Factional Conflict in Indiana Politics During the Later New Deal Years, 1936-1940

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Factional Conflict in Indiana Politics During The Later New Deal Years, 1936-1940

Iwan Morgan*

Factional conflicts within both the Republican and Demo- cratic parties rocked Indiana politics to its very foundations during the late 1930s. The quarrel between the Paul V. McNutt organization and Senator Frederick Van Nuys nearly rent the Hoosier Democracy asunder. Indeed, at one stage it seemed as if Van Nuys would make common cause with the Republicans in the 1938 midterm elections. The GOP, however, had its own problems. Republican moderates and the strongly conservative Old Guard were locked in mortal combat for control of the party. Factional disputes were nothing new in Indiana; yet, the battles of the Depression era were unusually bitter because they were linked with the political controversies generated by the New Deal. In recent years historians have manifested keen interest in the relationship between the New Deal and the states, but their interpretations of certain issues have differed markedly, while some problems still await full investigation. A study of the Hoosier factional conflicts of the late 1930s can offer some valuable contributions to this debate. Two issues are particularly important with regard to the state Democratic parties in the 1930s. James MacGregor Burns has argued that Franklin D. Roosevelt missed an excellent opportunity to liberalize his party during the Depression because he generally remained neutral in state factional disputes. According to this eminent political scientist, bold executive action, capitalizing on the president’s immense popularity and

* Iwan Morgan is senior lecturer in the Department of Politics and Gov- ernment, City of London Polytechnic, London, England. He was an exchange teacher at Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne in 1979-1980. The research and writing of this essay were undertaken prior to the publication of James H. Madison’s study, Zndiana through Tradition and Change: A History of the Hoosier State and Its People, 1920-1945 (Indianapolis, 1982). 30 Indiana Magazine of History

his control of federal patronage, would have enabled liberal factions to defeat conservative opponents and so placed the New Deal on secure foundations. In contrast, historians such as James T. Patterson contend that the very nature and organization of most state parties made them resistant to the liberalizing influence of presidential interventi0n.l Since Roosevelt de- viated from his customary neutrality to side openly with McNutt, Indiana offers a particularly interesting test case for these conflicting hypotheses. Inextricably linked with the debate concerning possible lib- eralization of the Democratic party is the general question of what impact the New Deal made on state politics. In his classic study of the New Deal, William Leuchtenburg argued that Roosevelt revolutionized the agenda of American politics in the 1930s, when political emphasis shifted to socioeconomic issues that generated partisan divisions of a more ideological nature than had been the case for many years past. Nevertheless, many historians doubt that the change was profound at the state level. In their view patronage and personality politics continued to be more important than ideological issues, particularly when Roosevelt’s star appeared to wane in the late 1930~.~An examination of the way in which the Hoosier De- mocracy made peace in 1939-1940 and the attitude it thereafter adopted toward the New Deal can test the validity of this viewpoint. The state Republican parties have attracted less attention from historians than have the Democrats. Given the predomi- nance of the Democratic party on the federal level, this is understandable, but the 1930s still constituted a significant era for the GOP. Several national leaders, notably Arthur H. Van- denburg and Alfred M. Landon, hoped that Republican state parties could forge alliances with conservative Democrats to fight the New Deal on a bipartisan basis.3 Nowhere did this

James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York, 19561, 376-80; James T. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Lexington, Ky., 1967), 261-87. William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, 1963), 326; James T. Patterson, The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition (Princeton, 1969); John Braeman, Robert Bremner, and David Brody, eds., The New Deal: The State and Local Levels (2 vols., Columbus, 1975), 11; James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washing- ton, 19731, 183-244. Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 258-59, 274-75. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 31

seem more likely to happen than in Indiana, where one Repub- lican faction wanted the party to run Van Nuys as its senatorial candidate in 1938. An investigation of why this move failed can provide important clues to explain the general lack of party realignment in American politics during the Depression. Most Republican leaders at national and state levels were also aware that the party had to make concessions toward reformism if it was to offset the immense electoral popularity of the New Deal during the mid-1930s. Even the Indiana GOP, one of the most conservative of all state parties in the 1920s, finally acknowledged the wisdom of this viewpoint. The Hoosier example therefore makes a good case study of the changes that occurred in state Republicanism during the 1930s. Further study of the Indiana political scene during the decade of the 1930s reveals some possible influences that the factional struggles had on the reemergence of the GOP as the dominant party in Indiana. The Democratic factional conflict of 1937-1938 was the culmination of a struggle for the leadership of the Hoosier Democracy. The struggle had commenced when the party had won power in 1932 and at various times had involved four different groups, the strongest of which was led by Governor McNutt. McNutt’s overriding ambition was to become president, and his rising star attracted support from younger Demo- crats, certain business interests, and the American Legion, an organization that he had once served as national commander. McNutt also had many allies in the legal profession, an important force in state politics, since he had formerly been dean of Indiana University’s Law Scho01.~Older Democrats tended to support either Van Nuys, who had made many allies during his thirty years of party service, or R. Earl Peters, the state chairman who had done much to revive the party’s fortunes following the electoral disasters of the mid-1920~.~Another group emerged in 1935 when McNutt’s patronage secretary, Pleas Greenlee, launched an independent campaign after the statehouse refused to endorse his ambitions of obtaining the guber-

Robert R. Neff, “The Early Career and Governorship of Paul V. McNutt” (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Indiana University, 19631, 36, 75; I. George Blake, Paul V. McNuttc Portrait of a Hoosier Statesman (Indianapolis, 1966), 107. Indianapolis News, December 8, 1933; Lebanon, Indiana, Reporter, Au- gust 16, 1935. 32 Indiana Magazine of History

natorial nomination. His rebellion gained support from many disappointed office seekers and defectors from the other groups.6 Outsiders found it difficult to comprehend the patterns of this factional mosaic partly because so many groups were involved and partly because the internal divisions were not the product of ideological, social, cultural, or regional factors. Even a veteran politician such as the president’s aide, Louis M. Howe, had to confess: “I do not pretend to keep track of what goes on about the Indiana mess!”7 Nonetheless, Hoosier factional conflict had a clear logic insofar as its participants were concerned since it centered upon patronage issues. During the late nineteenth century when the Indiana parties had battled to retain their traditional constituencies and corral the floating vote in a series of closely fought elections, they had found it expedient to build well-organized machines that were adept at mobilizing electoral support. As a result, patronage-oriented politics gained primacy over issue-oriented politics in the Hoosier party system since party workers expected to be re- warded from the spoils of office for their expertise at getting out the vote. Factionalism proved to be an inherent feature of patronage politics, which continued to be the principal concern of the parties even in the twentieth century, because the victors inevitably squabbled over the division of spoils after elections. The power of state party leaders depended greatly on their ability to reward their personal followers, and, therefore, struggles between rivals tended to center upon questions of patronage control rather than political principles.6 Because of the state Democratic party’s weakness in the 1920s no faction had established undisputed leadership; it was hardly surprising, therefore, that quarrels about the distribution of spoils flared up almost immediately after the Democrats gained office in 1933. By 1936, however, McNutt had done much to establish his dominance within the Indiana party, a vital step in his quest for the presidency, by increasing his

Indianapolis Star, April 7, 1935; R. Earl Peters to James A. Farley, October 17, 1935, Box 2, R. Earl Peters Papers (Fort Wayne-Allen County Historical Society, Fort Wayne). ‘Louis M. Howe to Farley, April 11, 1934, Official File 300, Box 18, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York). Frank 0. Munger, “Two Party Politics in the State of Indiana” (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Harvard University, 19551, 122- 26. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 33

control over state patronage. His government reorganization act of 1933, which reduced the number of state departments from 169 to eight, gave the governor’s office unprecedented control over appointments. State employees also had to contrib- ute 2 percent of their income to the newly formed Hoosier Democratic Club, which became NcNutt’s personal treasury because he appointed its offi~ers.~The latter innovation alienated Peters, who wanted the funds to go to the regular party treasury, which he controlled. When McNutt outmaneuvered him on this issue, Peters resigned office to seek the 1934 senatorial nomination, confident that he could undermine his rival’s growing prestige by winning a first ballot victory.1° By astute use of his new patronage powers the governor was able to sway many delegates who had promised to support Peters into voting for his candidate, Sherman Minton. This defeat eliminated the former state chairman as a leading force in Hoosier politics. McNutt’s easy victory surprised Van Nuys, who had remained neutral in the hope that his rivals would weaken each other by having to fight a protracted struggle. To protect his own position the senator now had to challenge McNutt himself by sup- porting Kirk McKinney’s bid to win the 1936 gubernatorial nomination. It was at this juncture that the New Deal was sucked into the murky waters of Hoosier factional conflict. All the rival Democratic leaders had already voiced support for Roosevelt’s policies in acknowledgement of the president’s popularity, but this ideological consensus had not lessened Democratic factionalism. In fact the New Deal had increased the scope for intraparty conflict because the vast expansion of federal jobs in the 1930s added a new layer to the spoils system. At first the Roosevelt administration treated the three main leaders fairly equally, but from 1934 onward it increasingly channelled its burgeoning patronage, especially Works Progress Administra- tion (WPA) jobs, toward McNutt in recognition of his newly established primacy. Already cut off from state jobs, Van Nuys now found that his federal patronage was restricted to a few scraps, mainly control over Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) posts; consequently, he adopted a new strategy in early

9Patterson, New Deal and the States, 134-36. lo Indianapolis Times, November 14, 1933; Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, April 9, 1934. Peters to Farley, December 12, 1935, May 28, 1936, Box 2, Peters Pa- pers; Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, April 23, 1936. 34 Indiana Magazine of History

E Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 35

1936 to warn Roosevelt not to ignore him and to undermine McNutt’s standing with the federal government. Breaking his record of strong support for the New Deal, Van Nuys made some speeches that criticized recent federal labor legislation. More seriously, he also charged that Indiana’s WPA administrator, Wayne Coy, had pressured job holders in this agency to support the nomination of McNutt’s gubernatorial candidate, M. Clifford Townsend, and that local allies had forced relief workers to run on their county precinct and convention delegate slates.12 Van NUYS’Sallegations embarrassed Roosevelt rather than McNutt since the president was just about to ask Congress for a massive relief appropriation. An infuriated Harry L. Hopkins, federal relief administrator, commented: “he doesn’t have to prove this to make it bad-just the fact a Democratic senator says it!”13 Contrary to Van Nuys’s charges, a federal investigation revealed that no jobholders associated with Van Nuys or Greenlee had been dismissed, nor would any admit to having been pressured to support Townsend. No one had been denied relief work for political reasons, and relatively few precinct workers held WPA patronage jobs in the two cities about which Van Nuys had particularly complained, South Bend and Evansville. The senator’s allies actually defeated McNutt’s supporters in the 1936 St. Joseph County committee primaries, while the number of Vanderburgh County committeemen with HOLC posts was larger than the small WPA contingent. Moreover, Van NUYS’Scharges of financial waste carried little weight when it was discovered that the WPA had lower per capita administrative costs in Indiana than in any state except Alabama.14 Believing that the senator had unjustly embarrassed the New Deal in order to score points in a state dispute, the Roosevelt administration became appreciably less friendly toward him. Hopkins could not have felt any regret when McNutt telephoned him in July to say that Van Nuys would not be ren~minated.’~ The governor’s confidence concerning Van Nuys’s defeat seemed justified. McNutt had easily swept aside the challenges

l2 Sherman Minton to Farley, August 10, 1936, Official File 300, Box 17, Roosevelt Papers; Harry L. Hopkins to Wayne Coy, April 24, 28, 1936, Box 74, Harry L. Hopkins Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library). 13Hopkins to Coy, April 24, 1936, Box 74, Hopkins Papers. 14Coy, memorandum, April 26, 1936, Wayne Coy Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library); Hopkins to Frederick Van Nuys, May 20, 1936, ibid. Paul V. McNutt to Hopkins, July 17, 1936, Box 74, Hopkins Papers. 36 Indiana Magazine of History

of Greenlee and McKinney at the 1936 state nominating convention. Just as in 1934, his expert use of patronage had undermined his opponents’ apparent preconvention strength. These proven tactics could be employed against Van Nuys when he had to seek renomination in 1938. As the journalist Maurice Early commented, “delegates, being politicians, usually have some irons in the fire and the arm of the state government is long.”16 In 1937 McNutt departed to become high commissioner in the Philippines, confident that in his absence his allies could control affairs under the direction of Frank McHale, his political advisor and promoter. The strategy of awaiting the convention before taking action against Van Nuys changed, however, when the senator played a prominent role in the defeat of Roosevelt’s plan to reform the Supreme Court.17 The angry president summoned Governor Townsend to Washington in July, 1937, to urge him to do something about the senator. This action was the first indication of Roosevelt’s intention to purge the leading Democratic conservatives, a policy which reached its climax in the 1938 primary elections. Seizing on what seemed a golden opportunity to legitimize its personal battle with Van Nuys, the McNutt faction launched an immediate attack. Townsend gave the first public expression of the intention to remove the senator when he dramatically informed reporters outside the White House that the Indiana party could not renominate Van Nuys because of his failure to support presidential policies.18 This new strategy proved to be a costly error. Van NUYS’Sprospects may well have appeared to be hopeless in the face of the combined assault from the White House and the statehouse, but the latter would have been better advised to have kept the quarrel within its original framework as a patronage dispute. Democratic factional contro- versy had lost its impetus since the 1936 convention because McNutt’s ultimate victory seemed inevitable. Roosevelt’s intervention breathed new life into the conflict by giving it the ideological dimension of Van Nuys’s attitude toward the New Deal. In these circumstances the senator found new sources of support from conservative Democrats, while the McNutt faction

l6 Indianapolis Star, July 18, 1937. l7 Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 120-21; Time, XXX (July 26, 19371, 11. 18Frank McHale to McNutt, July 12, 1937, Paul V. McNutt Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington). Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 37

proved ill-equipped to carry the banner for liberalism. As a result Van Nuys managed to escape the fate of McNutt’s other opponents. Hoosiers’ support for the New Deal declined dramatically from mid-1937 on. The unpopularity of the Judiciary Bill, Roosevelt’s “court-packing” scheme, provided the initial impetus. Many local Democratic politicians and large numbers of voters who had supported Roosevelt in the previous election regarded Supreme Court reform as a threat to the Constitution. Five Democratic congressmen broke ranks to voice their opposition to the bill, while loyalists like James I. Farley of the Fourth District faced strong criticism from their constituents.19 This outcry encouraged Van Nuys, whose plight had hitherto aroused little public interest, to declare that he would run as an independent if he was denied his party’s nomination. His counterattack depicted him as a Jeffersonian Democrat who had thwarted Roosevelt’s attempt to subvert the Constitution and bucked McNutt’s dictatorial control of the state party.20 This strategy did not entail a direct indictment of the New Deal, a logical tactic since the senator had rendered Roosevelt sterling support prior to 1937. Nevertheless, Van Nuys became the rallying point for conservative Democratic opposition to the president’s socioeconomic policies in late 1937. Rural Democrats, especially those from southern Indiana, tended to be more conservative than their urban counterparts. They had supported the early New Deal because it had had some success in promoting the recovery of the agrarian economy. Indiana farmers became disenchanted after 1935, however, because they felt that federal policies now showed far more concern for industrial recovery and urban relief problems than for their difficulties. Their open break with the New Deal came in the fall of 1937 when the so-called “Roosevelt Reces- sion” led to a decline of commodity prices and aroused fierce resentment of crop restriction policies, high taxes, and federal welfare spending.21 In these circumstances it was inevitable

l9 Indianapolis Star, July 15, 1937, June 19, 1938. 2o “Political Statement by Senator Frederick Van Nuys, March 22, 1938,” copy in Box 2, Peters Papers; Peters to Farley, November 21, 1938, Box 2, Peters Papers; Indianapolis Star, June 25, 1938. 21 Coy to Farley, October 1, 1936, Box 1094, Democratic National Commit- tee Papers (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library); Louis A. Ludlow to Marvin McIn- tyre, October 10, 1936, Official File 300, Box 18, Roosevelt Papers; William Gutzwiller to Farley, December 9, 1938, ibid.; Van Garrett to Farley, December 23, 1938, ibid.; James Flemyng to Farley, December 10, 1938, ibid. 38 Indiana Magazine of History

SENATORFREDERICK VAN NUYS 1938

Courtesy Indianapolis Star

that rural Democrats should regard Van Nuys as the focal point for their opposition to the New Deal. Although the senator did not identify explicitly with agrarian criticism of federal policies, he fuelled its fires by persisting with his allegations concerning McNutt’s corrupt use of the WPA, the welfare agency that farmers considered most guilty of waste and discrimination in favor of the cities.22In view of the nationwide agrarian disillusionment with the New Deal in 1937-1938, the ideological harmony of the Indiana Democrats was bound to falter, but the Van Nuys affair acted as a catalyst which in- tensified their divisions. By mid-1938 it was evident that the senator’s independent campaign could draw off so many Democratic votes that the Republicans would win the election. No longer was Van Nuys merely an irritating thorn in the side of the statehouse organization. He had become a major threat to McNutt’s ultimate

22 Indianapolis Star, June 16, 22, 1938. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 39

ambition.23 McNutt had to hold his own state in 1938 if he was to be regarded as a serious contender for the Democratic presidential nomination two years later. His prospects of obtaining the nomination would also be hurt by the nationwide publicity that Van Nuys’s allegations were bound to attract as the Indi- ana election campaign gathered momentum. Finally, since Roosevelt now appeared unlikely to purge his conservative opponents, they could exact revenge for Van Nuys by leading anti-McNutt delegations to the 1940 national Democratic convention. McNutt therefore decided to compromise. Through a series of telephone calls from Manila, he commanded Townsend to offer their opponent the n~mination.~~ This decision to support Van Nuys angered Roosevelt for he was still engaged in his own purge strategy and it was widely reported that the senator’s victory boosted the morale of several colleagues who faced renomination problems, especially Alva Adams of Colorado.25 McNutt’s climb-down marked the first significant break in his support for Roosevelt’s policies. The results of the 1938 elections widened the breach. Although Van Nuys triumphed narrowly, Hoosier Republicans won the secretaryship of state, their first statewide victory since 1928, recaptured six congressional seats, gained control of the lower house of the state legislature, and barely failed to secure a senate majority. All the pundits agreed that the result was attributable to the unpopularity of the New Deal during the “Roosevelt Recession”;26 consequently, the McNutt faction decided to distance itself further from the Roosevelt administration in a bid to restore the unity of the state party and regain electoral support. The dilution of McNutt’s identification with the New Deal did not constitute a significant change in his political principles. Even though McNutt had been one of the best governors of the Depression era, in essence he was a pragmatist who would rarely buck the prevailing political currents. His gubernatorial record was certainly impressive, not least because he

Ibid., July 1, 3, 1938. Van Nuys also benefited from the McNutt group’s failure to find an obvious replacement for him. Sam Jackson, an early choice, was ruled out to appease Peters. The spotlight then fell on Henry F. Schricker, who reluctantly agreed to run but never hid his preference for the 1940 gubernatorial nomination. Ibid., June 1, July 6, 1938. 24 McNutt to McHale, July 19, 1938, McNutt Papers. 25 Indianapolis Star, July 6, 1938. 26 Indiana Democratic State Committee, “Result of the Indiana Election, 1938,” Official File 300, Box 42, Roosevelt Papers. 40 Indiana Magazine of History had launched his own anti-Depression measures in 1933 in advance of Roosevelt’s, whereas most other state executives had awaited federal action. After restoring the solvency of the state treasury, largely by enacting a gross income tax and reducing the administrative costs of government, he had introduced a series of reforms which included old-age-pension legislation, prohibition of yellow dog contracts, and better relief administration. His government had also cooperated promptly and efficiently with the New Deal program^.^' Without decrying his achievements, it should be noted that he enacted his reform program when there was a desperate need for action; he thus did not encounter any serious opposition from a pliant state legislature. Moreover, his firm support for the New Deal projected him as a potential successor to Roosevelt when the liberal wave was at high tide. When the political climate changed, so did McNutt’s commitment to the New Deal, as evidenced by his handling of the Van Nuys affair. When McNutt eventually announced his bid for the presidential nomination in 1939, he projected himself as a moderate capable of uniting the warring forces in the national party. Because they had never fully trusted him, neither Roosevelt nor his closest advisers had ever supported McNutt’s aspira- tions. His new position only confirmed their opinion that he was an opportunist. Somewhat true to form McNutt reverted to outright liberalism in 1940, hoping in vain to gain Roosevelt’s support for the vice-presidential nomination after the president’s third-term intentions had become evident.28 Despite McNutt’s reconversion in terms of national politics during 1940, his Indiana allies clung to the course upon which the denouement of the Van Nuys affair had launched them. Nothing illustrates their movement away from a strongly pro- New Deal position better than their strategy to keep the governorship in Democratic hands, their overriding concern in the 1940 elections since this office controlled patronage distribution. In 1936, when Roosevelt’s prestige was at its zenith, the McNutt group had hitched its wagon to his star by nominating

27 Neff, “The Early Career and Governorship of Paul V. McNutt,” 148-79; Blake, Paul V. McNutt, 124-70. One federal official commented that relief in Indiana was the “most orderly and best managed” in the Midwest. Howard Hunter to Hopkins, March 20, 1938, Box 406, Federal Emergency Relief Ad- ministration Records (National Archives, Washington, D.C.). 28 Bernard Donahoe, Private Plans and Public Dangers: The Story of FDR’s Third Nomination (South Bend, Ind., 1965), 136-38. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 41

PAULV. McNun, HIGHCOMMISSIONER TO THE PHILIPPINES,AND GOVERNORM. CLIFFORDTOWNSEND, 1939

Courtesy Indianapolis Star. 42 Indiana Magazine of History the liberal Townsend for the governorship. The Indiana Demo- crats had then focused their campaign almost entirely on the virtues of the New Deal and the need to elect a state administration which would support the president’s policies.29 Townsend did indeed prove a more liberal governor than McNutt. Whereas McNutt’s relations with organized labor had been somewhat frosty, especially after he called out the Indiana National Guard during the 1933 coalfield strikes, Townsend publically identified with the unions’ cause. On one occasion he put pressure on a steel company to grant strikers a union contract, and he also added a Department of Labor to the state government setup. Less committed to economy than McNutt, who had built up a treasury surplus of $7,000,000 by 1937, Townsend also increased state expenditure on public works.30 In 1940, however, the McNutt group endorsed the candidacy of Lieutenant-Governor Henry F. Schricker, a moderate conservative of German descent, who was an advocate of fiscal ortho- doxy and had sympathized with Van Nuys’s stand against the Judiciary Bill.31 Schricker seemed to be the ideal gubernatorial candidate at a time when the national party leadership’s continuing adher- ence to the New Deal and growing identification with Great Britain in the European war threatened the slim majority that the Indiana Democrats had to defend. Schricker’s nomination also restored some unity to the state party. Conservative Democrats considered him an acceptable candidate; he was not closely associated with any particular faction, and he favored a more equitable distribution of patronage than McNutt had hitherto countenanced. His candidacy also enabled the state party to downplay ideological issues by capitalizing on his personal popularity, especially since he faced an obscure Republi- can opponent in Glenn R. Hillis, mayor of Kokomo. Schricker’s campaign emphasized his proven record in government and his

29 Hoosier Republicans, in turn, concentrated their campaign fire on McNutt’s record, notably on issues like the “2% Club and the controversial beer licenses. In consequence, the Democratic leaders moved closer still toward Roosevelt and pleaded with him to visit Indiana during the campaign. McKin- ney to Farley, October 19, 1936, Official File 300, Box 17, Roosevelt Papers; Sherman Minton to Farley, September 16, 1936, ibid. 3nIndianapolis Times, July 13, 1937; John D. Barnhart and Donald F. Carmony, Indiana: From Frontier to Industrial Commonwealth (4 vols., New York, 19.541, 11, 481-82. 31 For a description of Schricker see Charles F. Fleming, The White Hut: Henry Frederick Schricker, A Political Biography (Indianapolis, 1966), 10-56. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 43 personal reputation for honesty, symbolized by his famous white hat. These personality issues had a perennial appeal in Indiana politics. In contrast to the 1936 election the state organization downplayed presidential policies in the 1940 campaign, except in Democratic urban strongholds such as Gary, South Bend, and Evansville. A friend of Roosevelt’s complained bitterly, for example, that Indiana’s small towns and country districts “haven’t had a thing done for the This strategy had much in common with that of the 1928 campaign, when Hoosier Democrats abandoned Alfred E. Smith as a lost cause, concentrated on winning the governorship, and emphasized the personal virtues of their candidate in the hope of capitalizing on Republican corruption scandals.33 The 1940 campaign suggests that Roosevelt had much less success in changing the agenda of state as opposed to national politics. Hoosier Democratic leaders had the power to eschew ideological or programmatic politics and to focus on state and personality issues whenever such a strategy suited their pur- poses. The state Democratic organization assumed that the New Deal’s sustained popularity in the larger cities would benefit the whole ticket and that Schricker would run far enough ahead of the president elsewhere to ensure his own victory. It could be argued that this strategy was responsible for Roosevelt’s failure to carry the state. While Schricker won, the president lost Indiana by only 25,000 votes despite the disadvantage of facing a native son opponent, Wendell L. Willkie. Stronger support from the state organization might have tipped the balance in Roosevelt’s favor. Senator Sherman Minton, a “100% New Dealer” who was also beaten, complained of being double-cr~ssed.~~Roosevelt’s popularity continued to decline after the election, particularly because his wartime agricultural policies alienated the normally Democratic counties of southern Indiana; consequently, the state organization per- sisted in avoiding a close identification with his administration in the interests of preserving party harmony and maintaining rural support.

32 Tom O’Malley to James Row, October 15, 1940, Box 1, Hopkins Papers. 33 Munger, “Two Party Politics,” 48. 34 Minton to William Gibbs McAdoo, November 16, 1940, William Gibbs McAdoo Papers (Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.). 44 Indiana Magazine of History

In view of the outcome of the Van Nuys affair and the resultant Hoosier Democratic policy, Indiana’s experience lends weight to the view that Roosevelt had no realistic prospects of creating a liberal party by intervening in state disputes. It is highly unlikely that he would have been more successful had he taken action before 1937 when his prestige was undi- minished. Several Hoosiers did implore him to intervene and restore the harmony of the state party in 1935-1936, but none occupied a prominent position in the warring factions. The dispute was patronage-oriented at that stage, and the powerful McNutt would have resented any presidential attempt to establish a compromise when he appeared to have total victory within his grasp. Accordingly, the Democratic National Com- mittee chairman, James A. Farley, advised Roosevelt not to involve himself.35 Even had the president acted to help McNutt achieve victory in the early 1930s, he would still not have guaranteed the triumph of liberalism because his prospective allies, as their conduct later indicated, were pragmatists rather than idealists. His eventual intervention, coinciding with the decline of his popularity, only served to demonstrate the dangers of mistiming. McNutt probably had better prospects of transforming the party because he could have used his unprecedented patronage powers to promote committed liberals to leadership positions. He regarded the governorship principally as a stepping-stone to the White House, however, and had no desire to engage in risky ventures to reform the Hoosier De- mocracy. Other factors peculiar to Indiana’s political culture also helped to limit the prospects of liberalizing the state Demo- cratic party. In several northern industrial states Democratic urban machines had espoused a pragmatic welfare liberalism during the Progressive era; therefore, the New Deal had a political kinship with influential factions in states such as 11- linois, Massachusetts, and New Y~rk.~~In Indiana, however, the Democrats had not succeeded in building comparable political organizations during the early twentieth century. Most Hoosier cities in these years had not attracted sizeable numbers

35 Humphrey Harrington to Farley, April 24, 1935, Official File 300, Box 18, Roosevelt Papers; Fred Feick to Farley, September 10, 1936, Box 1094, Democratic National Committee Papers; Farley to Feick, September 16, 1936, ibid. 36 John D. Buenker, Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New York, 1973), discusses the “pragmatic liberalism” of the urban machines during the early twentieth century. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 45

of the “new” ethnic immigrants who formed the natural constituency of the machines in other states. As a result, rural southern Indiana, where politics were generally conservative, retained its traditional preponderant influence within the Hoosier Democratic party. Despite the growing significance of the urban vote in the New Deal era, no leader rose to promi- nence in the state party during the 1930s on the basis of his identification with the cities. There were no Hoosier equiva- lents of James M. Curley, Edward Kelly, or Robert F. Wagner. Moreover, the statehouse tended to favor rural areas and small towns disproportionately in the distribution of spoils. Political organizations in the urban counties therefore lacked the means to develop machines as adept at winning the city vote as their counterparts in other states. Organized labor did not become a major political force in Indiana during the Roosevelt era, even though it helped to liberalize the state Democratic parties in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan. Even in these midwest- ern states, labor forces, despite facing very weak Democratic organizations, did not attain success until the 1940s when they had support from other interest groups. Indiana’s convention system enabled party leaders to block challenges to their power, whereas the primary system of nomination would have allowed labor to exert greater influence. It was also difficult to coordinate Hoosier unions to undertake political action on a statewide basis because there was no all-powerful group, such as Michigan’s United Automobile Workers, nor was union strength concentrated around a major urban center, such as Milwaukee.37 Although the Democrats’ factional disputes attracted more public attention because they were the party in power, the Republicans, too, experienced serious internal problems in the late 1930s. The Old Guard, which had dominated the state Republican organization for over thirty years, was opposed to government intervention in the economy and was strongly conservative on social issues, as exemplified by its toleration of Ku Klux Klan influence in the party during the 1920s. This group was led by James E. Watson, a fervent advocate of the business

37 John Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York, 1966), 219-31; Munger, “Two Party Politics,” 67-68, 244; William Riker, “The (2.1.0. in Politics, 1936-1946” (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Harvard University, 1948), 202-12. 46 Zndiana Magazine of History Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 47

Republicanism of the Calvin Coolidge era.38 Watson’s defeat in the 1932 senatorial election and that of his ally, Senator Ar- thur R. Robinson, in 1934, encouraged younger Republicans to challenge Old Guard leadership. Initially their predominant concern was to obtain greater say in patronage matters.39 Fol- lowing the crushing Republican defeats in the 1936 elections, the dispute broadened to encompass a debate over political principles. Many Hoosier Republicans became convinced that their party had to modify its conservatism if it was ever to regain office. In these circumstances the most significant challenge faced by the Old Guard came from the faction led by Ralph F. Gates, the Fourth District party chairman. This group drew its main support from northern Indiana, particularly the urban areas, and the Republican Editorial Association, which had broken with Watson over the Klan issue.*O Gates’s supporters launched their challenge in 1937; but, although they ousted some Watson allies from the state committee in May, the Old Guard still retained great influence and succeeded in getting its candidates chosen as state chairman and national committeeman in October.41 The struggle between the two groups then centered upon the 1938 senatorial nomination when Watson declared his candidacy and the Gates group supported the Angola newspaper publisher, Raymond E. Willis. Although historians have generally characterized Willis as a conservative, he regarded himself as a “liberalized Republi- can.”42A description of his views provides some insight into the politics of the Gates group. Willis advocated a pragmatic acceptance of the most popular aspects of the New Deal. He rejected the old Republican notions that government should not intervene to deal with economic and unemployment problems and thus declared himself in favor of temporary WPA relief aid and contributory social security and old-age pensions.43 Regard- ing the welfare state in general, Willis acknowledged that “we

James Watson, As I Knew Them: Memoirs of James E. Watson, Former United States Senator from Indiana (Indianapolis, 19361, offers some indication of his political views. :Is Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, September 20, 1936. 40 Indianapolis Star, July 8, 1938. 41 Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, May 15, 1937; Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette, October 31, 1937; Indianapolis Star, October 30, 1937. 42 Patterson, Congressional ConseruatisnL, 276; Raymond E. Willis to John Moorman, October 4, 1938, Box 78, Raymond E. Willis Papers (Indiana Divi- sion, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis). 43 Willis to Neil McAllum, August 12, 1938, Box 78, Willis Papers; Willis to William Carson, August 30, 1938, ibid. 48 Indiana Magazine of History have to provide a minimum standard of living for those unable to keep up with the American way.”44 Even collective bargain- ing won his approval, and he endorsed labor’s right to strike, although he disapproved of the National Labor Relations Board because he thought that it discriminated in favor of the unions when it mediated in industrial Willis’s views, it is worth noting, were more progressive than the national Repub- lican party’s 1936 platform, which had criticized the unemployment insurance and old-age-pension provisions of the Social Security Act. Significantly, his most direct indictments against New Deal policies in 1938 focused upon Roosevelt’s agricultural program and the reciprocal trade treaties, which farmers opposed. Otherwise Willis’s criticisms tended to center upon issues such as the costs, corruption, and inefficiency of Democratic relief administration, issues which did not entail a direct challenge to the principles of federal unemployment

Willis had not, of course, become a full-fledged liberal. His criticisms of the New Deal’s inefficiency were often opportunis- tic and unconstructive. Although he insisted that only the re- vival of business confidence could generate full economic recovery, he did not explain how the Republicans would help promote a sufficient expansion of the private sector economy to eliminate unemployment; nor did he indicate how they would improve relief administration. While he accepted certain aspects of Roosevelt’s programs, he was critical of the New Deal in general. His letters and campaign oratory of 1938 stressed that the benefits of the New Deal were outweighed by its dangerous consequences, which he identified as its encouragement of radicalism-exemplified by the sit-down strikes-the debilitating effect of its bureaucratic regimentation upon the spirit of individual enterprise, and its shackling of private business through the expansion of governmental power and high taxation.47 In essence, Willis, like the majority of the Gates group, was a pragmatic, moderate conservative who accepted that reform was necessary and thought that the Old

44 Willis to Jesse Clark, October 8, 1938, ibid. 45 Willis to Otto Lee, July 8, 1938, ibid. 46Au~tinStults to Noel Neal, August 4, 1938, ibid.;Omer Whiteman to Willis, September 1, 1938, ibid.; Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, September 15, 1938; Indianapolis Star, October 7, 9, 1938. 47 See especially Willis’s speeches as reported in the Indianapolis Star, October 11, November 4, 1938. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 49

Guard was out of touch with the realities of the 1930s but still wished to limit the scope and pace of change. Initially Watson seemed the stronger candidate, especially when he undermined hopes of northern unity by concluding an agreement with Oliver Starr, the Gary mayor who had also entered the race, to pool delegates on later ballots. A similar deal appeared to be in the offing when Walter Bossert, a former Klan regional leader, declared his candida~y.~~The apparent decline of Willis’s prospects led to one of the most interesting episodes of a politically eventful decade. One group within the Gates faction, the Allen County Republicans, proposed that the party should nominate Van Nuys as its senatorial candidate. Several nationally influential figures, such as Alfred M. Landon and publisher Frank Gannett, had expressed hopes that Van Nuys would accept a Republican draft. The bipartisan opposition to the Judiciary Bill and Roosevelt’s purge strategy had raised their hopes for a national coalition between conservative Democrats and their party to oppose New Deal liberal~.~~Allen County Republicans had a more limited objective. Their overriding concern in proposing Van NUYS’Scandidacy was to ensure that Watson did not win the nomination and thereby restore the dominance of the Old Guard in the state party.5o A curious mixture of Irish Catholics and German Lu- therans held the leadership of Fort Wayne’s Republicans; therefore, it was hardly surprising that they were desperately anx- ious to defeat Watson, whose nativist prejudices and former acceptance of Klan influence had earned their enmity.51 The Allen County-Fort Wayne group also considered Old Guard conservatism to be unrealistic, and they had demonstrated the wisdom of making concessions to the prevailing political climate when they withstood the urban trend favoring Democrats to win control of city hall in 1934. Accordingly, they acknowledged the need for emergency federal relief aid and certain social reforms and accepted labor’s right to organize as “ordi- nary justice.”52

48 Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, June 30, 1938. 49 Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 263-87. John Morris to Willis, June 1, 1938, Box 78, Willis Papers; Willis to Morris, June 3, 1938, ibid. 51 The names of the leaders indicate the ethnic mixture: Harry Hogan, Dan Flanagan, Walter Helmke, and Harry Baals. 52Harry Hogan to Charles A. Halleck, September 8, 1938, Charles A. Halleck Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana University). Reproduced from Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, July 15, 1938, p. 6 Courtesy Allen County Public Library.

In June, 1938, this group, speaking through the influential Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, broadcast their proposal. It received little support because, other Republicans soon pointed out, the party would, in effect, be without a candidate if the Democrats, who convened later, also nominated Van Nuys. The Fort Wayne group then called for a postponement of the Republican convention until after the opposition had met. The only counties to support this idea were Porter, Starke, and Tippecanoe, where newspaper proprietors friendly with the News-Sentinel's owner had great influence in the local Republican organiza- Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 51

ti~n.~~Gates and the other northerners remained faithful to Willis. Hoping to increase his opponents’ disarray, Watson initially allowed some of his supporters, notably state chairman Arch Bobbitt, to express vague interest in a Van Nuys coalition but then personally condemned the proposal just before the convention met.54 Despite the hopes of several nationally important figures, Indiana did not provide the first stimulus for a realignment of the party system in 1938. Hoosier coalitionists, in fact, constituted only a small group within one of the state’s Republican factions. The coalition proposal faced overwhelming opposition from most county chairmen, who complained that Van Nuys would not help their local and congressional tickets, which faced partisan opponents. They also disliked the implications of bipartisanship regarding the distribution of patronage. Many Republicans noted, too, that because Van Nuys’s voting record was “95% pro New Deal” he seemed ill-suited to lead a campaign against Roosevelt’s The senator himself offered the coalitionists little encouragement, declaring on several oc- casions that he was “too much of a Democrat” to join forces with the Republicans, a good indication of his confidence about his eventual ren~mination.~~McNutt probably hoped that the senator would accept a Republican draft-which action would have exposed him to calumny as a turncoat-for the former governor conceded Van Nuys’s renomination immediately on learning of Willis’s selection by the GOP. Just before the convention Gates had managed to outflank the Watson-Starr alli- ance by negotiating an agreement whereby the other three candidates pooled their delegates in favor of Willis after the first ballot. The Fort Wayne group terminated their maneuvers immediately on learning of this agreement.57 If Watson’s defeat removed the greatest threat to the emergence of moderate Republicanism, Willis’s nomination still did not ensure the primacy of the Gates faction. The only clear result of the convention was that it reaffirmed the power of party regularity and the impotence of the Klan, for Bossert won least delegate support. The leadership issue was unresolved

53 Indianapolis Star, June 23, 1938. 541bid., June 12, 26, 1938. 55 Willis to John Morris, June 3, 1938, Box 78, Willis Papers; Willis to Hilton Hornaday, June 13, 1938, ibid.; Willis to Hugh Butler, July 2, 1938, ibid. 56 Indianapolis Star, June 25, 1938. 57 Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, June 30, 1938. 52 Indiana Magazine of History

since the northerners lost the battle for the other nomina- tions.58 Developments after the convention, however, soon tipped the balance in favor of the Gates faction. In August, 1938, the morale of the Hoosier Republican party received a much-needed lift when the famous Cornfield Conference was held at Homer E. Capehart’s farm. Although the state, regional, and national leaders who addressed the gathering represented a variety of viewpoints, the Indiana party as a whole received its most direct exposure to date to the views of Republicans who advocated a pragmatic acceptance of some New Deal measures. Not only did the publicity spotlight fall upon Willis, but Glenn Frank, chairman of the Republican Program Committee, and Capehart himself, though not yet committed to a political career, spoke of the need for governmental action on certain economic and social issues.59 The Cornfield Conference thus undoubtedly helped the cause of moderate Republicanism in Indiana, but it was the outcome of the 1938 elections that provided the decisive boost to moderates’ fortunes. While rural Republicans focused their campaign against federal farm policy, the urban county organizations found it expedient to direct their fire against the shortcomings of federal relief and welfare programs, a particularly potent criticism since Indiana’s WPA allocation had received severe cuts before the onset of the recession. County chairmen advised Willis not to criticize the WPA in principle but to attack instead the inadequacy of relief work and wages.60 Republicans also focused attention on allegations that a large proportion of WPA funds was spent on unnecessary bureaucracy in order to provide patronage jobs for Democrats. It is likely that Indiana’s WPA did not function as efficiently as usual during the recession because, as one official complained, so much of its energy was devoted to investigating Republican allegations of maladministration.61 Seeking to blunt these charges, the WPA appointed Republicans to some agency posts, but they often used their

58 Indianapolis Star, July 9, 1938. 59 William B. Pickett, “The Capehart Cornfield Conference and the Election of 1938: Homer E. Capehart’s Entry into Politics,” Indiana Magazine of History, LXXIII (December, 1977), 267-70. 6o Clay County Republican Party to Willis, August 20, 1938, Box 78, Willis Papers; Cullen Squier to Willis, undated, ibid. Hunter to Aubrey Williams, October 4, 1938, Box 610, Works Progress Administration Records (National Archives, Washington, D.C.). .~ Snout White?

Reprodud from the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, July 19. 1938, p. 6 Courtesy Fort Wayne Public Library. positions to spread disaffection among relief labor regarding work conditions. Most pundits agreed that the Republicans won a substantial share of the WPA vote in the urban areas, particularly in Fort Wayne where the maladministration was most blatant. Republican candidates also won the endorsement of the Townsend Clubs by approving the clubs’ old-age-pension propo- sals in principle. These senior citizens’ lobbying organizations were very active in Indiana and were thought to have tipped the balance in four close congressional races, including the contests in those districts which contained South Bend and Terre Haute. It was small wonder, therefore, that several 54 Indiana Magazine of History

Democratic county chairmen complained that the opposition had out-New Dealed them.62 In some ways a new Republican party emerged out of the factional and electoral battles of 1938. The party’s political views had changed because it now realized the wisdom of adopting a more pragmatic approach to the New Deal than the old conservative leaders had countenanced. Although Willis won a clear majority of the rural vote in 1938 by capitalizing on agrarian antipathy toward federal farm policy, it was equally significant that he regained much of the ground lost by the Republicans in the small towns and the cities in the Demo- cratic landslides of 1932 and 1936. Indeed, it was widely be- lieved that only vote fraud in Lake County had denied him overall victory, for Van Nuys won by only 5,000 votes, over 200,000 less than his 1932 majority. Willis’s good showing justified the contention of the Gates group that by accepting the most popular features of the New Deal and concentrating their fire on its less successful policies the Republicans could do much to neutralize Roosevelt’s appeal in Indiana. Having therefore proved that orthodox conservatism was out of touch with the conditions of the 1930s, younger elements were finally able to wrest control from the Old Guard and give the Republican party a new leadership. The changes of 1938 were important but limited. While the Gates faction did not retract its previous acceptance of certain liberal reforms, neither did it use its new influence to prod the party into making further concessions to New Deal policies. Pragmatic conservatism continued to be the basis of Republican politics, and the political climate after 1938 did not require a more liberal approach than that adopted in the midterm elections. The Republicans also had to be careful that their pragmatic attitude toward reform, which appealed mainly to the urban electorate, did not offend their rural supporters, many of whom remained strongly antipathetic to the New Deal. This was particularly the case regarding the WPA. Hoosier farmers grew more hostile than ever to this agency in 1939-1940, ex- pressing resentment that it deprived them of cheap seasonal labor and that the federal government overtaxed rural areas to

Indiana Democratic State Committee, “Result of the Indiana Election, 1938,” Official File 300, Box 42, Roosevelt Papers; Joseph Suelzer to Farley, December 22, 1938, ibid.; Glenn Griswold to Farley, December 31, 1938, Off- cia1 File 300, Box 18, ibid. I I -I I

Reproduced from Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, July 20, 1939, p. 6 Courtesy Allen County Public Library. pay for urban-oriented relief program^."^ Sensing the growing frustration of the electorate at the sluggish rate of recovery both of agriculture and industry in Indiana, the Republicans tended to be more directly critical of the New Deal in their 1940 campaign than two years previously by focusing attention on Roosevelt’s failure to restore economic prosperity. Willis,

63 So strongly did farmers dislike the WPA that Van Nuys felt obliged to vote for a reduction of federal relief appropriations in 1939. He was one of only two Democratic senators from predominantly urban states to do so. The other was Scott Lucas of Illinois. See Patterson, Congressional Conservatism, 297. 56 Indiana Magazine of History

who ran again, attacked his opponent, Sherman Minton, as a “1Ooo/o New Dealer.” At first he was even wary of discussing international problems lest he deflect attention from the issue of the New Deal economy.64 The limits of change in the Hoosier Republican party were underlined in the early 1940s when a group of Wendell Willkie’s liberal supporters tried to gain power. Willkie’s views, especially his internationalist ideals, were too liberal for many of the Gates faction to stomach. An open break developed when some Willkeites ran a slate, albeit unsuccessfully, in the Allen County primaries of 1942.65The comprehensive defeat of Charles La Follette’s bid for the 1946 senatorial nomination only confirmed the weakness of the liberal Republicans. The pragmatic conservatism of the Gates faction continued to exert a significant influence upon Hoosier politics. In the 1940s the young senator, William E. Jenner, assumed Watson’s mantle and rekindled the ideological fervor of the party’s right wing. Jenner’s rise led to renewed factional conflict during the late 1940s and 1950s when the Gates group, which had never for- gotten the lessons of the Depression era concerning the virtues of moderate politics, strove to limit Jenner’s influence.66 The results of the 1940 election confirmed that the Repub- licans had effectively reestablished their ascendancy over the Democrats in Hoosier politics. A recent study has indicated that a two-fold electoral realignment occurred in Indiana during the 1930s when “urbanite, working-class and ethnically identified voters” moved into the Democratic camp and Repub- licans gained increasing support from the rural areas and the small towns.67 The impact that the internal party battles had on electoral behavior in the late 1930s cannot be measured with any exactitude; nevertheless, it is possible to offer some

64 Willis to Chase Harding, September 2, 1940, Box 79, Willis Papers. Willis also gave greater emphasis to anticommunist issues than in previous electoral campaigns of the 1930s. He repeatedly told his audiences that Earl Browder, the Communist party’s leader, and Harry Bridges, the longshoremen’s union leader who consistently followed the Communist line, supported the New Deal. Indianapolis Star, October 18, November 2, 1940. 65 Fort Wayne News-Sentinel, May 6, 1942. Gates personally remained friendly with Willkie. See Gates to Willkie, November 7, December 12, 1942, Willkie Papers. 66 Fenton, Midwest Politics, 69-73. 67Charles S. Hyneman, Richard C. Hofstetter, and Patrick F. OConnor, Voting in Indiana: A Century of Persistence and Change (Bloomington, 1979), 115-17. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 57 brief suggestions as to the likely effect of the factional struggles and their outcome on the parties’ electoral support. Since agrarian disillusion with the New Deal was nationwide, Democratic factionalism was evidently only an incidental factor in the alienation of the farm vote. Although rural Demo- crats supported Van Nuys in his battle with McNutt and Roosevelt, he still ran badly in the agricultural areas in 1938, particularly in the corn belt counties. The statehouse’s close identification with Roosevelt in 1937-1938 probably increased the midterm ticket’s loss of rural support to a small extent. When the state party regained some unity by distancing itself from the New Deal in 1940, Schricker ran ahead of Roosevelt in most rural counties. While his lead usually amounted at best to a few hundred votes, these small margins still proved crucial in the tightly contested election.6* The outcome of the factional battles arguably had more impact on the urban vote. Indiana was one of only two predominantly urban states which Roosevelt failed to carry in 1940. Having gained 62 percent of the votes cast in the seven most urban counties in 1936, he won only 52.9 percent four years later and actually failed to carry Indianapolis and Fort Wayne. His modest urban majorities did not counterbalance his heavy losses in the rural areas and small towns. This decline was attributable to several factors: Roosevelt’s foreign policy had alienated German-Americans; the middle classes blamed the Democrats for encouraging trade union militancy; and many labor voters expressed their frustrations about the sluggish pace of industrial recovery.69 Factional battles also undoubtedly had an impact on the decline of Democratic support in the particular case of Fort Wayne. Internal strife had seriously weakened the Allen County Democratic party. Because Earl Peters had controlled the local organization until 1938, McNutt had starved it of

68 Rural counties are defined in this context as those counties not contain- ing towns with populations over ten thousand. In thirteen southern rural counties that had gone Republican three times or less in presidential elections between 1892 and 1936, Schricker’s total vote was over two thousand greater than Roosevelt’s. His poll in the twenty-five northern and central rural counties that the president had carried in the two previous elections was four thousand ahead of Roosevelt’s. See Edgar E. Robinson, They Voted for Rooseuelt: The Presidential Vote, 1932-1944 (Stanford, 1947), 85-89; Robert J. Pitchell, Indiana Votes: Election Returns for Governor, 1852-1956, and Senator, 1914-1958 (Bloomington, 19601, 52-53. 6y “1940 County Polls-Indiana,’’ Box 1170, Democratic National Cornmit- tee Papers. 58 Indiana Magazine of History patronage. Meanwhile the Republicans had used their occu- pancy of city hall and consequent control over municipal jobs to build a powerful machine that was very efficient at getting out the vote.70 Moderate Republicans, who had gained power in mid-decade, also had much success in winning votes from groups who had supported Roosevelt in 1936. One Democrat calculated that his party had won less than 20 percent of the WPA vote in 193€L71The GOP also built up good relations with local labor by adopting moderate attitudes toward union rights, organizing Labor for Republicans clubs, and publicizing the fact that Mayor Harry W. Baals had a union background. In 1938 Republicans also elected the first black candidate in Allen County history, which fact helped the party retain the support of Fort Wayne’s black Republicans. In 1940 Willkie carried six of the seven primarily black precincts. Since Roosevelt carried only seven of the city’s fifty-seven precincts in 1940, it is evident that Republican strength was not based entirely on Fort Wayne’s German-American vote.72 In the other main urban counties in Indiana the Republi- cans appear to have made few converts from the New Deal coalition in 1940 as Roosevelt’s vote held up well in numerical terms in comparison to 1936. Nevertheless, some connection between the emergence of moderate Republicanism and the increased voter turn-out in 1940 seems evident. Indiana had, in fact, experienced a voter participation surge in the previous presidential elections of the New Deal era. This development interrupted what has become a century-long pattern of declin- ing turn-out and initially benefited the Democrats rather than the republican^.^^ As a recent study has noted, Democratic success in 1932 and 1936 was not wholly attributable to the New Deal’s conversion of Republican supporters but also owed much to the activation of voters not previously in the par-

7n Alexander Campbell to McNutt, July 29, 1935, Box 2, Peters Papers; James Flemyng to Farley, December 13, 1938, Official File 300, Box 42, Roosevelt Papers. ‘l Samuel Cleland to Daniel Roper, November 14, 1938, copy, Official File 300, Box 18, ibid. 72 Former Congressman E. Ross Adair, who was active in local politics in the late 1930s, outlined Republican strategy to the author in an interview in April, 1980. ‘3 Paul Kleppner, “Searching for the Indiana Voter: A Review Essay,” Indiana Magazine of History, LXXVI (December, 1980), 351-55. Indiana Politics during the New Deal Years 59

ticipating ele~torate.~~Turn-out in the New Deal era, however, peaked in 1940, benefiting the Republicans on this occasion.75 Turn-out appears to have been especially high in the urban areas. A crude indication of this is provided by the fact that the actual numbers of votes cast in these counties in the 1940 presidential election was 12.9 percent greater than in 1936, whereas the increase was only 7.4 percent for the state as a whole. Accordingly, the large percentage of decline in Roosevelt’s share of the poll in the seven main urban counties only converts into a numerical loss of some 14,000 votes in comparison to his 1936 showing. On the other hand, Willkie gained 100,000 votes more than Landon’s tally in 1936 and Hillis 83,000 more than the previous Republican gubernatorial candidate. It seems probable that the increased Republican vote was largely attributable to the reactivation of habitual supporters who had abstained in 1936. The presence of a native- son candidate in Willkie was doubtless an important factor in this development, but it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the emergence of the “new” Republican party from the factional battles of 1937-1938 was also partly responsible. In other words, many voters who habitually supported the party had abstained in the 1930s because they could not reconcile themselves either to the New Deal or to Old Guard conservatism in the context of the Depression but could now identify with a moderate Republicanism that accepted the need for limited reforms. Factional conflict had subsided by 1940 because both parties had been able to resolve their principal disputes. In the Democratic case McNutt’s allies retained effective control of the party, but they had been forced to accommodate their opponents’ demands for more equitable distribution of patronage and to distance themselves from Roosevelt. It was evident that the New Deal had not transformed the Hoosier Democracy, which continued to show more interest in patronage-oriented politics than ideological issues despite the tribulations of the Depression. Roosevelt could probably have done little to change this state of affairs. “To the victor the spoils” was still the

74 Hyneman, Hofstetter, and O’Connor, Voting in Indiana, 111. 751bid., 27, calculates that 80.1 percent of the eligible electorate voted. Walter D. Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Poli- tics (New York, 1970), 196, calculates a turn-out of 81.1 percent. Both agree, however, that this has been the only election since 1916 when over 80 percent of the eligible Hoosier electorate voted. 60 Indiana Magazine of History

guiding principle of the Democratic party, as it was also for the Republicans. There can be little doubt that the uncertainties of bipartisan patronage distribution constituted a major impedi- ment to the development of coalitionism in 1938. This is not to say that the New Deal’s impact on Indiana politics was unimportant, merely that it was limited rather than radical. The triumph of the Republican moderates was inextricably bound up with the emergence of a new political consensus in Indiana during the Depression. By 1940 nearly all the leading figures of both parties, admittedly with varying degrees of enthusiasm, accepted some of the New Deal’s basic principles. Politicians endorsed policies that they would not have countenanced a decade earlier. Some degree of federal intervention to promote economic recovery was now acceptable to them; so was federal unemployment relief; so was a moderate extension of trade union rights; and, probably most important of all because it implied the permanence of the welfare state, so was social security legislation. In this sense Indiana was in tune with nationwide trends; yet, both parties remained pragmatic in their attitudes toward reformism. Electoral disasters suffered by the Old Guard, not newfound idealism, prodded the GOP to endorse certain reforms; consequently, the extent of change to which Republicans would agree was depen- dent on the ongoing electoral success of the New Deal. Even the Democrats, who had happily clung to Roosevelt’s coattails from 1934 to 1936, quickly relinquished this grasp when the going got rough from 1938 to 1940. The state organization was not prepared to identify with those New Deal measures that, regardless of their merit, it thought were electoral liabilities and that threatened Democratic retention of state offices con- trolling patronage distribution. This disaffection applied in particular to the unpopular farm program, the urban orienta- tion of relief following the “Roosevelt Recession,” and the growth of union rights to the point where labor’s radical mili- tants appeared to have the support of the New Deal. By 1940 both parties concurred as to the limits of the new consensus, and the factional conflicts of 1937-1938 had done much to effect this agreement. Many features of the old party system endured the challenge of the Depression and continued to exert a significant influence on Hoosier politics for years afterward, coexisting comfortably with the changes that had occurred during the 1930s. In Indiana, therefore, continuity appears to be as important as change in American state politics during the New Deal era.