Bernstein on the Pragmatic Conception of Objectivity
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Six RELATIVISM, GOOD AND BAD: BERNSTEIN ON THE PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF OBJECTIVITY Ángel M. Faerna George Santayana once condemned “the modern scramble of philosophies” for not having learned enough of one another.1 Once a philosopher has gained mastery of a particular system, method, or vocabulary, it becomes difficult for her to grasp, let alone to appreciate, the value of alternative approaches to similar problems. Moreover, she also quickly forgets how strange or whimsical the ideas she wholeheartedly endorses and promotes may sound to philosophers of a different breed. The more she tries to refine those ideas from within her own frame of thought, the more abstruse they seem to those who consider them from outside. Richard Bernstein is a noteworthy exception to this predicament of contemporary philosophy. On one hand, he staunchly upholds the tradition of American pragmatism and is an authoritative interpreter of its classic and more recent developments. On the other hand, he has developed the rare ability to cross the borders and grasp the wider picture because of his acquaintance with all the major thinkers of the twentieth century. That vantage point allows Bernstein to discern the continuity between pragmatism and other apparently disconnected trends in philosophy, which admittedly is one of his perdurable contributions. However, this “peripheral vision” also benefits Bernstein’s case for pragmatism in another way, since it enables him to identify the pragmatic notes that unfamiliar ears often find dissonant just because they are played in a harsh, confrontational key. Bernstein is convinced that the spirit of pragmatism is much more constructive than “deconstructive,” and that pragmatist motives and themes are more apt to fertilize rather than disrupt philosophical conversations if those notes are cleverly downplayed or re-phrased. Thus, by smoothing over the friction between alternative vocabularies Bernstein’s work lends an invaluable service to the philosophic community and fosters a dialog where different traditions can learn more from each other. In these pages I shall comment briefly on one of the topics on which Bernstein has made a serious effort to make the pragmatist views fully understandable, namely, the objectivism/relativism debate. The impression that pragmatism is somehow incompatible with the idea of “objectivity” has 96 ÁNGEL M. FAERNA been prevalent among its critics since the very beginning. In the early years of the movement the issue used to be stated in metaphysical terms to suggest that pragmatists denied the existence of objects external to our experience of them.2 Thereafter the discussion turned mainly epistemological, so that the objectivism/idealism opposition was replaced by the opposition of objectivism/relativism. Another important difference is that, while James protested that none of his pragmatist fellows (such as Dewey and Schiller) incurred the reprehensible idealism that their critics imputed to them, in the present day the house seems to be divided against itself. Some contemporary versions of pragmatism, notably Rorty’s, are seen by other reputed members of the school —not only by those who utterly repudiate the pragmatic approach— as openly relativist. Other versions, such as Putnam’s, try to emphasize their objectivist commitment but raise criticism for being timid or too concessive.3 In “Pragmatism, Objectivity, and Truth,”4 Bernstein puts aside these local quarrels and addresses the central point: how is “objectivity” to be conceived in pragmatic terms? This is not to ignore the fact that pragmatism “encompasses a variety of different and conflicting positions”5 —therefore the existing disagreements will largely remain within it— nor is it expected that recalcitrant critics of pragmatism will be content with the type of objectivity that pragmatism is ready to offer. Bernstein’s concern, as I take it, is only to show that being a pragmatist is not a matter of refusing to use terms such as “objectivity” or “truth” —though, of course, some pragmatists may prefer to avoid them for different reasons—, but is a matter of explaining in a certain way what we mean when we use them. After all, pragmatism was introduced by Peirce as a method only to make our ideas clear. Now, pragmatists are persuaded that, once the clarification is made it will become evident that the opposition of objectivism/relativism is confusing in some fundamental ways. In the light of this, one can recommend dropping it altogether or, less provocatively, one can decide to preserve it in the hope that its confusing connotations have finally been eradicated. The fact that Bernstein himself has rehearsed both strategies at different times without falling into contradictions shows that the choice is essentially innocuous.6 For one thing, the opposition between objectivism and relativism is confusing because it overlooks the fact that there are good as well as bad forms of relativism. By “bad relativism,” Bernstein means “the sort of relativism that claims that there is really no truth (except truth for me or my group), no objective facts, and no universal validity claims.”7 But —Bernstein adds— “there are many positive ways to speak about the relativity of contexts, justifications, and language that are not controversial and do not entail the consequences of ‘bad relativism.’”8 That something can be both objective and relative can hardly be denied. For instance, length and weight are objective properties of things, and still they can only be described .