sign in sign up
<<
Home , Adhikari, Bista, Chhetri, Dalit, Government of Nepal, Karki (surname)

Issue 46, September 2012

FIELD BULLETIN Perspectives on identity and how these relate to federalism

Introduction There has been a marked change in the discourse of many Chhetri actors about their identity since the end of ’s conflict in 2006 when they first began to assert their ‘indigenousness’ and act politically on the basis of their identity. Since early 2010, various Chhetri groups have become increasingly active, both organisationally and politically, at the local and central levels1 and played an increasingly visible role in national level debates on federalism, identity and inclusion.

Following a series of protests in the early part of 2012, in which Chhetri Samaj Nepal (CSN- see box: 1) and other groups demanded ‘Adibasi’ (indigenous) status, the (GoN) announced on 18 May 2012 that it would categorise the , Chhetri, , Dasnami, Sanyasi and communities as ’Khas Arya Adibasi’. The Nepal Federation for Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) flatly rejected this decision2 and some Dalit organisations rejected the new categorisation3. According to the Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact4, the agreement was aimed to allow ‘certain groups to continue to dominate, muddle and diffuse the rightful entitlement of indigenous peoples to self- determination in the new constitution’5.

The debate about who is, and who is not, indigenous to Nepal could play a major role in the process to negotiate the formation of provinces in a federal Nepal and the rights of the various communities living in them. The inclusion debate, as well as the debate over federalism, has led to the ’surfacing of fault-lines hitherto unknown or unappreciated’6 in Nepal.

This Field Bulletin looks at the different perspectives on Chhetri identity in Nepal and how these relate to federalism, the peace process and the broader debate on identity and social inclusion in Nepal. It attempts to clarify why a Chhetri social organization, the Chhetri Samaj Nepal, has chosen to advocate for to be classified as Adibasi and Khas, as this has not always been the case. It also examines the way in which identity in Nepal is constantly evolving and how the debates around

1 The Carter Centre Nepal Report: ‘Local Political and Peace Process Trends’ 23 November 2010. Available at; http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/nepal-release-trends-rpt-eng.pdf. 2 NEFIN press release, 20 May 2012. 3 Bishowkarma, I. Dalit Sewa Sangh General Secretary, interview. 4 Think tank on indigenous issues based in Bangkok, Thailand. 5 Asia Indigenous People’s Pact, press release, 18 May 2012. Available at: http://www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?news_id=509. 6 , RS (2005). In defence of : Dynamics and fault lines of Nepal's political economy. New : Adroit Books.

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism identity and ‘indigenousness’ are part of wider political tensions. Furthermore, it highlights some of the issues that could provoke future tensions between actors whose agendas contradict each other.

Background Amidst the agitation by groups advocating for various political agendas in the lead up to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on 28 May Box 1: The Chhetri Samaj Nepal (CSN) 2012, there were a number of clashes between The Chhetri Samaj Nepal, a nationwide Chhetri activists of the National Integrity and Ethnic organization with its head office in , claims that Goodwill Society (NIEGS)8 and Janajati groups such the word Chhetri is a Nepali form of the word and uses the word Kshatri interchangeably as NEFIN, Joint Tharuhat Struggle Committee and with Chhetri on their website7. While recognising that 9 factions of the Federal State Council . there are many other groups representing Chhetris, this Field Bulletin focuses on the CSN as one of the main On the surface these clashes were related to groups that possess a wide membership and a clear agenda that illustrates the various concerns of many competing or contradictory agendas regarding the Chhetris. form of a federal Nepal, although many commentators felt that they went beyond this and touched upon the wider issue of inclusion of previously marginalised communities in the Nepali state and a more inclusive political process10, particularly of Janajati communities. While these clashes garnered a great deal of attention, low level tensions between groups advocating on Chhetri issues and other identity-based groups have been ongoing since at least 2010 and observers have noted an ‘organisational drive’ by various Chhetri groups since the beginning of 201011.

The Khas and the Chhetris The Nepali term Chhetri derives from the Sanskrit word Kshatriya, class or , comprising ‘kings, , government bureaucrats and others who represent power’12. People of Kshatriya status are found throughout , including people of different nationalities and religions13. According to Nepal’s national population census of 200114, they comprised 15.5% of Nepal’s population and are found in almost all districts, but have their greatest concentration in the Far Western Region and Karnali region15 of the country. The Khas (as in Khas Arya Adibasi) people, on the other hand, are an ethnic group, which includes people claiming Brahmin, Chhetri and Thakuri status, with a distinct history, identity, language and

7 Please refer to: http://chhetrisamajnepal.com/contact_us. 8 The NIEGs comprises the Brahmin Samaj, Chhetri Samaj Nepal, Thakuri Samaj, Nepal Dasnami Samaj, Progressive Anti- Society, Khas Chhetri Ekata Samaj, Dalit Uplift Service Association and Oppressed Classes Federation. 9 UN RCHCO Field Bulletin, Issue 41: Confrontation over federalism: Emerging dynamics of identity-based conflict and violence. Available at: http://www.un.org.np/headlines/rchco-field-bulletin-issue-41. 10 Jha, P (2012) ‘Forging a Nepal for all its peoples’. The Hindu, 22 May 2012. 11 The Carter Centre Nepal Report: Local political and peace process trends’ November 23, 2010. Available at: http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/pr/nepal-release-trends-rpt-eng.pdf. 12 http://hindustudentscouncil.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=116&catid=48. 13 For example, the Muslim Kadia community of Gujerat claims Kshatriya status, while several Muslim families in ’s Punjab claim (Kshatriya) status. See http://kshatriyasociety.com/miscellaneous/rajpakistan.htm. 14 Available at: http://cbs.gov.np/wp-content/uploads/2012/Population/%20Ethinicity%20Population.pdf. 15 The Karnali region in the Mid Western Region of Nepal comprises Humla, Mugu, Dolpa, Kalikot and Jumla districts. It is one of the poorest areas of Nepal and has only limited access by road and air. Page 2 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism culture16 and roots that date back for at least two thousand years in what is now Nepal17. The Khas are considered to be a distinct group of Indo- who moved into the Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal since before records began18. Their religion was and, to some extent, still is a “form of , pre-Buddhist Bon and Tibetan Buddhist traditions”19. There are some people in the Karnali region of Nepal who still identify themselves as Khas, yet do not claim Chhetri status and are not considered to be Chhetris by other Nepalis20. In the words of Dor Bahadur Bista21 (himself of Khas heritage), “Many and most western scholars think that all Khas are Chhetri”22, but there are many Khas who are not Chhetris and, likewise, many Chhetris who are not Khas. The ‘tagdhari’23 (or thread-wearing) Chhetris perceive the Khas as low caste Shudra24, as they do not observe many orthodox Hindu customs25. Some Khas political actors argue that the Khas did not observe the Hindu caste hierarchy until the supposed arrival of in western Nepal in the thirteenth century26 and therefore should be treated as a group distinct from the Brahmins, Chhetris and , although this view is increasingly contested by some Chhetri groups27. While many of today’s Chhetris may have Khas heritage, points out that “The fact is that a vast majority of the Khas have never been Hindu-ised, let alone ‘Chhetri-ised’. Thus, while it may be true that today’s Chhetri of Nepal branched off from the Khas, what has happened is that the descendants of the original Khas remained distinct, remote and deprived”28. Sources of tension over the terms Adibasi and Janajati Although often used synonymously, different understandings of the terms Adibasi and Janajati exist, which has been a source of contest and tension between groups such as NEFIN and the CSN. In its literal sense, Adibasi means ‘first settler’, but it is commonly translated into English as ‘indigenous’, while Janajati is translated as ‘indigenous nationality’ and defined by the GoN in the National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) Act 2002, as “A tribe or community having its own mother tongue and traditional rites and customs, distinct cultural identity and social structure, and written or unwritten history”. Although Janajati and Adibasi are distinct in meaning, even some Janajati actors accept that the difference is not always easy to explain29.

16 , SM (1998) The , Press. 17 , NK (1997) Nepal: to ruler. A militant race of Nepal. : APH Publishing. 18 Tucci, G (1962) Nepal: The discovery of the Mallas. New York: Dutton. 19 Dhunghel, R (2011): Revisiting the history of the formation of Nepali society, Research paper, Tribhuwan University, Nepal. 20 Krause, I-B (2002): The Shahas of West Nepal. Political autonomy and economic dependence in former Nepalese community. New Delhi: Adarsha Books. 21 Dor Bahadur Bista is a writer, anthropologist and social scientist in Nepal. 22 Bista, DB (1995): ‘The Khas of Chaudabisa.’ Himal, May 1995. 23 The Tagdhari (Sacred thread wearing) Chhetris consider themselves to be ‘orthodox ’. 24 The are considered the fourth ‘varna’ of the Hindu hierarchy, below Brahmin, Kshatriya and Vaisya. 25 Bista, DB (1995) ‘The Khas of Chaudabisa.’ Himal, May 1995. 26 , Y (2012) Pers. comm., Interview with Yuvaraj Karki, Chairman of Khas Chhetri Ekata Samaj (Janajati Adibasi), Biratnagar, March 2012. 27 Please refer to: http://khas-people.blogspot.com/2012/02/blog-post_6040.html. 28 Bista,DB (1995) ‘The Khas of Chaudabisa.’ Himal, May 1995. 29 Gurung, O. Interview with Kantipur Online: http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/05/15/interview/janajati- movement-is-the- product-of-marginalisation/221734.html. Page 3 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism

In the view of various Khas Chhetri and Brahmin groups, Adibasi is a purely temporal term30, simply relating to the period at which a group settled in a given territory. They feel that, according to this interpretation, they should be listed as Adibasi due to the long association of the Khas people with the Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal. This purely temporal understanding of Adibasi is not used by the NFDIN and is rejected by many indigenous groups. For these groups, the definition of indigenousness, or being an Adibasi, is based on the experience of various groups of being disempowered in the Nepali society at large and hence many indigenous groups claim various histories of discrimination31. The latter understanding of the term also serves to link the indigenous movement within Nepal with an already existing international movement and discourse organized around the idea of indigenous peoples, as recognized in the UN system and outside of it or, as the former chairman of NEFIN32 puts it, “The movement in Nepal is defined by marginalisation” 33.

Moreover, many Janajati feel that the Chhetri claim to Adibasi status belittles the experience of structural discrimination that Janajatis perceive they have faced from a state dominated by Brahmin and Chhetri elites34. They say that Brahmins and Chhetris simply do not share the same Janajati experience of exclusion from a state which, Janajatis claim, has historically promoted the culture and religion of Brahmins and Chhetris35. However, Chhetri groups would point to the of their populations in the Mid and Far Western Regions of Nepal and claim that the Khas people living there have been subject to as much structural discrimination and exclusion as any other identity group.

Further complications arise with the Nepal Government’s translation of ‘tribal and indigenous people’ as ‘Janajati Adibasi’ (as one category, without the equivalent of the English ‘and’). The NIEGS object to this definition, claiming that such a formulation in Nepali precludes the inclusion of Chhetris as Adibasi, as they are not Janajatis. They believe this to be a strategy of Janajati groups to deny the indigenousness of the Chhetri community. This is despite the fact that the GoN, using this terminology, formed the NFDIN through an ordinance in 1997, and no ‘Khas Arya’ groups are known to have objected at the time.

Some Chhetri actors understand the term Janajati to refer to a certain stage in socio-economic development and social organisation beyond which they feel that they have progressed, rather than being a cultural, religious or linguistic category. Therefore, they believe that Chhetris should be considered Adibasis, but not Janajatis. Though, it should be noted that not all Chhetri political actors consider themselves to be Khas Arya Adibasi, some argue that the Chhetri population of Nepal should be classified as Janajati Adibasi as the majority of the Chhetri population in the Far West of Nepal is poorer and less developed than many other groups that are categorised as Janajatis and that they therefore fit the ‘Janajati’ stage of socio-economic development as well.

30 Onta, P. (2012a) ‘/Janajati – Definitional Politics of the past and future’: http://www.mastinepal.com/thread58475.html. 31 Ibid. 32 Gurung, former Chairman of NEFIN, Head of the Dept. Sociology and Anthropology, Tribhuwan University. 33 Om Gurung, interview with Kantipur Online: http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2011/05/15/interview/janajati- movement-is-the-product-of-marginalisation/221734.html. 34 Interview Buddha Tshering Moktan, Founding President, Dharmadatta Foundation, 15 August 2012, Kathmandu. 35 Ibid. Page 4 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism

The NFDIN continues to use the term Adibasi Janajati, or indigenous nationalities, as a single category and some Janajati actors flatly reject the claim by the Khas Arya Adibasi that Chhetris are Adibasi. For example, NEFIN states on its website that ‘Brahmins, Chhetris and Madheshi Brahmins are not indigenous people of Nepal’36. In its talks with the GoN in May this year, NEFIN demanded the removal of the Khas Arya Adibasi from the Adibasi category37 as it is their view that only groups which are Janajati can also be Adibasi. The CSN and others argue that, on the basis of their differing understanding of the term Adibasi, it is possible to be Adibasi without being Janajati.

Clearly, the two very different usages of the term Adibasi are a source of tension and something which contributed to the straining of relations between Chhetri and Janajati activist groups in May 2012, providing a source of grievance to both groups.

Changing discourse around indigenous status, the term Khas and Chhetri identity In May 2012, the GoN granted Khas Arya Adibasi status to Chhetris, Brahmins, Thakuris, Dasnamis and . This implies that these groups are now officially considered to be both Khas and Adibasi. Apart from Dalits, these groups had previously been categorised as ‘Anya’ (others) and had been claiming Adibasi status, although they did not claim Janajati status. By asserting themselves as Khas and indigenous, members of the Khas Arya Adibasi group could be able to avail themselves of the benefits of the various policies on inclusion put in place by the GoN, such as job quotas, policies and portions of the development budget. This, in turn, is perceived by Janajati groups as reducing the share of these benefits available to other indigenous nationalities and is therefore a highly political issue and a potential source of conflict. Likewise, it is possible that the Khas Arya Adibasi would seek to derive benefit (for example, from control over certain natural resources or the right to be consulted over development work) from the various pieces of international legislation on indigenous rights, such as ILO 16938 or the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People39, to which Nepal is a signatory. The groups which comprise the Khas Arya Adibasi category have not always embraced their Khas heritage, nor called themselves Arya or claimed Adibasi status. This new self-identification seems to have begun at some point after end of the 10-year armed conflict although, as late as 2010, members of the CNS wrote that ’The notion that Khas Chhetris and Thakuris are Aryans was always baseless’40. They also stated that “Whatever the origin of the Khas, they are at any rate now known to have existed as a separate nation long before the penetrated Nepal in the thirteenth century, when they together with multitudes of other Indians were fleeing before the Muslim invasion”41. This was written before the CSN entered into an operational alliance with the Brahmin Samaj and other groups.

36 Available at: http://www.nefin.org.np/list/Definition-of-Indigenous/5/0/4. 37 Sherpa Kisan, AK, NEFIN General Secretary, press release (email), 20 May 2012. 38The CSN claims that they should either benefit from the ILO 169 Convention or Nepal should withdraw its ratification. More information on ILO 169 available at: http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm. 39 More information available at: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 40 Chhetri, KB (2010) Rights movement by in Nepal: A perspective. London; note the author is currently the head of Chhetri Samaj Nepal’s International Department. 41 http://chhetrisamajnepal.com/articles. Quoting Northey, WB ‘(1198): The Himalayan . New Delhi: Asian Educational Services. Page 5 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism

The Thakuris, who are described as the “ amongst the Chhetris”42 and considered a highly prestigious group within the Hindu caste hierarchy, have historically taken great pride in their Rajput origins43. Thakuris all over Nepal have endorsed the view that they are descended from who entered what is now Nepal from during the period of the Muslim invasion in the thirteenth century44. Thakuris have not historically regarded themselves as Khas, even when living in areas where there are large Khas populations, and do not usually regard themselves as having the same origin as the Khas people45.

The above position confuses current claims by Chhetris and others to be indigenous, particularly bearing in mind that many people of Khas origin have stated that they, “Dislike being addressed or referred to as Khas and that Brahmin, Chhetri and Thakuri look down upon them”, according to DB. Bista. He further observed that Khas people would often change their title and caste into Chhetri as soon as they leave their area46. Likewise, Kumar writes of Khas families attempting to get away from, rather than reveal, their original Khas ancestry47. Prayag Raj Sharma commented in 1971 that this process of disavowing their Khas origin has meant that the Khas have vanished from the ethnographic map of Nepal48. The principal motivation for disguising Khas origins appears to relate to the stigma and structural discrimination that Khas people were historically subjected to by so-called ‘orthodox Hindus’ for their non-adherence to certain Hindu practices, including their consumption of alcohol and meat, not wearing of the sacred thread, non-observance of caste hierarchy and non- observance of notions of ritual purity49. While this remains a very brief examination, it is clear that, until very recently, the Khas identity was one that may not have always been worn with pride and the Khas were seen as a separate community from Brahmins, Chhetris and Thakuris. Therefore, it is interesting to note that Chhetris, Brahmins, Thakuris and others have collectively chosen to take on this label, despite their previous rejections and historical efforts to establish they were anything but Khas or Adibasi, and it is important to understand their reasons why. Concerns of the CSN The concerns and agendas of members of the CSN are often expressed both on a personal and political level. These concerns manifested themselves in powerful protests, such as the bandhs called by the NIEGS in May 2012, and clearly have the potential to spark further sustained and significant protests in the future. Bahadur Thapa, current head of CSN’s international department, summed up the feelings of many Chhetris when he said that, “Being made a foreigner in my own country was hurtful”, a reference to the fact that Chhetris are often described as being originally from India and therefore not indigenous to Nepal50. He also expressed frustration that their ancestors’

42 Bista, DB (2004) People of Nepal. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 43 , RN (1970): ‘The ancient and mediaeval history of Western Nepal’. Ancient Nepal, Vol. 11, Kathmandu. 44 Krause, IB (2002): The Shahs of Western Nepal. 45 Shah, K (2012) Pers. comm., Interview with Kiran Shah, Banke District Chairman of Thakuri Mahasangh, May 2012. 46 Bista, DB (2004) People of Nepal. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar. 47 Pradhan, K (2009). 48 Sharma, PR (1971): ‘The Matwali Chhetris of Western Nepal’. Himalayan Review, Kathmandu. 49 Ibid. 50 Thapa Chhetri, KB (2010). Page 6 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism contribution to ‘unifying’ Nepal has been denigrated in that it has become “recent fashion to debase our glorious past”51.

The movement towards greater social inclusion in Nepal (supported by the Interim Constitution of Nepal52, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the GoN’s current Three Year Plan for Development) has also been experienced as deeply negative by some Chhetris, who feel that they are being excluded from opportunities in order to facilitate the inclusion of other communities. An NGO worker in Dang expressed his frustration as follows “The rotten reservation system in education, jobs and politics has dominantly ceased the opportunities for Kshatriyas. Now even distinction and merit awarded Kshatriyas do not stand a chance to pursue doctoral or engineering degree or get better employment … *and+ due to current policy of the government and targeted programmes of non- government organizations, even socially well-off Dalits benefit, whereas poor Brahmins and Chhetris cannot get anything”53.

In this connection, the CSN has been advocating for government employment and other activities to be based on the principle of proportional representation, rather than a system of reservations54 or other affirmative action measures. While some observers claim that the Chhetris’ demand is not justifiable and tries to hinder progress of other marginalized and deprived groups55 the CSN claims that the bulk of the Chhetri population in the Far Western Region and Karnali region56 are extremely poor – considerably poorer than many Janajati groups currently benefiting from government inclusion policies57.

The CSN and other Chhetri actors (such as the ‘Khas Chhetri Ekata Samaj (Adibasi Janajati)’58) object to the way in which they are labelled so-called ‘shashak samudaya’59 (ruling groups) and to statements that “the high still overwhelmingly dominate national politics, the Army, bureaucracy, media and business communities”60, despite the well-documented poverty of Chhetri populations in certain areas. They claim to promote the interests of a marginalised rural group, of whom many live in conditions of great poverty, and that any development plan or set of remedial measures for the historically disadvantaged should not exclude the poor Chhetri populations simply because of the privileged role played by a minority of that caste. They further argue that the privileged position of a minority of Chhetris has done nothing to relieve their general economic position and that they would claim that their poverty itself demonstrates the limitations of government strategies crudely and exclusively based on identity.

51 Thapa Chhetri, KB (2010). 52 Interim , Section 4, Clause D, inter alia. 53 Interview with NGO worker, Dang, May 2012. 54 Chhetri National Movement Committee (2011), Press release, 1 May 2011. 55 Interview with journalist, Dang, May 2012. 56 UNCT Nepal: A country analysis 2011. Available at: http://www.un.org.np/reports/country-analysis-2011. Of the 23 most vulnerable districts identified in the Country Analysis, 14 were in the Mid and Far Western Regions of the country. 57 , K (2010) Pers. comm., Interview with Kumar Khadka, General Secretary Chhetri Samaj Nepal, Pokhara, July 2012. 58 A Chhetri group based in Biratnagar that claims both Janajati and Adibasi status. 59 Jha, P (2012) ‘The Battle Ahead’. Ekantipur [online], 13 June 2012. Available at: http://www.ekantipur.com/2012/06/13/opinion/the- battle-ahead/355478.html. 60 Available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/05/nepals-minorities. Page 7 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism

CSN and federalism The CSN rejects proposals for so called ‘ethnicity-based’ and has called instead for federalism based on administrative convenience, economic viability, availability of natural resources and materials and respect for culture and language61. This position contradicts the agendas of many Janajati groups and others in favour of ethnicity-based federalism. The CSN believes ethnicity-based federalism would make Chhetris vulnerable to communal tensions in many districts, as well as losing out in other ways.

There have been specific consequences of this divide. The CSN claims that, in 2010, there were attacks by Janajati activists (affiliated to the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M)) on their activists in Kaski, Gorkha, Terhathum and Kathmandu62. Members of the CSN were also allegedly expelled from the UCPN- M affiliated Limbuwan State Committee simply for being members of the CSN63. Ethnic tensions flared up again during the bandhs called by the NIEGS during May 2012, when Chhetris and various Janajati activists clashed across Nepal64. During this bandh, supporters of NIEGS vandalised private and public vehicles in Kathmandu, Palpa and Chitwan and clashed with security personnel in Pokhara, Kaski, Palpa, Chitwan and districts65.

During the early part of 2012, the NIEGS carried out numerous so called ‘Ethnic Harmony’ rallies across Nepal and the promotion of ‘ethnic harmony’ and the ‘strengthening of communal relations’ have been regular points of advocacy for the NIEGS and CSN. Critics claim that the NIEGs (of which the CSN is a member) is an ‘anti’ ethnicity-based federalism group and essentially a coalition of so-called ‘high caste’ Hindu groups promoting an ‘unequal’ social harmony that is unacceptable to Janajatis and other minorities66.

The issue of ‘Agraadhikar’ (primary rights) over natural resources or political posts for whichever community the identity of the province is based upon, is something that the CSN strongly opposes. Likewise, it opposes the idea of reservations based on identity in government employment and other areas, favouring instead proportional representation of communities in accordance with their populations67. Conclusions Claims of indigenousness remain an area of contention and political conflict in Nepal and are having a profound impact on the process to negotiate a new constitution and the federal restructuring of Nepal. Partly at the core of this process is the contention and mobilisation over the status of the Chhetri community. The indigenousness of non-tagdhari (thread wearing) Khas to Nepal is accepted by some, if not all, Janajati organisations68. However, there is widespread contention over whether members of the Chhetri community and others should be identified as Khas Arya, both within and

61 Chhetri National Movement Committee (2011) Press release, 1 May 2011. 62 Ibid. 63 Nepalnews.com [online] (2012). Available at: http://www.nepalnews.com/home/index.php/news/2/4836-maoists-expel-- and-chhettri-members-from-their-limbuwan-committee.html. 64 UN RCHCO Field Bulletin, Issue 41: Confrontation over federalism: Emerging dynamics of identity-based conflict and violence. Available at: http://www.un.org.np/headlines/rchco-field-bulletin-issue-41. 65 Ibid. 66 Interview with Tharu activist, Kailali, 28 July 2012; Federal Socialist Movement (2012) Press release, Kathmandu, 26 May 2012. 67 Ibid. 68 For example, the Federal Socialist Movement, a collective of Janajati and Adibasi organizations, includes the Khas Chhetri Ekata Samaj (Adibasi Janajati) and accepts the Khas as indigenous to Nepal. Page 8 of 9

Perspectives on Chhetri identity and how these relate to federalism outside of those communities. It is evident that many Chhetri groups (such as the CSN) have shifted their positions in recent years; while previously emphasising their aristocratic heritage and genealogical links to Indian Kshatriya and Thakuri , they are now often emphasising their indigenousness and their Khas origins in the Karnali region. This change is most likely a political response to the changing context in which the Chhetri groups perceive themselves as competing with other groups for resources and influence. The Khas Arya Adibasi classification gives them access to the benefits attached to being indigenous under ILO 169, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and Nepali national legislation. The change in Chhetri identity discourse could also be seen in the context of a newly assertive Janajati body politic and civil society, national and international legislation supporting inclusion and the broader debate on federalism, all of which could be perceived as undermining the supposed traditional domination of the Nepali state by Brahmins and Chhetris.

Nevertheless, this contention is one factor contributing to significant fault lines across Nepali politics and society. Other Janajati groups perceive the inclusion of the Chhetri and many additional groups (and especially those that they perceive to be already overly empowered) as Adibasi as diluting the availability and access to the special benefits accruing to those with indigenous status. Other Janajati groups also possess a fundamentally different vision from Chhetri groups of a federally restructured Nepal, advocating for provinces or units based predominantly on ethnic-based criteria. This seemingly irreconcilable divide is at the heart of the current impasse over the constitution and peace process and poses the potential for a repeat of identity-based political conflict and violence in the future. As it is so intimately linked to finding a mutually agreeable solution to the organisation of the state through federalism, the debate on Chhetri identity will have an impact on the wider peace process.

It is in the interests of sustainable peace in Nepal that, all those who perceive that they will win or lose from the social change involved with redesigning the state through the new constitution are engaged in the process, and that the concerns of all actors, including of Chhetri groups, must be acknowledged. Equally, the fact that many Chhetris remain poor and their communities underdeveloped must be recognised. Development planning by the GoN and its partners has to pay particular attention to areas such as the Far Western Region and Karnali region in order to allay concerns that Brahmin and Chhetri communities are being neglected amongst broader efforts to combat structural inequalities and discrimination in other parts of the country.

Disclaimer: This field bulletin is prepared following a brief field study and also uses secondary data. The information presented in this field bulletin does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Although the RCHCO aims to confirm all information independently, occasional factual inaccuracies can occur.

United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator’s Office (UN RCHCO) GPO Box: 107, UN House, Pulchowk, Kathmandu Email: [email protected] Phone: +977 1 5523200, Fax: +977 1 5523991 Visit the UN Nepal Information Platform at http://www.un.org.np

Page 9 of 9