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Topic 5: the Cold War the German Question by John Lewis Gaddis

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Topic 5: the Cold War the German Question by John Lewis Gaddis Topic 5: The Cold War The German Question by John Lewis Gaddis Major Theme: Origins of the Cold War Ideological Differences See Historiography Mutual Suspicion and Fear The nuclear bomb caused both nations to question the status quo and stop defending it, leading to a stalemate If Germany was revived, both sides were afraid of it choosing the other side of the Cold War, leading to Germany staying divided Stalin met with the German Communist Party in 1945 to plan on reunifying Germany “within Moscow’s sphere of influence” to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The US and the Soviet Union couldn’t mutually keep Germany controlled, avoid the Cold War, and ensure that Germany, if it made its own settlement, would settle in favor of the ‘right’ side. From Wartime Allies to Post-War Enemies The Soviet Union feared United States revitalizing imperialist Germany to use in a future war on their side Historiography “Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would accept the other’s vision of a postwar world, even as neither would risk war – at least not intentionally – to achieve their own.” “Neither proved capable of separating foreign policy from domestic influences, but those influences differed enormously, producing correspondingly dissimilar external behavior.” “One common destination, they would have been surprised to learn, was to be three and a half addition decades of confrontation.” “…[the] very irresolution [of Soviet-American issues] had become, by then, so familiar a feature of international life as to seem to some observers reassuringly normal.” “Hitler himself – who collected enemies as avidly as he did bad art – was the architect of German disunity, as of so much else.” “The western occupying authorities were, in short, coming to think of the Germans more as future allies than as defeated adversaries.” Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953…opened up what may have been a more promising opportunity to reunify Germany; although only very briefly.” Major Theme: Nature of the Cold War Ideological Opposition See the previous Historiography section “Unfortunately, at a certain stage, ideological issues are decided by the stomach, that is, by seeing who can provide the most for people’s daily needs.” – Nikita Khrushchev Superpowers and Spheres of Influence The Cold War was the “second and more significant” cause for Germany’s division Stalin wanted to create a unified Germany that was popular with the West and controlled by Russia to combat the US England proposed the unifications of Germany’s divided zones with the US, as foreseen by Stalin a year earlier West Germany was given the ability to form their own independent government; this meant that the Western powers gave up on unified 4-power cooperation Stalin was losing German support and failed to give Germany self-confidence Stalin was unable to replicate Hitler’s success by promising an economic and national revival Alliances and Diplomacy in the Cold War “Stalin had no monopoly on the ancient practice of using external enemies to justify internal policies.” The UN discussed the distribution/control of atomic power extensively Armistice negotiations and resolutions for issues such as the Berlin blockade crisis lasted into 1955, as well as the Geneva convention at the end of 1955 (French, British, American, and Soviet diplomats) General George C. Marshall of England tried 43 times to talk to Molotov to have a reunifying 4-power foreign minsters’ meeting in Moscow but Molotov never listened All of the members of the Moscow conference from the West had informal discussions about the future of Germany outside of Stalin’s influence Historiography “Cold War history is, at least in part, the story of how what was thought to be unendurable became endurable; how order and stability, if rarely justice, evolved from bitter and sustained rivalry.” “The task Stalin faced in Germany was one for which he was ill-prepared: he had to win the support of people he could not easily control.” “The Marshall Plan gave Germans outside the Soviet zone a choice: they could follow the Stalinist path toward national unity, knowing that the Soviet Union’s capacity to bring about economic recovery was minimal and likely to remain so; or they could seek immediate economic assistance through alignment with the United States and its allies, knowing that the effect might be to postpone German reunification for years to come.” “Washington’s role in all of this had been uncharacteristically passive: officials there gave relatively little thought to the German problem as a whole during the early postwar years…. The British had been more purposeful, nudging the Truman administration toward a consolidation of occupation zones which then complemented the Marshall Plan” Major Theme: Development and Impact of the Cold War Global Spread of the Cold War from its European Origins See Alliances and Diplomacy section “The most striking anomaly of the Cold War was the existence of a divided Europe, within which there resided a divided Germany, within which there lay a divided Berlin.” Cold War Policies of Containment, Brinkmanship, Peaceful Coexistence, Détente Role of the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement See Alliances and Diplomacy section Role and Significance of Leaders Marshall proposed the Marshall Plan at the Moscow conference, proposing to give $13 billion to Western Europe to help it rebuild after the war, however Stalin rejected it. The US still implemented it. Kennan wanted to have Germany become a “third force” in the world stage, offsetting and denying Soviet power while keeping the US free of responsibilities and with high potential power while hoping to end the Cold War with the removal of Soviet military and political might – this is called “Program A” Beria wanted to use the German issue to improve his own standing within the Kremlin and “eventually secure his position as successor to Stalin”. Arms Race, Proliferation and Limitation If West Germany was allowed to flourish and become independent, NATO would have to form a military agreement with them that the US was hesitant to even discuss Social, Cultural, and Economic Impact Historiography “From a purely military standpoint, rearming the Germans would make sense… for the Truman administration the political costs of yielding to military expediency…outweighed the advantages.” “Washington had no ‘grand design’.” “…the Soviet leader inadvertently founded and rearmed West Germany. He was in this instance, as in so many others, the ultimate source of his own worst fears.” “As in earlier crises involving Germany, it was the British – not the Americans who shaped the Western response.” “Did not [the Western powers’] own preoccupation with building strength cause them to miss an opportunity to moderate, if not to end, the Cold War in Europe, and to achieve German reunification almost four decades earlier than it was in face accomplished?” “It is clear now that Stalin never wanted a separate East German state.” Major Theme: End of the Cold War Break-Up of Soviet Union: Internal Problems and External Pressures Breakdown of Soviet Control Over Central and Eastern Europe Historiography “It is easy now to say that the Cold War could only have disappeared when the Soviet Union did…. To what extent is it fair to conclude that the victors in the Cold War, by refusing to accept anything short of victory, themselves perpetuated it?” .
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