National High Water and Flooding Emergency Response Plan Part 1: Policy Scenario
1 Published by The Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Directorate-General for Public Safety and Security Crisis Control Department P.O. Box 100 3970 AC Driebergen [email protected] www.minbzk.nl
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Design Van Erkelens graphic design company, The Hague
Typesetting Aeroset, Rijswijk ZH
No rights can be derived from this publication. The information contained in this publication may be duplicated providing this publication is stated as the source.
6150/8347-GMD13 January 2007
2 Table of Contents
1 Introduction 5 1.1 Introduction 5 1.2 Objective 5 1.3 Target Group 6 1.4 Definitions of High Water and Flooding 6 1.5 Part of the National High Water and Flooding Emergency Response Plan 7 1.6 Relation to High Water and Storm Flood Crises handbook of the Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management 7 1.7 Management 7 1.8 Explanatory note 8
2 Approach: underlying premises 9 2.1 Introduction 9 2.2 Scenarios: what can we expect and how does this affect the measures described in this scenario? 9 2.2.1 What can we expect 9 2.3 How it affects the action of the crisis control organisation: Step-by-step scaling up structure 11 2.4 High water = trans-regional action 14 2.5 Trans-regional action = national management 15
3 National crisis control agencies and agencies involved 17 3.1 Introduction 17 3.2 Role of municipal, regional and provincial crisis agencies 17 3.3 Role of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 17 3.4 Inter-ministerial information and coordination: the parties, their tasks and powers 21 3.4.1 The actors 21 3.4.2 Contact safety regions, provinces and water board councils 25 3.5 Inter-ministerial information and coordination: the information and decision-making process 27
4 Process 29 4.1 Introduction 29 4.2 Description of process phases 0.1 and 2 30 4.3 Description of process phase 3 33
4 Proces 29 4.1 Inleiding 29 4.2 Beschrijving proces fasen 0,1 en 2 30 4.3 Beschrijving proces fase 3 33
5 The Departmental Coordination Centres and their networks 55 5.1 Introduction 55 Overview of State roles in the event of High Water 57 5.2 Overview of crisis structures of DCCs 57 5.2.1 Network diagram: Departmental Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management 57
3 5.2.2 Network diagram: Departmental Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 58 5.2.3 Network diagram: Departmental Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 59 5.2.4 Network diagram: Departmental Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport 60 5.2.5 Network diagram: Departmental Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Economic Affairs 61
Annex 1 Definitions / Abbreviations 63
Annex 2 Relevant websites 65
Annex 3 Map of Safety Regions 67
Annex 4 Water board councils 69
Annex 5 Dike Rings 71
Annex 6 Remits of warning agencies and role of the LCO 75
Annex 7 Overview of alarm/phasing of warning agencies 79
Annex 8 Scaling up diagrams: Coast and Ijsselmeer area 81
Annex 9 Accountability method for generic high water scenarios 83
Annex 10 Bottom-up information lines in inter-regional flooding 91
Annex 11 Overview of measures per strategy and per emergency management process 97
Annex 12 large-scale flood scenarios 99
Annex 13 Bibliography 101
4 1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Flood emergency response plans in the Netherlands have so far generally dealt with emergency scenarios on a regional scale and focus on efforts in the region concerned. Central government plays a limited role in the plans or is implicitly assigned a passive (reactive) role. In the event of high water the (impending) disaster will strike multiple regions simultaneously and regions that are not hit will also be involved in coming to the aid of the affected regions and in the care of people evacuated from the regions. Preparations confined to municipal or regional level are insufficient.
The current situation has much to do with the fact that, in the Netherlands, the tasks and powers involved in dealing with contingencies are primarily charged to decentral agencies. With regard to the role of the State in trans-regional calamities, a variety of expectations have gradually evolved. That trans-regional calamities must be coordinated by the State is widely supported.1 This policy scenario describes how the State puts this coordinating role into practice. The scenario is part of the National High Water and Flooding Emergency Response Plan.
The National High Water and Flooding Emergency Response Plan contains: 1. The National High Water and Flooding Policy Scenario 2. The National High Water and Flooding Operational Strategy 3. The National High Water and Flooding Communications Strategy
1.2 Objective
This policy scenario sets out the ways in which the State will take practical measures to tackle high water and flooding. This scenario describes inter-ministerial action: • In mutual relations (information and decision making) • Towards provinces and safety regions • Towards ministerial network partners The objective of this scenario is to describe an approach which will enable the parties involved both administratively and operationally to respond optimally to the (imminent) flood, thereby containing and/or managing the consequences of the flooding as effectively as possible.
The National Crisis Decision-Making Handbook (Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming) served as the context for this scenario. Parallel to developing this scenario, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management is developing a national High Water and Storm Flood Crises handbook (landelijk draaiboek Hoogwater- en Stormvloedcrises).
1 See report of the administrative congress of 31 May 2006
5 The scenario of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management sets out the action to be taken by, and arrangements between, the various agencies in the water sector. The arrangements in this scenario are in line with those in the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management handbook the national Evacuation handbook.2
1.3 Target group
This policy scenario is intended for all agencies involved in the inter-ministerial crisis control organisation and for those which, on the basis of their role in a sector relevant to high water and flooding, are in contact with this organisation (such as crisis coordinators in the water sector). The scenario is also intended for those within the administrative sector who, thanks to the role they play in their own crisis organisation must coordinate with representatives of the inter-ministerial crisis organisation (regional managers and operational leaders) at some point. An extra resource, the Guide on Managing the Impact of High Water (Handreiking Hoogwatergevolgbestrijding) has been developed within this project for these target groups. This guideline (brochure) offers an overview of the ‘chain moments’ between regional (municipal, provincial, functional) and central decision making and offers a clarification of the connection between the regional and inter-ministerial decision-making structures.
1.4 Definitions: Flooding and High Water
The National High Water and Flooding Emergency Response Plan is directed at activities that focus on managing, containing and preventing the consequences of an imminent and/or actual flood. We refer to flooding if a dike is breached and/or substantial quantities of water overflow considerable stretches of a water defence such that the influx of water cannot be halted by taking emergency measures.3 The definition ‘flooding’ concerns rivers, coastal areas and lakes and the large-scale consequences of the flood in terms of human lives and damage. Flooding results from a combination of natural causes (storm and/or heavy rain) and human or technical failure.4 It is assumed that a canal bursting its banks can be dealt with as a regional emergency.
The National Operational Strategy not only relates to the actual flooding but also to all the activities directed at managing, containing and combating the consequences of an imminent flood, also referred to as high water.5 High water occurs when the water rises above a specific pre-defined level; the water defences have not yet been breached. Although in this situation the disaster has not (yet) taken place, it is considered a crisis situation and large scale action is taken: full crisis control measures are mobilised (pre-crisis response). This situation thus differs from that of many other types of emergencies (post-crisis response). High water can, but is not necessarily, followed by flooding. In other words, the scenario not only describes the action taken in the event of a flood, but also the warning stages and the measures to be taken if flooding is imminent.6
2 Expected in 2007. 3 Project Nationale Veiligheid, zelfevaluatie Toenemen Overstromingsrisico (2006), p. 6 4 It may also be due to malicious intent. This scenario applies to tackling the results of such a situation; the action of the Ministry of Justice in the framework of the Terrorism scenarios runs parallel to this. 5 The term ‘high water’ is used to refer to rivers and the Ijsselmeer, while the term ‘flood’ is used to refer to coastal waters. To avoid the impression that this concerns two different types of emergency, we will use one term only in this document: high water. 6 For an impression of a large-scale flood, see annex 12.
6 To avoid misconceptions, in this plan we use the term ‘high water impact control’ for all activities directed at managing, containing and preventing the consequences of an imminent of actual flood.
1.5 Part of the National High Water and Flooding Emergency Response Plan
High water rapidly assumes the proportions of a large-scale crisis. By definition, the nature and scale of this kind of emergency means that several municipalities, dike rings, regions or even provinces may be hit. This not only applies to the bodies within the (potential) crisis area but also to the municipalities, dike rings and regions outside it. The evacuees are sheltered and cared for in these areas and damage claims and after-care are organised there. These are often lengthy processes that place considerable demands on the governments and aid organisations involved. With the scale of the crisis and of the social disruption that ensues, these processes call for national coordination. The same applies to the mobilisation of the – scarce – crisis control resources. The National Operational High Water and Flooding Strategy optimally coordinates the demand and supply of these resources. The Strategy supports the safety regions and the National Operational Coordination Centre (Landelijk Operationeel Coordinatiecentrum or LOCC in dealing with all assistance needs in a proactive and structured fashion. Together, the Policy Scenario and the Operational Strategy focus on the administrative and operational approach to (imminent) floods.
The High Water and Flooding Communications Strategy of the Expertise Centre for Risk and Crisis Communication (Expertisecentrum Risico- en Crisiscommunicatie or ERC) supplements the Policy Scenario and the Operational Strategy. It lays down the national communications strategy along with how to approach crisis communication.
1.6 Relation to High Water and Storm Flood Crises handbook of the Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management
This scenario has been developed to interact with the High Water and Storm Flood Crises handbook of the Ministry of Transport Public Works and Water Management. This scenario relates to the actions of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management in the event of (imminent) large scale flooding (specifically the provision of information, improving its own water management and shipping); this scenario deals with containing, managing and preventing the social impact of high water and flooding. Both handbooks are based on the same scenarios and integrate a clear, integrated scaling-up structure (paragraph 2.3).
1.7 Management
The management of the National Emergency Response Plan is in the hands of the Crisis Control department of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom relations. Here, the policy scenario is managed by the National Crisis Centre (NCC). The NCC pursues this management task in cooperation with the ministries involved. The Minister of BZK is the coordinating minister for crisis control. His coordinating accountability covers both the vertical, general administrative sector and the functional horizontal sector (see figure 1). Due to its nature and scale, high water is an emergency that
7 requires coordination within both the vertical and horizontal sector; consequently, the Ministry of BZK is responsible for the management of this document
Figure 1
Functional chain General chain
Minister of VenW Minister of BZK
Provincial Executive Queen’s Commissioner
Water Board Council Chairman Lord Mayor
Order line
Instruction
1.8 Explanatory note
The main points of the premises underlying this scenario are given in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we detail the tasks and powers of the actors in the national crisis structure. These chapters can be used as benchmarks in up-dating regional preparations for high water and flooding. Chapter 4 of this scenario is the guideline for action to be taken during a crisis situation. The measures taken by the actively involved parties are given in concrete terms, per phase. This chapter is to be used by the accountable parties within the regional crisis structures as a guideline in the response. Chapter 5 translates the tasks and powers into overviews and descriptions of the actions of the ministries involved.
8 2 Approach: underlying premises
2.1 Introduction
This High Water and Flooding Policy Scenario is intended to be a practical, workable resource. The description of the general crisis control organisation with its official tasks, powers and structures does not in itself offer a sufficient basis for taking effective, clear action under enormous time pressure, in highly specific circumstances. The dynamic of the high water scenarios which the crisis control organisation has set out to tackle, is of great relevance. The high water scenarios generate the framework within which the various relief services, safety regions and the State focus their action. The factors facing the crisis control organisation (bottlenecks, dilemmas) can be typified by means of common denominators’ related to the different stages of the crisis control organisation’s action. These phases determine the structure of the part of this document that deals specifically with high water and flooding.
In addressing high water and flooding contingencies, this document is founded on two pillars:
• A number of generic high water scenarios that determine the content within which the crisis control organisation (of which the State is a part) acts: the ‘situational frameworks’ • The various phases in the crisis management process that are typical of the bottlenecks and dilemmas present to the State, among others: ‘need’
This chapter contains a description of the main points of these pillars. We also indicate the aspects both have in common and the typical features of a flood crisis; by definition, trans- regional action is imperative! Why this is the case and what this means for up-scaling the crisis control organisation is explained in the third paragraph of this chapter.
2.2 Scenarios: what type of situations can we assume may occur and what does this mean to the description of the actions in this scenario?
2.2.1 The type of situations we can assume may occur
The descriptions in this scenario are emphatically placed within the specific context of high water. In so doing we attempted to identify typologies that are sufficiently flexible and recognisable to prepare for different situations (weather conditions, geographic and infrastructural features, population numbers and composition, speed of evacuation etc.) and which are not area-specific.7 This helps to arrive at a generic plan applicable in a variety of situations.
7 The area-specific scenarios are described in the regional high water crisis control plans.
9 When drawing up the scenarios, the following criteria were identified: 1 the number of individuals in the area in question, divided into: • the number of evacuees per hour • the number of individuals left behind 2 the time required to evacuate people from the area, divided into: • little time available < time required • much time available > required time
This leads to the four generic scenarios below:
Figure 2 Four Generic Scenarios Veel tijd Weinig tijd Few people threatened (scenario 1) (scenario 2) Least serious flooding scenario Many people threatened (scenario 3) (scenario 4) Most serious flooding scenario
In the serious flooding scenario (little available time, many people threatened) a less broad weighing up of interests can be made than in the least serious scenario (much time available, few people threatened).
The above scenarios assume that (some) time is available. Since the publication of the report ‘Risico’s in bedijkte termen’8, it is however accepted that it is possible that a water defence may fail without warning. This is why we distinguish a further, extreme variant of the most serious flooding scenario: No (or minimum) time.
In the report ‘Worst credible scenarios’ by the Ministry of V&W,9 ‘gravest realistic’ flooding scenarios are detailed for the coast, river area and the Ijsselmeer area. The scenario of the coast is the most grave in terms of scale and time. This scenario shows that in the event of a flood in the worst weather conditions (= likelihood less than 1 x per 10,000 years) major areas of the west of the Netherlands could be affected. This scenario also shows that, even in this situation, large sections of the west of the country will not be affected because of their location (relatively high or relatively shielded behind a broad line of sand dunes or ‘protected’ by internal dikes/quays). What does this mean for the State’s actions? The need for aid (capacity, information and coordination) addressed to the State will differ per generic scenario! After all the regions gear their input to: • The available time between the time of the official alert and the flood is expected to actually occur • The time required to evacuate the inhabitants from the area that is expected to be flooded
This means that, in broad lines, their actions can be categorised in terms of the following strategies: • Strategies directed at source and effect measures: Measures focused on reinforcing or repairing (anticipated) weak spots in the water defences •Evacuation: Measures focused on the removal of the inhabitants from the expected flood area and providing them with shelter and care in other areas
8 Risico’s in bedijkte termen, RIVM, 2004. 9 Anticipated publication date: spring 2007.
10 • Assistance to those remaining: Measures focused on saving the lives and meeting the basic living needs of people who cannot leave the flood area in time •Managing the area: measures geared to limiting irreparable damage to: – The environment – Economic functioning – Social/community functioning – Protecting the vital infrastructure10
Figure 3 Interpretation of the Four Generic Scenarios with clusters of measures Situation Much Time Little Time Few people threatened Water management methods Water management methods Evacuation Managing the area Evacuation (scenario 1) eg. Noordwaard, (scenario 2) eg. Schouwen-Duiveland, Land van Altena Waddeneilanden Many people threatened Water management methods Helping those who remain behind (Managing the area) (scenario 4) eg. coast of South Holland Helping those who remain behind (scenario 3) eg. KAN area Nijmegen-Arnhem
These strategies are also directive for the State in shaping its decisions on coordination, information and the distribution of scarce resources.
2.3 How it affects the action of the crisis control organisation: phased scaling-up structure
This scenario primarily serves a functional purpose. The actions of the State are steered by the type of flood scenario confronting the Netherlands and the issues (dilemmas, bottlenecks) that this generates. These differ per time-phase. For these reasons, the structure of this document follows the various coordination phases. These coordination phases run parallel to the coordination phases currently applied within the water sector, with which this scenario links up with the V&W scenarios.
The National High Water and Flooding Policy Scenario maintains the following structure:
Phase 0: Normal control situation Phase 1: Crisis control: dealt with regionally Phase 2: National coordination of crisis situation in the water sector Phase 3: (imminent) flooding as a result of high water Phase 3a: Preparations phase: period between decision on whether or not to evacuate and moment of flooding Phase 3b: Evacuation phase: period between decision on whether or not to evacuate and moment of flooding Phase 3c: Acute phase Phase 3d: Stabilisation phase
10 Including drinking water companies, and the chemical and nuclear industry.
11 Figure 4 Integrated scaling up diagrams
Organisational (and administrative) scaling upbestuurlijke) Informative scaling up
Coordination phase 0: Normal control Initial water level
RWS RDs/water board counsils Normal control
Coordination phase 1: Regional processing of crisis situation Pre-warning water level No
1a: Preparation National media attention
No Water defences/dikes breached Level/drainage/wind/(hydraulic) load General sector: Water sector: (operational) (operational) RWS RDs/water board counsils •Safety regions •RWS/DCC Preparation crisis organisation •Provinces •Water board councils •Municipalities •KNMI •NCC
1b: Implementation Warning water level No No
Water Sector General sector Crisis teams RDs/Water boards councils (Administrative) (administrative) headed by crisis managers •DG-RWS •Director safety regons Limited dike surveillance •Water board ch. •Queen’s Commisioners •DCC •Mayors •LCO •NCC
Coordination phase 2: Administrative/national coordination crisis situation Limit water level No No
RWS-team heade by DG-RWS/DCC/LCO Pre-warning in connection with National communication high water preparations for evacuation DCC coordination group advising •Stas/Min. V&W High water teams RDs headed by HID •Min. BZK High water communication •NCC/LOCC/ERC Dams and dikes surveillance •Directors Safety regions Water board councils headed by water board ch. •Queen’s Commisioniers Extended dike surveillance •Mayors
Coordination phase 3: National decision on processing crisis situation
3a: Preparation evacuation Alarm water level Yes Imminent breach
Rhine - Lobith IBT/MBT headed by Min. BZK Actual Expected •participation of V&W and assoc. of water board councils •NCC/LOCC/ERC Initial water level n.v.t. > NAP+15.00 m •LCO Pre-warning level > NAP+14.00 m > NAP+15.00 m Regional teams headed by Warning level > NAP+14.00 m > NAP+16.15 m director of Safety regions •participation RWS and water board councils Water level limit > NAP+15.00 m > NAP+16.75 m Alarm water level > NAP+16.75 m > NAP+17.75 m
3b: From evacuation to flooding Measures RIJN - Lobith (evacuation) MHW NAP+17.60 m (drainage 15,000 m3/s)
MAAS – Borgharen Actual Expected 3c: Acute assistance Flooding Initial water level > NAP+42.75 m Pre-warning level > NAP+42.75 m Stijgend Warning level > NAP+43.55 m Stijgend Water level limit > NAP+44.10 m Stijgend 3d: Stabilisation Stabilisation Alarm water level > NAP+46.30 m Stijgend
recovery infrastructure (water defences and roads) MAAS – Borgharen phase ends with return of population MHW NAP+50.50 m (afvoer 3,800 m3/s)
This integrated scaling-up diagram applies to river flooding. The scaling up diagrams for the coast and Ijsselmeer area are identical in terms of structures, but have different water levels. These diagrams are contained in annex 7. As regards the scaling up diagrams, establishing coordination phases 1 and 2 is one of the powers of the Minister of V&W. The minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) is responsible for establishing the coordination phases 3a through to 3d.
12 The coordination phases do not necessarily follow each other in sequence. Per phase, a prognosis is made on the basis of the available information. It may be the case that the circumstances alter to such an extent that the risk of flooding and/or the anticipated scale of the flood area decreases. If so, the situation is reassessed or can be scaled down. In some situations, the decision to evacuate may already have been implemented, but the flood may not actually occur. The phase that then follows is referred to as 3T.
Phase 3T: No flood. Inhabitants return to area
The moment of return is, in principle, the moment at which the scenario ceases to apply. (An explicit decision is taken in this regard at IBT level). This does not alter the fact that the intervention of the State and that of other governments comes to an end. The State will receive requests for processes such as after-care, dealing with damage, psycho-social counselling and coordinating preventive public health for a long time to come. This period of recovery and return to ‘normal’ social functioning is complex: it is specifically structured at strategic level by inter-ministerial work groups (yet to be set up).11
The diagram involves coordination phases. It involves the coordination of: • The provision of information and of • Decisions and the resulting actions (the response)
In a phase in which (‘technically’) little is going on and requires no measures, it might be decided to scale up information provision and exchange. The latter is the case in threat situations in which the nature and degree of threat is still unclear but media attention is such that the government must respond adequately and clearly (be well informed).
In other words, in the above diagram, up-scaling is not linked to water levels on a one to one basis, but also to the condition of the water defences and to national media attention. These matters are included in an overall consideration of the situation prior to deciding whether or not to scale up measures. After the decision to scale up, the parties involved are informed in accordance with arrangements made beforehand (see chapter 4) and these parties perform the agreed actions.
11 The State has since drafted a scenario document on dealing with flood damage, entitled Wet tegemoetkoming schade bij rampen en zware ongevallen.
13 Figure 5: Process diagram
High water level
Consideration - Water level - Conditioni of water defences - National media attention
Decision not to scale up Decision to scale up
Inform Inform
Actions
2.4 High water = trans-regional action
In this scenario we work on the basis that there is (a threat of) a large-scale flood. Based on the knowledge of experts12 in the event of large-scale flooding we must assume: • A (potential) disaster area larger than one safety region • Trans-regional, if not national and/or international impact
Up to now, in the Netherlands emergency preparations have mainly occurred on a regional scale. Within the general administrative line, agreements have been reached on trans-regional coordination. For the majority of (regional) disasters, these agreements are sufficient. For a flood disaster that, by definition, is almost trans-regional by nature, these arrangements don’t go far enough. There is insufficient time for the usual bottom-up approach within the general administrative line. And this type of contingency, which often involves saving lives, large-scale evacuation and large-scale aid to those remaining in the area, desperately needs prompt alerts and the prompt up-scaling for the effective operation of the crisis control organisation. This standpoint has now secured the full support of local and provincial administrators.13
In the regional flooding emergency plans, it has been agreed that once the warning water level has been exceeded, the situation is immediately scaled up to GRIP 4. This means that the crisis control organisation operates to the maximum at regional level. Parallel to this, all sections of the national crisis organisation will go into operation, the national scenarios will apply and the State will take a directive, steering approach to its coordinating role.14
12 Scenario ‘Worst Credible Flood’, Minister of V&W (draft November 2006). 13 See report of the meeting of BZK’s CdKs of 4 July 2006. 14 See the policy rules yet to be set to structure the instrument of instruction.
14 2.5 Trans-regional action = national management
The scaling-up diagram presented in paragraph 2.3 presents an integral way of scaling up for both the water sector and the general administrative sector. It is based on the national warning system in terms of structure (information phase, coordination phase and decision- forming phase) and symbols (colour codes).
The structure (phases) follows the chronological course of an (imminent) flood and coordinating measures (coordination phase). These activities take place within the hydraulic engineering column and connect with/make use of the expertise, experience, arrangements and processes present there. When implementing these activities the powers of the Minister of V&W within the water management domain can be utilised. Announcing phases 1 and 2 are also decisions to be taken by the Minister of V&W. Although the activities in these phases are implemented within the water management domain, the general sector is nonetheless alerted in accordance with national arrangements (warning system).
Announcing phases 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and 3T are decisions taken by the Minister of BZK (partly on the basis of the advice of V&W). In these phases it is a case of crisis decision making. Announcing phase 3 means that there is a national crisis. In that case, the situation calls for national direction. This occurs on the basis of: • The consideration that the tempo of the bottom-up decision-making process within the general administrative sector is insufficient for the required crisis decision-making in the event of (imminent) flooding (see annex 8) • The optimal information position of the Minister of BZK (total overview) and • The specific statutory powers of the Minister of BZK as described in Chapter 3.
15 16 3 National crisis control organisation and agencies involved
3.1 Introduction
This chapter contains a description of the national crisis organisation, its tasks and powers and the relation with the parties involved inside and outside the State.
3.2 Role of municipal, regional and provincial crisis agencies
This scenario is based on the assumptions that, in addition to the national crisis organisations, the municipalities, safety regions15 and provinces scale up and act in accordance with the designated municipal, regional and provincial plans and scenarios; the same also applies to the water board councils. For a description of the scaling-up method, please see the explanation in paragraph 2.3. In a departure from the descriptions in the above-mentioned plans and scenarios are the following:
1. Earlier than usual coordination with the State 2. Operational and administrative coordination in principle via one agency (NCC/LOCC) 3. Some decisions that are ‘normally’ taken in the RBT can (but not after administrative consultation) be taken by the Minister in the event of a national flood (imminent flood). The implementation of such decisions runs according to municipal, regional and/or provincial scenarios and plans. The same applies to operational level: decisions regarding capacity allocation can (but not after consultation with the ROTs in question) be taken by the LOCC that is mandated for this. The starting point is that the ROTs are able to implement their tasks independently. In this scenario we name the Safety Regions [veiligheidsregio’s] as the point of contact for regional action; we are anticipating future legislation with this. We are working on the premise that there will be secured arrangements between the municipalities and Safety Regions.16
3.3 Role of the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom relations
The understanding that trans-regional disasters involve a coordinating role for the State and, more specifically, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom relations (BZK), is widely supported.17 There are different expectations concerning how this coordinating role will take shape.
15 In this handbook safety regions are referred to in the context of the draft of the Safety Regions act [Wet op de Veiligheidsregio’s] 16 In practical terms, this is already occurring on this level in fire department management (coordinating task of the fire department in the context of the Dutch Disasters and Major Accidents Act or Wrzo) 17 Bestuurlijke Conferentie Hoogwater, 30 May 2006.
17 The Emergency Response Plan works on the basis of a decidedly process-oriented approach to the State’s coordinating role in the context of trans-regional flooding. The following process-related roles are foreseen: Initiate : ensure that parties are mobilised on time and Facilitate : ensure that parties coordinate where necessary, on time. The knowledge and experience to tackle crises operationally are at local and regional level and have been legitimated as such by the legislators. The tasks and powers of the State and Province are predominantly procedural; the text of the Disasters and Major Accidents Act (Wrzo) corresponds with this in broad terms.
In addition, the Minister of BZK also possesses a content-related role on the ground of statutory powers: management and direction.
Management and direction = The prompt – on the basis of an optimal information position – taking of decisions that intervene in the crisis management processes; this is to protect national safety and/or vital interests.
In other words: he is authorised to take decisions regarding substantial matters. The Wrzo legitimates the Minister’s authority to issue instructions. In practice this power is applied with caution. In Chapter 4 we indicate the situations within which and at which moments it can be useful to exercise this power to issue instructions.
On the basis of the Population Evacuation Act (Wvb) in a crisis the Minister of BZK is authorised to: Issue an instruction to evacuate or order the removal of the population To determine areas that qualify for evacuation, who is obliged to leave this area and who is obliged to remain To allocate emergency shelter and to subject the shelter to stipulations, in the interests of public health or with a view to the health, age or behaviour of the evacuees and, if necessary, those that live with them.18
He exercises this authority after consulting the regional governments involved. Given the scope of his statutory tasks and powers during a crisis, the minister is able to give this role optimal substance on the basis of his information position (‘helicopter view’). The way in which this information position is organised and secured in arrangements is a key element of this policy manual.
Furthermore, the minister also possesses powers regarding the provision of assistance in accordance with the Wrzo, the fire department and the police act. The decisions on assistance have enormous impact on operational action given that capacity is scarce.
18 The minister is responsible for housing and caring for those for whom emergency shelter has been allocated (article 8, paragraph 3).
18 Basic rules re. national prioritising maintained by the Minister of BZK:
1. Victims 2. Vital interests 3. Environmental damage 4. Material damage
The Minister of BZK plays a coordinating role within both the general administrative and functional column. The other ministries also play a coordinating role within the functional column as regards the parties within their own ministerial network. This role is only partly based on specific crisis legislation.19 Elaborating the coordinating role is largely determined by the political accountability of the minister in question.
Other applicable legislation: • Safety Regions Act • Emergency legislation Additionally: • Municipalities Act, Integral Water Act
An overview of the relationship between the measures taken in the context of combating the impact of high water and the ministries in question is contained in chapter 5.
The ministries of Defence (military support) and Foreign Affairs deserve a special mention. The input of Defence predominantly relates to providing capacity: in phase 3, contacts with Defence go through the LOCC. Requests for information from foreign countries are in principle directed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the diplomatic posts. The Ministry passes them on to the NCC which informs all ministries involved.
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) On the basis of his powers, the Minister of V&W conducts administrative consultations with: • The water managers concerned • The managers of water defences – HIDs of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management – the water board council chairmen – the Provincial Executive
19 Such as legislation regarding animal diseases, nuclear incidents, etc.
19 Authorities of the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) during the response phase
On the ground of the Public Works Act (Waterstaatswet 1900) the Ministry of V&W has a number of crisis authorities within the functional water chain in the event of a national crisis. The minister of V&W has a specific authority as manager of state-managed public works such as sea defences. He may take all measures, if necessary counter to statutory stipulations in the event of serious danger. This concerns public works measures that remain unspecified.
Article 72 Public Works Act (Waterstaatswet 1900) In the event of danger and as long as the resulting situation so requires, the Minister of V&W is authorised to take measures he considers necessary, departing from statutory stipulations if need be. This authority does not apply if the measures could be in conflict with the Constitution or any undertakings in the context of international law.
Further, the Minister of V&W is authorised to order a water manager (the management of a water board council, Provincial Executive or lord mayor and aldermen) with instructions if he believes that the water manager is taking insufficient measures.
Article 75 Public Works Act (Waterstaatswet 1900) If the Minister of V&W believes that the Provincial Executive or Our Commissioner in the Province wrongfully does not use or makes insufficient use of the authority referred to in article 74, first paragraph, our Minister of V&W can, where possible after consultation with the Provincial Executive or Our Commisioner in the Province, give an assignment to said administrator.
20 3.4 Inter-ministerial information and coordination: the parties, their tasks and powers
In the form of a diagram:
Figure 6: inter-ministerial information and coordination
Ministerieal Policy Team (MBT) (State) Cabinet (R)MRR
Inter-Ministerial Policy Team (IBT)
Ministerial National Crisis Centre Ministerial Coördination Cedtre (DCC) (NCC) Coordination Centre (DCC)
Deconcentrated Provincial Deconcentrated State Services Coordination Centre (PCC) State Services
Regional Coordination Centre (RCC)
3.4.1 The actors
Ministerial Policy Team (MBT) The threat of flooding can call for consultation between a number of ministers concerned and may prompt the formation of an MBT. The MBT will be formed at the NCC. Taking decisions on crises at political-administrative level in principle takes place in the MBT. In the more restricted variant, this consists of the ministers involved. In the event of flooding, several ministries will be involved. The MBT is chaired by the Minister of BZK if there is a risk of flooding. Should there be cause to do so, the Prime Minister will chair the MBT. In the extensive variant the MBT is formed by (almost all members of) the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister. All ministers are informed when the MBT is convened.
Participants: • Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), chair • Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) • Minister of Justice • Prime Minister if he considers this is required or due to the nature of the crisis • Head of the Emergency Risk and Crisis Communications Centre(ERC)/National Information Centre (NVC) • Director of Communications/Spokesperson, Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W) • Ministers of Defence, Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Economic Affairs, Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, and Health, Welfare and Sport
21 • Other ministers if required by the nature of the crisis • Secretary of the NCC
The MBT and the Cabinet deliberate and decide on the following: • Perceptions and views of the situation • Information exchange and inventorise information gaps • Decisions on administrative (inter-ministerial and from the province/region) and operational bottlenecks (from LOCC) • Evaluation of current situation re. measures taken • Measures under consideration • Informing the States General • Informing the Council of State • Making arrangements re. public information and communications • Instructions for public services • Determine frequency of meetings
Decisions at political-administrative level receive official support from: • The Ministerial Coordination Centres (DCC) • The National Information Centre (NVC) • The National Crisis Centre (NCC)
Inter-ministerial policy team (IBT) In the event of an imminent flood there will be both horizontal and vertical scaling up within the structure of the national crisis control organisation and the crisis decision-making processes. In many cases an IBT will be formed. The topics dealt with in the IBT cover the entire breadth and depth of the dossier. The Safety Directorate-General of the BZK will, as the party responsible for the organisation and coordination of, among other things, assistance in the context of crisis control, provide specific information and make proposals regarding, for instance, mobilising the fire department, the GHOR (which offers medical assistance in accidents and disasters) and other support services.
The IBT deliberates and decides on: • Perceptions and views of the situation • Evaluation of current situation re. measures taken • Taking effective measures or drafting recommendations for them • Advising on administrative (inter-ministerial and from the province/region) and operational bottlenecks (from LOCC) • Informing the States General • Informing the Council of State • Determining policy frameworks for (public) information and communications • Instructions for the public services • Whether scaling up to MBT is necessary and if so, determines meeting structure and frequency (possibly in preparation of an MBT)
The IBT’s tasks are coordinating, aligning and overall decision making. The IBT (minimally) comprises: Participants: • Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), chair • Director-General of Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat) • Director-General Law Enforcement (Min. Justice)
22 • Council Advisor Minister of General Affairs (AZ) • Director-General of Political Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK) • Director-General of Water Management (V&W) • Representative of the Ministry of Defence • Representatives of other ministries concerned • Head of the NCC • Chairman and coordinator of the NVC • Secretary of the chairman
The National Crisis Centre (NCC) The Minister of BZK is responsible for organising inter-ministerial coordination (National Handbook on Crisis Decision-Making or Nationaal Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming). This coordination is carried out by the NCC. In the event of a crisis, beside the normal manning of the NCC (24 hours a day, 7 days a week) use is made of the extensive core staff (UKB) of the Directorate-General for Safety. The personnel of the NCC can also be expanded with liaisons from other ministries or services. The NCC organises inter-ministerial meetings. Information is exchanged and coordinated and arrangements made within the inter-ministerial policy team (IBT) and the ministerial policy team (MBT). Each minister remains responsible for their own policy area (see National Handbook on Crisis Decision-Making ). In the event of crises, the Minister of BZK ensures that the administrative line is informed (provinces and municipalities) and informs the ministries concerned if the crisis is on a national scale and, if it’s impact spreads over the national borders, informs colleagues abroad.
The NCC makes sure that the administrators can take well-informed decisions both in preparing for large-scale events and in current – trans-sectoral – crises so that the non- beneficial impact on society can be kept to a minimum.
In summary, the NCC plays two roles: a ‘do role’: • The general coordination at administrative level: before, during and after an imminent flood • Informing the parties concerned by mail, fax, etc • Informing its own line and the other BZK agencies involved (including the DCB, DB&G, DPOL, C&I, ERC and LOCC) And a support role: • Bringing together the parties concerned by, among other things, organising an Administrative Emergency Meeting (ACO)
Administrative Emergency Meeting (ACO) Before the IBT is convened, the NCC will decide to organise an Administrative Emergency Meeting (ACO) with the crisis coordinators and the ministries involved. The chairman is the head of the NCC.
The National Operational Coordination Centre (or LOCC) The LOCC coordinates the operational effort both in the preparation phase and in the response phase of a crisis, on behalf of the Ministry of BZK. With this the objective of the LOCC is the efficient, coordination of manpower, resources and expertise (the fire service, police, emergency medical aid (offered by the GHOR) and Ministry of Defence) if there is a threat or acute serious crises. The fire department, police, GHOR and Ministry of Defence participate in the LOCC.
23 This concerns situations in which the impact of the crisis spills over regional borders and inter-regional and/or international assistance must be rendered. The LOCC supports the safety regions, the Queen’s Commissioner and the Minister of BZK in all operational aspects. The core task of the LOCC consists of managing the need for assistance or support and the operational coordination between operational services. In the said situations, the LOCC is also responsible for providing national operational information.
The National Information Centre (NVC) Communication and information in the event of high water is, in the first instance, the responsibility of the ministerial information services in question, and regional and local services. The Risk and Crisis Communication Expertise Centre (ERC) supports the NVC in these efforts. In this case, the lord mayor, coordinating lord mayor, Queen’s Commissioner or specialist minister is always responsible and the effort of the ERC falls under their competent authority.20
If a national crisis occurs, steering and coordination of the communication and information on the crisis with press and public at national level occurs by scaling up to the National Information Centre (NVC). The NVC is then charged with the following tasks: • Monitoring and analysing of media, internet and the crisis environment • Advising on the information strategy to be followed • Developing, coordinating and implementing central government communications • Preparing and issuing information to the national and international media • Informing other authorities about the communication activities of central government and coordinating the communications of central government and other authorities • Producing concrete communication products and disseminating these products to media, public, organisations and other authorities
The NVC is activated at the instruction of the chairman of the IBT or MBT. The director of communications of the Ministry of V&W and the head of the NVC participate in the IBT or MBT.
If there is a high water crisis, the NVC will comprise the staff of the ERC and the director of Communications of the Ministry of V&W, together with staff from the Information departments of the ministries and communication departments from the regions. The latter are specially recruited and selected for the NVC and are trained up for NVC work.
20 See also the Nationaal Handboek Crisisbesluitvorming.
24 3.4.2 Contact between safety regions, provinces and water boards
Figure 7 Political
MBT
IBT Ministerial Other DCC V&W NCC DCC’s
Advising Coordination ERC • RIZA group • RIKZ • DWW Operational LOCC • KNMI group
Backbench: LCO
Regional/Provincial Factual info Safety regions • SVSD • Hoogwatergroep Regional RWS • WDIJ PCC • KNMI weather services chamber Water Board Councils
The NCC, LOCC and ERC are the three executive bodies within the national crisis structure. The efficient interaction of these three organisations is essential for effective State action. Furthermore, it is essential for regional and provincial government to have clarity on who is the point of contact within the national crisis organisation. Here, the following is agreement applies:
The administrative ‘desk’ in the context of formal communication with domestic administration is the NCC.
Administrative coordination takes place in the IBT and, if necessary, the MBT. The following organisations are involved at administrative level:
• Min BZK: – NCC – ERC – C&I • The DCC of – BZK – V&W – Defence –AZ – LNV –EZ
25 – VROM – VWS – Foreign Affairs • Municipalities • Provinces • Public Prosecution Department • Water Board Councils • Rijksheren
At operational level the following organisations are (minimally) involved:
• LOCC • Regional fire services • GHOR • Police regions • National Police Services Agency (KLPD) • Defence Operational Centre • Public Prosecution Department • Regional services • Water Board Councils
Figure 8
IBT/MBT
NCC Advice decision
LOCC demand need need Reg. demand Rijksheren BRW GHOR KLPD need Police Water Board demand threatened area demand Council
need
Reg. DOC BRW GHORPolice KLPD non-threatened area
Agreement: The LOCC is the operational desk.
The party that acts as contact point in the functional sector must also be clear. Here, the following agreement applies:
From phase 3 onwards, the DDC V&W is the functional desk within the water sector.
This is further elaborated in the V&W scenario.
26 3.5 Inter-ministerial information and coordination: the information and decision-making process
The above paragraphs describe how tasks and authorities are assigned within the various sections of the national crisis organisation. This paragraph sets out the relations between relevant parties within the national crisis management structure and their relations with the relevant actors outside this structure.
Each ministry has its own (functional) network with which agreements exist on the mutual exchange of information in the event of an emergency. These arrangements are laid down in the ministerial handbooks. Some network partners have a permanent function as liaison within RBT or ROT; others are involved in regional crisis control in other ways. These network partners provide the ministerial Coordination Centres (DCCs) with information on: • The current and anticipated situation in the affection regions • Possible bottlenecks (signal function) The DCCs analyse this information and: • Inform and advise their own government minister (and state secretary) • Inform the NCC • Assess the need for discussing signals from the field in the NCC. The DCCs in turn inform the network partners on the basis of the sitraps from the NCC.
The NCC gathers the information from the DCCs and the other network partners within the general administrative and functional sector; and, on the basis of this data, drafts sitraps. In the NCC, representatives of the DCCs meet to prepare the agenda and recommendations for the IBT; this is chaired by the NCC.
The IBT agenda is determined based on the sitraps drafted by the NCC, the prognoses drawn up by experts and the recommendations from the NCC. The IBT arrives at decisions, and communicates them to the NCC for further elaboration within the general administrative sector and functional sector. In addition, the IBT determines the information to be provided to the MBT and advises it on coordination bottlenecks that call for a broad, administrative weighing of interests.
The MBT makes the broad administrative assessment of interests based on information and recommendations from the IBT; the information and recommendations originating from their own individual governmental ministries are taken into account. The means of communication and means of guidance are a key part of these considerations. This can go directly via the minister or via the administrative line. In the event of the latter, the decisions are issued via the IBT.
If the type of emergency is extremely serious or far-reaching, broad administrative assessment of interests are made by the Ministerial Policy Team (MBT). In such a case, the IBT provides the MBT with information and advice. The MBT plays a guiding role with respect to the IBT. The Minister of BZK has the option of directly managing the regions and provinces. In addition, there is a possibility that the regions and provinces may be advised by the threatened and/or affected areas. The minister of the government department in question is advised by the DCC. Furthermore, the government minister and the DCC furnish each other with information. Finally, the government minister is also responsible for advising and providing the Minister of BZK with advice and information.
27 28 4 Process
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the overall actions of the relevant parties involved are set out, both within the water sector and the general sector, within the national crisis structure. In this chapter we restrict ourselves to describing the main points of action taken within the water sector. For more detailed information, please consult the High Water and Storm Flood Crises Handbook of the Ministry of V&W.
The interaction between the parties is dealt with based on the timeframe involved in a flood crisis. This process is given in three principal phases (1.2.3). The decision to announce phases 1 and 2 is taken by the Minister of V&W; in these phases, agreements are made on exchanging information and coordinating measures. Announcing phases 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and 3T is decided by the Minister of BZK (also partly based on recommendations from V&W). In these phases information is exchanged, measures are coordinated AND decisions are taken. The announcement of phase 3 means that there is a national crisis. In this case, the crisis is controlled at national level. At regional level, there is a scale-up to the maximum level (GRIP 4) in the regions under threat and GRIP 2 or GRIP 4 in the non-threatened regions.
In principle, the up-scaling is based on a weighing-up of the situation. The overrunning of the water level limit is a crucial factor in this weigh-up up, but not the only consideration. National media attention and the (imminent) failure of a water defence can lead to announcing a higher alert phase even if water levels are relatively low (see also paragraph 2.3).
29 4.2 Description of process phases 0.1 and 2
Phase 0 Normal control situation
Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (Rijkswaterstaat) and the water board councils are able to implement usual water management activities.
Phase 1 Dealing with the crisis situation regionally
Phase 1A Preparation
Alert The Storm Warning Service (SVSD), the IJsselmeer Storm Warning Service (WDIJ) or the agency for river water levels (the Hoogwatergroup Rivieren21) report that sea or river water levels exceed the pre-warning water level. The pre-warning water levels are described in annex 6. The remits of these agencies are described in annex 5.
The following agencies/bodies are alerted: • The DCC V&W • The water board councils of the threatened dike rings • The threatened safety regions and provinces Measures: The crisis organisations of the V&W, the regional departments of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management and of the water board councils become operational.
Phase 1B Implementation
Alert The Storm Warning Service (SVSD), the IJsselmeer Storm Warning Service (WDIJ) or the agency for river water levels (the Hoogwatergroup Rivieren) report that sea or river water levels exceed the warning water level limit. The warning water level limits are described in annex 6.
The following agencies/bodies are alerted: • The DCC V&W • The water board councils of the threatened dike rings • The threatened safety regions and provinces
Measures: • The crisis organisations of the V&W, the regional departments of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management and of the water board councils become operational. • Limited dike surveillance commences
21 A number of departments of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management issue high water reports. The RIKZ issues national high water reports for tidal waters; the SVSD implements them. The RIZA issues national high water reports for other state waters; the WDIJ implements this for the large lakes and related waters; the Hoogwatergroep Rivieren implements this for the major rivers.
30 Phase 2 National coordination of the crisis situation in the water sector
Alert The Storm Warning Service (SVSD), the IJsselmeer Storm Warning Service (WDIJ) or the agency for river water levels (the Hoogwatergroup Rivieren) report that sea or river water levels exceed the water level limit. The remits of these agencies and the water levels are described in annex 6.
The following agencies/bodies are alerted: • The Minister and State Secretary of V&W • The Minister of BZK • The NCC, LOCC and ERC • The coordinating lord majors of the threatened safety regions • The Queen’s Commissioners of the threatened safety regions and provinces
Scaling-up The Minister of V&W announces phase 2. The crisis situation is coordinated at national level. The way in which this coordination is structured in the water sector is set out in the national High Water and Storm Flood Crises handbook of V&W. The threatened regions decide whether they scale up to GRIP 2 or GRIP 4.
Water board council action: • Extensive dike surveillance • Inform surrounding water board councils • Administrative consultation with lord majors of threatened safety regions • Consultation with support services (GHOR, fire services and police)
Action DCC V&W: • Inform the NCC, LOCC and ERC • Initiate and manage LCO
Action LCO: • Analyses the current and expected situation • Analyses the condition of the water defences • Drafts national sitraps
Action NCC: • Inform the relevant administrators within the general administrative sector: the lord mayors and Queen’s Commissioners in the threatened areas • Coordinate information from and to: – DCC and V&W – Other DCCs – LOCC – ERC • Organise and chair Administrative Emergency Meeting (ACO)
Action LOCC: • Inventorise available capacity (how much and where) • Inventorise potential capacity required • Inform NCC
31 Action ERC: • Coordinate with DCO (information) V&W and communication of regions concerned • Scale up media and internet monitoring: alert/mobilise members of NVC • Alert call centre, translation agency • Prepare resources (approach of spokespersons, press releases, FAQs, web texts, scripts for call centre) • Initiate (temporary) public opinion monitoring
32 4.3 Description of process phase 3
Phase 3A Preparatory phase From official alert to decision to evacuate area completely, partially, or not at all
Alert The Storm Warning Service (SVSD), the IJsselmeer Storm Warning Service (WDIJ) or the agency for river water levels (the Hoogwatergroup Rivieren) report that sea or river water levels exceed the alarm water level. The alarm water levels are described in annex 6. The remits of these agencies are described in annex 5.
The alerting agencies warn: • The water board councils of the threatened regions • Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management • And other partners within the water sector,22 including DCC and V&W
Scaling-up The Minister of BZK announces phase 3. It is a national crisis: the national crisis organisation is fully operational. The threatened regions are scaled up to GRIP 4. The non- threatened regions decide whether they should scale up to GRIP 2.
Characteristics of this situation: The scaled-up agencies begin their preparations for decision-making by attempting to gain more insight into: Possible weak points in the water defences (which points will be flooded when the dike overflows) and with this: 1. The scale, specific features (geographic, infrastructural and demographic) of the threatened region and the risks present 2. The available time (the time from the moment of the warning to the anticipated moment of flooding) 3. The required time: in other words, the time required to evacuate all inhabitants from the disaster area As greater clarity about the above-mentioned aspects is achieved (depending on the available time in relation to the time required to evacuate all inhabitants from the threatened dike rings) all measures in anticipation of the planned decisions are taken. Important measures: setting up distribution points on the edge of the disaster area and determining the ‘exit points’ and evacuation routes inside and outside the disaster area. Informing the population is essential if not crucial in this phase!
This phase is characterised by: focus on PREPARING THE DECISION TO EVACUATE, INFORMTION (!)
22 See High Water handbook of Min V&W
33 Inform: • SVSD periodically supplies information on water levels to DCC V&W, the NCC, PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The Hoogwatergroep Rivieren periodically supplies information on water levels to the DCC V&W, the NCC, the PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The WDIJ periodically supplies information on water levels to the DCC V&W, the NCC, the PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The KNMI informs the DCC V&W, and the NCC on current and future weather conditions
Action water board councils • Implement technical measures for each stretch of dike • Patrol each stretch of dike • Coordination centres are in operation • Coordinate with and in RCCs and PCCs at least with regard to the possible shutting off of dike roadways • Coordinate with other agencies within the water sector
Action Safety regions and Provinces in the area under threat • RCCs and PCCs are set up and operational • Gather information and prepare decisions
Action DCC V&W • Gather and analyse information from the water sector • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Inform NCC • Inform network partners and coordinate information within the functional V&W sector • Coordinate effort within the water sector in accordance with V&W handbook • Advise LCO via NCC, pass on to IBT, MBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LCO Advises IBT/MBT on • The chance that the threatened area will actually be flooded • The size of the (potential) flood area • The time left before the flood breaks
Action other DCCs23 • Inform network partners in accordance with scenario • Collect and analyse information from network partners in accordance with scenario • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Discuss advice on coordination bottlenecks in NCC and possible decisions to be taken in IBT • Inform and advise ministers
23 More information on the measures per DCC are contained in Chapter 5 of this scenario.
34 Action LOCC • Analyse available capacity (how much and where) • Direct national capacity re. connections, cordoning off disaster area and logistics after consultation with the ROTs of the threatened safety regions • Draft sitraps to familiarise NCC and ROTs with the threatened safety regions • Draft advice on capacity bottlenecks to be decided upon in IBT • Coordination with the safety regions • Advise NCC
Action ERC • NVC is operational • Continuous internet and media monitoring and analysis • Advise IBT/MBT • Inform press and public by means of: – Press statements and press releases – Coordination Public Information call centre 0800 1351 – Implement www.crisis.nl – Telephone press information – Coordination with Information in safety regions – Advise Information action centres in safety regions – Analyse information (content and strategy) of Information action centres in safety regions – Advise potential coordination bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT – Advise (potential) Public Information bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT
Action NCC • Coordinate information from and to the general-administrative sector: –RBTs – PCCs – DCCs – International • Prepare and draft national sitraps • Inform IBT and MBT • Prepare IBT meetings with the help of DCCs liaisons • Facilitate MBT meetings
35 Action IBT • IBT meets
IBT Agenda Sitrap → Determine and present to MBT for information Prognoses → Determine and present to MBT for information Scale-up phase → Determine and present to MBT for information Strategic choices: evacuate yes/no → Determine and present to MBT for information (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for information (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for information Communication strategy → Determine and present to MBT for information Initiate inter-ministerial CRAS working group → Decide on / or present to MBT for information Initiate inter-ministerial After-Care working group → Decide on / or present to MBT for information
Action Minister BZK: • Strategic consultation with chairmen of threatened safety regions and Queen’s Commissioners of threatened area
36 ,
Action MBT • MBT meets
MBT Agenda Sitrap → for information Prognoses → for information Strategic choices: evacuate yes/no → To be decided (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → For information or decision (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → For information or decision Communication strategy and Information → To be decided Inform States General and Council of State Initiate inter-ministerial CRAS working group → for information Initiate inter-ministerial After-Care working group → for information
37 Phase 3B Evacuation phase From decision to whether or not to evacuate until the flood moment
Prognosis SVSD, WDIJ or the Hoogwatergroep Rivieren conclude that the maximum warning water levels have been exceeded. Several dike rings are threatened with inundation.
Alert: • SVSD alerts the DCC V&W, the NCC, PCCs and the water board councils in the threatened area • WDIJ alerts the DCC V&W, the NCC, PCCs and the water board councils in the threatened area • The Hoogwatergroep Rivieren alerts the DCC V&W, the NCC, PCCs and the water board councils in the threatened area • The PCCs alert the municipalities concerned unless these have made other arrangements (directly with the alerting agency) • The LOCC alerts the ROTs outside the threatened area that play a role in sheltering the inhabitants to be evacuated • The NCC alerts the DCCs and the RBTs outside the threatened area that play a role in sheltering the inhabitants to be evacuated
Scaling up Provinces and Safety Regions in the threatened area continued to be scaled up to GRIP 4; the action centres are set up and operational; • The Provinces and Safety Regions outside the threatened region scale up to GRIP 4; the action centres are set up
Characteristics of this situation: Depending on: 1. The available time (the time from the moment of the warning to the anticipated moment of flooding) 2. The required time: in other words, the time required to evacuate all inhabitants from the disaster area and 3. The way in which these timeframes interrelate, the Minister of BZK will decide whether or not to evacuate wholly or fully on the ground of the Population Evacuation Act (Wvp).24 He does this after consulting with the regional authorities and Queen’s Commissioners and discusses this in the MBT. If it is acknowledged that there is too little time to evacuate the majority of the population, the relief activities will focus on providing help to those remaining behind (information, providing for basic needs). If there is sufficient time to evacuate all inhabitants from the threatened area, some of the relief activities will focus on measures to manage the area (prevent the disaster after the disaster).25
Focus on DECISION-MAKING, (PUBLIC) COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION IMPLEMENTATION
24 In this scenario we refer to a structured evacuation. 25 See Chapter 2 for information.
38 Inform: • SVSD periodically supplies information on water levels to DCC V&W, the NCC, PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The Hoogwatergroep Rivieren periodically supplies information on water levels to the DCC V&W, the NCC, the PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The WDIJ periodically supplies information on water levels to the DCC V&W, the NCC, the PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The KNMI informs the DCC V&W, and the NCC on current and future weather conditions
Action water board councils • Advises in RCC and PCC • Decides on pumping activity in the threatened area and/or installing ways of shutting the water off • Implement technical measures in accordance with the boards’ own emergency plans and scenarios • Coordinate with other agencies within the water sector in accordance with national V&W scenario
Action Safety regions and Provinces in the area under threat • Action centres are set up and operational • Implement Minister’s evacuation decision • Decide on information strategy • Decide on tackling source and effect based on advice from the water board councils • Decide on the input of extra manpower and equipment • Implement measures in accordance with crisis control plans and High Water handbook • Enforce public order under the aegis of DCC BZK • Inform PCC and NCC • Decide on whether or not to change the location of the RCCs26
Action Safety regions and Provinces outside the area under threat • Action centres for Shelter and Care, CRIB, PSH, Basic needs are set up • Measures from the scenarios Shelter and Care, CRIB, PSH, Basic needs are implemented under the management of the LOCC • Inform PCC and NCC
Action DCC V&W • Gather and analyse information from the water sector • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Inform NCC • Coordinate information within the functional V&W sector • Coordinate effort within the water sector in accordance with V&W handbook • Direct LCO • Pass on advice from LCO via NCC to IBT & MBT • Inform and advise ministers
26 If dike ring 14 is threatened, moving the location of the DCCs and NCC must also be considered.
39 Action LCO • Advises on implementing water management measures • The size of the (potential) flood area • The time left before the flood breaks
Action other DCCs • Inform network partners in accordance with scenario • Collect and analyse information from network partners • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Discuss advice on coordination bottlenecks in NCC and possible decisions to be taken in IBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LOCC • Analyse available capacity (how much and where) • Draft sitraps and provide, for information, to NCC • Draft advice on capacity bottlenecks to be decided upon in IBT • Consult with the ROTs of the safety regions • After consultation: direct operational decision making re. large-scale evacuation and clearance. Points to be addressed include: – Routing – Shelter and Care – CRIB – Basic needs – Traffic – Rescue – Funeral arrangements – Coordination with NCC
Action NVC • Continuous internet and media monitoring and analysis • Advise IBT/MBT • Inform press and public by means of: – Press statements and press releases – Coordination Public Information call centre 0800 1351 – Implement www.crisis.nl – Telephone press information • Coordination with Information in safety regions • Advise Information action centres in safety regions • Analyse information (content and strategy) of Information action centres in safety regions • Advise potential coordination bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT • Advise potential Public Information bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT
40 Action NCC • Coordinate information to and from: –RBTs – PCCs – DCCs – International • Prepare and draft national sitraps • Prepare IBT meetings with the help of DCCs liaisons and national project groups • Facilitate MBT • Process coordination implementation of IBT and MBT decisions in consultation with: – DCCs –RBTs – PCCs
Action IBT • IBT meets
IBT Agenda Sitrap → Determine and present to MBT for information Prognoses → Determine and present to MBT for information Public perception / national information strategy → present to MBT for information (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → Decisions and / or present to MBT for information International relief → present to MBT for information (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → Decisions and / or present to MBT for information Set up inter-ministerial CRAS working group → Decisions presented to MBT for information Set up inter-ministerial After-Care working group → Decisions presented to MBT for information Set up Evaluation Process Decisions presented to MBT for information
41 Action MBT • MBT meets
MBT Agenda Sitrap → for information Prognoses → for information Public perception / national information strategy → present for decision (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → For information or decision International relief → To be decided (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → For information or decision Spokesperson → To be decided
Phase 3T No flood. Return
Situation: The water defences do not overflow/are not breached. The LCO and the water board councils do not expect this to happen within the foreseeable future. The acute phases of the high water crisis are over: the evacuated inhabitants return. A stable situation gradually returns.
Characteristics of this situation: Central role for TRAFFIC, CRAS and AFTER CARE
Scaling down After the decision has been taken in the MBT and in consultation with the highest administrative parties responsible: • The water board councils scale down to phases 3, 2 and 1 respectively. In the event of a river scenario, winding down the dike security parallels the return of (part of) the population • The Provinces and Safety Regions scale down in consultation with the water board councils • The national crisis organisation scales down to Phase 2
Inform: • SVSD, WDIJ and the Hoogwater Rivieren continue periodically to supply the DCC V&W and the water board councils in the former threat area with information
Action Water Board Councils • Advise RCCs and PCCs to scale down • Implement recovery activities (if necessary) • Coordinate with other agencies in water sector in accordance with V&W handbook
42 Action Safety regions affected area • Decisions on information strategy, damage settlement and after care • Decisions on making area accessible, negotiable, clearing up under direction of the LOCC • Decisions on input of manpower and equipment • Enforce public order under the aegis of the NCC • Inform PCC and NCC
Action Safety regions outside affected area • Decide on information strategy • Implement traffic measures • Inform PCC and NCC
Action DCC V&W • Gather and analyse information from the water sector • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Inform NCC • Coordinate information within the functional V&W sector • Coordinate effort within the water sector in accordance with V&W handbook • Direct LCO • Pass on advice from LCO via NCC to IBT & MBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LCO • Advises on implementing recovery measures
Action other DCCs • Inform network partners in accordance with scenario • Collect and analyse information from network partners • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Discuss advice on coordination bottlenecks in NCC and decisions to be taken in IBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LOCC • Analyse available capacity (how much and where) • Draft sitraps and provide, for information, to NCC and ROTs • Draft advice on capacity bottlenecks to be decided upon in IBT • Consult with the ROTs of the safety regions • Facilitate regional operational measures re.: – Routing – Traffic – Accessibility/negotiability/clearing up – Coordination with NCC
Action ERC • Coordinate with DCO V&W (on scaling down NVC to ministerial responsibility) • If scaling down: support DCO V&W • Coordination with Information action centres in safety regions • Support Information action centres in safety regions • Analyse information (content and strategy) of Information action centres in safety regions
43 • Advise on (potential) coordination bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in NCC • Coordinate with national Public Information • Coordinate with www.crisis.nl • Advise on (possible) Press and Public Information bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT
Action NCC • Coordinate information from and to: –RBTs – PCCs – DCCs – International • Prepare and draft national sitraps • Prepare IBT meetings with the help of DCCs liaisons and national working groups CRAS and After Care • Facilitate MBT meetings • Process coordination implementation of IBT and MBT decisions in consultation with: – DCCs –RBTs – PCCs
Action IBT • IBT meets
IBT Agenda Sitrap → Determine and present to MBT for information Prognoses → Determine and present to MBT for information Downscaling process → Determine and present to MBT for advice (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for advice (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for advice CRAS strategy → Decision presented to MBT for advice After-Care strategy → Decision presented to MBT for advice Adjusted communications strategy → Decision presented to MBT for advice
44 Action MBT • MBT meets
MBT Agenda Sitrap → for information Prognoses → for information Downscaling Process → To be decided (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → For information / decision (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → For information / decision CRAS strategy → For decision After-Care strategy → For decision Spokesperson → For decision Evaluation → For reflection and for (possibly) rendering account to States General
45 Phase 3C Acute Phase
Situation: The water defences are overflowing and/or have burst. There is an emergency situation in the sense of the Disasters and Major Accidents Act (Wet rampen en zware ongevallen).
The focus of the crisis control action shifts from SAVING and BASIC NEEDS of those remaining in the disaster area to SHELTER AND CARE and REGISTRATION of those who have left the disaster area.
The RBTs/ROTs within the affected area have been wholly or partially moved to locations outside the affected area. The RBTs/ROTs outside the affected area have fully activated their action centres. The distribution points on the edge of the disaster area are fully set up and active; COPIs have been set up at the distribution points and at other locations to be stipulated at the edge of the disaster area.
Scaling up • The water board councils are scaled up to phase 4/5: Disaster • Safety regions in the area under threat are scaled up to GRIP 4 • Safety regions outside the threatened area are scaled up to GRIP 4
Inform: • SVSD periodically supplies information on water levels to DCC V&W, the NCC, PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The Hoogwatergroep Rivieren periodically supplies information on water levels to the DCC V&W, the NCC, the PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The WDIJ periodically supplies information on water levels to the DCC V&W, the NCC, the PCCs and water board councils in the threatened area • The KNMI informs the DCC V&W, and the NCC on current and future weather conditions
Action water board councils • Advises RCCs and PCCs • Close dike posts in the (partially) flooded dike rings • Move coordination centres in the threatened or flooded area (where necessary) • Decide on pumping activity in the threatened or flooded area • Decides on mobilising extra personnel and equipment to restrict flooding and for recovery measures • Implement technical measures in accordance with the boards’ own emergency plans and scenarios • Coordinate with other agencies within the water sector in accordance with national V&W scenario
Action Safety regions and Provinces in the area under threat • Decide on information strategy • Decide on tackling source and effect based on advice from the water board councils • Decide on the input of extra manpower and equipment • Implement measures in accordance with crisis control plans and High Water handbook facilitated by the LOCC
46 • Enforce public order under the aegis of DCC BZK • Inform PCC and NCC
Action Safety regions and Provinces outside the affected area • Implement measures for Shelter and Care, CRIB, Basic needs, Rescue and Funeral Arrangements in accordance with the scenarios under the management of the LOCC • Inform PCC and NCC
Action DCC V&W • Gather and analyse information from the water sector • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Inform NCC • Coordinate information within the functional V&W sector • Coordinate effort within the water sector in accordance with V&W handbook • Direct LCO • Pass on advice from LCO via NCC to IBT & MBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LCO • Advises on implementing water management measures
Action other DCCs • Inform network partners in accordance with scenario • Receive information from network partners in accordance with scenario • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Discuss advice on coordination bottlenecks in NCC and (possible) decisions to be taken in IBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LOCC • Analyse available capacity (how much and where) • Draft sitraps and provide, for information, to NCC and ROTs • Draft advice on capacity bottlenecks to be decided upon in IBT • Consult with the ROTs of the safety regions • After consultation: direct operational decision making re.: – Large-scale evacuation and clearance – Routing – Shelter and Care – CRIB – Basic needs – Traffic – Rescue – Funeral arrangements • Coordination with NCC
47 Action NVC • Continuous internet and media monitoring and analysis • Advise IBT/MBT • Inform press and public by means of: – Press statements and press releases – Coordination Public Information call centre 0800 1351 – Implement www.crisis.nl – Telephone press information • Coordination with Information in safety regions • Advise Information action centres in safety regions • Analyse information (content and strategy) of Information action centres in safety regions • Advise potential coordination bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT • Advise potential Public Information bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT
Action NCC • Coordinate information from and to: –RBTs – PCCs – DCCs – International • Prepare and draft national sitraps • Facilitate and prepare IBT meetings with the help of DCCs liaisons and national project groups • Facilitate MBT meetings • Process coordination implementation of IBT and MBT decisions in consultation with: – DCCs –RBTs
– PCCs
Action IBT • IBT meets
IBT Agenda Sitrap → Determine and present to MBT for information Prognoses → Determine and present to MBT for information Public perception / national information strategy → present to MBT for information (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for information (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for information Set up inter-ministerial Preventive Public Health survey → Decide on / or present to MBT for information
48 Action MBT • MBT meets
MBT Agenda Sitrap → for information Prognoses → for information Public perception / national information strategy → present for decision (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → For information or decision (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → For information or decision
49 Phase 3D Stabilisation
Situation: The acute phases of the high water crisis are over: a stable situation gradually returns. Together with the water board councils, the LCO researches if and when inhabitants can return. Evacuated inhabitants are in long-term shelter outside the emergency area. They register for damage settlement and focus on the short and long term future. Inhabitants who are still in the affected area after 72 hours will be rescued. This phase is characterised by the central role of the IACs, CRAS and AFTERCARE strategy.
Scaling up • Until decided otherwise, the following applies: • The water board councils are scaled up to phase 4/5: Disaster • Provinces and Safety Regions in the affected area are scaled up to GRIP 4 • Provinces and Safety Regions outside the affected area are scaled up to GRIP 4
Scaling down After advice from the LCO and the MBT has taken the decision, and in consultation with the highest administrative parties responsible: • The water board councils scale down to phases 3, 2 and 1 respectively. In this case: • Winding down the dike security parallels the return of (part of) the population • The Provinces and Safety Regions scale down in consultation with the water board councils • The national crisis organisation scales down to Phase 2
Action of alerting agencies: SVSD, WDIJ and the Hoogwatergroep Rivieren and the KNMI continue periodically to supply the DCC V&W and the water board councils in the former threat area with information
Action Water Board Councils • Advise RCCs and PCCs to scale down • Implement recovery activities (if necessary) • Coordinate with other agencies in water sector in accordance with V&W handbook
Action Safety regions in affected area • Decisions on information strategy, damage settlement and after care • Decisions on making area accessible, negotiable, clearing up under direction of the LOCC • Decisions on input of manpower and equipment • Enforce public order under the aegis of the DCC BZK • Inform PCC and NCC
Action Safety regions outside affected area • Decide on information strategy • Implement traffic measures • Inform PCC and NCC
50 Action DCC V&W • Gather and analyse information from the water sector • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Inform NCC • Inform network partners within the water sector • Coordinate effort within the water sector in accordance with V&W handbook • Direct LCO • Pass on advice from LCO via NCC to IBT & MBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LCO • Advises on water management measures
Action other DCCs • Inform network partners in accordance with scenario • Collect information from network partners in accordance with scenario • Analyse (potential) coordination bottlenecks • Discuss advice on coordination bottlenecks in NCC and possible decisions to be taken in IBT • Inform and advise ministers
Action LOCC • Analyse available capacity (how much and where) • Draft sitraps and provide, for information, to NCC and ROTs • Draft advice on capacity bottlenecks to be decided upon in IBT • Consult with the ROTs of the safety regions • After consultation with ROTs, direct operational decision-making re.: – Large-scale evacuation and clearance – Routing – Shelter and Care – CRIB – Basic needs – Traffic – Rescue – Funeral arrangements • Direct operational decision-making re: – Accessibility/negotiability/clearing up • Coordination with NCC
Action NVC • Continuous internet and media monitoring and analysis • Advise IBT/MBT • Inform press and public by means of: – Press statements and press releases – Coordination Public Information call centre 0800 1351 – Implement www.crisis.nl – Telephone press information • Coordination with Information in safety regions • Advise Information action centres in safety regions • Analyse information (content and strategy) of Information action centres in safety regions
51 • Advise potential coordination bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT • Advise (potential) Public Information bottlenecks to be discussed in NCC and possibly decided in IBT
Action NCC • Coordinate information from and to: –RBTs – PCCs – DCCs – International • Prepare and draft national sitraps • Facilitate and prepare IBT meetings with the help of DCCs liaisons and national working groups CRAS and After-Care • Facilitate MBT meetings • Process coordination implementation of IBT and MBT decisions in consultation with: – DCCs –RBTs – PCCs
Action IBT • IBT meets
IBT Agenda Sitrap → Determine and present to MBT for information Prognoses → Determine and present to MBT for information Downscaling process → Determine and present to MBT for information (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for information (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → Decide on / or present to MBT for information CRAS strategy → Decision presented to MBT for advice After-Care strategy → Decision presented to MBT for advice Adjusted communications strategy → Decision presented to MBT for advice
52 Action MBT • MBT meets
MBT Agenda Sitrap → for information Prognoses → for information Downscaling Process → To be decided (Potential) capacity bottlenecks → For information / decision (Potential) coordination bottlenecks → For information / decision CRAS strategy → For decision After-Care strategy → For decision Spokesperson → For decision Evaluation → For reflection and for rendering account Rendering account to the States General → For decision
53 54 5 The DCCs and their networks
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the broad lines of an overview of the measures to be taken by the ministerial crisis and coordination centres (DCCs) and their network partners. The first paragraph presents a total survey of the measures facilitated by the State or directed by it in the case of high water. In annex 9 you will see this overview in relation to the 25 sub- processes deployed in crisis control plans. In paragraph 5.2 a schematic overview per DCC is provided of the ministerial crisis structure in relation to the network partners (relevant to high water). These tables are based on the actions of the DCCs in the event of high water from the perspective of the DCCs in question; they do not presume to offer a complete overview of the tasks and powers per DCC and how they interrelate.
General Strategy Source and effect Evacuation Support Strategy: those Strategy: Manage Environment is always prevention Strategy remaining behind implemented strategy (see RWS handbook)
Alert Reinforce dikes Directed Rescue Protect environment information Connections Dike surveillance Alert population Directed information Evacuate cattle Cordon off Close gaps Evacuate and Enforce legal order Protect infrastructure emergency area clear area Logistics Pumps Cordon off and Medical aid chain Disconnect gas/electricity protect Direct traffic Victim registration Protect drinking water purification systems Enforce legal order Victim identification Maintain essential business processes and objects Shelter and care Funeral arrangements Increase connection potentialities Victim registration Make area accessible/ Limit irrecoverable cultural negotiable/clear up damage Routing Logistics Provide for basic needs Psychosocial Psychosocial support support Damage regis- Preventive public health tration and processing Damage registration and processing After-care After-care
55 Overview of the roles of the State in the event of high water
Role 1: coordinate = facilitate Environmental Management measures Scenario Who Phase Environmental protection 1,3 LNV, V&W, VROM 3B Evacuate cattle 1,3 LNV 3B Protect vital infrastructure 1,3 BZK, V&W 3B Disconnect gas/electricity 1,3 EZ 3B Protect drinking water purification systems 1,3 VROM, V&W 3B Maintain essential business processes and objects 1,3 VROM 3A Increase connection potentialities 1,3 EZ 3A Limit irrecoverable cultural damage 1,3 OCW 3B
Directed information 1,2,3,4 BZK (ERC) 3A Alert population 1,2,3 BZK (ERC) 3A
Alert 1,2,3,4 BZK (LOCC) 3B Connections 1,2,3,4 BZK (LOCC) 3A Cordon off emergency area 1,2,3,4 BZK (LOCC) 3A Logistics 1,2,3,4 BZK (LOCC) 3A
Role 2: coordinate = manage Environmental Management measures Scenario Who Phase Large-scale evacuation and clearance 1 BZK (LOCC), V&W 3B Shelter and Care 1,3 BZK (LOCC) 3A,B Routing 1,3 BZK (LOCC) 3A Enforce legal order 1,2,3,4 BZK (government ministry) 3B,C,D Direct traffic 1,2,3 BZK (LOCC), V&W 3A,B Registration 1,2,3,4 BZK (LOCC) 3A,B,C Rescue 4 BZK (LOCC) 3C Basic needs 1,2,3,4 BZK (LOCC) 3B,C,D Make area accessible/negotiable /clear up 3,4 BZK (LOCC), V&W 3D Funeral arrangements 4 BZK (LOCC) 3C,D Preventive Public Health 3,4 VWS 3C,D Psycho-social support 1,2,3,4 VWS 3B,C,D
Damage processing 1,2,3,4 FZ, EZ, BZK, LNV, VROM, V&W 3,B,C,D After-care 1,2,3,4 BZK, EZ, VROM 3B,C,D
Role 3: coordinate = facilitate policy and administrative balancing of interests Environmental Management measures Scenario Who Phase Inform 1,2,3,4 BZK (NCC) 3A, B,C,D Manage process 1,2,3,4 BZK (NCC) 3A,B,C,D Advise 1 BZK (NCC) 2, 3A,B,C,D
56 5.2 Overview of crisis structures of DCCs
5.2.1 Network diagram of the Water Quantity Departmental Coordination Centre (DCC), Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
International network partners (e.g.: UN, NATO) MBT IBT DCCs/DCO involved: • VROM • EZ NCC • VWS DCC - V&W LOCC • BZK • BUZA • Finance Coordination PCC ERC • Defence group • Justice Operational group Policy fields involved: Royal RCC • Water quantity Backbench: Navy LCO • Water quality • Shipping, harbours, KLPD and North Sea ROT • Inland waterways Water board • Rail & public transport RWS • Air traffic Regional Dept.enst • Buses KNMI • Road traffic RIZA/RIKZ/SVSD Deconcentrated • Weather state services KWC OCM-V&W
OCM-RWS Prorail
DWW LVNL
Abbreviations: DCO Communications Department DWW Highway and Hydraulic Engineering Department HDJZ Chief Legal Affairs Department KLPD National Police Services Agency KNMI Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute KVNR Royal Assoc. Of Netherlands Shipowners KWC Coastguard Centre LVNL Air Traffic Control the Netherlands OCM-RWS Crisis Management Consultation Dir.-Gen. for Public Works & Water Management OCM-V&W Crisis Management Consultation Min. Of Transport, Public Works & Water Management OG Operational Group RIKZ Nat. Inst. for Coastal and Marine Management RIZA Inst. For Inland Water Management & Wastewater Treatment RWS Dir.-Gen. for Public Works & Water Management SVSD Storm Warning Service
57 5.2.2 Network diagram Ministerial Coordination Centre (DCC), Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Security (Min. LNV)
International network partners MBT (e.g.: EU) (P)SG IBT
DCCs involved: NCC DCC - LNV • VROM ERC • V&W • VWS • BZK OT-LNV PCC • BUZA • EZ VWA Policy team • SZW crisis management RCC RIVM DIC
Communication ROT team RCC - LNV
RVV Crisis staff
AID Policy team
LASER Communication team PD Team FPF-affairs (support)
Abbreviations: AID General Inspection Service DIC Ministerial Infocentre ERC Expertise Centre for Risk and Crisis Management LASER The LASER agency is the in-house implementation service of the Min. Ag., Nature & Food Quality OT Min. Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality Team PD Plant Protection Service RIVM Nat. Inst. for Public Health and the Environment RW Govt. Meat and Livestock Inspectorate VWA Food & Consumer Product Safety Authority
58 5.2.3 Network Diagram Ministerial Coordination centre (DCC) Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)
International network partners MBT (e.g.: IRC) IBT
DCCs involved: • VWS NCC DCC - VROM LOCC • V&W • LNV • BUZA OT-VROM • BZK PCC ERC • SZW Policy team crisis man. RIVM/LSO BORI/BOGI RCC Coordinator crisis man.
BOT-mi KNMI ROT EPAn (Front Office) MOD VROM inspectorate NVIC
KFD CEV
VWA
BZK-Crisis man.
RIZA
RIKILT Abbreviations: BOG Back Office Medical Information BORI Back Office Radiological Information MGFB BOTmi Policy Support Team Environmental Incidents CEV Centre for External Safety EPAn Planning and Nuclear Advice Unit ERC Expertise Centre for Risk and Crisis Communication KFD Nuclear Energy Service KNMI Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute LOCC National Operational Coordination Centre LSO National Laboratory for Radiation Research MGFB Military Health Support Unit MOD Environmental Accident Service NVIC Neth. Assoc. for Intensive Care OT-VROM Operational Team-Min. Housing, Spatial Planning & the Env. RIKILT Inst. for Food Safety RIVM Nat. Inst. for Public Health and the Env. RIZA Inst. For Inland Water Management & Wastewater Treatment VWA Food & Consumer Product Safety Authority
59 5.2.4 Network diagram Ministerial Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport
International network partners MBT (e.g.: IRC) IBT
DCCs involved: • VWS NCC DCC - VWS • V&W LOCC • LNV • BUZA OT-VWS • BZK PCC ERC • SZW Policy team crisis man. RIVM/LCI BORI RCC Co0rdinator crisis man. CGOR
ROT IGZ NVIC
Directorate VGP BOGI RGF/GHOR
Abbreviations: BOG Back Office Medical Information BORI Back Office Radiological Information CGOR Centre for Health Impact of Disasters ERC Expertise Centre for Risk and Crisis Communication GHOR Med. Assistance in the Event of Accidents & Disasters IGZ Healthcare Inspectorate LCI Nat. Coordinator Infectious Disease Control LOCC National Operational Coordination Centre NVIC Neth. Assoc. for Intensive Care OT-VWS Operational Team-Min. Public Health, Welfare & Sport. RGF Regional Medical Officials RIVM Nat. Inst. for Public Health and the Env. VGP Food, Health Protection and Prevention
60 5.2.5 Network diagram Ministerial Coordination Centre (DCC) Ministry of Economic Affairs
International network partners MBT (e.g.: EU) (P)SG IBT*
DCCs involved: • VROM NCC DCC - EZ • V&W NCTb • VWS • BZK OT-EZ • BUZA PCC ERC • LNV Policy • SZW crisis man. RIVM RCC Coordinator Sectoren involved: crisis man. • Elektricity • Oil • Gas ROT Deconcentrated • Telecom/ICT state service • Post • Mineral extraction
* DCC-EZ is represented in the IBT in the event of: - Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Terrorism - Nuclear Accident Control - Crisis control
Abbreviations: ERC Expertise Centre for Risk and Crisis Communication NCTB Nat. Coordinator Terrorism Control OT-EZ Operational Team-Min. Economic Affairs RIVM Nat. Inst. for Public Health and the Env.
61 62 Annex 1 Terms/Abbreviations
AID General Inspection Service AZ Ministry of General Affairs BOGI Back Office Medical Information BORI Back Office Radiological Information BOT-mi Policy Support Team Environmental Incidents BUZA Ministry of Foreign Affairs BZK Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations CdK Queen’s Commissioner CEV Centre for External Safety CGOR Centre for Health Impact of Disasters COPI a commando group dealing with emergencies CRAS Central Damage Registration and Reporting Point CRIB Central Registration and Information Bureau C&I Communication and Information DCC Ministerial Coordination Centres DCO Communications Department DIC Ministerial Infocentre DOC Defence Operation Centre DG Directorate-General DR Regulations and Agency Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality DWW Highway and Hydraulic Engineering Division EPAn Planning and Nuclear Advice Unit ERC Expertise Centre for Risk and Crisis Communication EU European Union EZ Ministry of Economic Affairs GHOR Medical Assistance in the event of Accidents and Disasters GRIP Coordinated Regional Incident Management Procedure HDJZ Chief Legal Affairs Department HovJ Chief Public Prosecutor IAC Information and Advice Centre IBT Inter-ministerial Policy Team IGZ Healthcare Inspectorate IVW Transport, Public Works and Water Management Inspectorate KAN area Arnhem and Nijmegen Junction KFD Nuclear Energy Service KLPD National Police Services Agency KNMI Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute KVNR Royal Association of Netherlands Shipowners KWC Coastguard Centre LCI National Coordinator Infectious Disease Control LNV Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality
63 LCO National Flood Threat Coordinating Commission LOCC National Operational Coordination Centre LSO National Laboratory for Radiation Research LVNL Air Traffic Control the Netherlands MBT Ministerial Policy Team MGFB Military Health Support Unit MOD Environmental Accident Service NBC nuclear, biological, chemical NCC National Crisis Centre NCTb National Coordinator Terrorism Control NVC National Information Centre NVIC Netherlands Association for Intensive Care OCM Crisis Management Consultation OCW Ministry of Culture, Education and Science OG Operational group OT Operational Team PCC Provincial Coordination Centre PD Plant Protection Service (P)SG Deputy Secretary-General PSH Psycho-social support RBT Regional Policy Team RCC Regional Coordination Centre RGF Regional Medical Officials RIKILT Institute for Food Safety RIKZ National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management RIVM National Institute for Public Health and the Environment RIZA Institute for Inland Water Management and Wastewater Treatment (R)MR (Government) cabinet RW Government Meat and Livestock Inspectorate RWS Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management ROT Regional Operational Team SG Secretary General SVSD Storm Warning Service SZW Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment V&W Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management VGP Food, Health Protection and Prevention VROM Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment VWA Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority VWS Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport WDIJ IJsselmeer Storm Warning Service Wrzo Disasters and Major Accidents Act Wvb Population Evacuation Act
64 Annex 2 Relevant websites
Website of organisation
Ministry of General Affairs www.minaz.nl Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations www.minbzk.nl Ministry of Defence www.mindef.nl Ministry of Economic Affairs www.minez.nl Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality www.minlnv.nl Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment www.minszw.nl Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Man. www.minvenw.nl Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport www.minvws.nl Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment www.minvrom.nl General Inspection Service (AID) www.aid.nl Centre for External Safety (CEV) www.rivm.nl/over- ivm/organisatie/mev/cev Centre for Health Impact of Disasters www.rivm.nl/cghor Healthcare Inspectorate www.igz.nl Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) www.knmi.nl National Police Services Agency (KLPD) www.politie.nl/klpd Royal Association of Netherlands Shipowners (KVNR) www.kvnr.nl National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC) www.loccnl.nl Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (LVNL) www.lvnl.nl Netherlands Coastguards (KWC) www.kustwacht.nl Netherland Assoc. For Intensive care www.nvic.nl Plant Protection Service (PD) www.minlnv.nl/pd Nat. Inspection for Livestock and Meat (RVV) www.minlnv.nl/rvv Inst. for Inland Water Man. & Wastewater Treatment (RIZA) www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/ rws/riza/ Nat. Inst. for Coastal and Marine Management (RIKZ) www.rikz.nl Regional Medical Officials (RGF) www.rgf.nl Nat. Inst. for Public Health and the Env. (RIVM) www.rivm.nl Foundation for Applied Water Research (STOWA) www.stowa.nl Storm Warning Service (SVSD) www.svsd.nl Food & Consumer Product Safety Authority (VWA) www.vwa.nl Water Board Councils www.waterschappen.nl
General websites: www.crisis.nl www.risicoencrisis.nl
65 66 Annex 3 Map of Safety Regions
67 68 Annex 4 Water Board Councils
69 70 Annex 5 Dike Rings
Dike rings in the Netherlands with the exception of areas along the Maas to the south of Nijmegen
The Netherlands Safety norm per Dike ring area Legend
12 number of dike ring area 1/10,000 per year
1/4000 per year
1/2000 per year
1/1250 per year
High ground (also outside the Netherlands Primary water defence outside the Netherlands
North Sea
Germany
Belgium
71 Dike rings along the Maas, south of Nijmegen
Annex IA, as referred to in article 2, first section of the Flood Defences Act [wet op de waterkering] Dike rings along the Maas, south of Nijmegen
Legend Dike ring area, surrounded by primary wate defences or high ground 80 number of dike ring area High ground Dutch national border
Map created by: Highways and Hydraulic Engineering Dept., Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management
72 no. Name of dike ring Safety region(s) involved Province(s) involved 1 Schiermonnikoog Fryslân Fryslân 2 Ameland Fryslân Fryslân 3 Terschelling Fryslân Fryslân 4 Vlieland Fryslân Fryslân 1 Schiermonnikoog Fryslân Fryslân 2 Ameland Fryslân Fryslân 3 Terschelling Fryslân Fryslân 4 Vlieland Fryslân Fryslân 5 Texel Noord-Holland Noord Noord-Holland 6 Friesland and Groningen Fryslân, Groningen, Drenthe Fryslân, Groningen, Drenthe 7 Noordoostpolder Flevoland Flevoland 8 Flevoland Flevoland Flevoland 9 Vollenhove IJssel-Vecht, Drenthe Overijssel, Drenthe 10 Mastenbroek IJssel-Vecht Overijssel 11 IJsseldelta IJssel-Vecht, Noord-Oost Gelderland Overijssel, Gelderland 12 Wieringen Noord-Holland Noord Noord-Holland 13 Noord-Holland Noord-Holland Noord, Zaanstreek-Waterland, Noord-Holland Kennemerland 13a IJburg Amsterdam-Amstelland Noord-Holland 13b Marken Zaanstreek-Waterland Noord-Holland 14 Zuid-Holland Kennemerland, Amsterdam-Amstelland, Zuid-Holland, Noord-Holland, Kennemerland, Haaglanden, Hollands-Midden, Utrecht Utrecht, Rotterdam Rijnmond 15 Lopiker and Krimpenerwaard Utrecht, Hollands-Midden, Rotterdam Rijnmond Utrecht, Zuid-Holland 16 Alblasserwaard and Vijfheerenlanden Zuid-Holland Zuid, Utrecht Zuid-Holland, Utrecht 17 IJsselmonde Zuid-Holland Zuid, Hollands-Midden, Zuid-Holland Rotterdam-Rijnmond 18 Pernis Rotterdam-Rijnmond Zuid-Holland 19 Rozenburg Rotterdam-Rijnmond Zuid-Holland 20 Voorne-Putten Rotterdam-Rijnmond Zuid-Holland 21 Hoekse Waard Zuid-Holland Zuid Zuid-Holland 22 Eiland van Dordrecht Zuid-Holland Zuid Zuid-Holland 23 Biesbosch Zuid-Holland Zuid Zuid-Holland 24 Land van Altena Midden and West Brabant Noord-Brabant 25 Goeree-Overflakkee Rotterdam-Rijnmond Zuid-Holland 26 Schouwen-Duiveland Zeeland Zeeland 27 Tholen and Sint-Philipsland Zeeland Zeeland 28 Noord-Beveland Zeeland Zeeland 29 Walcheren Zeeland Zeeland 30 Zuid-Beveland (west of Kanaal Zeeland Zeeland through Zuid-Beveland) 31 Zuid-Beveland (east of Kanaal Zeeland Zeeland through Zuid-Beveland) 32 Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen Zeeland Zeeland 33 Kreekrakpolder (no water defences) Midden and West Brabant Noord-Brabant 34 West-Brabant Midden and West Brabant Noord-Brabant 34a Geertruidenberg Midden and West Brabant Noord-Brabant 35 Donge Midden and West Brabant Noord-Brabant 36 Land van Heusden/De Maaskant Brabant Noord Noord-Brabant 36a Keent Brabant Noord Noord-Brabant 37 Nederhemert Brabant Noord Noord-Brabant
73 no. Name of dike ring Safety region(s) involved Province(s) involved 38 Bommelerwaard Brabant Noord, Gelderland-Zuid Noord-Brabant, Gelderland 39 Alem Brabant Noord Noord-Brabant 40 Heerewaarden Gelderland-Zuid Gelderland 41 Land van Maas en Waal Gelderland-Zuid Gelderland 42 Ooij en Millingen Gelderland-Zuid Gelderland 43 Betuwe/Tieler and Gelderland-Zuid Gelderland Culemborgerwaarden 44 Kromme Rijn Utrecht, Gooi and Vechtstreek, Kennemerland, Utrecht, Noord-Holland Amsterdam Amstelland 45 Gelderse Vallei Gelderland-Midden, Utrecht Gelderland, Utrecht 46 Eempolder Gooi- and Vechtstreek, Utrecht Utrecht 47 Arnhemse and Velperbroek Gelderland-Midden Gelderland 48 Rijn en IJssel Noord- and Oost Gelderland, Gelderland-Midden Gelderland 49 IJsselland Noord- and Oost Gelderland Gelderland 50 Zutphen Noord- and Oost Gelderland Gelderland 51 Gorssel Noord- and Oost Gelderland Gelderland 52 Oost-Veluwe Noord- and Oost Gelderland, Gelderland-Midden Gelderland 53 Salland IJssel-Vecht Overijssel
74 Annex 6 Remit of warning agencies and role of the LCO
Introduction: Role and added value of the LCO The warning agencies set out in this annex provide information to the parties with which they made agreements in this regard. Which parties are involved and when they receive this information is given in chapter 4. The warning agencies supply factual information: in other words, information that relates to water levels, whether or not in relation to other factors (such as dike heights). The bodies that combine this factual information with other information (such as weather forecasts, anticipated water levels and the condition of the threatened water defences) is the National Flood Threat Coordinating Commission or LCO. It combines the information and translates it into: 1. Situation reports and 2. Advice to the decision-makers within the general administrative and water sector. With this, the LCO functions as the ‘back bench’ of the DCC V&W and consists of experts from the relevant hydraulic engineering disciplines. A detailed description of the organisation, composition and tasks of the LCO are contained in the V&W handbook High Water and Storm Flood Crises.
Remit WDIJ The IJsselmeer Storm Warning Service (WDIJ) warns the managers of dikes and external dike areas in its remit if a dike section or external dike section is under threat of being breached as a result of Flood or High Water alarm levels. After a warning the dike managers will generally set up dike surveillance and take additional measures if necessary.
Dikes in the IJsselmeer area are under pressure from the combined effect of water levels and wave increase. On the down-wind side of a lake, the water level at the foot of the dike will rise during a storm because of the wind. The wind produces waves which can also rise against the bank of the dike and even over the crown of the dike. The combination of water level plus wave increase is referred to as the storm water level. Once the storm water level is higher than the alarm water level agreed with the dike manager, the WDIJ issues a warning.
The amount of water whipped into waves depends on the wind force and wind direction and is different at all points on the lake. The height of the waves also depends on wind force and wind direction, but also relates to the length of sweep of the wave (the distance to the up-wind dike embankment). The wave increase depends on wave height, wave period, the type and roughness of the dike and, predominantly, the angle at which the waves break onto the dike. All these factors mean that pressure on the dikes in the WDIJ area varies greatly. Consequently, the alarm water levels agreed with the dike manager differ per dike section. The majority of alarm water levels are at a level that, statistically, is reached 10 times more frequently than the crown height of the dike.
75 The WDIJ also monitors the lower reaches of the Ijssel and Vecht. In this area, high water levels are often caused by a combination of high river drainage and water whipped up from the Ijsselmeer via the Ketelmeer. The WDIJ follows the meteorological (KNMI) and hydraulic developments in the Ijsselmeer area in a permanent monitoring service. If, based on the predicted circumstances the alarm water levels are under threat of being breached, the WDIJ becomes active and joins the Inland Waterways Infocentre. The necessary warnings are sent from here and additional information is circulated to all interested parties for the duration of the storm or high water.
At this point, the WDIJ can look 6 to 12 hours ahead. Work is being done on a permanent forecasting system that looks up to 40 hours ahead. The remit of the WDIJ is the Ijsselmeer, Ketelmeer, Vossemeer, Markermeer, Ijmeer, Gooimeer, Eemmeer, Zwartemeer, Zwarte water, lower reaches of the Overijsselse Vecht, the lower reaches of the Ijssel as far as Kampen.
The remit of the Hoogwatergroep voor het Rivierengebied The National Institute for Inland Water Management and Wastewater Treatment (RIZA) is the advisory body of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management in the area of freshwater in the Netherlands and internationally. The RIZA gathers and analyses data on water quality and quantity. On the basis of this information, it issues advice on managing freshwater in the Netherlands and beyond. In the area of high water, the RIZA plays a key role. If the major rivers are expected to have high water levels, high water alerts will go into operation. This is implemented by the Hoogwatergroep voor het Rivierengebied. Based on set limits, the Hoogwatergroep voor het Rivierengebied will become operational. This group of experts tests the predictions regarding water levels and issues national alerts when the alarm water level is exceeded. If this threatens to exceed the set water level limit for the River Maas, the information will be sent to the Limburg Department of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management (RWS). In the event of high water in the Rhine, the data are coordinated with the Oost Nederland Department. The data will also be sent to the Zuid Holland Department. These organisations assess the data, supplement them and pass on the information to the Inland Waters Infocentre of the RIZA which checks the information for consistency and places it on teletext and the internet (Final Report: ‘De Organisatorsche voorbereiding op overstroming van Rijn en Maas’, Part II, Annexes, July 2005).
Remit of the Storm Warning Service (SVSD) The task of the SVSD (in Dutch the abbreviation literally means ‘Storm Danger Sign Service’) is to keep the dike and water defence managers and public safety managers informed of anticipated dangerously high water levels. The SVSD is ready to sprint into action 24 hours a day: it is always on the alert. It closely follows coastal tides during heavy storms, particularly wind directions between Southwest and North. It makes forecasts of critically high waters and issues prompt warnings to managing bodies. The SVSD doesn’t itself take measures to defend the dikes; these must be taken by the dike manager.
The SVSD is informed when the anticipated high water will exceed the so-called ‘information level’ at a base station. This water level is 40 to 50 cm below the warning water level. The KNMI generally informs the SVSD around ten hours in advance of the rising water level. The duty tide hydrologist of the SVD decides on the basis of the information and his experience whether or not to man the warning centre, the SVSD’s action centre. If the warning or alarm water level is expected to be reached or exceeded, the centre will be manned. If the centre is not manned, the situation is expected to be relatively safe or that, at
76 most, the warning water level will be achieved or exceeded. In the event of the latter, the tide hydrologist will phone the agencies on the advance warning list. If the centre is manned and the warning water levels in one or more sectors are expected to be breached, the head of the SVSD will inform his supervisors and the warnings and/or alerts will be issued – as early as possible and at all events roughly 6 hours before the high water will occur. The dike managers will then have time to prepare.
There are four water levels which, if breached, give the SVSD the green light to take action:
1. The first and lowest water level is the pre-warning water level. The SVSD will issue a warning and the dike managers will take very limited measures
2. The second water level is the warning water level. If this water level is breached, various measures are taken
3. The third water level is the water level limit. If this level is breached, there is national coordination of activities within the water sector
4. The fourth and highest water level is the alarm water level. If the SVSD expects this level to be breached, more far-reaching measures are taken. The SVSD will then alert the dike managers and advise dike surveillance
Which agencies are warned?
In the coastal provinces: • Water board councils and the high water board management • The management services of the Directorate-General for Public Works and Water Management • The Ministry of the Interior and Home Affairs and other stakeholders
The pre-warning, warning or alarm (dike surveillance recommended) do not go ahead if the water conditions in the entire sector (taking account of duration) have again fallen below the indicated (pre) warning water level and alarm water level, after the high water situation in question. If in the next incident of high water a certain water level is expected to be breached, the SVSD will again send out warnings and alerts. Because the times at what high water occurs differ and a storm is seldom as wild along the coast, the coastal area has been divided into sectors. A base station has been set up in each sector. If alerts have been issued, announcements are broadcast in the TV and radio news. In terms of dike surveillance, the following measures are taken:
The ANP announces the dike surveillance sectors on radio and TV. These will also be announced on teletext. The people living in these sectors understand that they can expect further updates via radio and TV. This marks the point of maximum alert. The progress in each separate case cannot, of course, be predicted here. In general, damage is limited to dune erosion (source: www.svsd.nl, 2006).
77 78 Annex 7 Overview of alarm/phasing of warning agencies
For a clarification and underpinning see the High Water and Storm Flood Crises handbook of the ministry of V&W.
Phasing/alerting the Rivers Area
Phase 0: Phase 0 is the normal situation in which the river water levels are higher than usual. Scaling up criteria are given in table 1.
Table 1 Scaling up for phase 0 in high water river scenario Theme Scaling up criteria Reported by Rhine Expected water level at Lobith NAP 15.00 m OostNederland Maas Water level Borgharen NAP 42.75 m Limburg Condition of water defences None Water board councils National media attention None -
The scaling up criteria for the Rhine are derived from the criteria from the RWS Oost Nederland crisis plan, that of the Maas from the high water handbook of RWS Limburg.
Phase 1:
Theme Scaling up criteria Reported by Rhine NAP 14.00 m at Lobith and expected NAP 15.00 m OostNederland Maas NAP 43.55 m at Borgharen Limburg Condition of water defences None Water board councils National media attention None -
Phase 2:
Theme Scaling up criteria Reported by Rhine NAP 15.00 m at Lobith and expected NAP 16.75 m Infocentre Maas NAP 44.10 m at Borgharen Infocentre Condition of water defences None Water board councils National media attention None -
Phase 3 (relevant for this national response plan):
Theme Scaling up criteria Reported by Rhine NAP 16.75 m at Lobith and expected NAP 17.75 m OostNederland Maas NAP 46.30 m at Borgharen Limburg Condition of water defences Critical condition, great risk Water board councils National media attention National media attention DCC VenW
79 Alert coastal area Water levels in coastal sectors (cm re. NAP) Sector Sector Dordrecht Den Helder Sector Delfzijl Schelde Westland Delfzijl Vlissingen Hoek van Harlingen Holland Information water level* Pre-warning water level 310 200 260 Warning water level 330 220 190 270 300 Water level limit 350 260 225 305 330 Alarm water level 370 280 250 260 330 380
* The information water level is announced by the KNMI and depends on weather forecasts known in advance between 24-12 hours.
Alert coastal area IJsselmeer Markermeer Initial water level NAP + 0.20 m NAP.+ 0.15 m Pre-warning water level NAP + 0.20 m NAP + 0.15 m Warning water level NAP + 0.20 m NAP + 0.15 m Water level limit NAP + 0.20 m NAP + 0.15 m Alarm water level NAP + 0.20 m NAP + 0.15 m
80 Annex 8 Scaling up diagram Coast and Ijsselmeer area
Coast
Coordination phase 0: Normal control Initial water level
RWS RDs/water board councils National media attention National media Coordination phase 1: Regional processing of crisis situation 1a: Preparation Pre-warning water level No Water defences/dikes breached
Level/drainage/wind/(hydraulic) load No
General Sector: Water sector: (operational) RWS-RDs/water board councils (operational) • Safety regions Preparation crisis organisations • RWS/DCC • Provinces • Water board councils • Municipalities • KNMI • NCC
1b: Implementation Warning water level No No
Water Sector: General sector: (Administrative) (administrative) Crisis teams RDs / Water boards councils • DG-RWS • Director safety regions headed by crisis managers • Water board ch. • Queen’s Commissioners Limited dike surveillance • DCC • Mayors • LCO • NCC
Coordination phase 2: Administrative/national coordination crisis situation Limit water level No No
RWS-team headed by DG-RWS/DCC/LCO Pre-warning in connection with National communication high water preparations for evacuation DCC coordination group advising • Stas/Min. V&W High water teams RDs headed by HID • Min. BZK High water communication • NCC/LOCC/ERC Dams and dikes surveillance • Directors Safety regions Water board councils headed by water board ch. • Queen’s Commissioners Extended dike surveaillance • Mayors
Coordination phase 3:National decision on processing crisis situation 3a: Preparation evacuation Alarm water level Yes Imminent breach
Rhine-Lobith IBT/MBT headed by Min. BZK Actual Expected • participation of V&W and assoc. of water board councils Not applicable > NAP+15.00 m • NCC/LOCC/ERC Initial water level • LCO Pre-warning water level > NAP+14.00 m > NAP+15.00 m Regional teams headed by director of Safety regions Warning water level > NAP+14.00 m > NAP+16.15 m • participation RWS and water board councils Water level limit > NAP+15.00 m > NAP+16.75 m Alarm water level > NAP+16.75 m > NAP+17.75 m
3b: From evacuation to flooding NAP+17,60 m (drainage 15.000 m3/s) Measures MHW (evacuation)
MAAS - Borgharen Actual Expected 3c: Acute assistance Flooding Initial water level > NAP+42.75 m
Pre-warning water level > NAP+42.75 m Rising
Warning water level > NAP+43.55 m Rising
3d: Stabilisation Water level limit > NAP+44.10 m Rising Stabilisation Alarm water level > NAP+46.30 m Rising
recovery infrastructure (water defences and roads) MAAS - Borgharen phase ends with return of population MHW ______NAP+50.50 m (drainage 3.800 m3/s)
81 IJSSELMEER AREA
Organisational (and administrative) scaling up Informative scaling up
Coordination phase o: Normal control Initial water level
RWS RDs/water board councils Normal control
Coordination phase 1: Regional processing of crisis situation
1a: Preparation I Pre-warning water level National media attention No Water defences/dikes breached No Level/drainage/wind/(hydraulic load
General Sector: Water sector: (operational) RWS-RDs/water board councils (operational) Preparation crisis organisations • Safety regions • RWS/DCC • Provinces • Water board councils • Municipalities • KNMI • NCC
1b: Implementation Warning water level No No
Water Sector: General sector: Crisis teams RDs / Water boards councils (Administrative) (administrative) • Director safety regions headed by crisis managers • DG-RWS • Queen’s Commissioners Limited dike surveillance • Water board ch. • DCC • Mayors • LCO • NCC
Coordination phase 2: Administrative/national coordination crisis situation Limit water level No No
RWS-team headed by DG-RWS/DCC/LCO Pre-warning in connection with National communication high water preparations for evacuation DCC coordination group advising • Stas/Min. V&W High water teams RDs headed by HID • Min. BZK High water communication • NCC/LOCC/ERC Dams and dikes surveillance • Directors Safety regions Water board councils headed by water board ch. • Queen’s Commissioners Extended dike surveaillance • Mayors
Coordination phase 3:National decision on processing crisis situation 3a: Preparation evacuation Alarm water level Yes Imminent breach
IBT/MBT headed by Min. BZK • participation of V&W and assoc. of water board councils • NCC/LOCC/ERC • LCO Regional teams headed by director of Safety regions • participation RWS and water board councils
3b: From evacuation to flooding Measures ( evacuation)
Markermeer
3c: Acute assistance Flooding Sector IJsselmeer Markermeer Monitored Initial water level > NAP+ 0.20 m > NAP+ 0.15 m Pre-warning water level > NAP+ 0.20 m > NAP+ 0.15 m ‘warnings’ Warning water level > NAP+ 0.20 m > NAP+ 0.15 m ‘warnings’ Water level limit > NAP+ 0.20 m > NAP+ 0.15 m ‘formal warnings’ 3d: Stabilisation Stabilisation Alarm water level > NAP+ 0.20 m > NAP+ 0.15 m ‘formal warnings’
recovery infrastructure (water defences and roads) phase ends with return of population ______
82 Annex 9 Accountability method for generic high water scenarios
1 Introduction
The LOCC project National Operational High Water and Flooding Strategy is geared on mapping the trans-regional crisis control activities for various scenarios. The flood scenarios for (threatened) flooding determine the assistance required for crisis control. The present memo indicates the realisation of normative flood scenarios. Parallel to this, the project also inventories the (maximum) available aid. Ultimately, the project matches relief supply and demand in the event of a flood as effectively as possible in a national operational plan.
The memo first outlines the determining elements for the assistance required in the event of a flood. Based on this, the normative scenarios in chapter 3 were defined and focus on these determining elements.
2 Elements that determine the assistance required
In large-scale emergencies, the aid required is mainly determined by the number of threatened persons and the time dynamic. These two parameters within the LOCC project are used to draft normative scenarios. The scope within which the flood scenarios are situated thus comprise the elements ‘time’ and ‘number of persons’. Depending on the type of flood, there will be little or more time. Depending on the location(s) of the flood, there will be many or few persons under threat. These aspects are dealt with in the following paragraphs.
Upper limit number of persons threatened
Many people Many people Little time much time Upper limit time
Few people Few people
No. Persons threatened Little time much time
83 2.1 Number of persons under threat
First of all, it is crucial to know the total number of people affected, therefore the number of inhabitants in the threatened or affected area. These persons can then be categorised into various groups. The aid required will after all be different for someone evacuated from the area than for someone who remained behind. The people remaining also share different characteristics. A number of them will not survive the flood, while others may be injured but will survive. Figure 1 shows this structure in terms of the number of persons under threat.
Figure 1 Categorisation of persons threatened by flooding
Total number of persons in threatened area
Evacuated Remaining behind (from area before flood)
Sheltering in Affected high-rise buildings
Injured Victims Hypothermia etc
2.2 Time dynamic
Determining the time dynamic mainly revolves around the evacuation process. As regards evacuations in the event of large-scale floods, the following time parameters are of importance:
1. Available time This time consists of two components: namely time between the forecast high water and pressure on the water defences (prediction time) and the time between pressure and breaching the water defences (breaching time).
2. Time required The time required consists of a number of components, namely: deciding on evacuation, warning the population, response of the population and actual evacuation.
84 Figure 2 Components of the available time and the required time in the event of an imminent flood
P F
P = Predictability of critical situation (depending on type of water system) F = Time between excess pressure on water defences and actual breach (depending on fail-safe mechanism)
Required time
100 rapid 90 slow
80
70
60
50
% evacuees 40
30
20
10
0 tijd T1
D W P E E
Time
D = Decision-making time (2-4 hours approx) W = Warn population (2-3 hours approx) P = Population response (2-3 hours approx) E = Evacuation time (highly depends on area) and choise of traffic management
3 Flood scenarios
3.1 Flood types
We have defined four types of large-scale external flood scenarios for the Netherlands
1. Sea flooding A sea flood normally occurs when there is a storm. In the Dutch situation there is most risk of sea flooding during the spring tides and in the event of an extreme North-westerly storm. This type of flood is typified by the small amount of time available (predictability time + failure time). There will be very little time for preventive evacuation.
85 2. Upper river area Flooding in the upper river area is caused by extreme drainage from the Rhine or Maas. Such floods are typified by the relatively large amount of time available because the high water will be anticipated far in advance. In general there will be sufficient time for the preventive evacuation of the area (provided that adequate action is taken).
3. Lower river area In the lower river area, floods are caused by a combination of considerable amounts of drainage waters in the rivers and extreme water conditions at sea. The available time is something between that for the sea area and the upper river area. In general, however, there will also be too little time for full preventive evacuation in this scenario.
4. Lake Flooding from the large lakes (Ijsselmeer, Markermeer) may occur in extreme water conditions if there are strong winds. There is little available time in lake flood scenarios.
Unexpected breach The above categorisation of external waters is based on a breached in the water defences in a way that is ‘theoretically underpinned and predicted’. In other words, in this approach the strength and height of the dike is in order and the dike reacts as expected and only fails when the water levels for which the dike was designed, are exceeded. However, it is also possible that the strength of the dike has been overestimated. This is possible either because the dike management is not in order, the structure of the dike is other than expected or the strength of the dike is other than expected. The current discussion about modelling pipes prompted by the results of VNK, can serve as an example here.
In the event of an unexpected breach what actually happens is that in the cases in which the available time is estimated as ‘long’, this duration proves ‘short’ from one moment to the next.
3.2 Areas affected by large-scale flooding
Individual dike rings The flood-sensitive areas in the Netherlands have been divided into dike rings. The size, inundation depth, compartmentalisation and number of persons in the area is very different: from dike ring 14 (Zuid Holland) with 3.6 million inhabitants and a surface area of 223,000 hectare to extremely small dike rings such as Schiermonnikoog. In the event that a single dike ring floods, an upper and lower limit of the number of persons under threat can be given for every type of flood.
86 Type Upper Limit Lower Limit Area Number of persons Area Number of persons under threat under threat sea Zuid-Holland 3,600,000 Schiermonnikoog 1,000 Dike ring 14 Dike ring 1 BOR* Kromme Rijn 650,000 Heerewaarden 1,100 Dike ring 44 Dike ring 40 BER** Alblasserwaard 210,000 Biesbosch 300 Dike ring 16 Dike ring 23 lake Flevoland 365,000 Marken 1,850 Dike ring 8 Dike ring 13b
* upper river area ** lower river area
Combinations of dike rings Under extreme circumstances it is likely that several dike rings will flood. This was also the case in the flood disaster of 1953. In the flood of 1995, there similarly seemed to be a similar danger that multiple dike rings would be breached. Possible combinations for the type’s sea and upper rivers are:
Sea As an individual dike ring, dike ring 14 (Zuid Holland) is normative but if dike ring 14 floods it is also realistic to assume that other dike rings will have flooded (earlier). Based on a section with possible breaches of roughly 150 km, a number of combinations are possible: 1. The dike rings in Zeeland and dike ring 14, Zuid Holland, will flood 2. The coast of Holland will flood and dike ring 14, Zuid Holland, floods in combination with dike ring 13, Noord Holland 3. The northernmost dike rings will flood: Friesland and Noord Holland
Upper rivers In practice, high water periods on the Rhine and Maas can occur concurrently. Based on extreme high water on rivers, a multiple flood of, for instance, Bommelerwaard (dike ring 38), the Betuwe/Tieler and Culemborgerwaarden (dike ring 43) and the Land van Maas en Waal (dike ring 41) is possible.
3.3 Time aspects
Time limits At the instruction of the Highways and Hydraulic Engineering Service (DWW), in June 2004 27 HKV lijn in water researched the available and required time in the event of imminent flooding. The upper and lower limits of the time available are based on these findings. The time required depends on the evacuation process and will differ per area. Here we only offer an estimate of the margin given on the basis of calculations for several dike rings with the evacuation calculator.
27 Barendregt, van Noortwijk. Bepalen Beschikbare en benodigde tijd voor evacuatie bij dreigende overstromingen, HKV lijn in water, June 2004.
87 Type Time available Time required Average Lower limit Upper limit Estimated margin sea 15 10 58 BOR* 60 35 147 18-60 hours BER** 24 15 61 lake 18 9 62
* upper river area ** lower river area
Acute breach The aforementioned values for the time available are based on the water defences failing after a predictable length of time and assumes there is time for evacuation. However, it is also possible that an unexpected breach may occur, but evacuation is not considered necessary.
3.4 Ratio of evacuated/non-evacuated
In the event of sea flooding the time available is limited. The time required is generally greater than the time available. Areas threatened by the sea therefore have a large percentage of non-evacuated individuals and a small percentage of evacuees. In the upper river area there is a greater amount of available time, for instance, because the high water can be anticipated quite a while beforehand.
In (Jonkman, Cappelmans)28 the fraction of the population present at the flood moment is established for 3 dike rings (1 Sea, 1 upper river). Based on this, general estimates have been made of the ratio of evacuated and non-evacuated persons in the area. The table below offers an overview:
Type Number of persons evacuated at Number of persons left behind at the moment of flooding [%] the moment of flooding [%] sea 10 90 Upper rivers 95 5 Lower rivers 40 60 lake 30 70
3.5 Normative scenarios
Based on the elements that are decisive for the aid required and paragraph 3.1 and 3.2, the individual dike rings and the time/number of persons can be included in the diagram.
28 Jonkmans, Cappendijk, 2006, Veiligheid Nederland in kaart – inschatting van het aantal slachtoffers bij overstromingen.
88 Upper limit number of persons threatened
1 Dike ring number Many14 people Many people Little time much time Dike ring 1: Schiermonnikoog 44 Dike ring 8: Flevoland
8 Upper time limit 16 Dike ring 13b: Marken Dike ring 14: Zuid-Holland Dike ring 16: Alblasserwaard Dike ring 23: Biesbosch Few people Few people Dike ring 40: Heerewaarden Little time much time 13b 40 Dike ring 44: Kromme Rijn No. Persons Threatened 1 23
Time
For the national operational plan, the trans-regional situations are crucial. In scenarios with few people (and small areas) it can be assumed that the regional handbooks suffice. These are not considered normative and can thus be removed from the diagram. What is missing from the diagram are the combinations of dike rings. With these combinations, the diagram is as follows:
Upper limit number of persons threatened A 40 Dike ring number Dike ring 8: Flevoland B2Many people Many people B1 40 Dike ring 14: Zuid-Holland Little time much time Dike ring 16: Alblasserwaard
40 Upper time limit Dike ring 44: Kromme Rijn 40 40 A Combination of dike rings
A: Flooding in braod coastal stretch Few people Few people e.g. dike ring 14 and dike rings in Zeeland Little time much time B1: Combinations of dike rings in No. Persons Threatened upper river area B2: Combinations of dike rings in upper river area wit acute breaches Time
In examples 1, 2 and 3, the normative parameters for a number of characteristic dike rings have been indicated. Based on the elements that are decisive for the aid required and paragraph 3.1 and 3.2, the individual dike rings and the time/number of persons can be included in the diagram.
89 Example 1: Parameters for upper rivers area Total Average Evac/ No. evacs Average no. No. number of time non-evac evacs per remaining threats available hour behind Dike ring 44 650,000 60 hours 95% / 5% 617,000 10,300 33,000 Kromme Rijn Dike ring 41 251,000 60 hours 95% / 5% 240,000 4.000 11,000 Maas en Waal Dike ring 40 1,100 60 hours 95% / 5% 1,045 17 55 Herewaarden
Example 2: Parameters for upper rivers area. In the worst credible flood, the no. of threatened persons on the coast can increase to 6,000,000 Total Average Evac/ No. evacs Average no. No. number of time non-evac evacs per remaining threats available hour behind Dike ring 14 1,000,000 15 hours 10% / 90% 100,000 6,700 900,000 Zuid Holland Dike ring 25 108,000 15 hours 10% / 90% 10,800 720 97,200 Goeree Dike ring 1 1,000 15 hours 10% / 90% 100 7 900 Schiermonnikoog
Example 3: normative need for assistance if dike rings are flooded, in average time available. The demand for assistance is proportionately higher for a combination of dike rings
normative need for assistance, in average time available
1000000
dike ring 14 900000
800000
700000
600000 upper rivers lower rivers 500000 sea lake 400000
300000 dike ring 8
200000 dike ring 16 no. persons present in flooded area dike ring 25 100000 dike ring 7 dike ring 44 dike ring 41 0 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 average number of evacuees per hour [H/hour]
90 Annex 10 Bottom-up information line in inter-regional floods
The diagram below offers an example of the usual information process in the event of inter- regional (and inter-provincial) floods. This diagram is not based on State management of the situation
Minister BZK
(C) Queens’ (C) Queens’ Commissioner Commissioner Consultation Queen’s Lord mayors Lord mayors Comm. & lord mayors involved in A involved in A involved
(C)RBT RBT (C)RBT +WBT
ROT ROT (coördinating ROT (coördinating for A) for F)
Dike Ring A: Lord mayors VZ VZ Dike ring Dike ring OL OL Dike ring Dike ring Dike ring C B +WBT D E F
Dike ring A/C = inter-provincial Dike ring F = inte-rregionaal (dike ring(s) entirely within 1 province) Dike ring B/D/E = within 1 region (C) = coordinating = liaison
Goal: clear operational and administrative managmeent per dike ring, maintain the powers and accountabilities of each party
• For a dike ring with several regions, one of the regions is designated coordinator in the preparatory phase. This means: it takes initiative for coordinated effort. The normal structure continues to exist. For this region, both the ROT, the RBT and, in the case of an inter-provincial dike ring, the Queen’s Commissioner of the province in which the region concerned is located, are appointed coordinators. • At dike ring level, when the crisis control plan commences (as agreed in the preparative phase) an administrative consultation with the lord mayors involved is held, supplemented with the operational leader(s) involved and a representative from the water policy team (WBT). This meeting is informative. In principle, decisions can also be taken
91 in this meeting, which will then be tested against implementation within the RBT. The meeting is chaired by the chairman of a water board council.
For clear operational management of the dike ring area • In the preparatory phase, dike rings in which several ROTs are involved (several safety regions in one dike ring) are designated a coordinating ROT. The coordinating ROT takes the initiative as regards the other ROT for coordinating the effort. This latter ROT proves (unilaterally) liaison for the coordinating ROT. Each ROT is responsible for its own area.
• The municipalities have their own BT. Manning by emergency staff will be zero or minimal with regard to availability due to scale.
For clear administrative management of the dike ring area • Both in inter-regional (several safety regions within a province within a dike ring) and inter-provincial collaboration (several regions and provinces in one dike ring) at dike ring level the consultation with involved lord mayors, operational leaders and water board council chairmen and the chairmen of the involved regions, meet. The coordinating RBT is responsible for initiating the meeting and supplies the chairman. A similar request can also be forwarded by the other RBT. • If the RBTs/lord mayors in an inter-regional collaboration do not reach uniform recommendations, the Queen’s Commissioner acts in accordance with the usual structure, after administrative consultation with the lord mayors and/or chairmen involved, in his designatory capacity. In the event of differences of opinion between lord mayors within a dike ring inside a single region, coordination also runs according to this customary structure. • If the RBTs/lord mayors in an inter-regional collaboration do not reach uniform recommendations, the Queen’s Commissioners hold an administrative meeting with the lord mayors involved after which the Queen’s Commissioners consult with each other. The coordinating Queen’s Commissioner is responsible for initiating this Queen’s Commissioners’ consultation. • If the Queen’s Commissioners fail to agree, the Minister of BZK decides. • The content of the information to be shared is coordinated in the dike ring consultation and is then continued by the regions via their own structures. The water board councils arrange the information sharing to occur via this line in the general sector where possible.
Source: consultation between the provinces of Utrecht and Gelderland and the regions Noord and Oost Gelderland, Gelderland Midden, Gelderland Zuid and Utrecht.
92 Example Vallei and Eem
Coordination diagram Goal Clear operational and administrative management for the dike rings while retaining parties’ powers and accountabilities
Minister BZK
Queen’s Commissioner Queen’s Commissioner Utrecht (coördinator) Gelderland
V&E V&E lord mayors involved lord mayors involved
VRU: GM: RBT RCBT RBT (coordinator) = water board council chairman
VRU GM ROT (coordinator) ROT + WOT
Vallei and Eem Lord mayors involved VZ-RCBT VRU (+ Queen’s Commissioner) VZ-GM Legenda: OL-VRU OL-GM Vallei and Eem water board = liaison council chairman = consultation
Utrecht For the dike ring, the VRU/Utrecht is designated coordinator in accordance coordinates with the administrative covenant of 2002. This means that it takes the initiative for the coordinated effort. The regular structure is retained. Both the ROT and RCBT of the VRU and the Queen’s Commissioner of Utrecht are designated coordinator.
NB For the storm scenario it is assumed that the regions will all be scaled up to GRIP 4 due to the fact that there is a storm. If the dike threatens to be breached there is a problem in the second instance
Clear coordination dike ring area
Coordinated At dike ring level when a crisis control plan commences, there is admini- start-up strative consultation with the lord mayors involved, supplemented by the consultation operational leaders of the VRU and Gelderland-Midden, the chairmen of
93 the two safety regions and a representative from the water board policy team (WBT). This consultation is informative. In principle, decisions can also be taken in this meeting, which will then be tested against implementation within the R(C)BT. The meeting is chaired by the chairman of the water board council for Vallei and Eem.
Operational The ROT of the VRU (coordinating ROT) takes the initiative as regards the coordination Gelderland-Midden ROT for coordinating the effort. The Gelderland- Midden ROT provides (unilateral) liaison for the ROT of the VRU. Each ROT is responsible for its own area.
Administrative At dike ring level, the coordination consultation with involved lord mayors, coordination supplemented by the operational leaders of the VRU and Gelderland- Midden, the chairmen of the two safety regions and a representative from the water board policy team (WBT), meet. The RCBT Utrecht (coordinating RBT) is responsible for initiating the meeting and supplies the chairman. A similar request can also be forwarded by the Gelderland-Midden RBT. This meeting can be seen as cyclical meeting.
If the RBTs/lord mayors do not reach uniform recommendations, the Queen’s Commissioners hold an administrative consultation with their ‘own’ lord mayors after which the Queen’s Commissioners consult with each other. The coordinating Queen’s Commissioner of Utrecht (coordinating Queen’s Commissioner) is responsible for initiating this Queen’s Commissioners’ consultation.
If the Queen’s Commissioners fail to agree, the Minister of BZK decides.
The content of the information to be shared is coordinated in the dike ring consultation and is then continued by the regions via their own structures. The water board council of Vallei and Eem arranges the information sharing to occur via this line in the general sector where possible.
Representation In the ROT VRU: of Vallei and Liaison from the water board council operational team (WOT) Eem water Agreement: the liaison will now and then be in the ROT and has a firm board council accessibility rule In the RCBT VRU: Liaison from the water board council policy team (WBT)
Locally The municipalities have their own municipal policy team (GBT). Manning by emergency staff will be zero or minimal with regard to availability due to scale.
94 Re. the GCT/ • The GCTs/GMTs and the ACs are organised locally along standard lines. GMT/AC Starting point for the VRU is to cluster forces as far as possible. The municipal action centres (ACs) are organised differently because of this specific scenario. The municipal processes are divided into primary and secondary processes and clustered wherever possible to save manpower and time. The ACs are arranged regionally for the primary processes; for the secondary processes, the ACs continue to be arranged locally. In this plan, the locations are already given. • In Gelderland Midden the GCTs/GMTs and ACs continue to be regulated locally.
Source: Crisis control plan ‘(Dreiging) dijkdoorbraak Vallei en Eem’, version 1.0, December 2006.
95 96 Annex 11 Overview of measures per strategy and per emergency management process
Process Evacuation Manage env. Aid to those remaining behind warning x x x communication x x x logistics x x x 1. fire fighting 2. rescue x 5. inspect and measure x X x 6. warning population x X 7. create access x 8. medical/somatic x x 9. preventive healthcare x 10. medical/psycho-social x x 11. clear and evacuate x x 12. cordon off x x x 13. regulate traffic x 14. enforce public order x x 15. identify victims x 16. routing x x 17. criminal investigation x X 18. information x x 19. care and shelter x 20. funeral arrangements x x 21. victim registration (CRIB) x x 22. basic needs x (utilities/basic facilities) x 23. damage registration (CRAS) x x 24. environmental measures x 25. aftercare x x
97 98 Annex 12 Large-scale flood scenario
In the event of an imminent flood from the rivers, the whole of the Netherlands will be affected by flooding and threatening situations. The forelands will be completely flooded and the rivers will be full to bursting. The dike surveillance will be at maximum and, in many places, emergency dikes and sandbags will offer extra protection. The emergencies services and all local and national crisis centres will then already be active. According to the existing crisis control and disaster management plans, sandbags and emergency dikes are reinforced or made higher. Extensive information is provided. Preparing to carry out evacuation will be carried out in conformity with current plans. In many places, public life will be disrupted to a greater or lesser extent. If it seems that more water will enter the Netherlands from the rivers, measures will be taken to prepare for the flooding. An imminent flood by the rivers can be anticipated days in advance. This gives sufficient time for taking emergency measures. By this time it will have been raining for months. France, Germany and Belgium are already experience major problems with the water before the high water reaches the Netherlands. If an area is threatened by flooding and the safety of the population can no longer be guaranteed, the area will be cleared and the population evacuated. In principle, a flood along the rivers will not claim any victims because of the relatively long warning times.
If there is a threat from the rivers, it will have been raining heavily for a considerable time (in the entire drainage basin of the Maas or the Rhine and in the rest of Europe). Here, too, a considerable amount of snow could be melting or the ground could be frozen solid, preventing the water from draining. In the Netherlands, there will be serious problems with the smaller, regional waterways. Because the effects of the flood will be considerable, precisely who will take which measures, must be absolutely clear.
In the case of flood disasters from the past such as New Orleans in 2005 and Zeeland in 1953, there are often a number of breaches. And in the case of coastal water flooding, flooding could occur at various places in the regional water system. The high sea levels are caused by storms at sea.
When water defences are breached, the water rapidly flows over the land to lower-lying areas. The dike rings in the rivers area act in most cases as a sort of ‘bath tub’. They fill up if there is a flood. Compared to flooding by the rivers, in the event of coastal floods, parts of the dike ring area will remain dry. People will be able to venture there safely but there will probably be problems with electricity, gas and drinking and waste water.
After a flood, the material damage to homes, business and the (vital) infrastructure is considerable. Moreover, companies will be inoperable as a direct result of the flooding. The flood area will most probably also be affected by lack of utilities, IT and telecom services. This disruption will not be restricted to the flood area and can impact regions far beyond.
99 100 Annex 13 Bibliography
• Engineering/Consultancy Agency Save and Consultancy Agency Van Dijke, Leidraad Maatramp. Ministry of the Interior, September 2000.
• Engineering/Consultancy Agency Save et al, Leidraad Operationele Prestaties. Ministry of the Interior, August 2001.
• Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Circulaire Referentiekader Opschaling (GRIP) dated 11 September 2006.
• Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Voorbereiding Rampenbestrijding, June 2003. • Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Beleidsdraaiboek WTS, Disasters and Serious Accidents (Compensation) Act [wet tegemoetkoming schade bij rampen en zware ongevallen] (draft), June 2006.
• Ministry of Economic Affairs, Handboek CrisEZbeheersing, 2006.
• Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Draft Beleidsdraaiboek Klassieke Varkenspest (version 2.0), December 2005.
• Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Ministerial Crisis Control Coordination Centre Transport and Public Works. Handboek Crisisbeheersing, December 2005.
• Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sport, Beleidsdraaiboek Influenzapandemie, June 2004.
• Project Nationale Veiligheid, self evaluation, Toenemend overstromingsrisico, 2006.
• RIVM et al, Risico’s in bedijkte termen: Een thematische evaluatie van het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeleid tegen overstromen. RIVM, May 2004.
• Twynstra & Gudde, Royal Haskoning and COT, De organisatorische voorbereiding op overstromingen van Rijn en Maas. Ministry of the Interior, June 2005.
• Twynstra Gudde, Basisvereisten interdepartementale crisisbeheersing. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, August 2006.
• Twynstra Gudde, Basisvereisten interdepartementale crisisbeheersing (summary). Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, August 2006.
101 • Twynstra Gudde, Royal Haskoning and COT, Rampbestrijdingsstrategieën overstromingen Rijn en Maas (concluding report). Ministry of the Interior, June 2005.
• River Lands Water Board Council, Calamiteitenbestrijdingsplan Hoogwater Buiten van Waterschap Rivierenland, January 2005.
102