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CURRICULUM VITAE Ernest Sosa I. Education CURRICULUM VITAE Ernest Sosa Professor of Philosophy, Romeo Elton Professor of Natural Theology Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Visiting Professor II (every spring term), Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 E-mail: [email protected] Dept. tel.: (401) 863-2718; dept. fax: (401) 863-2719 I. Education: University of Miami (Coral Gables, FL), 1957-61; B.A. in Philosophy, 1961 University of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh, PA), 1961-64; M.A., 1962; Ph.D., 1964 II. Professional Appointments: University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario): Instructor, 1963-1964; Assistant Professor, 1966-67 Brown University (Providence, RI): Postdoctoral Fellow, 1964-1966; Assistant Professor, 1967-1968; Associate Professor, 1968-1974; Chairman, 1970-1976; Professor, 1974- ; Acting Chairman, Fall Semester, 1981-1982; Romeo Elton Professor of Natural Theology, 1981- Visiting Professor at the Universities of Pittsburgh, Western Ontario, Miami, Michigan (Ann Arbor), Salamanca (twice), and Texas (Austin); the National University of Mexico; and Harvard University. Cowling Visiting Professor at Carleton College. Christensen Fellow at St. Catherine's College, Oxford University. Visiting Professor, CUNY Graduate Center. Visiting Fellow, Australian National University. Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford University. III. Completed Research: A. Bibliography 1963 • "The Paradigm-Case Argument: Necessary, Causal or Normative? Methodos XV: 253-273. 1964 • "The Analysis of 'Knowledge That P'," Analysis 25: 1-8. (Reprinted as part of the Bobbs-Merrill reprint series in philosophy.) 1965 • "Professor Malcolm on 'Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory'," Dialogue III: 422-423. (Reprinted in C.V. Borst, The Mind/Brain Identity Theory (London: MacMillan, 1970).) • "Actions and their Results," Logique et Analyse, Nouvelle Serie, 8 Annee, pp. 111-125. 1966 • "Necessity, the A Priori, and Unexpressible Statements," (with Brian Skyrms), Philosophical Studies 16: 65-74. • "On the Logic of Intrinsically Better," (with R.M. Chisholm), American Philosophical Quarterly 3: 244-50. • "Imperatives and Referential Opacity," Analysis 27: 49-52. • "The Logic of Imperatives," Theoria 32 : 224-35. • "On Practical Reasoning and the Logic of Imperatives," Theoria 32: 211-223. • "Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation," (with R.M. Chisholm) Synthese 16: 321-331. 1967 • "Hypothetical Reasoning," Journal of Philosophy LXIV: 293-305. • "The Semantics of Imperatives," American Philosophical Quarterly 4: 57-64. 1969 • "Comments on Descartes' Ontological Argument," Fact and Existence, ed. by Joseph Margolis (Oxford: Blackwells). • "Propositional Knowledge," Philosophical Studies XX: 33-43. • "Quantifiers, Beliefs, and Sellars," Philosophical Logic, ed. by J. Davis, D. Hockney, and W.K. Wilson (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company) 66-73. (Proceedings of the 1967 conference on philosophical logic at the University of Western Ontario.) • "Mill's Utilitarianism," Mill's Utilitarianism, ed. by James M. Smith and Ernest Sosa (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company): 154-72. 1970 • "Propositional Attitudes de Dicto and de Re," Journal of Philosophy LXVII (1970): 883-896. (Invited paper for an APA symposium on Belief, December 28, 1970. (Cf. Jaakko Hintikka, "Sosa on Propositional Attitudes de Dicto and de Re," ibid., LXVIII (1971) 489-497.) • "Two Conceptions of Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy LXVII: 59-66. • "On Practical Inference, with an Excursus on Theoretical Inference," Logique et Analyse, Nouvelle Serie 13 Annee, 215-230. (Proceedings of the Brussels Colloquium on philosophical logic of December, 1969.) • "Replies to Objections," ibid., 257-261. 1971 • "Rejoinder to Hintikka," ibid., LXVIII: 497-501. 1972 • "On the Nature and Objects of Knowledge," The Philosophical Review LXXXI: 364-371. (Discussion- review of The Concept of Knowledge, by Panayot Butchvarov.) • "On the Concept of Value," discussion- review of Values and the Future, by Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy Forum. 1973 • "What is a Logical Constant?" in Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences, edited by Robert S. Cohen and Marx Wartofsky (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel Publishing Company). (Proceedings of the 1972 Boston Colloquium in Philosophy of Science.) • "Standard Conditions," in Modality, Morality and Other Problems of Sense and Nonsense, volume in honor of Soren Hallden edited by the Philosophy Department of the University of Lund, Sweden (Lund: CWK Gleerup). 1974 • "How Do You Know?" American Philosophical Quarterly 11: 113-22. (Reprinted in G.S. Pappas and M. Swain, Essays on Knowledge and Justification (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978); 184-205.) • "On Our Knowledge of Matters of Fact," Mind 83: 388-405. 1975 • "Introduction to Causation and Conditionals (London: Oxford University Press), 1-14. (Part of the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series.) • "Russell, Berkeley, y la materia objectiva," Crítica VII: 35-43. 1976 • "¿Hasta donde se puede llevar la duda?" Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía II: 71-73. • "Epistemic Subjectivism," discussion-review of Knowledge, by Keith Lehrer, Journal of Philosophy LXXIII : 812-21. 1977 • "Thought, Inference, and Knowledge" discussion-review of Thought, by Gilbert Harman, Nous XI : 421- 31. 1978 • "Respuesta a Pfeiffer," Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía IV: 80-1. • "Tipos de Causalidad," Crítica 10: 5-21. 1979 • "The Status of Becoming: What is Happening Now?" The Journal of Philosophy LXXVI : 26-42. • "El fundamentismo axiológico," El hombre y su conducta (University of Puerto Rico Press), edited by Jorge Gracia. • "Los fundamentos del fundamentismo," Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 5. (Largely a Spanish translation of "The Foundations of Foundationalism," below; invited and translated by the editors.) • "Epistemic Presupposition," Justification and Knowledge, ed. by George Pappas (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company); 79-92. (Proceedings of the 1978 conference on justification and knowledge at the Ohio State University.) • "On Groundless Belief," Synthese 43: 453-60. (Discussion-review of Groundless Belief, by Michael Williams.) 1980 • "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. V: 3-25. Reprinted as follows: P. Moser, ed., Empirical Knowledge (a reader for graduate courses published by Rowman & Allanheld, 1986). P. Moser and A. vander Nat, eds., Human Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Approaches (a reader for undergraduate courses published by Oxford University Press, 1987; also in 2nd ed., 1995). In a Blackwell epistemology anthology edited by E. Sosa and J. Kim. In Louis Pojman, ed., The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings (a reader for undergraduate courses published by Wadsworth, 1992; and in the new 1998 edition). In Epistemology: the Big Questions, ed. by Linda Alcoff (Blackwell, 1998). In Marko Rajkovic, ed., Belief and Justification: The Problem of Knowledge in Contemporary Analytica Philosophy (Ibis Grafika, Zagreb, 2002). In Philosophy for the 21st Century, (Oxford University Press, 20030, a collection edited by Steven Cahn. Also in the Harcourt College Custom Publishers Harcourt Digital Library: Philosophy. In Knowledge and Reality: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Prentice-Hall, 2003). Translated into French and published in a collection edited by Pascal Engel and Julien Dutant (Vrin Publishers, 2004). • "The Foundations of Foundationalism," Nous XIV: 547-65. 1981 • "Varieties of Causation," Grazer Philosophische Studien . (English version of "Tipos de Causalidad," above. Reprinted in Causation ed. E. Sosa and M. Tooley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).) • "Scriven on Causation as Explanation," Theory and Decision 13: 357-61. • "A Rejoinder on Actions and De Re Belief," (with Mark Pastin) Canadian Journal of Philosophy XI: 735-39. • "Epistemology Today: A Perspective in Retrospect," Philosophical Studies 40: 309-332. (Proceedings of the 1980 Conference in Epistemology at UNC/Greensboro; reply by Arnold Levison, ibid.) 1983 • "Consciousness of the Self and of the Present," Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World (festschrift for Hector-Neri Castañeda), edited by James Tomberlin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company); 131-47. (Cf. Castañeda's "Reply to Sosa," ibid., 385-92.) • "Propositions and Indexical Attitudes," On Believing, edited by Herman Parret (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter Verlag) 316- 332. (Proceedings of the 1981 epistemology conference held by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique of France. A Spanish version appears in Analisis Filosofico III: 1-19; invited and translated by the editors.) • "Nature Unmirrored, Epistemology Naturalized," in special issue in epistemology of Synthese 55: 49-72. Reprinted in D. Føllesdal, ed., The Philosophy of Quine (Garland Publishers, 2000). • "Classical Analysis," Journal of Philosophy LXXX: 695-710. (Invited main paper for an APA symposium, December 30, 1983.) • "On the 'Content' and 'Relevance' of Information-Theoretic Epistemology," discussion-review of Knowledge and the Flow of Information, by Fred I. Dretske, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences . 1984 • "Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation," Midwest Studies in Philosophy IX. Reprinted in Problems of Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, edited by Jack Crumley III (Mayfield, 1999). • Review of Sensory and Noetic Consciousness, by F. Brentano, Canadian Philosophical
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