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The Right to Representation Recently Recognised

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The Right to Representation Recently Recognised Legal aid Right or privilege? In Olaf Dietrich v The Queen the Australian High Court confirmed that Karen Fletcher the right to a fair trial is a \ . fundamental prescript of the law of this country’1 and, in serious criminal cases and in the absence of ‘exceptional circumstances’, an accused person who is unable to afford legal represen­ tation must be provided with counsel at public expense. Cases in which such a person is not provided with counsel should, according to the majority High Court decision in Dietrich, handed down The right to representation on 13 November 1992, be adjourned until legal representation is provid­ recently recognised by the ed, indefinitely if necessary. Olaf Dietrich was refused legal aid, for his trial before the Victorian High Court may be no County Court in May of 1988, by the Victorian Legal Aid Commission for a plea of not guilty, although he was offered assistance for a plea of more than international guilty. The High Court has set aside his conviction on the grounds of a covenants require. miscarriage of justice arising from the failure of the County Court judge to exercise his discretion to adjourn proceedings until Dietrich was pro­ vided with legal assistance at public expense. In May of 1988 Dietrich presented his own defence in the Victorian County Court to an indictment containing four counts relating to the importation and possession of a trafficable quantity of heroin in December 1986. Dietrich was unrepresented at the trial because of his lack of means and the rejection of his applications for legal assistance. The trial was lengthy and complex, especially in relation to the admissibility of evi­ dence. Dietrich requested that the trial be adjourned until he was assigned legal assistance. He protested that he was unable to defend himself ade­ quately, due to his lack of knowledge of the legal process and his stressed mental state. His submissions on this question were, effectively, ignored. The trial proceeded for a total of 40 days, and Dietrich remained unrepresented. At the conclusion of the trial the jury found him guilty on one of the four counts. Dietrich appealed against his conviction to the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in May 1989 on the ground, among others, that ‘every person charged with an indictable offence in [Victoria] is entitled to coun­ sel provided at the expense of the State and that failure to appoint counsel to defend [Dietrich] was a breach of the “due process” requirements of th e... unwritten Constitution of the State of Victoria and the application of Division 3 of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980.’2 The appeal was unsuccessful on this and all other grounds. Dietrich’s subsequent application for leave to appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal was heard in March 1992. The appeal was grounded, primarily, on a claim that an accused person, charged with a serious crime, punishable by imprison­ ment, who cannot afford counsel, has a right to be provided with counsel a t p u b lic ex p e n se . The application accepted that the decision sought would involve an overruling of the decision in the leading Australian case cm the right to Karen Fletcher is a freelance journalist and part-time co u n se l, Mclnnis v R (1979) 143 CLR 575. Counsel for Dietrich argued financial counsellor in Sydney and was formerly Convenor of that Australia’s international obligations in relation to providing a fair the Queensland Association of Independent Legal Services. trial have changed since the decision in Mclnnis. VOL. IB,NO I, FEBRUARY • 1993 21 RI GHT TO LEGAL AID The decision in Mclnnis was handed down in December The formulation they prefer is that used in the opening to 1979. On 13 August 1980, Australia ratified the International this article: the right to a fair trial. Mason CJ and McHugh, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Optional Protocol Deane and Toohey JJ agree that this right implies a right not to was ratified on 25 December 1991. be tried (i.e. to have the case adjourned) without the benefit of The argument based on Australia’s international obligations counsel in serious criminal cases unless there are ‘exceptional’ under the Convention raised by counsel for Dietrich has been (Mason, McHugh and Deane) or ‘compelling’ (Toohey) cir­ previously noted by commentators on Australian human rights cumstances indicating otherwise. law : Toohey lists possible ‘compelling circumstances’ as ‘. At the time of the hearing of M clnnis the Commonwealth had not rati­ the situation of witnesses, particularly the victim . conse­ fied the ICCPR and so the obligations in Article 14 did not apply. It is quences of the adjournment for the presentation of the prose­ the view of the author that, even if the High Court was correct in cution case and for the court’s programme generally’ (at 63). 1979, it should now note the fact that Australia is a party to the ICCPR and follow the lead given by Murphy J in Mclnnis? Gaudron J, whose judgment forms part of the majority in Dietrich, went much further than her fellow judges. She held, In his dissenting judgment in Mclnnis, Justice Murphy rec­ without qualification for either ‘exceptional’ or ‘compelling’ ommended that special leave to appeal against the conviction circumstances, that: of M clnnis for deprivation of liberty and rape, should be granted and the conviction and sentence set aside for a sub­ . tip the extent that it [Mclnnis] is authority for the proposition that stantial miscarriage of justice. legal]representation is not essential for the fair trial of a serious offence [it] should no longer be followed. Instead, legal representation M clnnis, like Dietrich, was unable to afford legal represen­ should be seen as essential for the fair trial of serious offences unless tation and was unsuccessful in his applications for free legal the accused chooses to represent himself [sic], [at 83] aid. There was, however, some chance that he may have been able to obtain money from his family in order to retain coun­ sel, and there were some channels of appeal, within the legal aid system, which he had not yet explored. His barrister with­ drew from his case one day before the trial. Mclnnis was forced to present his own defence. Murphy J supported his dissenting views with an exposi­ tion of what he considered to be fundamental Australian com­ mon law principles on the rule of law and the right to counsel . He also examined international precedents, especially in United States cases, and cited Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Australia was then a signatory but which had not then been formally rat­ ified by Australia. The dissent was a strong and impassioned one. In his open­ ing paragraph M urphy said: Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, a right which is not in the slightest diminished by the strength of the prosecution’s evi­ dence and includes the right to counsel in all serious cases. This right should not depend on whether an accused can afford counsel. Where the kind of trial a person receives depends on the amount of money he or she has, there is no equal justice.4 The majority in Mclnnis (Barwick CJ and Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ) took what has been seen as the opposite view to Murphy J, although their finding may not have been essen­ tial to the ultimate result, that: Legal aid and access to justice in Australia an accused in Australia does not have a right to present his case by T h e Dietrich case has come before the High Court at a time of counsel provided at public expense. However he does have the right intense debate in Australian legal, political and community to apply for legal aid under statutory procedures .. .[Mclnnis at 581] sectors around the issues of access to justice, the cost of legal The Dietrich majority, in 1992, stopped short of over-ruling services and government legal aid funding. Mclnnis. The decision has already prompted Legal Aid Mason CJ and McHugh J, in a joint judgment, distinguish Commissions throughout Australia to point to their financial Mclnnis on the basis that the actual decision (that there had inability to provide legal aid in all cases in which a ‘fair trial’ been no miscarriage of justice in M clnnis’s particular situa­ would require it and to call for an increase in federal and State tion) did not turn on their assumption that an indigent accused funding to the Commissions. does not have a right to be provided with counsel at public Dawson J, in his dissenting judgment in Dietrich, states expense. They conclude that there is, therefore, no reason why clearly and succinctly the reasoning behind the position which the statements on the right to counsel in should not be Mclnnis holds that legal assistance cannot be provided in all cases in reconsidered. which the interests of justice require it: On reconsideration, however, they conclude that ‘it should . the interests of justice cannot be pursued in isolation. There are be accepted that Australian law does not recognise that an competing demands upon the public purse which must be reconciled indigent accused on trial for a serious criminal offence has a and the funds available for the provision of legal aid are necessarily right to the provision of counsel at public expense’ (at 15). limited, [at 56] 22 ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL RIGHT TO LEGAL AID This problem is not limited to the question of serious crimi­ gets.
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