and particularly the cultural framings and collective identity approaches all

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contribute to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of popular struggle in Palestine,

while insights from the transnational activism literature helps locate Palestinian resistance

in the global context. It is my intention to link and apply these various dimensions of

social movement theory in one in-depth case study, thus providing empirical support for a

more integrative approach to studying social movements and linking the literature more

directly to international relations theory. Furthermore, I aim to contribute to the literature

by relating the various dimensions to the often overlooked area of tactics, particularly

nonviolence.

Contentious Politics and Nonviolence

Although nonviolent resistance exists in some form in almost every conflict

situation, it is rarely the subject of scholarly political science or international relations

research, and it only receives brief mentions in social movement literature. The majority

of nonviolence literature draws at least to some extent from Gene Sharp's The Politics of

Nonviolent Action, perhaps the seminal scholarly work on strategic nonviolence to date.

Sharp bases his theory of nonviolence on the idea that "the exercise of power depends on

the consent of the ruled who, by withdrawing that consent, can control and even destroy

the power of their opponent" (1973, 4 ). From this viewpoint, it is believed that

"governments depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is

fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources" (8).

Thus, people can transform situations of oppression by withdrawing their consent through

refusal of cooperation, withholding of help, and persistence in disobedience and defiance

(64).

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As noted by contemporary nonviolence scholars Ackerman & Kruegler, "Anyone

undertaking to write about nonviolent action necessarily stands on the shoulders of Gene

Sharp" (1994, xvii); indeed, since its publication in 1973, academics and activists alike

have used Sharp as a foundation for guiding theoretical and practical applications of

nonviolence, and with good reason. Sharp's three-volume work provides an invaluable

resource for analyzing the nature of political power and consent, outlining methods of

nonviolent action, and developing a strategic nonviolent campaign, with theories

supported by historical examples.

Recent works on nonviolence published have built on Sharp's work to provide

historical accounts of nonviolent episodes, as in Ackerman and DuVall' s A Force More

Powerful (2000) and Kurtz et al.' s Nonviolent Social Movements (1999); operationalized

manuals for coordinating a nonviolent campaign, such as Helvey's On Strategic

Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking about the Fundamentals (2004); and combinations of the

two, such as Ackerman & Kruegler's Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of

People Power in the Twentieth Century (1994). All of these works are valuable in their

own way. Historical case studies ensure documentation of nonviolent movements, and

also raise awareness about when and how nonviolence has been successful, thus

increasing public support for nonviolence while providing real examples for activists at

the same time. Likewise, instructive guides to coordinating nonviolent resistance can

serve as practical tools for activists and organizers.

However, while interpreting and applying Sharp, these scholars have neglected to

acknowledge the limitations of Sharp's work, especially in the contemporary context.

Indeed, while most of Sharp's work is still highly relevant thirty-five years after its initial

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publication, some concepts and theories are not applicable in contemporary contexts like

Palestine. For example, Sharp's theories on power and consent in Power and Struggle

(Part I) are based on "control[ing] the power of threatening political groups or regimes"

(1973, 7), and using "people power" to challenge one's own government. This focus on

internal political change is evident in Sharp's theoretical discussion of sources of power

and obedience, as well as in his historical examples, including Russia in 1905-06,

Guatemala in 1944, and Montgomery, Alabama in 1955-56. While this model was

particularly useful at the time of writing during the Cold War, and while it still applies to

many states today, it is difficult to fully apply to cases of external occupation like

Palestine.

Indeed, Palestine presents a unique case in that the PA functions as a state-like

institution, yet East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza remain occupied territories

under Israel. This arrangement creates a double challenge for activists. First, it requires

them to confront challenges from their own government while focusing the crux of their

efforts on the occupying force. Second, and perhaps more importantly in the context of

Sharp, the occupation status complicates Sharp's assumption that power depends on the

consent of the ruled, and its corollary that withdrawal of consent can destroy the power of

the oppressor. While this theory may apply in internal situations, it is difficult to apply in

situations of occupation, as even complete withdrawal of Palestinian consent does not

undercut the power of the Israeli government if it still has the support of the Israeli

constituency. Similarly, situations of occupation present activists with an even greater

challenge than removing a dictator or political party from office, in that they must seek to

change the relational structure between themselves and the occupier. They thus need to

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negotiate a space between resisting the occupier and convincing the occupying state's

people and leadership of the need for change.

Because the framework of power and consent is different in the Palestinian

context, methods of nonviolent action also vary in strategic effect. Whereas Sharp

advocates for methods of protest and persuasion, such as protests, demonstrations, and

vigils; methods of noncooperation like strikes and boycotts; and methods of intervention

like civil disobedience, all of these are difficult to employ in the Palestinian context in

which the Israeli and Palestinian societies function separately. This has especially

become the case since the construction of the separation barrier, which has further limited

contact points between Palestinians and Israelis. As a result, protests and demonstrations

within Palestine are rarely noticed in Israel, Palestinian strikes affect only Palestinians,

and few opportunities exist for public civil disobedience. Palestinians thus have had to

develop other creative nonviolent strategies to influence Israelis, and have shifted much

of their activism to target the international community rather than Israeli society.

Finally, in terms of coordinating a nonviolent campaign, Sharp starts from the

assumption that people are starting from a point of passivity and obedience. Yet, in

intractable conflicts like Palestine, a nonviolent movement is situated in the context of

generations ofresistance, or cycles of contention, violent and nonviolent alike. Thus, it is

not so necessary to convince people to withdraw consent, since most do so on their own

accord, but rather to resist in strategic ways.

Clearly, while many of Sharp's theories are still useful and applicable, there are

limitations to his work, especially in the context of intractable conflicts and situations of

occupation, like Palestine. It is thus important to acknowledge these boundaries to allow

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for the emergence of meaningful inquiry to fill those gaps, as this study seeks to do. In

addition, the study seeks to further enhance scholarship on nonviolence by probing the

definitions of nonviolence and violence, examining identity factors when analyzing

challenges to mobilization, and using an innovative mixed methodology approach to

assess both the breadth and depth of support for nonviolent resistance.

First, this study expands beyond Sharp by broadening the definition of nonviolent

action. According to Sharp, nonviolent action consists of acts of omission, in which

people refuse to perform acts they usually perform or are required to perform; acts of

commission, when people perform actions they do not usually perform or are forbidden

to perform; and a combination of both. These kinds of acts exist within three broad types

of methods, namely, protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and direct intervention.

This study uses these categories as a framework for organizing direct actions, but

broadens the nonviolent action typology to include NGO projects, media activism, youth

initiatives, and everyday acts of resistance. Expanding the scope of nonviolence in this

way is necessary to accommodate the range of actors and actions that contribute to

resistance in situations of protracted conflict, such as Palestine. In cases such as these,

the lines between activists and non-activists are not clearly defined, nor are actions easily

identifiable as activism or non-activism. Rather, resistance becomes a part of daily life,

and becomes incorporated into institutions such as NGOs, schools, and media outlets.

This study still focuses primarily on direct action, using Sharp's helpful categories, and

agrees with Sharp that nonviolence has "nothing to do with passivity, submissiveness, or

cowardice" (1973, 70), but recognizes the importance of expanding the definition of

nonviolence.

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The study also seeks to expand on ideas touched upon by Sharp to develop a more

nuanced conception of violence. According to Sharp,

It is widely assumed that all social and political behavior must be clearly either violent or nonviolent. This simple dualism leads only to serious distortions of reality however, one of the main ones being that some people call 'nonviolent' anything they regard as good and 'violent' anything they dislike. (1973, 64)

This research likewise refrains from attaching normative value to either violence or

nonviolence, but builds on it more than Sharp by allowing for a more in-depth analysis of

attitudes towards violence, rather than dismissing violence in view of its incompatibility

with nonviolence. Indeed, my research indicates that support for nonviolent and violent

action often overlap, and that the specific means of violence most supported are usually

acts of limited violence or acts of self-defense. This closer look at violence reveals a

more nuanced conceptualization that allows for it to be incorporated into the discussion

on nonviolence. 23

Similarly, the study adds an additional dimension to Sharp et al. by taking a closer

look at mobilization, and including identity as a factor in that analysis. Sharp gives only

marginal attention to analyzing motives for participation in nonviolence, and most of his

discussion is limited to the societal level, with little attention to the characteristics and

experiences of the individuals making up that society. However, his few insights on the

topic inspire further research, which this study undertakes.

Primarily, Sharp postulates that, "in many cases motivations for using nonviolent

action have been mixed, practical considerations being combined with a relative moral

preference for nonviolence (although violence is not rejected in principle)" (1973, 68).

23 See also Kaufman 1991 for more on Israeli perceptions of Palestinian "limited violence."

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This study probes this idea further by examining the motivations of individual activists

directly, and noting a similar mix of motivations, but importantly, not a rejection of

violence in principle in most cases. As discussed further in Chapter 6, some Palestinian

activists are drawn to nonviolence through their faith traditions, both Christian and

Muslim,24 or their personal moral code. Yet, like Mohandas Gandhi, most did not expect

to build a mass movement built on a spiritual sense of nonviolence, and thus integrated

their personal ethical beliefs into a more practical nonviolent strategy. To be sure, as

Mary King argues, "No mass movement can be structured on the basis of nonviolence as

an article of faith" (2007, 18), even if some individuals and leaders within the movement

subscribe to a principled view. 25 Thus, even most of those viewing nonviolence as a way

of life maintained that creed as a personal belief, and emphasized the strategic over the

moral in mobilization. While the majority of activists interviewed subscribed to a more

strategic view of nonviolent resistance, this study seeks to further examine the principled

and pragmatic lenses for viewing nonviolence on the individual and collective levels.

Secondly, Sharp argues that rather than view political behavior as either violent

or nonviolent, responses to conflict situations should be divided into those of action and

nonaction (1973, 65). This recommendation is noteworthy, yet Sharp does not expound

upon it in greater detail, prompting deeper investigation in this research. To be sure, this

study indicates that activists themselves, at both the individual and collective levels, are

more likely to base their behavior on associations with action over inaction, than with

24 For more on nonviolence and Islam, see Abu-Nimer 2003.

25 Sometimes the pragmatic/principled debate can even cause divisions within nonviolent movements, as evident in the U.S. civil rights movement, in which the SCLC and CORE adopted a Gandhian notion of nonviolence, while SNCC constantly debated the merits of nonviolence as a norm or strategy (King 2007, 18).

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either violence or nonviolence. It can be argued that most Palestinian activists agree with

King's assertion, "Offering the choice of action rather than inaction, and nonviolent

rather than violent means of contention, nonviolent struggle balances political

responsibility and ethics with the ultimate in efficacy and pragmatism" (2007, 18). This

study seeks to further probe how activists' experiences and identities prompt them to

perceive this balance.

Finally, this study is able to incorporate more in-depth analysis into factors such

as activist identity, motivation, and background by applying a mixed methodology

approach to a case study research design. As noted above, many studies since Sharp have

used the case study approach, but they usually approach the cases from a structural level,

and compare between cases, rather than within cases. In contrast, this study combines

narrative research with quantitative surveys and participant observation to develop a

more contextualized understanding of individual and collective mobilization and

participation. In addition, rather than selecting on the dependent variable of focusing on

successful nonviolent campaigns, this study starts with the assumption that the

Palestinian nonviolent movement was fragmented in the second intifada, and applies

mixed methods to determine both why that was the case, and when and how nonviolent

episodes were in fact deemed successful by activists. Furthermore, the methods are

based on direct observations and recent research, rather than being a historical account.

Thus, by using different levels and methods of analysis, this study is able to assess both

the breadth and depth of the phenomenon of nonviolence within contemporary

Palestinian society.

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Sharp and his subsequent devotees established a solid foundation for research on

nonviolence, but many gaps in the literature remain. This study uses insights from Sharp

et al., but extends nonviolence theory from intra-state conflict to situations of occupation,

broadens concepts of nonviolence and violence to allow for more accurate and nuanced

understanding of both, and uses a new methodological approach to allow for the analysis

of internal and external factors in a contemporary case study. In these ways, this research

makes new contributions to both the content and approach of scholarship on nonviolence,

and hopes to inspire future research in the field.

While enhancing the literature within the field of nonviolence, the study also

establishes new connections between nonviolence and scholarship on broader theories of

social movements and revolutions by grounding nonviolent action in the conceptual

sphere of contentious politics. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (MTT)'s

Dynamics of Contention (2001), social movements can be best understood when studied

in conjunction with revolutions, nationalism, and democratization, that is, with varied

forms of collective political struggle. MTT thus develop the useful contentious politics

model to broaden social movement literature by identifying "parallels across nominally

different forms of contention" (2001, 6), and illustrating how "different forms of

contention-social movements, revolutions, strike waves, nationalism, democratization,

and more-result from similar mechanisms and processes" (2001, 4 ).

While this model is valuable, MTT fail to discuss nonviolence within the sphere of

contentious politics, even though nonviolent direct action in particular is compatible with

MTT's own definitions. Indeed, according to MTT, the term "contentious politics" refers

to "episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects

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when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the

claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the

claimants" (2001, 5). In the case of Palestine, nonviolent resistance certainly falls within

these requirements, with nonviolent struggle representing an ongoing interaction between

Palestinians (the makers of claims) and their object (the Israeli government).

Furthermore, the nonviolent aspect actually facilitates the public and collective nature of

that interaction by allowing for widespread participation from all levels of Palestinian

society. In addition, MTT neglect to account for the nuanced forms of resistance that

often form the foundation of larger processes and movements. This study thus seeks to

extend the contentious politics framework to include both nonviolent direct action and

daily acts of nonviolent resistance, therefore revising the boundaries of politics of

contention.

First, this study argues that nonviolent direct action is in accordance with MTT's

focus on "transgressive contention," in which "at least some of the parties to the conflict

are newly self-identified political actors, and/or at least some parties employ innovative

collective action" (2001, 6). In the case of Palestine, popular committees and grassroots

campaigns are emerging as new political actors whose primary objective is to mobilize

for and engage in demonstrations, boycotts, strikes, and other forms of collective action.

Indeed, as noted above by Sharp, strategic nonviolence is based on creative, collective

action for social change, thus situating it within the sphere of transgressive, if not violent,

contention. To be sure, nonviolent action can even fit some definitions of revolution,

such as a Goldstone's description of a revolution as "an effort to transform the political

institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by

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formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine

existing authorities" (2001, 142). Again, in the case of Palestine, both formal and

informal actors are aiming to transform the existing political environment by challenging

the occupation and Israeli institutions through popular participation and civil

disobedience.

Second, this study argues that everyday acts of resistance also fit within the

sphere of contentious politics. In the case of Palestine, the notion of sumoud, or

steadfastness, reflected in many Palestinians' resolve to stay on their land in spite of

settlement encroachment, disproportionate water distribution, and land seizure reflect the

quiet but conscious use of transgressive politics.26 In addition, Palestine's unique context

as an occupied territory has contributed to the emergence of a highly active civil society

with SMOs and NGOs that engage in contentious politics by coordinating activist

trainings, pressing legal cases, engaging in advocacy, and establishing alternative

institutions, reflecting not only elements of social movements, but also of

democratization, a process identified by MTT as an example of contentious politics.

Likewise, Palestinian mainstream and alternative media outlets function as vehicles of

both democratization and transgression by serving as a voice for activists and covering

both acts of oppression and activism often overlooked in the international press.

In these ways, it is clear that the nonviolent struggle in Palestine is inextricably

linked to other forms of contentious politics. By using Palestine as a case study, this

study fills a gap in the literature on social movements and contentious politics by locating

nonviolence within and between those areas of scholarship.

26 See Chapter 4 for further discussion of everyday acts of resistance.

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Palestine Literature

In addition to contributing to topical fields such as nonviolence and social

movements, this study seeks to relate these concepts to the specific context of Palestine to

introduce new lines of inquiry in scholarship on the region. Very little research exists on

nonviolent resistance in Palestine, and most studies that have been conducted focus on

the first intifada. This research uses those studies to compare dynamics of resistance

between the two intifadas, but strives to inspire new discourse on nonviolence and youth

participation during and after the second intifada.

The largely nonviolent nature of the first intifada (1987-1993 ), especially in its

early years, has been documented by numerous scholars. Mary King provides perhaps

the most comprehensive study on the use of nonviolence in Palestine during the first

intifada, concluding that Palestinians at that time "conceptualized new ways of waging

struggle for basic civil and political rights and in so doing reshaped the sources of power

within Palestinian society, causing shifts away from adherence the dogma of military

means [and] building leadership structures that emerged from the organizing of a civil

society" (2007, 343). Other scholars have likewise examined the nonviolent nature of the

first intifada. As Dajani summarizes, "Stone-throwing demonstrations and individual

armed attacks ... notwithstanding, the intifada was consciously and deliberately

envisioned as an organized and universal unarmed civilian struggle against the Israeli

occupation" (1999, 58).

It is worth noting Dajani's use of the word "universal" to emphasize the

widespread participation in the uprising, as it is this difference in mass mobilization

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between the first and second intifadas that underscores this research. Indeed, A wad also

noted how "resisting was everyone's responsibility" (2004), emphasizing how the

nonviolent nature of the first intifada allowed for all Palestinians to participate. 27

Ackerman and DuVall also explain how "Palestinians from every walk of life were

willing to protest, strike, and improvise" in the first intifada (2000, 420). In other words,

nearly all Palestinians were both able and willing to participate in the first intifada largely

because of its predominantly nonviolent nature.

In contrast to the nonviolent foundation of the first intifada, the second intifada

(2000-2008) was characterized by a much more violent nature, which arguably limited

youth involvement, as this research postulates. As Andoni explains, "Intifada 2000

started explosively, with many confrontations and high casualties, quickly escalated into

militant clashes ... and then normalized into less intense clashes with frequent military

operations from both sides" (2001, 212). Instead of a widespread campaign of civil

disobedience, the second intifada consisted largely of violent resistance, including the use

of suicide bomb attacks. Israel likewise adopted a more direct violent strategy, which

included massive raids, assassinations, and extensive home demolitions in addition to

checkpoints, curfews, and other forms of political, social, and economic oppression. This

resulted in the intifada becoming a cycle of violence between armed groups such as

Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Al-Aqsa Brigades and the IDF, with both sides justifying their

violent actions by the violence of the other.

The more violent nature of the second intifada severely hindered mass

involvement, with the majority of Palestinian actions being undertaken by militants and

27 See also Abu-Nimer 2003, 180.

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extremist organizations. As Andoni notes, "once armed groups became involved, the

majority of the population stayed away from direct confrontation" (2001, 211). D. Kuttab

agrees, stating that while the first intifada' s "use of nonviolent tactics allowed all sectors

of Palestinian society to participate in the resistance,'' the second intifada was dominated

by "just the armed few" (2003, 21 ). As a result, public participation was significantly

lower than it was during the first intifada, with little space available for nonviolent

advocates or widespread youth participation. As J. Hart explains, the "highly militarized

environment offer[ ed] few avenues for the young to play a meaningful role in the struggle

of their people" (2004, 28). Abu-Nimer agrees, noting that the second intifada's level of

"militancy had a far-reaching impact on the disempowerment of Palestinian youth who

constituted the base for the 1987 intifada mobilization" (2006, 145). It is thus clear from

these various analyses that the emphasis on nonviolence in the first intifada was

instrumental in facilitating widespread youth organizing and participation, in contrast to

the limiting means employed in the second intifada.

While these studies offer valuable insight into the role of nonviolence generally

and youth specifically in the first and second intifadas, little research has been conducted

on the episodes of nonviolence that did take place during the second intifada, much less

on youth participation in those campaigns. Similarly, these previous studies have tended

to generalize the first intifada as wholly "nonviolent" and the second infitada as wholly

"violent,'' while this research seeks to probe those assumptions in greater depth. Indeed,

this project posits that nonviolent tactics are actions first and nonviolent second, thus

implying that the use of nonviolent tactics is more of a reflection of activist identity than ·

conscious preference for nonviolence. Likewise, it argues that youth disillusionment

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with nonviolence in the second intifada largely resulted from the disconnect created

during the Oslo period between the framing of nonviolence and collective activist

identity. This study thus opens a new area of study in literature on Palestinian resistance

by introducing scholarship on nonviolence in the second intifada, and by offering a more

contextualized and nuanced examination of youth attitudes and participation in

nonviolence in both intifadas.

While many actors in both the field and the academy focus solely on the armed

struggle of militant groups, Palestinian grassroots activists are increasingly changing the

nature ofresistance in the West Bank through the use of strategic nonviolence.

Mainstream scholars have so far neglected to recognize this phenomenon and analyze its

dynamics for three main reasons: a) the failure academics and policymakers alike to

conceptualize Palestinian resistance as a popular social movement, rather than a "violent

uprising;" b) the lack oflinkage between the theories of nonviolence and contentious

politics; and c) the limited acknowledgement of nonviolence in the context of the Israeli

Palestinian conflict in general and the second intifada in particular.

This study draws from different areas of scholarly literature, including, social

movements, nonviolence, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While building on previous

research, it seeks to enhance knowledge within each subfield, while also creating new

links between the subfields. The project makes unique contributions to knowledge

regarding Palestine, applications of nonviolence, and broader social movement theory.

First, the study develops new links between nonviolence and broader social movement

theory by analyzing Palestinian popular resistance as a cycle of contention influenced by

various political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, as well as by

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transnational dynamics and discourse. Second, the research fills a gap in the limited

literature on nonviolence by examining nonviolence within the context of a non-state

territory, investigating internal and external factors that cause nonviolent movements to

fracture, and exploring nonviolence through a contemporary rather than historical case.

In addition, the study expands the definition of nonviolence, uses an innovative mixed

methodology approach to assess both the breadth and depth of support for nonviolent

resistance, and examines factors of both individual and collective identity when analyzing

' challenges to mobilization. Finally, the study also fills a gap in the literature on Palestine,

by creating a new space of analysis between more prevalent studies on Palestinian violent

resistance on the one hand, and more widely acknowledged methods of peacebuilding,

such as diplomacy and dialogue on the other hand. This research draws on earlier studies,

but specifically examines nonviolence in the West Bank as a cycle of contention in the

contemporary context, as influenced by the first and second intifadas, as well as the Oslo

period.

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH CONTEXT

This chapter situates the research within the historical context of popular

resistance in Palestine. It begins by highlighting episodes of nonviolence in Palestine

from the British Mandate period to the outbreak of the first infiada, then examines the

role of nonviolence in the first and second intifadas. It then examines the historical

setting of each intifada, and the intersecting Oslo period, and assesses the impact of

contextual dynamics in determining the primary resistance strategies used. Finally, it

addresses the specific context of the conflict during the period of field research from

2005 to 2007.

The Tradition of Popular Resistance in Pre-Intifada Palestinian History

The practice of nonviolence is not a new phenomenon in Palestine. While

accounts of Palestinian nonviolence often focus on the first intifada, there has been a

tradition of nonviolent resistance throughout Palestinian history, extending from the

British Mandate through the Nakba and the Six Days War, and notably evident in the first

intifada.

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The Balfour Declaration to the Nakba

Modem Jewish colonization of Palestine dates to the 1880s, when millions of

Eastern European Jews, fleeing from economic oppression and pogroms, sought new

lives in areas as diverse as western Europe, the United States, South America, and

ultimately, Palestine. Despite the occurrence of isolated violent encounters between the

Jewish immigrants and the approximately half a million Muslim and Christian Arabs

living in Palestine,28 relations between the communities were relatively peaceful.

However, as the World Zionism Organization (WZO) increasingly focused on purchasing

Arab land and replacing Arab workers with Jewish workers, Palestinians started asserting

their claims to the land, and subsequently, their own national sentiments, thus resulting in

conflicting national aspirations (King 2007, 26). These competing nationalisms were

further intensified by the colonial presence of the British, first with the 1916 Sykes-Picot

Agreement that divided the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence,

followed by the League of Nations' acceptance of the British Mandate for Palestine in

1922. However, it was the 1917 letter of Arthur James Balfour expressing support for

"the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" (Balfour

Declaration 191 7) that ultimately motivated Arab leaders to organize for resistance,

forming six Palestine Arab congresses between 1919 and 1923 in opposition to what

came to be known as the Balfour Declaration. In addition to these formal meetings,

hundreds of Palestinian Arabs demonstrated peacefully on February 27, 1920, in response

28 Approximately forty violent encounters between Jewish immigrants and Palestinian Arabs were documented between 1886 and the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. See King 2007, 25; and McDowall 1989, 17.

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to the rumored contents of the document, with a second demonstration on March 8 in

which stones were thrown. On March 11, Palestinians engaged in acts of civil

disobedience by holding unsanctioned public protests in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa;

closing shops, and submitting petitions to British authorities (King 2007).

Despite these nonviolent beginnings, a prayer gathering following the yearly al-

Nabi Musa celebrations turned violent on April 12, when it turned into a demonstration

against the Jews, with five Jews killed and 216 injured, and four Arabs killed and 21

injured (Peel Report 193 7). 29 Protests and riots continued throughout Palestine following

the ratification of the Balfour Declaration on April 25, 1920.30 One year later, violent

riots erupted yet again on May 1 in Jaffa, instigated by disputes over May Day parades,

leaving 47 Jews dead and 146 injured, and 48 Arabs dead and 73 injured (Peel Report

1937). 31

During most of the 1920s however, according to King, Palestinians directed their

resistance towards the British through "the simplest and most basic nonviolent action

methods of protest and persuasion: formal statements, declarations, petitions, manifestos,

assemblies, delegations, processions, marches, and motorcades" (2007, 32). Arabs held

street demonstrations, organized local strikes, sent delegations to London, organized

support from Muslims in Mecca, and passed resolutions rejecting a Jewish homeland,

opposing Jewish immigration, and calling for the establishment of a representative

29 See also King 2007, 31.

30 Britain's Peel Commission later concluded that the causes of the riots had been "(1) the Arabs' disappointment at the non-fulfillment of the promises of independence ... (2) the Arabs' belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination, and their fear that the establishment of the National Home would mean a great increase of Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews." (Peel 1937; King 2007, 31).

31 See also King 2007, 33.

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government (King 2007, 33). In addition to these protest and persuasion techniques,

Palestinians utilized methods of noncooperation, including withdrawal from political

systems and elections, general strikes, boycotts, tax withholding, and civil disobedience

(King 2007, 37).

Palestinian resistance to exponentially increasing Jewish irnrnigration32 expanded

and intensified in the 1930s, including acts of noncooperation like "suspension of social

activities, withdrawal from institutions, breaking contact with British administrators,

resignation from official jobs, and civil disobedience" (King 2007, 42). In March 1933,

five to six hundred Palestinians met in Jaffa for the Noncooperation Congress, which

adopted the principles of social boycotts of government events, political boycotts of

government bodies, and a consumers' boycott of British and Jewish goods (King 2007,

43). This was followed in September 1933 by a one-day general strike, with subsequent

rallies and demonstrations in October. The early 1930s also saw more Palestinian

political organizing, with the emergence in 1932 of Istiqlal (Independence), the first

modem Palestinian political party, and five others by 1935.33 This period also saw

increasing youth involvement through the first National Congress of Youth in Jaffa in

1932, which organized campaigns to support Palestinian businesses and industries, and

the establishment of the Arab Youth Congress in 193 5.

32 In response to the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933, the Jewish population in Palestine nearly doubled between 1931 and 1936, reaching 1,336,518 (or 31 percent of the population) in 1936. See King 2007, 43-44; and Peel 1937, 279.

33 These included the Reform party (Isiah) (1933), the National Bloc (1933), the National Defense Party (1934), the Palestine Arab party (1935), and the Arab Youth Congress (1935). See Kayyali 1978, 178; King 2007, 48.

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Not all episodes of resistance were nonviolent, with the Buraq Revolt in August

1929 leaving 133 Jews killed and more than 300 injured (King 2007, 38). In October

1933, approximately seven thousand armed demonstrators gathered in Jaffa, where police

resorted to the use of firearms to restore order, resulting in the deaths of 12 demonstrators

and 78 more wounded; the so-called "Jaffa Massacre" prompted riots and protests

throughout Palestine. Meanwhile, the 1920s and 1930s saw the rise of small armed

groups like al-Fidaiyya (Self-Sacrifice), al-Kaff al-Aswad (the Black Hand), al-Kaff al

Khadra (the Green Hand), Al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (Sacred Struggle) and Ikhwan al

Qassam (the Brotherhood of Qassam), led by Syria-born Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam,

deemed "the true father of the armed Palestinian revolution" (Abu-Amr 1994, 98) for

establishing the first attempt at organized violence for national resistance.

According to King, "Qassam's example of guerrilla warfare through secret

societies became the example followed during the revolt of 1936-39 by Islamic revivalist

factions" (2007, 49), which erupted in April 1936. However, the "Great Revolt" is

notable in its primary reliance on nonviolent methods, namely, a general strike by

Palestinians working in labor, transport, and business, called by the Arab National

Committee in Nablus on April 20, and ratified by leaders of the five main Arab parties

the following day. The parties also united to form al-Lajna al-Arabiyya al-Ulya (the

Arab Higher Committee), which demanded a halt to Jewish immigration, restrictions on

land sales to Jews, and the establishment of a national Palestinian government (Peel

1937, 97; King 2007, 50). Meanwhile, national committees organized to provide

provisions for the poor, raise funds, and promote Arab products, while local committees

formed to establish self-governing capabilities throughout Palestine. Other nonviolent

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methods included nonpayment of taxes, boycotts, and unsanctioned marches and

demonstrations organized primarily by women and student organizations.

The British responded to the strike with collective fines, forcible opening of

businesses, home demolitions, and mass arrests, with over 2,500 Palestinians detained by

mid-June (King 2007, 52). According to King, violent resistance led by underground

Qassamite militias grew in the summer of 1936 in response to the incarcerations, but the

general population remained committed to the strike, which ultimately lasted nearly six

months, finally ending on October 10. Armed rebellion erupted yet again a year later in

July 193 7 in response to Peel's recommendation to partition Palestine, a proposal which

split Palestinian leadership and reinvigorated violent actions by militant groups against

the British, the Jews, and even other Palestinian Arabs who the militias saw as moderates

or traitors. Chaos, violence, and organized intimidation continued through 193 8 with

extortion, kidnapping, assassination, and attacks on public roads and buildings. As the

British continued to debate Palestinian partition in London and resort to military

suppression on the ground, the revolt finally came to an end in early 1939, with 547 Jews

and 494 Arabs killed over the three-year period (King 2007, 55). As King concludes,

"Although the general strike had been well organized and nonviolent-its boycotts and

noncooperation methods carefully implemented through local coordinating committees

its discipline and restraint ultimately collapsed" (2007, 56). Palestinians were militarily

defeated, while Zionist armed resistance grew stronger, paving the way for subsequent

Arab defeat in the war of 1948.

Despite the presence of armed groups, a review of Palestinian resistance prior to

the Nakba indicates that the "Palestinians utilized predominantly nonviolent strategies to

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preserve their way of life" (King 2007, 57). Palestinians relied primarily on methods of

protest and persuasion, such as marches, demonstrations, petitions, and declarations, as

well as methods of noncooperation, including strikes, boycotts, withholding of taxes, and

civil disobedience. As King suggests, support for violence only really grew when these

nonviolent methods proved ineffective at changing British and Zionist policies.

The Nakba to 1967

On November 27, 1947, following World War II, western powers in the newly

formed United Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 181, calling for the

partition of Palestine, largely to allow for the resettlement of Jewish refugees emerging

from the horrors of the Holocaust in a Jewish state. Palestinian Arab leaders rejected the

partition, which gave 55 percent of the land to the Zionists, including most of the coastal

areas, the western Galilee, and the Negev, as well as one third of the Palestinian

population (King 2007, 60). Fighting and chaos spread throughout the region, but most

Palestinians were disinclined to take up arms (Pappe 1992, 65; King 2007, 60), and many

Arab villages initiated peace meetings, agreements, pacts, and ceasefires with nearby

Jewish communities (Morris 2004, 90-99).

Meanwhile, Zionist forces including the Haganah (the pre-state army), and

militias like the Irgun and Lohamei Herut Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or

LEHI) attempted to secure a Jewish majority in their apportioned land by forcibly

capturing and destroying hundreds of Palestinian villages. According to Morris, a

"policy of clearing out Arab communities sitting astride or near vital routes and along

some borders was instituted" (2004, 166-67), while securing the interior of the new

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Jewish state and its borders meant "the depopulation and destruction of the villages that

hosted hostile militias and irregulars" (2004, 163-166). Even villages with no history of

hostilities were targeted, the most famous perhaps being Deir Yassin, where 240 men,

women, and children were killed by armed bands, the few survivors paraded as captives

through the streets of Jerusalem. As King concludes, "a chain of operations were aimed

at militarily occupying areas beyond the proposed state and driving out the Palestinians"

(2007, 61).

The state of Israel declared its independence on the evening of May 14, 1948, an

event commemorated as the Nakba (disaster or catastrophe) by Palestinians. The

following day, the British troops withdrew, and forces from Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria,

and Jordan invaded. Despite their numbers, the Arab armies were ill prepared and

disunited, and the fighting officially ended in February 1949, with over 75 percent of the

land occupied by Israel.

Between 1947 and 1949, approximately 400 Palestinian villages were

depopulated, and 700,000 Palestinians, about half of the Palestinian population at the

time, were forced from their homes or left to flee the fighting (Morris 2004, 342).

Refugees fled east to Palestinian land that was annexed by Jordan in December 1948 and

termed the "West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom," or the present-day West Bank, as

well as to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and beyond. As noted by Mendolsohn,

policymakers in the United States and Europe assumed that "the Palestinians would

literally be absorbed into the Arab states" (1989, 74). However, as King writes, "the

Arab states, in the throes of decolonization, tended to act as competitors more interested

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in their own self-aggrandizement than in reaching a just solution on Palestine" (2007,

62), often suppressing Palestinian attempts to articulate their national identity.

In January 1964, Egyptian president Gamel Abd-al-Nasser pushed for the

formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), purportedly to spearhead the

liberation movement, though according to King "the primary purpose was to

circumscribe the Palestinian struggle to preclude the possibility that the Palestinians

might drag the Arab states into unwanted war with Israel" (2007, 62). The PLO thus

initially became known for restricting Palestinian guerrilla activities, until its takeover in

1969 by Fateh, a militant group founded in the late 1950s by Yasir Arafat, then the

primary organization calling for armed struggle to liberate Palestine. ,

In addition to these political organizations, the period between the Nakba and the

1967 war saw the increasing role of Palestinian civil society, led by women's

organizations. Nine new organizations were formed between 1948 and 1967 to address

the social needs of Palestinians, almost all of them run by women (King 2007, 94).

Organizations like these would continue to expand and adapt in subsequent years to form

one of the core bases of Palestinian nonviolent resistance. Meanwhile, this period saw

the emergence of another kind of day-to-day resistance, termed sumoud, or steadfastness.

This uniquely Palestinian form ofresistance refers to Palestinians' resolve to stay on the

land, resist expulsion, and persevere with daily life, in spite of the Israeli presence.

1967 to the First Intifada

The present-day West Bank and Gaza Strip were controlled by Jordan and Egypt,

respectively, until the War of 1967, in which Israel occupied these territories and East

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Jerusalem, as well as the Sinai peninsula, which was returned to Egypt in 1979 following

the Camp David Accords; and the Golan Heights, annexed by Israel in 1981. Following

the 1967 War, there were numerous demonstrations and protests in both the West Bank

and Gaza that were largely suppressed by Israeli forces. Teachers' associations

organized strikes in August and signed petitions protesting Israeli curriculum changes

and attempts at censorship. Strikes were called in Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin, and

Tulkarem in the spring of 1968, and public protests were held against home demolitions

in Hebron and Nablus.

While recruitment for armed resistance continued in refugee camps outside the

territories, inside the territories, the focus was on civil and political organizing, led

initially by the communist party. 34 The communists were unique at the time in

concentrating their work inside the territories, focusing on popular participation, and

advocating for nonviolent approaches to resistance across Palestinian society (King 2007,

71). The communists' efforts catalyzed other parties to start promoting al-tanzim al-

sha 'bi (popular organizing), first the leftist Democratic Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and

finally, following the Arab defeat in the October 1973 war, Fateh and the PLO. Though

turning to popular organizing later than some of the other parties, the size, influence, and

resources available to Fateh enabled them to be more effective in civilian mobilization.

With popular organizing activities led by Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Fateh "tipped the

34 After's Jordan annexation of the West Bank, the communist party was known as the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) in the West Bank and the Palestinian Communist Party of Gaza (PCPG) in Gaza. The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) was officially founded in 1982.

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balance and mobilized the majority of the West Bank and Gaza communities into

conscious participation in the nationalist political effort" (Sayigh 1989, 256).

Popular organizing il\.the 1970s and early 1980s consisted largely of building

networks of social organizations and civic associations, created to provide the social,

cultural, and political infrastructure lacking under the occupation. These organizations

established a tradition of civic participation in Palestine, and later functioned as centers

for political organizing during the first intifada. Once again, women's organizations were

leaders in civic organizing, with 38 women's organizations operating in 1976, focused on

generating jobs, providing relief, establishing orphanages, offering child care and elderly

care (King 2007, 94). According to King, local work committees became the main way

for women to become involved in national politics, prompting tens of thousands to

participate in nonpartisan voluntary organizations. Following the establishment of the

first women's work committee in Ramallah in 1978, similar committees spread to

villages and refugee camps, seeiking to address shortcomings in female education and job

opportunities by offering literacy classes and trade workshops, and establishing nursery

schools and kindergartens. Known collectively as the Women's Work Committees

(WWC), these groups focused on mass recruitment of women to fight oppression at

home, at work, and under occupation. Women's groups were thus among the first to put

civilian mobilization into action and illustrate the potential capacity for widespread

resistance.

Women's organizations worked closely with the voluntary work committees,

associated with the Community Work Program of Birzeit University near Ramallah.

These nonpartisan groups brought together men and women of all ages from various

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classes and social backgrounds for manual labor and social work, such as coordinating

schools, planting trees, fixing roads, and addressing other community needs. In addition

to providing needed services, the committees served as a way to preserve Palestinian

identity, establish a sense of nationalism, reclaim land, and ultimately, struggle

nonviolently against the occupation.

University student movements were also instrumental in civic mobilization in the

1970s, particularly at Birzeit University, as well as at West Bank universities in Nablus,

Bethlehem, and Hebron. Youth were eager to play a role in West Bank politics, and the

lack of employment opportunities gave students time, energy, and grievances to channel

into political mobilizations. In addition to student movements, the Al-Shabiba (Young

People) movement consisted of youth committees engaged in social work, primarily in

the refugee camps, and served as a network for political mobilization under Fateh.

Prisoners' groups or clubs also proved to be mobilizing networks that garnered

first hand experiences with nonviolent resistance. Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons

elected committees with each cell electing a committee that joined with one hundred

other committees to represent a section, which in tum elected another committee with the

final committee representing the entire prison. All the prison leaders elected an executive

committee, and despite the fact that communications were officially forbidden, managed

to organize hunger strikes and utilize other nonviolent tactics such as banging bars.

Prisoners also struggled for the right to take classes through correspondence courses, and

to organize Hebrew and English language workshops. Thus, prisons ironically "became a

place where democratic proceedings, processes of debate, parliamentary procedures,

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aspects of institutionalized action, and mechanisms of citizenship were learned" (King

1007, 119).

As King summarizes, "Girls, boys, men, women, university students, labor

unionists, and prisoners were involved in collective action-a wedging open of

nongovernmental political space and development of institutions not under official

purview-which represented germination of an evolving Palestinian civil society" (2007,

125). Indeed, organizations flourished both because of and in spite of the military

occupation, with Palestinians establishing alternative institutions, engaging in democratic

procedures, and both consciously and unconsciously acquiring strategies of nonviolent

action that would form the foundation of the first intifada.

The First Intifada

The first intifada relied primarily on nonviolent tactics, especially in the early

years from 1987-1989, with an emphasis on civil disobedience, defined as "a deliberate,

open, and peaceful violation of particular laws, decrees, regulations, ordinations, military

or police institutions, and the like, which are believed to be illegitimate" (Sharp 1973,

315). According to Dajani, this concept of civil disobedience formed "the essence of

[the Palestinians'] struggle and the essence of their uprising" (1995, 68). However, these

actions did not emerge spontaneously in 1987, but rather grew from the spirit of civic

participation that emerged in the network of organizations mentioned above, in

combination with the deliberate efforts of activist intellectuals and nonviolent activists.

Organized nonviolent action against the occupation started in 1980 through the

work of the Lajnat Muwajahat al-Qabda al-Hadidiyya (Committee Confronting the Iron

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Fist), led by Palestinian Feisel Abd al-Qadir Husseini and Israeli journalist Gideon Spiro.

The Committee Confronting the Iron Fist started as a series of committees focusing on

protesting arrests and deportations of Palestinian intellectuals and activists by raising

awareness about their cases within Israel. The committees officially merged in 1985,

seeking to persuade Israelis and the international committee about the need to recognize

the grievances and rights of Palestinians more generally. Specifically, the committee was

committed to ending administrative detention, eliminating collective punishment, putting

a stop to torture, and stopping the practice of forced deportation. The Committee

Confronting the Iron First utilized tools being employed in concurrent nonviolent

movements in eastern Europe and Latin America, including acts of persuasion and protest

like demonstrations, marches, vigils, public speeches, documentation, media releases,

letters of opposition, and lobbying (King 2007, 166). In June 1987, the twentieth

anniversary of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the committee organized a

march protesting the occupation and calling for an independent Palestinian state

alongside Israel with Jerusalem as its capital. Meanwhile, by the early 1980s, Husseini,

along with Palestinian intellectual Sare Nusseibeh, were engaging in discussions with

Israeli intellectuals and government officials, laying a foundation for future direct

negotiations.

In the early 1980s, at the same time that the Committee Confronting the Iron Fist

was taking shape, handouts describing successful campaigns of nonviolent resistance in

other conflict areas began appearing throughout Palestine. According to King, the

mimeographed fliers "suggested that action was better than inaction, nonviolent

resistance was less self-destructive than armed struggle and within the limited capacity of

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the disarmed Palestinians, and fighting with political weapons could be more effective

than violence in redressing fundamental injustices" (2007, 127). The fliers were later

attributed to the cousins Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian psychologist schooled in the

nonviolent methods of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Gandhi; and Jonathan Kuttab, a

Palestinian lawyer who co-founded Al-Haq, the first Palestinian human rights

organization. In addition to distributing the leaflets, Kuttab and A wad started offering

workshops and meetings on nonviolent resistance, publishing booklets, and distributing

Arabic copies of writings by Gene Sharp describing new conceptualizations of power and

civilian strength. In 1984, Awad opened the Palestinian Center for the Study of

Nonviolence (PCSN) in East Jerusalem, which continued disseminating materials,

initiated a library on wheels, and began organizing early acts of civil disobedience.

According to A wad, he and other leaders began by calling for simple acts of

disobedience that nearly all individuals were both willing and able to do. Early actions

included refusing to pay bills printed in Hebrew; eating only local produce, buying

Palestinian products, and boycotting Israeli goods; using alternative business hours, and

even adopting a different time zone. As Awad remembers, these acts made it possible for

many people to get involved in the initial days and weeks of the uprising, after which

leaders could start raising the stakes of the action and still maintain widespread

participation (Awad 2004).

The actual start of the intifada is usually referenced as December 9, 1987,

following an automobile collision between an Israeli truck and two cars of Gazan

laborers, whose funerals turned into mass protests in Gaza, especially in Jabaliya refugee

camp. Protests then broke out across the territories, as Palestinians from all walks of life

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participated in the "shaking off' (the literal translation of intifada) of the occupation.

Acts of defiance included shouting and wailing to prevent soldiers from entering people's

homes, blowing car horns at designated times, wearing the Palestinian kuffiyeh

(traditional headdress), burning tires, and writing on public walls. Flying the Palestinian

flag, which was illegal, was also encouraged as a symbol of resistance. Some of these

actions resulted in mass arrests that nonviolent leaders hoped would "overcrowd and

paralyze Israeli prison systems" (Dajani 1995, 69). Indeed, the prisons came to form a

solid foundation for the movement, as nonviolent leaders held large meetings in jail.

Some activists also used the time in prison to talk to Israeli soldiers to try to influence

their morale.

Other nonviolent tactics included methods of protest such as demonstrations, sit

ins, marches, mock funerals, hunger strikes, and teach-ins. In addition to boycotting

Israeli products, economic noncooperation extended to strikes, withdrawal of work from

Israeli factories and farms, and withholding taxes. As Ackerman and DuVall write, "all

these steps were designed to amplify the spirit of resistance and make it impossible for

the Israelis to conduct business as usual" (2000, 410). While trying to frustrate Israeli

daily systems, Palestinians were at the same time creating alternative institutions in the

forms of specialized committees in towns, villages, and camps throughout the territories.

These committees performed a variety of functions, from providing humanitarian aid to

mobilizing and organizing the general population, to serving as an alternative civilian

administration.

Perhaps one of the most noteworthy groups to emerge during this time was Al

Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada lil-Intifada, the Unified Nationalist Leadership of

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the Uprising (UNLU). Comprised ofrepresentatives from all the major political parties,

including Fateh, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the PCP, the UNLU became the primary

initiator of calls for action and civil disobedience, which it disseminated through a series

of leaflets of communiques. According to a report completed by the Palestine Center for

the Study of Nonviolence, over 95 percent of the 163 actions called for in the initial 17

leaflets were specifically nonviolent, and over 90 percent of the 291 calls in leaflets 18-

39 were nonviolent (Dajani, 1995, 194). The few calls that were not specifically

nonviolent generally called for acts of "limited violence" such as throwing stones.

Meanwhile, at the local level, popular committees emerged throughout Palestine,

especially in the villages and rural areas, organizing actions, providing social relief, and

functioning effectively as local government institutions.

For the purpose of this research, it is especially important to note that the

nonviolent tactics used in the first intifada allowed for, and indeed, depended on,

extensive youth involvement and leadership. To be sure, youth were the leaders of the

first intifada and the initiators of the stone-throwing demonstrations. As D. Kuttab

explains, youth of all ages had a role in typical demonstrations. Seven-to-ten year olds

for example were usually responsible for setting tires on fire to block traffic and attract

soldiers. The eleven-to-fourteen age group was assigned the task of placing large stones

in the road to slow down or stop traffic. The fifteen-to-nineteen year olds were the

veteran stone throwers, as well as the smugglers of supplies and resources during

curfews. Finally, young Palestinians over the age of nineteen led the entire team of youth

by taking key positions around the demonstration area (1988, 19).

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To be sure, the child stone-thrower is an image often associated with the first

intifada (D. Kuttab 1988, 14). However, youth were involved in the first intifada in other

ways as well. Many youth participated in nonviolent actions such as protests,

demonstrations, sit-ins, walks-outs, boycotts, and strikes. Many youth also assumed

leadership roles. According to Seif, "the youth were widely engaged in the organization

and leadership of the Intifada, its striking forces, its popular committees, its educational

and solidarity committees," (2000, 20). Universities became centers of popular

mobilization, and even after schools and universities were closed, the diffusion of

students and faculty into their villages and camps throughout the West Bank and Gaza

"hastened the spread of ideas about Palestinian nonviolence resistance" (King 2007, 222).

J. Kuttab goes so far as to refer to the first intifada as "the children's revolt,"

arguing that youth "possessed a new spirit that challenged the occupation" and also

"infuse[d] the rest of Palestinian society with the same spirit" ( 1988, 26). According to J.

Kuttab, youth leadership in the first intifada was instrumental in Palestine in removing

the barrier of fear, fostering pragmatic unity, creating a sense of self-reliance, developing

a sense of generosity in daily life, encouraging new organizations and grassroots

committees, and opening people's minds to new ideas (1988, 26~31). Clearly, youth

played major roles in the coordination and implementation of the first intifada, with

approximately ninety percent of young males and eighty percent of young females

participating in some form of demonstration or activism (Barber 2000, 7).

Though stone-throwing and more directly violent acts such as gasoline bombs and

stabbings became more common in subsequent years, it is clear that the first intifada was

based on an initial foundation of nonviolent activism and civil disobedience. To be sure,

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as Abu-Nimer explains, though some actions of the intifada were "indisputably violent. ..

what was remarkable about the uprising was the infrequency of these incidents and the

degree to which they stood outside the strategy and structure of the resistance as a whole"

(2003, 145). Nearly all Palestinian were both able and willing to participate in the first

intifada largely because of its predominantly nonviolent nature. As King summarizes, the

first intifada represented an "historic instance of intellectuals, academicians, and elite

activists being joined with savvy young street organizers in common cause" (2007, 222).

The first intifada was essentially a visible extension of the Palestinian national

movement that had been building for some time, emerging from the efforts of civic

organizations, activist individuals, and advocates of nonviolence. In other words, it was

not merely a resistance movement against Israel, but a nationalist movement.for

Palestine. It thus allowed for the public emergence of a veritable Palestinian national

identity, which according to Ackerman and DuVall, "transferred the motive power

behind the Palestinian cause from militants and guerrillas to the Palestinian people

themselves, and thereby endowed that cause with a legitimacy and urgency it did not

have before" (2000, 420). Accordingly, there was a sense of reclaiming the Palestinian

movement for the people, and thus restoring to it a sense of united hope and optimism.

Although the exiled PLO would take over the leadership of the intifada in its later

years, initially at least there was a feeling of popular ownership to the movement, and

willingness of the masses to participate "if it meant plowing the ground of their own

society" (Ackerman and Duvall 2000, 420). The entire population therefore took it upon

themselves to challenge the status quo that had paralyzed the region, not through violent

rebellion or militant opposition, but through intifada, a literal "waking up" of the people

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and "shaking off'' of both their oppressor and their own quietude. There was hence a

sense of internal empowerment that found its expression in the nonviolent tactics and acts

of civil disobedience in the initial phases of the intifada.

Oslo and the "Peace Process"

Despite its nationalist roots, the intifada did not culminate with the formation of a

Palestinian state, but rather with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP)

following the Oslo Accords, which provided for the establishment of the Palestinian

Authority (PA), a semi-autonomous governing body in parts of the occupied territories.

Under the 1993 Oslo I Accords, the PA was installed in Gaza and, at least in name, in

Jericho. Two year later, the Oslo II Accords articulated the framework for the Palestinian

Legislative Council (PLC), scheduled the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian

urban centers, and divided the West Bank into three areas: Area A consisting of

Palestinian population centers to be under Palestinian control; Area B consisting of

Palestinian village areas to be under joint Israeli and Palestinian jurisdiction, and Area C

to be under Israeli control.

At this point, most Palestinians assumed that the Oslo process eventually would

bring statehood, and that the PA would form the foundation of a Palestinian national

government. However, the Oslo period saw a continuation of the status quo and the

extension of economic and political oppression in the West Bank and Gaza. According

to Khalidi, "Israel was allowed by the United States ... to help itself to huge bites of the

pie that the two sides were supposed to be negotiating" (2007, 198). It appeared to many

Palestinians that Israel was taking advantage of the interim period by creating so-called

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"facts on the ground," specifically in the form of settlement construction, which would

make the formation of a Palestinian state increasingly difficult and unlikely. 35

Meanwhile, frequent border closings, often in response to militant attacks by

groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, contributed to rising poverty in the West Bank and

Gaza, while Israel also maintained control over water resources serving the majority of

the land (three-quarters in the West Bank and one-third in Gaza) (King 2007, 326). Thus,

in spite of the discourse on coexistence, peace building, and "nonviolence" under Oslo,

Palestinians quickly became disillusioned with both the PA as a body and the DOP as an

agreement as the economy worsened, settlement activity continued, autonomy was

withheld, and other promises were left unmet. As Andoni summarizes, due to the

"malfunctioning of the PA on the one hand, and the continuity of the Israeli occupation

on the other. .. Palestinians had lost interest in the peace process, having given up hope

that they would get anything substantial out of it" (2001, 214 ).

It was in this context that the second intifada emerged in 2000, with the hope and

optimism of the first intifada replaced by anger and frustration. While the ultimate goal

of Palestinian statehood remained, the previous pro-Palestinian nationalist idealism was

overshadowed by anti-Israeli cynicism. This context was reflected in a surge of violent

resistance in the second intifada, including suicide bombs and rocket attacks. However,

this shift in emphasis to violence limited opportunities for popular resistance, thus

decreasing the scale of the struggle while increasing its intensity, and resulting in a kind

35 According to B'tselem, since 1967, Israel has established 135 settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), which are illegal under international humanitarian law. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring citizens from its own territory to the occupied territory (Article 49). The Hague Regulations prohibit an occupying power from undertaking permanent changes in the occupied area unless these are due to military needs in the narrow sense of the term, or unless they are undertaken for the benefit of the local population. (B'tselem 2008)

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of hijacking of the movement by militants. Although many Palestinians continued to

work for nonviolent change, the primary use of armed violence overshadowed other

efforts both in practice and in public discourse for the majority of the second intifada.

Participation in the second intifada by Israeli peace groups and international

supporters was also hindered by its violent nature. While many Israeli peace groups

formed or expanded during the first intifada, as Andoni writes, "the fact that there [was]

more armed resistance in [the second] uprising severely limited the chances even for the

radical and extremely marginalized Israeli peace groups to participate in anti-occupation

efforts" (2001, 217). In addition, the earlier nonviolent tactics of attempting to talk to

Israeli soldiers to influence their morale, and reaching out to the Israeli public, were

nearly impossible in the second intifada, due to heightened mistrust and demonization of

the "other" by both communities, as well as by limitations on mobility in the name of

security. This lack of dialogue due to violence, and fear of violence, resulted in each

community being "exposed to the uprising only through its own, relatively uncritical

media" (Andoni 2001, 217), which only exacerbated the conflict. In addition, as

Ackerman and DuVall point out, "Western sympathy for Palestinian underdogs-which

could have been translated into pressure on Israel-was undercut when violence came

from both sides" (2000, 420).

The violent nature of the second intifada thus limited both internal participation

and external support. However, nonviolent resistance did take place, as discussed further

in Chapter Four. These actions built on the tradition of popular resistance that has been

part of Palestinian history, not only in the first intifada, but throughout the past century.

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Context of the Fieldwork

The conflict dynamics and political climate in Palestine varied considerably

during the various stages of the fieldwork from 2005-2008. In the first preliminary

research period, in summer 2005, both Israelis and Palestinians were preparing for the

withdrawal of Israeli settlers from all settlements in Gaza and four settlements in the

West Bank, which began on August 15, 2005, and was completed by August 24, 2005.

According to my interviews, many Palestinians criticized the unilateral nature of the pull

out, as well as Israel's continued control over Gaza's ports and air space, and many

voiced concern that the withdrawal from Gaza would be coupled by settlement expansion

in the West Bank. Nevertheless, the settler withdrawal, combined with relatively lower

levels of violence than since the beginning of the second intifada, manifested a sort of

cautious optimism in Palestine. Though Palestinians still mourned Y assir Arafat, who

died on November 11, 2004, many were hopeful that President Mahmoud Abbas

(referred to as Abu Mazen) would help increase the transparency of democracy within

Palestine and broaden political avenues with Israel and the international community.

In the summer of 2006, the mood in Palestine had shifted from wary hope to tense

uncertainty. Hamas's victory in the Palestinian legislative elections on January 26, 2006,

resulted in internal power struggles between Fateh and Hamas, as well as a suspension of

funds to the PA from outside donors, affecting thousands of civil servants. Meanwhile,

confrontations between Hamas and Israel continued, with Israel conducting air raids and

shellings in Gaza and Hamas launching Qassam rockets into nearby Sderot in Israel. In

June, both Palestinian and Israeli passions intensified respectively with the death of a

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family of seven on a beach in Gaza as a result of Israeli airstrikes, and the kidnapping of

an Israeli soldier by Hamas. These tensions were overshadowed however when

Hezbollah militants attacked an Israeli patrol on the Lebanese-Israeli border, resulting in

an Israeli bombing and artillery shelling offensive against Lebanon, and Hezbollah rocket

attacks on northern Israel, which continued until a ceasefire was signed on August 24.

The following year, 2007, during which the majority of the research was

conducted, saw a continuation of Israeli raids and incursions in the West Bank and Gaza,

combined with increasing daily difficulties and disillusionment with Palestinian

leadership. Regarding daily life, Israeli construction of the 723-kilometer long separation

barrier, taking the form of a six-to-eight meter concrete wall in some areas and barbed

wire and electic fense in others, restricted movement, divided villages from their farming

land, and limited access to Jerusalem and urban centers within the West Bank. Indeed,

though erected for "security" purposes, the separation barrier was not built directly on the

Green Line separating 1967 Israel and the West Bank, but rather snakes around, and

sometimes through, Palestinian villages and towns within the West Bank. 36 The resultant

economic difficulties, combined with over a year of Israel withholding Palestinian tax

36 The route of the separation barrier was contested in the Israeli High Court of Justice in February 2004, with the court ruling that the route was illegal and needed to be changed, yet that ruling was not implemented. On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice in the Hague likewise ruled against the legality of the separation barrier and its route, caJling for a cessation of construction, dismantling built portions, and compensating affected communities. The court's rulings are non-binding however, and the recommendations went unheeded. For more on the separation barrier, see http://www.btselem.org/english/Separation Barrier/Index.asp.

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money and the international community continuing to boycott the PA, contributed to

mcreasmg. . rates o f poverty and unemp 1oyment. 37

Meanwhile, tensions between Barnas and Fateh continued to exacerbate, with

outbreaks of factional violence in Gaza continuing through the spring. The

confrontations reached an unprecedented level in June 2007, when Barnas militants

expelled Fateh from Gaza, prompting Abu Mazen to dissolve the unity government.

While the parties continued to struggle for power, most Palestinians with whom I spoke

during this time expressed increasing disillusionment with both parties and despair at the

occurrence of Palestinian-Palestinian violence. 38

I provide this admittedly brief overview of the political landscape in Palestine to

give the reader a sense of the context that both the interviewees and myself as a

researcher experienced during my fieldwork. Regarding the interviewees, it is important

to be aware of the impact of political and economic conditions on responses related to

popular resistance. On the one hand, while some interviewees commented that the

economic conditions and the predominance of factional fighting in 2007 may have

decreased activism against the occupation, others noted that disillusionment with top

levels of leadership actually helped renew interest in grassroots-level resistance. As the

researcher, the conflict dynamics also influenced my own decisions about what kinds of

questions to ask, which locations to include, and how I understood and interpreted

interviewee responses, as will be discussed further in the next chapter.

37 According to the UNDP, approximately 70 percent of Palestinians were living under the poverty line (of2 US dollars per day) in 2008 (UNDP/PAPP 2008), up from 51 percent in 2004 and 23 percent in 1998, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs (Madhoun 2006).

38 For more on responses to the internal situation, see Chapter 7.

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In this chapter, I have sought to provide a context for nonviolent resistance in

Palestine in the broader historical framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, I

have identified episodes of nonviolence in Palestinian history, noting the scope and

diversity of nonviolent tactics employed from the British Mandate to the present. I have

paid particular attention to the first intifada, which represented a peak period in

Palestinian nonviolence, and I have compared the tactics adopted in that uprising with

those used in the second intifada. While I explore the reasons behind those different

dynamics in subsequent chapters, I used this discussion to establish a historical context

for both uprisings, specifically noting the influence of the failed Osl.o Accords on the fact

and form of the second intifada. Finally, I have briefly discussed the conflict dynamics at

the time of the fieldwork to provide a specific context for the research.

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LENSES OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the research was designed,

developed, and interpreted. The first section discusses the decision to use a case study

research design, as well as the rationale for adopting a mixed-methods approach. The

second section describes the data collection methods used, including semi-structured

interviews, surveys, and participant-observation. The third section identifies the data

analysis methods used, including thematic categorization and content analysis, which

complement the study's grounded theory approach. In the final section, I reflect on how

my personal identity and background influenced the development of the research and the

interpretation of the data.

The Telescope: Methodological Overview

Research Design: Case Study

This section argues that a case study approach is an appropriate research design

for this study. According to Yin, case study research is appropriate when "investigators

either desire or are forced by circumstances (a) to define research topics broadly and not

narrowly, (b) to cover contextual or complex multivariate conditions and not just isolated

variables, and (c) to rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence" (2003a, xi).

The topic of nonviolent popular resistance in the West Bank during and after the second 77

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intifada meets all of these criteria, thus making the case study methodology a logical

choice.

First, in accordance with Yin's point that case studies are useful when defining

research topics broadly, the objective of this study is to inductively explore nonviolent

resistance in the West Bank as an emergent phenomenon. In this sense, the study

holistically examines the actors, mechanisms, and processes (see McAdam, Tilly, and

Tarrow 2001, 24) that shape and define Palestinian resistance in the stated time period.

Because the study focuses on these larger, dynamic dimensions over a specific, narrow

aspect of resistance, a case study approach makes sense to incorporate the broader field

of inquiry. As Yin notes, "the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to

understand complex social phenomena," allowing researchers to "retain the holistic and

meaningful characteristics ofreal-life events" (2003b, 2). Palestinian popular resistance

in the second intifada period is indeed a "complex" social phenomenon that benefits from

the holistic analysis facilitated by the case study approach.

Second, according to Yin, "the case study is the method of choice when the

phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its context" (2003a, 4).

While it is hoped that conclusions from this study will be useful in other conflict

situations, the research focuses on the specific phenomenon of nonviolent popular

resistance in Palestine during and following the second intifada. Although some

elements of Palestinian resistance in this context are comparable to aspects of other social

movements, the Palestinian case is unique for two main reasons. First, from a temporal

perspective, Palestinian resistance during this period reflects a revival of strategies

employed fifteen to twenty years earlier during the first intifada, thus requiring any

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analysis to address the implications of this historical precedent. To be sure, Palestinian

resistance is not limited to the two intifadas, nor do movements in other contexts

necessarily emerge without historical foundations. However, the (re )emergence of

nonviolent resistance in Palestine following the widespread popular uprising in the first

intifada, the disillusionment with the "peace process" during the Oslo period, and the

predominantly violent second intifada presents a unique temporal context for

examination. Indeed, I believe an analysis of the nonviolent methods used in the second

intifada period, as well as the motivations of the participants, requires consideration of

the unique historical context. Likewise, a critical analysis of the challenges to popular

resistance in the second intifada are based largely on comparisons with relatively

successful mobilization and coordination efforts during the first intifada.

In addition to the historical context, the political dynamic is also unique in the

case of Palestine. While other social movements may emerge when a group has

grievances against its state's governing body, the distinctive nature of Palestine as an

occupied territory under Israel represents a unique power situation. On the one hand,

Palestine has many of the makings of a state, with a geographic location, an elected

government, and a vibrant civil society. However, in reality, the Palestinian land,

government, and people exist under Israel's military occupation, creating a political

situation that is distinct in the world. Therefore, while activism in the West Bank shares

some attributes with self-determination movements and historical anti-colonialism and

anti-apartheid efforts, Palestine's relationship with Israel creates a unique context in

which popular resistance is conceptualized and implemented. Thus, both the historical

and political contexts of Palestine recommend the use of the case study method.

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Similarly, as Yin notes, "the richness of the context. .. means that the study cannot

rely on a single data collection method but will likely need to use multiple sources of

evidence" (2003a, 4). To be sure, in order to effectively understand and analyze both the

breadth and depth of nonviolent resistance in the West Bank during this period, it was

helpful to employ several methods with complementary strengths and weaknesses,

including narrative research, surveys, and participant observation. The case study

research design facilitates the use of this mixed methodology approach, which is

discussed further in the following section.

As Yin summarizes, "case studies are the preferred method when 'how' and

'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and

when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context" (2003b,

1). The case study design is thus suitable for this research as it inductively explores how

and why nonviolent resistance (re)emerged in the West Bank in the post-Oslo context.

Mixed Methodology

As noted by Yin (2003a), investigating complex social phenomena in rich

contexts, such as popular resistance in the West Bank during and after the second

intifada, often recommends the use of multiple methods. Accordingly, this study utilizes

a mixed methodology approach, containing elements of both the quantitative and

qualitative approaches. According to Tashakkori and Teddlie, mixed methodology is

conducive to a pragmatic paradigm, which rejects the assumed "wars" between the

positivist approach underlying quantitative methods, and the constructivist approach

underlying qualitative methods (1998). The focus on pragmatism makes sense for this

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study, which aims to function as a useful tool for activists in Palestine and other conflict

zones.

Greene et al. identify five purposes for using mixed methods, which are in

accordance with the aims of this study. First, triangulation, or seeking convergence of

results, reflects this study's goal of drawing accurate conclusions on nonviolent popular

resistance in the West Bank by comparing results from activist interviews, public

surveys, and personal observation. Second, complementarity, or examining different

aspects of a phenomenon, is evident in this study's emphasis on both the breadth and

depth of Palestinian activism. Third, initiation, or discovering fresh perspectives, is

mirrored in this investigation's use of multiple methods to get untold stories heard and

generate new ways of conceptualizing Palestinian resistance. Fourth, development, or

using methods to inform each other, is evident in this study's use of preliminary narrative

research and questionnaires to inform later surveys and interview questions, respectively.

Finally, expansion, or adding scope to a project, which is utilized in this research by

incorporating survey and observation methods to further expand the study beyond initial

narratives (Greene et al. 1989; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, 43).

Because little research has been conducted to date on nonviolent popular

resistance in the West Bank between 2000 and 2008, the use of mixed methods for

triangulation is especially important for ensuring both the validity and the scope of the

findings. As Maxwell notes, triangulation "reduces the risk that your conclusions will

reflect only the systematic biases or limitations of a specific source or method, and allows

you to gain a broader and more secure understanding of the issues you are investigating"

(2005, 94). Likewise, as Brewer and Hunter note, mixed methodology allows researchers

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to "attack a research problem with an arsenal of methods that have nonoverlapping

weaknesses in addition to complementary strengths" ( 1989, 17).

Indeed, the methods adopted in this study, narrative research, surveys, and

participant observation, were selected because of their complementary strengths and

weaknesses in regard to scope in data collection and validity in data analysis. First,

regarding scope, the administration of surveys allowed for greater breadth of coverage of

behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions related to popular resistance in the West Bank than

semi-structured interviews and observations of actions, which instead contributed to the

depth of analysis.

In terms of validity, or the "correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion,

explanation, interpretation, or other sort of account" (Maxwell 2005, 106), the methods

complement each other in ways that do not guarantee validity, but at least increase

credibility. For example, participant observation somewhat balances the validity threat of

researcher "bias" inherent in interviews and survey designs, in terms of the researcher's

preconceptions and selection of noteworthy data (Maxwell 2005). Indeed, my interview

and survey questions initially focused primarily on youth participation in resistance, but

participant observation methods indicated that the role of youth in direct actions was

different than I had assumed. Likewise, data collected via interviews and surveys was.

less influenced by the validity threat ofreactivity, or "the influence of the researcher on

the setting or individuals studied" (Maxwell 2005, 108), inherent in participant

observation methods.

In another example, the triangulation of interviewing and observation allowed for

increased levels of validity. As Maxwell notes, "While interviewing is often an efficient

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and valid way of understanding someone's perspective, observation can enable you to

draw inferences about this perspective that you couldn't obtain by relying exclusively on

interview data" (2005, 94). Indeed, observation was important for assessing if actions

matched words, and if behaviors revealed perspectives that interviewees might have been

reluctant to state in an interview. For example, several NGO leaders spoke in interviews

about the importance of direct action and civil disobedience, yet they were often absent

from the actions or content to stay in the rear lines. Others spoke about the importance of

involving women as equals in resistance, yet then-treated their own wives as servants.

On the other hand, although observation provides a direct way of learning about

behavior, "interviewing can also be a valuable way of gaining a description of actions

and events" (Maxwell 2005, 94). For example, interviews were useful for learning about

demonstrations that had taken place in the past in villages like Budrous and Biddu, or for

gathering data on events to which I could not gain access, such as the private meetings of

popular committees, or conversations that took place in all-male venues. In these ways,

as Maxwell notes, "triangulation of observations and interviews can provide a more

complete and accurate account than either could alone" (2005, 94).

While the triangulation of interviews and observation increases validity, the

integration of surveys with these other methods contributes to the reliability of the study,

referring to the "extent to which a measuring instrument contains variable errors"

(Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 163). Although even survey instruments

contain variable errors, the relatively high level of standardization in data collection and

objectivity in data analysis makes survey research more reliable than semi-structured

interviews and observation. For example, each of my interviews varied in terms of the

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content and order of questions asked, depending largely on the direction set by the

interviewee, as well as differing in location, level of formality, and language.

Furthermore, all interview responses, as well as data collected via observations, were

interpreted through my own subjective lens. In contrast, all survey participants were

given the same standard survey and instructions, and the primarily quantitative nature of

the questionnaire required objective recording of the data. This uniformity in survey

based data collection contributes to its high reliability when considered relative to

interviews and observation.

In these ways, the use of mixed methodology enhances the scope, validity, and

reliability of the study. The strengths and weaknesses of narrative research, surveys, and

participant observations complement each other well within the framework of a case

study design and in the context of the specific research question. The actual data

collection and analysis methods are discussed further in the following section.

The Magnifying Glass: Methods of Data Collection

The previous section addressed the rationale behind the case study design and

mixed methodology approach for the study. The following section provides a more in

depth discussion of the field sites and the data collection methods used, including

narrative research, surveys, and participant observation. The discussion explains why

these methods were selected, and how they were employed during the fieldwork period.

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The Field Sites

All fieldwork was conducted in East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the

Palestinian Territories. Gaza was not included as part of the domain of study for several

reasons. Firstly, I anticipated logistical problems with attempting to enter Gaza. At the

time of the research, all individuals wishing to travel to Gaza were required to apply for

special permission from the Israeli government, which usually only granted permits to

international journalists and humanitarian aid workers, and even those requests were

often denied. Secondly, in addition to logistical reasons, the conflict dynamics in Gaza

during the time of research became increasingly intense. The situation was already

difficult in the summer of 2006, when Hamas was launching rockets from Gaza into

Israel, and Israel was conducting air strikes and incursions into Gaza. However, the

internal situation further deteriorated over the following year as factional fighting within

Gaza intensified, culminating with Hamas' expulsion of Fateh forces in June 2007.

Thirdly, in corresponding with friends and colleagues in Gaza, it was clear that the

political, economic, and social realities in Gaza were becoming increasingly distinct from

the West Bank, a view that was shared by interviewees in the West Bank. Thus, research

conducted in Gaza would have had a different context and content than that conducted in

the West Bank. While I believe research on popular resistance in Gaza to be important

and, indeed, necessary, such research is beyond the scope of this study. It will however

be a possible and probable follow-up to the current study.

I also decided not to extend my research to Palestinians living in Israel. Unlike

Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, most Palestinian-Israelis are

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citizens of the State of Israel and experience a different lived reality than Palestinians in

the occupied territories. Again, my decision to not include these Palestinians in the study

does not in any way discount their own challenges, but rather recognizes the uniqueness

of their experiences. As with Gaza, I anticipate future research with interviews and

surveys with this population, but their inclusion was not within the scope of this study.

For a more detailed description of the cities and villages visited during the

fieldwork, see Appendix A.

Narrative Research

The project relies largely on narrative research to ground the study in actual

personal experiences with nonviolent popular resistance. As Clandinin & Connelly

(2000) argue, narrative research is uniquely capable of capturing individuals' stories and

investigating how they perceive their experiences in the temporal, spatial, and personal

social dimensions. In this way, by drawing out participants' stories, interviews are not

only descriptive, but rather serve both analytical and representational purposes. First,

narratives are analytical in that they provide first-hand accounts and interpretations of

events and phenomena. However, narratives are also representational, in that individuals

construct their identities through their own and others' stories. In the context of this

research, the identity element was useful for giving insight into why some individuals

choose to engage in nonviolent activism when others do not, and perhaps more

importantly, for understanding how different identity constructs might contribute to

fragmentation between activists. Furthermore, when considered collectively, interviews

can indicate how individual, group, and cultural stories and identities intersect to inform

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social phenomena (Clandinin and Connelly 2000), and are in turn informed by that

phenomena.

To be sure, narrative research inherently probes beyond the mere reporting of

events, and even beyond the individual's role in or opinion of such events. Rather,

because interviews rely on the story-telling aspect, the participant's interpretation of the

phenomena, as well as his/her interpretation of his/her role in the phenomena, narrative

research offers multiple dimensions of analysis. As Ricoeur explains, narratives are both

lived and told, mediating between the world of action and the world of

recollection/interpretation (1984). Accordingly, narratives include dialectics that

combine innovation and sedimentation, fact and fiction (Ricoeur 1987), and neutral

description and ethical prescription (Ricoeur 1992). In addition, narratives undergo

further interpretations by both the researcher and the reader, such that the person telling

the story functions as the interpreter, the interpreted, and the recipient of interpretations

(Ricouer 1987). For example, each activist interviewed in this study had to reflect on

his/her own involvement in popular resistance and articulate his/her experiences and

opinions to me; I in turn processed these narratives through my own lenses and had to

consolidate responses in this study through my own analysis; and now diverse readers,

who may include the original study participants, will (re )interpret both the stories and the

meanings of the stories through their respective knowledge-bases and worldviews.

Although some researchers may worry that the various levels of interpretation in

narrative research undermine its validity a method, including elements of interpretation

and perception was deliberately used in this study to allow for the investigation of the

role of identity construction. To be sure, while the study draws from the narratives for

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descriptions of popular resistance experiences and efforts in the West Bank, the research

is especially interested in how participants perceived those efforts, and how they

interpreted their own roles in resistance. Specifically, the study aims to examine how

individuals' identity influenced their decision to become involved in activism, and in

turn, how participation in resistance efforts informed their identity.

For example, in the case of Palestine, the majority of community leaders in

nonviolent activism engaged in various forms of resistance in the past, specifically during

the first intifada, and many cited this "activist" identity as motivating their present

efforts. Ironically however, they noted that the collective Palestinian activist identity

inhibits many people from openly supporting nonviolence because they see it as

undermining, rather than enhancing, the culture of resistance. In other cases, interviews

revealed "accidental activists," such as farmers who started resisting the separation

barrier out of necessity, but gradually came to adopt an activist identity. The study uses

interviews to probe these processes of activist identity formation to better understand the

promises and limitations to popular mobilization in Palestine.

The dimension of perception provided through narrative inquiry is also important

for this type of pragmatic study, which aims to be a useful tool for practitioners.

Research that seeks to develop theories related to social change must consider

participants' perceptions and interpretations to be effective. For example, while I

perceived the turnout at one action to be strong in terms of numbers, an interview with an

organizer revealed his frustration that the majority of participants were with a single

political party, which he felt would limit participation from other political parties in the

future. Although we were present at the same event, my interpretation of its success

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differed considerably from the local organizers' perception. The interpretive quality of

narrative research is thus useful for ensuring that community perceptions are understood

and respected.

The interpretive quality of interviews was thus useful in this study for gaining rich

descriptive and analytical data on the phenomenon of popular resistance, as well as for

getting an in-depth understanding of activist identity construction. However, as with

many methods, narrative research's strengths can also be limitations, though these are

relatively balanced by the mixed methods approach. For example, while narrative

research provides an in-depth look at a phenomenon like popular resistance, it lacks

breadth in terms of numbers of participants. In addition, while narrative research is highly

valid in some ways because it relies on primary sources and allows for in-depth

description, it faces validity threat in terms of researcher bias in selection of subjects and

interpretation of data, as well as the potential inability or unwillingness of participants to

be open or honest in all responses. Finally, the semi-structured interview approach

adopted in this study allows for much variation in format and content, resulting in low

reliability. This study seeks to atone for these limitations by using surveys to increase

breadth and reliability and using participant observation to increase validity, as dicussed

later in this chapter.

Interview Overview

A total of 88 interviews were conducted between May 2005 and August 2007,

with 61 interviews conducted during the main fieldwork period of March - August 2007,

19 interviews conducted between May and August 2006, and 8 interviews conducted

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between May and July 2005. The diversity of participants39 in terms of geographic

location, profession, gender, religion, age, political affiliation, and socioeconomic class,

is reflective of the West Bank population itself, and was thus considered an asset to the

research. Some aspects of this diversity are reflected in the tables below.40

Table I. Interview Participants: Gender and Location Male Female Total

Urban 48 14 62

Village/Rural 22 2 24

Refugee Camp 2 0 2

Total 72 16 88

39 While traditional social science research studies usually refer to interviewees as subjects, I prefer to use the term "participants," which I believe to be both more accurate and more respectful towards the individuals who shared their time and their stories with me. First, the term "participant" emphasizes the voluntary nature of the interviews. While nearly all narrative research endeavors clearly require some sort of voluntary consent, the majority of the individuals with whom I spoke did not merely consent to participating in the interviews, but rather, they actively facilitated participation. Most were very open to speaking with me, and several mentioned that they saw the research as a sort of indirect advocacy, a way to get their stories of activism efforts disseminated to a wider global audience. The term "participant" is also more appropriate for describing the dynamic, conversational quality of most of the interviews. Rather than viewing myself as "the researcher" and the interviewees as "the subjects," I tried to be an active listener, and approached the participants as leaders, activists, and storytellers with experiences and insights to share. I also encouraged participants to ask me questions, so our roles were not always as definite as implied by traditional labels.

40 It should be noted that the numbers listed below do not include the countless informal conversations I had with individuals in shops, cafes, busses, etc., which informed my overall research experience, and some of which are incorporated into my fieldnotes. The numbers also do not include individuals who participated peripherally in the actual interviews, such as co-workers who added their input during interviews conducted in offices, or family members who commented during interviews conducted in participants' homes. These comments were documented in the interview notes. Finally, these numbers do not include the youth who participated in the survey portion of the research, which will be discussed in the next section.

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Table 2. Interview Participants: Date and Organization Professional Grassroots Political Total

(Paid/NGO) (Volunteer/CEO) (PA/Political Party)

Summer 2005 8 0 0 8

Summer 2006 9 10 0 19

Spring-Summer 2007 17 39 5 61

Total 34 49 5 88

As Table 1 indicates, the majority of the interviews were conducted with males,

and were conducted in urban settings. In terms of location, the majority of actions took

place in or near urban centers or large villages, in accordance with the high number of

participants from those demographics. In regards to gender, although the study aimed for

balance, both male and female participants noted that women's participation in popular

resistance was limited, a statement verified by my own observations at events,

conferences, and demonstrations. There are many possible reasons for this trend, one

simply being the fact that many women's domestic responsibilities limit the time

available to them to participate in actions. In addition, many actions are coordinated with

the Friday prayer, which is a predominantly male gathering. As Table 2 shows, the

research shifted from being primarily NGO-based to being more focused on grassroots

popular resistance. This shift not only reflects my evolving interests, but also my level of

access, as well as the concentration of activist efforts.

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Interview Participants

Narrative research commenced in the summer of 2005, when I was an intern and

researcher with the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG). At the time

I was conducting research on human rights and democracy in Palestine, so I met

primarily with individuals working in human rights organizations or democracy

development organizations. The data from these interviews are somewhat limited, as the

research topic differed from popular resistance, and I had not yet engaged with theories

of narrative research and methodological designs. Furthermore, the primary objective of

the interviews was to inform NGO research, not to serve as dissertation data, so I was

representing an organization rather than operating as an independent scholar, which may

have altered responses from participants familiar with the group. Despite these

limitations however, I was able to gain valuable experience with the practice of

interviewing, and some of the content from those interviews proved useful in this study,

as the ideas of human rights, civil society, and participatory democracy are relevant to

popular resistance and activism.

Perhaps most importantly, these interviews gave me a base of resources and

contacts on which to build in subsequent visits. Indeed, in the following summer of

2006, I interned with Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND), an organization

with whom I had met in 2005. This internship introduced me to numerous activists and

nonviolence trainers and gave me the opportunity to conduct informal interviews, the

content of which informed the development of the current study and is directly relevant to

its findings. Once again, the contacts developed in 2006 constituted my initial network of

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participants when I returned to Palestine in 2007. At that point, nearly every individual

with whom I spoke gave me suggestions of other friends and colleagues to meet, so that

my network of contacts expanded organically. Other contacts were made at conferences

and events, and through both local and international colleagues.

The Interview Process

Both the content and the format of my interviews varied between my different

periods in the field. However, this variation contributes to, rather than detracts from, the

strength of my narrative research, by reflecting the development of my study over time.

As I acquired new data from both primary and secondary sources, and as the conflict

dynamics themselves shifted, I made necessary revisions in the interview procedure.

Moreover, the insights gained from each experience in the field and each set of

interviews conducted informed the research techniques for the following field

experiences, culminating with the interview procedure used in spring-summer 2007, the

main fieldwork period. This type of reflective revision process is compatible with the

tradition of grounded theory data analysis, which is discussed in more detail below.

In each stage of administration, the interviews began with a verbal assent

agreement. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at American University waived written

consent (and parental consent for minors), acknowledging the possible risk that

participants might face from 1) Israeli security officials seeking to minimize resistance

activities, and 2) Palestinian extremists who might view nonviolence initiatives as

normalization or collaboration with Israel. Thus, I began each interview by introducing

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myself and explaining the purpose of the research. Participants were told that their

participation was voluntary, and that they could end the interview at any time.

Participants were also asked if they preferred to conduct the interview in Arabic

or English. The majority of the interviews were conducted in English. The conversations

that were conducted in Arabic were translated during the interviews by native Palestinian

Arabic speakers. Several interviews were conducted by myself in Arabic, or in a mix of

Arabic and English (me asking questions in Arabic, and the participant responding in

English).

I also asked participants for their permission to record the interview on a digital

voice recorder, and/or take notes during the interview. All recorded interviews were

transcribed verbatim, except for slight changes to ensure comprehensibility, usually to

correct language errors. Interviews documented using written notes were also

transcribed, and were close to verbatim when compared with audio transcripts. I also

recorded notes in the transcripts of different observations made during the interviews,

including participant mannerisms, speech, and appearance. Transcripts were completed

as soon as possible after each interview, usually the same day, to ensure that interviewee

statements and interviewer observations were as accurate as possible.

I deliberately avoided a standardized interview protocol, both to accommodate the

diversity of the participants and their experiences, and to foster a more open and

comfortable dynamic. I thus adopted a semi-structured interview format (sometimes

referred to as a focused interview approach), in which the interviewer establishes the

focus for the interview, but the actual content and order of the questions remains flexible.

The approach uses open-ended questions, some of which are prepared before the

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interview, and others that emerge during the conversation. In accordance with this

model, I developed a standard list of prepared questions, but the wording, order, and

content of questions varied between interviews. See Appendix B for a list of sample

questions used in the interviews.

The semi-structured interview approach is useful for understanding the individual

experiences and opinions of diverse interviewees, while also allowing for comparisons

and generalizations between participants. I chose this approach primarily to maximize

the validity of participants' responses, as the semi-structured model allows interviewees

to speak in depth about difficult subjects and experiences without pre-direction from the

researcher, and allows the interviewer to ask for further explanation or clarification on

complex issues. The conversational dynamic also establishes a positive rapport between

the interviewer and the interviewee, fostering a safer space for revealing emotions, past

experiences, and controversial opinions. For example, the dynamic allowed me to spend

hours with different activists, often in their homes, and established a level of trust that

enabled them to share personal accounts of former militant activities, abuses sustained in

prison, and losses of friends and family members to violence.

As noted above, the lack of standardization can be considered a limitation of the

semi-structured approach, since interviews are rarely, if ever, conducted the same way

twice. Indeed, even in the rare instances when the same questions are covered, the order

and wording of the questions usually vary, allegedly making it more difficult to cross

analyze responses or generalize findings. However, while I can see how the variation in

format and content might be a limitation in some studies, I emphasize again that this

diversity was both deliberate and desirable in this study. It was deliberate to allow for

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more detailed discussions with diverse participants, and it was desirable to create a

comfortable, conversational dynamic when broaching sensitive issues. To be sure, for

this study, a standardized protocol would have proved more limiting in forcing a uniform

question set on diverse participants, and for establishing a scientific rather than a personal

rapport, which I imagine would have restricted participants' responses.

Narrative research, evolving over several years, thus functioned as an integral

method in this study for probing the depth of popular resistance in the West Bank. Semi

structured interviews with diverse participants offered first-hand accounts of nonviolent

episodes, assessments and interpretations of different activism strategies, and rich

insights into individual and collective activist identity construction.

Survey

While narrative research provided me with important data on the personal level, I

wanted to ground those individual stories and experiences within a societal level

framework. This was important because, while I was interested in the identity

development and decisions made by individual activists, I was interested also in the

dynamics of the movement itself. Surveying the behaviors and attitudes of the larger

population was important both to assess the level of popular participation in resistance,

and to compare and contrast the perceptions of the resistance leaders with those of the

wider public. It thus made sense to conduct a survey to describe the characteristics and

opinions of the broader society, in order to complement the personal stories and

narratives elicited in the interviews.

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The use of surveys was not only complementary in terms of content, but also in

terms of methodological strength. Indeed, the survey dimension compensates for some of

the limitations of the narrative approach, in that its standardized nature gives it high

reliability when compared to interviews or observation. This uniformity helps decrease

observer subjectivity, ensures that similar data can be collected from different groups,

and makes measurements more precise. The benefits of survey research thus balance the

weaknesses of narrative research, and vice versa. In the case of Palestine for example,

the surveys allowed for a uniform assessment of the broader population's attitudes

towards popular resistance, rather than relying on the personal accounts of diverse

activists.

Survey Overview

I first conducted one hundred preliminary surveys in August 2006 to gauge basic

youth attitudes towards nonviolent and violent resistance. (See Appendix C for Arabic

and English versions of the preliminary survey). These surveys were administered at the

MEND summer camp, to youth ages 10-18 years from Jerusalem, Azariyeh, Jericho,

Hebron, Rarnallah, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, and Nablus. I administered the survey to all

willing participants during the beginning of one of the workshops in the camp. It is

important to note that these initial survey participants were youth already involved in

nonviolence training programs, as that was both my context and my research focus at the

time. (This is in contrast to the main survey sample, most of whom had not been exposed

to nonviolence trainings. The main survey sample was also older than the preliminary

survey sample.)

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Following the grounded theory tradition of using fieldwork to inform later

research design, I used the data from the preliminary survey to help shape my research

questions, and to develop a more in-depth survey for administration in 2007. This second

survey was further informed by my narrative research and expanded literature review. I

drafted the survey in English, and it was translated into formal Arabic (jusha) by a native

Arabic speaker. It was then edited by myself and a second native Arabic speaker, and

was further edited and formatted by a contact at the Palestinian Center for Policy and

Survey Research (PCPSR). Six former students of a Palestinian contact at Al Quds

University took the pilot version of the survey, and their comments were used to finalize

the document. The English and Arabic versions of the survey are available in Appendix

The survey is two pages in length, consisting of five sections. The first section

uses open-ended factual questions to request demographic information, including gender,

religion, geographic location, and political affiliation. The second section uses a closed

ended question format by asking participants to circle yes or no in response to questions

regarding their participation in different forms of nonviolent and violent resistance. This

section aims to gather data on youth participation in resistance, as well as gauge youths'

perceptions of actions as violent or nonviolent. The third section uses a scaled single

variable closed-ended response format to gauge participants' attitudes towards the

morality and efficacy of violent and nonviolent approaches to resistance on a rating scale

of five qualifiers (strongly agree, agree, depends, disagree, strongly disagree). The fourth

section, also using the same rating scale, asks for participants' attitudes towards specific

forms of action. The second, third, and fourth sections all use a matrix format for

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organizing the questions. The final section uses an open-ended response format,

consisting of a space for optional comments.

Survey Sample

The research focuses on the population of Palestinian university students in East

Jerusalem and the West Bank as the survey sample for several reasons. Firstly, many of

the participants in the narrative research emphasized the importance of student

involvement in initiating and coordinating a viable popular resistance campaign.

Numerous interviewees referred to the role of students in leading the first intifada, and

many referred to their own experiences as student activists as being foundations for their

continued activism. In addition, when asked about challenges facing popular resistance

in the West Bank, many interviewees pointed to the lack of student participation.

Clearly, there was a pattern ofreferences in the narrative research to the importance of

student engagement for building a widespread movement, an idea also reflected

frequently in social movement literature and in historical examples. Thus, previous

research suggested that it was important to examine the attitudes and opinions of this

particular segment of the Palestinian population.

Secondly, the study focuses mainly on university students since this sample is

often associated with violent resistance. The average age of Palestinian suicide bombers

from 2000-2005 was 20.9 years, and 18.8 percent were graduates or students in higher

education, compared to 8 percent of the national average in Palestine (Benmelech &

Berrebi, 2007). Interviewees in my narrative research also commented that it was

sometimes difficult to engage youth and students in nonviolent activism because they are

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more inclined towards violence, ranging from throwing stones to armed resistance. As

scholars and practitioners alike thus look at Palestinian university students as potential

violent activists, I wanted to examine the attitudes of this population towards various

methods of resistance.

Thirdly, Palestinian university students were an accessible sample. I recognized

that the survey would be controversial, since it explicitly asks participants to report on

both behaviors and attitudes associated with violent resistance. Even though I

emphasized orally and in writing that the survey was voluntary and that all responses

would remain confidential, I understood that many individuals might suspect me of

collecting information for the Israeli government or the CIA. Indeed, three universities

that I approached would not allow me to administer the survey due to its sensitive nature.

However, in general, the university campuses provided a safe space to administer the

surveys, especially with the assistance of contacts in the university faculties,

administrations, and student leaders, who helped in administering the survey to minimize

suspicion of my intent. The university environment also allowed me to attain a diverse

sample, since students represented different genders, religions, political affiliations, and

geographic backgrounds.

Since it was not logistically feasible to have a random sample of students, the

study instead employed purposive non-proportional quota sampling to ensure a diverse

sample. The sampling was purposive in that, as stated above, the research targets

Palestinian university students, and it was reflective of the non-proportional quota

approach in that I sought to have at least thirty percent of the respondents be female to

ensure gender diversity; 63 percent of participants were male and 37 percent were female.

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The survey was administered in July 2007 to 273 participants, ages 14-34 years, in

Jerusalem (Al-Quds University), Bethlehem (Bethlehem University), Hebron (students

from Hebron University, though the surveys took place off-campus due to the

university's request), Ramallah (Al-Quds Open University), Birzeit (Birzeit University),

Tulkarem (Al-Quds Open University), and Jenin (Arab American University of Jenin). 41

Survey Procedure

To distribute the survey, I first contacted friends and colleagues at the various

university campuses to assist me in administering the survey. We met on their respective

campuses on agreed upon dates, and approached different students individually or in

small groups in the cafeteria and the quad. My contact asked the students for a moment

of their time and briefly introduced me. I then introduced myself (in Arabic), explained

the nature and purpose of my research, and, if the student was interested in participating,

secured a verbal assent agreement. (As noted above, the IRB at American University

recognized the possible risk of associating names with opinions and reported behaviors

related to popular resistance, thus the requirement for written consent forms was waived.)

I orally reiterated the statement that was printed on the survey, reminding the student that

their participation was entirely voluntary, they could stop at any time, they could skip any

questions the did not want to answer, and their responses would be kept confidential. I

provided pens for the participants, and then waited nearby while they completed the

survey. I tried to answer any clarification questions they had, and my contacts served as

41 Surveys were not administered at An-Najah National University in Nablus despite my efforts, due to the request of the university. However, youth from Nablus were represented in other university samples, including Birzeit and AAUJ.

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translators when necessary. Some participants also expressed interest in discussing the

topics raised in the survey after completion, or asking me questions about my research

and/or opinions. I welcomed these conversations, and incorporated them in my

fieldnotes.

Participant Observation

Though this study does not claim or strive to be an ethnography, it incorporates

interactionist ethnographic methods (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995) in the form of

participant observation. Acting in different contexts as a participant observer and an

observing participant (Tedlock 1991; Hammack 2006), I have relied on my immersion in

the field to provide me with a "thick" understanding ( Geertz 1973) of the context in

which the research was conducted. The majority of observation data comes from my

presence, and thus participation, at various nonviolent direct actions, including

demonstrations, protests, re-plantings of olive trees, and dismantlings of roadblocks.

While I usually focused on documenting the events through photography or video, my

presence amongst the Palestinian activists made me a default participant also.

Data collection consisted of keeping detailed fieldnotes on my observations and

experiences throughout the various research periods, including additional observations

from the interviews and survey administration; documentations from events, meetings,

and conferences. that I attended related to popular resistance; reflections on my

involvement as a photography and film/video trainer with several youth media projects in

the West Bank; and notes on conversations and interactions with different people in

cafes, shops, taxis, and around town. I usually jotted notes in a notebook, then expanded

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my jottings into more developed fieldnotes at the end of each day. I drew from an

interpretive understanding of ethnography (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995) in writing

my fieldnotes, which is based on an immersive understanding of participation, and

acknowledges the role of the researcher's experience in producing written accounts. In

this way, my notes both reflect what I observed, as well as my own interpretations and

responses to those observations.

My role as a participant observer was important in several ways. First, contextual

awareness was necessary for acquiring and interpreting the data I gained in my narrative

and survey research. At every stage of research, I relied on my awareness of the political,

social, cultural, economic, and geographic contexts that I had obtained from immersion in

the field in shaping my interview questions and survey design and in conducting the

research. Moreover, it was necessary to have a deep contextual understanding when

interpreting and processing my findings from the other methods.

Furthermore, being a participant observer provided me with types and sources of

data that were distinct from the other methods. For example, my presence at various

actions, events, and trainings introduced me to activism strategies that I would not have

encountered through narrative or survey research alone. In other instances, my role as a

participant observer enhanced my understanding of themes and phenomena that were

raised in through the interviews or surveys, but which I could not fully appreciate without

being present to experience them directly. For example, several interviews with

grassroots activists had revealed tensions between themselves and NGOs claiming to be

engaged in nonviolence. While I at first thought these criticisms may be due to personal

differences, my presence at actions revealed different levels of participation and

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engagement between the local organizers and the NGO staffs that I had not expected to

see.

Engaging in participant observation also increased both my access to activists and

my legitimacy. In terms of access, I was able to meet numerous activists and make

contacts with various leaders simply by being present at different actions and events.

Moreover, the fact that I was a regular participant at events such as demonstrations,

rallies, tree re-plantings, and other direct actions made activists willing to talk to me or

help me distribute surveys. For example, after seeing me at the weekly protests, local

resistance leaders in the villages south of Bethlehem whom I interviewed early in my

fieldwork later called to invite me to unpublicized meetings and events. Similarly, my

ongoing role as a coordinator of youth media trainings in the region gave me credibility

that I would not have had if I relied solely on interviews and surveys. Indeed, an activist

and photographer in Hebron who learned about photography trainings I coordinated

invited me to meet with friends of his in a rural cave community near the South Hebron

Hills that I would not have had access to otherwise. Finally, my "embededness" at

events allowed me to encounter some of the direct challenges faced by the activists,

ranging from movement restrictions to tear gas to near arrest, enabling me to understand

their experiences more deeply and giving me a better reference point during interviews.

While my level of engagement was usually beneficial to the study, it presented

limitations as well. First, I had to be careful not to get too friendly with certain

individuals or organizations, not only to retain a comfortable analytical perspective, but

also to avoid alienating other activists who might have concerns with other people or

groups. For example, I had to disassociate myself from an organization with whom I had

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partnered for youth media projects because I found that the group had a bad reputation

with other people I wanted to meet. Second, from a more academic perspective, I

recognize that my participation and engagement limit my objectivity, and indeed

influence the very phenomena that this study examines.

The Microscope: Data Analysis

The study approaches data analysis through the methodological lens of grounded

theory, in which theory is "inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it

represents ... One does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather, one begins with an

area of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge" (Strauss and Corbin

1990, 23). This inductive and iterative approach is particularly useful in studies

examining newly emerging phenomena because the data existing prior to the study is

limited for conceptualizing informed hypotheses. In this study for example, little

research has been conducted on nonviolence in Palestine, and the studies that do exist

focus on the first intifada; thus, it was helpful to base hypotheses and theories for this

research on the data collected during fieldwork through the methods discussed above.

In this way, data from preliminary interviews, surveys, and observations from my

first two summers in the West Bank were used to develop interview and survey questions

in the main fieldwork period. For example, initial conversations with nonviolent activists

in summer 2006 revealed common sentiments of re-introducing first intifada ideals, thus

influencing the decision to further probe activist identity formation in the extensive

interviews in 2007. Likewise, preliminary surveys conducted with youth in 2006

indicated that over fifty percent of youth supported both violent and nonviolent

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resistance, a finding which guided the development of the 2007 survey instrument which

examines youth attitudes towards multiple forms of activism. The episodic nature of my

fieldwork, taking place over a series of visits to Palestine, was conducive to this strategy

of intermittent analysis by allowing me to identify these trends in the context of shifting

conflict dynamics and adjust future research accordingly.

The research also reflects the grounded theory property of focusing on

participants' concerns and how they are aiming to resolve them. Indeed, grounded theory

does not merely aim to generate theory for theory's sake, but rather strives to formulate

theory that is relevant and useful on the practical level. According to Glaser, while one

criteria for adequate emerging theory is that it fits the situation, the other criteria is that

the theory works in practice; that is, it helps people in the situation make sense of their

experience and manage the situation better (Dick 2005). By relying on reflective,

iterative processes to generate practically relevant theories (Dick 2005), the grounded

theory approach adopted in the study reflects elements of action research, which "aims to

contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation

and to further the goals of social science simultaneously" (Gilmore, Krantz, and Ramirez

1986, 161 ). This approach is suitable for a study on nonviolence in Palestine because the

research is grounded in a real-world situation and seeks to be useful to activists and

practitioners involved with popular resistance in the West Bank.

With the aim of drawing conclusions that have both theoretical significance and

practical relevance, the study employs several data analysis methods within the broader

analytical framework of grounded theory. These methods are discussed in terms of

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qualitative and quantitative data analysis, in accordance with the mixed methodology

used in the data collection.

Qualitative Data Analysis

The initial reading of the qualitative data--in terms of transcribing interviews and

rewriting rough fieldnotes--functioned as the first step in analysis, in which I wrote short

notes and memos to start developing ideas about relationships and trends in the data

(Maxwell 2005; Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). I then used both categorical and

holistic approaches (Hammack 2006; Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber 1998) to

organize and analyze the data, with categorical analysis exploring themes across

narratives and observations; and holistic analysis, or connecting strategies (Maxwell

2005), examining ideas within a single individual's narrative or observed episode. These

approaches allow the researcher to consider patterns both between and within participant

responses and observations.

Both approaches were necessary in this study to be compatible with the set of

research questions. On the one hand, the primary question exploring the extent to which

a space exists for the reemergence of a nonviolent movement in the case of post-Oslo

Palestine requires a connecting approach to assess attitudes and events in the given

context. Likewise, the question examining the role of activist identity in mobilization

and participation requires a holistic analysis of activist narratives and the use of

connecting strategies within the context of Palestine. On the other hand, the question of

real and potential challenges and opportunities facing nonviolent activists both in and

beyond the Palestinian context requires a categorizing strategy. The two strategies thus

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complement each other (Maxwell 2005), allowing for both specific contextual analysis

and broader theory generation.

Categorization Analysis

The categorization strategy of thematic analysis was first used to organize the data

into broader themes through the development of organizational, substantive, and

theoretical categories (Maxwell 2005, 97). According to Maxwell, organizational

categories are anticipated topics that "function primarily as 'bins' for sorting the data for

further analysis" (2005, 97). I thus used this classification approach to organize the main

forms of nonviolent resistance into broad categories, namely direct action, NGO efforts,

media activism, youth media initiatives, and daily acts of resistance. 42 This step in

categorization was useful and necessary in this study because of the lack of previous

research on popular resistance in the given time period. Because of this dearth of

knowledge, it was appropriate to use this categorization strategy to first identify the

various forms of nonviolent activism taking place before attempting to analyze those

methods.

Using the organizational categories as a framework, I describe the beliefs and

concepts used by, or observed in, participants to develop substantive categories critically

examining the fragmentation of popular resistance efforts. In addition to physically

divisive Israeli measures like the wall and checkpoints, these emic categories include

divisions between activists, within civil society, and in Palestinian political culture, all of

which inhibit the emergence of a unified, widespread movement.

42 The rationale behind this typology is discussed further in Chapter 4.

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These classifications were then further developed into theoretical categories,

which "place the coded data into a more general abstract framework" (Maxwell 2005,

97). In this study, these etic, or researcher-developed, theories were developed

inductively, in accordance with grounded theory, and include categories related to activist

identity formation, framings of nonviolent resistance, and youth participation. These

categories were used for extrapolating beyond the case of Palestine to build more widely

applicable theory.

Connecting/Holistic Analysis

In contrast to categorizing analysis, connecting or holistic strategies seek to

understand the data in context. Thus, rather than dissecting and sorting data into

categories, the researcher looks for "relationships that connect statements and events

within a context into a coherent whole" (Maxwell 2005, 98). This approach was used in

the research to identify connections between various narratives and observations to better

understand the phenomenon of popular resistance in the given time period, and to

examine aspects of collective identity. For example, holistic analyses of narratives and

observations revealed trends in redefining resistance, re-activating the popular

committees, and reclaiming activism at the village level. These themes were not

discussed as generic categories, but rather emerged to reveal how popular resistance is

conceived at this particular point in Palestinian history, specifically in response to the

second intifada and inspired by the first intifada. Likewise, the shared identity of most of

today's nonviolence leaders as former activists or militants in the first intifada provided

insight into individual and collective identity construction that contributes to levels of

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participation in resistance. In these ways, holistic analyses of notes and transcripts

allowed for the emergence of connecting relationships within the current Palestinian

context, which complemented the organizational, substantive, and theoretical categories

developed using categorization techniques.

Quantitative Analysis

The survey data was coded and entered into an Excel spreadsheet using direct

data entry, and descriptive statistics were used to interpret the data in terms of mean

responses. I also examined means of subsets of the data to investigate relationships

between gender, religion, and political affiliation and attitudes towards popular

resistance. These tests were important to support the hypothesis that a space for popular

nonviolent resistance exists across demographics.

The Mirror: Reflections of the Researcher

In this section, I reflect on my research through the lenses of my own background

and identity, a task which may be uncommon in most dissertations, but which I deem

essential due to both the philosophical approaches and research methods employed in the

study. Rather than attempt to maintain an illusion of objectivity or detachment, I prefer

to gain credibility by being open and explicit in recognizing my own positionality in

regards to this project.

My reliance on interviews and participant observation demands reflexivity from

the researcher, as both narrative research and interactionist ethnography require

significant interpretive work (Hammack 2006). Indeed, the data acquired via both of

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these techniques were filtered through my own lenses of identity and understanding. In

this way, my own personal narrative both informed and was informed by my fieldwork;.

thus, it is necessary to reflect directly on this narrative.

Moreover, the paradigms of grounded theory and action research included in this

research require the reflexivity of the researcher. In grounded theory, reflection is

essential for processing fieldwork, while reflection is also an intrinsic aspect of action

research, in that it is beneficial to come to terms with one's background, beliefs, and

biases. In accordance with this approach, it is advantageous for me locate myself within

my research, be aware of how I perceived different people, places, and experiences; and

be conscious of the ways in which others might perceive me. 43 In the following sections,

I thus provide a brief chronological narrative of my background and engagement with

Palestine, and reflections on how my identity has both shaped and been shaped by my

fieldwork.

Narrative of the Researcher

During my fieldwork, I was often asked if I was Palestinian or if one or both of

my parents are Arab, perhaps due to my mere presence in the region, my Mediterranean

features, or my moderate competency in Arabic. However, I have no direct ties to the

region, having been raised in a Catholic family of Italian heritage in the suburbs of

Washington, DC. I was fortunate to grow up in a diverse area where I had friends and

43 This reflexive approach is largely inspired by feminist methodological theory. See for example England 2005; Mauthner and Doucet 2005; Letherby 2003.

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classmates of different faiths and ethnic backgrounds, including Jews, Muslims, and

Arabs.

Despite these personal interactions, I knew very little about the Middle East or the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict until high school, when my interest in the region was piqued

by exposure to secondary sources. My high school freshman English class read The

Source, by James Michener, which chronicles the evolution of Judaism, Christianity, and

Islam through the frame story of an archaeological dig in 1960s Israel. The land,

histories, faiths, and cultures described in the book fascinated me, and I sought out other

books on Israel-Palestine, most fictional, and most written from the Israeli/Jewish

perspective (Leon Uris, Herman Wouk, etc.). At the same time, I closely followed

mainstream media accounts of developments in the region, which at that time, in the mid-

1990s, was in the heart of the Oslo period.

I began my undergraduate studies at Duke University in 1998, eager to learn more

about Israeli and Palestinian history, culture, and politics. Taking an academic approach,

I enrolled in courses on Israel-Palestine, and wrote research papers on the region for other

courses, thus gaining a much more balanced understanding of the conflict that I had had

in the past, mainly by the inclusion of the Palestinian narrative which I had not

encountered before. At the same time, I was further influenced by lectures, discussions,

films, and other events organized by both Israeli and Jewish, and Arab and Muslim,

groups on campus, all of who were very active, and I became involved with a new group

called Hiwar (the Arabic word for dialogue) that sought to promote discussion on Middle

East related issues. I also sought out summer internships related to Israel-Palestine, and

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worked on developing an educators' guide for a film on Israeli and Palestinian youth at

the Seeds of Peace summer camp, thus exposing me directly to peace building efforts.

In addition to my personal studies and pursuits, my interest in the Middle East

was further enhanced during this time by world events. First, the outbreak of the second

intifada in 2000 was further evidence to me of the need for peace with justice in the

region. Secondly, the events and aftermath of September 11 ushered in new discourses

on the Middle East and Islam, some of which I found compelling and others that I found

problematic.

These personal and global developments combined to influence my decision to

work in the Middle East after graduation. However, as the second intifada was at its peak

in 2002, I had difficulty finding a job in Israel-Palestine, so I worked with a child

development NGO in Cairo, Egypt, instead, where my interest and understanding of

Islam and Arab cultures increased, and where I started learning Arabic. I tried to travel to

Israel-Palestine at the end of my time in Cairo, but I was denied entry at the Israeli

border, and was unable to enter the country for almost two years. Through frustrated by

this setback, I focused on activism and advocacy efforts back home in the States, teaching

a course on nonviolent activism in Israel-Palestine, participating in conferences, and

continuing to expand my knowledge of the conflict through various sources, including

graduate studies in peace and conflict resolution at American University.

In the summer of 2004, though still denied entry to Israel, I worked from

Washington for Massar Associates, a consultancy and development organization in

Ramallah. The following summer, I managed to secure a tourist visa to enter Israel, so I

interned for several months with the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group

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(PHRMG), where I conducted research on human rights and democracy in Palestine.

Though I had been studying and following the conflict for some time before this point,

actually being in the region, talking to people, and observing the conflict directly

provided me with a further depth of understanding and motivation to continue to pursue

work and research in the area.

I returned to the region in 2006 to work with the NGO Middle East Nonviolence

and Democracy (MEND), which coordinated nonviolence and media trainings with youth

in the West Bank, and to conduct preliminary research for my dissertation. During this

time, I also founded and directed the Contrast Project, an initiative that works with

0 Palestinian youth in using photography as a tool for expression and activism. Finally, I

returned to Palestine in 2007 for six months to conduct the core of my fieldwork, to

continue the Contrast Project, and to work on a new film/video project with youth in

refugee camps in the West Bank. I have thus continued to mix research and activism, and

theory and practice, in a continuous effort to expand my knowledge and understanding of

the conflict and the region.

I provide this brief narrative to give the reader a sense of how my interest and

passion, as well as my knowledge and experience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

developed, and consequently, provide insight into how this study evolved. I also offer

this account to the reader because it is the basic narrative that I shared with participants in

the field. Thus, the identities revealed in the narrative undoubtedly influenced how

people responded to me, as well as how I approached and interpreted the data.

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Influence on the Research

I do not claim to know how exactly different people responded to different

aspects of my background and identity. However, in this section, I aim to reflect on how

participant responses may have been influenced by two notable aspects of my identity

while conducting this research: the fact that I was an outsider and the fact that I am a

person of privilege.

In terms of being an outsider, the fact that I had no direct ties to either Israel or

Palestine had both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, although I do not

claim to be objective, the outsider identity can give the impression of relative objectivity,

which can elicit more honest responses from some participants (Hammack 2006). On the

other hand, I recognize that, because I am an outsider, some people may have told me

what they thought I wanted to hear, rather than what they really believed. Gaining

credibility and legitimacy was also difficult in some circumstances, as some people

questioned my motives for researching a topic and an area to which I have no personal

connection. (However, my participation in actions and events and my involvement in the

youth activism projects helped me gain credibility, as did my reliance on personal

references for making contacts.) Logistically, being an outsider sometimes made

communication difficult, as my Arabic, though functional, is not fluent, and possibly

made it difficult for people to communicate openly with me, and vice versa. Finally, it is

important to acknowledge that the very presence of any outsider in any situation naturally

alters the environment, especially when the researcher acts as a participant, thus

unavoidably shaping the environment being observed.

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In addition to being an outsider in terms of nationality, I was also a minority in

many situations due to my gender. The majorities of interviews were conducted with

men, and most meetings, conferences, and actions were predominantly male. While the

fact that I was a foreign female gave me access to some mostly male settings, including

certain cafes, offices, and social gatherings, I did not attempt access in many situations

due to my gender. When I did gain access, I was very conscious of my female status,

such as when I was the only female in a bus of activists attending a conference in Bil'in,

or when I was the only female at a popular committee meeting and demonstration in

Hebron. At the same time, I found that I did not always fit in with groups of females

either, due to my outsider status and our different gender identities.

The fact that I was an outsider also contributed to my privileged identity. Any

international is automatically privileged in Palestine, from the fact that internationals are

immune from freedom of movement restrictions, that we can "escape" from the conflict

at any time, and that we have a state of our own to which we can return home. For these

reasons, no matter how "immersed" one becomes, an outside researcher can never truly

understand the Palestinian experience. I felt this privilege on a daily basis, from being

able to walk through the checkpoints with minimal questioning, to traveling freely

between Jerusalem and the West Bank, to being able to confront soldiers at

demonstrations without risking long-term detention. I was very conscious of this position

of privilege, and these privileges were pointed out to me by various people I spoke with.

My privileged identity was also influenced by the fact that I am an American.

Indeed, from some perspectives, Americans are not pure "outsiders" like some other

internationals, because of the United States' current and historical role in the conflict.

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The US government's alignment with Israel on most policy issues automatically links

Americans to the oppressive system of the occupation, a fact which many people made

clear to me. I had to acknowledge the role that my country plays in the conflict, and

patiently respond to people's suspicions that I was working for the CIA or the Israeli

Ministry of the Interior.

I also was aware that my educational level and middle class background gave me

a privileged identity in Palestine. While at times my educational level was almost a

liability, especially with some grassroots activists who viewed researchers and academics

as disconnected from true resistance, in most cases it gave me legitimacy and even an

(undesired) aura of prestige that gave me access to different individuals and events. My

position as a well-educated American also puts me in a different socioeconomic position

than many of the people I interacted with, which may have had an effect on how we

perceived each other.

Influence on the Researcher

In the last section, I explained how elements of my identity, particularly my

outsider status and privileged position, may have affected my fieldwork and research. In

this section, I briefly reflect on how the fieldwork informed my own positionality. As

alluded to in the preceding section, conducting this research made me further appreciate

the position of privilege that I enjoy, not only in Palestine but in other locations and at

home in the United States as well. Also, in conducting the research, I discovered how

difficult it is to remain an "outsider" in a conflict like this. Although I never intended to

maintain complete objectivity, I struggled with the tension of balancing proximity and

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distance to the conflict, and with defining my role as a participant observer or observing

participant. I will be forthright in acknowledging my increasing support for and

participation in nonviolent activism in Palestine, and as stated previously, I hope that this

study will be useful to that movement. However, I developed this position not out of a

desire to "take sides" in the conflict, but rather because I see popular resistance as the

most viable way to secure a just peace for both Israelis and Palestinians.

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ACTIVISM AND ATTITUDES

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"A COLOR OTHER THAN BLOOD":44 NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

IN THE WEST BANK

We are not working for peace. We are working to end the occupation. --Majdi, interview, 2006

In this chapter, I discuss the state of nonviolent resistance 45 in the West Bank

during the second intifada (2000-2008). Whereas the next section of this project

constitutes a more critical analysis of Palestinian nonviolence, this chapter primarily aims

to describe the "repertoire" (Tilly 2004, 3) of nonviolent action in Palestine during the

second intifada. The goals of the chapter are to show that the strategy of nonviolence

44 The title of this chapter was inspired by one activist's comment stating, "I think there has been enough blood. I want to find a color other than blood" (interview, 2007).

45 As noted in the introduction, I use the terms "nonviolence" (or "nonviolent activism," "nonviolent action," or "nonviolent resistance") and "popular resistance" interchangeably in my discussion. The term "nonviolence" is perhaps the most accurate word for western readers in describing these types of actions, as nonviolence is commonly associated with activism, social movements, and notions of "people power." However, the Arabic word for nonviolence (la 'anf) often has negative connotations, implying submission, passivity, and even normalization. For this reason, many Palestinian activists prefer the term "popular resistance" (muqu 'ama sha 'abia) to refer to actions and strategies considered to be "nonviolent" by activists in the United States and elsewhere. For the purpose of this chapter, both nonviolence and popular resistance refer to "a set of attitudes, actions, or behaviors intended to persuade the other side to change their opinions, perceptions, and actions" (Abu-Nimer 2003; 2006; 135), by "mobilizing social, economic, and political power, without recourse to killing or otherwise causing direct physical injury" (Ackerman & Kruegler 1994, 4).

120

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was in fact used during the second intifada, and to illustrate that the scope of nonviolence

expanded beyond conventional direct action tactics.

Although the second intifada was characterized as mostly violent, especially

relative to the first intifada, many individual~ organizations, and communities continued

to utilize nonviolence throughout the second intifada. Recognizing the extent of

nonviolence in this time period is important for several reasons. First, this endeavor is

necessary for scholarship, as there is limited research on nonviolent resistance in

Palestine, and most research that does exist focuses on the use of nonviolence in the first

intifada (see King 2007; Abu-Nimer 2003; Dajani 1999, 1995; Awad 1992; D. Kuttab

1988; J. Kuttab 1988). With the exception of Abu-Nimer (2006), the few articles

published on nonviolence in Palestine after the start of the second intifada called for more

nonviolent action in Palestine without sufficiently acknowledging the nonviolent efforts

that had been taking place (see Kuttab 2003, Stephan 2003). It is thus important to

document the elements of popular struggle in Palestine to maintain an updated historical

record of nonviolence in the region.

Furthermore, it is beneficial for local, regional, and international actors to be

aware of nonviolent initiatives as they determine their opinions, actions, and policies to

influence change in the area. On the local level, it is helpful for Palestinians to be

informed about episodes of nonviolent struggle being conducted by other Palestinians.

Increasing the visibility of nonviolent activism can help actively redefine the negative

concept of nonviolence held by many Palestinians, and can inspire others to participate.

On the regional level, disseminating knowledge on Palestinian nonviolence is important

for challenging many Israelis' association of violence and terrorism with Arab

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populations, while also identifying avenues for joint actions and meaningful dialogue

between Israeli and Palestinian citizens and leaders respectively. On the international

level, raising awareness about nonviolence in Palestine can help redefine public opinion

towards Palestine, especially in the United States, and can create opportunities for policy

change.

In the following sections, I use an organizational categorization approach to

underscore the scope of nonviolent activism in the West Bank in the second intifada

period, including several case studies to provide more in-depth descriptions of specific

tactics. As in many popular struggles, there are a plethora of individual and collective

approaches to nonviolence in Palestine, ranging in concept, form, and objective. For

organizational purposes, I explore Palestinian nonviolent actions through the framework

of several dimensions of activism. This is not an attempt to separate actions or categorize

activism into rigid boxes; on the contrary, it is important to note that some actions reflect

multiple approaches to nonviolence, and some individuals and organizations engage in

various forms of resistance. This organization of nonviolent efforts also does not aim to

be exhaustive, as it is recognized that nonviolence takes many forms, not all of which can

be identified in a single study. Rather, it is hoped that this organizational framework

provides clarity, structure, and specificity for examining the broader phenomenon of

nonviolent action in the West Bank. In particular, I use this framework to illustrate how

the repertoire of nonviolence was not limited to the direct action approach often

associated with nonviolence, but rather included a variety of approaches, in accordance

with the contextual political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings

available.

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I begin the discussion with a description of community-based nonviolent efforts

utilizing direct action tactics, such as demonstrations, marches, and protests, primarily led

by village popular committees. Direct action often constitutes the most visible form of

nonviolent action, and it is the form of action most frequently associated with the concept

of nonviolent activism. Second, I discuss the role of civil society in terms of social

movement organizations (SMOs) organizing direct action; NGOs coordinating

nonviolence trainings, organizing popular education campaigns, and supporting episodes

of direct action in the West Bank; political parties mobilizing for popular resistance; and

alternative media outlets amplifying the occurrence of nonviolent efforts in the local and

international spheres. Finally, I examine everyday acts of resistance that may not fit

traditional notions of activism, but reflect acts of perseverance and determination that

constitute a sort of "subtle resistance." This concept of sumoud (steadfastness) was

identified by numerous Palestinians as both a timely and traditional method of resistance

in the region. Considered collectively, these diverse modes of resistance constituted a

cycle of (nonviolent) contention during the second intifada that has not yet been

sufficiently mapped by scholars or activists. A table summarizing the typology is

provided at the end of the chapter.

Grassroots Direct Action

Direct Action as a Strategy

Direct action refers to strategic nonviolent tactics that deliberately challenge the

authority of the oppressor. Direct action is usually the most visible form of popular

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resistance and is the approach typically associated with nonviolent activism. Nonviolent

direct actions can include acts of omission, when people refuse to perform acts that they

are required to do by practice, custom, or law; acts of commission, when people perform

acts that they are not usually expected or allowed to perform; or combinations of the two

(Sharp 1973 ). Both acts of omission and acts of commission can be categorized in the

areas of protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention (Sharp 1973; Helvey

2004; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994).

Protest and Persuasion

Acts of protest and persuasion include public actions such as mass

demonstrations, marches, and vigils; formal statements such as petitions, declarations,

and public statements; symbolic acts such as displaying flags, colors, and symbols; and

communicative acts such as hanging banners and posters, distributing newspapers and

leaflets, and holding meetings and teach-ins. While often used strategically throughout

nonviolent movements, acts of protest and persuasion usually emerge early in a struggle,

and can function as tools for mobilization and consciousness-raising.

Protest and persuasion techniques have several objectives. First, actions of this

nature seek to provide a signal to oppressive forces that the participants seriously object

to certain policies or acts. Moreover, these actions serve to show the wider oppressed

population that the opposition movement is challenging the oppressor, thus encouraging

others to critically analyze their situation and, ultimately, work for change. Finally,

persuasive actions can raise consciousness about the situation outside of the region, thus

calling attention to the situation and increasing international solidarity. In these ways, as

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Helvey (2004) summarizes, protest and persuasion tactics aim to "expose the actions of

the regime to public scrutiny, express objections to them, and attempt to persuade the

regime and others that change is needed."

Noncooperation

Often considered the most powerful category of nonviolent tactics (Helvey 2004),

noncooperation include acts of social, political, and economic noncooperation. Social

noncooperation includes acts such as shunning and ostracism, suspension or boycott of

social events, and disobeying social norms, thus marginalizing the oppressive

community. Acts of economic noncooperation, including boycotts, strikes, and

nonpayment of taxes, aim to impair the means available to a government to provide

goods and services to its supporters, thus decreasing supporter loyalty. In addition,

reducing government means can ultimately hinder its ability to carry out oppressive

policies. While nearly all nonviolent acts are political to a degree, acts of political

noncooperation refer specifically to actions that aim to reject the authority of the

occupying power, such as withdrawal of political support, boycott of government bodies,

and refusal to recognize government institutions.

The objective of noncooperation is to make it difficult for the government to

function by withdrawing the people's consent to the occupying power. While impairing

the oppressor, noncooperation can also increase solidarity within the community and

strengthen civil society (Helvey 2004).

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Intervention

Intervention refers to acts of civil disobedience, such as sit-ins, pray-ins, defiance

of blockades, land seizure, and use of alternative social, economic, transportation, and

communication systems. Interventionist tactics aim to disrupt established practices and

policies with the aim of creating new relationships, institutions, and patterns of behavior

(Helvey 2004). Because they are more confrontational, interventionist acts often put

activists at greater risk of immediate and severe repression than other actions. However,

because they are provocative, interventionist actions can sometimes bring a more timely

response to the situation, or at least succeed in achieving immediate visibility for the

issue.

Even when the oppressive power responds to interventionist tactics with violence,

such harsh responses can bring about change by initiating political jiu-jitsu. According to

Sharp, political jiu-jitsu occurs when "negative reactions to the opponents' violent

repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the

opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent

resisters" (Sharp 1973; Helvey 2004). In this way, harsh responses by an occupying

power to activist tactics can convince other bodies, such as international organizations,

institutions, and states, to put pressure on the regime and/or lend support to the

movement.

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Grassroots Direct Action in the West Bank

Village-Based Resistance

Popular resistance during the second intifada was largely rooted at the village

level, where local communities used strategies of protest, noncooperation, and

intervention to resist the occupation. There are several explanations for this localization

of action, which will be explained in more depth in Part III. However, for many local

communities, the decision to act was not so much a choice, but a necessity. Indeed, the

majority of village-based resistance aimed to halt (or at least re-route) the construction of

the separation barrier, which has separated many village-based farmers from their

agricultural land. The farmers, their families, and the communities themselves rely on

the land for sustenance and livelihood, thus, prohibition of access instigated a number of

grassroots resistance campaigns.

The majority of village-based direct action campaigns were (and continue to be at

the time of writing) coordinated by local popular committees. Popular committees

emerged in the first intifada to organize local resistance in accordance with strategies

developed by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), an organized

underground movement that coordinated nonviolent actions for all of Palestine, through

the use of weekly or biweekly fliers and communiques. 46 The role of the popular

committees and the UNLU diminished significantly with the PLO centralization of

actions in the latter half of the first intifada, and essentially remained dormant during the

1990s and the first three years of the second intifada. However, popular committees

46 See Chapter 2 for more on the UNLU.

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started to re-emerge in several villages to coordinate local resistance activities in 2003,

largely in response to the construction of the separation barrier, and these served as

models for other villages initiating their own committees in subsequent years.

Popular committees are grassroots in the truest sense of the word, consisting of

individual volunteers from local communities with natural ties to the land and closeness

to the people. This proximity, in terms of geography and lived experiences, gives

popular committees a degree of legitimacy and respect that may be difficult for non

community members to attain. The committees are not formal, therefore giving them

considerable flexibility and freedom to communicate and associate with various groups

and stakeholders. The membership of the popular committees varies, but often includes

village elders, farmers, activists, students, and local political leaders. The diverse

composition of the popular committees allow community members to collaborate on

various objectives and actions in such ways that overcome political divisions plaguing

other levels of Palestinian society.

Village popular committees undertake a variety of duties. For the sake of this

discussion, it is important to note the popular committees' role in coordinating direct

actions in terms of protest, noncooperation, and intervention. Regarding protest, popular

committees are the primary organizers of sustained campaigns usually consisting of

weekly demonstrations following the Friday prayer. Villages throughout the West Bank

have mobilized to organize and sustain these weekly marches, usually near the

construction sites of the separation barrier. In terms of intervention, popular committees

have organized episodes of civil disobedience, again focused on the separation barrier, by

mobilizing villagers to physically block the destruction of olive groves and other land, or

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by taking control of the bulldozers and other equipment used for the wall construction.

Finally, regarding noncooperation, popular committees have been instrumental m

organizing boycotts of Israeli products, particularly those manufactured in settlements.

Each popular committee also performs other tasks in accordance with local

grievances and needs, with several committees even pursuing legal cases in Israeli courts

on behalf of the villagers. In addition to coordinating the direct actions described above,

popular committees also typically handle the village's communications with Israeli

authorities and sometimes settlers, maintain records and maps of land closures and

seizures, act as spokespeople with the media, offer support to other villages, and

coordinate actions, conferences, and events with other committees.47 In addition to the

case study below, detailed examples of village-based resistance coordinated by popular

committees in Budrous, Biddu, South Bethlehem, and the South Hebron Hills are

available in Appendix E.

Case Study: Bil'in

The village of Bil'in became a symbol of popular resistance in Palestine during

the second intifada. Bil'in is a small farming village of approximately 1,700 residents,

located twelve kilometers west of Ramallah, and just four kilometers east of the Green

Line. The separation barrier's route cut off the village from over 2,000 dunams

(approximately 500 acres) of its agricultural land, to allow for the expansion of the

nearby Modi'in Illit settlement.

47 For more on the role of popular committees in the first intifada, see Chapter 2.

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Starting in January 2005, Bil'in residents began participating in weekly

demonstrations to protest the construction of the separation barrier, in which villagers

marched from the mosque to the construction site. However, as the protest and

persuasion techniques were having little effect on the wall's construction, leaders in the

village decided that they needed to organize a popular committee, re-evaluate their work,

and explore alternative tactics. As Ibrahim,48 a member of Bil'in's popular committee

explains,

We had to figure out how we wanted to continue, and what would be our aim. In the beginning, it was too simple, without any organization ... No one was thinking in terms of mapping or planning a strategy, but that need arose from our experience in the field. We felt we needed to decide on a strategy, aims, tactics, and methods. (interview, 2007)

The popular committee was formed on February 20, 2005, including members

from Fateh, Barnas, Islamic Jihad, Mubadara, and other parties, and with close

communication with local NGOs and CBOs. The committee decided to emphasize at the

demonstrations that they were not against the soldiers, but against the occupation.

Furthermore, they decided to focus on calling attention to the problem of land

confiscation, in addition to the direct violence of the occupation that was visible at the

demonstrations.

The popular committee also began to consider more creative noncooperation and

intervention strategies. For example, on May 3, 2005, the IDF informed the village that

the bulldozers would be coming to uproot a grove of Bil'in's olive trees. Rather than

replanting the trees after the uprooting, an act of protest conducted by other villages, the

48 All interviews were confidential. Names of participants have been changed or withheld by mutual agreement.

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popular committee, along with several Israeli activists, instead tied themselves to the

olive trees and prevented their destruction. According to Ibrahim,

It was like a day of revolution in how to resist. It communicated our real message, and it was successful, because the soldiers couldn't do anything, like arrest us or beat us. We weren't doing anything illegal, we weren't aiming at them, we didn't damage their property, and they couldn't claim it as a military zone since it was clearly our land. So this started a new way in our resistance. (interview, 2007)

The popular committee continued to experiment with different types of actions.

At several demonstrations, they used mirrors to reflect anti-occupation slogans onto the

IDF soldiers and jeeps. At another protest, they had a group of activists distract the

soldiers while Tito Kayak, a Puerto Rican activist and climber, scaled a nearby Israeli

surveillance tower and unfurled the Palestinian flag at its top. On other occasions,

members of the popular committee locked themselves in water barrels as a political

theater allusion to the film, "Under the Sun," in an effort to stop the bulldozers. These

actions were successful in delaying the construction of the wall, and also in getting

Bil'in's name in the news and calling media attention to the plight of villages affected by

the wall, settlements, and land confiscation. The media attention subsequently increased

international and Israeli activist support for the village, thus providing the weekly

demonstrations with additional support and participation from the International Solidarity

Movement (ISM) and Israeli groups such as Ta'ayush, Gush Shalom, and Anarchists

Against the Wall.

Popular resistance continued in Bil'in even after the initial construction and

closure of the wall. On December 22, 2005, the popular committee worked with Israeli

activists to coordinate a caravan to their land on the opposite side of the wall, which

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resulted in the participants being arrested and detained. They tried again on the night of

December 24, when one of the Israeli civil administration officers told them that it was

illegal for them to go to the other side of the wall unless they had a house there. As

Ibrahim explains,

That gave me an idea to build a house there between the wall and the settlement. We knew the police wouldn't be back until the next morning, so I got everyone to agree to help build the house. I went back to the village and got materials, someone else went and found workers, and I found someone with a vehicle to help bring the supplies ... It was raining, but we managed to finish the house by the morning. When the policeman returned, he was shocked and yelled at the soldiers, because now they couldn't arrest us! So we succeeded, and the house is still there. (interview, 2007)

Villagers, as well as international and Israeli activists, ensure that someone

inhabits the house twenty-four hours a day, thus giving the Palestinians claim to the land

and forcing several policy changes. First, the presence of the Palestinian house on the

settlement side of the wall blocked the construction of additional settler buildings, and

required the settlement to dismantle several buildings and change the route of the main

road. Second, a decision by Israel's Supreme Court mandated that the Palestinian claim

presence requires that farmers have access to the land on the far side of the wall by way

of a gate. However, the presence of the gate has not been a .viable solution for most

farmers. As Bil'in farmer and activist Abu Sarni explains,

Even with the gate, I still consider the land lost. It takes several hours to get back and forth by going through the gate, and you never know when they might close it and you get stuck either inside or outside. There are many restrictions also; for several months we haven't been able to bring in our livestock, like sheep and donkeys, and there are limitations on the hours that the gate is open. (interview, 2007)

Abu Sarni also reported that the Israeli soldiers often harass the farmers when

they are on the far side of the wall:

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Once I was on the other side of the wall, on my land, and a soldier challenged me, and I said that I was just abiding by the court decision to let us enter the land. But the soldier didn't believe me, and he arrested me, and blindfolded me, and handcuffed me, and took me into detention. Finally, they took me back to the gate area, but I was still blindfolded and handcuffed, and they laughed at me while I tried to figure out where I was. I told them to untie me, but they just laughed ... (interview, 2007)

As the farmers continued to suffer, the village continued to struggle. Like the

nearby villages of Budrous and Biddu, Bil'in's popular committee sought legal assistance

through the Israeli court system, with the help of Israeli legal organization Yesh Din and

Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard. Although it took almost two years for the

case to be heard, on September 4, 2007, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the

government to redraw the route of a 1. 7 kilometer section of the wall near Bil 'in because

the current route was "highly prejudicial" to the villagers and not justified on security

grounds (Asser 2007). The village was supposed to get back between 1,000 and 1,400

dunams (between 250 and 350 acres) of the 2,000 dunams confiscated, however, as of

December 2008, no action had been taken on the ground to return the land or change the

route of the wall. Meanwhile, the court also upheld the legality of the Mattiyahu East

neighborhood, a section of the Modi'in Illit settlement built on village land. Nevertheless,

the legal decision to change the route of the wall was hailed as a major victory by Bil'in

activists.

The legal victory once again garnered regional and global media attention for

Bil'in, which as been one of the objectives of the popular committee. Raed, a

videographer from Bil'in who heads the media section of the popular committee, notes,

"Media is very important in Bil'in. The whole world sees the story of Bil'in so it has

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changed the whole situation. The general media likes the story because we do creative,

different things." According to Raed, the village has deliberately used media as a tool for

resistance. Bil'in has also increased publicity by holding annual nonviolent activism

conferences in the village for Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals, and assisting in

organizing popular committees and resistance in other villages.

Nationally Coordinated Resistance

As local resistance campaigns have expanded, there have been efforts to

coordinate a more unified movement on the national level, or to at least link local village

actions through a shared framework of organization and operation. These efforts are not

distinct from village-based resistance so much as they overlap with local movements and

expand beyond them in geographic scope and issue focus. In terms of location, the

implementation of national resistance still occurs at the village level, with members of the

national committee either participating in demonstrations or serving on local popular

committees. Yet, they also plan or participate in public actions and demonstrations in

cities and university campuses. Whereas local village resistance usually concentrates on

opposing small sections of the wall that affect a specific local community, national

resistance efforts resist the wall in its entirety. In addition, national efforts expand

resistance beyond the issue of the separation barrier to the entirety of the occupation.

A primary effort to increase coordination between the popular committees has

been through the creation of a National Committee for Popular Resistance, within the

PA' s Office of Settlements and the Wall, in the Ministry of the Interior. According to

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Abu Nadr, the coordinator of the national committee, the PA was slow to understand and

respond to the initial construction of the wall:

When the construction began, the PA believed the wall was being built on the Green Line, so they expected that they would basically get a nation handed to them. Also, the construction began during a time of heavy military incursions [in 2003], so people were distracted and more focused on the incursions than the wall. (interview, 2007)

As a result, from the start of the wall's construction, popular resistance was commg

primarily from the popular committees, and also from some NGOs, without any kind of

action or support from the PA. The PA finally started responding in 2004, when

Palestinian popular committees working with Israeli human rights lawyers brought a

legal case to the United Nations' International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague. On

July 9, the ICJ ruled that the wall violates international law, that construction should be

halted, that constructed sections of the wall should be demolished, and that reparations

should be given to Palestinians as damages (ICJ 2004). 49 Although the ICJ's ruling was

non-binding, it was hailed as a victory and succeeded in bringing local and global

attention to the issue of the wall.

The PA responded by creating a department within the Ministry of the Interior to

concentrate on the wall and settlements. Abu Nadr, who had been involved with the

popular committees in Bil'in and Biddu as an individual, was appointed to direct the

office, and he started by trying to organize the popular committees through a national

committee. The aims of Abu Nadr and the national committee were to create a collective

vision for the popular committees, work with Israeli lawyers in pursuing legal action, and

garner funding to cover the basic needs of the popular committees, such as transportation

49 See Chapter 2 for more on the separation wall and the ICJ ruling.

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and phone cards. The national committee also worked to develop partnerships between

the popular committees and Israeli and international solidarity organizations, noting that

the use of force by the IDF in response to demonstrations was considerably lower when

those groups were present. However, Abu Nadr was careful to ensure that the local

committees maintained decision-making power and ownership of their campaigns. As he

explained, "we made sure to give the popular committees fifty-one percent vote on

decisions so it wouldn't be the national committee taking over and enforcing opinions"

(interview, 2007).

Despite these efforts, Abu Nadr recognized that popular resistance remained very

localized, and he noted that the loss of funds after the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006

limited the national committee's ability to support widespread actions. However, in

March 2007, the national committee worked with local popular committees to organize a

conference for activists, which was held in Bil'in. According to Abu Nadr, "As the

national committee, we wanted to try to get everyone working together. So, at the

conference, we discussed the mistakes of the past, and set up a new committee to deal

with the challenges" (interview, 2007). Some of the issues that the committee continues

to explore include using international law to support resistance, discussing the role of

internationals and Israelis in resistance, increasing the participation of students, using the

media more effectively, and developing creative popular resistance tactics.

It is important to note that the above discussion on direct action in Palestine does

not intend to be exhaustive. Rather, it aims to provide a sense of the direct action tactics

utilized by various communities and groups in the West Bank. Moreover, it should be

recognized that many direct actions take place without the institutional framework of a

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political party or even a popular committee. For example, Yared, a young professional in

Ramallah, explains how he and his friends decided to organize actions to protest Israel's

2006 offensive in Lebanon:

We coordinated different activities each day for a month. Each day we met at 6 p.m. in Al-Manara [the city-center of Ramallah], and every day we did something unique. We played the national anthem, flew balloons; passed out [political] cartoons, organized a boycott by putting Israeli products on the street with a big "X" over them, and just did anything we could to increase public awareness. It was mainly just a group of friends who did this. (interview, 2007)

Yared's experience is just one of many direct action initiatives that were not affiliated

with any specific group, but still used tactics of protest and persuasion, and sometimes

noncooperation and intervention. There were also numerous "spontaneous" occurrences

of direct nonviolent action, including removals of roadblocks, re-planting of olive trees,

demonstrations at checkpoints, and hunger strikes in prisons.

Clearly, direct action continued to be used as a nonviolent tactic in Palestinian

resistance, utilized by village-based popular committees, national campaigns, and

community members. Although boycotts and episodes of civil disobedience reflected

elements of noncooperation and intervention, my interviews and observations indicated

that the majority of nonviolent direct action during and after the second intifada consisted

of protest and persuasion tactics, usually focused on the separation barrier. Indeed, the

construction of the separation wall ironically created a political opportunity for

resistance, by providing a common cause for activists, a visible image of oppression to

export internationally, and access to contact points with Israeli soldiers and police at

construction sites. However, the separation barrier was also effective in its purpose of

restricting movement, and further isolating Palestinians from Israelis and from each

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other. Thus, Palestinians utilized other channels of nonviolence at the civil society level

that complemented the village-based resistance.

Activism in Civil Society

In addition to grassroots campaigns, many Palestinian civil society organizations

have been active in coordinating or supporting nonviolent resistance efforts. According

to mobilization structure theorists, social movement organizations (SMOs) are distinct

from other organizations in that they "mobilize their constituency for collection action,

and they do so with a political goal" (Kriesi 1996, 152). Although theorists like Kriesi

typically analyze SMOs in the context of "new" transnational social movements, such as

peace, ecology, women's rights, and gay rights (see Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996; McCarthy

1996), I apply the concept here to describe organizations in Palestine that fulfill similar

functions in regards to the national movement. However, as Kriesi notes, SM Os are just

one part of a broader social movement sector (SMS) that includes supportive

organizations, movement associations, and political parties (1996, 152-153), all of which

contribute to popular resistance in the West Bank through the sphere of civil society.

Civil society has played a leading role in activism, education, and advocacy

throughout Palestinian history. As the deputy secretary at the Palestinian Initiative for

the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFT AH) commented, numerous

civil organizations have existed since the early years of the occupation, essentially

"keeping the country going before the PA, and still very active" after Oslo and during the

present period (interview, 2005)., Similarly, Dajani notes that, in Palestine, "in the

absence of a state and central government, and without any formal, centrally organized

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political socialization via schools, the media, religion, friends or family, people began to

organize themselves in civil groups--which subsequently became known as NGOs-and

took over the role of a government" (2007). 50 These organizations have assumed a

variety of roles and duties, including the provision of social services, political activism,

human rights monitoring, education, advocacy, media and outreach. Civil society groups

have thus taken a number of forms, such as women's groups, media outlets, trade unions,

democracy development groups, youth initiatives, human rights organizations, health

services, and religious institutions.

During the second intifada, civil society organizations facilitated nonviolent

activism in the West Bank in different ways. In this section, using Kriesi's framework

(1996), I first discuss how SMOs have coordinated and supported resistance efforts,

provided nonviolence trainings, and raised awareness locally and globally about the

situation in Palestine. Second, I discuss the role of action dialogue groups as movement

associations in terms of their constituency-oriented consensus mobilization function.

Third, I examine the role of political parties in organizing popular resistance. Finally, I

explore how alternative media initiatives, including grassroots news outlets and

participatory media projects, function as supportive organizations for activism and

advocacy by indirectly supporting the popular struggle.

Social Movement Organizations (SMOs)

In this section, I focus on examples of organizations participating in nonviolent

resistance through the direct action strategies of protest and persuasion, noncooperation,

5°For more on the development of Palestinian civil society, see Chapter 2.

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and intervention, as described above. These organizations help coordinate popular

resistance campaigns, support local activist initiatives, and educate the public about

nonviolence. SMOs actively coordinate resistance efforts by working with local

communities to establish popular committees, or by supporting grassroots campaigns,

coordinating actions, assisting with local trainings, and educating the public about

nonviolent activism.

Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall)

The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign is a coalition of

Palestinian NGOs and popular committees that coordinate efforts on local, national, and

international levels to resist the separation barrier and the occupation. Specifically, the

campaign aims to halt the construction of the wall, dismantle the existing sections, return

confiscated land to Palestinian owners, and compensate landowners for losses, in

accordance with the 2004 ICJ ruling. A seven-member coordinating committee works

with local popular committees and NGOs to support grassroots resistance, encourage

NGO and national mobilization, facilitate research and documentation, and encourage

international outreach and solidarity, especially in the form of boycott, divestment, and

sanctions (BDS) on Israel. 51

51 The Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign started in October 2002, when construction of the wall first began. As the founder and coordinator of the campaign explained, We started by visiting people in the affected areas to try to get a real sense of what was going on ... and started to bring things together. .. We decided that the only way to respond was through resistance and confrontation. We decided on three main dimensions of work. First, documentation and research. Second, organizing local committees to function as local contact groups and to organize local activities. And third, contacting international delegations and sending them to affected villages. (interview, 2007) The campaign started by supporting the village of Jayyous, which was organizing daily demonstrations against the wall in the fall of 2002. It then expanded to develop links with other villages in the northern

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Although the Stop the Wall aims for more organization and cooperation between

popular committees, the coordinators view the initiative as a true campaign, rather than

an NGO. As Ahmed, a member of the Coordinating Committee, notes, "Stop the Wall is

a campaign; we didn't want it to be an NGO, focusing on proposals and collecting

money. We didn't want it to be like any organization just looking for profits. It had to be

a grassroots struggle" (interview, 2007). Stop the Wall's resistance activities are also

primarily land-based; the campaign emerged out of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs

Network (PENGON), a collective of Palestinian environmental and agricultural NGOs,

and the campaign's activities remain focused on supporting rural areas and agricultural

villages. As Ahmed stated, "We needed to establish something national to support the

farmers, especially those who depended on the land for generations" (interview, 2007).

In the same way, Stop the Wall is committed to grounding its work in the local

communities. As Ahmed explained,

The idea of Stop the Wall was to establish a network of popular committees and land defense committees. Each committee consists of ten to fifteen people who are the main contacts for Stop the Wall. They let us know what is going on locally, and we assist them by helping them get media coverage, sending internationals, and writing reports on our website. (interview, 2007)

Ahmed pointed out that Stop the Wall goes beyond the strategies of protest and

demonstrations however. Indeed, the organization also conducts research on the effects

of the wall and the occupation, assists villages and families in using the legal system to

argue their cases, and encourages internationals to pressure their governments to support

region of the West Bank affected by the wall. In June 2003, the campaign convened a meeting in Tulkarem for the popular committees in the north, in which the local committees agreed to meet regularly to plan and coordinate activities together. They also declared an International Day Against the Wall on November 9, the date of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

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Palestinian rights. In 2005, the campaign also started a youth initiative, in which they

offer courses at university campuses on the effects of the wall, the history of Palestinian

struggle, and the importance of strategies like boycotting, and they take youth on trips to

other areas of the West Bank to see the effects of the wall. As Ahmed stated, "If we want

to educate youth, we should teach them about the history of the struggle, about the

leaders, and about why we have spent our lives fighting" (interview, 2007). In addition

to the courses and trips, Stop the Wall involves youth in their research and

documentation, and supports students in organizing actions and campaigns at their

universities.

Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (P ARC)52

In the second intifada, PARC worked closely with the Stop the Wall campaign

(discussed above) to reform the popular committees in rural areas as Land Defense

Committees, to support farmers in areas affected by the wall. According to Marwan, the

coordinator of PARC's Land Defense Committees, the committees have three main

dimensions: empowering farmers by "reinforcing farmers' confidence in themselves and

the land" (interview, 2007), challenging Israeli claims regarding the purpose of the wall,

and lobbying the PA to address the issue of the wall and aid farmers. Specifically, PARC

52 The largest Palestinian NGO, PARC focuses on various aspects of rural development and environmental protection, as well as the empowerment of rural women. PARC started in 1983 as a voluntary project in which local and international agronomists provided trainings and support to farmers whose land was being affected by the occupation. When the first intifada began in 1987, PARC organized a campaign to boycott Israeli goods, developed projects to aid the domestic economy, and played a role in getting food to areas under siege. According to PARC's director of lobbying and advocacy, these actions inspired PARC and its beneficiaries to start focusing on resistance, so they established a network of popular committees called Land Defense Committees, which coordinated resistance activities throughout the West Bank, especially in areas where land was being confiscated.

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works with farmers in areas threatened by the wall, holds workshops and meetings with

other groups related to the agricultural sector to discuss possible solutions, and pursues a

legal track to address land and water confiscation. PARC was instrumental in

coordinating a successful case regarding the water issue:

Our main concern was in determining how we could get water to reach the land behind the wall. PARC was successful in the northern region on this issue. Land had been confiscated behind the wall, but Israel didn't want bad media coverage. So when PARC tried to sue regarding the construction of the wall and the resultant water problems, Israel retreated because of the threat of the bad publicity. So, as a result, we were able to set up water pump lines to continue through the wall. (interview, 2007)

PARC's Land Defense Committees have since merged with Stop the Wall's popular

committees to join their efforts against the common concern of the wall, as well as

against checkpoints, settlements, and the occupation itself.

Holy Land Trust (HL T)

Holy Land Trust is an NGO founded in Bethlehem in 1998 to encourage the use

of nonviolence to resist the occupation, through community programs and local and

international advocacy initiatives. HLT coordinates a number of projects, including the

Palestine News Network (discussed in the following section), and travel and encounter

programs for international visitors and activists. However, the projects most relevant to

this section of the study consist of various nonviolence training programs. First, HL T

organizes trainings for villages being affected by the wall and settlements. As Suheil,

HL T's Nonviolence Coordinator, explained, the trainings last three days, and take place

in the villages, so the people can see the situation on the ground, and set up an action

plan. The first day focuses on conflict analysis, and applying different approaches to

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Israel-Palestine. The second day concentrates on understanding violence; as Suheil

notes, "To understand nonviolence, you have to recognize violence. Some of the people

practice nonviolence and don't know it is nonviolence. It's important to recognize

violence and nonviolence so people can differentiate" (interview, 2007). The third day

consists of exploring nonviolence in theory and practice, and the trainings conclude with

developing an action plan, and using role-playing to see how proposed actions might play

out in reality.

In addition to the village trainings, HL T offers short trainings on nonviolence in

various youth centers and sports clubs, and helps to organize conferences and summer

camps on nonviolence. HL T has also initiated a Training of Trainers (TOT) project, in

which they provided in-depth nonviolence training to a group of fourteen young people,

who work in pairs to provide nonviolence trainings and workshops to their respective

local communities. According to Maj di, HL T's office manager, the goal of the TOT

initiative is to spread the concept of nonviolent resistance to "build a nonviolent army in

Palestine" (intervew, 2007). As Majdi explained, "We don't just want to train people, we

want them to lead, to develop an action plan, and to act" (interview, 2007). HL T thus

focuses on nonviolence training, and supports local villages in their direct actions and

demonstrations.

Israeli and International Solidarity Organizations

Palestinian direct action in the West Bank has been supported by Israeli activist

groups, including Ta'ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, Gush Shalom, and Peace Now;

as well as international groups such as the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) and

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the Palestinian Solidarity Project (PSP). While the scope of this study does not allow for

an in-depth discussion of these groups' participation, it is important to note their ongoing

involvement in nonviolent direct action in the West Bank. Although Palestinian

organizers have different opinions on the role of Israeli and international activists, most

popular committees welcome their participation in a supportive capacity. In the

immediate short-term, soldiers tend to use less violent measures when Israelis and

internationals are present, and in the long-term, Israeli and international participation

increases media attention and global publicity. Because this study focuses on Palestinian

resistance efforts specifically, further description and analysis of Israeli and international

activist support remains a subject for future research. However, I briefly call attention to

Ta'ayush and ISM, since both of these groups include Palestinian participants.

Ta'ayush (Arabic for "life in common") was founded in 2000 by Jewish and

Palestinian Israelis as "a grassroots movement of Arabs and Jews working to break down

the walls of racism and segregation by constructing a true Arab-Jewish partnership"

(Ta'ayush 2007). The organization undertakes different projects to help Palestinians stay

on their land, and to educate the Israeli public about the situation. However, according to

Lina, a Palestinian-Israeli member of Ta'ayush, the main activities are supporting

Palestinian villages by participating in demonstrations organized by the popular

committees. As Lina explained, "Despite the doubts about their effectiveness and

necessity, there is always a need to demonstrate and express a collective cry of protest.

The demonstration is an old and traditional method, but it is irreplaceable and we are

determined to preserve it" (Just Vision interview, 2005).

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ISM was founded in August 2001 by Palestinian and international activists to

support nonviolent resistance in Palestine through participation in direct action,

emergency mobilization, and documentation. International activists with ISM worked

closely with Palestinian activists at the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between

Peoples (PCR) and also with the popular committees to coordinate actions. ISM also

offers nonviolence trainings in some Palestinian communities, and supports Palestinian

activists by providing financial aid and resources. Sarni, a 23 year-old activist from the

village of Beit Ommar, was active in nonviolent resistance for years through Fateh Youth

and as an independent, but he joined ISM during the second intifada to assist him in

continuing his activism:

As Palestinians, it's important to participate in nonviolent demonstrations, especially against the wall. But with the current economic situation, when I don't. have work, and when many others are unemployed, it's hard to get to the demonstrations. ISM helps us pay for the transportation to the demonstrations. (interview, 2007)

In this way, ISM serves as an additional avenue through which Palestinians, as well as

internationals, participate in direct action.

Palestinian organizations like Stop the Wall, PARC, and Holy Land Trust, as well

as Israeli and international solidarity groups like Ta'ayush and ISM, all function as SMOs

in terms of mobilizing their constituencies for action, and working towards a political

goal (Kriesi 1996, 152). In contrast to other more formal institutions, these organizations

function structurally as networks of individuals and groups, rely on committed adherents

as their primary resources, and engage in protest actions as their main mode of operation

(Rucht 1996, 187). They are thus distinct from NGOs and interest groups in general, and

movement organizations, supportive associations, and political parties in particular.

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I include these examples of SM Os to illustrate how nonviolent resistance during

the second intifada was not always clearly visible in its typical forms of demonstrations,

protests, marches, and other public actions. While these forms of resistance were evident

as well, as discussed in the previous section, much of the nonviolent activism during this

period was also located in the "submerged networks" (Melucci 1985) of Palestinian

SM Os. While some activists criticized the partial shift of activism from local

communities to organizations, as will be discussed further in Chapter 6, it is important to

recognize the role of these groups in both directly and indirectly contributing to popular

resistance. I also discuss these organizations' work to further underline the fact that

nonviolent efforts were simultaneously focused on mobilizing (or "training) local

populations and appealing to international networks, but often had limited engagement

with Israeli society directly. All of these phenomena (the shift from grassroots to

organizational activism, the focus on international solidarity, and the limited direct

contact with Israeli society) represented shifts in activism from the first intifada.

Movement Organizations: Action Dialogue

Some Palestinian organizations do not engage in direct action or nonviolence

trainings, but they do promote nonviolent resistance at the individual level, thus

contributing to "consensus mobilization" (Klandermans 1988) in accordance with

Kriesi's "movement associations" (1996). Although Kriesi describes movement

associations as voluntary associations, clubs, and self-help organizations created by a

movement to address the needs of its members (1996, 152-153), I use the term here to

refer to Israeli-Palestinian dialogue groups. In accordance with the more conventional

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definition of movement associations, these groups are voluntary, usually comprised of

movement members, and help members cope with needs incurred by the conflict.

Furthermore, the specific groups I focus on are action dialogue groups; instead of

concentrating solely on dialogue between participants, these groups also engage in public

dialogues to raise awareness and encourage nonviolence. In these ways, the groups

reflect the persuasion technique of nonviolent resistance, and contribute to internal and

external consensus mobilization, if not action mobilization or commitment to a political

goal.

The Parents' Circle - Families' Forum (PCFF) is a grassroots organization of

bereaved Palestinians and Israelis who have lost family members to violence related to

the conflict. In addition to engaging in dialogue with each other, PCFF organizes public

dialogues locally and globally to promote nonviolence and reconciliation as alternatives

to violence and revenge. They organize events in schools, arrange tours overseas, and

participate in interviews on television and radio and in publications. Although dialogue

is an unorthodox form of resistance, many participants in PCFF regard their work in the

Forum as a form of activism, including Ali Abu Awwad, a Palestinian activist who was

active in the first intifada, was shot by an Israeli settler, spent several years in jail, and

whose brother was killed by an Israeli soldier. According to Ali, spreading the message

of Palestinian suffering, and talking about checkpoints, the occupation, settlements, and

martyrs, is a kind of revolution:

Extremists carry out operations because they want to convey that they are suffering, to an extent that life and death have the same value. We talk in order to exploit the suffering in a more efficient way, and our work presents a greater danger to the Israeli state ... because it undermines all the excuses for the occupation and the legitimacy they claim to have... (Just Vision interview, 2005)

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Though Ali now views the work of the Forum as an approach to resistance, he notes that

participating was difficult at first because "we were accustomed to thinking that talking

with the other, the occupier, is treason and normalizing. It isn't easy for a patriot to do

such a thing. But I discovered that these weren't normalization meetings" (Just Vision

interview, 2005). Indeed, Ali has become a leader in PCFF, encouraging other

Palestinians to participate in the meetings and use the Forum as an alternative means of

resistance.

Combatants for Peace is another "action dialogue" organization, started in 2005

by Israelis and Palestinians who have participated in acts of violence, the Israelis as

soldiers in the IDF, and the Palestinians as activists in violent resistance. Like PCFF,

Combatants for Peace holds private dialogues for members, but also coordinates public

dialogues in schools, universities, youth groups, media outlets, and other public forums to

raise consciousness in both publics about the "other," educate for nonviolent struggle,

and pressure both governments to end the occupation through nonviolent means.

According to Bassem, one of the founders of Combatants for Peace, the group

aims to develop a network for nonviolence through three main principles: "First, to

commit to fighting in a nonviolent way. Second, to end the occupation, which we see as

the root of the violence. Third, to struggle for a two-state solution with 1967 borders and

East Jerusalem as the capital" (interview, 2007). Like Ali, Bassem views the work of

Combatants for Peace as a form of resistance, though he also noted the "normalization"

connotations that others often associate with any dialogue initiative. However, he

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recognized that the identity of the members as former combatants gives the group a

degree of legitimacy that may be absent in traditional civilian dialogues.

Action dialogues, though viewed by some as normalization, contribute to the

social movement structure by functioning as movement associations. Though perhaps

less contentious than SM Os, these groups provide movement members, many of whom

are actively involved in more visible forms of resistance, with a space for processing the

conflict, as well as a sense of support and solidarity. Furthermore, the public nature of

these action dialogues contributes to consciousness-raising in the wider community, thus

indirectly facilitating mobilization. In these ways, action dialogue groups complement

the work of SM Os and indirectly inform the cycles of contention.

Political Parties

According to Kriesi, while parties pursue political goals in the same way as

SMOs, they generally have sufficient resources in terms of institutionalized access,

authority, and expertise that preclude their reliance on popular mobilization. While

political parties "mobilize their constituencies from time to time, this is not essential to

their activities, which are typically carried out by an elite" (1996, 153). To be sure,

Palestinian political groups are becoming increasingly institutionalized and dominated by

elites who, according to my interviews, are often perceived as being out of touch with

public sentiments. However, the fact that most Palestinian parties emerged from political

movement organizations that did rely on constituent mobilization in the past, these

elements of contention still play a role in party dynamics, especially at the local level.

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As noted previously, the majority of popular committees include representatives

from various political parties. Despite the cleavages between parties at the top-level

leadership, members of nearly all parties are represented in local events and in joint

actions, such as rallies and events on dates such as May 15 (date of Israeli independence)

and June 5 (date of the 1967 war and Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the West

Bank, Gaza, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights). The parties also coordinate independent

actions, and support respective youth parties on university campuses. Indeed, many adult

activists currently leading the popular committees first became involved in activism

through the political youth movements.

Fateh remains one of the most prominent political parties, with Fateh Youth

(formerly known as Al-Shabiba) constituting one of the main activist movements.

According to Nidal, a spokesman for Fateh Youth, the organization aims to continue

resistance against the Israeli occupation until a Palestinian state is declared, as well as

develop Palestinian civil society and build Fateh membership. As Nidal indicates, Fateh

Youth is instrumental in mobilizing young people through direct action strategies such as

protest and persuasion:

The main popular method of Fateh Youth resistance is demonstrations. In the beginning of the [second] intifada, Fateh Youth had demonstrations daily or weekly. Many of the actions were organized for the apartheid wall, checkpoints, campaigns to release prisoners, and solidarity with many people, especially Arafat, who was under siege, as well as people who were under curfew. (interview, 2007)

According to Nidal, Fateh Youth coordination with other political movements varied, but

at central campuses like Birzeit University, students participated in joint actions and

demonstrations through June 2007, when Fateh and Barnas relations fractured.

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While Hamas and Islamic Jihad, together referred to as the Islamic Block, openly

support armed resistance, many of their members also support and participate in

nonviolent actions. One Hamas official explained, "We need nonviolent resistance; first,

because the world needs to hear us; second, because we are tired, we don't want to be in

jail anymore, we want our prisoners to be released ... " (interview, 2007). As this

statement illustrates, members of the Islamic Block participate in all forms of resistance,

including nonviolent resistance, thus contributing to the wider sphere of protest and

persuasion efforts.

Many smaller parties are also involved in popular resistance. Mubadara, headed

by former PA minister of information Mustafa Barghouthi, organizes and actively

participates in demonstrations against the wall. Many other activists subscribe to Leftist

parties like the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), which has advocated for land-based

resistance through popular committees, and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front

(PPSF), which has facilitated the Land Defense Committees (LDCs), a sort of popular

committee in rural areas.

Like action-dialogue groups, political parties are not social movements or SMOs

themselves, but they function as movement-related organizations (Kriesi 1996, 153)

within the broader social movement sector. Like SMOs, they work towards political

goals and mobilize their constituencies for collective action, however, their main mode of

operation is through the holding of political offices (rather than protest actions), they rely

on voters (rather than activists), and they maintain formal structural features rather than

operating as networks (Rucht 1996, 188). Political parties are thus distinct from SMOs,

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but their contentious history in the Palestinian context still makes them influential actors

in popular mobilization and participation, especially at the local level.

Supportive Organizations: Alternative Media

According to Kriesi, supportive organizations are institutions such as friendly

media outlets, which "contribute to the social organization of the constituency of a given

movement without directly taking part in the mobilization for collective action" (1996,

152). In Palestine, alternative media centers, documentary filmmakers, and participatory

media initiatives contribute to this sort of consensus mobilization in that they often "work

on behalf of the movement [and] their personnel may sympathize with the movement"

(Kriesi 1996, 152), but they utilize a more indirect approach to mobilization through

media. Though less direct, these efforts are still significant in the broader cycles of

contention to raise awareness of both the issue and the movement, both locally and

globally, thus using media as a persuasive tactic. The direct action campaigns and SMOs

mentioned above all rely heavily on media for drawing attention to violations, informing

others about their efforts, and disseminating a call for nonviolent resistance. While many

NGOs and direct action campaigns are trying to get their message heard through the mass

media, other groups have initiated grassroots media projects to cover stories often

overlooked by the mainstream media, alternative media outlets, documentaries, and

participatory initiatives.

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Alternative Media Outlets

Many Palestinians are critical of both the international mass media's coverage of

Palestine, as well as Palestinians' efforts in negotiating that public sphere. As one

activist noted, "Palestinians have failed in the media. We need to stop acting as victims

and waiting for other countries to take action. Israel know how to use the media, but

Palestinians don't have much credibility ... We need to work more on owning our media"

(interview, 2007). In response to this sentiment, several NGOs have launched their own

independent new networks, including the Palestine News Network (PNN), launched in

2000 by Holy Land Trust; the International Middle East Media Center (IMEMC), which

grew out of the joint efforts of the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between

Peoples (PCR) and the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) in 2003;53 and the

Alternative Information Center (AIC), a Palestinian-Israeli activist organization that uses

information for political advocacy.

These news groups have two main objectives, the first being to report on issues

related to the occupation to tell another side of the Israel-Palestinian story that is often

overlooked in the mainstream media. As Ghaleb, a reporter and producer for IMEMC,

explains,

53 IMEMC grew out of the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement Between Peoples (PCR), an action-oriented NGO that has functioned as a dialogue group and an activist organization, and was the primary Palestinian group involved in the development ofISM. Indeed, IMEMC grew out the Palestine Media Alert Project that PCR coordinated with ISM. In 2001, PCR started utilizing ISM activists' stories, photos, and footage as alternative information sources on their website, to counter the stories given to the mainstream media by Israeli military reporters, then moved the reports and images to the ISM website in 2002. According to the director of PCR, "these images started raising awareness about what was happening, because people started to see news and read reports that they never heard about in the media" (interview, 2007). The positive response prompted PCR to launch IMEMC in 2003, which now works closely with PNN.

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We report on stories that you won't hear anywhere else. All the international news agencies have their correspondents based in Jerusalem, so they only hear one side of the news, or they only hear some of the stories ... We have a network of contacts who are actually in the field all over Palestine, and we try to present both sides of the story. (interview, 2007)

The websites thus include updated news in multiple languages on developments within

the West Bank and Gaza, and also maintain special sections on topics like refugees,

prisoners, checkpoints, settlements, and incursions, while PNN and IMEMC host radio

programs on timely issues and AIC produces publications based on more in-depth

research.

PNN, IMEMC, and AIC also focus largely on nonviolent activism, which reflects

their second objective of drawing attention to popular resistance efforts. As Maj di, one

of the founders of PNN, stated:

There are many kinds of nonviolent activities, but no one covers them. The [mainstream] media doesn't cover them regularly because they are not 'exciting' without killing and shooting ... We want to show nonviolence, and we want to show it working. This is not for self-promotion, but to spread the message of nonviolence and publicize the activities. This is the power of nonviolence, and the media is essential for nonviolence. (interview, 2007)

Ghaleb also noted that, like PNN, IMEMC aims to draw more attention to stories of

nonviolent resistance:

The mainstream news does not report on nonviolence, only violence. We do many nonviolent activities, but we are only in the news if someone dies if there is blood. And this does not help the cause of nonviolence, because people just hear about the violence, and it reinforces it. It is good for people participating in nonviolence to see that their activities are being publicized. It reinforces what we are doing, and show that it is making a difference. (interview, 2007)

In documenting acts of nonviolence, as well as the violations and abuses that go

unreported, these alternative news outlets thus contribute to both consensus formation

and mobilization through their framings of both the issue and the movement,

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respectively. They provide affirmation and solidarity for local movement activists, while

raising consciousness and prompting participation both locally and globally.

Documentary Media

In addition to the groups mentioned above, it is also important to note the ways in

which individuals have utilized documentary media as a form of activism. For example,

Raed, a former videographer for Reuters and a member of Bil' in' s popular committee,

has documented the village's demonstrations with several objectives. First, as Raed

explains, "Some of the footage has helped free people arrested in the demonstrations.

Often the army will say they arrested someone for attacking the soldiers, but the footage

often shows that was not the case, so the army has to release the activist" (interview,

2007). Second, Raed's footage has been important in getting the story of Bil'in out to the

world, and attracting people from different countries to support the village. Raed has

shared his footage with other news agencies, including Reuters, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya,

and Israeli TV, and has also produced a documentary entitled One Year ofPeace and

Resistance that has been screened in several festivals, in efforts to draw attention to the

situation in Bil'in and the village's nonviolent action campaign. In these ways, Raed

identified media as a powerful form of resistance, commenting, "The camera isn't

violent, but I can still use it as my weapon. It is a way to show what is happening in a

nonviolent way" (2007).

Zeinab, another documentary filmmaker, agreed, stating, "The best form of

advocacy right now is the documentary, which helps the Palestinian story get out in the

right way to the West ... When you see things you believe it" (2007). According to

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Zeinab, documentary media is a way of appealing to the international community by

"sending our story in the right way" (2007) that appeals to universal values and uses the

human rights frame. In these ways, documentary films functioned as tools for indirect

mobilization by raising awareness, increasing solidarity, and prompting transnational

activism.

Participatory Media and Arts

Participatory media is a specific form of alternative media in which individuals

and communities use photography, film, video, publications, websites, theater, and other

forms of arts and media to share personal narratives and collective experiences, often

with the goal of raising awareness about a specific issue or challenging dominant

discourses in the mainstream media. Youth media, as the term implies, involves youth

development and production of media with the aim amplifying young people's voices on

issues of importance and relevance to them. Youth media is creative on the one hand, in

that the process challenges youth to express their ideas and experiences in unique ways;

and activist on the other hand, in that the products can enhance dialogue and initiate

action on different issues. In this way, youth media deals both with issues of identity,

contributing to cultural pride and self-esteem; and issues of power, by empowering

communities to confront injustices. 54

54 As Dagron outlines, participatory media differs from other communication strategies in several ways. First, participatory media is horizontal rather than vertical, involving people as dynamic actors who control processes of communication and social change, rather than as passive recipients of information and instructions. Second, community-based media focuses on processes of dialogue and participation over top down campaigns that fail to build local capacities. Third, participatory media recognizes that communication, development, and change are long-term processes rather than short-term solutions. Fourth, participatory media involves communities in collective efforts instead of including just a few individuals.

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Alternative media, and participatory youth media in particular, has been an

important tool in Palestine for several reasons. First, participatory media is useful in

many conflict areas for reflecting how the conflict is being experienced at the personal

and local levels. The majority of mass media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

(and other conflicts) primarily focuses on incidents of violence, and top-level

developments and decisions. While these emphases are understandable from a mass

media perspective, it is important to provide accounts of how individuals and

communities at the grassroots level are experiencing the conflict on a daily basis.

Second, alternative media is important in conflicts with asymmetric power dynamics,

such as Israel-Palestine, in which media coverage is often framed through the lens of the

more powerful party. In these cases, participatory media offers alternative points of view

from the dominant discourses, providing different frameworks for analysis. Third, youth

media is especially valuable in the case of Palestine for directly amplifying the voices of

young people, who are often portrayed solely as either victims or perpetrators of violence

in the mass media. Youth media facilitates the emergence of a different image and

understanding of Palestinian youth by enabling them to share their stories in proactive

and creative ways. Finally, the process of youth media can foster a sense of healing in

youth by restoring a sense of agency and helping youth address traumas experienced

during the conflict, which are common for Palestinian youth. For these reasons, many

Fifth, external trainers work with local communities in researching, designing, and disseminating projects, rather than working for them. Sixth, participatory media is specific to each community in terms of content, language, and culture, rather than imposing a standard framework in diverse settings. Seventh, community based media is people-driven, rather than donor-driven, responding to and highlighting real needs and issues identified by the group. Eighth, participatory media projects are owned by the participants to ensure equal opportunities for community access. Finally, participatory media projects are essentially about raising consciousness about real problems and possible solutions (2001).

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NGOs, community centers, and individuals are initiating youth media projects in

Palestine, creating a new dimension of nonviolent youth activism that deserves to be

explored. For a more detailed discussion of specific youth media projects in Palestine,

see Appendix F.

While the process of youth media can be transformative for participants, the

products created in media workshops can influence change beyond the community as

well. Photographs, films, plays, publications, websites, and other media address issues of

injustice in the context of personal realities and community experiences, thus humanizing

situations of conflict and oppression, and creating new frameworks for dialogue and

action. The fact that participatory media projects are produced directly by people living

in the conflict situation also makes them a legitimate tool for challenging dominant

discourses in the mainstream media. Like alternative news networks and documentary

films, participatory media projects can thus raise awareness, increase solidarity, and

inspire action and movement participation through the introduction of new narratives.

Alternative media initiatives, including grassroots networks, documentaries, and

participatory projects, thus function as movement supporters that complement the work

of SM Os and contribute to more widespread participation. On the one hand, alternative

media provides a contrasting framing of the issue that offers an alternative narrative to

mainstream media discourses, thus making more people aware of, and sympathetic to, the

movement's cause. On the other hand, alternative media provides coverage of the

movement itself, thus affirming activist strategies and tactics and indirectly contributing

to mobilization. Media outlets clearly function as movement-related organizations in the

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broader social movement sector, contributing to local and transnational cycles of

contention.

Various sectors of civil society contribute to the cycle of nonviolent contention in

Palestine, as discussed in the context ofKriesi's typology of movement-related

organizations (1996, 153), mainly by adopting strategies of protest and persuasion. First,

direct action campaigns function as SMOs, working towards political goals by mobilizing

for collective action. Second, action-dialogue groups serve as movement associations,

contributing to consensus mobilization amongst movement actors. Third, political parties

act as formal institutions that promote mobilization, but place greater emphasis on

elections and formal processes. Finally, alternative media, in terms of grassroots

networks, documentary teams, and participatory initiatives, function as supportive

organizations in terms of indirectly contributing to mobilization through information

advocacy. These different spheres overlap to form the wider social movement sector,

which shapes the dynamics of cycles of contention.

Sumoud

The majority of this chapter has focused on direct action campaigns, and on civil

society o,rganizations like SMOs, NGOs, media outlets, and youth groups, that utilize the

approaches of protest, persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. However, it is also

important to note the presence of everyday acts of resistance in the West Bank, conducted

by individuals and communities, employing the uniquely Palestinian nonviolent tactic of

sumoud, or steadfastness.

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The development of consciousness and the will to resist can occur outside the scope

of popular committees and civil society, particularly among peasant and rural

communities. As Scott explains in Weapons ofthe Weak, daily experience is one of the

most organic sources of consciousness development that leads to everyday acts of

resistance. As Scott notes, these acts reflect the tactics of relatively powerless groups,

such as "foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned

ignorance, arson, sabotage, and so on" (1985, xvi). As Scott continues, in contrast to

more visible social movements, these forms of struggle "require little or no coordination

or planning; they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they often

represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic

confrontation with authority" (1985, xvi).

Everyday acts of resistance are often more a reflection of individual resilience and

survival strategy than a deliberate effort to be part of a greater collective movement. As

Scott notes, "Where institutionalized politics is formal, overt, concerned with systematic,

de jure change, everyday resistance is informal, often covert, and concerned largely with

immediate, de facto gains (1985, xv). Despite what may be more humble intentions

however, everyday acts of resistance can have a powerful transformative effect when

accumulated over time. As Scott writes, "such kinds of resistance are often the most

significant and the most effective over the long run" (1985, xvi). Indeed, although

revolutions and social movements flow largely from dramatic large-scale processes, such

movements are created and sustained by countless individual acts, both seen and unseen,

that form the foundation for larger cycles of contention.

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It is thus clear that everyday acts of resistance are complementary to, and indeed,

inherent to, larger social movements. In the case of Palestine, this type of resistance

includes staying on one's land and refusing to be moved. Within the West Bank, there

were countless stories of daily acts of resistance and examples of sumoud during the

second intifada (see Allen 2008). At the village level in particular, Palestinian farmers

and their families have stayed on their land despite harassment from soldiers, abuses from

settlers, and land confiscation from the separation wall and encroaching settlements and

outposts. In this section, I provide two brief case studies to reflect the everyday land

based resistance tactics employed by Palestinians in West Bank villages.

Nahalin is a village near Bethlehem, where the local Palestinian community has

resolved to remain, despite Israeli threats ofland confiscation. Alex, whose family's land

is targeted for confiscation, has pursued various avenues to holding on to the land,

including taking a case to the Israeli courts, and calling for international solidarity.

However, his main form of resistance is encouraging Palestinians to stay on the land.

According to Alex, "Nonviolence is connected to the land. Without land, there is no

future. Land is worth nothing without a people, and a people is worth nothing without

land. So the land and the people should be connected" (interview, 2007). Alex started an

organization to involve Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals in land-based resistance.

The idea is to support local farmers, re-connect people with the land, and nurture a sense

of self-sufficiency in Palestine. According to Alex, this type of land-based activism is

useful in several ways. First, working the land is therapeutic for people; as Alex notes,

"When people dig, their frustration comes out. It helps them relax, and helps them think

in another way" (interview, 2007). Second, working the land renews people's sense of

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hope by engaging them in something active and constructive. Third, in keeping the land

populated and making it productive, Alex and others prevent it from being confiscated.

In these ways, Alex and other villagers in Nahalin have made working the land a form of

community empowerment and nonviolent resistance.

Ghwein is a small village consisting of eight families who live in caves on the

southern border of the West Bank. The people are mainly shepherds, and rely on the

surrounding land for grazing. However, in the past twenty years, a number of settlements

and outposts have been built in the area, including the large settlements Karmel, Mo' an,

and Susya. The settlers, with the approval of the army, have taken much of the land in

the region, including over 100 dunams (25 acres) from Ghwein, significantly reducing the

land available for grazing. It has also limited access to the land on which the villagers

produce beans and grains to feed the livestock, and perhaps more importantly, it has cut

off the village from several wells and water sources.

The residents' very presence on the land is a form of resistance, according to

Khaled, the director of a volunteer organization in Hebron that assists Ghwein with food,

clothes, books, and medical care.· Khaled notes that if the villagers left the area to avoid

the encroaching settlements, Israel would take the land ala tu! (quickly and completely).

Ghwein is thus one of many villages in the West Bank in which people's steadfastness

and determination to remain on their land function as a form of resistance.

Synthesis

This chapter has described the state of nonviolent activism in the West Bank

during the second intifada by providing examples of direct action campaigns; civil

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society-based initiatives, coordinated by SMOs, NGOs, dialogue groups, political parties,

and media outlets; and everyday acts ofresistance (see Table 3).

Table 3: Nonviolent Activism in the West Bank, 2000-2008 Form of Resistance Examples Movement (Direct Action) Village-Based Biddu, Bil'in, Budrous, Um Salamouna, Al-Tawani, Susy a Nationally coordinated National Committee for Popular Resistance Organizational (SMOs/NGOS) SM Os Stop the Wall Campaign, PARC, Holy Land Trust Action Dialogues Combatants for Peace, Parents Circle/Bereaved Families Forum Israeli Orgs Ta'ayush, Anarachists Against the Wall, Peace Now, ActiveStills International Orgs International Solidarity Movement (ISM), Palestinian Solidarity Project (PSP) Political Parties Fateh Youth, Islamic Block, PCP, Mubadara, Third Way Alternative Media Palestinian News Network (PNN), International Middle East Media Center (!MEMC), Alternative Information Center, Electronic Intifada, participatory media Everyday resistance (Sumoud) Ghwein, Susya, Nahalin, Jordan Valley

It is important to note that these categories are not distinct, as many nonviolent

efforts occur at various levels and employ multiple strategies; rather, these categories

serve as an organizing framework for examining the scope of nonviolent resistance

activities. It is also important to emphasize that these categories, and the examples

discussed, are by no means exhaustive; rather, my goal is to give a sense of the breadth

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and depth of nonviolent resistance in the West Bank through the discussion of specific

examples.

This mapping of nonviolent activities during the second intifada reveals several

trends. First, it is evident that nonviolence was utilized as a form of resistance during the

second intifada. Although nonviolence never became a widespread phenomenon as it did

during the first intifada, nonviolent actions were being conducted throughout the West

Bank.

Second, it is clear that there was a broad scope of nonviolent activities, with

various groups and individuals becoming engaged in nonviolence in different ways. At

the same time, within that scope, it is evident that the many actions were coordinated

through organized groups, creating a delicate balance between the organization and

institutionalization of activism.

Third, while the breadth of nonviolent actions was notable during the second

intifada, nonviolent tactics were somewhat lacking in depth. Indeed, the majority of

actions can be classified in Sharp's category of "protest and persuasion," rarely

expanding or intensifying to acts of noncooperation and civil disobedience. While

protest and persuasion techniques should not be discounted, they generally characterize

actions taken at the beginning of a movement, establishing a foundation for more

engaged tactics.

Fourth, and closely related, it is evident that many actions were conducted to raise

awareness about Palestine outside the region, in a sort of boomerang approach to

activism. Finally, despite the extent of individual episodes of nonviolent resistance, it is

clear that participation was limited, and the movement itself was fragmented.

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It is thus clear from this chapter's discussion that Palestinian nonviolent resistance

did in fact exist in the second intifada period, with various levels of society engaged in

nonviolence throughout the West Bank. However, it is also evident that most nonviolent

efforts were localized and/or episodic, resulting in a fragmented series of nonviolent

episodes, rather than a unified, cohesive movement. The following chapters analyze the

causes of this fragmentation, and explore possibilities for the emergence of a viable

national movement.

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"YOUTH WILL BE THE LIFEBLOOD":55 RE-EXAMING YOUTH ATTITUDES

TOWARDS POPULAR RESISTANCE

Despite the plethora of nonviolent activities described in the previous chapter,

popular participation in nonviolent resistance remained low throughout the second

intifada, especially when compared to the widespread mobilization in the first intifada.

This chapter takes a closer look at popular attitudes towards civil-based resistance to

better gauge public opinions towards nonviolence outside the sphere of self-defined

activists, and thus provides insight into why mobilization for nonviolence in the second

intifada was so limited. Was there an actual public preference for violent resistance over

nonviolence? Did some Palestinians doubt the efficacy of nonviolent action? Did others

see it as normalization or passivity? Did still others see it as too risky?

Specifically, I examine youth attitudes towards resistance as a subset of the

broader population; as discussed in the methodology chapter, the focus on young people

is appropriate in this study because (1) youth comprise approximately sixty percent of the

population in Palestine (Sharek Youth Forum 2008),56 (2) youth are often considered the

55 This title refers to one activist's comment that "Youth will be the lifeblood of the campaign" (interview, 2007).

56 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 56.4 percent of Palestinians are under 19, and in Gaza, 75.6 percent are under 30 (Erlanger 2007).

167

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most volatile age group, and the demographic most likely to support violent resistance; 57

and (3) youth were the primary leaders and activists in the first intifada, in which popular

participation was widespread. 58 The chapter begins by examining the issue of youth

participation by investigating the state of youth resistance during the second intifada, then

discusses how youth involvement relates to other elements of movement fragmentation,

and finally explores youth opinions towards popular resistance to gauge the potential for

future mobilization. The findings indicate that there is more youth support for popular

resistance than typically assumed or acknowledged by older activists, suggesting that a

space may still exist for the (re )emergence of a more unified, widespread movement

spearheaded by youth participation.

This chapter's discussion is grounded in Klandermans' concepts of consensus

formation, consensus mobilization, and action mobilization. I argue that Palestinian

youth embody aspects of a collective Palestinian identity, or consensus, ofresistance, that

results from both organic consensus formation and intentional consensus mobilization. 59

However, the consensus mobilization to date, while generating "a set of individuals

predisposed to participate in a social movement," has failed to extend to action

mobilization, or "the legitimation of concrete goals and means of action" (Klandermans

1992, 80). Youth thus represent a sector with significant "mobilization potential"

57 See Urdal 2004; Kaplan 1996.

58 For more information on the decision to focus on youth respondents, see Chapter 3.

59 Klandermans defines consensus formation as "the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures" and consensus mobilization as "a deliberate attempt by a social actor to create consensus among a subset of the population" (1992, 80).

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(Klandermans 1992, 80), which requires new cultural framings, as well as improved

organizational structures and creation of political opportunities, to translate into action.

Youth Resistance During the Second Intifada

Youth played significant roles in the coordination and implementation of the first

intifada, with approximately ninety percent of young males and eighty percent of young

females participating in some form of demonstration or activism (Barber 2000, 7).

However, according to nonviolence coordinators, their participation and leadership in

nonviolent activism has been visibly lacking during the second intifada. 60 Indeed, nearly

all of the activist leaders and popular committee members interviewed during this

research were above the age of thirty-five years, having been youth leaders in the first

intifada twenty years ago. According to these activists, youth participation in nonviolent

actions has been low in the second intifada because youth are either embracing violent

resistance on the one hand, or withdrawing from political conflict on the other hand.

According to Nader Said, a political scientist at Birzeit University in Ramallah, youth

were leaders of the first intifada, both in coordinating the uprising and serving as a

symbol of the struggle for statehood. However, in the second intifada, which was largely

usurped by militant groups, youth became "irrelevant" (Erlanger 2007, 1).

In terms of perceiving a youth preference for armed resistance in the second

intifada, some activists invoked recent public discourse portraying youth primarily as

60 See also Erlanger 2007.

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perpetrators of violence. 61 For example, a 2007 New York Times article stated that

"worried parents call [today's youth] the lost generation of Palestine: its most radical,

most accepting of violence and most despairing" (Erlanger 2007, 1). Many activists

likewise noted the violent nature of youth. As one of the Palestinian founders of ISM

characterized the second intifada,

Youth were more into clashing with soldiers than developing the infrastructure for civil-based resistance. Younger people are more emotional and less responsible, so they usually are attracted more to 'heroic' violent actions than long-term processes. I think it was the younger generation that made the second intifada so much more violent than it should have been. (interview, 2007)

Others likewise commented that youth are "more ready to embrace violence" (interview,

2007), and "want to be heroes, want to have guns, and want to have glory" (interview,

2007). Several activists even attributed their past attraction to violent resistance to their

youthfulness at the time, noting that "age plays a role in how you resist" (interview,

2007), reflecting a perceived association between youth and the tendency towards armed

resistance. _

Other activists claimed that youth have responded to the occupation by

withdrawing from the conflict. As the youth organizer for Stop the Wall explained,

"Youth have decided not to think about living under occupation, and instead each focuses

on creating an atmosphere around himself to escape" (interview, 2007). Many activists

described youth as "lost" or "depressed," while others commented that youth were

61 Much of the discourse surrounding youth and conflict portrays youth as perpetrators of violence (Wessells 1998), with recent scholarly analyses focusing on the link between violence and the phenomenon referred to as the "youth bulge." For example, in "The Devil in the Demographics," Urda! (2004) uses statistical analysis to indicate the correlation between increased youth populations and the onset of domestic armed conflict between 1950 and 2000. El-Kenz (1996) also perceives a link between youth bulges and violent conflict, and Kaplan (1994) associates youth demographics with increased crime, conflict, and instability.

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immersing themselves in media, technology, fashion, and entertainment in an attempt to

block out the political situation. Others indicated that youth were trying to escape the

situation in the literal sense, by leaving Palestine in pursuit of jobs and education

overseas. Whereas the Palestinian commitment to remaining on the land used to be a

source of national pride, nearly fifty percent of Palestinians between the ages of 18 and

30 now say they would emigrate if they could, according to N. Said's polls at Birzeit

University (Erlanger 2007, 5).

As the above discussion indicates, it is often assumed that youth in Palestine are

either inclined towards violent resistance, or disengaged from activism altogether. These

assumptions seem to imply that second intifada youth, in contrast to first intifada youth,

eschew nonviolence in both theory and practice, and collectively have little potential for

mobilization. Yet is that really the case? According to some activists, nonviolent

resistance might represent a way to engage youth in the idea of popular struggle as an

alternative to the "fight or flight" options of violence and emigration/withdrawal. As one

activist explained, "We don't want [youth] to embrace violence on the one hand, or to be

apathetic and leave on the other hand. We want them to be moderate, national people

who believe in resistance in the way of solidarity" (interview, 2007). The following

section examines the potential space for increased youth involvement in nonviolent

struggle by exploring youth attitudes, opinions, and behaviors regarding civil based

resistance.

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Examining Youth Opinions on Popular Resistance

This section analyzes the complex nature of youth attitudes towards different

forms of resistance, examining trends both across and within the data. The data indicates

nuanced conceptions of both nonviolence and violence, which may affect mobilization

and perceptions of public support for various tactics. Furthermore, findings indicate that

the majority of young Palestinians support both nonviolent and violent resistance, but are

highly more likely to participate in nonviolent activism than armed actions. Finally, the

data suggests supporters of both violent and nonviolent resistance are often linked by a

common activist identity, or consensus, which could be utilized to collectively redefine

nonviolence for increased action mobilization.

Few studies have been conducted to gauge Palestinian attitudes towards

nonviolent resistance. This study draws from 265 surveys62 conducted in July 2007 with

youth ages 14 to 34 years of age, 63 with a mean age of 22, at university campuses

throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The findings from this research support

trends noted in a 2006 Joint Advocacy Initiative (JAi) report, coordinated through the

East Jerusalem YMCA and YWCA of Palestine, which surveyed youth in the Bethlehem

area, as well as a 2002 survey of the general public conducted by the Program on

International Policy Attitudes (PIP A) at the University of Maryland, sponsored by Search

for Common Ground (SFCG). The data indicates that support for violent and/or

nonviolent resistance is not clear-cut; rather, perceptions, behaviors, and attitudes

62 See Appendix D for copies of the survey in English and Arabic.

63 Most Palestinian youth NGOs (including the International Palestinian Youth League (IPYL) and Panorama) define youth as up to 35 years of age.

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associated with popular resistance are complex and multi-faceted, requiring careful

examination and understanding for translation into action mobilization and effective

nonviolent strategy.

Perceptions

Perhaps the most notable finding from the data is that the majority of Palestinian

youth (56.6 percent) viewed both violence and nonviolence as effective means of

resisting the occupation. It should be noted that nearly the same percentage of youth

(59.3 percent) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, "Violent resistance is the

most effective means of challenging the occupation." However, closer examination of

the data indicates that 64.3 percent of those respondents also agreed or strongly agreed

that both violence and nonviolence are effective; thus even the majority ofrespondents

who viewed violence as the most effective form of resistance still recognized the merits

of nonviolence.

This simultaneous support for both forms of resistance was reflected in earlier

surveys as well. In a preliminary survey of 100 youth conducted for this study in 2006,

44 percent of youth recognized the legitimacy of both forms of resistance, while 24

percent favored only violence, 22 percent favored only nonviolence, and 10 percent felt

that neither form ofresistance was effective. Similarly, in the JAi study, although 63

percent of youth agreed with the statement, "Armed resistance is the best means to get rid

of the Israeli occupation," over 82 percent also agreed that "Boycotting Israeli products is

a successful means of resistance" (2006), indicating support for nonviolent tactics as

well. Likewise, the PIP A study noted, "concurrent with their strong support for

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nonviolent methods, Palestinians show equal levels of support for violent methods" (Kull

2002).

Support for both forms of resistance reflects the fact that while the majority of

Palestinian youth support nonviolent resistance, they are unsure of its effectiveness alone,

with only 37.7 percent viewing nonviolence as the most effective way ofresisting the

occupation, and just 31. 7 percent perceiving nonviolent resistance as more strategic than

violence. Indeed, according to the PIP A report,

The arguments presented in favor of nonviolent action's effectiveness were all found unconvincing by majorities. The statement "Mass nonviolent action can help direct international attention to unjust Israeli behavior and repression" was found convincing by 41 % and unconvincing by 52%. Another argument related to world opinion went: "When Palestinians use nonviolent forms of resistance this improves the image of Palestinians in the eyes of the world." Only 3 8% found this convincing, while 57% did not-quite possibly because it implies that violent resistance worsens the Palestinians' image, something a majority does not believe. A third argument asserted that nonviolent action had the capacity to put Israeli policy in a bind: "Mass nonviolent action puts pressure on Israel while also undermining its excuse that it cannot negotiate as long as there is violence." Only 36% found this convincing; 59% found it unconvincing. (Kull 2002)

In addition, a majority of respondents agreed with statements expressing doubts about the

effectiveness of nonviolent action, including "Palestinians have tried massive nonviolent

action in the past and it did not succeed in changing Israel's behavior" (68 percent),

"Israelis are so stubborn that mass nonviolent action will have no impact on their

behavior" (62 percent), and "It would take too long for mass nonviolent action to produce

any real change" (61 percent) (Kull 2002). It is thus clear that while the majority of

Palestinian youth support nonviolence resistance, they have doubts about its effectiveness

when employed as the only form of resistance.

Support for both forms of resistance may also stem from the fact that the majority

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of Palestinian youth do not see a moral advantage to using nonviolent action, with only

38.5 percent viewing nonviolence as more ethical than violence. This indicates that the

majority of support for nonviolence is based on strategic, or pragmatic,

conceptualizations of nonviolence, rather than moral, or principled, approaches. 64 This

perspective is perhaps related to Palestinian youths' familiarity with the right to

resistance, with 82.3 percent of youth agreeing that Palestinians have a legal right to

resist the occupation by any means. 65 Because the majority of Palestinians view all forms

of resistance as legitimate under international law, the principled approach of using only

nonviolence for ethical reasons lacks widespread merit.

Behaviors

Despite doubts regarding the effectiveness of nonviolence, the majority of youth

reported participating in nonviolent actions, while only a small minority reported

participating in violent resistance, 66 with no significant difference between youth of

different genders, religions, or political parties. However, youth did not always consider

their actions to fall into violent or nonviolent categories, indicating nuanced

interpretations of the terms.

Looking at participation in acts of nonviolent and violent resistance collectively,

the highest percentage of youth reported participating in demonstrations (71. 3 percent),

64 For more on pragmatic and principled approaches to nonviolence, see Chapter 1.

65 See UN General Assembly Resolution 37/42, which "reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle" (A/RES/37/43 1982).

66 As discussed in Chapter 3, it should be noted that reported behaviors may differ from actual behaviors due to security concerns and lack of a developed trust relationship with the researcher.

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followed by boycotting Israeli goods (52.1 percent), throwing stones (37.7 percent),

signing petitions (34 percent), and re-planting trees (32.5 percent), with only a small

minority reporting participation in armed resistance (6.8 percent) (see Figure 1).

Youth Participation in Resistance

8 0. 0 0 % --,=--:,,.-,.,...-,--.,--:-=.,..-,,,...,...... ,...,.-.,,,=,..---.,.....-,-----,-,--, 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% Series1 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00%

Means of Resistance

Figure 1. Youth Participation in Resistance.

These findings indicate that, while youth view both violent and nonviolent tactics as

effective means of resistance, with a slight preference for violence, they are much more

likely to participate in nonviolent actions.

In terms of nonviolence, 59.3 percent of youth reported taking part in some sort of

nonviolent action against the occupation. While that majority is notable in itself, the

number of participants further increased when youth were asked about specific

nonviolent tactics, with 71.3 percent reporting participation in a nonviolent demonstration

or protest. Taking a closer look at this shift, it is found that 37.4 percent of youth who

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said they had not participated in nonviolent resistance did report taking part in a

demonstration, indicating that the level of participation is even higher than reported.

While it is possible that some youth may not consider demonstrations to be nonviolent

(indeed, according to the JAI report, 7.7 percent of the sample classified national

demonstrations as "violent"), this finding more likely indicates that at least one in three

youth do not identify with the term nonviolence, or do not equate the term with

demonstrations and protests.

Similar disparities between generalized and specific statements of participation

were noted in regards to reports of violent resistance. Although only 17.4 percent of

youth admitted to participating in violent resistance against the occupation, over twice

that number (37.7 percent) reported throwing stones at soldiers. Indeed, a closer look at

the numbers indicates that 54 percent of those who admitted to throwing stones did not

report using violent means of resistance, implying that more than half of the youth

surveyed do not consider stone-throwing to be a form of violence. In the JAI study, an

even greater percentage (82.5 percent) classified throwing stones as nonviolent.

The fact that youth opinion varies on this question reflects the ongoing debate on

this same issue between activists and scholars67 alike, as discussed further in the

following chapter. Another consideration may be the aforementioned observation that

many Palestinians view all forms of resistance as "nonviolent," because they are not

technically "violating" international law by resisting the occupation. To be sure, of the

6.8 percent of youth who reported participating in armed resistance, 16.7 percent did not

consider those actions to be violent, and in the JAI report, 49.1 percent classified "armed

67 See for example D. Kuttab (1988, 2003) and Kaufman (1991).

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fire against occupation forces and settlers" as nonviolent. These findings indicate that at

least a segment of youth adopt a more rights-based conception of violence than the usual

interpretation of the word implying any use of physical harm, by again seeing all forms of

resistance as legal and legitimate.

To summarize, the behavioral findings indicate that youth are much more likely

to participate in nonviolent actions, despite perceiving violence to be more effective, as

discussed above. This finding reflects the JAI report's claim that there is a "tendency

towards [support for] violence, but not necessarily to practice violence" (2006).

Furthermore, of the youth who did participate in some form of violent resistance, nearly

all also participated in nonviolent actions, indicating that youth do not necessarily choose

between violent and nonviolent actions, nor do they eschew nonviolent resistance for

violence; rather, they adopt both approaches in a broader framework ofresistance and

struggle.

Similarly, 78.4 percent of those who had participated in some kind of nonviolence

training also participated in acts of violent resistance. While it is possible to view this

finding as indicating the "failure" of nonviolence trainings, it more likely indicates that

even those youth most actively seeking nonviolent strategies and resources are

integrating those tactics into a larger toolbox of resistance methods. This lack of clear

distinction between violent and nonviolent actions indicates that youth see both means as

overlapping in a broader sphere of activism.

Attitudes

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Attitudes towards potential actions reveal similar trends to those identified in

youth perceptions and behaviors. First, a majority of youth indicated that they would

support a nonviolent movement as well as a violent movement. Though there were

slightly higher levels of support for a violent movement (63.8 percent) than a nonviolent

movement (56.2 percent), the fact that the majority of youth would support nonviolence

is significant in itself. At the same time, the fact that many more youth expressed

willingness to participate in potential nonviolent actions (with 74. 7 percent willing to

take part in demonstrations and 70.9 percent willing to participate in a boycott) than

violent actions (45.3 percent) again indicates a distinction between articulated support for

means of resistance and actual willingness to participate via that means. Indeed,

willingness to participate in nonviolent action was documented in the PIP A survey as

well, with 69 percent willing to participate in boycotts of Israeli goods such as cigarettes

and soft drinks, and 44 percent willing to engage in acts of civil disobedience such as

blocking home demolitions (Kull 2002). It is important to acknowledge that the number

of people who would actually mobilize (action mobilization) would most likely be less

than the number of those simply stating they would act (consensus mobilization), yet

even the recognition of the will to participate is a notable finding.

While there is an apparent contradiction between stated support for nonviolent

and violent resistance on the one hand, and actual willingness to participate in actions on

the other hand, deeper inquiries into Palestinian attitudes towards both forms of

resistance reveal that support for specific forms of violence are actually relatively low,

while support for specific forms of nonviolence are relatively high. In terms of violent

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resistance for example, while the majority of Palestinian youth support stone-throwing

(55.5 percent) and armed resistance (66 percent) against Israeli soldiers, only small

minorities report supporting rocket attacks on civilians inside Israel (22.3 percent) and

suicide bomb attacks on civilians (19.3 percent) (see Figure 2).

Contextualizing Support for Violent Resistance

Throwing Stones at Soldiers Armed Resistance Against Rocket Attacks on Civilians Suicide Bomb Attacks on Soldiers Civilians Form of Resistance

Figure 2. Contextualizing Support for Violent Resistance.

Conversations with youth indicated that the majority of those who "supported

violence" saw armed resistance as necessary and just when used against soldiers and, in

some cases, settlers, inside the West Bank, but did not approve of armed attacks on Israeli

civilians. As one youth commented, "I'm not saying we don't need violence, but I'm

against suicide bombings. I believe we have a right to fight the settlers and the army, but

not the people in Israel. I'm not saying that I support them living there ... but we can't

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fight in Israel" (interview, 2007). Similarly, a member of Islamic Jihad who supported

violent actions but also organized boycotts and supported nonviolent resistance

explained:

The Jews are human beings. I'm not against them as human beings, or against them for their religion. I'm against them only when they come into our land with their jeeps and are killing our people. When they are in this role, they are the enemy. But I don't believe in targeting kids or civilians. (interview, 2007; emphasis added)

Noting this finding is imperative for recognizing that the oft-cited Palestinian

"preference" for violence is more accurately an affirmation of support for violence when

used for self-defense or defense of one's land. Thus, it is misleading to interpret even

stated support for violence as an endorsement of rocket attacks or suicide bomb attacks

on civilians living in Israel. It is therefore necessary that apparent support for violence be

interpreted with this contextualization as mind.

Just as the above finding indicates the need to deconstruct the meaning of

"support for violence," the deeper meaning of "support for nonviolence" must also be

probed. Though still a representing a majority at 56.2 percent when stated in general

terms, support for nonviolent resistance increases significantly when specific tactics are

identified, as noted by the higher levels of support for demonstrations and boycotts.

Indeed, according to the PIP A survey, 92 percent of those polled expressed support for

boycotts, 82 percent supported limited strikes, 81 supported mass protest demonstrations,

and 73 percent supported large groups blocking demolitions of homes (Kull 2002). As

noted in the previous section, apparent lower levels of support for nonviolence may

actually just be an issue of semantics, reflecting an unwillingness to identify as

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nonviolent, and/or a misinterpretation of nonviolence as submission and normalization

rather than activism and confrontation.

To be sure, the majority of youth viewed popular resistance, if not nonviolence, as

part of their cultural and generational identity. A sizable majority (67.2 percent) of youth

recognized a tradition of popular resistance in Palestine, while an overwhelming 92

percent felt that youth have a major role to play in resistance. This finding indicates that

recent observations of youth apathy and withdrawal from activism may not be as

entrenched as suggested. To be sure, according to the JAI report, 51.3 percent of youth

identified "anti-emigration," or remaining on Palestinian land in the spirit of sumoud, as

the most effective form of nonviolent resistance (2006), indicating that many youth are

also concerned by the departure of their peers to schools and jobs outside Palestine.

These findings indicate that there may be greater youth willingness to participate in

resistance than perceived by older activists interviewed for this study. Furthermore, as

the previous discussion indicates, such participation is more likely to take the form of

nonviolent resistance than violence.

Reflecting on the Findings

Despite the fragmented nature of popular resistance described previously, the

findings in this section indicate that there is a potential space for a more unified,

widespread popular movement. Although many divisive factors remain, there is public

support among youth for nonviolent resistance, and, perhaps more importantly, popular

willingness among youth to participate in nonviolent actions, or consensus mobilization

(Klandermans 1992). However, data reflects that support for nonviolent resistance is not

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straightforward, which may contribute to the apparent lack of widespread participation,

or action mobilization (Klandermans 1992), noted by activists.

Perhaps the most notable finding is the overlap of support for nonviolent and

violent resistance in terms of perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. In terms of

perceptions, while a minority of youth sees nonviolence alone as more strategic or ethical

than violence, most do see both violent and nonviolent resistance as effective means of

struggle. Likewise, regarding attitudes, the majority of youth would support a nonviolent

resistance movement as well as a violent movement. In addition, the fact that nearly all

respondents who had participated in armed resistance also participated in nonviolent

resistance suggests that even violent resisters see merit in nonviolent tactics. This implies

that a broader activist identity overrides violent/nonviolent categorizations when

determining support for and participation in popular resistance. In other words, youth

activists many not consciously differentiate between "violence" and "nonviolence" when

determining how they engage in resistance, but rather differentiate between "action" and

"non-action." Thus, youth may combine nonviolent tactics with methods of limited

violence in a broader toolbox of resistance, rather than intentionally selecting one means

over the other.

The findings also indicate that the terms "nonviolence" and "violence" have

nuanced meanings for youth and are constantly being re-negotiated. Indeed, youth were

less willing to admit to participating in or supporting nonviolent resistance than they were

to participating in specific nonviolent tactics, such as demonstrations and boycotts,

indicating a disassociation from the term nonviolence. At the same time, youth displayed ·

multi-faceted interpretations of the term "violence," with many neglecting to view

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throwing stones, or even armed resistance, as violence. However, it is imperative to note

that youth support for violence is primarily limited to operations against soldiers, and

sometimes settlers, inside the West Bank, with very low levels of support for rocket or

suicide bomb attacks on Israeli civilians. This finding reflects the fact that even youth

support for violence is limited to a specific context. 68 Activists should be aware of this

distinction to recognize the conditions in which youth see a need for armed resistance,

instead of assuming that youth support violence in all forms.

Finally, regardless of individual youth conceptions of violence and nonviolence,

the strong majority indicated a willingness to participate in popular resistance. It is thus

evident that youth are not nearly as attached to violent resistance or prone towards apathy

as assumed by some activists. Rather, youth constitute a viable population of activists

that has the potential to mobilize. The challenge for activists is to translate that youth

potential into nonviolent action by drawing on a collective activist identity, rather than a

stated preference for nonviolence. For example, trainings and organizing efforts for

popular resistance might focus less on establishing an either/or dichotomy of violence

and nonviolence, and instead nonviolent resistance as one option for resistance.

Moreover, activists can emphasize that nonviolent popular resistance allows greater

opportunities for youth participation, with measures of reported past behaviors and

reported willingness to participate in future actions showing overwhelmingly more

involvement in nonviolent tactics than armed resistance.

68 Again, it is also necessary to consider the possibility that the low levels of support for rocket and suicide bomb attacks on civilians in Israel reflect an unwillingness of respondents to indicate support for those operations, even with confidentiality, to an American researcher.

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The Missing Link?

If there is potential youth support for nonviolent resistance, why has youth action

mobilization been limited during the second intifada? Activists in the region have asked

the same question; as one nonviolence coordinator commented, "Students are looking for

change, are aware of the issues, and are more politicized ... So I don't know why they are

being so quiet now" (interview, 2007). In this section, I briefly explore how youth

engagement was curbed by political constraints, in terms of Israeli measures; ineffecient

organizational structures, including absence of leadership and vision within the

movement, and societal divisions among NGOs and political parties; and competing

movement frames, in terms of the ineffective "packaging" of nonviolence to the general

public.69

Israeli measures such as restrictions on movement and crackdowns on activists

affect Palestinians in all demographics, but these policies especially affect youth.

According to B 'tselem, and confirmed through personal observation, passage through

checkpoints is particularly difficult for young people, as Israel often prevents men

between the ages of 16-35 from crossing, even at checkpoints within the West Bank.

Because of this policy, it is especially difficult for young men to travel to and from

actions. In addition, while all activists face possible arrest or detention, several noted that

the Shin Bet70 often targets youth, which makes some youth hesitant to participate.

Indeed, youth are sometimes wary of participating in actions with Israeli or international

69 I examine these factors in greater depth in Part III, but use this section to emphasize how these elements uniquely affected youth involvement.

70 The Shin Bet, or Shabak, is the Israeli counter-intelligence and internal security service.

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activists who they think may be undercover Israeli agents (interview, 2007). Thus, while

Israeli measures act as political constraints at many levels, they especially hinder the

participation of youth.

The lack of student leadership and participation in resistance can be largely

attributed to the internal political situation. Whereas political parties functioned as

machines mobilizing against the occupation in the first intifada, their efforts during and

after the second intifada were often targeted at each other. For example, at a July 9,

2007, graduation ceremony at Birzeit University, the Barnas-affiliated Student Council

president was kidnapped for several hours, allegedly by Fateh supporters, who demanded

an apology from him on behalf of Hamas' actions during the ousting of Fateh from the

Gaza Strip several weeks earlier. While animosities were not always so extreme, student

leaders of both Fateh Youth (the youth arm of Fateh) and the Islamic Block (the youth

arm of Hamas and Islamic Jihad) noted that inter-party tensions limited coordinated

actions. While they had joint demonstrations on major dates of remembrance such as the

Nakba71 and June 5, 72 their activities were generally separate.

In addition to strained relations between the parties, the very structure of the

parties themselves had also changed since the first intifada, particularly after the Oslo

Agreement and the establishment of the PA. During the first intifada, the parties

functioned more as resistance movements, and thus engaged youth directly through

political education. As Mahmoud remembered:

71 Literally, "the disaster," referring to May 15, 1948, the date oflsraeli independence.

72 Referring to the date of the 1967 war.

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We had weekly party meetings at university where we would learn about other revolutions, read philosophy, and discuss and debate the news with each other and with members of other parties. So we really learned in our parties, not in the university; for us, our degrees were in politics, not academics. It was a resistance culture, which was real education. But this is not happening now. (interview, 2007)

Mahmoud noted that the shift away from political education was partly due to the parties,

but partly also to society.

Indeed, according to Nidal, a former secretary general of Fateh Youth, the Oslo

Accords created new social realities by redefining relations with Israel and by

establishing the PA. Prior to Oslo, Al-Shabibeh (as Fateh Youth was called before 1995)

"focused on mobilizing people and fighting the occupation" (interview, 2007) with youth

from the universities and in the prisons, culminating with the first intifada. However,

after Oslo, Fateh Youth needed to shift their tactics to be in accordance with the peace

agreement. As Nidal explained,

In the past, the relationship between the resistance and the occupation was clear. We were against them, and they were against us. But after the peace agreement, it became very complicated ... We resolved to continue fighting the occupation until we achieved an independent state, but our fighting had to be stable and suitable with the peace negotiations. (interview, 2007)

The establishment of the PA thus affected the structure and activities of Fateh Youth.

Prior to the PA, the students designed and directed actions and formed the core of the

national resistance leadership, yet after the PA was established, the students' leadership

role in Palestinian society was replaced. Not only did they lose their leadership influence

on the general public, but they also became subject themselves to the decisions of

officials who redefined their roles. According to Nidal, after the establishment of the PA,

"the actions of youth were minimized so that they focused more of their work in the

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university and on youth development in the local society" (interview, 2007). Indeed, in

conversations with Fateh Youth and Islamic Block student leaders, it was clear that their

main responsibilities focused on assisting fellow students by helping them with school

assignments and fees as means for recruitment, rather than emphasizing resistance.

In addition to political constraints, youth involvement was also limited on the

organizational level, through the shift of coordination from the universities to NGOs, and

from a general lack of leadership. Youth were instrumental in the first intifada,

particularly at university campuses, in assuming leadership roles, coordinating actions,

articulating visions, and determining strategies. As several activists noted, "In the past,

the leaders came from the university students. In the first intifada for example, many of

the leaders came from Birzeit University" (interview, 2007). Indeed, according to Seif,

"youth were widely engaged in the organization and leadership of the [first] intifada, its

striking forces, its popular committees, its educational and solidarity committees," and

the UNLU, which coordinated the daily acts of resistance (2000, 20). However, youth

did not assume those responsibilities in the second intifada, creating a void that older

activists found difficult to fill. Indeed, the lack of work and family duties for most

students, combined with the natural mobilization space of university campuses,

seemingly makes the university an organic site for initiating and sustaining resistance, as

in the first intifada. Several activists expressed their desire to ground the movement in

the universities once again, commenting, "I hope the university students will go back to

taking the lead; they can do more" (interview, 2007), and, "We need to encourage the

youth; university students should be the coordinators" (interview, 2007). Clearly, many

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activists saw youth, and students in particular, as the source for the vision, leadership, and

strategy absent in the movement, and were puzzled as to their lack of engagement.

In addition to political constraints and shortcomings in organization, youth

resistance was limited by a reframing of nonviolence in accordance with the "peace

process" through the proliferation of nonviolence trainings, programs, and NGOs during

the post-Oslo period. As discussed further in Chapter 8, activists in the first intifada

participated in nonviolent actions without knowing they were "nonviolent," but rather

viewing all their actions as resistance. During the second intifada however, although

most Palestinians still expressed support for the same tactics, there was aversion amongst

activists and non-activists alike to the word "nonviolence," because of its association

with normalization. Whereas the older generation has a memory of nonviolent resistance

during the first intifada, the younger generation associates "nonviolence" with a western

imposition of submission and passivity, largely because of the way nonviolence was

marketed in the late 1990s. 73

The lack of youth engagement in resistance, due to specific impacts of political

constraints, organizational structures, and movement frames on youth, clearly affects

trends of general public support and participation in nonviolent resistance. By sheer

numbers alone, Palestinians under 30 years of age constitute nearly 60 percent of the

population (Sharek Youth Forum 2008); thus, widespread popular participation depends

largely on the mobilization of this group. In addition, the widespread participation of

youth might also provide a spark to the nonviolent struggle and give it fresh momentum

73 See Chapters 8 and 9 for a more detailed discussion of the reframing of nonviolence, largely by donor-driven NGOs, under Oslo.

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to become a veritable popular movement. As the coordinator of the Stop the Wall

Campaign explained, "Youth are essential for the continuity of resistance. Older people

have gone back to their daily life, focusing on their families and working as much as they

can. The ones with real determination, commitment, and vision are the youth" (2007).

Youth engagement could provide the leadership and vision lacking in the

movement, as well as mobilize vast segments of the population, yet political constraints

from Israel and the PA, lack of effective resource mobilization, and reframings of

nonviolence under Oslo have had unique limiting effects on youth involvement. It is

important to note however that the relative absence of youth in nonviolent activism

leadership and participation is not due to lack of support or interest in the struggle, as

assumed by some activists. Rather, the data suggests that a space does exist for youth

consensus and action mobilization, but the realization of that phenomenon depends on

acknowledging youths' complex and nuanced understandings of violence and

nonviolence in order to reframe nonviolence in the sphere of resistance.

Due to the sheer number of youth, if that segment of the population were to be

mobilized, the momentum of the nonviolent struggle would most likely shift

dramatically, allowing the currently fragmented campaigns to become a veritable popular

movement. This chapter has explored the question of youth participation by examining

perceptions and realities of youth leadership and involvement in popular resistance

during the second intifada; indicating that youth support for nonviolent action, though

nuanced, is relatively high; and exploring some of the factors that have limited youth

engagement. The chapter thus suggests that a space for the reemergence of a popular

nonviolent movement does exist, based on youth engagement. However, effective action

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mobilization of youth depends on a contextual understanding of youth perceptions of

nonviolence and violence that reflects a broader collective identity of activism, rather

than specific distinctions between nonviolent and violent resistance. In addition, action

mobilization requires an understanding of the political constraints, organizational

structures, and cultural framings limiting engagement at all levels of society, which I

examine in more depth in the following chapters.

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SOURCES OF FRAGMENTATION

192

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INEFFICIENT RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

As Chapter 5 illustrates, a variety of nonviolent mechanisms were implemented

throughout the West Bank to challenge the occupation during the second intifada.

However, the majority of activists hesitated to define the current cycle of contention as a

popular movement, because of its fragmented and localized nature. As one activist

commented, "There are events, and different communities are trying to be active ... But

it's not a movement. It is still fragmented" (interview, 2007). Similarly, another activist

noted, "Many organizations are trying to bring a nonviolent movement, but there is still

not a movement. We are still working as individuals and small groups, so it's not a

movement from the people" (interview, 2007). Others agreed, stating that despite various

individual efforts, "there is no networking, no vision, no shared meaning, no tools"

(interview, 2007).

As the previous comments indicate, even activists deeply engaged in the

nonviolent struggle in the West Bank acknowledged that a popular, national movement

had yet to emerge. Indeed, the majority of nonviolent strategies discussed in Chapter 5

represent local actions and, in some cases like Bil'in, local episodes and campaigns, but

they have yet to coalesce into a unified or centralized movement. 74 As one activist

193

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summarized, "The Palestinian community has many activists. But because every person

or every area has its own needs ... or different issues, they are fragmented too much ...

Fragmentation is a symptom of the illness of the civil-based resistance movement"

(interview, 2007). Activists attributed the fragmentation to factors at multiple levels,

including divisions among activists, within civil society, and within Palestinian politics,

as well as physical barriers imposed by the occupation. As one nonviolence trainer

explained,

One of the biggest challenges is the Palestinian community. We need to make them understand that [nonviolence] is the approach to use. Another problem is the Israeli army; they won't accept even nonviolent activities. We also have the challenge of reaching the international community, and making them understand and believe in the problems here, and make them support us. So we have challenges in three domains, the local, the regional, and the international. (interview, 2007)

In the following chapters, I examine these different levels of fragmentation through the

social movement theory lenses of weak mobilizing structures, political constraints, and

ineffective movement frames. This chapter focuses on fragmentation from within, that is,

factors identified by activists related to movement coordination and resource

mobilization.

The majority of activists were reflexively critical of the nonviolent struggle itself,

acknowledging problems in the coordination of popular resistance. In this way, activists

recognized numerous weaknesses in the movement's organizing structures, defined in

Chapter 1 as the "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people

mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3). This

analytical framework is especially useful for assessing movement goals, tactics, and

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organizational dynamics, all of which represented challenges in the case of Palestine. As

one activist in the Bethlehem area summarized,

We don't have a clear strategy of what we want to achieve ... There's no good leader, there's no networking between groups, there's no clear understanding of nonviolence. And there's no structure, no clear goal. .. Most importantly, there is no commitment and continuity to nonviolent activities. (interview, 2007)

This chapter thus examines the weaknesses existing within the nonviolent struggle itself,

including lack of conceptual cohesion, in terms of goals, vision, and leadership; lack of

strategic consensus, due to different opinions on tactics including the utility of violence,

the roles of international and Israeli activists, and the rationale of using the Israeli legal

system; and lack of unity among civil society organizations due to competing NGO

agendas.

Conceptual/Structural Challenges

The majority of participants identified the lack of vision and leadership in the

nonviolent struggle as a primary weakness in the organizational structure of the

movement. As an activist from the Salfit region commented:

First, there are lots of organizations working in the same field, and each promotes nonviolence in its own way. Some talk about it as peace, some in terms of struggle, and so on, so it confuses people. Second, there are lots of leaders, and all of them want to be the big leader. Third, there is no single goal. People can't decide if they are focusing on the wall or independence or what. People concentrate on actions but not on a larger goal. (interview, 2007)

To be sure, a unified movement has been inhibited by conceptual and structural factors

such as the absence of a clear objective, the lack of leadership, and the inconsistent

understandings of nonviolence.

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Lack of Clear Goal

According to the literature on resource mobilization, social movements typically

rely heavily on their stated goals to shape their interactions with the broader political and

cultural environments (McAdam 1996b, 15). First, in terms of substance, stated goals

inform perceptions of the group's opportunity and threat potential, thus influencing levels

of support and opposition. Second, according to empirical studies, the ability to focus on

one clear goal is instrumental in both preserving resources and maintaining unity

(Gamson 1990, 44-46). According to McAdam, "the pursuit of a number of goals

promises to spread thin the already precious resources and energy of the SMO. Just as

dangerous is the impetus to internal dissension and factionalism that may accompany the

pursuit of multiple goals" (1996a, 15). A movement that is unable to articulate a clear

goal that resonates with the public will thus face challenges in garnering widespread

support, as has been the case in Palestine.

To be sure, many activists noted that the failure to articulate a common goal was a ·

major impediment to mobilizing for nonviolent resistance. For example, in a single

conversation with three activists in Ramallah, when asked about their goal for nonviolent

resistance, all three answered differently. One claimed the goal is to "affect the path of

the wall"75 (interview, 2007), while another aimed to "resolve social issues in Palestinian

society and end the occupation" (interview, 2007), while another said that "each action

has its own goal" (interview, 2007), such as preventing the demolition of a house or

stopping the uprooting of an olive grove.

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Such variation in both the scope and content of objectives was evident across

nearly all of the interviews. In many episodes of village-based resistance, the objective is

locally focused, such as stopping the construction of the separation barrier in that

particular village, or preventing the confiscation of local land. However, even more

broadly-stated goals range from halting the wall to ending the occupation, with variation

within these objectives as well. Regarding the separation barrier, some expressed the

goal of stopping construction of the wall (interview, 2007), while others aimed to

dismantle the wall (interview, 2007), and others sought to change the path of the wall to

stay on the Green Line. Such differences regarding wall-related objectives often cause

fractures between activists, who may view each other's goals as too soft or too extreme.

As Nour explained, "It's important for us to define our goals ... Maybe in the future we

will focus on ending the wall completely, but now we are using nonviolence just to keep

the wall on a straight route. Others criticize this and say, how can we tell the society that

we approve of the wall at all?" (interview, 2007).

Likewise, there are different long-term objectives amongst those aiming for an

end to the occupation. Some advocate for a two-state solution, with an independent

Palestinian state on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital (interviews, 2007),

while others hope for one democratic state, to secure equal rights for Israelis and

Palestinians, and to allow for the return of refugees (interviews, 2007). Others have

called for a complete overhaul of the PA in the short-term, and restructuring towards

"one state for both peoples" in the future (interview, 2007). Despite the individual merit

of these various goals, the range of objectives limits activists from developing a shared

vision, and hinders the development of effective strategies.

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Absence of Vision/Leadership

The absence of a common objective stems largely from the lack of unified

leadership and vision, noted by many activists (interviews, 2007). Despite the local

leadership of the popular committees, there was no unified leadership for popular

resistance during the second intifada, and thus no shared vision. As one activist

explained, "People felt the absence of a charismatic leader who could lead people with a

common vision" (interview, 2007). Even the few organizations that work for more

coordinated resistance, such Stop the Wall and the National Committee for Popular

Resistance, function more as umbrellas for networks of local committees, rather than as a

united, national leadership. This lack of leadership contrasted with the presence of the

Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) of the first intifada, and resulted

somewhat ironically from the presence of the PA in the second intifada. According to

several activists, while the absence of any present Palestinian leadership structure in the

first intifada allowed for the emergence of the UNL U, the existence of the PA in the

second intifada provided leaders and institutions that should have, yet failed to, embrace

and encourage popular resistance, as discussed further in Chapter 7.

Understanding of Nonviolence

The absence of a unified leadership and vision contributed to the existence of

many different interpretations and understandings of nonviolence, which further

contributed to fragmentation in both the spirit and strategy of the struggle. To begin

with, there was notable disagreement between activists regarding terminology, with some

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using the term "nonviolence" comfortably, but most eschewing that word in favor of

"popular resistance" (muqa 'uma sha 'bia) or "civil-based resistance" (muqa 'uma

mudania). For some, the distinction is purely an issue of semantics, even though they see

popular resistance and nonviolence as the same thing. As one activist commented,

I tend to use the term civil-based resistance. I don't mind the term "nonviolence," but... when you say "nonviolence" in Arabic [la 'anj], it appears in the negative, as if you are stripping away a certain right from somebody. When you say "civil based resistance," you actually mean nonviolence and mass participation of people. (interview, 2007)

Another agreed, noting, "Nonviolence itself is natural, especially in Palestine. People do

it every day. It's normal, but people don't want to mention that word [because of] the

'non' part of 'nonviolence,'" which implies submission, passivity, or normalization to

many Palestinians (interview, 2007).

Indeed, other see saw a marked difference between the meaning of "nonviolence"

and "popular resistance," arguing that the latter is more aptly suited to describe

contention. As one activist explained,

I prefer to call it popular resistance, rather than nonviolence. Some nonviolent activists want to go to the checkpoints and sing or raise flags for peace. But popular resistance is better. We don't want to kill or injure anyone, but we are going to fight using our bodies, to push through the bulldozers and jeeps, and not just stop in front of the checkpoints and sing. (interview, 2007)

Others prefer the term "popular resistance" over "nonviolence" to avoid making difficult

distinctions between nonviolence and violence in the legal sense of literally violating or

non-violating. According to a member of Bil'in's popular committee,

Palestinians are living under occupation, and under international law; we have a right to violent resistance. So when you say 'nonviolence,' it implies that other resistance is violent, when we believe that all resistance is nonviolent ... You can't distinguish between violent and nonviolent resistance, because both are legitimate. (interview, 2007)

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Likewise, another activist commented, "Armed resistance is not the same thing as

violence. We have a right to resist" (interview, 2007). Since conceptualizations of

nonviolence and violence differ between activists in these ways, the terms "popular

resistance" and "civil-based resistance" are most commonly used.

The meaning of nonviolence also differs between activists, with some seeing

nonviolence as a way of life, and others viewing it as a strategy, even within the same

organization. For example, two Palestinian activists with Combatants for Peace defined

nonviolence in different ways, with one seeing it from the principled perspective, which

typically views nonviolence as a way of life, and the other from the pragmatic point of

view, which generally considers nonviolence a form of strategy. However, both agreed

that "the meaning of nonviolence is different and complicated" (interview, 2007), and

that "everyone has their own meaning" (interview, 2007).

Indeed, even those who think of nonviolence as a way of life describe their

understanding of nonviolence in different ways. For example, some activists' principled

nonviolence grows out ofreligion or spirituality. According to one participant who

defines nonviolence as a way of life, both Christian and Muslim religious leaders refer to

"verses that support nonviolence, and tell you how to use nonviolence to save our dignity

and the other's dignity" (interview, 2007). Another activist explained, "Many people are

nonviolent simply because their faith tells them: I am Muslim, so that is why I'm

nonviolent. I am Christian, so that is why I'm nonviolent ... You always use nonviolence,

no matter what" (interview, 2007). In addition to faith-based nonviolence, other activists

who define nonviolence as a way of life pointed to family influence, with one stating,

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"the most important influence was through my family. They never believed in armed

resistance, and they actually pushed us towards nonviolence" (interview, 2007). Others

were not raised with nonviolence, but have since adopted it as a way of life to transition

from a militant past. As one former supporter of armed resistance explained,

"Nonviolence is not just a strategy, but instead it is an ideology, a way of life. I want to

clear myself, and to have a vision, and nonviolence enables you to do this" (interview,

2007).

Many activists have a principled view of nonviolence for themselves personally, but

they do not try to convince others to see it that way. Indeed, trainers committed to

nonviolence as a way of life often present it to others as a strategy. For example, as one

trainer explained, "When I teach children about nonviolence, I tell them that they have a

choice ... I say that violence is okay, but I just want them to know that there is another

way. For me, I never knew there was an alternative [to violence]" (interview, 2007).

Another activist agreed, stating:

My beliefs are that nonviolence is moral, principled, and spiritual, but I can't impose that belief on society. People want answers; they want things that will save their lives, and save their land. So, in the short term, I hope that Palestinians will adopt the pragmatic approach, and use nonviolence because it is strategic and creative. But in the long term, I hope the principle of nonviolence becomes embedded in the community, so that people live it in the home and school and workplace. (interview, 2007)

Others referred to nonviolence as a "way of life," but in the sense that nonviolence

can be employed in everyday situations, and not just as a tactic to confront the

occupation. Several activists noted the need for nonviolence within Palestine, in light of

the violent confrontations between Fateh and Barnas taking place during the time of the

research, as well as in community and family disputes. As one activist commented, "I

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choose nonviolence not just against the occupation, but I feel it should be a lifestyle in

Palestine" (interview, 2007). Another activist, who sees nonviolence as both a strategy

and a way of life, noted, "It's not just when you face an Israeli soldier that you act in

nonviolent ways" (interview, 2007). Although these activists described nonviolence as a

way of life, their understanding is different than a principled commitment to nonviolence,

as they do not necessarily condemn the use of violence as a form of resistance.

Likewise, most activists who see nonviolence as a strategy do not condemn

violence, but rather see popular resistance as a pragmatic form of resistance. For some,

nonviolence is strategic for protecting Palestinians from Israeli responses to more violent

forms of resistance. As one activist explained, "Nonviolence is a way of resisting the

occupation in order to present the justice of your situation without using weapons or the

flow of blood. It is more effective because blood lets your enemy use blood, too, and we

don't want any more blood" (interview, 2007). For others, nonviolence is preferred for

protecting both Palestinian and Israeli civilians, even if they are not against the use of

violence in regards to other segments of the population. For example, an activist with

Combatants for Peace commented, "We do not believe in hurting civilians, we condemn

suicide bombings, and ... we encourage the nonviolent way. But I can't condemn

resistance against the army and settlers in the West Bank" (interview, 2007). Similarly,

an activist and trainer in the Bethlehem area who took a pragmatic approach defined

nonviolence as a way to "address injustice, but in a right way, without creating another

injustice" (interview, 2007).

Other activists see popular resistance as strategic by recognizing the superiority of

the IDF to any form of Palestinian armed resistance. As the coordinator of the National

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Conunittee for Popular Resistance explained, "I believe in nonviolence as a strategy. I

think the IDF is stronger, and Palestinians can't realistically face it with violence, so we

need a different approach" (interview, 2007). Others agreed, including the campaign

coordinator of Stop the Wall, who stated:

I believe strongly that all means of resisting the occupation are legitimate. But strategically, we have no chance of military success. To have this, you need certain conditions, like an army, weapons, and a country with areas to retreat to and places to have trainings, but we don't have these things, and the Arab states don't help us, so we don't have a chance. (interview, 2007)

The majority of activists supporting strategic nonviolence see it as a way to "bring

the situation to the attention of the Israeli and international conununities" (interview,

2007). The majority of activists conunented that most of the world views Palestinians as

terrorists, so nonviolence provides a means of changing that image. Indeed, perhaps due

to the fact that few contact points limit the potential for actions that might affect Israelis

directly, activists instead are appealing more to the international conununity, and thus

Israel indirectly, in a sort of boomerang model (Keck and Sikkink 1998), as discussed in

Chapter 1.

Nonviolence is useful in attracting the international conununity to the Palestinian

cause in two ways. First, nonviolence allows for international activists to join with

Palestinians in solidarity against the occupation, with activists noting that "nonviolence

can help get people all over the world to help and support the Palestinian cause"

(interview, 2007). Second, nonviolence can appeal to the Israeli and international

communities through the media, since Israel "can't defend itself to the world in using

violence against unarmed civilians" (interview, 2007). As another activist noted, "Israel

responds to nonviolence with violence. We must expose this to the world and to the

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Israeli public" (interview, 2007). This reasoning reflects Sharp's notion of political

jujitsu, in which even violent repression of nonviolent action is strategic for drawing

attention to the tactics of the oppressor.

Clearly, there are many different interpretations of nonviolence, and many different

rationales for employing it as a form of resistance. Though perhaps complementary in

some ways, when combined with a lack of common goal, vision, or leadership, these

variations in conceptual understandings of nonviolence only further contributes to the

fragmentation of the struggle and the continued challenge of developing a more unified,

coordinated widespread movement.

Differences in Strategy and Tactics

Variations in conceptual approaches to nonviolent resistance have resulted in

different strategic approaches, which have further divided the struggle, leading to an

overall lack of strategy cited by nearly all activists interviewed. The absence of a

coordinated strategy renders nonviolence ineffective, and further hinders popular

mobilization. As the director of the Al-Watan Center in Hebron noted, "Nonviolence

without a strategy is like swimming with no direction, because you don't know where

you are going. There are many methods that can increase the number of people involved,

but there needs to be a plan and a strategy" (interview, 2007). Indeed, according to

McAdam, the success or failure of a movement largely depends on its "ability to devise

innovative and disruptive tactics" (1996a, 13).

One of the major problems acknowledged by Palestinian activists that both reflects

and contributes to the fragmented nature of the struggle was the fact that most actions

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were reactions to direct damages at the local level, such as wall construction and land

confiscation, rather than being proactive acts. As one activist stated, "Reacting to the

other side is not nonviolence. Nonviolence needs to be a proactive movement, it needs to

be a creative movement. We should be initiating actions, and [the Israelis] should have

to figure out how to deal with them" (interview, 2007). Likewise, another activist

commented, "Our strategy should be to build something. We should not just be reacting,

but rather we should be acting and achieving something" (interview, 2007). However,

articulating a strategic action plan has been difficult due to varying opinions on the utility

of armed violence, throwing stones, partnering with Israeli and international activists, and

pursuing legal paths.

The Use of Violence

Despite the collective position of the popular committees against the use of armed

violence, individual activists expressed different opinions on the issue. Some activists

echoed nonviolent theorists in claiming that any acts of armed resistance hurt nonviolent

movements, with several activists stating, "Rockets and violence weaken nonviolent

resistance" (interview, 2007), and "bombs are not strategic" (interview, 2007). Similarly,

many activists referred to the second intifada's reliance on predominantly militant

resistance as moving Palestine backwards. Others, though preferring nonviolent

resistance, consider it more realistic to accommodate militant acts until there is more

support for nonviolence. An activist from Salfit commented, "It is better to just have

popular [nonviolent] resistance, but it's hard to convince people of that. So maybe we

will continue with militant actions for awhile and then build nonviolence gradually as

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there are more successes" (interview, 2007). However, the same activist emphasized the

need for nonviolent actions themselves to remain nonviolent, noting, "The problem is that

at a nonviolent demonstration, if ninety-nine percent of the people are nonviolent, but

there is one percent violent, that one percent can mess up the whole protest" (interview,

2007). An activist from a village south of Bethlehem likewise acknowledged that while

there is a place for armed resistance,

We should keep our civil-based resistance movement, which is nonviolent, from being violent, keep it away from the militants, from all the things that bring it closer to violence. It's important. Because the closer it comes to violence, the more it will lose its character and identity, and the more it will lose the vision. (interview, 2007)

Thus, even many activists who recognize the legitimacy of armed resistance still aim to

keep popular resistance distinct from violence for strategic purposes.

Other activists however view violent and nonviolent resistance as part of the same

movement, and feel that the inclusion of violence is a necessary strategy. As a trainer

and activist in Bethlehem stated,

Nonviolence and violence should go together. I don't think the movement should be only nonviolent, because first of all, it is our legitimate right to use violence, recognized by the UN. But the other important thing is that it is natural, it is normal, for people to use violence. Why do you use violence? When you get humiliated. And we are humiliated on a daily basis. (interview, 2007)

Others agreed, feeling that nonviolence alone is not strategic. An activist in the southern

village of Beit Ommar who supports both violent and nonviolent resistance summarized

the frequently voiced belief that "violent resistance makes you a stronger partner for

negotiations" (interview, 2007), by providing a source of leverage. As another activist

noted, "Nonviolence is good, but it's not enough ... it does not provide enough pressure;

that's why we need armed resistance" (interview 2007). This rationale has been

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supported in social movement literature as well. According to McAdam, because

movement groups typically lack access to resources like money, votes, and influence

necessary to navigate the "proper channels" of political change, they "may have little

choice but to use their ability to disrupt public order as a negative inducement to

bargaining" (1996a, 14). Likewise, an empirical study of fifty-four "challenging groups",

conducted by Gamson (1990) indicated that groups that used "force and violence" were

"more successful" than groups that did not.

For many activists, there is not a clear line between violent and nonviolent

resistance. To be sure, for many who view nonviolence as a strategy, it represents just

one approach to resistance. Likewise, many activists who identify strongly with violent

resistance also support nonviolence as a strategy, including members of notoriously

"violent" groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. For example, a Hamas official in

Tulkarem, who participated regularly in nonviolent actions, stated the importance of

nonviolence, but acknowledged that violence is sometimes necessary for self-defense:

"Sometimes nonviolence is good, but sometimes you need something else. If a soldier is

coming into your home and using violence, how else can you respond to him?"

(interview, 2007).

Similarly, a member oflslamic Jihad who supports armed resistance also supports

nonviolence because it accommodates more widespread participation. He explained,

"If you use just military action, you only have a few members, but with nonviolence you

can get a lot of people involved ... We need to start thinking from the eyes of the

Palestinian people and be one in all actions" (Mustafa 2007). It is thus clear that activists

participating in nonviolent resistance come from a range of backgrounds and

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perspectives, which enhances the struggle in some ways, but complicates it in others.

The absence of a common viewpoint on the use of violence in resistance is one important

issue that hinders the development of a cohesive strategy.

Throwing Stones

The debate regarding the merit of violent resistance becomes even more nuanced

when considering the question of what constitutes violence. As noted above, some

activists do not view any form of resistance as violent, since Palestinians have a

legitimate right under international law to resist occupation. However, most activists

distinguish between the strategic value of armed resistance, such as bombs, rockets, and

guns, and other forms of "violent" popular resistance, most notably, throwing stones. For

example, one activist who supports throwing stones criticized that tactic's common

classification as violent: "There has never been one Palestinian bullet fired in any of our

demonstrations. If throwing stones is violent, if setting tires on fire is violent, if storming

the wall is violent, then yes, we are violent" (interview, 2007).

Other activists however, while supporting stone-throwing in principle,

acknowledged that it was not strategic. As a resistance leader in the weekly Um

Salamouna demonstrations commented, "You have to decide how much to accelerate the

situation. Do you want to throw stones, or do you want to pass on your message?

Sometimes you need stones, but that is not our message" (interview 2007). This activist

and the other popular committee members in Um Salamouna decided to prohibit the

throwing of stones at the demonstrations when they saw that the stones provoked the IDF

to crack down on the demonstrations with tear gas, bullets, and arrests. The popular

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committee coordinating Bil'in's weekly demonstrations made a similar decision, with

one member noting, "During the demonstrations, it's forbidden to throw stones, because.

we know the IDF will respond violently to stones. Besides, our message is not

communicated by throwing stones" (interview, 2007). However, the same activist

acknowledged, "If the army comes into the village using violence in a raid or incursion,

then we can't control the stones or tell the kids not to use them" (interview, 2007). The

popular committee leader from the northern village of Budrous recounted a similar

sequence of events, with a popular committee decision to prohibit stones during

demonstrations for strategic purposes, but willing acknowledgement of stone throwing

when the army entered the village in other instances.

Many activists' and popular committees' decisions to prohibit stone-throwing is a

significant departure from first intifada tactics, in which the stone became a symbol of the

uprising. As one activist acknowledged, "At first it was hard to talk about not using

stones. Throwing stones is in our history; it was a symbol of the first intifada"

(interview, 2007). However, the two-fold objective of protecting civilians from violent

IDF responses and sending a message to the international community prompted a move

away from the tactic for pragmatic, if not principled, purposes. As one activist explained,

You need to control nonviolent resistance, because you don't want chaos. It's like nuclear power. If you use it recklessly and drop the bomb, you will just have chaos. But if you control it, you can use its power for energy. Nonviolence is the same, because it requires control for the people participating (interview, 2007).

Nevertheless, different opinions on the strategic value of throwing stones further hindered

the development of a coordinated strategy.

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Role of International and Israeli Activists

In addition to divisions regarding the strategic value of various forms of violence,

a cohesive action plan was further hindered by different opinions on other tactical issues,

including the role of international and Israeli activists. Regarding internationals, most

participants expressed appreciation for the presence of internationals who worked in

solidarity with Palestinians, both for reducing the extent of the ID F's violent response to

demonstrations, and for attracting more support for the Palestinian cause in the

international community. However, nearly all activists emphasized the need for

internationals to play a supporting, rather then leading, role in actions, and some activists

were critical of internationals' participation. As one activist in Bethlehem commented,

"We do not want any nonviolent internationals to come teach us. We know what we are

doing. We want them to go teach their leaders, work in their communities, and with their

people" (interview, 2007). Another activist agreed, stating, "Internationals can spoil

nonviolence sometimes. It's better if they come here and learn and then take their stories

back home to advocate. They're not as important in the direct actions" (interview,

2007). On the other hand, other activists see strategic benefit in the participation of

supporters from the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), the Palestinian Solidarity

Project (PSP), Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), the Ecumenical Accompaniment

Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), the International Women's Peace Service

(IWPS), and other international groups. The role of international activists thus remains

another divisive point for strategic planning.

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The role of Israeli activists is also controversial, with many activists seeing the

presence of supporters from groups like Ta'ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, Gush

Shalom, and Peace Now as strategic for once again reducing the degree oflsraeli

responses to demonstrations and for raising awareness about the Palestinian situation in

Israel. However, other activists maintain that the place for Israeli activism is within

Israel: "We need Israeli activists to work inside Israel, to start to convince their

government to not use violence against the Palestinian people ... and to let the public

know that we are not a violent people" (interview, 2007). Others commented that

sometimes the presence of Israeli activists reduces Palestinian participation in

demonstrations.

However, most see Israeli involvement as beneficial on several levels. First,

several activists noted that the IDF is less likely to use lethal means of responding to

demonstrations when they know Israeli activists are present. In addition, as noted by one

activist whose village worked closely with Israeli activists, "It was good for our people to

see another face of the Jews. Palestinians are used to seeing Jews as either soldiers or

settlers, so they only see the bad side. From the Israelis' participation in resistance, they

now see the good side" (interview, 2007). Israeli participation also helps raise awareness

in Israeli about issues like the separation barrier, as well as giving publicity to Palestinian

nonviolence, by increasing coverage of actions in Israeli publications like Ha 'aretz.

However, the question of how and iflsraeli activists should be involved remains a

significant strategic question for Palestinian activists.

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Use of Legal Frameworks and Institutions

The strategic value of using Israeli courts has also been contentious. As discussed

in Chapter 4, villages like Bil'in and Budrous challenged the wall in Israeli courts and

managed to prevent land confiscation by the separation barrier. However, some activists

are critical of using the legal path because "it's clear that the Israeli legal system just

facilitates the government's wishes" (interview, 2007). Others recognized this concern,

but drew from international law to assert that the occupying authority has duties to ensure

certain rights that can be enforced legally. As Naser explained,

In the past, people here said any person that deals with the Israeli legal institution is a collaborator or normalizer with Israel. But there is a duty for the occupying authority to guarantee security and human rights, and if we keep ignoring these things, we are losing a good, pragmatic tool to deal with what's happening. (interview 2007)

The question of how and when to use the Israeli legal system strategically thus remains

unanswered.

This section has illustrated that fragmentation both contributes to, and is

reinforced by, the lack of strategy in resistance. Disagreements regarding the use of

violence, ranging from armed resistance to throwing stones, have made it difficult to

agree on tactics, while divisions over the utility of internationals, Israeli activists, and

legal frameworks have further hindered the development of a unified action plan. The

lack of strategy is a symptom of the broader structural issues related to the lack of a c common conception of or goal for nonviolence, and the absence of a strong leadership to

provide a guiding vision.

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Competing NGO Agendas

NGOs have become divisive actors in terms of resistance on several levels. Many

NGOs focusing on "nonviolence" have different definitions of the term, which makes it

difficult to coordinate efforts or develop joint strategies. However, many activists'

frustration with NGOs stems more from systemic and structural issues relating to their

role in resistance.

First, several activists perceived NGOs as being plagued by corruption and

mismanagement of funds. For example, one activist explained that he had started an

NGO several years ago to distribute donated food and clothes to needy children, only to

find that another NGO supposedly helping with distribution was actually selling the

donated items for profit. Another activist complained that, "The corruption in the NGOs

is worse than in the PA. In the PA is so evident you can touch it, but it is more concealed

in the NGOs" (interview, 2007). Other activists criticized NGOs for wasting funding, by

spending significant amounts of money just to talk or hold trainings about nonviolence,

without any real action. As one interviewee commented, "When you compare what

NGOs are saying about nonviolence to what real nonviolence they are doing, you see

how many millions of dollars have been wasted on this" (interview, 2007).

To be sure, NGOs' inherent focus on funding was viewed as problematic by many

activists, who criticized the NGOs for turning "activism" into a profession. According to

one activist, "volunteer work has been going away from struggling against the

occupation. Now many people involved in resistance want money or salaries, but I don't

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want this. I prefer to volunteer, and I am trying to develop the idea of grassroots

volunteer work against the occupation" (interview, 2007).

The shift ofNGOs to salaried activism, and reliance on funding to conduct

nonviolence, has put many NGOs in competition with each other "like different

companies in a market" (interview, 2007). As an activist with Combatants Against the

Wall explained, "The competition between NGOs is a problem ... There are too many

people pulling in different directions, and too many organizations working for their own

benefits and agendas" (interview, 2007). According to many activists, this competition

contributes to the lack of clear vision and lack of strategic action noted above.

Competition between NGOs in terms of both agenda-setting and funding are

linked to reliance on outside donors. According to a community activist from a village

south of Bethlehem, NGOs are often driven by both national and international agendas, in

contrast to grassroots community-based organizations (CBOs), which are directly

connected to local people (interview, 2007). As this activist explained, NGOs are also

often subject to political influence: "In other places, NGOs tend to present the needs of

the local communities to the authority. Here it works the other way. The NGOs work

under agendas that are linked to some political group, and pass on ideas in an ideological

way" (interview, 2007).

Indeed, according to Amaney Jamal, several hundred organizations were

extensions of Palestinian political parties during the Oslo period. On the one hand, "pro

PNA and pro-Fatah associations ... used their organizations to generate support for

Arafat's government, for instance, by using their sites for PNA employment

opportunities" (2007, 53; see also Amal Jamal 2005, 145). On the other hand, "because

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the Oslo Accords provided governmental institutions for Fatah and PLO supporters,

members of other factions, less supportive of the PNA, clung to their former civic

associations both to maintain their political allegiances and to counter the prevailing PNA

discourse" (Amaney Jamal 2007, 53). In these ways, NGOs served as "convenient

shelter[ s] for disappointed political figures" (Amal Jamal 2005, 146), using their

associations as "safe haven[s] from which to address PNA propaganda" (Amaney Jamal

2007, 53). Meanwhile, even NGOs that were not affiliated with a specific faction were

forced to cooperate with the PA to remain active. To be sure, "a major source of

weakness of the civil organizations stemmed from the fact that they had to negotiate

political deals with governmental agencies in order to survive and be effective" (Amal

Jamal 2005, 146). 76

While some NGOs have been driven by PA interests, others reflect the agendas of

western donors. As a nonviolence trainer in Bethlehem claimed, "Many NGOs get their

funds from the international community, so they end up being donor-driven. So when

many NGOs talk about nonviolence, they end up focusing on how to live with the

occupation, not how to end the occupation" (interview, 2007). 77 In addition to agenda

setting, donor-driven activism can also result in dependency on international funding. As

the same trainer in Bethlehem explained, "Many NGOs start working on the idea of

nonviolence, but then stop working when their funding ends" (interview, 2007). Other

activists agreed, noting that while some outside support is good, Palestinians need to

become more self-sufficient to avoid being locked in to European, American, and Israeli

agendas: "Palestine is often seen as a humanitarian problem, but this is not right. We

have educated people, and we should be dependent on ourselves, not on outside aid. We

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should be looking for solutions from inside and not outside, and start building

independently" (interview, 2007).

It is thus clear that while many NGOs support nonviolence in some way,

corruption within NGOs, competition between NGOs, and divisions between NGOs,

CBOs, and grassroots activists further contribute to the fragmentation of activism.

Activists' primary concern with NGOs was their increasing "institutionalization" of

resistance, reflected in prioritizing the organization over the struggle itself. This

phenomenon illustrates the special form of goal transformation called "organizational

maintenance," in which "the primary activity of the SMO becomes the maintenance of

membership, funds, and other requirements of organizational existence" (Kriesi 1996,

156; see also Zald and Ash 1966; Michels 1949). In this process, the action repertoire of

the SMO also becomes "more moderate, more conventional, more institutionalized"

(Kriesi 1996, 156). According to Kriesi, this institutionalization of SM Os transforms

some movement groups into parties or interest groups, while similar processes of

commercialization transform SMOs into service organizations. Indeed, the

institutionalized nature of many NGOs, combined with their ties to the PA (be it willingly

or not) and reliance on western donor agendas, made them appear "detached from the

daily burdens of most Palestinians" (Amal Jamal 2005, 146). According to Amal Jamal,

"Although the NGOs provided central services, such as education, health care, and

agricultural assistance to Palestinian society, they were at the same time detached from·

the real social dynamics and as a result had no serious impact on politics" (2005, 146).

As discussed in Chapter 4, conventional NGOs can complement the work of more

contentious SMOs in the broader social movement sector. However, they can also create

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additional challenges for SMOs when they undercut, rather than reinforce, action

mobilization. This has recently been the case in Palestine, in which NGO framings of

nonviolence, informed by western donor agendas, have conflicted with competing

movement frames, resulting in the disassociation of nonviolence from contention in the

public view, thus hindering mobilization, as discussed further in Chapter 8.

As this chapter has described, there were many factors within the Palestinian

nonviolent "movement" itself that hindered mobilization and resulted in fragmentation.

First, there was a lack of conceptual cohesion, with activists disagreeing on goals and

objectives, and lacking any shared vision or leadership. Second, there was a lack of

coordinated strategy, with tactical differences between activists regarding the utility of

violence, as well as the roles of international and Israeli activists, and the legitimacy of

the Israeli legal system. Finally, there were divisions in Palestinian civil society due to

some activists' mistrust ofNGOs, and competition between NGOs. In these ways,

movement leaders failed to mobilize their resources and organize sustained resistance

effectively. However, these internal variables were not the only factors inhibiting

widespread participation; as the next two chapters discuss, popular mobilization was also

hindered by political constraints and movement frames.

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POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

In addition to weak organizational structures within the movement, political

constraints also limited widespread participation. As defined in Chapter 1, political

opportunities refer to the "changes in the institutional structure or informal power

relations of a given national political system" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3),

which either create opportunities that "encourage people to engage in contentious

politics" (Tarrow 1998, 20) or create constraints that discourage contention. In the case

of Palestinian politics, changes in formal Palestinian political institutions prior to the

second intifada discouraged contention, while shifts in the informal power relations

between Palestinian political parties during the second intifada further hindered

opportunities for engagement. In addition to Palestinian political constraints, the

movement was also limited by Israeli political constraints and the perpetuation (and

indeed, intensification) of the occupation's policies. This chapter explores how these

variables limited action mobilization, indicating that fragmentation was rooted not only at

the movement level, but at the national and regional political level as well.

New Palestinian Political Institutions

In 1993, the signing of the Declaration of Principles following the Oslo Accords

provided for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), a semi-autonomous

218

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governing body with jurisdiction in specified areas of the West Bank and Gaza.

Although the PA was initially viewed by most Palestinians as a foundation for a

permanent national government, many Palestinians became increasingly disillusioned

with the new body's poor governance inside the territories, as well as its seemingly

placating relationship with Israel. Thus, rather than serving as a strong leadership for the

Palestinian movement, the PA actually created constraints to nonviolent struggle by

adopting autocratic policies, limiting the role of civil society, and repressing activism.

Lack of Good Governance

According to Andoni, the PA functioned "as a corrupt, one-party leadership,

[resulting in] a lack of democracy [that] cast a malaise over Palestinian society and

politics" (2001, 212). Indeed, corruption was believed to be rampant in the PA,

particularly under Arafat, who served as the president of the Authority from its

establishment to his death on November 11, 2004. This period was also characterized by

centralization of power, lack of accountability, and absence of transparency, which had

severe implications for the development of Palestinian democracy.

In the years following the Oslo Accords, power was largely concentrated in the

executive branch under the leadership of Arafat, who tended to bypass the majority of

institutions to extend his personal influence. While this strategy was arguably motivated

by Arafat's attempt to unite various factions of Palestinians with different opinions and

interests, and to bolster his status as the unifying symbol of Palestine, the centralization

of power proved detrimental and only further crippled the already limited legitimacy of

the PA.

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This centralization manifested itself in various ways. Financially, over one quarter of the

PA revenues were placed under the direct and unaccountable control of Arafat by 1997,

while politically, the legislative branch was kept weak. To be sure, while the Palestinian

Legislative Council (PLC) had the authority to draft and pass laws, all laws were subject

to Arafat's approval, and thus served more as resolutions than actual legislation. 78 The

PLC was further hindered by the fact that the DOP forbade the body from legislating on

"final status" issues, including Jerusalem, settlements, refugee, and borders, which were

delegated solely to negotiations between Israel and the PLO, even though all of these

issues also affected Palestinian national governance. In addition, any legislation that was

passed by the PLC was subject to approval by the Israeli side of the legal subcommittee

before becoming law (Parsons 2005, 205-6).

While factors such as the structure of the DOP and the ultimate subjugation of the

PA to Israel affected the emerging form of the PA, many scholars attribute the

centralization of power primarily to Arafat. As Amal Jamal writes, "Although Arafat

alone should not be blamed for the emerging Palestinian governing structures, he [was]

without a doubt a central source of authoritarianism in Palestinian politics, having

marginalized official institutional state structures and established instead a patrimonial

political system" (2005, 121). One such institution in which Arafat's authoritarian role

was evident was the security sector. According to Sirriyeh, "the absence of an effective

control by an identifiable institution led to the excessive manipulation of [the security

sector's] responsibilities by members and leaders of these organizations" (2000, 51). To

be sure, as Brown notes, "the security services effectively answered to the president

regardless of the content of the Basic Law. When Arafat was president, he encouraged

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multiple security services but declined to draw clear divisions of responsibilities among

them" (2005, 16). This resulted in a lack of both organization and mandate, with over a

dozen security organizations operating under Arafat, and none of them proving effective

in providing either internal or external security. As Brown suggests, "the myriad layers

of overlapping forces and command structures" contributed to a general lack of

transparency and accountability within the security sector, which was mirrored in other

PA institutions (2005, 17).

Arafat's centralization of power was largely linked to his reliance on patronage.

As Rubin writes, "All power came ultimately from Arafat himself. As frequently

happens in politics, a strong leader prefers lieutenants with a plodding loyalty over those

whose brilliance and ambition seem to threaten his own position" (1999, 23). In addition

to his inner circles, Arafat relied on clientilism to ensure support from all levels of the

ever-increasing PA bureaucracy, as well as from non-PA Palestinians. As Amaney Jamal

notes, "Arafat's monopoly on the resources and unchecked power to reward and punish

Palestinians allowed him to exert his influence over every Palestinian" (2007, 42).

Indeed, Arafat's supporters had access to permits, jobs, and contracts, while his

opponents were subject to harassment and sanctions against themselves and their

families; thus, "the costs of opposing Arafat were certainly higher than the costs of

supporting him" (Amaney Jamal 2007, 42; see also Rubin 1999, 25). Some opportunities

and costs were not material, but rather represented the chance to participate (or not) in the

development of the Palestinian state, for which many Palestinians had been striving for

years (Rubin 1995, 25).

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Of course, the patronage system provided a "natural seedbed for corruption"

(Rubin 1999, 25; see also Amaney Jamal 2007, 42). This corruption not only hindered

the internal functioning of PA institutions by inhibiting accountability and transparency,

but also curbed the ability of the PA to provide necessary services to the general

population. As Abu-Nimer writes, "the internal corruption scandals left the Palestinian

community trapped between an occupation force and a symbolic system of authority

ineffective in its negotiation policy and blocking other resistance forces from emerging"

(2006, 144). Indeed, the lack of good governance in the years following the Oslo

Accords extended beyond the PA institutions to inhibit Palestinian civil society, limit

local leadership, and curb popular participation in politics.

Limits on Civil Society

The PA centralized power not only within the governing institutions, but also

within Palestinian society itself, by limiting the role of alternative institutions and local

committees, many of which had played key roles in the first intifada. Arafat and most

other leaders of the PA in 1994 had been in exile in Tunis during the first intifada, and

thus had not experienced the democratic processes initiated by the local leadership

through the UNLU, popular committees, and civil society organizations. Rather, they

saw these local leaders as threats and deliberately attempted to push them aside or at least

limit their influence (King 2007; Rubin 1999). As King summarizes, "The main political

exploit of the returning exiles became that of neutralizing the potency of such groups,

even while lauding their accomplishments, because they stood as the sole force capable

of jeopardizing the consolidation of power by the new regime" (2007, 327).

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Arafat pressured these local leaders and organizations in multiple ways.

Regarding local leaders, he "tried to empty of any political role the political structures

established by the local political elite in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the

struggle against occupation" (Amal Jamal, 2005, 133). He thus marginalized activist

intellectuals who were leaders during the first intifada, and their respective organizations,

replacing them with new institutions led by individuals loyal to him. For example, to

ensure that first intifada leader Feisal Husseini did not become a threat, Arafat cut the

budget of the Husseini's Orient House and limited Husseini's duties to Jerusalem-related

issues (Rubin 1999, 21).

Regarding organizations, the PA sought to have more regulation over NGO

affairs. According to Amaney Jamal, soon after its establishment, the PA "began to

monitor associational activities, demand a portion of the funding these associations

received, and to play a more visible role in daily associational life" (2007, 51). It also

limited the independence of these groups by formally requiring them to register through

the Ministry of the Interior, and informally establishing patron-client relationships that

many NGOs deemed necessary for survival (Amaney Jamal 2007, 54). Meanwhile, the

PA sought to limit NGO influence by attempting to supplant their services and constrain

NGO agendas. As Parsons notes, the PA "tightened the space available to the NGOs

from two sides, marginalizing their role in promotion of the nationalist agenda and

supplanting their role in the provision of services through the expansion of the apparatus

of the PA" (2005, 178). In these ways, the PA marginalized local leaders, restricted

NGOs, and squeezed the public space available to civil society in an attempt to

consolidate authority.

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Limits on Activism

Perhaps most important for this study, the PA also repressed popular resistance.

As one activist explained, "For the seven years of Oslo, it was like the leadership was

giving the people sedatives, and people became content with the promise that everything

would be better, and they stopped resisting. So in reality, the PA was shutting up the

resistance before the wall" (interview, 2007). According to Parsons, the PA adopted a

"mandate for social demobilization" (2005, 175) that it applied to violent and nonviolent

activists alike.

This was largely due to the fact that both nonviolent leaders and militant groups

posed threats to Arafat's authority, as mentioned above. However, it is also due to the

nature of the Oslo Accords, which sought to establish a "Palestinian apparatus to do what

the IDF could not: demobilize the resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism in the West

Bank and Gaza" (Parsons 2005, 178). Because Israel essentially tasked Arafat personally

with maintaining security in the West Bank and Gaza, he could somewhat justify his

authoritarian policies, even to opponents, who recognized the difficult task of "balancing

between domestic radicals, Palestinian public opinion, and Israel" (Rubin 1999, 26).

Sirriyeh proposes several theses to explain the authoritarian nature of the PA under

Arafat. Some of these reasons include the desire of the PA to make an impression on the

Israelis by suppressing anti-Oslo opposition, the issue of internalized PA insecurity, the

"outsider" status of the original PA leadership, the lack of political experience of the PA,

and the desire to promote national unity by subordinating divisions within Palestine

(2000, 49).

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Lack of Leadership for Resistance

Whether due to Israeli-imposed limitations (discussed further below), internal

corruption, or a combination of both, the PA failed to provide sufficient leadership in

guiding the second intifada. According to Parsons, the failings of the PA, including lack

of political accountability and transparency, poor governance, and limits on civil society

participation, "were nowhere more obvious, or the consequences more disastrous, than in

the PA's inability to confront Israel's colonization campaign" (2005, 208), beginning

with settlement construction in the years following Oslo and continuing with further

settlement expansion during the years of the second intifada. Meanwhile, activists

pointed out how lack of leadership hindered civil-based resistance in general. As one

activist commented, in the second intifada, "leaders didn't make resisting the occupation

a priority, so that blocked our work for several years. Meanwhile, the people are getting

more and more lost. There is no vision, no leadership, so people don't know where

Palestine is going" (interview, 2007). Even when local grassroots activism began taking

place independent of the PA, leaders were slow to respond. As another activist

explained, "People have lost trust ... not in nonviolence itself, but in the leadership ... For

example, the other day, Mustafa Barghouthi [then Minister oflnformation] said the

leadership was 'pleased' with the nonviolence efforts. But we don't want them just to be

'pleased,' we want them to be out there with us" (interview, 2007).

Scholars agree, noting that the lack of leadership hindered the development of

effective coordination and strategy during the second intifada. As Amal Jamal states:

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The Palestinian elite structure contributed very much to the lack of a united Palestinian strategy to face Israeli policies. This lack of a common strategy led both to uncoordinated responses to Israeli provocations and to internal clashes that weakened Palestinian society and its ability to face the overwhelming power utilized by the Israeli army to crush the PA' s infrastructure and other symbols of Palestinian sovereignty. (2005, 155)

The failure of the Palestinian leadership to coordinate or even support nonviolent

resistance thus hindered the national coordination of the struggle.

As Parsons summarizes, the PA sought control over all aspects of resistance

through:

co-option, demobilization, and the centralization of power ... Rather than harnessing the mobilizational capacities developed during the first intifada and leading resistance to colonization, the PA engineered social control through patronage. The expansion of the PA bureaucracy diminished the political salience of the NGO community-the heart of Palestinian civil society and a stronghold of the left-through centralizing the provision of services [and] redirecting resources away from the non-state sector. (2005, 222)

In these ways, the centralization of power compounded by widespread corruption within

the PA, resulted in a system that lacked transparency, accountability, and legitimacy,

while limitations on NGOs and activists ultimately constrained opportunities for popular

struggle.

Palestinian Political Crisis

While the Fateh-led PA was viewed at best as weak and at worst as "a guarantor

oflsraeli security" as stipulated by the Oslo Accords (Andoni 2001, 212), the Islamic

block saw an increase in support, which also resulted in shrinking the space for

nonviolence. Groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad capitalized on the perceived

illegitimacy of the Fateh-controlled PA by offering alternative organizations with the

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capacity to confront Israel. 79 As Amal Jamal notes, "the lack of formal political

procedures and functional institutions encouraged the opposition to establish its own

institutional and political networks in order to compete with the national elite for power"

(2005, 122). Hamas in particular also gained support by providing social services to

' Palestinian communities that the PA had proven unable to deliver. By reminding people

that they had opposed the DOP and the creation of the PA from the start, they managed to

increase their following, and thus disseminated an armed resistance ideology largely

overshadowed nonviolence. 80

Tensions between Fateh and Hamas continued to rise during the second intifada,

culminating with Hamas' ousting of Fateh and seizure of control of the Gaza Strip in

June 2007. The internal politics fragmented popular resistance by dividing actions,

distracting activism from the occupation, and contributing to the lack of leadership, hope,

and vision. As Abu-Nimer states, "The failure of the Palestinian leadership (both of the

authority and opposition groups) to unify at an early stage of the second intifada resulted

in fragmentation and prevented it from launching a systematic campaign against Israeli

incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas" (2006, 143). He goes on to point out that

attempts at coordination were more "forum[ s] of factions competing for control" (2006,

143) than real efforts at cooperation, reflecting divisions that "played into the hands of

the Israeli government" (Amal Jamal 2005, 155), which capitalized on the infighting

between Palestinian political movements.

The political fragmentation had a direct effect on activism by frequently limiting

participation in actions to certain parties. While these divisions were sometimes

overcome in the villages and rural areas, it was evident in large, urban protests that were

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generally organized by a specific party or movement. Even large-scale actions that

included multiple parties, such as the June 5 demonstrations, reflected more of a

federation of parties rather than a unified movement, with protesters wearing their

parties' colors and symbols and carrying the parties' flags. Though most activists agreed

that "the struggle should be organized as a popular [national] movement"(interview,

2007) nearly all acknowledged that "right now, society is separated into political

factions" that present a "burden" to resistance (interview, 20D7).

Though the majority of activists were critical of all political infighting, some

especially faulted Hamas for hindering popular resistance. According to one activist,

"Most Hamas members don't participate in mass activities. If we are able to achieve

social change from nonviolence, this will decrease the power of Hamas, because they rely

so much on armed resistance. It's a paradox, because if they use nonviolence, and it

works, then they become weaker" (interview, 2007). Others blamed Hamas for the lack

of funding to Palestinian civil society, a result of the international boycott of the PA after

the election of Hamas in 2005, which lasted until the establishment of the interim

government in July 2007. As the coordinator for the National Committee for Popular

Resistance explained, "After the election of Hamas, there was no funding going to the

popular committees, so there was not even money for transportation, phones to contact

each other, cameras to document abuses, or care for individuals in prison or in the

hospital" (interview, 2007).

Despite these frustrations, most activists, even those who identified as Fateh,

leftist, or independent, felt it was "important to try to push Hamas to participate," noting

that there have been some "positive responses" to nonviolence from the Islamist block

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(interview, 2007). Indeed, popular committee members in villages with the most

successful episodes of nonviolent resistance attributed their achievements to the

participation of all the parties. As a leader of the resistance in Budrous explained,

Just the presence of leaders from Hamas and Fateh, as well as the school, the youth club, and the mayor, let people realize the importance ofresisting. It if was only the Fateh leaders participating, then you would just have Fateh people participating. This not only reduces the numbers, but also causes tensions between the sides. (interview, 2007)

Other activists agreed, noting the importance of shifting primary allegiance from

individual parties to Palestine, in the spirit of the first intifada. As an organizer in Salfit

explained, "We work with both Fateh and Hamas, to see how we can have actions as a

Palestinian people. During the first intifada, many sectors worked together with one goal,

so we are relying largely on that experience" (interview, 2007).

Others sought alternatives to Fateh and Hamas through third parties such as

Leftist movements like the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the

PPP (Palestinian People's Party), Hanan Ashrawi's Third Way, and Mustafa

Barghouthi's Al-Mubadara. As one activist with the Palestinian Agricultural Relief

Committees (PARC) commented, "We need to establish a social movement which is

open to all Palestinians who believe in democracy, composed of Left wing parties and

popular committees, to function as a strong alternative third political party, distinct from

Fateh and Hamas" (interview, 2007). Others sought to be completely independent from

politics, not aligning with any party or carrying any flag or banner.

However, several activists acknowledged that the movement could not function

independently of the political leadership. As one activist noted, "NGOs and civil society

have an important role, but you need the political will. You need both political parties

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and civil society working together to expand the grassroots activities on the national

level" (interview, 2007). The political question has thus further complicated strategizing

for resistance, with several activists noting that their nonviolent efforts must now focus

on two levels: ending the occupation, and improving the internal situation.

In addition to causing splinters amongst those resisting the occupation, the

political strife further hindered resistance by shifting activism to the party level. Instead

of mobilizing against the occupation, party elites and their members focused their

demonstrations and rallies on the internal situation. As one activist from the northern

village of Tubas explained, "The internal situation is so bad that many people have

forgotten about the occupation and are focusing on dealing with local issues. People

need rehabilitation to make them remember the real cause again" (interview, 2007). A

youth organizer with Stop the Wall agreed, commenting, "The struggle has been affected.

The parties are fighting to control the PA, but have forgotten their own people"

(interview, 2007). Although still using the rhetoric of resistance, many youth activists in

particular expressed the feeling that they were being used by the parties for political gain,

rather than engaging in true resistance. Indeed, over forty-three percent of Palestinian

university students surveyed for this study did not identify with any political party,

preferring instead to identify as independent (2007).

Disillusionment with the political parties has increased cynicism about the PA in

general. As one activist stated, "The current leadership is not capable ... They move back

and forth between civil conflict and diplomacy, rather than trying to examine other

options" (interview, 2007). The void of leadership has contributed to an overall lack of

hope and vision, which has stunted popular resistance. As an activist from Biddu, near

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Ramallah, commented, "Palestinians have been misled. We don't know if we can trust

the PA or Hamas; we feel Fateh betrayed us. We don't know what will happen

tomorrow" (interview, 2007). The majority of activists noted this uncertainty about the

future, which complicated their short-term and long-term strategizing ability, as well as

hindered mobilization.

Clearly, the internal political situation in Palestine hindered popular resistance in

the West Bank. The civil strife fractured participation in resistance against the

occupation, diverted energy and activism from the occupation to the internal situation,

and further contributed to feelings of despair, distrust, and uncertainty. Furthermore, the

infighting contributed to divisions within civil society and the general public, as well as

hurt solidarity between Gaza and the West Bank.

Political Constraints from Israel

While many of the challenges faced by activists resulted from internal factors,

nearly all activists commented that measures imposed by the occupation have

significantly hindered or splintered nonviolent efforts. The centrality of the effect of

Israeli measures on Palestinian resistance underscores the role of political constraints on

the emergence of social movements. Specific constraints imposed by Israel include

physical barriers and restrictions on movement, crackdowns on nonviolent activists, and

continued violence affecting Palestinian civilians.

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Restrictions on Movement

Israeli security measures that aim to restrict Palestinian movement, including the

separation barrier, checkpoints, and roadblocks, have fragmented the movement by

limiting contact amongst Palestinians, and between Palestinians and Israelis. Both of

these limitations decrease mobilization for and coordination of nonviolent efforts, by

making it difficult for activists to plan and participate in actions, and by restricting the

types of actions that can be implemented.

Checkpoints, roadblocks, and construction of the separation wall within the West

Bank (in areas near settlements) have localized actions by making it difficult for

Palestinians to travel between different cities and villages. As of November 2008, the

IDF maintained 63 permanent checkpoints within the West Bank, 49 of which are

regularly staffed, some around the clock, others for several hours a day (B 'tselem 2008).

In addition, the IDF maintains flying, or surprise, checkpoints throughout the West Bank,

which are temporary, staffed checkpoints set up for several hours and then dismantled,

averaging 89 per week between September 2007 and April 2008, according to the UN

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2008). Further restrictions on

movement within the West Bank, documented by OCHA in October 2008, include

physical barriers such as roadside fences, trenches barring vehicles from crossing, locked

entrance gates to villages, and dirt and debris piles blocking roads or entrances to

villages, with a monthly average of 537 obstructions documented. Additionally, as

reported by B'tselem, 430 kilometers of roads within the West Bank were restricted or

forbidden to Palestinian traffic as of July 2008. 81

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These measures have severely hindered travel and movement for all Palestinians

within the West Bank, including activists, thus contributing to the fragmentation and

localization of popular resistance. As the coordinator for the National Committee on

Popular Resistance noted, "Resistance [during the second intifadaJ was remaining

isolated and localized because Palestinians couldn't move between cities" (interview,

2007). For example, he pointed out that, although Bil'in, a center of popular resistance,

is usually just a short ride from Ramallah, an IDF roadblock restricted movement

between the city and the village for almost two years, thus making it difficult both to

organize actions and to facilitate participation. Another activist in Bethlehem

commented, "People don't leave their areas in Palestine right now. The areas are

disconnected, so we can't understand the struggle in different places" (interview, 2007).

He noted that the physical separation has hurt Palestinians psychologically as well in

terms of their feelings of connectedness, which also hinders consensus mobilization, and

thus popular participation.

In addition to restrictions on movement within the West Bank, Israel's policy of

separation, enforced by the separation barrier and checkpoints, has also limited

opportunities for nonviolent resistance by reducing contact between the Israeli and

Palestinian populations. Palestinians are separated from Israelis by forty permanent,

staffed, around-the-clock checkpoints along the Green Line (B 'tselem 2008), and more

recently, by the separation barrier. Construction of the wall commenced in 2002, ranging

in form from a six to eight meter wall to an electric fence bordered by an average sixty

square-foot area of barbed-wire fences, dirt, and trenches. Although there are eighty

seven gates in the separation barrier, only half serve Palestinians, their hours are

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irregular, and Palestinians wishing to cross must have a special permit (B 'tselem 2008).

Despite the ICJ advisory ruling against the legality of the separation barrier on July 9,

2004, 409 kilometers, or 56.6 percent of the wall, had been built by May 2008, while 66

kilometers (9.1 percent) were under construction, and 248 kilometers (34.4 percent) were

planned for construction (OCHA 2007).

While the separation barrier has affected Palestinians in the West Bank in

numerous ways, it has had a significant impact on popular resistance by limiting contact

between Palestinians and Israelis, which is essential for instigating the political jujitsu

that makes nonviolent activism effective (Sharp 2007). As one activist from Salfit

explained,

The problem is that the Israeli occupation has created a separation, so we need more and more tools and methods to create interactions with Israelis. The apartheid plan is difficult; because we need to make actions, but we're rarely in touch with the military or with Israelis. How can we show this injustice to the world if we can't get the interactions? (interview, 2007)

The director of an NGO focusing on nonviolent activism and training, agreed:

The biggest challenge is finding opportunities for confrontation. For nonviolence to be successful, there needs to be direct confrontation with the opposition to expose their use of violence and beatings ... But there are not many areas left to do this anymore. How can we engage in nonviolence when we are living in a prison? If we just demonstrate in circles among ourselves, what will that do? (interview, 2007)

Clearly, because of the policy of separation, opportunities for strategic nonviolent action

are limited, with activism being restricted to contact points such as checkpoints,

construction sites of the separation barrier, and villages along the Green Line. This

phenomenon has both hindered the widespread growth of nonviolence, and contributed to

the localization of existing efforts.

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Crackdowns on Activists

In addition to movement restrictions, Israeli crackdowns on nonviolent activists

have also contributed to the episodic nature of popular resistance. Beatings, detentions,

and arrests are commonplace at weekly demonstrations at villages like Bil'in and Um

Salamouna and at other actions, though punishments often extend beyond the events

themselves. For example, when residents of Biddu were demonstrating against the wall

in 2004, no one from the village could get permits to pass through the nearby checkpoint,

even for work, school, or hospital visits. As one of Biddu' s nonviolence leaders

explained,

Israel was punishing the villagers here for resisting. At the checkpoints, if the soldiers saw that people were from Biddu, they would make them wait in the sun for hours, or they would tell them to go home. We know that they deny permits to militants, but people like me were not engaged in militant actions, yet they still denied us permits, or confiscated permits from others. (interview, 2007)

In addition to denying or confiscating permits, Israel has deported leaders of nonviolent

resistance; as one activist noted, "Many nonviolent resistance people have been expelled

because Israel perceives us as dangerous, even if we're not in political [militant] work"

(interview, 2007).

While activists expressed concern for their own wellbeing, they also explained

that the IDF often targets their family members as another tactic of intimidation. As one

activist in the South Bethlehem area recounted,

Recently they broke into my brother's house next door during the night and arrested him, and he is still in jail. They shot one of the panes on his door and said they would keep shooting out the glass unless he came out, then they arrested him. I heard the commotion and was about to go outside, but when I saw them, I

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stayed hidden. But I would prefer it was me who was arrested, and not my brother. (interview, 2007)

Of course, activists themselves are often arrested as well, with the majority of those

interviewed having spent time in administrative detention or prison, ranging from several

days to ten years. These types of crackdowns have contributed to a climate of fear that

inhibits popular participation in resistance. As one activist noted, "For a lot of people, it

is an issue of fear. They think that if we do anything, we may lose more than we have

already lost" (interview, 2007). It is thus difficult for activists to instigate widespread

mobilization, leaving the struggle fragmented and localized.

Violence and Suffering

In addition to restrictions on movement and crackdowns on activists, widespread

participation in nonviolence is also limited due to many Palestinians being preoccupied

with the daily struggles imposed by the occupation. As one activist stated,

We realize that, until now, we have sadly failed to form a strong, united popular movement against the wall. But I should point out that the wall is not the only issue for Palestinians right now. There are many issues, including checkpoints, settlements, poverty, imprisonment ... Many people are depressed or affected by the situation, so the wall is not the only enemy. Most Palestinians are so caught up with their daily problems that it's hard to see the big picture. (interview, 2007)

A leader of nonviolent resistance in Budrous agreed, noting, "There is a lot of talk right

now about nonviolence, but not a lot of action ... Violent suffering and poverty is

stressing and oppressing people ... " (interview, 2007). Other activists likewise identified

the biggest challenge to widespread participation in civil-based resistance to be "the

Israeli occupation in the territories" (interview, 2007), the "continued Israeli brutality and

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the land confiscation" (interview, 2007), and the ongoing "siege, control, humiliation,

and accumulating anger" (interview, 2007).

According to Palestinian activists, it is evident that the day-to-day difficulties

resulting from the occupation reduce popular participation, either by forcing people to

focus on other priorities, by instilling a sense of futility and despair, or by pushing people

towards violent resistance. As many activists noted, the majority of Palestinians don't

have the liberty to engage in a long-term campaign because the situation has made even

day-to-day survival a struggle for many, regardless of location. As one Bethlehem-based

activist explained, "It's hard for people to work for a goal that seems far-off. It's gotten

to a point where most people need to work and are more focused on that. People need to

think about food before strategy" (interview, 2007). The former director of

Rapprochement, which works throughout the West Bank, agreed, noting that, during the

second intifada, "because of the severity of the conditions, the need for survival was so

huge that we couldn't really attract the human resources from the community that we

need for civil-based resistance" (interview, 2007).

Combined with physical restrictions on movement and crackdowns and activists,

it is clear that the political constraints created by the occupation contribute largely to the

fragmentation of popular resistance in the West Bank. Constraints from within the PA,

and from factional politics within Palestine, also squeezed the space available for popular

collective action.

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LACK OF RESONANT MOVEMENT FRAMES

This is my struggle! This is my freedom! -- Coordinator, Stop the Wall Campaign

This chapter analyzes the "Oslo effect," or the redefinition and institutionalization

of "nonviolence" during the Oslo period. In the period following the signing of the

Declaration of Principles, nonviolence became synonymous with dialogue and

coexistence programs like the people-to-people initiative, while nonviolent actions

became increasingly limited by repression from the PA and the structural and financial

constraints of NGOs. The resultant reframing of nonviolence caused many Palestinians

to view nonviolence as a form of accommodation rather than activism, furthering

coexistence and normalization over resistance. In particular, for youth who did not have

a memory of the use of nonviolent resistance in the first intifada, the Oslo effect

redefined nonviolence in such a way as to disassociate it from resistance. In this chapter,

I describe the re-definition of nonviolence as linked to the people-to-people strategy, and

the institutionalization of nonviolence through the NGO sector. I then discuss how new

framings affected public perceptions of nonviolence. Finally, I draw from the literature

on movement frames and issue frames to discuss how these (mis)perceptions of

nonviolence hindered widespread mobilization during the second intifada.

238

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People-to-People: Dialogue as Nonviolence?

As discussed in Chapter 2, the negotiations that comprised the Oslo Accords were

preceded by a series of dialogues that took place between mid-level Israelis and

Palestinians from the 1970s through the early 1990s. These conversations started as

clandestine meetings between members on the political margins of both societies,

gradually evolving to allow for direct talks between officials from the political center.

Finally, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, "the

door was opened for a large number of Israelis and Palestinians, including opinion

shapers, strategists, policymakers, academics, security officials, economists, civil

servants, and politicians alike to begin working together to develop a variety of

compromise solutions related to permanent status" (Hirschfeld and Roling, 2000, 24).

The DOP first called for the establishment of a people-to-people strategy in

Annex 3, in the Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Co-operation in Economic and

Development Programmes, with further guidelines stipulated in Annex VI of the Israeli

Palestinian Interim Agreement of September 28, 1995. According to the Protocol

Concerning Israeli-Palestinian Co-operation Programmes, the two sides were to work to

enhance the dialogue and relations between their peoples, expose their publics to the

peace process, and foster public engagement and debate to encourage personal interaction

and exchange. 82 The people-to-people strategy thus formed with the goals of "preparing

the ground for the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status deal, creating the

necessary conditions for a sustainable peace, and paving the way toward the

consolidation of peace" (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000, 23).

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Accordingly, Israelis and Palestinians, and sometimes internationals, met

throughout the 1990s to discuss issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders,

water, economic relations, and security in an effort to imagine possible compromises. As

Maoz describes, "meetings ranged from one-time single events to long-term and

continuous series of meetings, and from youth encounters to dialogues among

schoolteachers, university students, university professors, and other professionals" (2004,

566). Other initiatives included outreach campaigns, promotions of solidarity between

leftist Israeli groups like Peace Now, Bat Shalom, and B'tselem with Palestinian partners;

and cross-border projects involving cooperation through the environmental, agricultural,

and business sectors (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000, 24, 26). Dajani and Baskin likewise

categorize the people-to-people activities in the areas of Track II brainstorming, women's

and shared identity issues, professional meetings, professional trainings, formal education

activities, cultural activities, capacity-building trainings, environmental cooperation, joint

advocacy groups, religious dialogue, and grassroots dialogue (2006, 91-93).

However, as Hirschfeld and Roling point out, "In preparing a sustainable peace,

the creation of compromise solutions and acts of solidarity and outreach are important,

yet not enough" (2000, 24), and people-to-people initiatives in most cases failed to move

beyond talk to developing actual policies or action plans to address economic disparities,

social rifts, and political realities. Other limitations included language barriers, elite

target groups, lack of sustainability, lack of funding, lack of public exposure and

legitimacy, and logistical issues related to increasing violence, restrictions on movement,

and the inability to hold regular meetings (Dajani and Baskin 2006, 95-98).

Another significant impediment was the difference between most Israeli and

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Palestinian participants' motivations and expectations from the meetings. According to

Dajani and Baskin, most Israeli participants believed that "by participating in joint

activities with Palestinians they [were] making a real contribution to peace" (2006, 89),

thus focusing on cultivating personal relationships and viewing dialogue as an end in

itself. In contrast, most Palestinian participants approached the dialogues as spaces to

share their narrative, have their suffering affirmed, and work towards ending the

occupation and creating a Palestinian state. In this way, they saw the dialogues as a

means to an end, and part of a larger political process (Dajani and Baskin 2006, 89).

These differences in expectations hindered the success of the dialogues, as perceived by

participants from both communities.

Indeed, some dialogues may have had a negative impact on Palestinian

participants in particular by, willingly or unwillingly, perpetuating asymmetric power

dynamics (Abu-Nimer 1999). This was partly due to Israeli NGOs' organizational

capacity and access to funds relative to Palestinian NGOs, thus leading to a

disproportionate number of Israeli organizations initiating projects, writing proposals,

managing implementation, and controlling finances. As Dajani and Baskin note,

"Needless to say, this was extremely problematic in developing partnerships. Many

Palestinian institutions and individuals noted that many of the joint activities were

beginning to resemble already well-established models of asymmetry between Israelis

and Palestinians" (2006, 95). Meanwhile, as dialogues remained at the surface level and

failed to address issues of justice, such meetings started to be perceived by many

Palestinians as exercises in normalizing relations rather than working towards any real

change, especially as realities on the ground continued to worsen. 83

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Disillusionment with people-to-people programs and the Oslo Accords in general

increased in the late 1990s as dialogue groups continued with the promise of change,

while on the ground grievances increased, through the continued expansion of

settlements, increased restrictions on Palestinian movement, and worsening economic

conditions. According to Hassassian, "the perception quickly grew that the peace process

was nothing more than something that legitimized the Israeli occupation, Palestinian

Authority corruption, and ... ultimately Israel's securing control over fundamental

Palestinian rights, resources, and properties" (2006, 83).

Meanwhile, organizers, donors, and some participants began conflating the idea

of nonviolence with people-to-people dialogues and the peace process in general. While

some of the individuals and groups participating in people-to-people initiatives were

nonviolent activists, nonviolent resistance is a different method than dialogue, and it has

a different aim than the peace process. As Hassassian explains, nonviolent activists more

commonly reflect a "pre-established commitment to the national struggle before they

have any commitment to what is commonly seen as the peace process" (2006, 72).

According to Hassassian, such activists favor a "comprehensive, just solution to the

plight of and injustices to the Palestinian people,'' which the Oslo peace process did not

offer (2006, 72). This analysis echoes the comments of activists like Maj di, who stated,

"We do not work for peace. We work to end the occupation" (interview, 2006).

Nevertheless, a discourse emerged under Oslo that linked nonviolence with

notions of peace, coexistence, dialogue, toleration, forgiveness, and reconciliation. While

these concepts may complement a principled approach to nonviolence, they were distinct

from the pragmatic nonviolent resistance practiced by Palestinians in the first intifada.

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However, the international community's articulation of a donor agenda collectively

promoting "peace, tolerance, and non violence [through] practical activities which will

promote communication and understanding by demonstrating the advantages of working

together for mutual benefit" (EU Partnership for Peace Programme; emphasis added)

conflated the idea of nonviolence with coexistence, appearing to some Palestinians as

advocating normalization of relations with Israel and acceptance of the occupation. In

this way, the concept of nonviolence was reframed under Oslo from one of struggle and

resistance to one of accommodation and coexistence.

(Re)Framing Nonviolence Under Oslo

Regardless of the intentions of the Oslo Accords in general, and the People-to

People initiative in particular, the by-product was the institutionalization of nonviolence

through NGOs, and the redefinition of nonviolence by western agendas, or at least the

perception thereof. This section discusses how Oslo transformed the civil society sector

structurally, financially, and programmatically, resulting in new approaches to

nonviolence that emphasized the peace process over activism. First I examine the impact

of donor-driven agendas on NGO articulation of nonviolence, then I discuss the "NGO

ization" of nonviolence on the structural level.

Donor-Driven Agendas

As Amaney Jamal states, "After Oslo, donors almost exclusively funded

associations and projects that were linked to or supportive of the goals of the Accords.

Those who did not wholeheartedly support Oslo found it difficult to solicit funds" (2007,

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69). Funding was poured into dialogue groups, coexistence projects, and people-to

people initiatives, with the European Union alone channeling 5 to 10 million euros per

year into organizations promoting dialogue and "nonviolence,"84 supporting an average

of 15 programs each year with contributions of 50,000 to 500,000 euros. Other major

funders included European governments, primarily the Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, and

Belgian governments, the American and Canadian governments, the Palestinian Centre

for Peace, and philanthropic organizations like the Charles Bronfman, Nathan

Cummings, and Dorot and Yad Nadiv Foundations (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000, 26).

As Amaney Jamal notes, "Most donor projects aimed to secure one objective

the success of the peace process with Israel. .. None of the donor programs were aimed at

addressing the occupation or the political difficulties caused by that Occupation" (2007,

70, 73). Accordingly, Palestinian NGOs competing for funds and struggling for survival

increasingly adopted the language of nonviolence as dialogue, and moved away from

activities related to activism or resistance. This resulted in a shift away from civil-based

resistance in the short-term, and a re-framing of nonviolence in the long term. Both

phenonemna were evident in the second intifada, with the limited participation of

nonviolent resistance on the one hand, and the public misperception of nonviolence as

normalization on the other hand.

Institutionalization

The reframing of nonviolence during the Oslo period was due in part to the

structural shift of civil society groups from grassroots associations to formal

organizations. As discussed in Chapter 6, the shifting of nonviolence from a grassroots

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movement to an NGO-based program objective was problematic in that it

institutionalized nonviolence in several ways. First, it changed the very nature of civil

society organizations from community-based activist groups to organizations focused on

the peace process. As Hassassian notes,

The formation of Palestinian NGOs can generally be divided into two different groups: those that were started before or during the first intifada and those that began after its ending, generally with the signing of the Oslo Accords. In the former category, organizations tended to be characterized by a sense of strong ideology and activism ... The group of organizations that began after the Oslo process ... were a function of the political process, namely the Oslo Accords. (2006, 68-69)

Indeed, pre-Oslo organizations "tended to be characterized by a sense of strong ideology

and activism," and were inclined to "fight for the right of Palestinians and have that

message heard by a foreign audience" regardless of the political climate (Hassassian

2006, 68-69), while post-Oslo organizations, influenced largely by donor agendas, were

more focused on furthering the peace process. Despite their varied missions and

activities, NGOs in both groups tended to identify themselves as promoting nonviolence.

Second, the NGO-ization of nonviolence replaced the prior spirit of voluntarism

and activism associated with nonviolence with professional positions. As one long-time

activist observed, "There has been a big change in the Palestinian community, a change

in the spirit of voluntary work and social efforts and struggling. The NGOs have affected

the spirit a lot, by making resistance a profession, but you can't make a revolution this

way" (interview, 2007). Likewise, another activist explained, "NGOs tend to

institutionalize activism, but you can't be creative through the institution. Most NGOs

have employees, and employed people just follow the procedure and focus on their own

work. But if you're talking about a movement, you're talking about volunteer work"

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(interview, 2007). Indeed, the Oslo period saw a shift of nonviolence from the popular to

the organizational level, which ultimately limited popular participation in nonviolence in

terms of both numbers and sectors of society, with most NGO employees representing the

educated, urban sector.

Third, due to their organizational structure, the ways in which NGOs approached

nonviolence under Oslo was less about practical actions and more about sessions and

trainings. As one activist explained, "Everyone was talking about peace, but no one was

really raising awareness or using nonviolence ... We shouldn't be approaching

nonviolence through trainings in five-star hotels. Instead, we must go to the people, and

go to the action" (interview, 2007). Another agreed, noting, "When I see NGOs spending

money to hold a workshop in a fancy hotel, this makes no sense to me. Why not hold a

workshop on the land, or in public places? They should do it practically, so they can

invest in other ways" (interview, 2007). In other words, the institutionalization, or

"NGO-ization" of nonviolence made the concept seem to be more about talk than action.

Finally, the NGO-ization of nonviolence also resulted in the development of a

nonviolence "market" in Palestine As one activist noted, "Many people were just doing

nonviolence for the money, and were turning it into a business. Now many Palestinian

people have a bad image of nonviolence, because they feel that money drives it"

(interview, 2007). To be sure, the competition over funds for nonviolence made it into a

commodity of sorts.

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Ineffective Movement Frames: Public Perceptions of Nonviolence

This reliance on western trainers and donors alike resulted in many Palestinians

assuming that nonviolence was a western construct designed to subdue them. As the

breakdown of the peace process became apparent in the late 1990s, many Palestinians

became convinced that "nonviolence" was a western-imposed concept to promote

submission and normalization, in complete contrast to resistance. Mahmoud's perception

of "nonviolence" under Oslo reflected the opinions of many Palestinian youth in

particular'.

Nonviolence has come at the wrong time and the wrong place, brought by the international community. After September 11, the terrorism issue divided the world into terrorists and non-terrorists, and the world classified Palestinians as terrorists. So now it's like the world wants to make the Palestinian "terrorists" not be violent anymore. But I don't want to use this word, "nonviolence." Go to Israel and teach them nonviolence. We have been using nonviolence for years. At least be fair! By focusing nonviolence trainings on us, it makes us seem worse than the victimizers! How dare they say that we need to be nonviolent? F-- them! This is my struggle! This is my freedom! I know how to fight for it! I respect our nonviolent history, but the way they are talking about it is not acceptable now. (interview, 2007)

Clearly, regardless of its intentions, nonviolence was redefined during the Oslo

period in such a way that it came to be associated with business over activism, talk over

action, and an international agenda of subjugation. As one activist summarized,

Nonviolence itself is natural in Palestine ... but the word 'nonviolence' has been a term that the EU [and other western donors] has been using in the past few years to fund certain projects. People knew about nonviolence before these projects, but not the word. So now people think of nonviolence as part of the international agenda. They say, "The world doesn't want us to resist, so why should we think that nonviolence has anything to do with resistance if they are advocating it now?" (interview, 2007)

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As a result, nearly all activists noted that, in addition to opposition from the

occupation, they also face criticism from other Palestinians "saying that our efforts are

useless, that we won't achieve anything, or sometimes that we are spies with Israel"

(interview, 2007). Nearly all activists attributed movement fragmentation to the popular

misconception of nonviolence as passivity or normalization, due largely to NGO

portrayals of nonviolence as dialogue or peacebuilding. As one activist explained, many

"think nonviolence means the desire NOT to resist, just sitting back, or relying on

dialogue and negotiations. But this is not what nonviolence means" (interview, 2007).

Another activist also noted, "A lot of people don't understand what nonviolence is. It

often seems to people like normalization, or being passive, or giving up your rights, or

living with what's there. It's not about that at all, but it's hard to convince people"

(interview, 2007). An activist from Tulkarem likewise commented, "Some people think

nonviolence is a concept from America that was created to quell resistance" (interview,

2007).

Several activists also attributed misunderstandings of nonviolence to the

association of the concept to western theories. According to one activist, this is often due

to NGO trainings that "generally connect nonviolence to the West by speaking about

Martin Luther King, Gandhi, and Gene Sharp" (interview, 2007), rather than grounding

nonviolence in Palestinian history. Although there is a rich tradition of nonviolence in

Palestine, many NGOs removed nonviolence from its local context. As one trainer

explained, "Many people working in nonviolence were basing it on 'projects' and

'models.' But nonviolence must come from within the community and be connected to

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the local people. We need Palestinians, not Americans, leading nonviolence" (interview,

2007).

Youth Perceptions

While this redefinition made older activists more deliberate in their choice of

words regarding nonviolence, the strong association of nonviolence with the first intifada

overrode the negative image of nonviolence put forth under Oslo, so that they were more

critical of how nonviolence was presented than of nonviolence itself. Although many

older activists chose to use terms like "popular resistance" or "civil-based resistance"

rather than "nonviolence," most still nostalgically associated nonviolence with the first

intifada's spirit of community activism.

In contrast, youth who had no prior experience with nonviolence or memory of its

use in the first intifada had the Oslo definition of nonviolence as their first impression.

Thus, rather than viewing nonviolence as a form of national struggle, many youth

associated the concept with coexistence and normalization with Israel. As one activist

commented, "When I discuss nonviolence with youth, there is just silence. They need to

find that special energy, and feel it in their hearts" (interview, 2007). Yet it is difficult

for youth to feel the same passion or excitement for nonviolence when their experience

with the term is more through talk than action. As Alex asserted, "The first intifada

emerged from the belief that we could achieve something. Now, we talk about

nonviolent resistance, but when it is just through education, it's not the same. People

may be educated about it, but still not believe it in their hearts" (interview, 2007).

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To be sure, most older activists experienced and participated in nonviolence

before studying it, thus engaging in the practice first and grounding it in theory later. In

contrast, most youth were exposed to a theory of nonviolence before having the

opportunity to practice it, and during the Oslo period, the definition they encountered was

focused on peacebuilding and dialogue, rather than resistance. This study does not

attempt to offer normative judgments regarding this framing of nonviolence; rather it

seeks to illustrate that this representation of nonviolence shifted its meaning away from

resistance, and thus may have alienated rather than attracted youth to the practice of

nonviolence.

Political Structures, Historical Context, & Resource Mobilization

Of course, not all public perceptions of nonviolence are due to NGO framings.

Some activists acknowledged that even some Palestinians who have a clearer

understanding of nonviolent resistance simply do not view it as effective. For some, this

resulted from the belief that "nonviolence was attempted in the first intifada, and only

resulted in a flawed peace process. So why give nonviolence another chance?"

(interview, 2007). Other activists noted that people don't see the result of nonviolent

activities simply because nonviolence takes time. As one activist explained, "It's not like

with violence, where there are immediate results. Nonviolence needs time, so when

people don't see immediate results, they get frustrated" (interview, 2007).

For others, disillusionment with nonviolence reflected a more general sense of

futility and lack of hope. A youth activist with the Stop the Wall campaign noted that the

new generation especially has "lost hope ... There is a problem with their psychology.

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They think that Israel is the most powerful country in the world. They are trapped in a

circle and they can't get out, so they just don't think about it" (interview, 2007). As

Hassassian notes, this lack of hope was reflected in an "overall weakening politicization

of the Palestinian public, which [had] grown tired of the struggle and [had] become

disillusioned with the promise of the Oslo process and the Palestinian authority" (2006,

83).

This general lack of faith in the effectiveness of popular resistance is related to the

fact that many people are unaware of both the contemporary and historical successes

from nonviolence. Nearly all activists expressed frustration with both the local and

international media for failing to provide adequate coverage of nonviolent actions, while

others were reflexively critical of the lack of a media strategy within the movement. The

majority of activists noted that the "culture that our media and the world media has is a

bloody media" (interview, 2007), which fails to cover nonviolent actions because "they

are not 'exciting' without killing and shooting" (interview, 2007). In this way, media

framing of the conflict also limited the space available to nonviolence. 85

Unpacking the Oslo Effect: Master Frames and Cycles of Contention

The relationship between framings of nonviolence and youth action mobilization

in Palestine reflect the theories of Snow and Benford (1992) on master frames and cycles

of protest (see also Tarrow 1998). As discussed in Chapter 1, cycles of contention refer

to phases of heightened conflict and collective action across the social system (Tarrow

1998, 142), with master frames defined as the interpretive schema through which

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collective actors across time and space identify and articulate their experiences and

actions (Snow and Benford 1992, 137-139).

As Garrison (1995; 1992) reminds us, collective action frames both shape and are

shaped by the movement(s), and typically consist of three components: (1) injustice

frames, referring to moral indignation in response to a political situation or suffering; (2)

agency frames, referring to the belief that it is possible to create effective change through

collective action; and (3) identity frames, referring to a defined "we" in opposition to an

identifiable "they" with different interests (Gamson 1995, 90). As Gamson notes, while

injustice frames focus on the packaging of the issue, the agency and identity frames are

concerned with the framing of the movement (1995), thus including tactical approaches,

or nonviolence in this study. In the case of Palestine, the first intifada and the second

intifada reflect two distinct phases within the broader cycle of contention of Palestinian

resistance, 86 with both issue (ideational) and movement (tactical) master frames that

emerged in the first intifada both facilitating and constraining mobilization in the second

intifada.

Issue Frame: Injustice

On the one hand, the first intifada facilitated action mobilization in the second

intifada by defining a resonant ideational master frame of injustice, illustrating Snow and

Benford's proposition: "Movements that surface early in a cycle of protest are likely to

function as progenitors of master frames that provide the ideational and interpretive

anchoring for subsequent movements within the cycle" ( 1992, 144 ). As Gamson

summarizes, the injustice frame refers to the "moral indignation expressed in ... political

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consc10usness. This is not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgment about what is

equitable, but is what cognitive psychologists call a 'hot cognition'-one that is laden

with emotion" (1995, 90). Gamson adds that effective injustice frames also require the

identification of a recognizable other responsible for the harm or suffering.

In the case of Palestine, first intifada leaders drew on the injustices imposed by

the occupation to develop a master frame based on the principle of national Palestinian

independence through ending the occupation. In accordance with Gamson's definition,

Palestinian grievances regarding the Israeli occupation were emotionally "hot" and easily

attributable to the state of Israel. Furthermore, this injustice frame reflected empirical

credibility (evidential basis), experiential commensurability (individual proximity), and

narrative fidelity (ideational fit) (Snow and Benford 1992, 1988), in that nearly all

Palestinians had suffered to some extent because of the occupation, making it an inherent

part of Palestinian discourse. Thus, the issue/injustice frame had resonant mobilizing

potency that was manifest in broad action mobilization in the first intifada, and consensus

mobilization in the second intifada.

Issue v. Movement Frames

Why did the master frame of injustice inspire widespread action in the first

intifada but not in the second intifada? The differences in mobilization between the two

intifadas can largely be explained by the fact that, despite resonant issue frames, the

absence of effective movement frames limited actual participation, especially in regards

to youth. As noted above, movement frames consist of both agency and identity

components, both of which are relevant in the case of Palestine. I discuss the agency

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aspect here in the context of movement frames, and discuss the identity component in the

following chapter.

As Gamson states, agency refers to "the consciousness that it is possible to alter

conditions or policies through collective action;" thus, agency frames "empower people

by defining them as potential agents of their own history" (1995, 90). In the first intifada,

the UNLU and popular committees managed to imbue the public with this sense of

collective agency, resulting in widespread action mobilization. However, when the first

intifada failed to result in Palestinian independence or the end of the occupation, and

moreover, when the anticipated changes promised under the Oslo Accords failed to

translate into realities on the ground, the sense of collective efficacy proved much harder

to develop in the second intifada. As Gamson asserts, "As long as history making is

centralized and hierarchical, with very little opportunity for people to participate in any of

the institutions that set the conditions of their daily lives," they will inevitably feel

powerless (1995, 95). This was indeed the case in Palestine after Oslo, as first intifada

activists became increasingly disillusioned with both the continuation of the occupation

and the ineptitude of the PA.

For this study, it is helpful to examine agency frames in Palestine in the specific

context of nonviolent tactics. As Snow and Benford state, "Tactical innovation is

spawned in part by the emergence of new master frames" (1992, 146). This was indeed

the case in the first intifada, in which, in ways similar to the American civil rights

movement (McAdam 1996; Snow and Benford 1992), movement leaders adopted

nonviolent strategies in congruence with their master frame. For resistance leaders,

nonviolence allowed for widespread participation, which complemented the master frame

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component of Palestinian nationalism. Moreover, nonviolence allowed for the

juxtaposition of the popular movement set against Israel's powerful military force, thus

reinforcing the master frame of an oppressed people struggling for freedom from an

aggressive occupier, reminiscent of a David and Goliath dichotomy (invoked by Israel in

the past). In this way, like King and the SCLC in Birmingham, the Palestinian UNLU

sought to court violence while restraining violence, and thus frame events in the first

intifada as "highly dramatic confrontations between a 'good' movement and an 'evil'

system" (McAdam 1996, 349).

However, the framing of nonviolent tactics as innovative and radical in the first

intifada was largely replaced in the second intifada by the framing of nonviolence as

institutionalized "peacemaking" under Oslo. Indeed, the redefinition of nonviolence as

dialogue (rather than resistance) by international organizations and western-funded

NGOs during the Oslo period created a "structural impediment to collective agency" by

incorporating nonviolence in a political culture that, from the view of many Palestinians,

"operates to produce quiescence and passivity" (Gamson 1995, 95). Combined with the

perceived "failure" of nonviolent tactics in the first intifada, and the emergence of

competing frames 87 advocating for violent resistance, nonviolence came to be seen by

many as diminishing, rather than enhancing, agency and empowerment. Thus, even

though injustice/issue frames remained consistently relevant, the lack of resonance of

nonviolent movement frames in general, and agency frames in particular, hindered action

mobilization.

This chapter has illustrated how framing nonviolence in the context of dialogue

and peace building under Oslo ultimately led to misperceptions of nonviolence as

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accommodation of the occupation rather than resistance. Following the signing of the

DOP in 1993, civil society organizations in both communities initiated countless dialogue

groups and joint activities under Oslo's people-to-people mandate, supported largely by

western governments and foundations. The majority of donors were firmly committed to

the peace process outlined by Oslo, and promoted an agenda of tolerance, coexistence,

and reconciliation, often conflating "nonviolence" with those ideals. NGOs in the region

adapted their programs accordingly, increasingly focusing on conflict resolution and

dialogue, while essentially co-opting the term "nonviolence" to describe their activities.

While dialogue and reconciliation initiatives may have been more successful in a

post-conflict situation, the realities of the conflict during the Oslo period, combined with

programmatic and logistical challenges, ultimately made both communities disillusioned

with the people-to-people initiatives, and joint activities declined rapidly with the start of

the second intifada. However, the legacy of these failed attempts at "nonviolence"

carried over into the second intifada, with many Palestinians rejecting so-called

nonviolent initiatives as attempts to normalize relations and subdue resistance. Thus,

attempts to mobilize for nonviolent action during the second intifada were hindered by

these skewed perceptions of nonviolence, especially in terms of youth who had no

memory of the use of nonviolent tactics in the first intifada. For these youth, the

ideational frame of the Palestinian national movement remained the same, but the tactical

frame itself appeared to contradict, rather than support, popular struggle.

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IDENTITY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

While inefficient resource mobilization at the movement level, political

constraints at the national and regional levels, and ineffective cultural framings at the

international level all provide insight into the fragmentation of nonviolent activism

during the second intifada, no single approach can fully explain the lack of widespread

mobilization on the one hand, or the sustained episodes of resistance that did take place

on the other hand. Why did a popular movement emerge at all in the second intifada?

Why did some groups and individuals choose to act, while others did not? Why was

nonviolence embraced by some but eschewed by others? To what extent did popular

resistance have an impact on the second intifada? To answer these questions, it is helpful

to examine how collective identity functioned between and within the different levels and

spheres of analysis discussed in the previous chapters.

The findings in this project indicate that Palestinian support for, and participation

in, popular resistance is grounded largely in a common activist identity that does not

necessarily distinguish between violent and nonviolent struggle. This chapter further

examines how collective and individual identities inform action mobilization in popular

resistance. First, it explores how collective actors emerged in Palestine by discussing

257

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how a shared activist identity was constructed among youth leaders during the first

intifada. Second, it investigates how this collective identity influenced the individual

identity of then youth activists, whose first intifada experiences as activists, militants,

and/or prisoners inspired their attempts to revive nonviolent resistance in the second

intifada. Third, it argues that, in contrast to older activists, most youth do not view

nonviolence as being in accordance with their activist identity in theory, although they do

support nonviolent actions in practice. Therefore, youth mobilization depends largely on

the reframing of nonviolence in the context of the collective identity of resistance.

Collective Identity

What is collective identity? According to Polletta and Jasper, collective identity

is "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader

community, category, practice, or institution" (2001, 285). Collective identities are based

on perception and construction, and can apply to both imagined and concrete

communities. Similarly, as noted in Chapter 1, Melucci (1995) describes collective

identity as a process that extends across time and space, involves a network of active

relationships, and contains a sense of emotional investment that establishes a common

unity between individuals. In this way, collective identity is "fluid and relational,

emerging out of interactions with a number of different audiences, rather than fixed"

(Polletta and Jasper 2001, 298). Though dynamic in nature, collective identity "channels

words and actions ... [and] provides categories by which individuals divide up and make

sense of the social world" (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 298).

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What is not collective identity? Collective identity is distinct from personal

identity, although it may form part of an individual's identity. Likewise, collective

identity is not simply an amalgamation of individual identities, being instead an identity

that is itself communal and relational. Collective identity is also distinct from culture;

while collective identities may be expressed in some cultural narratives, traditions, and

symbols, not all cultural materials reflect collective identities, and not all collective

identities are grounded in a common culture. Collective identity is also different from

ideology, in that it implies identification with, and even positive feelings for, other

members of the group, rather than association through common goals or positions.

Similarly, collective identity should not be confused with common interest, in that

choices are not necessarily based on rationale or cost-benefit analyses.

In the case of Palestine, in addition to Palestinian national and cultural identities,

it can be said that there exists a collective identity of national struggle. This identity has

manifested itself in different ways, from the tradition of sumoud, to the militant actions

employed by the PLO, to the cultivation of alternative institutions in civil society, to the

widespread popular uprising in the first intifada. As described in Chapter 2, there is a

tradition of resistance in Palestinian history, which has continually reinforced and

redefined a collective identity of popular struggle. The remainder of this chapter explores

how that collective identity interacted with movement emergence, mobilization, tactics,

and outcomes in the second intifada.

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Movement Emergence: Shared Activist Identity in the First Intifada

While there has long been a historical tradition of resistance in Palestine, many

activists felt that the sense of a popular movement became truly evident in the first

intifada. As the coordinator of the Stop the Wall campaign explained,

The Palestinian people have a long history of resistance, going back as far as 1918 and 1936 with the strikes, and continuing through the years. The highest point of our resistance though was the first intifada ... Our resistance was unprecedented, in that we used stones and simplicity in confronting a big army, and we faced guns with our chests open to them. The intifada is deeply rooted in people's minds as the main resistance. We mobilized all the people in the streets, and mobilized the entire community for confrontation. (interview, 2007)

In this way, the first intifada translated the collective identity of national struggle into a

veritable movement identity, a shared identity based on participation in a movement. As

discussed in earlier chapters, the first intifada infused all levels of Palestinian society with

the spirit of activism, regardless of gender, religion, age, political party, or

socioeconomic class. As one activist described, "It was the intifada of the people ... If

there was a demonstration, you wouldn't only see the younger generation, you would see

mothers, old people, the whole village participating" (interview, 2007).

What prompted such widespread participation? Typically, according to Olson

(1965), in the absence of selective rewards, shared interests are not enough to motivate

individuals to act, especially in cases like the intifada in which actions are not guaranteed

to bring about change, and/or participating in actions puts the individual at risk. In these

cases, Olson argues, it makes more sense from a rational perspective for individuals to

free-ride on the efforts of others. However, this was not the case in Palestine, largely due

to the Palestinian collective identity and sense of responsibility to the community. As

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Fireman and Gamson argue, "A person whose life is intertwined with the group ... has a

big stake in the group's fate. When collective action is urgent, the person is likely to

contribute his or her share even ifthe impact of that share is not noticeable" (1979, 22).

Polletta and Jasper likewise note that collective identity can include "affective

connections one has to members of a group that oblige one to protest along with or on

behalf of them" (2001, 290).

To be sure, activists recalled that in the first intifada, "The youth would be

throwing stones, the mothers would be bringing water, the old people would be

protecting the children from arrest, so you would see the whole community working

together" (interview, 2007). A nonviolence trainer in Bethlehem likewise recalled,

"Everyone was together. You could go to any house if you needed to eat or you needed

to sleep, and people would welcome you. Whether you were Christian or Muslim, it

didn't matter, because all were open to each other" (interview, 2007). Another activist

added that communities worked together to become self-reliant, holding classes for

students in different houses when schools were closed, and planting gardens to grow

food. As he summarized, "We knew how to make a community together, and to support

each other for food, shelter, education, everything" (interview, 2007). The coordinator of

Stop the Wall added that there was a depth of trust within communities during the first

intifada, and asserted, "This is the real resistance, when there is unity within the society"

(interview, 2007). This level of community participation and cooperation around

nonviolent activism was especially notable because of the organic way in which it

emerged. As the founder of the Tent of Nations explained,

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Nobody knew about the theory of nonviolence, but people were working together to build a constructive future. Everyone was fighting for one goal, so the struggle came about practically. People were helping neighbors, ... not because someone told them to do this, but because they wanted to. (interview, 2007)

Civil-based resistance in the first intifada proved to be both individually and

collectively empowering, thus further reinforcing a veritable movement identity. As one

activist recalled, "The best part was that Palestinians were in control of their own

revolt ... You could feel the pride, because we were in action" (interview, 2007). Abu-

Nimer agrees, describing the first intifada as "an excellent example of a political

movement in which the masses ofpeople were able to take control of their destiny and

bring political change into their environment by organizing themselves to fight

oppression using nonviolent tactics" (2003, 180; emphasis added). The first intifada thus

not only strengthened local communities, but also contributed to the articulation of a

national Palestinian identity of resistance. As one activist commented, "My generation

was organizing people for the national aspiration and revolting against the oppression of

the occupation. We were sending out a message saying, 'Hey, we are a people here'"

(interview, 2007). Although the idea of a Palestinian nation was not new, the first

intifada firmly articulated a national identity of resistance.

The shared experience of popular resistance thus contributed to the emergence of

a collective activist identity. According to Polletta and Jasper, this development can be

considered as a movement outcome, in addition to the institutional impacts of collective

action. In the case of Palestine for example, while most assessments of first intifada

outcomes focus on the institutional components of the Oslo Accorrds, the collective

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identity lens makes it possible to consider impacts such as developing national pride,

building solidarity, and strengthening the social fabric of communities.

The shared experience of popular struggle also informs the individual identity of

activists. As Polletta and Jasper note, participation marks activists' personal identities

even after the movement ends (2001, 296). This was the case for many activists in

Palestine, particularly those who were youth during the time, as the first intifada provided

them with a sense of purpose and a place in society. As Mamoud remembered, "When

you were holding the flag, you felt like you were deciding things, coordinating things,

and deciding where the cause was going. It was a great feeling" (interview, 2007).

Likewise, Majdi recalled, "There was such a feeling of power, and of love, and of friends.

The feeling was beautiful. I found myself there, and I found the Palestinian way"

(interview, 2007). 88 As Polletta and Jasper suggest, "Core collective identity continues to

shape an individual's sense of self' (2001, 296). In this way, the collective experience of

resistance in the first intifada informed the individual identity of then youth activists, who

drew from that experience to initiate popular struggle in the second intifada.

Activist Identity in the Second Intifada

As Gamson asserts, "Collective identity is a concept at the cultural level, but to

operate in mobilization, individuals must make it part of their personal identity" (1992,

74). This phenomenon proved true in Palestine, where nearly all nonviolent leaders in

the second intifada based their actions on a core activist identity established during the

first intifada, as noted above. Whether former nonviolent activists, militants, and/or

prisoners, these individuals built upon previously established identities of resistance to

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define their participation in popular struggle during the second intifada. As an activist in

Salfit commented, "During the first intifada, I felt that I did something, and it gave me a

commitment to continue. I felt something in my heart, and I adopted that feeling

afterwards" (interview, 2007). This activist attributed his motivation for his efforts

during the second intifada to a foundation of activism developed during the first intifada.

Likewise, when describing his decision to launch the Stop the Wall campaign, Mahmoud

stated, "We created the campaign out of our experiences ... looking to get back the way of

resistance that we admired, night by night, stone by stone" (interview, 2007). It is

therefore clear that first intifada experiences as activists, militants, and/or prisoners were

instrumental in motivating resistance leaders to reclaim a space for popular resistance in

the second intifada.

Collective movement identity from the first intifada not only informed some

activists' decision to organize in the second intifada, but also influenced their decisions

regarding tactics and strategy. While most activists interviewed for this study supported

nonviolence, the reasons behind their tactical choices differed. As Polletta and Jasper

note, "Important to understanding tactical choice within movements is the operation of

numerous identities, with varying salience. Activists may identify primarily with a

movement organization, affinity group, style of protest, or degree of moderation or

radicalism" (2001, 293). Such primary identifications may determine the extent to which

activists base tactical choices on strategic logic or expressive logic. 89 For example, Jasper

(1997) distinguishes between activist, organization, and tactical identities, similar to

Gamson's solidary, movement, and organizational identities (1991 ). In this model,

activist identities "involve a history of political activity that is usually broader than a

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specific movement," organizational identities refer to loyalties to a specific group, and

tactical identities related to commitment to particular styles of action (Polletta and Jasper

2001, 293). In the case of the second intifada, most Palestinian activists' tactical choices

regarding nonviolence were based on an activist (or solidary ( Gamson 1991)) identity

developed during the first intifada, rather than an organizational affiliation or moral

tactical preference. Rather, preferences for nonviolence in the second intifada were

shaped by first intifada experiences as community activists, militants, and prisoners.

Community Activist Identity

The majority of second intifada leaders in nonviolence were first intifada activists

striving to reclaim a space for popular resistance in the new intifada. As one activist who

participated in nonviolent actions in both intifadas explained, "Palestinians who were

active in the first intifada still use the same thing, the nonviolence ... So there are many

leaders from the first intifada who are still leaders" (interview, 2007). While most of

these activists now use the language of nonviolence, they admit that their decision to use

nonviolent tactics was to reintroduce the spirit of resistance of the first intifada, when

they did not define their actions as nonviolent. As a nonviolence trainer in Bethlehem

remembered, "In the first intifada, when we spoke about nonviolence, we laughed about

it; we said, 'This is stupid,' not realizing that everything we did during that time was

nonviolent. When things became clearer to me and I realized that everything I did was

nonviolence, and that I practiced it, I said, 'Gosh, I need to look into this"' (interview,

2007).

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Likewise, a youth trainer at Holy Land Trust explained that he didn't know he

was practicing nonviolence until he went to a training and recognized the tactics as the

same actions he and his friends were doing: "At that time I wasn't really aware if things

were violent or nonviolent, so actually, I was involved in nonviolence for a long time

before I knew what it was called. I have always worked as this kind of activist, so

nothing changed in me, I just became more aware of it" (interview, 2007). The fact that

these activists had relied on nonviolent methods while assuming them to be a form of

violent resistance indicates that their preference for such methods was linked more to

their association with activism than to their nonviolent distinction. Thus, it was their

activist identity, not their nonviolent identity, that attracted these leaders to such tactics in

the first intifada. Likewise, it was the association of these methods with resistance, not

nonviolence, that inspired these activists to re-initiate similar tactics in the second

intifada.

"Militant" Activist Identity

While most activists who had engaged primarily in nonviolent resistance in the

first intifada did not deliberately choose nonviolence, activists with militant backgrounds

made a more conscious decision to use nonviolent tactics over armed resistance.

However, they still viewed nonviolent struggle as a natural extension of their previous

resistance work, considering it to be more personally empowering and collectively

strategic for Palestinians, thus integrating nonviolence as part of their activist identity.

Many of the older nonviolent leaders in the second intifada were former militants

who had engaged in various forms of armed resistance, mostly through the PLO in the

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years prior to the first intifada. While these activists do not necessarily condemn

violence today, many had experiences in their roles as militants that caused them to

question the value of armed resistance. Khaled, a Hebron-based activist who now

subscribes to nonviolent resistance, recounted an incident during his time with the PLO in

Lebanon in the early 1980s that altered how he viewed his role in resistance:

One day I went to a shooting exercise, and I pointed to a small tree in the distance, and I told my trainer that I would hit that tree. But then, I remember this very well, my trainer seized me hard by the shoulder and said, "You have no right to shoot anything or anyone without a reason. You have no right to shoot any person, tree, or stone without some purpose." I went back to the military base, but that night I couldn't sleep. At that time we always slept with two guns and with grenades and other weapons all around. But I couldn't sleep; I kept thinking about what the trainer had said. By the end of the night, I knew I couldn't continue in this way, in the way of violence. (interview, 2007)

Other activists had similar experiences. Daoud, who later founded the Palestinian Centre

for Rapprochement between Peoples (PCR), and was a co-founder ofISM, recalled:

I was active in national militant organizations for a long period of time, but this became problematic when I volunteered to go to Lebanon during the civil war. I realized then that there is something wrong with the concept, that people are killing each other without any meaning. It was the only thing we knew how to do. People were refraining from asking the questions, why? For what? What's next? I had a very severe internal dispute, which I couldn't resolve. (interview, 2007)

Similarly, Nidal, who coordinates land-based resistance in Tubas in coordination with

Stop the Wall and PARC, remembered:

I spent 18 years with the PLO, in military camps ... but then I underwent a change, not so much in my behaviors at first, but in my mind, about our way of struggle, and I started to move towards nonviolence. I felt that everyone has a right to live in peace. If I am against the occupation for using force and control, then I must not accept using force myself. If I don't want others using violence against my people, I shouldn't want my people to use it against others. (interview, 2007)

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Others were prompted to re-examine their resistance during the second intifada, in

which new forms of armed resistance were employed, most notably suicide bombing.

Mustafa, a member of Islamic Jihad explained how watching televised coverage of a

suicide bombing in Israel in 2002 made him realize the extent of civilian suffering on

both sides of the conflict, prompting him to re-examine his support for armed resistance:

"One image that really stuck with me was a man carrying the bodies of four children, and

they were all dead. It is the same for us, when Palestinian kids are killed. So I found

myself wondering, what do we get from this blood?" (interview, 2007)

Although these former militants questioned the logic and value of armed

resistance, they still identified strongly as activists and sought other ways to engage. As

Khaled explained, "When I told my commander my feelings [to leave the armed

resistance], he respected my choice. They knew that I was from the West Bank, so they

said, 'Okay, go back as an activist instead of a fighter"' (interview, 2007). 90 Likewise,

Daoud returned to Palestine looking for other ways to resist. As he remembered,

The first intifada was eye-opening for me. People took the lead in massive civil based resistance with limited employment of violence, and that was what I was looking for, because I do believe in engagement. I believe that you cannot disengage, or pretend the problem does not exist. You have to engage in all things that are important to your people. (interview, 2007)

Similarly, Nidal continued to work as an activist upon returning to the West Bank by

organizing rural workers and establishing the Palestinian Farmers Union (PFU) in Tubas.

As he stated, "I became interested in a new kind of resistance, and started investing in

new groups ... As the situation changes, we must react also, and change to resist in

different ways. So I still consider most of my work to be resistance against the

occupation" (interview, 2007). Likewise, Bassem, a Fateh Youth leader who disengaged

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from violent resistance at the start of the second intifada, still considers himself to be an

activist in his current work with Combatants for Peace (CFP), a dialogue group he co

founded consisting of former Israeli soldiers and former Palestinian violent resisters.

According to Bassem, "When I decided to not be active [during the second intifada], the

decision confused me. I had always been active, so it was hard to decide to not be active.

Because of my confusion, I searched for an alternative, and the alternative I found was

nonviolence" (interview, 2007).

It is thus evident that, while activists who had militant backgrounds made a more

deliberate decision to engage in nonviolence than those without such direct experiences

with violence, they still saw nonviolent action as a natural extension of their other

resistance, and considered it to be in accordance with their activist identity. Like the

activists cited in the previous section, these former militants noted that nonviolent

resistance emerged organically "on the battlefields" (interivew, 2007) as a strategic form

of struggle from the activists themselves. As Daoud commented, "We started fully on an

experimental basis, not following any philosophy or methodology ... It wasn't based on

any education or research or study of other examples. It came from engagement in a

conflict where I felt my values were comfortable with what was happening" (interview,

2007).

Indeed, the notion of "engagement" was a primary draw of popular resistance for

activists like Daoud, who saw nonviolence as more empowering and strategic than

violence by enabling people to take action to change their situation. Daoud did not feel

this same sort of empowerment from armed resistance, in which he commented, "The

gun was leading us, not the other way around" (interview, 2007). In regards to civil-

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based resistance however, he stated, "Activism helps you overcome anger and despair.

You feel you are doing something. You see that the situation is not a destiny, it's not

something you have to submit to" (interview, 2007). Other activists agreed that

nonviolence creates, rather than limits, opportunities for increased engagement. In

addition to being individually empowering, Mustafa noted that the increased participation

afforded through nonviolent tactics is strategic for involving more people in resistance.

As he explained:

I am not advocating for [nonviolence] because I am afraid. I have suffered much from the occupation, I have spent years in jail and have been wanted and injured, so I do not fear these things. But there are others who cannot take these risks, and we should give a chance to others to participate ... We need to start thinking from the eyes of the Palestinian people and be one in all actions. (interview, 2007)

It is thus clear that even former militants do not see nonviolence as distinct from

resistance, but rather view it as a natural and necessary form of struggle that is both

individually empowering and collectively strategic. While these activists may seek out

nonviolence more consciously than others, due to their own personal experiences with

direct violence, they still locate nonviolence within their broader activist identity.

Former Prisoner Identity

Whether activists had a history of nonviolent or militant resistance, the majority

of those interviewed had been arrested at least once and spent time in administrative

detention and/or prison for periods ranging from several hours to over ten years. For

activists who were in prison for a significant amount of time, the experience often

informed their decision to engage in nonviolent resistance by introducing them to

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nonviolent methods, opening them to new ways of thinking, and serving as an

educational period.

Several activists noted that they were introduced to nonviolent resistance in

prison, in which nonviolence was the only means of struggle available. Mustafa, the

activist affiliated with Islamic Jihad, spent significant time in both prison and

administrative detention, where his six-month term was renewed repeatedly, resulting in

him being held in jail for several years without charge. Mustafa used his time to organize

demonstrations and hunger strikes with the other prisoners, and managed to produce

some small results regarding their treatment. As Mustafa explained, nonviolence was the

only option for resistance in jail:

In jail you don't have anything you can use to throw at the soldiers or use to resist violently. What are you going to use? Even if we had something that would work, you needed to hold on to everything you had, so we just didn't do it. Yet through this other kind of [nonviolent] resistance, even in jail, we still had a way to struggle, and we still produced spots of hope. (interview, 2007)

Likewise, Hassan, originally from Jenin and currently the coordinator of the Gandhi

Youth Clubs through Relief International, recalled being arrested five times, first at the

age of 16 for starting a student group to resist the occupation. According to Hassan, the

power of nonviolence became evident to him when he and other prisoners participated in

a 15-day hunger strike. As he recalled,

The hunger strike was a powerful and effective way of achieving a goal, though it wasn't easy. By the end you just accepted that you were hungry, knowing that you could die, because by that point you couldn't even move. Finally, the guards came and asked us what we wanted. This was because they didn't know how to respond to our nonviolence, because with nonviolence, they can't use their power. They had the power to beat us and kill us if we so much as threw a blanket at them, but they didn't know what to do with the hunger strike. (interview, 2007)

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As noted by other activists previously, Hassan and the other prisoners did not know to

call the hunger strike "nonviolence;" rather, it emerged naturally as a tactic that was both

empowering and strategic. As Hassan continued,

They listened to us and said, "Okay, let's negotiate." This was the one time when I actually felt like their equal, even though I was a prisoner. They invited us to their offices and we talked there. Here we were, weakened by the hunger strike, yet still so powerful. So this was a very important event, but we didn't know it was nonviolence. We just saw it as a way ofreaching our goals. (2007)

In addition to demonstrations and hunger strikes, other activists noted that their

time in prison made it necessary for them to acquire skills in persuasion, dialogue, and

negotiation, which informed their subsequent work in nonviolence. U sama, a former

Fateh activist who now coordinates nonviolence workshops for youth in Tulkarem,

recalled being the representative of the prisoners to the Prison Commission, who were the

officers in charge of the prison. As he commented, "I changed my thinking in prison.

The time in prison pushed me to find another way of struggle, and that involved

nonviolence. I had to use dialogue with the officers to struggle for prisoners' needs and

try to improve our situation, in terms of treatment, food, and number of visits per month"

(interview, 2007). Prison thus prompted activists to adopt different nonviolent methods

out of necessity. However, the relative success of some of these methods convinced

many activists to extend their use beyond the prison walls.

In addition to forcing activists to adopt new tactics, prison also compelled some

activists to adopt new ways of thinking. Specifically, prisoners had to learn to control

their emotions and act rationally, rather than reactively. According to Hassan, the

humiliation, abuse, and torture sustained in prison made him stronger in some ways

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because, by resolving to not give the guards the satisfaction of a response, he had to learn

to control his anger:

They did a mix of things, like making us sit still in tiny chairs for long periods of time, putting bags on our heads like in Abu Ghraib,91 not allowing us to sleep, plus physical abuse ... They used to put their cigarettes out on us, so I had cigarette bums all up and down my arms. Sometimes they would have us lie on the floor, and they would prop their feet on our heads for six or seven hours while they laughed and ate ... They wanted to destroy the personalities of the people. (interview, 2007)

However, Hassan and others refused to respond to the provocations. As he continued,

"We realized they wanted us to react ... You could see the power trip between the Israelis

and you. But they didn't realize that people in prisons think deeply on things, not in an

emotional way. We are still human, but we are more rational in our decisions and our

actions" (interview, 2007). As Hassan explained, learning to control his emotions in such

a way, and becoming a more rational and logical thinker, encouraged him to adopt

nonviolence more deliberately. As he commented, ifhe and others acted only on

emotional responses to the occupation, they would quickly seek revenge through violent

means. However, the endurance of abuses in prison, combined with the extended periods

of self-reflection, allowed for a more rational approach to resistance, which included

strategic nonviolence.

Many activists thus used their time in prison as a period of learning, in terms of

learning new methods of resistance and ways of thinking, as well as learning from other

activists. As Fuad, a member of Combatants for Peace, commented, "Activists who spent

long years in prison were not only serving time, but were learning a new philosophy

about nonviolence" (interview, 2007). In addition, several activists noted that they used

their time in prison for political education, by immersing themselves in literature and

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theory. Naser, an activist who was in prison from the age of 15 to 21, explained that he

read for at least ten hours a day, allowing him to develop a critical perspective which

influenced his views on popular struggle. According to Naser, he read "philosophy for

the logic and the vision, and economics for the political view" (interview, 2007). Both

disciplines influenced his ideals and ways of thinking, and informed his later

commitment to resistance through popular struggle and community development.

Activists' time in prison clearly affected their later activism in different ways, by

introducing them to new forms of struggle and different ways of thinking. Despite

suffering abuses and having severe grievances, many former prisoners chose popular

resistance as their preferred means of struggle, seeing it as more strategic than

emotionally-charged violence. It is thus evident that even former prisoners incorporated

nonviolence as an integral dimension of their activist identity.

Activists' decisions to engage in nonviolent resistance in the second intifada were

clearly informed by their individual assumptions of an action identity, shaped by previous

shared experiences in the first intifada. Whether their prior participation involved

nonviolent resistance, armed struggle, and/or time in prison, these activists clearly

include nonviolence as part of, if not representative of, their broader activist identity. In

this way, nonviolence has become an integral aspect of the first-intifada generation's

collective action frame, defined by Snow and Benford as an "emergent action-oriented

set of beliefs and meanings that inspires and legitimates social movement activities and

campaigns" (Gamson 1992, 68; Snow and Benford 1992, 136-138).

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Identity Frames and Mobilization

As the previous discussion indicates, the identity component was especially

important in developing the social action frame, with activists "enlarging their personal

identities" to include "relevant collective identities as part of their definition of self'

(Gamson 1995, 100). Klandermans and Goslinga further assert that such frames

"develop in interpersonal interaction in which different sources of information are

employed," including individual-level dispositions and knowledge, shared experiences

and memories, and cultural themes and discourse (1996, 328).

Movement Frame: Identity

As Polletta and Jasper note, "If identities play a critical role in mobilizing and

sustaining participation, they also help explain people's exodus from the movement. One

of the chief causes of movement decline is that collective identity stops lining up with the

movement" (2001, 292). This was indeed the case in the second intifada, in which,

despite the continued resonance of shared injustices, the perception of nonviolent tactics

seemingly contradicted the collective identity of national struggle, especially for youth.

As indicated above, collective identities can be conceived as three embedded

layers: organizational, movement, and solid~ry group (Gamson 1995, 100). The

organizational layer refers to identities constructed around movement "carriers"

( Gamson 1995, 100), such as popular committees, or groups like Stop the Wall. This

layer is usually embedded in a broader movement identity, such as nonviolent activist,

which is rarely limited to a single organization. Finally, solidary group identity, such as

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Palestinian, is built around a common social location. According to Gamson, "The most

powerful and enduring collective identities link solidary, movement, and organizational

layers in the participants' sense of self' (1995, 100). Activists were successful in

creating this link in the first intifada, by bridging individual and sociocultural aspects of

identity at the movement level through the practice of nonviolent resistance.

In the second intifada, despite a strong solidary group identity among youth as

Palestinians, there has been a lack of a viable tactical frame to link that broader sense of

self with individual action at the movement or organizational levels. As Gamson notes,

"The movement layer is especially critical because it is a necessary catalyst in fusing

solidary and organizational identification in an integrated movement identity" (1995,

100). The lack of a viable nonviolent movement frame can thus be understood to both

influence, and be influenced by, the lack of a resonant movement identity amongst

second intifada youth, despite a strong sense solidary group identity.92

As noted in Chapter 5, a collective activist identity informs many youths'

perceptions, behaviors, and attitudes regarding popular resistance. Findings from the

survey indicated that there were not clear lines drawn between violent and nonviolent

actions; rather, most youth who participated in violent resistance also engaged in

nonviolence, and the majority of youth support both kinds of activism. Likewise, the

data showed that youth who support nonviolence do not see it as being more strategic or

ethical, but instead see nonviolent methods as part of a larger toolbox of resistance. In

addition, the fact that youth show more support for nonviolence when described

specifically in ways associated with resistance, such as demonstrations and boycotts, than

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when the term is used generally, indicates that youth opinions are based on a preference

for resistance rather than a clearly defined identification with nonviolence or violence.

These findings suggest that youth opinions on nonviolent resistance are underscored by a

collective activist identity indicating a willingness to struggle for a cause, in this case, the

resistance of the occupation.

In this way, there is significant potential for youth mobilization in the second

intifada, based on a common solidary group identity and potent injustice frames that have

developed from the first intifada into a resonant master frame. However, movement

frames have shifted during this cycle of contention, with re-conceptualizations of

nonviolence under Oslo failing to reflect congruence with agency and identity

components necessary for widespread action mobilization. According to Polletta and

Jasper, "How successfully groups frame their identities for the public ... affects their

ability to recruit members and supporters, gain a public hearing, make alliances with

other groups, and defuse opposition" (2001, 295). This was evident in Palestine, in

which the failure of activists to frame their nonviolent identity in the context of resistance

significantly hindered their ability to form linkages, respond to criticism, and mobilize

the public, especially the youth population.

To be sure, for older activists, both personal and shared experiences with

nonviolence in the first intifada contributed to the formation of individual identities and

collective action frames that likewise included nonviolence, as reflected in these activists'

use of nonviolent tactics in the second intifada. The second intifada generation however,

while sharing the injustice frame with older activists, have not yet integrated nonviolence

into their agency and identity frames. To use Gamson's framework (1995, 100), their

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collective identity is based at the solidary group level (as Palestinians), and has not yet

extended to the movement level (as activists) or organizational level (as members of a

specific SMO or campaign). In this way, they reflect consensus mobilization in terms of

their potential and will to act, but in lacking experience and memory of participation in

strategic nonviolence, they fail to see nonviolence as a meaningful form of action, and

thus fail to translate grievances into action mobilization. The first-intifada and second

intifada generations thus share the same issue frame, but their movement frames differ in

terms of the perceived compatibility of individual nonviolent action with Palestinian

national resistance.

A collective activist identity, inspired by the first intifada, can be recognized in

Palestinian society as a whole, but it is manifest differently at the individual level in pre

and post-first-intifada generations. Specifically, the older generation of activists

typically locates nonviolence within the larger sphere of resistance. Whether drawing

from former experiences as nonviolent activists, militants, and/or prisoners, most of these

individuals see nonviolence as being in accordance with their individual and collective

activist identities. In contrast, while youth may support specific nonviolent actions, they

do not as readily see the idea of nonviolence as compatible with the Palestinian activist

identity.

This chapter has described how a national Palestinian identity of resistance was

developed during the first intifada, which when combined with injustice and agency

components, shaped (and was shaped by) a collective action frame that included

nonviolence in a broader sphere of activism. Indeed, nonviolence provided a repertoire

of tactics that offered a bridge from potential mobilization at the solidary group level to

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action mobilization at the movement and organizational levels. This participation in

nonviolent resistance informed the individual identities of first generation activists, who

sought to reclaim a space for nonviolence in the second intifada. However, while the

frame of "Palestinian national resistance" developed during the first intifada still

resonates with second intifada youth, reinforced by a master issue frame of injustice, the

reframing of nonviolence during the Oslo period hindered the development of individual

movement identities for many youth, thus impeding youth action mobilization. Youth

mobilization for nonviolent resistance thus depends on activists making conscious efforts

to reframe nonviolence in accordance with broader identities of national struggle, as

discussed further in Appendix G.

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This study began with the question, to what extent does a space exist for the

(re )emergence of a widespread popular resistance movement in Palestine in the second

intifada? Specifically, I was interested in understanding why, despite episodes of

nonviolent resistance, the second intifada never realized the mass mobilization for

popular struggle witnessed in the first intifada, even as the scope of grievances expanded

and intensified. To understand this phenomonon, I have a) inventoried the types of

nonviolent resistance occurring in the West Bank during the second intifada; b) examined

popular youth attitudes towards different forms of popular struggle; c) analyzed sources

of fragmentation and barriers to widespread mobilization, in terms of resource

mobilization challenges, political constraints, and ineffective cultural framings; and d)

used an identity-based approach to analyze the contextual mechanisms informing

individual and collective participation in nonviolent activism.

Using a social movements theoretical framework, I have concluded that, while

potential mobilization for nonviolent resistance in Palestine has remained high, action

mobilization has been fragmented by the interaction of ineffective organizational

structures, political constraints and misapplied movement framings of nonviolence during

the post-Oslo period. These elements combined in such a way to shift the perception of

nonviolence from resistance to accommodation, especially for youth with no memory of

280

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the use of nonviolent tactics in the first intifada. Space exists for the re-emergence of a

widespread nonviolent movement, but it depends on redefining nonviolence in a way that

is compatible with many Palestinians' collective activist identity.

Nonviolent Resistance in the Second Intifada

Despite the apparent dominance of violent resistance during the second intifada,

nonviolent resistance did, and continues to, take place throughout Palestine in various

forms. First, direct action campaigns, consisting of acts of protest and persuasion,

boycotts, and civil disobedience, emerged in numerous villages, usually led by local

popular committees. While these campaigns typically transpired in response to the

construction of the separation barrier, they came to constitute a nexus ofresistance to the

occupation itself. Second, many local campaigns were directly or indirectly supported by

civil society organizations, including national campaigns to stop the wall, and NGOs

committed to supporting nonviolence, which often initiated their own direct actions or

BDS campaigns, while also conducting trainings, conferences, and workshops to

disseminate nonviolent strategies. Other civil society groups, such as action dialogue

organizations, arts/media-as-activism projects, and alternative media outlets adopted

more advocacy-based approaches, by amplifying Palestinian voices through various

mediums to raise awareness about the occupation in general and the nonviolent struggle

in particular, both regionally and internationally. Finally, countless Palestinians

participated in everyday acts of resistance, specifically remaining on their land in spite of

encroaching settlements and construction of the separation wall, reflecting the notion of

sumoud, or steadfastness.

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Clearly, nonviolent resistance has was not absent during the second intifada.

However, it is also evident that nonviolent action was episodic at best, with participation

limited, never garnering the mass mobilization necessary to constitute a real popular

movement. Furthermore, most nonviolent approaches during the second intifada were

restricted to the protest, persuasion, and advocacy dimensions of activism, rarely

translating into direct intervention or civil disobedience, as witnessed in the first intifada.

While these symbolic actions can be useful in the early stages of a popular struggle,

failure to utilize other tactics can render such approaches as little more than spectacles

over time. Similarly, the use of nonviolence in the second intifada, whether through

direct actions or advocacy-based approaches, has focused largely on appealing to the

international community in a sort of boomerang approach to activism, rather than

confronting the occupation directly. These shifts in the application of nonviolence, and

the (arguably resultant) lack of popular mobilization, especially among youth, can be

largely explained by the organizing structures, political constraints, and cultural framings

that emerged during the post-Oslo period.

Organizational Structures

Clearly, Palestinians found (or indeed, created) opportunities for popular

resistance throughout the second intifada. However, translating those opportunities into a

viable movement requires sufficient organization, both formal and informal, which has

been lacking in Palestine. Challenges to effective resource mobilization have been

evident both within and between political parties, NGOs, and grassroots networks, largely

influenced by political constraints, discussed below. The failure to organize successfully,

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specifically in terms of agreeing on common goals utilizing strategic tactics, thus further

inhibited widespread mobilization.

First, Palestinian political parties have proved ineffective in mobilizing for

popular resistance in the post-Oslo period, in sharp contrast to the first intifada. This is

largely due to the institutionalization of the major parties, specifically Fateh, under Oslo,

and the subsequent rise of Hamas as the primary party of resistance. This dual

phenomenon has limited political mobilization, especially among youth; fractured

participation in direct actions; and diverted activism energies from the occupation to the

internal situation. The civil strife, and the resultant lack of leadership, has also

contributed to a broader sense of despair, distrust, and uncertainty, which has further

limited mobilization by depleting people's sense of agency.

Political parties were not the only organizations facing structural challenges. At

the civil society level, many NGOs were seen as co-opting nonviolence during the post

Oslo period, leading to the institutionalization of activism. While some NGOs suffered

from internal corruption, it was more the systemic "professionalization" of activism, or

the common perception of such, that hindered mobilization. First, the shift to NGO

based "activism" depleted the voluntary spirit of nonviolence, rendering it a business

rather than resistance in the eyes of many Palestinians. Second, the proliferation of

NGOs created a marketplace of sorts for nonviolence, with organizations competing for

funding and becoming increasingly influenced by donor-driven agendas. This

phenomenon created challenges in mobilizing for nonviolent resistance specifically, as

NGOs during the post-Oslo period frequently adopted interpretations of nonviolence as

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peacebuilding or dialogue, in accordance with donor definitions, resulting in a framing of

nonviolence that contradicted Palestinian activist identities.

In addition to organizational impediments at the political party and NGO levels,

the grassroots movement itself has failed to coordinate effective resource mobilization.

First, activists have been unable to articulate a common goal for the popular struggle, in

terms of both scope and content. Regarding scope, some activists are focusing solely on

stopping the wall or protecting land on the local level, while others are targeting the

occupation itself. Within those levels of emphasis, some activists are calling for the

complete destruction of the wall while others are hoping to simply change the route or

secure access to land through gates; likewise, some activists relate "ending the

occupation" with a two-state solution, while others are calling for a bi-national secular

state. Conflated with the absence of a strong leader at either the grassroots or national

level, the movement lacks a clear goal or vision to mobilize constitutents.

The movement has also suffered from the inability to define and employ strategic

tactics. First, activists had different definitions of nonviolence and different motivations

for using nonviolent tactics, with some subscribing to a principled approach, which views

nonviolence as a way of life; others adopting a pragmatic approach, which sees

nonviolence as a strategy; and others relating to a combination of the two. These

different conceptualizations of nonviolence informed different interpretations of how

nonviolent tactics should be implemented, and if or when those tactics are compatible

with violent resistance. Such divisions made it difficult for activists to develop an

innovative strategic action plan, resulting in largely reactionary actions that were often

more symbolic than deliberately disruptive. Thus, with a few exceptions at the local

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level, actions lacked the creativity or impact to effectively challenge occupation forces, or

to attract other Palestinians to actively participate in the struggle.

Organizational structures at both the formal and informal levels have thus faced

challenges in effectively mobilizing for widespread participation. While some popular

committees and community-based organizations (CBOs) have had success at the local

level, mass mobilization has been limited largely due to shortcomings in various

mobilizing structures, including political parties, NGOs, social movement organizations

(SMOs), and grassroots networks. Indeed, as McAdam et al. note, "For the movement to

survive, insurgents must be able to create a more enduring organizational structure to

sustain collective action" (1996, 13). This structure need not be a formal organization,

but rather a framework with shared goals and a common articulation of strategic tactics.

Political Constraints

Widespread resistance in Palestine was significantly inhibited by political

constraints stemming from Israel, the PNA, and the structural dynamic between the two.

First, Israeli policies of separation, visibly manifest in the separation wall, limited contact

points between Israeli and Palestinian societies, restricting opportunities for direct actions

to checkpoints and wall construction zones, and limiting interactions with Israelis to

soldiers and settlers on the one hand, and activists on the other hand, with few

opportunities to engage directly with mainstream Israelis. For these reasons, attempts at

demonstrations, strikes, and demonstrations went largely unheeded in Israel, thus

prompting the shift to more symbolic, advocacy-based actions and the reliance on media

coverage to appeal to the international community for solidarity. Likewise, Israeli

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measures restricting freedom of movement, including checkpoints, roadblocks, and the

separation barrier, further fragmented Palestinian resistance by localizing actions, and

making large-scale events and campaigns difficult to organize and implement. In

addition, Israel's use of military violence in response to nonviolent actions, as well as

crackdowns on activists and their families, further contributed to limited participation.

According to Andoni, the IDF ironically used the context of the Oslo period to justify its

intensification of force, in that the existence of the Palestinian Authority "allowed the

Israelis to portray the conflict as a state of war. .. This situation gave Israel the excuse to

mobilize its full military arsenal against Palestinians, which was unthinkable during even

the most violent periods of the 1987 intifada" (2001, 211 ).

Political constraints also emerged within Palestine from the PA during the post

Oslo period. First, the political structure of the PA necessitated the institutionalization of

former "movements" under the PLO into more conventional parties under the PA. This

phenomenon was especially significant in the transformation of Fateh from a popular

mobilization front to a top-level bureaucracy; regarding youth in particular, there was a

shift from the political education approach of Al-Shabiba to the social services focus of

Fateh Youth. In this way, the mobilizing influence of the "old" parties was significantly

reduced, thus limiting action mobilization on the one hand, and creating a resistance gap

on the other hand that was quickly filled by Hamas and the Islamic Block. The rise to

power of these groups had several implications for popular resistance. First, it shifted the

focus of the popular struggle from strategic nonviolence, as employed during the first

intifada, to armed resistance, thus militarizing the struggle and, in doing so, limiting

opportunities for popular participation. Second, rising tensions between Hamas and

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Fateh fractured resistance against the occupation, as the parties either organized their own

separate actions against the occupation, or prioritized their mobilization regarding the

internal struggle over resisting the occupation. As Abu-Nimer summarizes, "the overall

impact of the organized Islamic groups was to undercut nonviolent resistance either by ...

fostering dissension among Palestinians, by accenting violence, or by resisting any

compromise with Israel" (2003, 165). The internal power struggle at the elite level thus

made it difficult to organize a unified, national movement, therefore further contributing

to the localization of nonviolent episodes.

Finally, the relationship between Israel and the PA, as established by the Oslo

Accords, created additional political constraints to popular mobilization. First, not only

did the institutionalization of the political movements limit their ability to organize

resistance, as discussed above, but also the PA' s tenuous relationship with Israel under

Oslo actually required it to subdue resistance efforts through the Palestinian "security"

services. Furthermore, the "semi-autonomous" structure of the PA under Oslo made

Palestinian institutions increasingly dependent on Israel, politically and economically.

Thus, rather than functioning as a site of Palestinian leadership, the PA came to be

perceived as an ineffective bureaucracy at best, and a puppet oflsrael and the West at

worst. Indeed, the PA was not only seen as being under the thumb oflsrael, but of the

broader international community, either through direct political pressure from the US and

the Quartet, or through indirect economic pressure from donor governments and agencies

promoting the Oslo "peace process."

Palestinian activists thus faced considerable political constraints in mobilizing for

popular resistance. According to social movement theory, political constraints generally

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include the relative closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability of elite

alignments undergirding the polity, the presence of elite allies, and the state's capacity for

repression (McAdam et al. 1996, 10; Kriesi 1991, Tarrow 1994 ). In the case of Palestine,

activists faced closed political systems, elite bureaucracies and allies, and repression from

both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. In this way, the political

structure established under the Oslo Accords resulted in the development of two polities

that generated constraints to Palestinian resistance. At the same time, it was largely the

frustration and disillusionment with this political structure, and its oppressive effects, that

initially sparked the cycle of contention undergirding the second intifada.

Movement Framings

Mobilization is not a only a function of political opportunities and organizational

structures, but also of cultural construction. In other words, participation depends largely

on perceptions of congruence between collective action frames and individual and

collective identities. In the case of Palestine, while many first intifada generation

activists viewed the nonviolent movement as compatible with their identities as activists,

youth tended to distance themselves from "nonviolence" due to its frequent framing as

normalization during the post-Oslo period.

One of the primary differences between the first and second intifadas was the lack

of youth engagement and leadership in nonviolent resistance in the second intifada.

Whereas youth were the main coordinators in the first intifada, and thus initiated the tide

of widespread popular participation, the second intifada saw very little youth involvement

in nonviolence, with most campaigns organized by middle-aged activists, many of whom

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were youth leaders in the first intifada. Just as youth were instrumental in mobilizing the

wider population in the first intifada, the lack of youth presence, in terms of both

numbers and spirit, stifled popular participation in the second intifada. I attributed this

generational gap to the contextual variance in the meaning of nonviolence for pre and

post-Oslo generations.

Because first-intifada youth experienced the practice of nonviolence before

encountering the theory, they interpreted nonviolence as being naturally in accordance

with their individual and collective activist identities. Indeed, most of these activists saw

nonviolence as an integral aspect of a wider sphere of resistance, having employed

nonviolent tactics in the first intifada because they were strategic, not because they were

"peaceful" or morally superior. Consequently, nonviolence became a part of these

activists' collective and individual resistance identities, prompting them to seek to

reclaim a space for nonviolent actions in the second intifada.

In contrast, second-intifada youth were first exposed to a neutralized notion of

"nonviolence" as a euphemism for normalization, as propagated under Oslo, and thus

tend to distance themselves from the concept, if not the practice, of nonviolence. While

these youth still share the collective Palestinian identity of resistance, their lack of

experience at the movement and organizational levels prevent them from integrating

nonviolence into their conceptual framework of struggle. In other words, while youth

share a common issue frame with older activists in terms of experienced injustice under

the occupation, their participation is limited by lack of a resonant movement frame, in

terms of conceptualizing nonviolent tactics as compatible with their senses of individual

agency and identity.

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Essentially, Palestinian youth are more likely to support nonviolence when, like

many first-intifada activists, they see it as part of a broader framework of resistance.

Thus, effective mobilization of this key population for popular resistance depends on re

framing nonviolence in both theory and practice so that youth perceive it as being in

accordance with their individual and collective activist identities. Activists can re-shape

the image of nonviolence in terms of resistance on the local level by relocating the crux

of nonviolence from the NGOs to the grassroots level, grounding nonviolence in local

histories and traditions, and reframing nonviolence as strategic action. They can also be

more intentional in grounding resistance in the human rights framework and developing a

media strategy to reframe nonviolence.

Potential for Action Mobilization

Action mobilization in the second intifada has been limited by political

constraints, inefficient resource mobilization and organizational structure, and perhaps

most significantly, ineffective framings of nonviolence under Oslo. However, this

study's analysis of popular attitudes suggests that consensus mobilization (Klandermans

1992), or potential mobilization, for nonviolent resistance remains high, indicating that a

space does exist for a more unified, widespread popular movement. Although many

divisive factors remain, there is public support for nonviolent resistance, and, perhaps

more importantly, popular willingness to participate in nonviolent actions, particularly

amongst Palestinian youth. However, data reflects that support for nonviolent resistance

is not straightforward, which may contribute to the apparent lack of widespread

participation, or action mobilization, noted by activists.

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Primarily, the terms "nonviolence" and "violence" have nuanced meanings for

youth and are constantly being re-negotiated. Indeed, youth were less willing to admit to

participating in or supporting nonviolent resistance than they were to participating in

specific nonviolent tactics, such as demonstrations and boycotts, indicating a

disassociation from the term nonviolence. At the same time, youth displayed multi

faceted interpretations of the term "violence," with many neglecting to view throwing

stones, or even armed resistance, as violence. However, even reported youth support for

violence is primarily limited to operations against soldiers, and sometimes settlers, inside

the West Bank, with very low levels of support for rocket or suicide bomb attacks on

Israeli civilians. This finding reflects the fact that even youth support for violence is

limited to a specific context.

Finally, regardless of individual youth conceptions of violence and nonviolence,

the strong majority indicated a willingness to participate in popular resistance. It is thus

evident that youth are not nearly as attached to violent resistance or prone towards apathy

as assumed by some activists. Rather, youth constitute a viable population of activists

that has the potential to mobilize nonviolently. The challenge for activists is to translate

that youth potential into nonviolent action by drawing on a common activist identity, and

grounding nonviolence in a broader sphere of resistance.

The study thus concludes that a space for the reemergence of a popular nonviolent

movement does exist, based on youth engagement. However, effective action

mobilization depends on reframing nonviolence within a broader collective identity of

activism. Such reframings would contribute to more effective resource mobilization

through improved conceptualizations of movement goals and tactics, and would in tum

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create new political opportunities by increasing pressure on Israeli and Palestinian

governmental institutions.

Contributions

This study is one of the first to provide an in-depth analysis of nonviolent

resistance in Palestine in the second intifada. It thus offers unique contributions to

scholars and practitioners alike, both inside and outside Palestine. Nonviolent episodes in

Palestine have been overshadowed by militant acts of resistance, such as suicide

bombings and rocket attacks, since the inception of the second intifada in 2000. Policy

towards Palestine has largely focused on responding to these acts and the groups that

conduct them, and both the academic literature and mainstream media have focused

almost exclusively on violent resistance. While these studies are undoubtedly important,

it is imperative for theorists and practitioners alike to recognize the widespread acts of

nonviolence that also occurred, and are occurring, throughout the West Bank, and explore

the potential of nonviolent activism as an alternative framework for popular participation

in Palestine.

Social Movement Theory

First, this study provides an empirical example of the synthesis between various

approaches to studying social movements. As McAdam et al. note, "Scholars have

tended to study only one aspect of a movement-for example, the effect of expanding

political opportunities or the organizational dynamics of collective action. The

challenge ... is to sketch the relationships between these factors, thus yielding a fuller

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understanding of social movement dynamics" (1996, 7). This study has attempted to

contribute to this "fuller understanding" by linking political opportunities, mobilizing

structures, and cultural framings in an interactive analysis, grounded in a contemporary

case study.

The research also focused largely on the role of framing processes, a dimension of

social movement research in which few in-depth studies have been conducted (McAdam

et al., 1996). It thus contributes to the empirical scholarship in this area of the literature,

to expand upon the more abstract, conceptual framework originally put forth by Snow et

al. Furthermore, this study has expanded the notion of framing from its usual ideational

basis to apply to tactics as well, reflecting the interaction of both the issue and movement

aspects of collective action frames. The study has also created new links between the

social movement and nonviolence literatures, which are often studied separately in the

sociology and peace studies fields, respectively. Finally, the research hopes to inspire a

new area in scholarly work related to Palestine related to the role of nonviolence in the

second intifada.

Application of the Findings

It is hoped that the findings from this study are useful to activists, practitioners,

and policymakers within Palestine and Israel. By identifying episodes of successful

resistance and analyzing sources of fragmentation and localization, I hope that this

research provides a constructive assessment of nonviolence in the current context. Such

knowledge can inform the interventions of conflict resolution practitioners, community

activists, and policymakers by providing insight into how perceptions of nonviolence are

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created, maintained, and challenged, and how such perceptions affect participation.

Traditional trainings in nonviolence have not been successful in mobilizing youth in

particular because, among other reasons, the mechanisms affecting popular attitudes

towards nonviolence have not been studied or addressed. Conflict resolution

organizations, especially those equating nonviolence with dialogue or coexistence, have

contributed to the conflation of nonviolence with normalization, failing to identify

nonviolence as a method of meaningful action. Similarly, activists have been

unsuccessful in mobilizing youth for nonviolence largely because they expect youth to be

inspired by the theory, rather than the practice of nonviolence, which they themselves

experienced organically in the first intifada, the shared memory of which inspires many

of their contemporary actions. It is my hope that this dissertation will enable such

individual activists and organizations to better engage youth by reframing nonviolence in

such a way as to relocate the strategy within the tradition of resistance.

Furthermore, I hope that enhanced understanding of mechanisms affecting

popular attitudes towards both violence and nonviolence, as well as more nuanced

understandings of how Palestinians define those terms, will assist politicians and social

scientists in examining the implications of policy decisions that are based on assumptions

of widespread Palestinian support in general, and youth support in particular, for militant

resistance. Specifically, the research can be useful to policymakers by indicating the

necessary balance between U.S. support of nonviolent movements and local ownership of

the struggle. In the case of Palestine, one of the main challenges to mobilization is the

association of nonviolence with passivity or submission, which many Palestinians feel

was implicit in American initiatives under Oslo. The study indicates that the U.S. could

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be more effective in covertly supporting local movements, as was the case with the

support of Otpor in Serbia. In this way, the study can be useful to academics and

policymakers by illustrating that the "packaging" of nonviolence in accordance with local

histories and identities can be a primary factor in garnering popular participation and

facilitating mobilization, a finding which may be useful for determining how best to

support activists in other conflict zones.

The research has implications beyond Palestine as well, as its findings can be

applied to other conflicts and struggles for self-determination in which non-state actors

are employing both armed and unarmed resistance. The study challenges the linear

assumption that conflicts escalate from nonviolent to violent tactics by illustrating that

community-based resistance occurred concurrently with militant resistance during the

second intifada, and by showing that both civilians and former militants have embraced

nonviolence. This finding can be useful to both theorists and policymakers by suggesting

that nonviolent movements can emerge even in the midst of direct violence. This finding

can be extrapolated to other intractable conflict zones, such as Kurdistan, Checnya, and

Kashmir, by indicating that while violence can beget violence, sustained armed resistance

without substantive achievements can also inspire alternative approaches of struggle.

In addition, the study can be useful by prompting more in-depth analyses of

popular support for various forms of resistance. Indeed, the research differentiates

between support for violent resistance against soldiers and violence against civilians, a

distinction that is rarely made, often justifying collective punishment measures against

Palestinian civilians. Similarly, the project differentiates between armed resistance and

throwing stones, thus providing a more nuanced view of opinions towards militant

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resistance and limited violence, respectively. These findings challenge more general

claims about widespread Palestinian support for "violence," which are often cited when

formulating policies towards the region. These distinctions are important in conflicts

beyond Palestine as well, in which studies claiming high public support for controversial

forms of resistance can be misleading if the terms "violence" and "resistance" are not

deconstructed.

Further Research

Because this study is one of the first to provide an in-depth analysis of nonviolent

resistance in the West Bank during and after the second intifada, it introduces numerous

areas for further exploration at the levels of Palestinian activism, Israeli-Palestinian

peacebuilding, and comparative nonviolence.

At the local level, the study raises questions about other actors, issues, and

analyses related to Palestinian activism that were outside the scope of this study. In terms

of actors, it would be interesting to pursue more in-depth research on the specific

experiences of former prisoners with nonviolence. The majority of activists interviewed

for this study either directly or indirectly referred to earlier stays in prison as informing

their knowledge of or experience with nonviolent resistance. It would thus be helpful to

investigate how Palestinian prisoners have used nonviolent actions in prison, how the

prisons served as spaces for organizing and popular education, and how the prison

experience affected individuals' subsequent work and activism.

Greater attention could also be given to the role of women in Palestinian

resistance. Following a trend similar to youth activism, women's involvement in popular

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resistance in the second intifada was significantly lower than the in the first intifada,

according to several activists (interviews, 2007). Because the generational argument put

forth in this dissertation does not explain this shift in women's involvement, additional

research is necessary to examine this ph~nomenon.

Similarly, as the example of women's involvement indicates, it is likely that the

conclusions reached in this dissertation do not fully explain the lack of widespread

popular participation generally, and youth participation specifically, nor does this

dissertation claim to provide such all-encompassing rationales. I argue that the generational difference in conceptualizations of. nonviolence is a major factor in influencing youth participation, but I recognize that it is not the only mechanism affecting

involvement. For this reason, additional research is needed to further probe other issues

affecting lack of youth engagement, including withdrawal as a coping strategy on the one

hand and perceived attraction to violence on the other hand. Similarly, more follow-up

research could be done on youths' nuanced conceptions of violence and attitudes towards

militant resistance, which were touched on through the survey used in this research.

It would also be helpful to pursue more in-depth research on other factors cited by

activists in this study as contributing to the fragmentation of the nonviolent movement,

specifically at the civil society and political realms. First, the apparent tension between

NGOs and grassroots activists opens up numerous avenues for further research on

relations within civil society, both in Palestine and in other contexts in which NGOs rely

largely on international donors. Second, the effect of increasing tensions between Fatah

and Hamas on activism during the period studied cannot be ignored, providing a possible

case study for analyzing how internal political struggles influence resistance movements.

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Finally, the important role of the media of constructing and disseminating collective

action frames (and counter frames) is deserving of more attention.

Further research could also be conducted on "submerged" methods of nonviolent

resistance, both in Palestine and beyond. While this study focused primarily on

participation in direct actions, the typology presented in Chapter 4 deliberately identified

other forms of nonviolence that are also taking place, including networking and advocacy

approaches via NGOs, media outlets, and youth projects, as well as everyday acts of

resistance. Additional research is necessary to better understand the globalization of

activism on the one hand, in the form ofTANs (Keck & Sikkink 1998) and international

solidarity; and the localization of activism on the other hand, in the form of sumoud and

refusal to emigrate at the individual and village levels.

At the regional level, additional research could be conducted on the role of Israeli

and international activists in Palestinian resistance. Some scholars have already started to

investigate these subjects (Abu-Nimer 2006; Stahlman & Aladin 2003), but further

research is necessary to reflect the growing involvement of these solidarity groups.

Similarly, further research is necessary to better understand the ways in which mid-level

Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives do or do not complement

grassroots activism. As clear in this research, most nonviolent activists see their work as

clearly distinct from those engaging in dialogue or peacebuilding. However, on the

ground, there is often significant overlap between these individuals and groups,

especially in more recently formed grassroots dialogues like Combatants for Peace and

the Bereaved Families Forum. Finally, additional research is needed to determine if or

how top-level negotiations and dynamics affect grassroots nonviolent movements, and

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vice versa. Although this study did not focus on elite negotiations as a form of

nonviolence, it agrees with Abu-Nimer that "an effective nonviolent grassroots campaign

has to be accompanied by committed political leadership to engage in formal negotiation"

(2006, 13 8). It is thus necessary to better understand how these two phenomena

reinforce each other.

These themes could also be extrapolated to the international level, by comparing

Palestinian resistance with other cases of nonviolent grassroots activism. A comparative

approach would help distinguish which mechanisms affecting popular participation in

nonviolence are Palestine-specific, and which apply to nonviolent social movements

more broadly. A related transnational approach might be to examine how nonviolence is

influenced by culture and religion. For example, some scholars (Abu-Nimer 2003;

Kadayifci-Orellana 2007) have initiated research into nonviolence and Islam that could

enhance understandings of popular attitudes towards nonviolent resistance in Palestine.

Conclusion: The Activist and the Olive Tree

I began this dissertation with a Palestinian story about a child seeing an old man

planting an olive tree. When the child asks why the old man is planting a seed if he will

never see the harvest, the old man replies that he is not planting the tree for himself, but

for future generations, so that they might eat even after he is gone. This seemingly

simple folktale was cited by multiple activists as an allegory for the cycle of resistance in

Palestine. As one activist stated, "This is what we are doing. Our fathers and

grandfathers planted so that we could eat, and now we are planting so the next generation

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can eat. We must invest in the new generation and let our ideas grow with them so they

can achieve something" (interview, 2007).

In this study, I have illustrated how older activists have planted the seeds of

resistance, that their efforts might improve the situation of their own children and

grandchildren, and that the next generation might maintain the tradition of struggle. Yet,

in the current context, the olive trees of Palestine are being literally and figuratively

uprooted, and the role of the young generation remains to be seen. The re-engagement of

youth in popular struggle in Palestine does not guarantee a change to the current

situation, or an end to the occupation. However, one way or another, the attitudes and

actions of the rising generation will shape the future dynamics of the Israel-Palestinian

conflict, and youth participation in nonviolent popular resistance may be one step

towards the realization of a just peace.

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FIELD SITES

Jerusalem

Jerusalem has a population of approximately 724,000 people, 65 percent Jewish,

32 percent Palestinian Muslim, and 2 percent Palestinian Christian. The city was divided

from 1949 to 1967, with West Jerusalem being the capital oflsrael and East Jerusalem

being part of Jordan. Israel gained control of East Jerusalem in the Six Days War in 1967

and annexed it immediately, formally declaring the "complete and unified" Jerusalem as

the Israeli capital in 1980. However, this move was not recognized by the international

community, and many Palestinians still view East Jerusalem as the future capital of a

potential Palestinian state. The Oslo Accords stipulated that the final status of Jerusalem

be determined by peaceful negotiations, but the current status remains disputed, and the

city remains divided in two distinct sections. /

The daily life of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem differs from that of

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Regarding legal status, most Palestinians living

in Jerusalem hold the status of "permanent resident" of the state oflsrael, which is the

same status given to immigrants to Israel, and is distinct from citizenship. The permanent

resident status also affects daily life, by allowing Jerusalem residents to live and work in

Israel and Jerusalem without the special permission required for West Bank residents. 301

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These Palestinians face other issues and pressures within Jerusalem however that are

unique from challenges faced by West Bank Palestinians.

I lived on the Mount of Olives in East Jerusalem during my fieldwork, and I

conducted a number of interviews in East Jerusalem and the nearby suburbs ofBeit

Hanina and Al-Ram. Most of these interviews took place in the offices of individuals

working with NGOs in East Jerusalem, while other interviews were held in hotels and

cafes in East Jerusalem. I also used East Jerusalem as a transit base for my travel to and

between different cities in the West Bank. I relied on the East Jerusalem busses to travel

to Ramallah and Bethlehem, from where I would find services and shared taxis to other

destinations in the north and south, respectively. This enabled me to interact on a daily

basis with mainstream Palestinians, have informal conversations, go through checkpoints,

and experience different parts of the West Bank.

The West Bank

The West Bank is home to approximately 2.1 million Palestinians, about one-third

of whom are refugees from towns and villages that became part oflsraeli in 1948. The

West Bank is considered an occupied territory under international law, and is regulated

by Israeli checkpoints and border controls. Although the West Bank is not large in size

(at 5,860 square kilometers), it is geographically, politically, economically, and socially

diverse. I was fortunate to be able to travel extensively in the West Bank (via public

transportation), sometimes for day visits but often more extended stays in different cities,

villages, and refugee camps.

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Cities

Cities in the West Bank all have their own unique qualities and character. I spent

the most time in Ramallah (15 kilometers north of Jerusalem) and Bethlehem (ten

kilometers south of Jerusalem). Ramallah is home to the PA, as well as numerous

businesses, media center, local NGOs, and international organizations. The city has a

lively, cosmopolitan nature, and integrates its political and economic concentrations with

a relatively vibrant arts scene, a popular cafe culture, and association with nearby Birzeit

University. Al-Manara, the city center of Ramallah, is a visible example of these

intersections, serving as the site of numerous political events and cultural festivities,

flanked by shops, restaurants, businesses and enterprises that range from the trendy Stars

& Bucks Cafe to young boys selling kites in the street.

Bethlehem has a much more subdued atmosphere. Although the areas near the

Old City, Nativity Square, and the universities are usually busy, the main road into town

is characterized by shop after shop that have been forced to close in recent years due to

drop in tourism, attributed to a combination of the second intifiada and the construction

of the separation barrier and Rachel's Tomb checkpoint. The presence of the separation

barrier has been felt especially hard in Bethlehem, where the wall runs around the city on

three sides and even through the middle of the city in places. The wall has cut off many

workers from Jerusalem, as well as farmers from their land and olive groves, and even

students from their schools and universities. Despite these challenges, there is an active

NGO community in Bethlehem, with a number of organizations and individuals

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dedicated to nonviolence, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution, thus making it a natural

center for much of my research.

I also conducted interviews in other Palestinian cities, making visits to Hebron, a

large city in the south that faces significant challenges from extremist Israeli settlers and

the resultant IDF force stationed in the city; Nablus, the largest city in Palestine, located

in the north, and a frequent site of Israeli incursions; Tulkarem, located in the northwest

close to the Green Line; as well as Jenin in the north and Jericho to the east.

Villages

I also conducted a number of interviews in villages throughout the West Bank.

Most villages can be accessed by service or taxi from urban centers like Hebron,

Bethlehem, and Ramallah. Villages are agriculturally based, with residents living in the

village while farming the surrounding land. Many villages have been focal points for

popular resistance as the separation wall has cut off many villagesfrom their surrounding

lands, and thus cut off many farmers from their livelihood. I spent time in a number of

villages, usually staying with Palestinian friends and colleagues. Interviews were usually

conducted in the participants' homes, or while sitting or walking on the land itself.

The villages I visited included Ghwain, a cave village facing water shortages from

nearby settlements; At-Tawani, a village south of Hebron that has organized numerous

nonviolent protests against settler violence in the area; Beit Ommar, an active village

between Hebron and Bethlehem; Um Salamouna, south of Bethlehem, the site of weekly

demonstrations against the separation wall; Battir, west of Bethlehem, a village losing

land to the wall; Bil'in, outside Ramallah, where weekly demonstrations have continued

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for several years; Biddu and Budros, villages near Ramallah that employed nonviolent

resistance early in the second intifada and have served as models for current

demonstrations; Yanoun, a village near Nablus surrounded by actively hostile

settlements; and many others.

Refugee Camps

I also conducted interviews and worked on youth projects in a number of the

refugee camps, first established in 1948 to accommodate the thousands of Palestinians

coming from towns and villages in what became the state of Israel. The camps have

since expanded from tent villages to tightly-packed neighborhoods, consisting of narrow

alleys, close buildings, and UN schools and centers administered by the United Nations

Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The economic conditions tend to be worse in the

camps than in the cities and villages, and the camps are often the sites of Israeli

incursions. However, the communities in the camps tend to be tight and close-knit, and

there is a spirit ofresistance in the camps that is distinct from other parts of the West

Bank. I spent time in Aida Camp (Bethlehem), Shu'fat Camp (near Jerusalem),

Qalandiya Camp (near Ramallah), Al-Am'ari Camp (near Ramallah), Nur Al-Shams

(Tulkarem), and Balata Camp (Nablus). Most interviews were conducted in community

centers or in participants' homes.

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SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Tell me more about your work in popular resistance.

How did you first get involved in activism?

Do you think of yourself as an activist? Why or why not?

How wer~ you involved in activism as a youth and/or during the first intifada?

What attracts you to nonviolent resistance?

Why do you prefer nonviolence?

How do you define nonviolence?

Do you see nonviolence more as a strategy or a way of life?

How do other people in your community view nonviolence?

How much do people in your community participate in nonviolence?

What kinds of strategies or tactics do you engage in or support?

What is your opinion on throwing stones or using other forms of limited violence in popular resistance?

What role does armed resistance have? Do violent and nonviolent resistance complement or hinder each other?

How involved are youth in nonviolent resistance?

How involved are women in nonviolent resistance?

How much do different political parties participate in nonviolent resistance?

How do you see the role ofNGOs in organizing/supporting activism? 306

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How do you see the role of CBOs and popular committees in coordinating resistance?

How do you see the role of internationals?

To what extent is there a popular movement right now in Palestine?

Why do you think the "movement" is so fragmented and localized?

What are the biggest challenges to nonviolence right now?

How do you think the events in Gaza affect nonviolence in the West Bank?

What do you think should be the next step for popular resistance in Palestine?

What do you think should be the long term vision for Palestine?

How optimistic are you?

What hopes do you have for your own children in terms of their future?

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PRELIMINARY SURVEY

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308

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This questionnaire is for research purposes only. Participation in this questionnaire is entirely voluntary. The participant may choose to stop at any time. All information will remain confidential. Thank you!

Location:

Age: Gender (please circle): Male Female

Please answer the following questions in your own words. You may use the back of the paper if you need more space: I. How did you first become interested in nonviolence?

2. How did you decide to become involved in nonviolence?

3. What have you learned about nonviolence?

4. How might you apply what you have learned about nonviolence in the future?

Please circle yes/no when indicated, and explain in your own words when applicable. 5. Have you had any other training in nonviolence? (Yes No) If yes, where and when?

6. Before beginning training in nonviolence, did you ever engage in acts of resistance or activism? (Yes No) If yes, did you consider your actions (violent or nonviolent)? Explain.

7. After having trainings in nonviolence, have you engaged in acts of resistance or activism (Yes No)? Do you plan to in the future (Yes No)? If yes, do you consider your actions (violent or nonviolent)? Explain.

8. Do you think participatory media is a form of nonviolent activism? (Yes No) Why or why not?

9. Do you think that nonviolence is an effective form of resisting the occupation? (Y N) Do you think that violence is an effective form of resisting the occupation? (Y N) Explain.

10. Do you consider nonviolence to be a lifestyle or a strategy? What does nonviolence mean to you?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIXD

YOUTH SURVEY

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This survey is for research purposes only. All responses will remain confidential. You may skip any questions you do not want to answer, and you may choose to stop at any time. Thank you for your participation.

Please circle the most accurate response:

VO. Age:

Vl. Location

V2. Gender

V3. Religion: Muslim Christian

V 4. Level of Devoutness to Faith: High Medium Low

VS. Political Party:

Ql. Have you ever received training in popular resistance or nonviolence? Yes No If yes, when and where?

Q2.Have you ever participated in a nonviolent action against the occupation? Yes No Q2-2. Have you ever participated in demonstrations or protests? Yes No Q2-3. Have you ever participated in a boycott? Yes No Q2-4. Have you ever participated in a petition? Yes No Q2-5. Have you ever participated in replanting trees on bulldozed land? Yes No

Q3. Have you ever participated in violent resistance against the occupation? YIN Q3-2. Have you ever participated in throwing stones? YIN Q3-3. Have you ever participated in armed resistance? YIN

Please respond to the following statements on a scale of 1-5 (I =Strongly DISAGREE, 5 =Strongly AGREE).·

Q4-1. Nonviolent popular resistance is the most effective way 1 2 3 4 5 to resist the occupation. Q4-2. Armed resistance is the most effective way to resist the 1 2 3 4 5 occupation. Q4-3. Both nonviolent and violent resistance are effective 1 2 3 4 5 ways of resisting the occupation. Q4-4. Nonviolent resistance is more strategic than armed 1 2 3 4 5 resistance. Q4-5. Nonviolent resistance is more ethical than armed 1 2 3 4 5 resistance.

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Q4-6. There is a history of nonviolent resistance in Palestine. 1 2 3 4 5 Q4-7. Palestinians have a right to all means of resistance. 1 2 3 4 5 Q4-8. Youth play an important role in resisting the 1 2 3 4 5 occupation.

Q5-1. Would you support a NV movement against the 1 2 3 4 5 occupation? Q5-2. Would you support nonviolent demonstrations and 1 2 3 4 5 protests? Q5-3. Would you support a boycott against Israeli products? 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-4. Would you support a violent uprising against the occupation? Q5-5. Would you participate in violent actions? 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-6. Do you support throwing stones at soldiers? 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-7. Do you support armed resistance against soldiers? 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-8. Do you support using rockets against civilians? 1 2 3 4 5 Q5-9. Do you support using suicide bombs against civilians? 1 2 3 4 5

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ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES OF VILLAGE-BASED

DIRECT ACTIONS

Budrous

One of the first popular committees to re-emerge in the second intifada was

organized in the village of Budrous. Budrous is a small farming village of approximately

1,600 people, separated from the Green Line (the internationally recognized border

between Israel and the West Bank) by about 700 dunams (175 acres) of olive groves.

Nonviolent resistance commenced in Budrous in November 2003 in response to the

construction of the separation barrier, the original route of which would have cut through

Budrous' surrounding farm land, seizing approximately 1,200 dunams (300 acres) and

uprooting hundreds of olive trees. In addition, the proposed route of the wall would have

encircled Budrous and eight nearby villages, creating a closed enclave, and cutting off the

25,000 area residents to their fields, offices, and schools, as well as relatives and friends.

Isreali authorities "notified" the village that the wall would be built by hanging

notices on olive trees in the surrounding groves, which were accidentally found by

several shopkeepers and brought to the village leaders. The leaders in the village decided

to coordinate with other villages to establish a popular committee, and to engage of initial

315

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acts of protest and persuasion. Abu Iyad, a leading activist in Budrous explained the

initial actions taken:

First, we initiated the popular committee, and agreed to call it the Popular Committee to Resist the Wall. We knew we needed to fulfill a real example of nonviolence on the ground, so we aimed to join all the movements and power points in the area to be together in a union. We gathered leaders from Hamas, Fateh, the Communist parties, the municipality, youth clubs, schools, and other organizations, because we needed to work together to be effective. We also needed members who believed in nonviolence, so we looked for representatives from all the organizations, ranging from the youth clubs to Hamas, who were supportive of the nonviolent way.

We had a meeting on November 9, 2003 to start the popular committee, and invited sixty or seventy local leaders and coordinators from different organizations. We held the meeting in Na' ale, a neighboring village, and invited leaders from the different villages in the area, and elected the popular committee ...

Not more than two days later, the bulldozers came. We had heard the wall would come, but we didn't think it would come so fast. We thought there was no hope; we thought they would destroy everything. But on November 11, 2003, we held our first demonstration, which was urgent. We just took thirty minutes to talk and gather people. We used the loudspeakers from the mosque to announce that the bulldozers were coming to the north of the village, and that we must go and try to stop them. The turnout was small, about eighty or ninety people, and they were mostly children ... but this was good, and meant a lot for us.

At this first demonstration, there were just three soldiers. When they saw us coming, they started to prepare their weapons. But we just walked with our bodies and carried Palestinian flags, and we didn't throw stones, and no one did anything. The soldiers were surprised by our action, and they started calling others on their mobiles. Soon, about twenty minutes later, five jeeps arrived. In one of them was a commander, who I later found out was the assistant to the Israeli military leader in the Ramallah region. He said, "What are you doing? Are you crazy? You won't change anything by resisting with your small village. This is a government decision that is already set." We said, "Okay, this is your decision. But we have another decision, and we will resist." So we managed to stop the bulldozer that day, but the commander told us that they would return. (interview, 2007)

After the initial demonstration, the construction crews spent about six weeks

completing other sections of the wall before returning to Budrous. During this time, Abu

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Iyad and other members of the popular committee tried to encourage nearby villages to

resist the construction of the wall, but the other communities did not organize as

effectively. Meanwhile, the popular committee continued to organize weekly

demonstrations consisting of marches between Budrous and the nearby village of Qibya

to send a message of resistance, in accordance with protest and persuasion strategies of

nonviolence. However, it was soon necessary for the villagers to utilize strategies of

noncooperation and intervention when the bulldozers returned in late December. As Abu

Iyad reflected:

On December 29, we had our first demonstration where there was real fighting. This was the first time the Israelis brought the bulldozers and we had to try to stop them. About five hundred people came to the demonstration, which was about one third of the village, including women, men, old, and young. At this first demonstration, we showed that the Palestinian people can do something. We had been waiting for this example. People always knew about nonviolent resistance, but they were waiting for someone to tell them how to do it. People were shocked by the wall, and were ready to resist. The Palestinian people are strong, and have the power to struggle and to defend their land and their olive trees.

Basically, we organized the people in such a way that they surprised the IDF jeeps and were able to pass through them and charge the bulldozers. Some of the soldiers fired rubber bullets and several people were injured, but we managed to occupy the bulldozers. Three bulldozers withdrew, and the IDF told us that they would take the remaining bulldozers if we removed the people from them. So we did, and we continued to sit in the field all day.

We continued resisting on the following days. On December 31, the army imposed a curfew, but we broke curfew after four hours and pushed in from the fields. We continued January 1, 2, 3, and 4, and finally on January 4 they stopped working. We had been suffering daily. Seventy people were wounded by rubber bullets, and even more were injured by the tear gas and by being beaten with batons. So we had no choice but to stop the daily struggling, but we continued demonstrating in the area once or twice a week, even when they weren't working, just to send a message that we wouldn't let them continue. (interview, 2007)

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Abu Iyad was arrested on January 14 and detained for ten days for participating in

nonviolent struggle, and other community members were held for months. Nevertheless,

the demonstrations in Budrous continued until April 1, 2003, when Israel decided to

change the route of the wall to be on the Green Line, with the exception of the

approximately 40 dunams (10 acres) that were taken on the first day of the

demonstrations. However, in May 2004, the IDF returned to Budrous to confiscate an

additional 200 dunams (50 acres) of land. At this point, the popular committee decided

to take their case to court with the help of Israeli human rights attorney Ronit Robinson,

who filed a petition with Israel's High Court of Justice. The court was willing to reduce

the amount ofland to be confiscated from 200 dunams (50 acres) to 56 dunams (about 13

acres), but the villagers didn't accept the ruling, and continued to demonstrate to protect

the land under dispute. In the course of these demonstrations in August 2004, a 17 year

old boy was killed by a rubber bullet, another 300 people were injured, and 45 were

arrested. They managed to protect 6 of the 56 dunams, but the remaining 50 were

confiscated.

Despite this loss, according to Abu Iyad, the village felt it had succeeded. First,

they managed to save over one thousand dunams (250 acres) ofland that would otherwise

have been confiscated. Yet, as Abu Iyad noted, "we also managed to encourage

nonviolent resistance and create an example, and now it is growing in other villages ...

everywhere people are demonstrating nonviolently"(interview, 2007). He adds that, "on

another level, we have developed friends around the world ... Now we know that we are

not alone in the occupation. People around the world know that we are victims, and not

criminals" (interview, 2007). In summary, Budrous was a successful example of

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nonviolent direct action on the local level, by saving land that otherwise would have been

confiscated; on the regional level, by establishing a model for popular resistance for other

villages; and on the international level, by showing the world a form of Palestinian

resistance distinct from the violent attacks that dominated headlines at the time.

Bid du

Several months after the demonstrations commenced in Budrous, the village of

Biddu initiated its own campaign of nonviolent resistance. Biddu is located 15

kilometers northwest of Jerusalem and 13 kilometers south of Ramallah, yet checkpoints

and road closures have increased travel time to the urban areas to up to two hours. Biddu

originally consisted of 6,000 dunams (about 1,500 acres), but it has been reduced to 1,500

dunams (about 375 acres) due to land confiscations by settlements and, more recently, the

Separation Wall. Biddu is located in the middle of eight Palestinian villages constituting

approximately 8,000 people, so the village's geographic centrality contributed to the

widespread participation in its popular resistance efforts.

The first demonstration was held on February 24, 2004, in response to the

commencement of construction of the separation barrier on the south side of the village.

About thirty people participated in this initial action, supported by several international

activists. Though the demonstrators managed to stop the bulldozers for one hour, the IDF

responded by beating the participants, resulting in numerous broken bones and broken

ribs, and they also arrested five activists. On the following day, there were bulldozers on

the north side of the village, so the popular committee went to the village mosque and

told the people that it was imperative for them to resist. Hundreds of villagers

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participated in this demonstration, which was again met by beatings, as well as tear gas

and rubber bullets. Demonstrations continued on February 26, when three villagers were

killed during the demonstration, and a fourth later died from a rubber bullet wound to the

head.

According to Ali, a leading activist on Biddu's popular committee, the IDF was

present twenty-four hours a day, and the demonstrators were becoming exhausted. The

popular committee thus started coordinating demonstrations, such that most people

demonstrated during the day, while others demonstrated at night. People from

neighboring villages came to participate in the demonstrations, while others provided

food and water to the activists in the field. According to Ali, "the moral meaning of this

kind of solidarity helped us to want to stay and continue" (interview, 2007). The village

did indeed continue the demonstrations, and intensified their actions from protest to

noncooperation and intervention, such as protecting homes that were to be demolished,

and attacking bulldozers. The IDF continued to respond with violence; in a large

demonstration on April 18, 2004, another villager was shot and killed, and over five

hundred people were wounded by rubber bullets, in addition to countless others affected

by tear gas and sustaining other minor injuries.

As Ali explained, demonstrations still took place after this point, though some

people were becoming afraid to participate. In addition to the direct violence at the

protests, the IDF punished citizens from Biddu in indirect ways at this time as well, by

refusing them permits to pass through the checkpoints to go to work, school, or the

hospital, or confiscating permits that had been granted. According to Ali, "at the

checkpoints, if the soldiers saw that people were from Biddu, they would make them wait

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in the sun for hours, or they would tell them they had to go home ... We know that they

deny permits to militants, but people like me were not engaged in militant actions or

violence, yet they still denied us permits" (interview, 2007). Despite the sanctions

however, the villagers continued to resist.

As in Budrous, the popular committee pursued legal action to stop the wall as

well. They collected money from the farmers in the village and hired Mohammed

Dahlan, a Palestinian lawyer and Israeli citizen, who framed his case around two central

arguments. He first argued that the wall's route should not be determined only by Israeli

security needs, but also by recognizing the hardships that the wall would inflict on

Palestinians. Secondly, he argued that the nonviolent demonstrations in Biddu and the

farmers' willingness to take legal action were clear indications that the villagers were

proactive in protecting their land, and are not just sitting back. As a result of the legal

case, Biddu managed to change the route of the wall, and save several homes that were to

be demolished. However, according to Ali, Biddu's popular committee did not consider

the decision to be a success, because the wall was simply moved to a different location

that confiscated other land not included in the court case. Nevertheless, Biddu's daily

demonstrations and widespread popular participation served as a model and inspiration

for other villages to resist. In addition, the legal case set a de Jure precedent that the route

of the wall be determined by both security concerns and minimizing the damage to

Palestinians.

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South Bethlehem

The South Bethlehem popular committee is made up of representatives from a

number of small villages south of Bethlehem, including farmers, teachers, and local

village council leaders from Umm Salamouna, Wadi Al-Nais, Mas'ara, Al-Khader,

Battir, and Ertas. The committee formed in the summer of 2006 in anticipation of the

construction of the Separation Wall, which will cut off villagers from up to seventy

percent of their agricultural land, as well as block their access to main roads and to the

city of Bethlehem. As in Budrous, Biddu, and Bil'in, the wall's route around these

Palestinian villages is due to presence of settlements, especially the large settlelments of

Efrata and Gush Etzion.

After several months of meeting, the popular committee started to organize

demonstrations against the construction of the wall near Umm Salamouna in January

2007. They started having weekly demonstrations, and they contacted Israeli and

international activists to join them in the actions. The committee usually meets on

Tuesday to plan the Friday action, then holds a town hall style meeting after the Friday

demonstrations with other participants and activists to discuss the action.

Although the initial demonstrations were met with violence from the IDF, the

popular committee continued to focus on ways to confront the soldiers without provoking

them to the point of using tear gas and rubber bullets, as has been the norm in Bil'in. As

Yousef, the Coordinator of the Popular Committees Against the Wall in South

Bethlehem, explained:

We are using a new model of nonviolent resistance that is more complicated than violence, because you need to control it. You don't want chaos. It's like nuclear

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power. If you use it recklessly and drop the bomb, you will just have chaos. But if you control it, you can use its power for energy. (interview, 2007)

According to Yousef, the South Bethlehem demonstrations have remained relatively

peaceful by avoiding stone throwing, which provokes the soldiers, and instead using

creative methods of protest and persuasion to send the message to stop the wall. Actions

have included pray-ins, in which Friday prayers are held on land that is planned for

confiscation, and crossing ribbons and streamers over constructed sections of the wall.

Other actions have appealed to the international community, including a Good Friday

procession to call attention to suffering in the Holy Land, and a tree-planting in honor of

victims of an American university shooting. The organizers also try to avoid violence

during demonstrations by instructing participants to sit on the ground if the soldiers start

using aggression, to make it clear that the activists are not the aggressors. Despite these

deliberate efforts, many of the villagers and· activists have suffered from beatings and

arrests during the demonstrations.

As in the villages to the north, residents of Umm Salamouna also petitioned

Israel's High Court to change the route of the wall, which will confiscate 280 dunams (70

acres) of their agricultural land. Their appeals managed to halt the construction of the

wall temporarily, but on August 3, 2007, the court ruled that the wall's route was

necessary for security purposes, and construction resumed.

South Hebron Hills

A number of small farming villages have joined together for common actions

against the wall in a rural area south of Hebron known as Shafa. Since 1982, the villages

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have been losing land to the construction of settlements, namely, Karmel, Mo'an, Susya,

and Beit Yatir, while connections between the villages have been cut off by illegal

outposts. Harassment and violent attacks from settlers, combined with legal restrictions

on Palestinian construction and land cultivation in the area, drew the attention of Israeli

organizations like Rabbis for Human Rights and Ta'ayush in 2000, and the international

organization Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) has maintained a presence in the area

since that time.

The villagers themselves initiated a campaign of direct action in April 2006, with

the start of construction of the separation barrier in the area, which would limit villager

access to their land to a single gate. The first demonstration was held on April 22 at the

village of Al-Tawani, and had a large turnout of villagers, internationals, and Israeli

activists, as well as media coverage. However, the demonstration faced strong resistance

by the IDF, who halted the demonstration after ten minutes, severely beating and

arresting the coodinator, Sari, and holding him in detention in two weeks with a broken

rib. However, the experience only reaffirmed Sari commitment to popular resistance. As

he explained,

When I was released and got home, all the people were waiting for me, so I knew this was an important opportunity to talk to them. I said, 'I am strong, and we are all strong, so we will have another demonstration next week.' The people couldn't believe what I had said, and it was difficult for me too, since I knew I would be a target. But we did this demonstration in another place, and it was bigger than the first, and then the following week we had another, and then another. (interview, 2007)

In addition to the weekly demonstrations, Sari started talking to leaders in other

nearby villages to start a popular committee for the area. He also continued to develop

relationships with Israeli and international activists, who have continued to support the

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actions of Al-Tawani, Susya, and other villages in Shafa. Finally, Sari has initiated an

education campaign within the villages to teach people about nonviolent resistance and

the importance of remaining on the land.

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YOUTH MEDIA

This section provides further background and details on participatory media

initiatives that have emerged throughout the West Bank during the second intifada.

Theatre

Although theater is considered more of an art than a form of media, I include it in

this discussion because its function and implementation is similar to youth media.

Indeed, community theater can be seen as a sort of predecessor to present youth media

projects, in that it reflects the same philosophies and processes as participatory media, but

does not require the equipment and technology necessary for media production. To be

sure, community theater is still one of the most affordable and accessible forms of

alternative storytelling.

Youth theatre groups in Palestine directly and indirectly reflect the "Theatre of the

Oppressed" framework developed by Augusto Boal in Brazil in 1971. Now present in

over fifty countries, the Theatre of the Oppressed uses participatory theatre to help people

think creatively about active change, with the ultimate objective of furthering essential

human rights. There are different approaches to Theatre of the Oppressed, but most

involve analysis and dialogue by both the actors and the audience on real-world situations

of oppression. 326

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One of the oldest and most widely used approaches to Theatre of the Oppressed is

Forum Theatre. In this type of theatre, actors present a scene or play reflecting a situation

of oppression, then invite audience members ("spect-actors") to replace the protagonist in

the scenes and improvise different responses and solutions to the situation. The other

actors improvise responses in turn, and then the situation and proposed solution is

discussed to explore the reality of using different options in real life. In this way, Forum

Theatre is a "collective rehearsal for reality" (Boal 2004) yet its dramatic context gives

participants the freedom to explore difficult issues openly.

In Palestine, the Ashtar Theatre has coordinated a Forum Theatre program, which

aims to raise issues of oppression that are often taboo in Palestine, and challenge both

oppressors and victims to engage in action and dialogue to find new solutions to these

problems. The program was started in 1997 by Edward Muallem, who developed a series

of plays called "Abu Shaker's Affairs," confronting internal issues such as child labor,

forced marriages, and honor killings, as well as various aspects of the occupation.

Edward works with young people from the Ashtar Theatre, as well as university students

from the Arab American University in Jenin (AAUJ) and Birzeit (BZU), in writing,

directing and acting in the plays, which are performed without charge at universities and

community centers throughout the West Bank.

Several other youth theatre initiatives are not directly linked to Boal's Theatre of

the Oppressed, but they share the same aims of empowering the youth participants and

instigating dialogue on issues affecting Palestinian communities. In Jenin Refugee Camp

in the northern West Bank, the Freedom Theatre uses the creative process as a "model for

social change," providing youth "with a safe space in which they are free to express

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themselves, and in which they can develop the skills, self-knowledge and confidence

which would empower them to challenge present realities and to reach out beyond the

limits of their own community" (Freedom Theatre website). The Freedom Theatre

developed from a drama project initiated in the first intifada by a Jewish woman, Arna

Mer Khemis, to help address children's traumas and fears resulting from the violence of

the intifada and the occupation. Today, the Freedom Theatre enables youth to have a

voice on the occupation and other issues through theater productions, and also to express

themselves through film, music, multi-media, storytelling, and circus performance

workshops.

Similarly, Al-Rowwad, the Palestinian Children's Theatre Center in Aida Refugee

Camp in Bethlehem, was started in 1998 by Abdelfattah Abu Srour to enable youth to use

theater for expression and to create "beautiful nonviolent resistance" (Abusrour,

interview). Abdelfattah worked with youth at the center to develop the play "We are the

Children of the Camp," which started with youth improvisations about their lives in Aida,

and grew to include reflections on Palestinian history, politics, and culture from the early

twentieth century to today. The play has been produced internationally as well as in

Palestine, including a 2005 tour in the United States. Al-Rowwad also includes

workshops in art/drawing, photography, film/video, and writing, and provides job

training, healthcare, and supportive education for youth in the camp.

Photography

Photography has recently emerged as a powerful medium for participatory youth

projects. New technologies are making both film and digital cameras more affordable,

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easier to handle, and competitive in terms of quality, while sharing via the internet is

easily done with digital and scanned images. Photography also maximizes the power of

the picture, with visual images of examples of oppression (such as the separation wall

and checkpoints in Palestine) often speaking louder than words (Dagron 2001).

As participatory photography has become more accessible, youth photography projects

have been emerging in Palestine. For example, the Contrast Project works with youth in

Bethlehem and the village of Battir in using photography as a means of creative

expression and activism. Youth receive training in basic film photography, then take

pictures of different aspects of their lives, ranging from soccer games to the separation

wall. The youth then discuss their photos, write descriptions and captions, and organize

exhibits and screenings in their communities and abroad. The youth in this project try to

reflect different dimensions of life in Palestine through their photos to provide a

"contrasting" image to mainstream portrayals of the Palestinian people and the conflict.

Other projects concentrate on documenting life in refugee camps, including

Picture Balata in Balata Camp in Nablus, and photography workshops in Aida Camp

coordinated by volunteers at the Al-Rowwad Center and Lajee Center. These projects

focus on emphasizing the specific challenges faced by Palestinian refugees; however, the

Lajee Center also incorporates a rights-based approach, with youth photographing images

that reflect specific rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the

Convention on the Rights of the Child. In another rights-based photography initiative,

students at Birzeit's Right To Education Campaign took photos and developed an exhibit

and book illustrating the challenges they face in pursuing an education in occupied

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Palestine, such as checkpoints, arrests, and harassment, as well as other themes including

isolation, poverty, and resistance.

As noted above, these various youth photography initiatives (and others) have all

utilized the portability of photography to disseminate youths' work and share images of

Palestine. Whereas theatre requires the movement of the actors and directors, not to

mention sets and props, photographs are easily exportable as prints, in books and

calendars, and perhaps most commonly, online on project websites. Photographs can

also be copied and re-printed to have multiple exhibits in different locations. In addition,

with the exception of captions, the image-based nature of photography overcomes

language barriers and the need for translation. These facts, combined with the increasing

affordability of both digital and film cameras, will most likely keep photography being a

common form of participatory media in Palestine.

FilmNideo

Like photography, the increasing accessibility of digital video is sparking an

interest in youth film, video, and digital storytelling workshops. Like photography, video

cameras are becoming more affordable, easier to use, and better in quality, while new

streaming technologies are allowing for easy convergence with the internet. Video has

the added advantage of combining the power of the image with the process of dialogue.

Video is highly interactive, allowing for filmmakers and subjects to collaborate as equals,

and facilitating continuous participation and immediate feedback through features such as

instant playback (Dagron 2001).

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In Palestine, the NGO Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy (MEND) worked

with youth in cities all over the West Bank through 2006 in producing short films on

local issues ranging from education to water shortages. In the summer of 2007, the

Voices Beyond Walls project worked with youth in five refugee camps (Aida, Qalandiya,

Al-Amari, Balata, and Jenin Camps) to produce a series of short videos based on youths'

stories from their lives and communities. Al-Rowwad also facilitated a film workshop in

2007, and other community centers have started video initiatives in the past several years.

Like photography, digital video is easy to export and share via DVDs or on the

web, especially through popular participatory media sites like Y ouTube. Films also have

the ability to reach wide audiences through public screenings, festivals, and use in

schools and universities.

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RECOMMENDATIONS: REFRAMING NONVIOLENCE

As indicated in the previous chapter, Palestinian youth are more likely to support

nonviolence when they see it as part of a broader framework of resistance. Thus,

effective mobilization of this key population for popular resistance depends on re

framing nonviolence in both theory and practice so that youth perceive it as being in

accordance with their individual and collective activist identities. This chapter explores

how activists are looking to re-shape the image of nonviolence in terms of resistance on

the local level by relocating the crux of nonviolence from the NGOs to the grassroots

level, grounding nonviolence in local histories and traditions, and reframing nonviolence

as strategic action. It also discusses how the human rights framework and the media can

be instrumental in reframing nonviolence.

Re-Focusing Nonviolence at the Grassroots Level

One of the key steps identified by activists for re-defining nonviolence is to shift

the primary coordination of nonviolence from the NGOs to the grassroots level. This

shift started to take place in 2006 and 2007, somewhat ironically in response to the

construction of the separation barrier, as villages had to rely on local CBOs, village

councils, and popular committees to deal with the issues created by the wall. While

332

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NGOs can and should still play supportive roles in the development, implementation, and

dissemination of nonviolent campaigns, the crux of the leadership should come from the

local level. To be sure, some of the most successful episodes of nonviolence during the

second intifada emerged from local, grassroots activism, as seen in villages of Tubas in

the north; Bil'in, Biddu, and Budrous near Ramallah; Umm Salamouna and the

surrounding villages south of Bethlehem, and Al-Tawani, Susya, and other villages in the

South Hebron Hills.

Indeed, activists from all of these villages largely attributed their relative success

in mobilizing their communities to the grassroots organization of their struggle. While

some received support from Palestinian NGOs like PARC, Ma'an, Holy Land Trust, and

PCR, as well as support from Israeli groups like Anarchists Against the Wall and

Ta'ayush, the campaigns were locally led and initiated. This local leadership,

particularly in the form of the popular committees, proved to be especially effective in

overcoming some of the challenges contributing to fragmentation at the NGO level.

First, the fact that the popular committees operated on a volunteer basis imbued them

with a spirit of activism that was lacking in the professionalized NGOs. This voluntarism

assuaged concerns about corruption or misuse of funds associated with NGOs, as well as

cynicism regarding NGOs making nonviolence into a business. Furthermore, the

voluntary aspect of the popular committees helped strengthen communities by setting an

example of service and civic engagement.

Secondly, the fact that popular committees were composed of local leaders

established a sense of trust that was absent with outside NGO "nonviolence trainers,"

who were often from different socioeconomic classes, educational backgrounds, and/or

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regions, if not countries. According to Abu Iyad in Budrous, successful mobilization

depended largely on the "big trust between the people and the coordinators of the

demonstrations ... Without saying anything, just the presence of the [local] leaders from

Hamas, Fateh, the school, the youth club, the mayor was enough to inspire people to

participate" (2007). As Abu Iyad's comment also reflects, local leaders in the popular

committees were often able to overcome some of the political divisions that were

typically evident in NGO affiliations, managing to involve leaders from various parties

and movements.

Finally, the popular committees were committed to action, not talk. By being

distinct from the NGO structure, the trainings and conferences associated with

nonviolence at that level were eschewed in favor of direct action, allowing notions of

nonviolence to emerge in practice rather than theory. In addition, these actions addressed

specific issues facing the community, thus reflecting a local agenda of resistance over a

(perceived) international agenda of submission or normalization. The return of the

popular committees, which echo the first intifada in both spirit and practice, thus

represents a unique opportunity to shift the core of nonviolence from the

institutionalization of the NGOs to the activist realm of grassroots communities. NGOs

can still play a major role in supporting local committees and publicizing nonviolence

both inside and outside Palestine, but increased reliance on the popular committees will

help to realign nonviolence with resistance, while also helping to overcome other issues

of fragmentation.

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Grounding Nonviolence in Palestinian History and Tradition

Other activists noted that relating nonviolent resistance to Palestinian history will

also contribute to the re-association of nonviolence with the national activist identity.

Instead of relying on NGO-sponsored trainings focusing on abstract theories and western

examples of nonviolence, these activists recommend taking a popular education approach

to teaching about nonviolence by engaging youth in the tradition of nonviolence in

Palestine. From this perspective, if one of the reasons that youth have a difficult time

conceptualizing nonviolence as activism is because they lack a memory of times when

nonviolent methods were employed for resistance, then exposing them to past and recent

examples of Palestinian nonviolent struggle is a natural way of overcoming that

disconnect.

Although many NGOs were committed to "nonviolence education" under Oslo,

those trainings often focused more on peacebuilding and dialogue than on resistance,

while others emphasized the use of nonviolence in daily life rather than nonviolence as a

strategy for challenging the occupation. While these approaches to nonviolence may be

valuable in their own ways, they did not link nonviolence to resistance. As Mahmoud

commented, "Most organizations do s--t for programs ... There are hundreds of youth

organizations, and if they would do political work, the youth would create a revolution.

But the money changes the focus to normalization" (2007).

Meanwhile, trainings that did include at least some aspect of nonviolence as

activism often focused on theories developed by western scholars, such as Gene Sharp,

and activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela. While many

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activists found these ideas and examples useful, they noted the importance of linking

those outside sources to the Palestinian context, especially when engaging youth.

Popular education, or learning for social change, is one possible approach to helpillg

youth re-conceptualize nonviolence as activism by raising their consciousness of episodes

of nonviolent resistance in Palestinian history. As Ahmed, the youth coordinator for Stop

the Wall, commented, "If we want to educate youth ... we should teach them about the

history of the struggle, about the leaders, and about why we have spent our lives fighting"

(interview, 2007). Ahmed thus designed a program for youth that consisted not only of

learning about the history of Palestinian struggle through presentations, but actually

taking trips throughout the West Bank to talk to activists, visit sites of past struggles, and

view the effects of current measures like the separation barrier. According to Mahmoud,

They came back very angry ... you feel like something exploded in them. They were in another world; they couldn't compare themselves afterwards to the way they were before they participated. The youth need this. When you focus on their history and their ancestors, and you say, "This is your responsibility," it opens their eyes. (interview, 2007)

Indeed, although survey data indicates that the majority of youth (67.2 percent)

are aware of a tradition of popular resistance in Palestine, many may not be aware of the

specific ways in which nonviolence has been used, or the ways in which past episodes

relate to their current context.

Popular education thus offers an approach to teaching youth about nonviolence in

a way that is engaging and inspires action and mobilization. Perhaps one of the keys to

popular education, in addition to grounding the substance in local content, is facilitating

that knowledge through respected leaders. As one nonviolence trainer commented, "My

political background is helpful when I speak about nonviolence; I was in prison, I was

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shot by Israeli soldiers, I was wanted for two years. So people know that I am not just

talking about nonviolence for the fun of it. They know it is something I believe in, and

they know my history" (interview, 2007). Indeed, the majority of activists, most of

whom had a reputation of resistance based on previous activism, time spent in prison, or

physical injury, stated that their activist identity was a key element in their work

regarding nonviolence. According to these activists, their legacy of resistance work gave

them a level of legitimacy that intern.ational trainers, NGO professionals, and peace

builders were lacking. It is thus important that popular education initiatives be conducted

by respected activists in the community to further reinforce the link between nonviolence

and resistance.

Reframing Nonviolence as Strategic Action

Perhaps the most important challenge for activists is to convince youth that

nonviolence is a form of strategic resistance, not a form of normalization or passivity.

Activists are already taking steps to help youth re-conceptualize nonviolence in this way,

primarily by eschewing the term "nonviolence" in favor of "popular resistance" or "civil

based resistance" (CBR), as noted previously. However, activists can further help youth

locate nonviolence within the sphere of resistance by emphasizing its allowance for

increased engagement, and by presenting it as a pragmatic option rather than a principled

mandate.

First, activists are emphasizing the point, stated by many that, "If you use just

military action, you only have a few members, but with nonviolence you can get a lot of

people involved" (interview, 2007). One activist used a series of concentric circles to

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illustrate this phenomenon, noting, "Just a very small percentage of the population will be

willing to be suicide bombers or martyrs. Just slightly more will be willing to use guns.

Then maybe using stones will bring slightly more. But with nonviolent resistance ...

every person in the society can participate" (interview, 2007). Zeinab made a similar

point by comparing the first and second intifadas:

The problem with the second intifada was that it was highly militarized. Usually with such a high level of militarization in a revolution, the majority of the population will not participate because not everyone is ready to engage in a military armed conflict. So you are left with a small number of people fighting with arms, and you isolate the majority of the public who have a stake in the resistance movement. (interview, 2007)

Activists can emphasize this point, especially with youth who claim they want to engage

in resistance, by illustrating that nonviolence creates rather than negates opportunities for

activism.

Similarly, activists are increasingly discussing nonviolence as a pragmatic

strategy, rather than a principled way of life. Many activists, even those who personally

take a principled approach to nonviolence, present it as a strategy in their trainings. As

Majdi explained, "When I teach youth about nonviolence, I tell them that they have a

choice ... I say that violence is okay, but I just want them to know that there is an

alternative. I don't want Palestinians to be used by people preaching [principled]

nonviolence, but rather I just want to give Palestinians as many options as possible"

(interview, 2007). This approach is beneficial for helping to locate nonviolence in a

broader toolbox of activism, and emphasizing strategy over moral stance. Furthermore,

presenting nonviolence as an option allows a space for the acknowledgement and

discussion of youths' nuanced support for forms of violent resistance.

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Reframing youth conceptions of nonviolence in accordance with an activist

identity will not be automatic, but activists can facilitate this process by re-focusing

nonviolence at the grassroots level, grounding nonviolence in Palestinian history, and

emphasizing nonviolence as a strategy allowing for increased engagement in popular

struggle. By redefining nonviolence in this way, activists are helping youth see

nonviolence as a form of resistance, and thus further their mobilization and participation.

Additional Recommendations

While highlighting the resistance dimension of nonviolence locally, the

peacebuilding dimension put forth under Oslo need not be ignored, but instead can be

used strategically by activists by proactively promoting this aspect of nonviolence on the

international level. Using the peace building dimension of nonviolence in this way is not

synonymous to conforming to an international agenda because the source is Palestine and

the recipient is the international community, rather than the other way around. Indeed,

many activists noted that nonviolence is strategic not just for increasing popular

participation, but also for communicating the Palestinian cause to the outside world. As

Fuad summarized, "I didn't used to think much about the idea of nonviolence. But the

situation has changed, especially the Arab situation, and the world situation. Now we

need another choice to continue our struggle, and to make a suitable conversation with

the world by focusing on injustice" (interview, 2007). Many activists agreed, noting the

importance of using nonviolence as a link between resistance and peace building,

appealing to both the local and global communities. Two potential tools for developing

this link include international law and the media.

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Human Rights Framework

International law in general, and the human rights93 framework in particular, lies

at a natural intersection of activism and peace building, and inherently links the local and

the global. Activists are already using international law in some ways, such as citing the

UN's General Assembly Resolution 37/24 as the source of a right to resist the

occupation, as well as the 2004 ICJ rulings against the separation wall. However,

activists could work more deliberately within the human rights framework to engage both

the local and international communities.

On the local level, though many activists used a language of human rights,

claiming that the occupation "violates our basic human rights of freedom and

independence" (interview, 2007), few activists work directly with either Palestinian or

Israeli human rights organizations. However, the human rights sphere did provide some

opportunities for cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. For example, some

popular committees, such as those in Bil'in, Budrous, and Biddu, established

relationships with Israeli human rights lawyers who assisted them in using the Israeli

court system to challenge the separation barrier. Meanwhile, other rural villages in the

south Hebron Hills and the Jordan Valley participated in "Shooting Back,'' an initiative

coordinated by the Israeli human group B 'tselem, which provides communities with

camera equipment and training to document abuses and rights violations. In these ways,

as Hassassian summarizes, "the issue of human rights was a popular and firm foundation

upon which many organizations organized ... [providing a] common ground for both

communities to work toward a mutual end" (2006, 73).

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Criticisms of the human rights approach include the perception that human rights

are a western construct. However, it is specifically because the human rights documents

are international codes that they are effective, in that they hold all states to the same

standard. In this way, they cannot be seen as pacifying or preferring one group over

another. As Hassassian states, "Part of the reason why the agenda of human rights can

become a platform between people of differing backgrounds to join efforts is that the

issue is less a question of political discussion that changes with individual perspective but

rather one that is more clearly defined" (2006, 74). Other criticisms of human rights

organizations include the perception that they focus awareness on the elitist level, by

concentrating on 'big name' cases rather than everyday abuses. Similarly, critics argue

that human rights organizations put more emphasis on gross civil and political violations

of human rights that are media friendly, such as torture, imprisonment, and death, while

overlooking everyday economic, social, and cultural violations like the lack of water and

lack of available health services. However, these concerns are less criticisms of the

human rights framework itself, but rather points of contention on how activists and

organizations are (or are not) using that framework effectively.

Indeed, the human rights framework could be used effectively in several ways,

mainly by providing a framing of both the conflict and popular resistance that resonates

locally, regionally, and internationally. The core human rights documents, particularly

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Fourth Geneva

Conventions could serve as foundations for exposing Israel violations and justifying

resistance on the one hand, while reflecting how nonviolent resistance respects human

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rights on the other hand. Using human rights as a guiding framework could thus allow

for more cohesive articulation of both grievances and tactics at the movement level,

provide a standard for both PA and Israeli government duties and accountability, and

offer injustice and movement frames that are mutually acceptable to the international

community and local activists. The human rights framework thus provides a natural

space for unpacking both the resistance and peacebuilding elements of nonviolence at the

local, regional, and international levels.

Media-Based Approaches

Media can play a key role in constructing collective action frames, both locally

and globally. As activists like Khaled noted, "The media is the main strategic power. It is

the main force of nonviolence and of activists. It is like the air that blows up a balloon

and makes even small things big" (interview, 2007). Indeed, some activists commented

that they cancelled actions if no media was present because that publicity was key to their

strategy of disseminating nonviolence within Palestine while sending a message to

Israelis and internationals. However, the majority of activists commented that

Palestinians still had to develop a better media strategy. As Zeinab stated, "There's no

good coverage of nonviolence activities, so in this way, the media is part of the problem.

People are doing many things, but it just isn't covered" (interview, 2007).

Increased media attention on nonviolent actions could help de-mystify

nonviolence on the local level by illustrating examples of nonviolence as resistance, and

by communicating stories of struggle that might inspire others to mobilize. According to

Polletta, stories ofresistance can help "forge an action-mobilizing collective identity," as

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was the case in the American civil rights movement when accounts of student lunch

counter sit-ins "turned unfamiliar and potentially disturbing events into familiar epics of

overcoming, with frightened students becoming triumphant heroes" (Polletta and Jasper

2001, 291; see also Polletta 1998a and 1998b). At the national and regional level, stories

of resistance represent a means of navigating the political constraints imposed by both the

PA and the Israeli government, and serve to communicate popular discontent. Finally,

media coverage of abuses can amplify the injustice frame on the local and international

level, while coverage of nonviolent resistance can further enhance solidarity networks

and gamer support for the movement.

Mass media is not the only tool available to activists. As noted in Chapter 4,

Palestinians are starting to use more alternative and documentary media to "expose the

world to a different story of Palestine" (Zeinab, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, new

technology like websites, blogs, cellphones, and I-pods offer new opportunities for

disseminating information about the occupation on the one hand, and popular resistance

to the occupation on the other hand. These tools, as well the mass media, can be further

utilized to increase the visibility of Palestinian nonviolence on the international level,

while enhancing the movement locally.

Reframing nonviolent resistance is starting at the local level, by re-situating

nonviolence at the local level through the popular committees, grounding nonviolence in

Palestinian history through popular education, and presenting nonviolence as a strategy

that allows for widespread participation. Locating Palestinian grievances within a human

rights-based frame can offer additional opportunities for reaching both local and global

communities, and provide a natural fit between injustice/issue frames and

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nonviolence/movement frames. Finally, Palestinian activists can be more deliberate in

using the mainstream and alternative media as tools for framing nonviolence. In these

ways, nonviolence can be redefined in such a way as to resonate with the collective

activist identity within Palestine, while still functioning as an effective advocacy tool in

the regional and international arenas.

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