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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Komlos, John Working Paper Reaganomics: A Historical Watershed CESifo Working Paper, No. 7301 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Komlos, John (2018) : Reaganomics: A Historical Watershed, CESifo Working Paper, No. 7301, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185499 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu 7301 2018 October 2018 Reaganomics: A Historical Watershed John Komlos Impressum: CESifo Working Papers ISSN 2364‐1428 (electronic version) Publisher and distributor: Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research ‐ CESifo GmbH The international platform of Ludwigs‐Maximilians University’s Center for Economic Studies and the ifo Institute Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany Telephone +49 (0)89 2180‐2740, Telefax +49 (0)89 2180‐17845, email [email protected] Editors: Clemens Fuest, Oliver Falck, Jasmin Gröschl www.cesifo‐group.org/wp An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded ∙ from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com ∙ from the RePEc website: www.RePEc.org ∙ from the CESifo website: www.CESifo‐group.org/wp CESifo Working Paper No. 7301 Category 6: Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth Reaganomics: A Historical Watershed Abstract The socio-economic impact of Reaganomics and its long-run deleterious legacy is documented. The preponderance of data indicate that economic growth was not particularly impressive in the wake of the tax cuts of 1981 or 1986. GDP did snap back to potential but failed to accelerate beyond the rates achieved in prior or subsequent decades. The supposed incentives of supply- side economics failed to materialize. People did not work more, they did not save or invest more than they did before, and the benefits trickled down like molasses and got stuck at the very top of the income distribution. Instead, Reagan’s presidency was a watershed in U.S. economic development in the sense that it reversed many of the accomplishments of the New Deal and inaugurated an era in which low-skilled men’s wages began a long period of decline, and labor’s share of GDP continued to fall. Reagan’s true legacy is a dual economy that accompanied the hollowing out of the middle class, a more business-friendly regulatory and oversight framework for Wall Street that ultimately led to the financial crisis, a stupendous increase in the national debt from 30% to 50% of GDP that put it on a path such that by 2012 it exceeded 100%, anti- statism that contributed to the rise of Trumpism, a remarkable rise in inequality that gave rise to an oligarchy, and the benign neglect of blue-collar workers who eventually became Hillary Clinton’s “deplorables.” Reagan put the economy on a trajectory to ultimately, even if not inevitably, led to the triumph of Trumpism and an economy of malaise. JEL-Codes: B520, D690, H290, H690, N120, P160. Keywords: reaganomics, Trumpism, tax cuts, supply-side economics, trickle-down economics. John Komlos Professor Emeritus University of Munich / Germany [email protected] Helpful comments on an earlier version are appreciated from Frank Ackerman, Charles L. Allen, Harry Bergsteiner, George Bittlingmayer, George H. Blackford, Fred Block, Jenny Bourne, Peter Coclanis, James G. Devine, John Donohue, Richard Easterlin, Wolfram Elsner, George Georgescu, Jack Goldstone, Raghbendra Jha, Michael Joffe, David Cay Johnston, Thomas Palley, Radmilo Pesic, Milenko Popovic, Terrence Quinn, Alex Rosenberg, Claudio Shikida, Robert Skidelsky, John N. Smithin, Antoon Spithoven. All remaining possible ambiguities, oversights, or errors are that of the author alone. Introduction Ronald Reagan’s Presidency was a watershed in U.S. economic history, the kind that occurs but once in a generation or two. Reagan was elected in the Fall of 1980, when the economy was not in great shape. Inflation hovered around an unprecedented 13%, unemployment rate was an uncomfortable 7.7%, and productivity growth was mediocre (Modigliani, 1988).1 In November the federal funds rate reached 16%.2 Although real disposable personal income per capita was growing at a decent rate of 1.2% per annum, despite two recessions that followed two oil shocks in the 1970s,3 it came to a standstill during the presidential campaign. Similarly, real GDP had been stagnant for two and a half years when the citizens went to the polls.4 A stagnating economy with inflation became known as stagflation. So, the economy seemed topsy-turvy. This essay presents empirical evidence that Reaganomics was not only a failure but that it inaugurated path-dependent socio-economic and political processes that paved the way to the triumph of Trumpism. Reagan’s proposition that by decreasing the taxes of the superrich the economy would shift into overdrive remained wishful thinking. Economic performance was not exceptional at all under his presidency (Krugman, 2008). However, the long-term consequences of his policies were far-reaching because they set into motion policies that locked the society into an inferior set of institutions, ideology, income distribution, and educational system that had powerful deleterious impact in the decades to come (Arthur, 1989). The accumulated effect of his tax cuts, deficits, and the income inequality that increased enormously ultimately led to a business-friendly legal framework, more deficits, and more inequality. Hence, we argue that the year 1981 was a turning point in U.S. economic development inasmuch as so many variables, discussed below, reveal an obvious kink in their trend values. The inequality eventually led to 2 the accumulation of so much despair among the have-nots, the less educated, the evicted, and the downwardly mobile, that they eventually reached for the pitchforks to overthrow the establishment and put a strongman into the White House come what may. Trump, therefore, is Reagan’s ultimate legacy. We focus on the very inception of this trajectory in 1981. The economic policies of the subsequent four administrations as well as the concomitant forces of hyperglobalization, technological unemployment of the less skilled, and the financial crisis that impacted the economy along the way and amplified the socio-economic problems are discussed elsewhere (Komlos 2018). Suffice it to say here that these processes started later to make a major impact on the economy. They did not begin suddenly in 1981 and therefore could not have caused the kinks documented below. Path-dependency meant that, given the course set by Reagan, it was much easier thereafter to continue to govern within the parameters of the worldview that unfolded in 1981. Under the circumstances, to reverse course permanently and stop coddling the superrich would have been a formidable undertaking (Buffett, 2011). Reaganomics: The Basics The ills of stagflation were real, the proposed remedies bitter, and their potential for success more than doubtful. In doctrinaire fashion Reagan blamed the government for the subpar economic performance because: “…government regulation,… has increased production costs…. high taxes,… have reduced incentives to work and save…. [and] transfer payments for welfare and social security,… have reduced employment of the poor and of older workers” (Rothschild, 1982). The policy of economic freedom that Reagan embraced meant foremost breaking the fetters of supposed overregulation and overtaxation using the untried principles of supply-side economics, known also as trickle-down economics, or Reaganomics for short. Its philosophy was 3 to “redistribute income to people with a high propensity to save—who happen to be rich people—and hope that their high spirits or their thrift will in some manner inspire economic growth” (Rothschild 1982). However, the proposal was not framed in those terms. Rather, it was couched in terms of redistribution from welfare recipients to workers and investors: “It is not surprising that voters were very receptive to the message that taxes and government spending should be sharply reduced to redress the distribution of income between wage earners and welfare recipients” (Feldstein, 1993, p. 13). It was a question of spin. Reaganomics was supported by an enthusiastic array of conservative economists led by Milton Friedman. However, the bold vision was conceived more
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