Nepal's Royal Coup

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Nepal's Royal Coup NEPAL'S ROYAL COUP: MAKING A BAD SITUATION WORSE Asia Report N°91 -- 9 February 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE COUP...................................................................................................................... 2 III. THE ARMED CONFLICT............................................................................................ 4 A. THE MAOISTS .......................................................................................................................4 B. THE SECURITY FORCES .........................................................................................................6 C. TWO DIFFERENT WARS.........................................................................................................7 IV. THE POLITICAL CONFLICT .................................................................................... 9 A. THE PALACE .........................................................................................................................9 B. THE PARTIES.......................................................................................................................10 V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE....................................................................... 11 A. INDIA ..................................................................................................................................11 B. THE U.S..............................................................................................................................13 C. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHERS ..................................................................................14 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 15 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ...................................................................................................................16 B. THE NEW COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ......................................................................................17 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................18 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................19 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD MEMBERS........................................................................................21 Asia Report N°91 9 February 2005 NEPAL'S ROYAL COUP: MAKING A BAD SITUATION WORSE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On 1 February 2005, in a move not only destructive of said it did not support holding an election. The main democracy and human rights but likely to strengthen Nepali Congress Party had said it favoured restoration of the Maoist insurgents and make Nepal's civil war even the parliament elected in 1999 and would not take part more intense, King Gyanendra sacked Prime Minister in new polls. Sher Bahadur Deuba, took power directly and declared a state of emergency.1 Gyanendra, who has dismissed Dismissal of that parliament in October 2002 began three governments since 2002, claimed he was acting the current political crisis. Gyanendra subsequently to "defend multiparty democracy". But his move had dismissed a royalist government he had hand picked and every familiar and indefensible coup ingredient: party brought most of the mainstream political parties back leaders were put under house arrest, key constitutional into power. But Deuba was unable to return the Maoists rights were suspended, soldiers enforced complete to peace talks, and his coalition government was deeply censorship, and communications were cut. split over how to proceed. With neither the political parties nor the king contributing constructively to the In a televised statement, Gyanendra blamed the process, little progress was being made in developing the politicians, saying they had discredited multiparty united multiparty democracy/constitutional monarchy democracy by "focusing solely on power politics". front that most observers have seen as a necessary Warning that the country was threatened by "terrorists", condition for any such talks to be productive. he said the security forces would end the nine-year-old Maoist insurgency in which 11,000 people have died. The last round of peace talks broke down in August Prime Minister Deuba was placed under house arrest, 2003, leading to intensified conflict. A significant and other political leaders, including the heads of party build-up of government forces has done little to student wings, were detained before the announcement. improve security across the country. Maoist insurgents, who have shown themselves able to attack Gyanendra's move was widely condemned by the at will, hold sway over most rural areas and are international community. India, caught off-guard by the increasingly active in towns nominally controlled by announcement, called it "a serious setback to the cause the government. Combining effective guerrilla tactics of democracy". UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan with violent intimidation and extortion, they have called for an immediate restoration of democracy, as did built up a nationwide presence, though one founded the British and U.S. governments. more on fear than popular support. The king's takeover came as political tensions were The state has withdrawn from most rural areas. Its building in Kathmandu over possible elections. Prime security forces, based in district headquarters and a few Minister Deuba had said that he would shortly announce heavily fortified posts, are vulnerable and unable to a date for polls but this was greeted with considerable protect the population. When they are attacked, their scepticism given the worsening security situation, in response has often been indiscriminate violence that which the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist further undermines civilian security. There is Leninist, UML), a member of Deuba's government, had widespread agreement among knowledgeable observers both inside and outside the country that the insurgency cannot be defeated militarily, and any solution will 1 This report provides the essential background to the royal require a mix of military and political strategies. So far coup of 1 February 2005, describes first consequences on the both have been lacking, and there is every reason to ground and reactions in Nepal and abroad, and offers initial believe that the situation will now get even worse with analysis of its implications. Crisis Group will shortly provide the king's assumption of full power: additional analysis and policy recommendations for a way forward, as well as fuller discussion of related political subjects including the constitutional crisis. Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse Crisis Group Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005 Page ii This move will only boost the Maoists by monarchy but calls for a republic have become confirming their view of the monarch as opposing louder in the past two years. The king is now democracy; they may now seek to make common directly exposed to the problems of running the cause with the mainstream parties against the king. country: if he does not deliver peace quickly, his support will sink further. The political parties, while diminished since the dissolution of parliament in 2002, retain A worsening of the human rights situation with considerable grass roots support: any solution the suspension of constitutional protections and that does not include them is likely to be an upsurge in violence will likely reduce the opposed by many and would be unsustainable. willingness of donors to fund the social and economic reforms that would necessarily be Government security forces presently lack the part of any political solution. capacity to defeat the Maoists and cannot develop it any time soon. Troops are now occupied There is no reason to believe that rule by decree controlling politicians and journalists in will mean that corruption and mismanagement Kathmandu rather than fighting the insurgents. will be any less prevalent than when Nepal was Nepal's terrain, the self-sustaining nature of the previously governed by an absolute monarchy insurgency and its lack of an external backer make from 1960 to 1991. it difficult to put pressure on the insurgents, and the arrest or killing of a few key Maoist leaders Kathmandu/Brussels, 9 February 2005 will not end the conflict. King Gyanendra enjoys little popular support. Most Nepalis would prefer a constitutional Asia Report N°91 9 February 2005 NEPAL'S ROYAL COUP: MAKING A BAD SITUATION WORSE I. BACKGROUND major party leaders. In September 2004 the HPC called for the Maoists to return to talks. But the Maoist leadership repeatedly said it would negotiate only with The conflict dates to 1996 when the Maoists2 began King Gyanendra, whom it regards as the real power. The organising an insurgency in the mid-west of the party chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal (commonly country. Regarded as an isolated problem that could known as Prachanda), challenged Deuba to demonstrate easily be controlled, it received little attention in his full authority or allow his "masters behind the 5 Kathmandu until a series of violent police operations curtain" to talk. led to a widening of the conflict. By 2001, the revolt had spread considerably, and the army had become Koirala's Congress
Recommended publications
  • 840A6bd8a501f56e852570520
    TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction............................................................................................................... 1 Background ............................................................................................................... 2 Village Defence Forces.............................................................................................. 3 Background to the Village Defence Forces ............................................................ 4 Training and weaponry of the Village Defence Forces ........................................... 5 Human rights violations committed by the Village Defence Forces........................ 6 Maoist Attacks on Village Defence Forces............................................................. 7 Divisions within rural Nepali society......................................................................... 8 Freedom of Movement ............................................................................................ 10 Detention................................................................................................................. 11 Maoist suspects.................................................................................................... 11 Torture and ill-treatment ...................................................................................... 12 Prisons................................................................................................................. 14 Non-Maoist political prisoners............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Fractured Country, Shattered Lives
    TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 Background .................................................................................................................... 2 Village Defence Forces .................................................................................................. 3 Background to the Village Defence Forces ............................................................... 4 Training and weaponry of the Village Defence Forces ............................................. 5 Human rights violations committed by the Village Defence Forces ......................... 6 Maoist Attacks on Village Defence Forces ............................................................... 7 Divisions within rural Nepali society ............................................................................ 8 Freedom of Movement ................................................................................................. 10 Detention ...................................................................................................................... 11 Maoist suspects ........................................................................................................ 11 Torture and ill-treatment .......................................................................................... 12 Prisons ...................................................................................................................... 14 Non-Maoist
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of International Humanitarian Law in the Protection of Civilians: the Case of Himalayan People’S War
    The Role of International Humanitarian Law in the Protection of Civilians: The Case of Himalayan People’s War By Gajendra Aryal A Dissertation Submitted to the School of Law In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Philosophy Aristotle University of Thessaloniki 2013 i Abstract "The role of International humanitarian law in the protection of civilians: The case of Himalayan people's war" examines how IHL played a role in the protection of civilians in the decade long armed conflict of Nepal. This dissertation argues that civilian abuses were conducted in a grave, systematic, and widespread manner, showing that international humanitarian law in Nepal played significant role in the protection of civilians. This study has provided a clear picture of the decade long armed conflict of Nepal and examined the rights of civilians in times of war as well as outlines the duties and obligations of the armed forces towards civilians. It critically analyzed the international legal obligations that the state has assumed for the protection of the right of civilians in case of Nepal. It also confirmed existing literature which indicated that during the war, parties to the conflict had carried out acts of extreme violence, and human rights and IHL abuses had been common across the country as increasingly civilians were the major victims of the conflict. Similarly, the reviewed literature about IHL showed that being a law of armed conflict the IHL is designed to regulate the treatment of the individual- civilian or military, wounded or active- in armed conflicts. It seeks to protect persons not engaged in or no longer participating in hostilities.
    [Show full text]
  • The 'People's War' in Nepal
    THE ‘PEOPLE’S WAR’ IN NEPAL The Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) is an independent, non-profit and non-governmental organization for collaborative research, networking and interaction on strategic and international issues pertaining to South Asia. Set up in 1992, the RCSS is based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The RCSS is a South Asian forum for studies, training and multi-track dialogue and deliberation on issues of regional interest. All activities of RCSS are designed with a South Asia focus and are usually participated by experts from all South Asian countries. The Centre is envisaged as a forum for advancing the cause of cooperation, security, conflict resolution, confidence building, peace and development in the countries of the South Asian region. The RCSS serves its South Asian and international constituency by: (a) networking programmes that promote interaction, communication and exchange between institutions and individuals within and outside the region engaged in South Asian strategic studies; (b) organizing regional workshops and seminars and sponsoring and coordinating collaborative research; and (c) disseminating output of the research through publications which include books, monographs and a quarterly newsletter. The RCSS facilitates scholars and other professionals of South Asia to address, mutually and collectively, problems and issues of topical interest for all countries of the region. Queries may be addressed to: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies 410/27 Bauddhaloka Mawatha Colombo 7 SRI LANKA Tel: (94-11)
    [Show full text]
  • Election 1991 Constituency Res
    Wahlbezirk Kandidat Partei Stimmen Prozent Ethnizität Stimmen- anteil ethn. Gruppen Taplejung 1 1. Kul Prasad Upreti NCP (UML) 12703 47,19 Bahun 2. Mani Lama NC 8757 32,53 Tamang Durga Pr. Myangbo NRJP Surya Man Gurung Independent Gurung Taplejung 2 1. Ambika Sanwa NCP (UML) 12215 52,03 2. Bishnu Maden NDP (C) 6104 26,00 Tamang Shukra Raj Samyog NC Swagendra Singh Ambuhang NRJP Limbu Panchthar 1 1. Basanta Kumar Nemwang NCP (UML) 13457 35,26 Limbu 2. Dipak Pr. Baskota NC 3180 4,54 Bahun Raj Kumar Joshi NDP (T) Bahun Indra B. Thamsuhang NDP (C) Machendra Yonghang Independent Panchthar 2 1. Dambar Singh Tumbahamphe NCP (UML) 14803 37,58 Limbu 2. Padma Sundar Lawati NDP (C) 11607 29,78 Newar Bhawani Bi. Nemwang NC Limbu Narendra Kumar Pradhan Independent Newar Krishna Raj Angdambe Independent Ilam 1 1. Jhala Nath Khanal NCP (UML) 25540 52,12 Bahun 2. Toya Nath Bhattarai NC 19270 39,32 Bahun Pasang Goparma NDP (T) Sanghya Suwal NMKP Newar Kumar Chwahar NCP (V) Bal Kumar Phoge Independent Ilam 2 1. Mani Kumar Limbu NCP (UML) 19759 41,96 Limbu 2. K. B. Gurung NC 17749 37,69 Gurung Sararaswati Rai NDP (C) Rai Jyan Bahadur Lawati Independent Newar Bhakta B. Rai Independent Rai Asal Bahadur Limbu Independent Limbu Jhapa 1 1. Drona Prasad Acharya NCP (UML) 13721 34,22 Bahun 2. Krishna Pr. Sitaula NC 9827 24,51 Keshav Raj Kandangwa NDP (T) Gopal Chandra C. Rajbanshi NDP (C) Purna B. Rai SJMN Rai Harsha Lal Singh Rajbanshi NSP Rishikesh Upadhyaya NCP (V) Bahun Ram Pr.
    [Show full text]
  • How to Cite Complete Issue More Information About This
    Colombia Internacional ISSN: 0121-5612 Departamento de Ciencia Política y Centro de Estudios Internacionales. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes Fernandez Torne, Carles Submissive to the Political Will? Civil Society and Victims’ Mobilization around Truth Commissions* Colombia Internacional, no. 97, 2019, January-March, pp. 57-85 Departamento de Ciencia Política y Centro de Estudios Internacionales. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes DOI: https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint97.2019.03 Available in: https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=81258313003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System Redalyc More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America and the Caribbean, Spain and Journal's webpage in redalyc.org Portugal Project academic non-profit, developed under the open access initiative Submissive to the Political Will? Civil Society and Victims’ Mobilization around Truth Commissions Carles Fernandez Torne Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) HOW TO CITE: Fernandez Torne, Carles. 2019. “Submissive to the Political Will? Civil Society and Victims’ Mobilization around Truth Commissions”. Colombia Internacional (97): 57-85. https://doi.org/10.7440/ colombiaint97.2019.03 RECEIVED: April 30th, 2018 ACCEPTED: July 15th, 2018 REVISED: October 25th, 2018 https://doi.org/10.7440/colombiaint97.2019.03 ABSTRACT. Objective/context: The article explores truth commissions as processes that allow victims and civil society mobilization. It examines the relationship between victims and civil society with the governing regime in the lead up to the establishment of a truth commission and in the implementation of a commission’s recommendations. The article frames mobilization as enabling vertical accountability relationships following the pressure that victims and civil society exert on the governing regime.
    [Show full text]
  • Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse
    NEPAL'S ROYAL COUP: MAKING A BAD SITUATION WORSE Asia Report N°91 -- 9 February 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE COUP...................................................................................................................... 2 III. THE ARMED CONFLICT............................................................................................ 4 A. THE MAOISTS .......................................................................................................................4 B. THE SECURITY FORCES .........................................................................................................6 C. TWO DIFFERENT WARS.........................................................................................................7 IV. THE POLITICAL CONFLICT .................................................................................... 9 A. THE PALACE .........................................................................................................................9 B. THE PARTIES.......................................................................................................................10 V. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE....................................................................... 11 A. INDIA ..................................................................................................................................11
    [Show full text]
  • Nepalese Political Parties: 1987A
    16 17 Berreman, Gerald D. 1962. Behind many Masks: Ethnography and Impression TOPICAL REPORT Management in a Himalayan Village. Monograph of the Society of Applied Anthropology; NoA. Also published in Berreman 1992. Nepalese Political Parties: 1987a. "Pahari Polyandry: A Comparison." In: M.K . Raha (ed.), Polyandry in India: Demographic. Economic. Social, Religious and Psychological Developments since the 1991 Elections Concomitants of Plural Marriages in Women. Delhi: Gian Publishing House, pp. 155-178. John Wbelpton 1987b. "HimaJayan Polyandry and the Domestic Cycle." In: M.K. Raha (ed.). Polyandry in India ( ... ), pp. 179-197. Based on a 'computer file updated regularly since 1990, this survey does not 1992. Hindus of the Himalayas: Ethnography and Change. Delhi, etc. : claim to be analytical but simply records some of the main developments in Oxford University Press. intra· and inter·party politics up to the recent (November 1994) general Bhall, O.S. and Jain, S.O. 1987. "Women's Role in a Polyandrous Cis-Hima1ayan election.! Infonnation has been drawn principally from the Nepal Press Digest, Society: An Overview." In: M.K. Raha (ed.). Polyandry in In dia ( ... ), pp. also from "Saptahik Bimarsha", Spotlight and other publications and from 405-421. interviews conducted in Kathmandu. Only brief mention has been made of the Brown. Charles W. and loshi, Maheshwar P. 1990. "Caste Dynamics and pre·1991 history of each party, including its role in the Movement for the Fluidity in the Historical Anthropology of Kumaon." In: M.P. loshi, A.C. Restoration of Democracy, and fuller details will be found in Whclplon 1993 and Fanger and C.W.
    [Show full text]
  • Caste Discrimination and Conflict in Nepal
    THE MISSING PIECE OF THE PUZZLE Caste Discrimination and the Conflict in Nepal © 2005 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ) at NYU School of Law (http://www.chrgj.org) focuses on issues related to “global justice,” and aims to advance human rights and respect for the rule of law through cutting-edge advocacy and scholarship. The CHRGJ promotes human rights research, education and training, and encourages interdisciplinary research on emerging issues in international human rights and humanitarian law. Philip Alston is the Center’s Faculty Director; Smita Narula is Executive Director; Margaret Satterthwaite is Research Director; Patricia Armstrong is Fellowship Coordinator; and Angelina Fisher is Assistant Research Scholar. Cover photo © 2005 Ami Vitale Tila village, Rolpa district, March 14, 2005: Hundreds watch a traditional dance performance during a Maoist “cultural program.” Maoists hold programs several times a month, gathering villagers from miles around to educate them about the “People’s War.” Maoist campaigns also include public humiliation and punishment schemes against those who practice caste and gender discrimination. The Maoists particularly target Dalits (so-called untouchables) and women for indoctrination and recruitment. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at NYU School of Law thanks the following people for their work and/or assistance in the preparation of this Report: Project Director : Smita Narula, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law Principal authors and researchers : This report was researched by Rajeev Goyal as part of the International Human Rights Clinic at NYU School of Law.
    [Show full text]
  • An Evaluation of Impact of the Commissions Established in Nepal and Sri Lanka Carl
    ADVERTIMENT. Lʼaccés als continguts dʼaquesta tesi queda condicionat a lʼacceptació de les condicions dʼús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: http://cat.creativecommons.org/?page_id=184 ADVERTENCIA. El acceso a los contenidos de esta tesis queda condicionado a la aceptación de las condiciones de uso establecidas por la siguiente licencia Creative Commons: http://es.creativecommons.org/blog/licencias/ WARNING. The access to the contents of this doctoral thesis it is limited to the acceptance of the use conditions set by the following Creative Commons license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/?lang=en PhD in International Relations and European Integration Doctoral Thesis How Truth Commissions Promote Accountability: An Evaluation of Impact of the Commissions Established in Nepal and Sri Lanka Autor: Carlos Fernández Torné Director: Dr. Rafael Grasa Hernández Departament de Dret Públic i Ciències Historicojurídiques Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Març de 2017 Carlos Fernández Torné PhD Thesis Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Abstract Most studies assess impacts of truth commissions (TCs) in pre-conceived outcomes, such as democracy or human rights, without considering how a TC process affects that outcome. This research attempts to evaluate the impact of TCs as processes and how these processes influence the ultimate outcomes. A focus on process entails considering public participation in TCs and the relationships and interactions that a TC generates among the various affected groups within society. Accountability provides a framework to evaluate whether the relationships a TC generates empower people in front of the state, allowing us to link process and outcome. The theory of change presented suggests that TCs as processes generate vertical accountability relationships between the state and civil society and horizontal accountability relationships within the state.
    [Show full text]
  • Violence Erupts Again in Ambon
    TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE IN NEPAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Asia Report N°99 – 15 June 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY .................................................................................. 3 A. THE RANA AND SHAH ERAS..................................................................................................3 B. THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE AND THE PANCHAYAT ERA..........................................3 C. THE 1990 CONSTITUTION......................................................................................................4 III. THE STATUS OF THE 1990 CONSTITUTION ........................................................ 6 A. FROM DISSOLUTION TO DEUBA'S SECOND DISMISSAL...........................................................6 B. THE ROYAL COUP OF FEBRUARY 2005 .................................................................................7 C. TOWARDS A "ROYAL ROADMAP"?........................................................................................8 D. THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC WAY OUT ..........................................................................11 IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES........................................................ 12 A. THE MONARCHY.................................................................................................................12
    [Show full text]
  • Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990 Author(S): Michael Hutt Source: Asian Survey, Vol
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by SOAS Research Online Drafting the Nepal Constitution, 1990 Author(s): Michael Hutt Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 11 (Nov., 1991), pp. 1020-1039 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645305 Accessed: 21-06-2019 12:36 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Asian Survey This content downloaded from 195.195.176.5 on Fri, 21 Jun 2019 12:36:44 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms DRAFTING THE NEPAL CONSTITUTION, 1990 Michael Hutt On November 9, 1990, King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah promulgated a new constitution for the Kingdom of Nepal that en- shrined several basic concepts which the country's banned political parties had demanded ever since King Mahendra's "royal coup" of December 15, 1960. The constitution has so far proved generally acceptable to the prin- cipal political parties in Nepal and is the main achievement of the Move- ment for the Restoration of Democracy launched on February 18, 1990.
    [Show full text]