Mao's Massive Military Industrial Campaign to Defend Cold War China."
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Mao’s Massive Military Industrial Campaign to Defend Cold War China with Covell Meyskens November 10, 2020 Arunabh Ghosh: O.K., I think we'll get started. It's a few minutes past 4 p.m. and we have already over 70 participants here. So welcome to the fourth and final meeting of the Fairbanks Center's Modern China Lecture Series. Final meeting for the semester, of course. Not otherwise. My name is Arunabh Ghosh. I teach Modern Chinese History here in the History Department. And, today, I'm delighted to welcome Professor Covell Meyskens who will be delivering a talk titled, "Mao's Massive Military Industrial Campaign to Defend Cold War China." Arunabh Ghosh: Covell Meyskens is an Assistant Professor of Chinese History in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School. His first book, which is what we will hear about today, is titled, "Mao's Third Front: Militarization of Cold War China." And it was published earlier this year by Cambridge University Press. As you can tell from the subject of his first book, Covell's research centers on capitalist and anti-capitalist development in Modern China with a particular focus on large-scale infrastructure projects. Arunabh Ghosh: Very much in keeping with that interest, he's working now on a second book, which is the history of perhaps the biggest infrastructure project of them all, the Three Gorges Dam. And this project as of now is titled, "The Three Gorges Dam: Building a Hydraulic Engine for China." Well, he's still keeping busy beyond that. He's also got a third project that he's working on. And this one, I think, aligns rather well with his home department because it's a history of the changing conceptions of national security in modern China. So very much in keeping with sort of security concerns and military concerns. Arunabh Ghosh: In addition, Covell has written on topics as diverse as Chinese railroads, the Three Gorges Dam, as we just mentioned, Sino-North Korean relations, Maoist visual culture, globalization, radio in Mao's China, and racial violence in the Pacific War. So really, really diverse set of publications. But, I would be remiss if I did not mention the, in some ways, the most interesting part of Covell's academic profile which is that he's also an amazing curator of images, videos, and other kinds of paraphernalia from the Mao era. He curates a website known as, "Everyday Life in Mao's China." It's an ever-growing repository. And if you haven't had the chance to visit it, I would highly encourage you to check it out. Arunabh Ghosh: So before I hand things over to Covell, just a few words about format. Covell will speak for about 30 to 35 minutes and then we will have a Q&A session for roughly the same length of time. So we'll try and finish by about 5:15 or 5:30 p.m. If you have questions, please use the Q&A function within Zoom to type them up. You are free to start asking questions during the talk itself. And we keep track. Ideally, I would request that you identify yourself as you type your question. So start with your ID. But at the same time, we recognize that because this talk is being recorded, some people may not be comfortable with that. So again, it's perfectly fine if you wish to stay anonymous. O.K., so that's it. Without further ado, please join me in welcoming Covell. Over to you. Covell Meyskens: All right, thanks a lot, Arunabh. And thanks to the Fairbank Center for organizing this event. So, today, I'm going to be talking about what was probably the biggest campaign in, let me just get the stuff lined up with the PowerPoint here. All right, that looks fine. Yep. All right. So today, what I'm going to be talking about is the biggest campaign in Mao's China, which really nobody knows about. And it's this massive military industrial campaign called the Third Front. Covell Meyskens: So on May 27th, 1964, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and a few other Chinese Communist Party leaders discussed China's third five-year plan. Over the past few months, Deng and other leading officials had drafted the initial plans which concentrated on developing coastal areas and lifting the output of agriculture and consumer goods. Mao disapproved of this economic strategy because it did not address China's worsening political environment. The United States had a string of military bases around China from South Korea to the Philippines and Washington was expanding these four deployed forces in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had transformed in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split from a close ally into a major security threat with 200,000 troops on China's northern border. Covell Meyskens: What made matters worse was that both the United States and the Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear weapons, while China did not even have a single atomic bomb, as the Soviet Union had withdrawn its promise to help China to build one. Given China's imperiled international security position, Mao argued that, quote, "In the age of the atom bomb, not having a military year was no good," end quote. In preparation for war, the party had to divide the country into three military fronts, a First Front along the coast in the Northeast and in the Far West, as you can see in the map here on the left. A Second Front behind coastal provinces, and a Third Front and Central China. Covell Meyskens: In this final region, the party had to secretly build a large military industrial complex called, "The Big Third Front" to serve as a backup economic motor for national defense in case the Americans or Soviets invaded and the party had to abandon established industrial areas and retreat into the interior like Chiang Kai-shek had done during World War II. And then also like Stalin had done. That is another place that was taken as an example with Stalin's retreat from the Nazis during World War II. Provinces in the First and Second Front also had to build small industrial bases. So, you can see over here in the image on the right. These are all the small Third Front complexes that I've found to date. I'm sure that there are more, but these are all the little dots that are on that map there-- the ones that I've found so far. Covell Meyskens: Like the CCP's revolutionary based areas, all Third Front projects had to be dispersed in mountain locations. With this new industrial war machine, Beijing would be in better position to fight off an assault by its Cold War enemies. Between 1964 and 1980, China dedicated about 40% of the national construction budget to building this arsenal of Chinese socialism, all while keeping the project completely secret because like other Cold War statesmen exposed to the heat of intense geopolitical friction, Chinese leaders presumed that whatever was publicly perceptible was militarily honorable. There's much that can be said about the Third Front. Covell Meyskens: Today, I will concentrate my talk on a few major issues. First, I'll examine what party leaders initially thought of Mao's proposal to launch the Third Front. Next, I'll discuss CCP efforts to socially engineer a new Maoist person that embraced an austere life of hard work, put building socialism before family concerns, and took wherever the party sent them to be their home. I'll assess what the builders of the Third Front made of Maoist standards of conduct by first looking at how the party mobilized labor and how people responded to recruitment. Then I'll go over the different meanings that people ascribe to the spartan conditions of everyday life at the Third Front. Finally, I'll close my talk with a few comments about the Third Front's social, economic, and political afterlives. Covell Meyskens: When Mao first proposed building the Third Front in May 1964 in China's inland regions, Deng Xiaoping and other top party leaders did not immediately back Mao's call to undertake a big developmental drive to bolster national security. Instead, [they] recommended conducting preparatory surveys and drawing up plans for a few select projects. This policy stance was based on the preference for focusing on coastal development, agriculture, and light industry, as well as their concern that Mao was seeking to launch an industrial campaign like the Great Leap Forward. Covell Meyskens: During the Great Leap, the central government could de-centralize authority localities and commanded them to mass mobilize local resources to quickly expand China's industrial base. In the end, the Great Leap had led to economic and administrative disorder, and a famine that killed tens of millions. Party elites only endorsed building the Third Front in August 1964 when the United States bombarded North Vietnam in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf incident. Faced with the prospect of great power war, party leaders green-lighted construction of a military industrial complex in inland regions. Covell Meyskens: To ensure that the Third Front campaign did not experience the Great Leap Forward's managerial problems, party leaders granted central planners sole authority over its administration, did not allow local leaders to independently initiate projects, and repeatedly reminded the areas with Third Front projects to pay due attention to agricultural production.