Objectivism Versus Constructivism: Do We Need a New Philosophical Paradigm?

Objectivism versus Constructivism: Do We Need a New Philosophical Paradigm?

[] David H. Jonassen

[] Learning theory has undergone a major David H. Jonassen is at the University of revolution during the past few decades. Begin- Colorado. ning in the late 1950s with psychologists such as Chomsky, Simon, and Miller, learning psy- Many scholars in the instructional systems chology underwent a scientific revolution or field have addressed the paradigm shift in the paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962) in which theories field of learning psychology and its implica- and models of learning from the cognitive tions for instructional systems technology sciences are now more commonly used to (IST). This article analyzes the philosophical explain learning processes than the behav- assumptions underlying IST and its behavioral explanations they supplanted, especi- ioral and cognitive foundations, each of ally those that require higher-order thinking which is primarily objectivistic, which means (Gardner, 1985). that knowing and learning are processes for For most of the first half of this century, representing and mirroring reality. The phil- behavioral laws provided the most prominent osophical assumptions of objectivism are conceptions of learning. Learning, according then contrasted with constructivism, which to behaviorism, is a change in the behavioral holds that knowing is a process of actively dispositions of an organism. Learning behav- interpreting and constructing individual iors, according to behaviorists, can be shaped knowledge representations. The implications by selective reinforcement. Since learning is of constructivism for IST provide a context equated with behavioral outcomes, behavioral for asking the reader to consider to what laws excluded the role of mental operations. extent our field should consider this philo- Behaviorists such as Skinner were unwilling sophical paradigm shift. to acknowledge the existence of the mind* or the act of knowing because these are not observable. Since the existence of the mind could not be proven from the observation of behavior, and since behaviorists were con-

*The term "mind" is used often in this paper to refer to the covert, mental operations that give rise to consciousness and cognition. The term is not meant to posit a sepa- rate Cartesian entity, but rather the ability to think.

ETR&D,Vol. 39, No, 3, PD, 5-14 ISSN1042-1629 5 6 ETR&D,Vol. 39, No. 3 cerned primarily with discovering laws of sumptions therefore delimited the types of human behavior, the mind was an unneces- questions generated by research and theory sary construct in the learning process. Behav- development in the IST field. iorists '%elieve that the construct of mind does In the past decade, IST has consciously more harm than good; that it makes more rejected many (though certainly not all) of its sense to talk about neurological structures or behavioristic assumptions and accommodated about overt behaviors than about ideas, con- a new set of psychological assumptions about cepts or rules" (Gardner, 1985, p. 39); and that learning from the cognitive sciences. Winn discussing these entities is misleading and (1975), a leader in this transition, invoked an incoherent. The exclusion of the mind from "open systems model of the learner," a more the learning process by behavioral laws was organismic view of the learner as one who a primary theoretical cause of the paradigm interacts with the environment and acquires shift in learning psychology. knowledge, skills, and competence from it. Learning, according to cognitive psychol- But the roots of behaviorism extend deeply ogy, is concerned not so much with behav- into IST practice. Acceptance of the mentalistic ioral responses, but rather with what learners perspective from the cognitive sciences has know and how they acquire it. The cognitive been inconsistent. Therefore, Winn (1989) is revolution first enlisted the neo-behaviorists, still promoting the use of cognitive instruc- who posited a role for the mind but relegated tional strategies, less reductionistic forms of it to "black-box" status because they could not analysis, and a more holistic approach to con- comprehend or understand it. The revolution ceiving learner interactions to a field that still concluded by not only acknowledging the focuses on learning behaviors. mind, but also studying its functions and The urging of cognitive models and pro- processes. Cognitive activity is embodied in cesses of instructional design has echoed mental states that enable humans to construct through our journals and conferences for over mental representations and manipulate them a decade (Champagne, Klopfer, & Gunstone, through the use of symbols (Fodor, 1981). The 1982; DiVesta & Rieber, 1987; Jonassen, 1985a; mind is the agent of learning, and so it is both Wildman & Burton, 1981). Why have these appropriate and necessary to study it from a calls had so little effect on IST theory and prac- mentalistic perspective, according to cognitive tice? Does cognitive psychology not provide theorists. Unlike the behaviorists, who were a more valid model of learning than behav- only concerned with what learners do, cogni- iorism? This article argues that perhaps cog- tive psychologists are interested in what learn- nitive psychology has not provided enough ers know and how they come to acquire it. of a paradigm shift; that behavioral and many cognitive instructional design processes are based on a restrictive set of philosophical INFLUENCES OF THE assumptions that do not adequately concep- COGNITIVE REVOLUTION ON IST tualize the mental states of the learner; and that perhaps a new philosophical paradigm Instructional systems technology evolved with shift is needed in IST. a behaviorist foundation, so its theory base was naturally influenced by many of the behaviorists' assumptions. Fundamental IST Limitations of the Cognitive Theory of Learning processes, such as task analysis, behavioral objectives, criterion-referenced evaluation, The Role of the Mind in Learning and mathemagenic strategies, all reflect a behavioristic tradition. For instance, the first Perhaps IST has not accommodated or even true technology of instruction--programmed adequately conceptualized the mind in its the- instruction--was essentially an application of ories of learning because the psychological rev- operant conditioning wherein the learner's olution did not include a commensurate behavior was shaped by reinforcement of philosophical revolution in the field to ade- desired learning behaviors. Behavioristic as- quately accommodate the mind. Cognitive OBJECTMSMVERSUS CONSTRUCllVISM 7 theory conceives of mental processes but What contemporary cognitive theorists are does not make the philosophical assumptions asking is, is the mind merely a tool for repro- necessary to extricate itself from the con- ducing the real world, or does the mind pro- straints of Cartesian dualism. Descartes duce its own, unique conception of events or believed that the mind stands apart and oper- objects which is based on individual concep- ates independently of the body, which is a dif- tions of reality? This new group of cognitive ferent sort of entity (Gardner, 1985). He theorists is driving the revolution that is the posited great powers to the mind, but was subject of this article (Bruner, 1986, 1990; unable to say what the mind really does. Is Churchland, 1984; Goodman, 1984). The new the mind the sole source or agent of learn- cognitive revolution escapes the trap of dual- ing, or is learning the result of neurochemi- ism and conceives the proper study of man cal reactions that occur in the body? Does the through a more interpretive approach to cog- mind therefore exist within the body? Des- nition concerned with "meaning-making" cartes believed both. (Bruner, 1990). Many cognitive scientists believe that the mind is a material entity that controls the Is There an Objective Reality? actions of the knower. Others believe that the mind and the consciousness it enables are not Another limitation of current cognitive the- material but spiritual, and hence not bound ories is the philosophical position about the by physical entities. Cognitive theorists are mind (defined in the next section as objectiv- also caught in the theoretical trap of dualism; ism) that regards thinking as effective only if the agents of learning are therefore not clear it adequately describes some "objective real- to them because they, like Descartes, are ity." Bruner (1986, p. 95) asks, "Is a science unable to apply consistent epistemic criteria of thinking not a science until it meets the cri- to study the existence of the mind. teria of objectifiability?" Is the mind merely a Most current cognitive psychologists start reflexive agent for re-presenting a societally with the assumption that the role of mental accepted reality? Our western cultural belief activities is to represent the real world. Infor- system accepts the existence of a real world. mation processing theorists, for instance, For instance, the journal that you are read- use cognitive task analysis to represent the ing now is real. It is simple to describe its phys- mental operations that must be performed in ical attributes: black ink on white paper. order to accomplish the task, assuming that However, what each reader believes this arti- a most appropriate sequence of mental activ- cle to be, and, more importantly, what each ities exists. These activities are externally reader believes it to mean, may not be so eas- manipulated by the teacher or the instruction. ily referenced to any objective reality, at least Cognitive learning models isolate mental oper- none that appears obvious. If our learning the- ations in order to discover the most efficient ory assumes that we construct meaning for mapping of external reality onto learners. objects and events by interpreting our percep- Even Piaget, whose epistemological theory is tions of them in terms of our past experiences, alleged to be one of the most constructivistic, beliefs, and biases, then each of us mentally assumed that mental constructions were rep- represents our own personal reality. Each real- resentations of the real world to which the ity is somewhat different, because each per- learner had to "accommodate" (Bruner, 1986). son's experiences and resulting apperceptions The inconsistency of his position was that, like are different. These differences in interpreta- Descartes and many cognitive theorists, Piaget tion are proof, ipso facto, of the individual, posited epistemic characteristics to the mind constructed nature of reality. but did not employ epistemic criteria for describing or evaluating the role of mental activities in learning. The mind, according to Consequent Effects on IST Piaget and most cognitive psychologists, can only be thought of as a reference tool to the So, to restate the hypothesis of this article, a real world. potential explanation for the lack of a para- 8 ETR&D,Vol, 39, Ncx3 digm shift in IST is that both behavioral and A purpose of this article is to describe the phil- cognitive conceptions of instruction seek to osophical assumptions of these theories. This analyze, decompose, and simplify tasks in article argues that behavioral psychology, most order to make instruction--and by inference, of cognitive psychology, and IST are firmly learning--easier and more efficient. The pro- rooted in objectivism. The implications of a cess of reducing the complexity of learning philosophical paradigm shift to constructiv- tasks, whether cognitively or behaviorally ism for IST are considered later. Ultimately, based, may well be misrepresenting the think- the reader must judge the meaningfulness of ing or mental processing required by the each theory in generating his or her own view task. Such decomposition also misrepresents of reality, learning, and instruction. the nature of the content, which is often This article proceeds by describing the dif- fraught with irregularity and complexity ferences in these alternative positions for a the- (Spiro, Coulson, Feltovich, & Anderson, ory of understanding and learning. In order 1988). In attempting to simplify the learning to contrast their assumptions, the two theo- in order to improve instructional efficiencyand ries are generally described as polar extremes effectiveness, IST may be short-circuiting rel- on a continuum from externally mediated real- evant mental processing. Designers' attempts ity (objectivism) to internally mediated real- to simplify learning risk supplanting the com- ity (constructivism). Most theorists, however, plexity that is inherent in the learning pro- take positions that fall somewhere in the mid- cess or the task to be learned. die of the continuum. The implicit goal of many instructional strat- In order to explain any philosophy, its meta- egies espoused by instructional designers physics and epistemology must be described. appears to be to supplant thinking rather than These are the foundations of any philosophy. engage or enhance it (Salomon, 1979). The Metaphysics (more specifically, a branch explicit goal of IST is more efficient "know- known as ontology) describes the nature of ledge transmission." Designers use their ob- reality, that is, the assumptions that we hold jective tools (e.g., task analysis) to determine about the physical world. Epistemology is the an objective reality, which they then try to map study of the nature of knowledge and thought. onto learners through embedding instruc- How we come to know and what we know tional strategies that control learning behavior. are integrally related and essential to any phi- But knowledge transmission tacitly assumes losophy of understanding. Objectivism and that (1) we all agree on what reality is, and constructivism are contrasted on the basis of (2) we all use essentially the same process for metaphysical and epistemological criteria. understanding it. A number of cognitive Table 1 lists assumptions that both objec- researchers, whose positions are described tivism and constructivism make about reality, later in this article, question these assump- the mind, thought, meaning, and symbols. tions and present alternative conceptions of These convey the metaphysical and the epis- learning that are based on different philosoph- temological assumptions of the poles of the ical assumptions. Their assumptions are based continuum described above. upon constructivism. In the next section, these constructivistic assumptions are contrasted with the assumptions of current behavioral, cognitive, and IST beliefs, which are based Objectivism on objectivism. Objectivism has its roots in realism and essentialism (Lakoff, 1987). Realism, needless to say, COMPARING PHILOSOPHICALPARADIGMS believes in the existence of the real world, external to humans and independent of hu- In this section, alternative conceptions of man experience. This belief relies on the exis- how we perceive objects and conceive reality tence of reliable knowledge about the world, are compared. These theories of thinking and knowledge that we, as humans, strive to gain. learning are objectivism and constructivism. What is epistemically important to this posi- OBJECTMSMVERSUS CONSTRUCTMSM 9

TABLE I [] Assumptions Inherent in Objectivism and Constructivism Objectivism Constructivism Reality External to the knower Determined by the knower (real world) Dependent upon human mental activity Structure determined by entities, Product of mind properties, and relations Symbolic procedures construct reality Structure can be modeled Structure relies on experiences/interpretations Mind Processor of symbols Builder of symbols Mirror of nature Perceiver/interpreter of nature Abstract machine for manipulating Conceptual system for constructing symbols reality Thought Disembodied: independent of human Embodied: grows out of bodily experience experience Governed by external reality Grounded in perception/construction Reflects external reality Grows out of physical and social experience Manipulates abstract symbols Imaginative: enables abstract thought Represents (mirrors) reality More than representation (mirrors) of reality Atomistic: decomposable into Gestalt properties "building blocks" Algorithmic Relies on ecological structure of conceptual system Classification Building cognitive models What machines do More than machines are capable of Meaning Corresponds to entities and categories Does not rely on correspondence to in the world world Independent of the understanding of Dependent upon understanding any organism External to the understander Determined by understander Symbols Represent reality Tools for constructing reality Internal representations of external Representations of internal reality reality ("building blocks")

tion is that it assumes that we all gain the and its structure. It does so by thought pro- same understanding. Essentialism holds that, cesses that manipulate abstract symbols (pri- among the properties that make up this sta- marily language) that represent that reality. ble knowledge, what makes an entity a par- Those thought processes are analyzable and ticular thing is the existence of essential decomposable. The meaning that is produced properties. Lakoff claims that objectivism is by the thought processes is external to the a special case of essentialism. understander; it is determined by the struc- The important metaphysical position that ture of the real world. Learning consists of objectivism makes (see Table 1) is that the grasping the referents of words, that is, the world is real, that it is structured, and that its kinds of entities or concepts that the words structure can be modeled for the learner. The denote in reality (Rand, 1966). Objectivism epistemology of objecfivism holds that the assumes that learning is the process of map- purpose of the mind is to "mirror" that reality ping those entities or concepts onto learners. 10 ~. vo,. 39, No. 3

Objectivism--the more common scientific ity. In Goodman's view, our personal world conception of reality--holds that there is an is created by the mind, so no one world is any objective reality that we as learners assimilate. more real than any other. There is no single The role of education is to help students learn reality or any objective entity that can be about the real world. Students are not encour- described in any objective way; rather, the real aged to make their own interpretations of what world is a product of the mind that constructs they perceive; it is the role of the teacher or that world. A less radical form of constructiv- the instruction to interpret events for them. ism holds that the mind is instrumental and Learners are told about the world and are essential in interpreting events, objects, and expected to replicate its content and structure perspectives on the real world, and that those in their thinking. interpretations comprise a knowledge base that is personal and individualistic. The mind filters input from the world in making those Constructivism interpretations. Bruner (1986) claims that constructivism Constructivism claims that reality is more in began with Kant, who, in his Critique of Pure the mind of the knower, that the knower con- Reason, argued for a priori knowledge that structs a reality, or at least interprets it, based precedes all reasoning. It is what we know, upon his or her apperceptions. The empha- and we map it onto a posteriori knowledge, sis in objectivism is on the object of our know- which is what we perceive from our interac- ing, whereas constructivism is concerned with tions with the environment. But what we how we construct knowledge. How one con- know as individuals is what the mind pro- structs knowledge is a function of the prior duces. Kant believed in the external, physi- experiences, mental structures, and beliefs cal world (noumena), but it is known only that one uses to interpret objects and events. through our sensations (phenomena)--how Constructivism does not preclude the exis- the world appears to us. tence of an external reality; it merely claims Constructivism, founded on Kantian beliefs, that each of us constructs our own reality claims that reality is constructed by the knower through interpreting perceptual experiences based upon mental activity. Humans are per- of the external world. ceivers and interpreters who construct their This view of constructivism is not an exam- own reality through engaging in those men- ple of solipsism, which claims that the mind tal activities: "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, can only know its own interpretations, that therefore I am--Descartes). Therefore, the reality is completely individualistic. We are existence of the individual is predicated on clearly able to comprehend a variety of inter- his or her own constructions. pretations and use those in arriving at our own According to constructivists, thinking is interpretation. For instance, some of us inter- grounded in perception of physical and social pret the wars in Vietnam, Granada, and Iraq experiences, which can only be comprehend- as the obligation of a democratic state to ed by the mind. What the mind produces are defend the rights of nations oppressed by mental models that explain to the knower what the evils of communism or dictatorships; he or she has perceived. Rather than being others believe these wars represent the avari- driven by external structures, these mental cious protection of the rights of multinational models are a priori, according to Kant. corporations to perpetuate a decadent life- The important epistemological assump- style. How correct is either view? tion of constructivism is that meaning is The assumptions of constructivism are fun- a function of how the individual creates damentally different from those of objectivism. meaning from his or her experiences. We Radical constructivists (Goodman, 1984; von all conceive of the external reality somewhat Glasersfeld, 1984; Watzlawick, 1984) believe differently, based on our unique set of ex- that there is no real world, no objective,real- periences with the world and our beliefs ity that is independent of human mental activ- about them. OBJECTMSMVERSUS CONSTRUCTMSM 11

APPLICATIONS OF CONSTRUCTMSM IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTRUCTMSM FOR IST: DO WE NEED ANOTHER REVOLUTION? Many educators and cognitive psychologists are working to develop more constructivistic IST is not ignorant of cognitive learning theory. environments and instructional prescriptions Many of its innovations, such as elaboration (Duffy & Jonassen, in press). Perhaps the theory and information processing analysis, most important of these prescriptions is the are based on cognitive theories. Yet IST begins, provision of instruction in relevant contexts as do these cognitive theories, with an objec- (Jonassen, 1991a). Situated cognition (Brown, tivistic world view, secure in the belief that COllins, & Duguid, 1988; Resnick, 1987) argues the purpose of instruction is that of transfer that learning occurs most effectively in con- agent, transferring objective information to text, and that context becomes an important learners. Perhaps the greatest epistemologi- part of the knowledge base associated with cal concern about this assumption is that what that learning. So, rather than decontextualiz- is transferred to the student is learned by the ing learning in isolated school environments, student without interpretation or reconstruc- we should create real-world environments that tion. Constructivism claims that learners can employ the context in which the learning is only interpret information in the context of relevant. A related approach is to require learn- their own experiences, and that what they ers to serve a cognitive apprenticeship (Collins, interpret will, to some extent, be individual- 1990; Collins, Brown, & Newman, 1987). Just istic. As designers, we may intend to map a as a craftsman would not teach an apprentice particular reality onto learners, but ultimately using prepared scripts, instructional environ- they interpret our messages in the context of ments and teachers should focus on realistic their own experiences and knowledge, and approaches to solving real-world problems construct meaning relative to their own needs, rather than utilize predetermined instruc- backgrounds, and interests. Rather than tional sequences. The instructor is a coach attempting to map the structure of an exter- and analyzer of the strategies used to solve nal reality onto learners, constructivists rec- these problems. ommend that we help them to construct their Another important strategy is the presen- own meaningful and conceptually functional tation of multiple perspectives to learners. representations of the external world. Cognitive flexibility theory is a conceptual model If IST were to accommodate some of these for instruction that facilitates advanced acqui- constructivistic assumptions, these are some sition of knowledge in ill-structured knowl- of the changes in practice that could result: edge domains. Flexibility theory (Spiro et al., 1988) avoids oversimplifying instruction by stressing conceptual interrelatedness, provid- Instructional goals and objectives would be nego- ing multiple representations or perspectives on tiated, not imposed. Instructional designers can- the content because there is no single schema not impose a prescribed reality on learners (no objective reality), and emphasizing case- because each learner will interpret that real- based instruction that provides multiple per- ity somewhat differently. Therefore, the out- spectives or themes inherent in the cases. comes of learning will vary somewhat, and The approaches represented by these authors objectives, if they are useful at all, would be are clearly cognitive and also make construc- a negotiating tool for guiding learners during tivistic assumptions, yet there is an objectiv- the learning process and for self-evaluation of istic grounding to them. Constructivism is not learning outcomes. This prescription is espe- the panacea for all of the instructional prob- cially problematic for training design, which lems in education and training, no more than typically is based on the solution of specific, other theories and technologies are. Yet all are perceived problems. Most training is, almost designed to make learning a more realistic and by definition, convergent and objectivistic, meaningful process. because it supports explicit performance goals. 12 ETR~, Vol. 39, No. 3

Task and content analysis would focus less on iden- map an external reality onto learners. Perhaps tifying and prescribing a single, best sequence for the most common conception of instruction learning. Task analysis would concentrate based upon objectivist thinking is the "trans- more on considering appropriate interpreta- mission of knowledge," a knowledge that is tions and providing the intellectual tools that prescribed by subject-matter analysis. Objec- are necessary for helping learners to construct tivists accomplish this task analysis, whether knowledge. These tools, and the environ- it is behavioral or cognitive task analysis, by ments containing them, should not only determining what reality should be learned accommodate but also promote multiple inter- and how it should be acquired. pretations of reality. Constructivists warn that the "knowledge" that is transmitted may not be the knowledge The goal of IST would be less concerned with pre- that is constructed by the learner. They main- scribing mathemagenic instructional strategies tain that, rather than prescribe learning out- necessary to lead learners to specific learning comes, instruction should focus on providing behaviors. Rather than presenting instructional tools and environments for helping learners treatments, designers would provide genera- interpret the multiple perspectives of the tive, mental construction "tool kits" embed- world in creating their own world view. In ded in relevant learning environments that answer to Bruner's question about whether a facilitate knowledge construction by learners. science of thinking must be objectifiable, con- This generative-mathemagenic distinction structivists contend that it is unnecessary, (Jonassen, 1985b) refers more to control of while objectivists believe that learning and mental processing than to levels of process- thinking can and must be objectified in order ing. Constructivists believe that learning is to be transmitted and assessed. internally controlled and mediated by the If we as a field choose to adopt a more learner. Objectivists believe that learning is constructivistic view of instruction, then we externally mediated by the instructional strat- assume the need for a philosophical revolu- egies that predetermine the required mental tion of some dimension in our field to sup- actiVities that give rise to acquiring the ele- port the psychological revolution that has been ments of an external reality. underway for over a decade. Constructivists claim that we need a philosophy of understanding Evaluation of learning would become less criterion- to support our psychology of understanding. This referenced. If you believe, as radical construc- philosophy of understanding is "constructi- tivists do, that no objective reality is uniformly vism," claims Goodman (1984), and it com- interpretable by all learners, then assessing prises a philosophy of science, a philosophy the acquisition of such a reality is not possi- of art, as well as a philosophy of cognition. ble. A less radical view suggests that learners Objectivism and constructivism represent will interpret perspectives differently, so eval- alternative conceptions of learning and think- uation processes should accommodate a wider ing, much like the artist-scientist, two-worlds variety of response options. Evaluation of dialectic (Snow, 1960). The IST world is largely learning, according to constructivists, should scientific and objectivistic. Goodman (1984) become more goal-free (Jonassen, 1991b; claims that constructivism is an increasingly Scriven, 1983). Evaluation would become less popular philosophy that may be applied to of a reinforcement or control tool and more of cognitive science and, by inference, to IST. a self-analysis tool. The intention and conclusion of this article is not that we reject all of our objectivistic assumptions in favor of the constructivistic CONCLUSION assumptions. Objectivists would argue against that recommendation from the pragmatic per- Much of cognitive psychology and most of IST spective that any nonobjectivist or nonrealist currently are grounded in objectivism. Objec- position is inoperable, that constructivism is tivists believe that the goal of instruction is to antecedent to academic chaos. IST should not OBJECTMSMVERSUS CONSTRUC~VlSM 13 necessarily adopt a radical constructivistic sive presumption that we can always control view that thought is completely individualis- what individuals learn. At best, teachers and tic, that all of us cannot interpret the world designers constrain learning, but in order to in a similar manner. Such a position is solipsis- maximize individual leaming, we may have tic and would surely lead to intellectual chaos to yield some control and instead prepare and the inability to communicate. Besides, the learners to regulate their own learning by pro- socially negotiated meaning that underlies viding supportive rather than intervening "common knowledge" is part of the construc- learning environments. tivist belief. A final caveat: when integrating construc- Yet constructivism holds important lessons tivism into the instructional design process, for how to interpret the results of learning and the nature of the learning and the context in for how to design environments to support which it will occur should be considered before learning. Those environments must engage committing to one theory or the other. For learners in negotiating meaning and in socially instance, the outcomes of air traffic control- constructing reality. Educators have always ler training probably should not be individu- been the agents of control, so that societal rein- alistic or primarily constructed, yet designers forcement (social learning theory remains must recognize that controllers' perceptions firmly rooted in behaviorism) is predicated on of their roles and functions will differ some- assimilating enough of its objective reality. If what. The intent of this article is not to sug- we, as educators or designers, relinquish that gest that designers adopt constructivism as control, then learners must assume it. The they have so many other potential panaceas, objectivistic research on learner control sug- but that they reflect upon and articulate their gests that learners are often unable or unwill- conceptions of knowing and learning and ing to assume greater personal responsibility adapt their methodology accordingly. When for learning, so learning should be externally asked to commit to either the objectivistic or mediated by instructional interventions. Con- constructivistic camp, the designer will be structivists argue that the type of control that best served by replying that it depends upon is invested in learners in such studies pre- the context. [] cludes "meaning making." Since learning obviously entails constructivistic and objectivistic activities, the most Thanks to Roberts Braden, PeggyCole, Scott Grabinger, realistic model of learning lies somewhere on Marty Tessmer, and Brent Wilson, as well as the ETR&D the continuum between these positions. In- editorial consultants who reviewed this manuscript, for helping me to reconstruct these ideas based upon their structional design is a prescriptive theory interpretations of earlier drafts. This article was completed based upon descriptive theories of learning while the author was a visiting professor on the Instruc- (Reigeluth, 1983). Instructional design and the tional Technologyfaculty at the Universityof Twente, Neth- erlands. Thanks to their chair, ProfessorSanne Dijkstra. learning theories that support it are largely objectivistic. The implications of many descriptive learning theories are obvious for a prescriptive theory of instruction and its related practice. However, constructivistic the- REFERENCES ories of learning remain largely descriptive. The implications of constructivism probably Brown, J. S., Collins, A., & Duguid, E (1988). Sit- uated cognition and the culture of learning. Edu- are not established well enough to support a cational Researcher, 18(1), 32-42. prescriptive theory of instruction, yet some Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possibleworlds. Cam- of the implications are becoming more obvi- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ous (Duffy & Jonassen, in press). Bruner, J. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge. MA: It is reasonable for IST to consider the impli- Harvard University Press. 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