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0706Bombers.Pdf A Tale of Two Bombers Photos Carlson Ted by After a long review process, the Rea- gan Administration in 1981 decided there was room in the inventory for both the B-1B (shown here) and the B-2A stealth bomber (at right). The two bombers formed the centerpiece of the strategic arms buildup of the 1980s. 72 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2006 Many thought Ronald Reagan had to choose between the B-1 and the B-2. They were wrong. A Tale of Two Bombers By Walter J. Boyne hen President Reagan took work on a new low-altitude penetrat- proached, the B-1’s critics stepped office in early 1981, he came ing bomber, which was given the name up their complaints, turning it into a Wface to face with a huge bomber ques- Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft, subject of major political debate. The tion. Should he resurrect the long-dor- or AMSA. North American Rockwell Brookings Institution in early 1976, for mant B-1 to quickly boost US striking won the contract. instance, published Modernizing the power? Or should he bypass the B-1 Things moved slowly, however. Sec- Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How. and invest those billions of dollars in retary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, In this critical book, authors Alton H. the revolutionary but far more distant no friend of the manned penetrating Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood urged the B-2 stealth bomber? bomber, decided in 1966 to delay AMSA Pentagon to scrap the penetrating B-1 It was a major dilemma, and Reagan development, declaring that “a new and save up to $15 billion by building solved it in a classic, Reaganesque way: advanced strategic aircraft does not at a different kind of standoff, cruise-mis- He bought both. this time appear justified.” sile-firing bomber. That was 25 years ago. Reagan’s The Nixon Administration revived Fierce opposition to B-1 produc- decision, announced in October 1981, AMSA, however, and the support con- tion began to take hold in Washington. marked the close of a difficult, five-year tinued after the August 1974 resignation Congress wavered on making a funding ordeal in which USAF’s bomber mod- of Nixon and his replacement by Gerald decision, pending a postelection Penta- ernization campaign was twisted into R. Ford. On Oct. 26, 1974, Rockwell gon decision. knots, untwisted, and twisted again. rolled out the first aircraft—now known Meanwhile, the year’s three most sig- In a sense, the tale of the two bombers as the B-1A bomber—and staged a first nificant Presidential contenders stoked actually began two decades before, in flight two months later. Testing continued the controversy, each in his own way. 1962. The Air Force in that year took into 1975, with a go-no go production Reagan, challenging a sitting Presi- delivery of its last B-52 bomber with no decision set for November 1976. dent for the Republican nomination, follow-up in sight. The service wanted contended that the Ford Administration the high-flying B-70, but the Kennedy Bull’s Eye on the B-1 had allowed the United States to fall be- Administration doubted its utility and It was in 1976—a tumultuous Presi- hind the Soviet Union in military power, canceled it. dential election year—that the B-1 particularly in strategic airpower. As a result, USAF in the same year bomber program began to unravel. Ford, at least in part in response to initiated research and development As the production decision ap- the Reagan’s stark criticisms, pledged AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2006 73 capability could not be seen as inferior to that of the Soviet Union. At least in part because of Brown’s views, Carter moved to offset the loss of the manned bomber with acquisition of a new nuclear-tipped Air Launched Cruise Missile. The Air Force had in 1974 contracted with Boeing to develop the AGM-86A. However, the Pentagon continued to flight-test the four B-1A prototypes as insurance against the day when the US might need to build them. A handful of officials were aware of another factor in the bomber equation, one that would not be publicly known for several years to come. Carter, after his election, had been told of the Air Force’s supersecret Advanced Technol- ogy Bomber project, which in time would Carter, shown here with (l-r) Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Presidential advisor lead to the operational B-2 stealth aircraft Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Gen. Alexander Haig, in 1979 gave up his plans to eliminate that would be “invisible” to radar. It was many weapons systems, but it was too late. His re-election bid failed miserably. an intriguing idea, but Brown always to build the B-1 in numbers sufficient could not be made to see the value of a held that the prospect of acquiring the “to keep our strategic airpower strong penetrating bomber. B-2 was not a factor in Carter’s cancel- in the future.” Carter’s moves were controversial lation of the B-1. Democrat Jimmy Carter, reflecting because, at the time, the Soviet Union For the Air Force, the B-1 decision his own party’s post-Vietnam skepti- maintained a force of about 200 land divi- was a blow. USAF was still suffering the cism of military power, called the B-1 a sions, some 1,500 ICBMs, 900 subma- effects of the cancellation of the B-70. wasteful and unnecessary program and rine-launched missiles, 700 long-range Now the second attempt to replace the pledged to oppose it, if elected. bombers, 8,400 tactical aircraft, and a B-52 had fizzled. For all that, the Air When Carter prevailed in the Novem- rugged, integrated air defense system. Force, led by its Chief of Staff, Gen. ber election, the B-1 program entered a Conservative critics were outraged. David C. Jones, acquiesced in Carter’s new and highly uncertain phase. Ford, decision. departing the White House in January Brown’s Marker Fast forward three years, to 1980. 1977, left behind a long-range budget Brown, Carter’s Pentagon chief (and By 1980, adverse political pressure that funded 244 B-1s, but Ford’s over- a former Secretary of the Air Force), had forced Carter to forgo many of the-shoulder bomber plan was of little made it clear that the US had to main- his weapon-cancellation plans. The consequence. Everyone knew the actual tain “essential equivalence” with Soviet Georgia Democrat was being harshly decision would be made by the new strategic power. He insisted, as had all of criticized on foreign affairs and defense Administration. his predecessors, that American strategic issues, the result of his numerous The more-dovish Carter took office holding strong views about national defense generally and manned pen- etrating bombers in particular. The new President believed the Soviet Union would react favorably if Washington AP photo by Ed Reinke unilaterally constrained its strategic nuclear programs. Carter, through Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, instructed the Pentagon to study the feasibility of reducing the US strategic arsenal. The Democrat believed he should slow down or stop programs that could derail superpower arms control. Most observers expected Carter to cancel the B-1, and, on June 30, 1977, he did just that. In explanation, he called it “a very expensive weapon” that was “not now necessary” because of the “recent evolution of the cruise missile.” Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, shown here in a 1983 Rose Garden ceremo- Despite the efforts of Air Force and ny with Reagan, was pro-defense but fiscally prudent. He studied the two bomber some Congressional leaders, Carter programs for months before making a recommendation to the President. 74 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2006 U-turns and gaffes in dealing with national security. Carter’s military reputation hit bottom as a result of the April 24, 1980 Desert One fiasco—the failed US military at- tempt to rescue US hostages held in Iran. The ill-conceived and micromanaged mission ended in disaster in the Iranian desert, where eight US troops died in a fiery refueling mishap. (See “Desert One,” January 1999, p. 60.) Desert One intensified the campaign rhetoric. Soon, the President and his advisors began to worry that his pros- pects for re-election might well hinge on success in dispelling his widespread image of weakness. Carter was squared off against the staunchly pro-defense Reagan, and the political climate had changed in dramatic ways in the Carter years. Carter specifically targeted the B-1A, shown here at the North American Rockwell factory, as a symbol of wasteful weaponry. He canceled the program in 1977, but in Americans in 1976 may have been 1981 Reagan resurrected the Lancer. caught in the post-Vietnam doldrums. In 1980, they were alarmed by nega- The revelations created a political leaks and comments had dealt a “grievous tive international developments. These uproar. First, Carter critics charged—al- blow” to US security by giving Moscow included the fall of the Shah of Iran, most certainly erroneously—that the “a 10-year head start” on finding a way the hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion Pentagon was handing out national to counter stealth. Worse, he claimed that of Afghanistan, the establishment of a security secrets simply to help Carter Brown personally had “breached one of Marxist regime in Nicaragua, a buildup fend off Reagan’s charges that he had this nation’s most closely held military of large, superaccurate Soviet ICBMs, allowed the nation’s defenses to dete- secrets in a transparent effort to divert and other signs of a deteriorating US riorate.
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