Iraq in Books by Michael Rubin
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Geopolitics, Oil Law Reform, and Commodity Market Expectations
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW VOLUME 63 WINTER 2011 NUMBER 2 GEOPOLITICS, OIL LAW REFORM, AND COMMODITY MARKET EXPECTATIONS ROBERT BEJESKY * Table of Contents I. Introduction .................................... ........... 193 II. Geopolitics and Market Equilibrium . .............. 197 III. Historical U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East ................ 202 IV. Enter OPEC ..................................... ......... 210 V. Oil Industry Reform Planning for Iraq . ............... 215 VI. Occupation Announcements and Economics . ........... 228 VII. Iraq’s 2007 Oil and Gas Bill . .............. 237 VIII. Oil Price Surges . ............ 249 IX. Strategic Interests in Afghanistan . ................ 265 X. Conclusion ...................................... ......... 273 I. Introduction The 1973 oil supply shock elevated OPEC to world attention and ensconced it in the general consciousness as a confederacy that is potentially * M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami. 193 194 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:193 antithetical to global energy needs. From 1986 until mid-1999, prices generally fluctuated within a $10 to $20 per barrel band, but alarms sounded when market prices started hovering above $30. 1 In July 2001, Senator Arlen Specter addressed the Senate regarding the need to confront OPEC and urged President Bush to file an International Court of Justice case against the organization, on the basis that perceived antitrust violations were a breach of “general principles of law.” 2 Prices dipped initially, but began a precipitous rise in mid-March 2002. -
Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover Berkeley Law
Berkeley Law Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository Faculty Scholarship 1-1-2005 Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover Berkeley Law Hanny Megally Hania Mufti Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Bremer's Gordian Knot: Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq, 27 Hum. Rts. Q. 830 (2005) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Bremer's "Gordian Knot": Transitional Justice and the US Occupation of Iraq Eric Stover,* Hanny Megally, ** & Hania Mufti*** ABSTRACT Shortly after the US invasion and occupation of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer III, in his capacity as the chief administrator of the Coalition Provisional Author- ity (CPA), introduced several transitional justice mechanisms that set the *Eric Stover is Director of the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, and Adjunct Professor in the School of Public Health. In 1991, Stover led a team of forensic scientists to northern Iraq to investigate war crimes committed by Iraqi troops during the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s. In March and April 2003, he returned to northern Iraq where he and Hania Mufti monitored the compliance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions by all sides to the conflict. He returned to Iraq in February 2004 to assist Mufti in investigating the status of documentary and physical evidence to be used in trials against Saddam Hussein and other members of the Ba'athist Party. -
The Search for Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: a Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their Applicability to Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 Brook
Brooklyn Journal of International Law Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 2 2007 The eS arch for Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their Applicability to Post- Saddam Iraq Dana M. Hollywood Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil Recommended Citation Dana M. Hollywood, The Search for Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Their Applicability to Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2007). Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol33/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks. THE SEARCH FOR POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE IN IRAQ: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO POST- SADDAM IRAQ Dana Michael Hollywood* INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................60 I. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE .......................................................................63 A. Conceptual Overview .....................................................................63 B. Retributive v. Restorative Justice ...................................................67 C. Truth v. Justice...............................................................................69 1. Truth: A Right to Disclosure?.....................................................70 a. Is -
Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: in Brief
Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief Christopher M. Blanchard Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Amy Belasco Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget January 9, 2015 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43727 Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief Summary The FY2015 continuing appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-164, H.J.Res. 124, FY2015 CR), enacted on September 19, 2014, authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) through December 11, 2014, or until the passage of a FY2015 national defense authorization act (NDAA), to provide overt assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, and sustainment, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes. The FY2015 NDAA (P.L. 113- 291, H.R. 3979) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, H.R. 83) provide further authority and funding for the program. Congress acted in response to President Obama’s request for authority to begin such a program as part of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and to set the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war. The FY2015 measures authorize DOD to submit reprogramming requests to the four congressional defense committees to transfer available funds. DOD submitted the first such reprogramming request in November 2014 under authorities provided by P.L. 113-164, and, in December, Congress approved $220 million in requested funds to begin program activities. H.R. 83 states that up to $500 million of $1.3 billion made available by the act for a new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) may be used to support the Syria train and equip program. -
2003 Iraq War: Intelligence Or Political Failure?
2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies and of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies By Dione Brunson, B.A. Georgetown University Washington, D.C. April, 2011 DISCLAIMER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS ACADEMIC RESEARCH PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND DO NOT REFLECT THE OFFICIAL POLICIES OR POSITIONS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, OR THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. ALL INFORMATION AND SOURCES FOR THIS PAPER WERE DRAWN FROM OPEN SOURCE MATERIALS. ii 2003 IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE OR POLITICAL FAILURE? Dione Brunson, B.A. MALS Mentor: Ralph Nurnberger, Ph.D. ABSTRACT The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you God for continued wisdom. Thank you Dr. Nurnberger for your patience. iv DEDICATION This work is dedicated to Mom and Dad for their continued support. -
US and Kurdish Forces Keep Iraqi Northern
MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds U.S. and Kurdish Forces Keep Iraqi Northern Front Stable by Soner Cagaptay Apr 7, 2003 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Soner Cagaptay Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony he northern front was supposed to have been occupied by tens of thousands of U.S. troops who would make up T the second front of a pincer movement against Baghdad. But Turkey's refusal to allow American forces and heavy armor to cross the Turkish-Iraqi frontier means that only a few thousand moderately armed allied soldiers are now engaging Saddam Hussein's troops in the north. And fighting along side the allies are lightly armed Kurdish forces. Although the revised allied campaign in the north has been successful, many analysts believe that the original plan might have backfired. While there's little doubt that American tanks rolling across northern Iraq toward Baghdad would shorten the war, it also might have opened the door for Turkey to send large numbers of troops into Kurdish- controlled territory -- igniting a conflict between Turks and Kurds. "I guess we have everything to be thankful for the fact all hell did not break lose in the north," says Charles Pena, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute here in Washington. "The Turks showed some restraint and did not come across the border, really in large numbers. And the Kurds did likewise show restraint. So that, combined with the fact that the Iraqi forces in the north don't seem very interested in engaging in offensive operations means that the north has stayed relatively stable. -
Neoconservative Propaganda Campaign Led to Iraq War Z
Neoconservative Propaganda Campaign Led to Iraq War Karen Kwiatkowski ( 2004/1/11 ) [ Document Starts on the Next Page. ] Key Words: Iraq, Neoconservative, Neocon, Description: insiders view of neoconservative manipulation of the pentagon Search the Card Catalog for other titles. Visit our Home page: zFacts.com This document is referred to by the following pages: What's behind the new U.S. global policy? This PDF = http://zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/Am-Conservative-2004-Neocons-Iraq-War.pdf Problems? Try right clicking links. Former Pentagon Insider : 'Neoconservative Propaganda C... http://www.truthout.org/docs_04/printer_011204C.shtml Go to Original Former Pentagon Insider: 'Neoconservative Propaganda Campaign Led to Iraq War' By Karen Kwiatkowski The American Conservative January 19th Issue Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, a former Pentagon insider, concludes her observations on the run-up to the Iraq war in this last of a three-part series. As the winter of 2002 approached, I was increasingly amazed at the success of the propaganda campaign being waged by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and neoconservative mouthpieces at the Washington Times and Wall Street Journal. I speculated about the necessity but unlikelihood of a Phil-Dick-style minority report on the grandiose Feith-Wolfowitz-Rumsfeld-Cheney vision of some future Middle East where peace, love, and democracy are brought about by pre-emptive war and military occupation. In December, I requested an acceleration of my retirement after just over 20 years on duty and exactly the required three years of time-in-grade as a lieutenant colonel. I felt fortunate not to have being fired or court-martialed due to my politically incorrect ways in the previous two years as a real conservative in a neoconservative Office of Secretary of Defense. -
Transitions in Iraq: Changing Environment Changing Organizations Changing Leadership
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMANDER U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND 1562 MITSCHER AVENUE SUITE 200 IN REPLY REFER TO: NORFOLK, VA 23551-2488 102 20 JAN 2010 Mr. Steven Aftergood Federation of American Scientists 1725 DeSales Street NW, 6th Floor Washington, DC 20036 Dear Mr. Aftergood, This is a partial response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, dated 7 May 2008, in which you seek a copy of a 2006 study of operations in Iraq that was performed by the Joint Warfighting Center at the direction of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducted a thorough search and discovered one hundred eighty-seven (187) pages of documents responsive to your request. We are releasing a partial copy of this information: portions of pages 47-51 are being withheld under Exemption 1; portions of pages 140-141 are being withheld under Exemption 2; and portions of pages 17-22 and 140 are being withheld under Exemption 6. Exemption 1 pertains to information specifically authorized by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy that is properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. Exemption 2 pertains to internal information the release of which would constitute a risk of circumvention of a legal requirement. Exemption 6 pertains to information the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of a third party. Please be advised that this is only a partial response. Significant portions of this record fall under the jurisdiction of other agencies, whom USJFCOM must consult regarding their equities. -
March 26, 2019 the Honorable Richard Shelby Chair, Senate
March 26, 2019 The Honorable Richard Shelby The Honorable Patrick Leahy Chair, Senate Committee on Appropriations Vice Chair, Senate Committee on U.S. Senate Appropriations Washington, DC 20510 Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs The Honorable Lindsey Graham The Honorable Nita Lowey Chair, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Chair, House Committee on Appropriations on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Chair, House Appropriations Subcommittee Programs on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs U.S. House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 The Honorable Kay Granger The Honorable Harold Rogers Ranking Member, House Committee on Ranking Member, House Appropriations Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs The Honorable James Risch The Honorable Robert Menendez Chair, Senate Committee on Foreign Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Relations Foreign Relations The Honorable Eliot Engel The Honorable Michael McCaul Chair, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Ranking Member, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Dear Members of Congress: As former diplomats and national security officials, as well as leaders of non-governmental organizations, we write to express our most serious concern about the President’s 2020 budget proposal for international refugee and humanitarian assistance. At a time in which global forced displacement, at nearly 70 million, is at its highest level since these numbers have been recorded, it is disheartening that the administration is proposing a reduction in humanitarian aid of more than $3 billion, or more than one-third of the amount the United States is expected to spend on such aid in this fiscal year. Such cuts would have devastating impacts on civilians at grave risk in countries experiencing conflicts or natural disasters, and we urge you to sustain and even augment the current levels of refugee and humanitarian aid. -
Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security
Order Code RL31339 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Updated March 29, 2006 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, but Iraq remains violent and unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, as well as growing sectarian violence. According to its November 30, 2005, “Strategy for Victory,” the Bush Administration indicates that U.S. forces will remain in Iraq until the country is able to provide for its own security and does not serve as a host for radical Islamic terrorists. The Administration believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. However, mounting casualties and costs — and growing sectarian conflict — have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals. The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is showing important successes, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term National Assembly, a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005), progress in building Iraq’s security forces, and economic growth. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has been working to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions; Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein but now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. -
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance
Order Code RL31339 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Updated May 16, 2005 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished a long-standing U.S. objective, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but replacing his regime with a stable, moderate, democratic political structure has been complicated by a persistent Sunni Arab-led insurgency. The Bush Administration asserts that establishing democracy in Iraq will catalyze the promotion of democracy throughout the Middle East. The desired outcome would also likely prevent Iraq from becoming a sanctuary for terrorists, a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report. The Bush Administration asserts that U.S. policy in Iraq is now showing substantial success, demonstrated by January 30, 2005 elections that chose a National Assembly, and progress in building Iraq’s various security forces. The Administration says it expects that the current transition roadmap — including votes on a permanent constitution by October 31, 2005 and for a permanent government by December 15, 2005 — are being implemented. Others believe the insurgency is widespread, as shown by its recent attacks, and that the Iraqi government could not stand on its own were U.S. and allied international forces to withdraw from Iraq. Some U.S. commanders and senior intelligence officials say that some Islamic militants have entered Iraq since Saddam Hussein fell, to fight what they see as a new “jihad” (Islamic war) against the United States. -
An Interview with Bing West
SMALL WARS JOURNAL smallwarsjournal.com The Wrong War: An Interview with Bing West by Michael Few Bing West’s The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan will be out on the bookshelf tomorrow. We asked Bing, a longtime supporter of Small Wars Journal, for an exclusive interview prior to publication. We wanted an honest, open discussion on the current war in Afghanistan and modern warfare. He more than delivered, and hopefully, this interview will be followed in several weeks with another by Octavian Manea. Enjoy the interview, and make sure that you go out and get his book! - Mike The new book title is quite provocative. Why is Afghanistan the “Wrong War?” Afghanistan is the Wrong War for our benevolent strategy of wooing the Pashtuns by offering money. Our senior leaders say the war cannot be won by killing. It will surely be lost if we don't kill more Islamist terrorists and hard-core Taliban. More disturbing, the US is steadily getting out of the arrest and imprisonment business, due to politics in the States. Why aren‟t we the “Strongest Tribe” in Afghanistan? In Iraq, the Sunni tribes, with an established hierarchy and strong intra-clan ties, came over to our side because, as their leaders told me, they concluded we were the strongest tribe. It was no accident that the Sunni Awakening began in Anbar, where the Marines had hammered the insurgents - al Qaeda and Sunni tribes alike - year after year. In Afghanistan, the Pashtun sub- tribes have no such established hierarchy. Many villages have scant contact with the next.