No. 83 November 2010

MERCATUS ON POLICY

The Negative Consequences of Government he U.S. national debt currently stands at 62 percent of GDP—its highest level since WWII.1 Expenditure Under plausible assumptions, this ratio will rise to at least 80 percent and possibly 185 per- cent of GDP by 2035 and continue increasing By Jeffrey Miron 2 Tthereafter. As the debt ratio increases, the country’s credi- tors will demand higher and higher interest rates to con- tinue financing this debt. This means even larger deficits and ultimately a U.S. default.

Both macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives sug- gest that tax increases cannot address the debt problem because higher taxes mean slower economic growth, reduc- ing the scope for increased tax revenue.3 If tax increases can- not restore fiscal balance, the must slow the path of expenditure, starting with reforming entitlement spending, to avoid fiscal Armageddon. Expenditure cuts can ­simultaneously improve fiscal balance while enhancing ­economic growth.

The Problem Debt relative to GDP has trended strongly upwards over time. Debt rose during the Great Depression, when spending grew under the New Deal, and since the early 1970s, as both Great Depression programs (Social Security) and Great Soci- ety programs (Medicare, Medicaid) expanded.

Over the 1940–2009 period, most of the growth in debt came from entitlement programs (see Figure 1). Government health expenditure rose from almost nothing in the mid-1960s to roughly 5 percent of GDP in 2009. Similarly, government retirement expenditure rose from almost nothing in the 1940s to roughly 5 percent of GDP in 2009. The other compo- nents of federal expenditure, while larger than before WWI, have been relatively stable. Military spending, for example, increased during the Bush years but is still modest compared to the post-WWII period.4 Entitlement spending is expected

MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY to raise the debt even more going forward.5 The implications Medicare that incorporates higher co-pays and deductibles of these facts are that the U.S. fiscal situation is not sustain- along with a higher age of eligibility would achieve the most able and the United States must reign in entitlement spending, defensible goals of government health insurance with fewer especially for health care. negative side effects.

Social Security Current Spending Levels Are Too High The usual justification for Social Security is that Governments spend tax revenue in two ways: by transfer- some people outlive their earnings abilities and fail to save ring revenue to particular subgroups of the population or by ­adequately for retirement. Without government support, purchasing goods and services that are then used to produce therefore, these people might be destitute in old age, and some kind of output. This expenditure comes with serious society might wish to prevent or alleviate such suffering via costs. Taxes and transfers distort decisions about work and old-age benefits. savings. Government production crowds out private activity, which is usually more efficient. This argument assumes that the current beneficiaries of Social Security would not have saved anything at all, but in Medicaid and Medicare the absence of Social Security, many who now receive benefits The usual justifications for Medicaid and Medicare rely would have saved more during their working lives or could on both efficiency and equity arguments. One efficiency claim receive help from families or private charities. The argument is that private health-insurance markets do not function prop- that current beneficiaries would be destitute without govern- erly because of adverse selection, the tendency of people with ment support also assumes that current beneficiaries do not poor health to buy more insurance.6 A second efficiency claim have substantial savings. This may be true for some benefi- is that private markets do not provide insurance against the ciaries but certainly not for all. A simple means test could be misfortune of being born with “bad genes,” yet behind a veil applied to the distribution of benefits to reduce payments to of ignorance most people would purchase insurance against those who do not need the support of Social Security. such bad luck by accepting lower consumption overall.7 The equity argument asserts that everyone should receive ade- In addition, Social Security has adverse effects on the size of quate medical care regardless of ability to pay. the economic pie. In the presence of Social Security, some people choose an earlier retirement age, which means they The adverse selection argument is unconvincing since insur- leave the labor force when the extra income they could pro- ers can identify bad health risks via appropriate medical tests duce is greater than the value they place on the extra leisure. or can include conditions that address any lack of informa- This leaves society with less output because individuals face tion in their contracts. The veil of ignorance argument is more a distorted tradeoff between labor and leisure.10 convincing, but it only implies that people would buy some insurance against bad health, not unrestricted access to all A scaled-back system could provide the most crucial benefits medical care. The veil-of-ignorance argument therefore sug- of Social Security with fewer negative impacts. One approach gests subsidizing insurance for the poor, not equalizing health to reform is a higher age of eligibility since life expectancy insurance outcomes for everyone. has increased by 10 to 14 years since Social Security’s incep- tion.11 A different approach would index benefits to the price Government health insurance generates negative efficiency level rather than to the wage rate. Under wage indexation, effects. Medicare encourages early retirement and discour- ­recipients get real benefits that increase with economic ages saving for medical expenses.8 Medicaid, like any trans- growth. Under price-level indexation, real benefits would fer program conditioned on low income, discourages work remain constant. effort.9 Because these programs have only modest deductibles and co-payments, they encourage overutilization of health Other Expenditure care, driving up costs for both citizens and the government. Medicaid and Medicare are the fastest-growing parts of As government expenditure mounts, the budgetary pressure federal expenditure,12 so any serious attempt to tackle the leads to price controls and rationing, which distorts choices debt must address these components. Other expenditures, in health-care markets. however, also have negative effects that plausibly outweigh their positive effects. These include subsidies, such as those The implication of these concerns is that government provi- received by farmers,13 and earmarks, which are targeted sion of health insurance must balance the goal of protecting expenditures on small, localized projects that have question- the most vulnerable against the adverse side effects of such able societal benefit. provision. This suggests a defensible role for Medicaid, but not Medicare or the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Similarly, while federal expenditure is on a much worse path Act. Alternatively, Medicaid plus a scaled-back version of than state and local expenditure, much of state and local

2 MERCATUS ON POLICY NO. 83 NOVEMBER 2010 spending is excessive as well. Education expenditure could be reduced substantially by adopting vouchers in place of public schools, colleges, and universities.14 All state and local spending could be reduced by shrinking excessive employee compensation packages.

Conclusion Large chunks of current expenditure are counterproduc- tive and fail to accomplish reasonable policy goals. Determin- ing the ideal level of government expenditure is difficult, but just a few decades ago the United States was a productive economy with far lower expenditure. In the 1960s, for exam- ple, federal government expenditure was below 20 percent of GDP, and state and local expenditure was below 12 percent; this contrasts with roughly 25 percent and 15 percent now. The good news is that, from a fiscal perspective, the United States can have its cake and eat it too. By slashing expenditure, the country can simultaneously improve economic efficiency and get the debt under control.

Figure 1: Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP 1975 21.301 1.654 5.545 5.289 1.490 45 1976 21.391 1.816 5.156 5.312 1.538 1977 20.736 1.857 4.927 5.373 1.515 1978 20.688 1.862 4.712 5.265 1.599 40 1979 20.150 1.879 4.651 5.226 1.704 1980 21.692 2.028 4.919 5.500 1.928 1981 22.186 2.159 5.153 5.753 2.249 35 1982 23.133 2.296 5.748 6.061 2.638 1983 23.494 2.361 6.101 6.170 2.610 30 1984 22.157 2.288 5.915 5.754 2.890 1985 22.824 2.396 6.096 5.603 3.123 1986 22.489 2.409 6.208 5.562 3.089 25 1987 21.585 2.474 6.063 5.508 2.980 1988 21.252 2.463 5.797 5.412 3.031 20 1989 21.182 2.470 5.622 5.312 3.130 1990 21.850 2.717 5.220 5.322 3.215

Percentage of GDP Percentage 1991 22.329 2.962 4.608 5.556 3.279 15 1992 22.133 3.340 4.780 5.608 3.194 1993 21.396 3.491 4.419 5.593 3.017 1994 20.952 3.610 4.037 5.550 2.909 10 1995 20.647 3.749 3.706 5.534 3.162 1996 20.218 3.804 3.443 5.473 3.123 5 1997 19.498 3.822 3.294 5.370 2.971 1998 19.075 3.743 3.096 5.273 2.783 1999 18.481 3.600 2.984 5.066 2.495 0 2000 18.216 3.580 2.997 5.002 2.270 2001 18.219 3.810 2.980 5.077 2.016 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008 20021940 1942 1944 1946 19.0721950 1952 1954 1956 4.0531960 1962 1964 1966 3.3051970 1972 1974 1976 1980 5.1651982 1984 1986 1990 1.6211992 1994 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006 2003 Total 19.672 Expenditures 4.271Total Health 3.686 5.158 1.394 Total =e>re?ent 2004 19.621 4.360 3.901 5.052 1.371 2005 Defense 19.862 4.413Net Interest 3.980 5.007 1.478 2006 20.076 4.405 3.946 4.922 1.713

Source: 2007Office of Management19.637 and Budget (OMB),4.619 “Historical Tables,”3.967 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/.5.018 1.706 2008 20.656 4.650 4.267 5.086 1.751 2009 24.708 5.369 4.643 5.680 1.313

MERCATUS CENTER AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 3 Endnotes

1. Congressional Budget Office,The Long-Term Budget Outlook, (Washing- ton, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2010), xii.

2. Ibid., x-xi.

3. Dan Miller and William MacReynolds, “Economic Update: Tax Policy, Eco- nomic Growth and American Families,” Joint Economic Committee, July 20, 1995, http://www.house.gov/jec/growth/taxpol/taxpol.htm.

4. Ibid.

5. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), “Historical Tables,”Table 1.2— Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (-) as Percentages of GDP: 1930–2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/.

6. George A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of , Aug. 1970: 488- 500.

7. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1999), 118.

8. R. Glenn Hubbard, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes “Precautionary Saving and Social Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy 103, no 2 (1995): 360–399.

9. See the review in Robert A. Moffitt, “Welfare programs and labor sup- ply,” in A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics 4 (2002), 2393–2430.

10. A different potential negative of Social Security is reduced national savings, but the welfare implication of this reduced savings is theoretically ambigu- ous. Existing evidence, moreover, does not support a strong conclusion about the magnitude of any impact; see Martin Feldstein and Jeffrey B. Leibman “Social Security” (NBER Working Paper No. 8451, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001). The Mercatus Center at George Mason ­University 11. Life expectancy at birth for 1940 was 64. Life expectancy at age 15 was 68. is a research, education, and outreach organization US Life Tables and Actuarial Tables 1939–1941, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ that works with scholars, policy ­experts, and govern- data/lifetables/life39-41_acturial.pdf. Life expectancy at birth in 2006 was 78. ment officials to connect ­academic learning and real- Life expectancy at age 15 was 78. US Census 2010 Statistical abstract, http:// world practice. www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0103.pdf). The mission of Mercatus is to promote sound 12. Congressional Budget Office,The Long Term Budget Outlook (Washing- ton DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2010). ­inter­disciplinary research and application in the ­humane sciences that integrates theory and ­practice 13. Chris Edwards, “Agriculture,” in Downsizing the Federal Government to ­produce solutions that advance in a sustainable (Washington, DC: , 2005), http://www.downsizinggovernment. way a free, prosperous, and civil ­society. org/agriculture/subsidies.

14. Joshua Angrist, Eric Bettinger, Michael Kremer, “Long-Term Consequences of Secondary School Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Jeffrey A. Miron is senior lecturer and direc- Colombia” (NBER Working Papers 10713, National Bureau of Economic tor of undergraduate studies in the department of Research, 2004). ­economics at and a senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Miron has previously served on the faculties of the University of and ; at the latter, he was department chairman for six years. He has been the recipient of an Olin Fellowship from the National Bureau of Economic Research, an Earhart Foundation Fellowship, and a Sloan Foundation Faculty Research Fellowship. Miron holds a B.A. in economics, magna cum laude, from and a Ph.D. in economics from M.I.T.

4 MERCATUS ON POLICY NO. 83 NOVEMBER 2010