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The Dispute Over the New Rules of the Game the State and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

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The Dispute Over the New Rules of the Game the State and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan Analysis The Jordanian government had not taken drastic steps with regards to the Brotherhood, but the outcomes of the Arab spring, especially after 2013, provided it the opportunity The Dispute over the to do so. The regime appeared to consider what happened during the Arab Spring to be treason or a Brotherhood ‘conspiracy’ to topple New Rules of the Game the government.” The State and the Muslim Behind these policies is a conviction that has taken root over time and even become a sort of ‘official doctrine’ that the previous relationship and alliance Brotherhood in Jordan between the state and the Brotherhood has ended for good and that the two parties have reached a final stage of ‘divorce.’ Dr. Muhammad Abu Rumman September 2020 The group has taken unprecedented steps since 2016. This is evident by the development of the by-laws, the complete organizational separation from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the commitment to separate the group and the political party. 1 The Dispute over the New Rules of the Game The State and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan Dr. Muhammad Abu Rumman September 2020 3 Abu Rumman, Muhammad The Dispute over the New Rules of the Game … The State and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Link to the book: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/amman/16530.pdf Published in 2020 by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Jordan & Iraq FES Jordan & Iraq P.O. Box 941876 Amman 11194 Jordan Email: [email protected] Website: www.fes-jordan.org Not for Sale © FES Jordan & Iraq All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted, reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means without prior written permission from the publishers. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are solely those of the original author. They do not necessarily represent those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. • Cover and internal design: Kamal Qasim Contents Contents Introduction 6 Formations of the Crisis: Causes and Consequences 7 What Does the Government Want from the Brotherhood? 12 Shifting Sands within the Brotherhood 17 Outlining the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party’s options 22 Future Prospects: Rewriting the Rules of the Game 24 5 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - The Dispute over the New Rules of the Game The State and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 1 Introduction The current crisis between the government in Ironically, whereas the state accused the Jordan and the Muslim Brotherhood differs Muslim Brotherhood of attempting to from past crises. The traditional ebb and flow overthrow the rules of the traditional equation that characterized relations between the state during the Arab Spring through its political and the Muslim Brotherhood for the past demands, Brotherhood leaders today, consider seventy years no longer applies to the relations state actions such as withdrawing their legal between the two parties today and the rules recognition, confiscating their property and of this relationship no longer provide a basis finances, and refusing to engage in dialogue, for the future. to be a state-led coup against them. The writer ultimately have doubts about the thesis, In this article, we will test the previous as it is clear that the mutual trust gap seen hypothesis, noting that both parties have not during the Arab Spring still exists today. Will reached an agreement on the rules that will this “gap” remain the main variable that govern their relationship in the next phase. governs the “gray state” between the two Nor have they entered into joint dialogue (as parties, which former Islamist member and of the writing of this article), even following current leader of the Zamzam party, Dr. Nabil the major transformations since the Arab al-Kofahi calls “the state of no peace and no Spring in 2011 and the latest teachers’ crisis.1 war?” Or, is there the potential to overcome 1 If the constitution serves as the official contract determining the essence of the relationship between doubts and create new foundations for the the state, citizens, institutions and political forces, and relationship in light of the collapse of the laws regulate these relationships, then the situation in the Arab world requires that political actors make previous foundations? What lies beyond the clarifications and that agreements be added to the constitution and laws in order to bridge the trust current crossroads? In what direction are the gap in the relationship between these different foundations for the next relationship heading? actors. This is especially true when we discuss the relationship between the regime and Islamists Will the foundations be dictated by one party because it is governed by concerns like establishing a religious state or “democracy for one time only” or will it be mutual? These are the questions I or the fear of Islamic fascism, which is employed as a boogeyman by the state to not proceed with the will address in this article. democratic process. Therefore, there is the need for internal dialogues and discussions to agree upon the rules of the political game under the umbrella of the constitution and the laws in order to avoid scenarios like military coups or domestic chaos. 6 Formations of the Crisis: Causes and Consequences 2 Formations of the Crisis: Causes and Consequences The current status quo of relations is not a with five ministerial portfolios. However, sudden development. Rather, the crisis took after Jordan’s entry into peace negotiations shape gradually in the 1980s and accelerated with Israel and the signing of the Wadi Araba in the 1990s after parliamentary elections treaty in 1994, the state began to see the revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood had Brotherhood as a political opponent instead of become the largest opposition organization in a partner in confronting internal and regional the country, taking the place of the leftist and forces. Meanwhile, the Brotherhood began nationalist forces, which the state had originally to aspire to play a greater role in the political allied with the Brotherhood to oppose. This arena commensurate with its popular strength. provided the Brotherhood space to engage in social, charitable, cultural, and political causes Differences grew between the state and the during the 1950s-1990s. The Brotherhood Brotherhood, and in 1997 the Brotherhood formed a network of charitable institutions, called for the boycott of parliamentary universities, properties, and activities under elections. However, the legacy of relations the umbrella of the Islamic Centre Society between the leaders of the moderate group which was established in 1991. In doing so, in the Brotherhood and the late King Hussein the Brotherhood was able to entrench itself in bin Talal remained strong and prevented the society and influence a broad segment of it. 2 relationship from reaching “the brink of the abyss.” Instead, issues were resolved through There was a brief honeymoon period between personal meetings. the state and the Brotherhood during the 1991 war in Iraq, when the Brotherhood With King Abdullah’s ascension to the throne, participated in Mudar Badran’s government the relationship between the two sides entered a new phase. Hamas leaders were expelled 2 Muhammad Abu Rumman and Hassan Abu Haniyeh, from Jordan at the end of 1999 and the “The Islamic Solution in Jordan: Islamists, the State, and the Ventures of Democracy and Security,” Brotherhood file was handed over to be dealt Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, 2nd Ed., (2013): with in large part by the security institutions. 63 - 72. 7 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - The Dispute over the New Rules of the Game The State and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan The Brotherhood then participated in the Meetings between the king and Brotherhood 2003 parliamentary elections based on an leadership became rare, and their relationship agreement with the regime. This was linked began to be framed by security matters. to international and regional trends after 911/ Relations saw a brief and unexpected thaw in that promoted democracy in the Arab world 2008 at the hands of the former intelligence and the rise of American and Western theories director, Mohammed al-Dhahabi, who oversaw that linked the emergence of al-Qaeda to Arab a rapprochement with the Brotherhood and despotism.3 Hamas in the context of a struggle he had with his then rival, the Chief of the Royal Hashemite The opening of relations between both parties, Court Bassem Awadallah. However, these however, was temporary. Regional variables changes were short lived and ended when the soon imposed themselves on the relationship, intelligence director changed that same year such as the emergence of the axis of resistance in 2008.5 comprised of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan being The fundamental shift in relations occurred associated with this axis, and the emergence of with the outbreak of the 2011 Arab Spring. the moderate Arab camp made up of Jordan, The Muslim Brotherhood joined the popular Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The result movement, participated in demonstrations of this regional and domestic polarization was and marches, and refused to participate in the launch of a major government campaign the National Dialogue Committee, which the against the Brotherhood, including the government formed in 2011 to foster dialogue arrest of four deputies after they paid their about the demanded reforms. In response, the condolences to the family of Abu Musab al- Brotherhood presented seven reforms which Zarqawi, the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in the regime considered to be a “soft coup” 2006. This was followed by tampering with the due to its attempt to change the rules of the 2007 parliamentary elections to defeat Muslim game in Jordan and to limit the powers of the Brotherhood candidates and other political king constitutionally and politically.6 forces.
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