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China‟S Two Economies
China‟s Two Economies Contributing Analysts Uwe Parpart David Goldman Steve Wang Victor Kwan +852 2843 1474 +852 5328 3360 +852 2843 1464 +852 2843 1480 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] CHINA‟S STORY 2 CHINA‟S STORY IS CREATIVE DESTRUCTION – THE DESTRUCTION OF ONE CHINA AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANOTHER • Mao leveled the old imperial culture and empowered the peasants • Deng destroyed the countryside through mass migration and the One Child Policy, in favor of an urban smokestack, export economy • Xi‟s new government is tearing down large parts of the old smokestack economy and building a tech-based, consumption-oriented economy • Any snapshot of the Chinese economy captures two different things: the destruction of the old and building of the new • Aggregate GDP data don‟t capture the transformations now in progress • We drill down into the details to assemble a portrait of the emerging China 3 CHINA‟S TRANSFORMATION CHINA‟S CURRENT ECONOMIC GROWTH REMAINS 4 ROBUST Import data are a good cross-check on China‟s GDP. Iron ore imports jumped in Q4 2013 and maintained this level during 2014. Crude oil imports in the 1Q totaled 74.72 Mt, +8.3% from 1Q 2013, in-line with the pace of economic expansion Mn Tonnes Mn Tonnes 100.00 30.00 23.52 90.00 73.96 25.00 80.00 70.00 20.00 60.00 50.00 15.00 40.00 10.00 30.00 20.00 5.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 Imports of Iron Ore Source: Customs Imports of Crude Oil Source: Customs BUT GROWTH IS SHIFTING AWAY FROM 5 PROCESSING EXPORTS BASED ON CHEAP LABOR Academics, analysts and noted short sellers have repeatedly forecast the coming collapse of the Chinese economy. -
Asia Focus #3
PROGRAMME ASIE QUELLE COMPOSITION DU POLITBURO ET DU COMITÉ CENTRAL CHINOIS APRÈS 2017 ? Par Alex PAYETTE STAGIAIRE POSTDOCTORAL CRSH UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTREAL OCTOBRE 2016 Septembre 2016 ASIA FOCUS #3 l’IRIS ASIA FOCUS #3 - PROGRAMME ASIE / Octobre 2016 lors que 2016 se termine et que la campagne anticorruption agressivement menée par la tristement célèbre « jiwei » [纪委] a pris fin, il ne reste que A quelques mois pour finaliser la sélection interne des cadres qui seront appelés à être élus en novembre au Politburo ainsi qu’au Comité central. Cela dit, depuis la fin de 2015, nous avons pu remarquer un certain durcissement, voire même un « repli » de la part de Xi, tant dans son attitude face au pouvoir (p. ex. retour aux idiomes/symboles maoïstes, méfiance ouverte de l’Occident, attitude de plus en plus inflexible en matière de structures internationales, etc.), que dans son attitude envers certains patriarches du Parti, notamment Jiang Zemin (président de la République populaire entre 1993 et 2003) et Hu Jintao (président de 2003 à 2013), ainsi qu’envers les autres forces en présence sur la scène politique chinoise (par exemple la Ligue des jeunesses communistes [共青团]1, la « faction du pétrole » [石油帮]2, la bande Shanghai [ 上海帮], la bande du Jiangxi [江派], etc.). Ce dernier a également resserré son emprise non seulement sur Beijing – par le biais de son proche collaborateur Wang Xiaohong [王 小洪]3-, mais bien aussi sur le pays en entier. Tandis que le temps d’« abattre les tigres » [打虎] et que les déraillements de la jiwei sont encore perceptibles, en particulier dans la province du Hebei4, fort est de constater que l’impact n’est pas celui escompté, sauf dans les cas de Su Shulin [苏树林]5 et Jiang Jiemin [蒋洁敏]6, et qu’il ne sera pas vraiment possible d’évaluer les dégâts de cette campagne avant la formation du Comité central de 2022. -
December 1998
JANUARY - DECEMBER 1998 SOURCE OF REPORT DATE PLACE NAME ALLEGED DS EX 2y OTHER INFORMATION CRIME Hubei Daily (?) 16/02/98 04/01/98 Xiangfan C Si Liyong (34 yrs) E 1 Sentenced to death by the Xiangfan City Hubei P Intermediate People’s Court for the embezzlement of 1,700,00 Yuan (US$20,481,9). Yunnan Police news 06/01/98 Chongqing M Zhang Weijin M 1 1 Sentenced by Chongqing No. 1 Intermediate 31/03/98 People’s Court. It was reported that Zhang Sichuan Legal News Weijin murdered his wife’s lover and one of 08/05/98 the lover’s relatives. Shenzhen Legal Daily 07/01/98 Taizhou C Zhang Yu (25 yrs, teacher) M 1 Zhang Yu was convicted of the murder of his 01/01/99 Zhejiang P girlfriend by the Taizhou City Intermediate People’s Court. It was reported that he had planned to kill both himself and his girlfriend but that the police had intervened before he could kill himself. Law Periodical 19/03/98 07/01/98 Harbin C Jing Anyi (52 yrs, retired F 1 He was reported to have defrauded some 2600 Liaoshen Evening News or 08/01/98 Heilongjiang P teacher) people out of 39 million Yuan 16/03/98 (US$4,698,795), in that he loaned money at Police Weekend News high rates of interest (20%-60% per annum). 09/07/98 Southern Daily 09/01/98 08/01/98 Puning C Shen Guangyu D, G 1 1 Convicted of the murder of three children - Guangdong P Lin Leshan (f) M 1 1 reported to have put rat poison in sugar and 8 unnamed Us 8 8 oatmeal and fed it to the three children of a man with whom she had a property dispute. -
Chinese Politics in the Xi Jingping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership
CHAPTER 1 Governance Collective Leadership Revisited Th ings don’t have to be or look identical in order to be balanced or equal. ڄ Maya Lin — his book examines how the structure and dynamics of the leadership of Tthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have evolved in response to the chal- lenges the party has confronted since the late 1990s. Th is study pays special attention to the issue of leadership se lection and composition, which is a per- petual concern in Chinese politics. Using both quantitative and qualitative analyses, this volume assesses the changing nature of elite recruitment, the generational attributes of the leadership, the checks and balances between competing po liti cal co ali tions or factions, the behavioral patterns and insti- tutional constraints of heavyweight politicians in the collective leadership, and the interplay between elite politics and broad changes in Chinese society. Th is study also links new trends in elite politics to emerging currents within the Chinese intellectual discourse on the tension between strongman politics and collective leadership and its implications for po liti cal reforms. A systematic analy sis of these developments— and some seeming contradictions— will help shed valuable light on how the world’s most populous country will be governed in the remaining years of the Xi Jinping era and beyond. Th is study argues that the survival of the CCP regime in the wake of major po liti cal crises such as the Bo Xilai episode and rampant offi cial cor- ruption is not due to “authoritarian resilience”— the capacity of the Chinese communist system to resist po liti cal and institutional changes—as some foreign China analysts have theorized. -
BETWEEN TAIZIDANG and TUANPAI: What's Next for China's Succession
CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona E-ISSN 2014-0843 opiniónASIA BETWEEN TAIZIDANG AND TUANPAI: 148 What’s next for China’s succession MAY crisis? 2012 Seán Golden, Senior Research Fellow associate, CIDOB oth the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) are facing succession crises in the autumn of 2012. One will be resolved by democrat- ic elections, the other by democratic centralism. In both cases short-term Band long-term strategies are at stake. In the short term, jockeying for power pro- motes radical rhetoric for immediate domestic consumption and political gain, even though this rhetoric could be counterproductive for any effective long-term strategy in a globalised economy. Beyond the short-term, radically different ideo- logical models are in conflict in both cases. In the US, a right-wing coalition of Christian fundamentalists and wealthy people who see no danger in restricting scientific research, social entitlement and civil empowerment, nor in eliminating the middle class, are seeking to dismantle the limited amount of social guarantees that were begun by the New Deal in the 1930’s, while an incumbent President whose re-election is uncertain is trying to defend them. In the PRC, a reform pro- gramme based on liberalising the economy in order to generate wealth efficiently faces resistance from forces, inside and outside of the Party, that defend the redis- tribution of wealth in order to guarantee social equity and State-centred control of the economy and the country. The power struggle taking place within the Party-State in the run-up to the reno- vation of its leadership in the 18th Chinese Communist Party National Congress next October, when the “fifth generation” of leaders (Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang) will replace the current generation (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao), has become visible as a re- sult of the purging of Bo Xilai. -
The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report March 23, 2012 The China Rising Leaders Project, Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders by John Dotson USCC Research Coordinator With Supporting Research and Contributions By: Shelly Zhao, USCC Research Fellow Andrew Taffer, USCC Research Fellow 1 The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission China Rising Leaders Project Research Report Series: Part 1: The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders (March 2012) Part 2: China’s Emerging Leaders in the People’s Liberation Army (forthcoming June 2012) Part 3: China’s Emerging Leaders in State-Controlled Industry (forthcoming August 2012) Disclaimer: This report is the product of professional research performed by staff of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, the public release of this document does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the Commission’s other professional staff, of the views or conclusions expressed in this staff research report. Cover Photo: CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member Xi Jinping acknowledges applause in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People following his election as Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China during the 5th plenary session of the National People's Congress (March 15, 2008). -
China Analysis 48
China Analysis Les Nouvelles de Chine n°48 - Avril 2014 Sommaire DOSSIER : LE DÉFI DÉMOGRAPHIQUE CHINOIS 1. La Chine après le dividende démographique (Agatha Kratz et Clare Chng) 5 2. L'assouplissement de la politique de l'enfant unique (Camille Boullenois) 10 3. Les droits des femmes à l'épreuve de la politique de l'enfant unique (Hugo Winckler) 14 4. Émigration chinoise vers l'étranger : constats et controverses (Simeng Wang) 18 5. Mettre fin à la fragmentation du système des pensions de retraite (Marie-Hélène Schwoob) 2 3 REPÈRES 6. L'intensification de la lutte anticorruption : bilan et nouvelles orientations un an après le XVIIIe Congrès du PCC (Camille Liffran) 27 7. Quel avenir pour la « trêve diplomatique » entre Taipei et Pékin ? (Tanguy Lepesant) 33 8. La main invisible du Parti à l'université (Jérôme Doyon) 37 © Asia Centre 9. La Chine et l'Asean : entre tensions et coopération 71 boulevard Raspail (Abigaël Vasselier) 41 75006 Paris, France 10. La nouvelle réforme foncière chinoise : rationaliser l'urbanisation en www.centreasia.eu libéralisant le foncier rural (David Bénazéraf et Carine Henriot) 46 [email protected] ISSN : 2101 - 0048 SOMMAIRE DOSSIER : LE DÉFI DÉMOGRAPHIQUE CHINOIS Le dossier de ce numéro 48 de China Analysis revient sur le défi démographique chinois. La question de la politique de contrôle des naissances a été remise à l’ordre du jour à l’occasion du IIIè Plenum du XVIIIème Congrès du PCC, et il semblerait que les autorités soient désormais prêtes à assouplir la célèbre « politique de l’enfant unique ». Néanmoins, cette question n’est que l’un des nombreux aspects de la question démographique en Chine, et nous nous efforçons, avec ce dossier, d’en couvrir au moins cinq composantes majeures. -
BETWEEN TAIZIDANG and TUANPAI: 148 What’S Next for China’S Succession MAY Crisis? 2012
CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona E-ISSN 2014-0843 opiniónASIA BETWEEN TAIZIDANG AND TUANPAI: 148 What’s next for China’s succession MAY crisis? 2012 Seán Golden, Senior Research Fellow associate, CIDOB oth the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) are facing succession crises in the autumn of 2012. One will be resolved by democrat- ic elections, the other by democratic centralism. In both cases short-term Band long-term strategies are at stake. In the short term, jockeying for power pro- motes radical rhetoric for immediate domestic consumption and political gain, even though this rhetoric could be counterproductive for any effective long-term strategy in a globalised economy. Beyond the short-term, radically different ideo- logical models are in conflict in both cases. In the US, a right-wing coalition of Christian fundamentalists and wealthy people who see no danger in restricting scientific research, social entitlement and civil empowerment, nor in eliminating the middle class, are seeking to dismantle the limited amount of social guarantees that were begun by the New Deal in the 1930’s, while an incumbent President whose re-election is uncertain is trying to defend them. In the PRC, a reform pro- gramme based on liberalising the economy in order to generate wealth efficiently faces resistance from forces, inside and outside of the Party, that defend the redis- tribution of wealth in order to guarantee social equity and State-centred control of the economy and the country. The power struggle taking place within the Party-State in the run-up to the reno- vation of its leadership in the 18th Chinese Communist Party National Congress next October, when the “fifth generation” of leaders (Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang) will replace the current generation (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao), has become visible as a re- sult of the purging of Bo Xilai. -
SUMMARY Rejuvenating Communism the Communist Youth
SUMMARY Rejuvenating Communism The Communist Youth League as a Political Promotion Channel in Post-Mao China Jérôme Doyon Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Jérôme Doyon All rights reserved ABSTRACT Rejuvenating Communism : The Communist Youth League as a Political Promotion Channel in Post- Mao China Jérôme Doyon How does the Chinese Party-State renew its political elite and maintain its cohesion in the post-Mao era? This is a key question to understand the evolution of China’s political system and still the explanations one can find in the literature are far from satisfactory. Overall, the literature on transformation of the Chinese political elite focuses on the broad outcomes, the fact that since the 1980s officials tend to be younger and more educated, but it falls short in unveiling the mechanisms at play. It gives a limited answer to the elite renewal issue as it leaves politics aside. By focusing on educational levels and technical skills it forgets about the importance of political commitment. I approach these questions through a unique account of the role played by the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) in terms of cadres’ recruitment and promotion since the 1980s. Using biographical data and a snowball sample of 92 interviewees I reconstructed the trajectories of CYL cadres. Beyond my focus on the central organization of the CYL in Beijing, I compared the situation of the CYL in the capital cities of two very different provinces and in four universities. -
China's Political Trajectory: Internal Contradictions and Inner-Party
China’s Political Trajectory: Internal Contradictions and Inner-Party Democracy Cheng Li Brookings Institution and Hamilton College Draft paper prepared for the conference “The Rise of China” Mount Holyoke College March 7-8, 2008 1 Introduction This year marks the 30th anniversary of China’s policy of “reform and opening,” which was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. During the past 30 years, China’s meteoric economic growth, profound societal transformations, and multi-faceted integration with the outside world have been widely recognized by both policymakers and the general public in the United States. Yet, the American China studies community seems to have been struck by a prolonged and peculiar sort of political blindness. The early signs of Chinese political experiments, such as genuine local elections and regional representations at the national leadership, have largely been overlooked.1 Some important socio-political forces unleashed by the country’s transition toward a market economy, including the emergence of an entrepreneurial class and a middle class, are commonly perceived as factors that are more likely to consolidate the existing authoritarian political system than to challenge it.2 The prevailing view in the United States is that, despite the economic dynamism exhibited by present-day China, the Chinese regime is still essentially a Communist system resistant to significant political change.3 Of course, China’s political development in the reform era, though intriguing and potentially consequential, has been far less fundamental or systemic than changes in the economic realm. Yet, it is too simplistic to think that the earthshaking socio-economic changes that have transformed China over the past three decades have taken place within a political vacuum, with no corresponding changes in the Chinese political system. -
Rule of the Princelings
Rule of the Princelings With his decisive Mandate, new Party Leader Xi Jinping Can Transform China. but Will he? By Cheng Li he much-anticipated 18th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November unfolded according to that classic rhythm in the study Tof Chinese elite politics: predictability giving way to ambiguity, and optimism alternating with cynicism. Prior to the announcement of the composition of the new guard, led by new party General Secretary Xi Jinping, many analysts both in China and abroad had believed that the new leadership would continue to maintain the roughly equal balance of power that existed between the Jiang Zemin camp and the Hu Jintao camp. Yet in the end, the results were a huge surprise: the Jiang camp won a landslide victory by obtaining six out of the seven seats on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) while only one leader in the Hu camp—Li Keqiang, now designated to become premier in March— was able to keep a seat on this supreme decision-making body. In the wake of the recent Bo Xilai scandal and the resulting crisis of CPC rule, many had anticipated that party leaders would adopt certain election mechanisms—what the Chinese authorities call “intra-party democracy”—to restore the party’s much-damaged legitimacy and to generate a sense that the new top leaders do indeed have an election-based new mandate to rule. For example, some analysts had anticipated that the CPC Central Committee might use competitive (though limited) multiple-candidate elections to select members of its leadership bodies, such as the twenty-five-member politburo or even the PSC. -
Throttling Dissent: China's New Leaders Refine Internet Control
FREEDOM HOUSE Freedom on the Net 2013 1 Throttling Dissent: China’s New Leaders Refine Internet Control Madeline Earp, Research Analyst, Freedom on the Net July 2013 Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... 2 About This Report ........................................................................................ 3 Key Developments: May 1, 2012-April 30, 2013 ................................................... 4 Key Figures ................................................................................................. 5 Introduction ................................................................................................ 6 Obstacles to Access ...................................................................................... 10 Limits on Content ........................................................................................ 17 Violations of User Rights ................................................................................ 32 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 45 About Freedom House ………………………………………………………………47 CHINA FREEDOM HOUSE Freedom on the Net 2013 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Xiao Qiang, founder and chief editor of China Digital Times and an adjunct professor of the School of Information, UC Berkeley, served as an advisor for this report. A second advisor based in Hong Kong requested anonymity. At Freedom House, Sanja Tatic Kelly, project director for Freedom on the Net, guided