CMI brief May 2011 Volume 10 No. 2 When elections consolidate power: The futile fight of the Ugandan opposition in the 2011 elections

Recent elections in produced the outcome “everyone expected”: President Museveni and the NRM-party won. After 25 years of Museveni in power, the opposition has failed to pose any significant and real challenge to President Museveni’s rule. Rather than a democratic contest for power, appear to be tools for consolidating power. The election reflects the NRM and Museveni’s continued control of the political game. Albeit internal weaknesses in the political opposition, we argue that a hostile operating environment makes it impossible for the opposition parties to compete.

The international community, monitoring teams Six years after the re-introduction of multiparty and the opposition have all lamented that there politics in Uganda, the opposition parties have not managed to attract enough members and voters due to poor party organisation wasthe election an uneven results playing also field revealed in the a 2011 fragmented elections, and that the results were fraudulent (box 1). Yet, andparties infrastructure. have been compounded Lack of access by to within-party both anddistribution weak opposition of voting inmaterial Uganda. to While the polling claims of financialsplits, making and human already resources fragile organisations within the ballotstations, stuffing, dominated a faulty the voters’ discussion register on electionand uneven day, the large difference between the NRM candidates and the candidates of the other parties in both weaker.also failed With to createthe failure a credible, of the Interpartymonolithic the Presidential and Parliamentary race, seems Cooperationopposition alternative (IPC), the toopposition the NRM parties(see box have to indicate that the opposition failed to mobilise voters to challenge President Museveni and the opposition parties to attack each other rather 2). “Opportunistic ambitions” have caused the

NRM. than to unite against the NRM. CMI brief MAY 2011 Volume 10 No.2 when the elections consolidate power

Table 1: Results of Uganda Presidential election 2011 Table 2: Results of Uganda Presidential election 2011 by party: directly elected MPs Candidate (party) Number Percentage Party Regular Women Total of votes of votes MPs MPs Yoweri K. Museveni (NRM) 5,428,369 68.38% NRM 164 86 250 (IPC) 2,064,963 26.01% Independents 30 11 41 Norbert Mao (DP) 147,917 1.86% FDC 23 11 34 Olara Otunnu (UPC) 125,059 1.58% DP 11 1 12 Beti O. Kamya (UFA) 52,782 0.66% UPC 7 3 10 Abed Bwanika (PDP) 51,708 0.65% JEEMA 1 - 1 Jaberi B. Ssali (PPP) 34,688 0.44% CP 1 - 1 Samuel Lubega (Indep) 32,726 0.41% Total 237 112 349 Source: Electoral Commission of Uganda

decentralisation has been a goal of the Ugandan opposition in Uganda, there have been positive government and international donors since the While this might paint a bleak picture of the of the parties have held delegate conferences developments since previous elections. Most late 1980s, research has shown that NRM and schemes to broaden their resource base, they President Museveni enjoy significantly higher withhave internalshown a elections.willingness Through to spend new, some inventive of electoralThe single-member support in districtnewly created plurality districts. electoral their resources on building an organisation system for Parliament creates a candidate- centred system where many opposition Party Cooperation shows that there are ongoing thatinitiatives in time within can reach the opposition across Uganda. to create The aInter This creates disgruntled losers and spreads candidatestheir resource, campaign which againstis detrimental each other. for the opposition cooperation has been successful in credible alternative to the NRM. This kind of opposition.this has also A haunted split opposition the NRM-sponsored simply cannot manyAccording other to African the Afrobarometer, countries. when voting competecandidates with who the have monolithic faced former NRM. NRM While for president, voters consider personality and leadership skills more important than ability Box 1: Monitoring to deliver on issues like employment and Independents, it has highlighted the splits both reports within and between opposition parties. Commonwealth Observer Group: development. The candidate’s party affiliation is “The Political Parties and Organisations Act” “The country is still in the less important. The opposition failed to convince restricts fundraising. It is poorly and selectively process of consolidating its votersBesigye they did couldnot manage ensure to peace convince and security.voters he implemented.Simultaneously, Public the law funds contains supposed clauses to be that multi-party political system Without support from a powerful coalition, givencan be to used presidential to disband candidates and prosecute were delayed.political … Some serious concerns parties and individuals if they do not comply remain. Of particular note couldThis seeming beat Museveni failure ofand the be opposition, a strong leader. we will with the regulations, thus making it an effective are the overwhelming lack Votersargue, isdid a resultnot buy of Besigye’s Museveni vision and the of NRMchange. of a level playing field and using the state apparatus and their incumbency the “commercialisation of advantages strategically to distance the “threat-mechanism”.is appointed and funded Finally, by the the government Electoral politics”. As a result, the Commission lacks legitimacy. The Commission 2011 elections in Uganda taken control of the electoral contest? conducts elections without addressing previous did not fully meet national, electorate from the opposition. How have they and thus dependent on it. The Commission regional and international standards for democratic A “hostile” operating failures.The use of state resources elections.” environment A fusion between the state and the NRM party EU Observation Mission: creates opportunities for the NRM to use and “The 2011 Ugandan general The legal and institutional framework elections showed some improvements over the The manipulation of the legal and institutional distribute state resources. These resources are previous elections held framework surrounding the election process has eitherThe importance used to buy of votes,money positions in politics or in policy. Uganda in 2006…. Furthermore, the power of incumbency The number of electoral and bureaucratic NRM has been named top vote buyer in both was exercised to such an contributeddistricts has toincreased a “hostile” dramatically operating environment.since is increasing, and vote buying is pervasive. extent as to compromise severely the level playing surveys as well as focus groups. Money is field between the compet- electionselection and were of reintroducedparticipation inbecause 1996 (seethe numberbox funnelled through the State House, which has ing candidates and political 3).of positions This has increasedthe opposition the costs has toof competethe actual for anpolicies item inand the projects budget to called regions, to “Presidential districts or parties.” Gifts”; the President himself can grant

increases. This hurts opposition parties with individuals. This was used in the period before 2 weakly developed party structures. While the campaign. The importance of the public CMI brief may 2011 Volume 10 No.2 when elections consolidate power

sector for the economy in Uganda, has created an environment where the private sector is Box 2: The failure of the IPC • The Interparty Cooperation (IPC) was an attempt to create a unitary increases the importance of being on sound Ugandan opposition for the 2011 election. dependentfooting with on the public ruling contracts party, and to prosper.the risk if This • The initiative was supported and funded by the international community.

oneAs the is associatedruling party, with NRM the controls opposition. the creation • It originally included the following parties: FDC, DP, UPC CP, SDP and JEEMA. of positions as well as the loyalty of those • DP quit the IPC in early 2010 and by August UPC has quit as well. Both nominate their own presidential candidate instead. of both the local, regional and national employedgovernments in the and state bureaucracies apparatus. are The extensive size • SDP quit the Cooperation after seeing FDC support Independent candidate Erias Lukwago for the Kampala Mayor’s race, after initially supporting and nominating SDP leader Michael Mabikke as the IPC’s candidate. andwhich growing can provide (See box you 3). with This the means resources that itto is 1) important to be associated with the party can provide other party sympathisers with the state apparatus, the opposition mobilised win elections, and 2) that the winning party

non-elected positions. This is compounded by youth wings to “protect the vote”. The use and thelocal large and salariesregional enjoyed government by public structures officials. and misusemilitary of and the the term police “vigilante to intervene group” in and opposition “youth TheRegional legacy District of the Commissioners“Movement” system has created on brigade” create both fear and space for the many non-partisan government structures responsible for security during the elections that are loyal to the NRM and, more often than mobilisation.because the army The policeis under was the supposed command to of be

paid from public funds, and should thus be role in the organisation of the security aspects not, the President himself. These are often President Museveni. Yet, the army’s crucial

Theconsidered “fear public factor” servants. and the “silent linkedin the late to the aftermath Election, of created the election of an whenatmosphere the threat” of a “silent threat”. This threat became reality protest marches against increasing fuel and food opposition organised peaceful “walk to work” partisan face by violently stopping the protest, While the build-up to the election and the prices.arresting The protesters state’s security including apparatus the head showed of the its Election Day was generally peaceful, security forcesand a formal were massively and informal deployed security on apparatusElection Day.capture The the close essence links betweenof how the the regime government uses oppositionthis creates Dr. a feeling Kizza Besigye,of insecurity and killingin Uganda, at least a fivefeeling people which in the NRMstreets and of MuseveniKampala. Allnurture in all, to strengthen the image of the incumbent president electionshas the largest to consolidate government-friendly power. Hendrickson militia in and Mutengesa (2008) estimate that Uganda attacks from an organised youth mob known as a “strong leader”. the world. As a response to the fear of violent

as “Kiboko Squad” with assumed links to

Box 3: The increase in districts and ministerial positions in Uganda

Number of administrative districts in Number of junior and senior ministers in Ugada by year Uganda by year

3 Project: Elections and Democracy in Africa Authors: Svein Erik Helle, Sabiti Makara and Ingvild Aagedal Skage Editor: Ingvild Hestad Copy editor: Lisa Arnestad

Looking ahead after the 2011 Elections elections with the certainty that they would that can compete. In 2011, the NRM could hold After the election, the opposition called for peaceful protests against what they perceived win. substance and in order to ensure a level triumph the week after the election, President To give the 2016 Elections democratic toMuseveni be rigged addressed elections. a Returninglarge crowd to of Kampala NRM- in in all stages of the process, the rules of the playingelectoral field game between and the the institutions competing governing actors

supporters: “If anybody jokes with this victory huge incumbency advantages enjoyed by the ofto Ugandans,note that Museveni I will hold here him appears like a samosa to allure or the whole election cycle must be changed. The a cake and swallow them up”. It is interesting resources in and before the campaign period NRM needs to be constrained. The use of state toevents the memories have shown of Idithat Amin Museveni and his was cannibal not be controlled either through spending caps reputation. And indeed, the post-election needs to be curbed. Money in politics must

joking. The 2011 election was his and the orclose through ties between more transparent the security spending. apparatus, The the NRM’s latest “electoral tool” to legitimize and pervasive use of vote buying must stop. The consolidate their hold on power. This suggests thateffectively opposition compete parties with are the stuck NRM, in and a “vicious the governmentCommission andwith the enough NRM resourcesmust be addressed. to further cycle”:operational their environmentorganizations effectively are too weak constrains to An inclusive and independent Electoral

strengthen the Electoral process would be a the opposition’s ability to build organisations good place to start.

“Elections and Democracy in Africa” is a collaborative research project between CMI, IESE in Maputo and in Kampala. It focuses on the challenges of institutionalising democratic change within existing formal and informal power structures. The brief is published for the Kampala Conference 2011: Legitimacy of Power - Possibilities of Opposition. www.cmi.no

References Afrobarometer (2010) Round 4.5 Pre-Election Survey Nkuubi, J. (2010) Police Accountability & Security Sector Democracy Monitoring Group (2011) Report on Money Reform Project-HURINET-U; in Politics: Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections. Tumushabe, G.W. (2009) Trends in Public Administration Kampala: DEMGroup; Expenditure in Uganda, Kampala: ACODE Mutengesa and Hendrickson (2008) State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs:The Politics of Security Decision- Interviews carried out in Kampala, December 2010, as Making. Uganda Country Study. CSDG Papers, King’s well as newspaper articles from the Daily Monitor, New College London; Vision and the Independent online.

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