Using Optical Illusions to Enhance Projection Design for Live Performance
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The Epistemology of Evidence in Cognitive Neuroscience1
To appear in In R. Skipper Jr., C. Allen, R. A. Ankeny, C. F. Craver, L. Darden, G. Mikkelson, and R. Richardson (eds.), Philosophy and the Life Sciences: A Reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The Epistemology of Evidence in Cognitive Neuroscience1 William Bechtel Department of Philosophy and Science Studies University of California, San Diego 1. The Epistemology of Evidence It is no secret that scientists argue. They argue about theories. But even more, they argue about the evidence for theories. Is the evidence itself trustworthy? This is a bit surprising from the perspective of traditional empiricist accounts of scientific methodology according to which the evidence for scientific theories stems from observation, especially observation with the naked eye. These accounts portray the testing of scientific theories as a matter of comparing the predictions of the theory with the data generated by these observations, which are taken to provide an objective link to reality. One lesson philosophers of science have learned in the last 40 years is that even observation with the naked eye is not as epistemically straightforward as was once assumed. What one is able to see depends upon one’s training: a novice looking through a microscope may fail to recognize the neuron and its processes (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962/1970).2 But a second lesson is only beginning to be appreciated: evidence in science is often not procured through simple observations with the naked eye, but observations mediated by complex instruments and sophisticated research techniques. What is most important, epistemically, about these techniques is that they often radically alter the phenomena under investigation. -
Richard Gregory Pri- 1970 He Moved to the University of Bristol, Where He 19 Marily from His Small 1966 Masterpiece Eye and Brain Remained for the Rest of His Career
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Obituary 10 11 ALFRED H. FUCHS, EDITOR 12 Bowdoin College 13 14 15 16 17 RICHARD LANGTON GREGORy (1923–2010) 18 19 20 21 BRUCE BRIDGEMAN 22 University of California, Santa Cruz 23 A giant among cognitive scientists, Richard L. Gregory died on May 17th at the age 24 of 86. While most of us remember him for his pioneering work in perception, he 25 had many other interests and accomplishments as well. Though I knew him only 26 late in his life, he always had a spark of boyish curiosity and enthusiasm. Gregory 27 had a way of cocking his head and looking down at his conversation partners; with 28 his height, he looked down at almost everyone, literally but never figuratively. He 29 must have been born tall—it’s impossible to imagine him any other way. 30 Gregory was born into an academic family. His father Christopher was the first 31 director of the University of London Observatory, and he attended a public school 32 (in North America, a private school). His education was interrupted by WWII, 33 during which he served in the signals branch of the Royal Air Force. Continuing on 34 the academic fast track, in 1947 he entered Downing College, Cambridge, studying 35 philosophy and experimental psychology, tutored by Bertrand Russell in the small 36 world of British academia at the time. After earning his degree in 1950, he stayed 37 in Cambridge to work at the Medical Research Council applied psychology unit 38 under Frederic Bartlett, one of Bartlett’s last students and, for Gregory, one of his 39 most treasured mentors. -
August in San Diego: Neuroscience for Architecture, Urbanism & Design
August in San Diego: Neuroscience for Architecture, Urbanism & Design Michael A. Arbib University of California at San Diego NewSchool of Architecture and Design [email protected] (August 24, 2019) Table of Contents 1. Introduction + Evidence Based Design ........................................................................... 2 Neuroscience For Architecture, Urbanism & Design ............................................................. 2 NfA and ANFA ......................................................................................................................... 4 Evidence-based design ........................................................................................................... 5 2. From Neuroscience to Architecture and Back Again ....................................................... 6 The Spectrum from Neuroscience to Architecture ................................................................ 6 Core Neuroscience/Cognitive Science: The Action-Perception Cycle and Affordances ........ 9 Embodied Cognition/Embrained Bodies .............................................................................. 10 Linking Music and Architecture ............................................................................................ 11 3. Measuring Physiological and Neural Correlates............................................................ 11 Core Neuroscience: The Autonomic Nervous System ......................................................... 11 What can we measure and what does it mean? ................................................................. -
Mental Imagery: in Search of a Theory
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25, 157–238 Printed in the United States of America Mental imagery: In search of a theory Zenon W. Pylyshyn Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, Busch Campus, Piscataway, NJ 08854-8020. [email protected] http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/faculty/pylyshyn.html Abstract: It is generally accepted that there is something special about reasoning by using mental images. The question of how it is spe- cial, however, has never been satisfactorily spelled out, despite more than thirty years of research in the post-behaviorist tradition. This article considers some of the general motivation for the assumption that entertaining mental images involves inspecting a picture-like object. It sets out a distinction between phenomena attributable to the nature of mind to what is called the cognitive architecture, and ones that are attributable to tacit knowledge used to simulate what would happen in a visual situation. With this distinction in mind, the paper then considers in detail the widely held assumption that in some important sense images are spatially displayed or are depictive, and that examining images uses the same mechanisms that are deployed in visual perception. I argue that the assumption of the spatial or depictive nature of images is only explanatory if taken literally, as a claim about how images are physically instantiated in the brain, and that the literal view fails for a number of empirical reasons – for example, because of the cognitive penetrability of the phenomena cited in its favor. Similarly, while it is arguably the case that imagery and vision involve some of the same mechanisms, this tells us very little about the nature of mental imagery and does not support claims about the pictorial nature of mental images. -
Downloaded by [New York University] at 06:54 14 August 2016 Classic Case Studies in Psychology
Downloaded by [New York University] at 06:54 14 August 2016 Classic Case Studies in Psychology The human mind is both extraordinary and compelling. But this is more than a collection of case studies; it is a selection of stories that illustrate some of the most extreme forms of human behaviour. From the leader who convinced his followers to kill themselves to the man who lost his memory; from the boy who was brought up as a girl to the woman with several personalities, Geoff Rolls illustrates some of the most fundamental tenets of psychology. Each case study has provided invaluable insights for scholars and researchers, and amazed the public at large. Several have been the inspiration for works of fiction, for example the story of Kim Peek, the real Rain Man. This new edition features three new case studies, including the story of Charles Decker who was tried for the attempted murder of two people but acquitted on the basis of a neurological condition, and Dorothy Martin, whose persisting belief in an impending alien invasion is an illuminating example of cognitive dissonance. In addition, each case study is contextualized with more typical behaviour, while the latest thinking in each sub-field is also discussed. Classic Case Studies in Psychology is accessibly written and requires no prior knowledge of psychology, but simply an interest in the human condition. It is a book that will amaze, sometimes disturb, but above all enlighten its readers. Downloaded by [New York University] at 06:54 14 August 2016 Geoff Rolls is Head of Psychology at Peter Symonds College in Winchester and formerly a Research Fellow at Southampton University, UK. -
Conjoint Representations and the Mental Capacity for Multiple Simultaneous Perspectives
in: H. Hecht, R. Schwartz & M. Atherton (eds.) (2003). Looking into Pictures: An In- terdisciplinary Approach to Pictorial Space (pp. 17-60). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press Conjoint Representations and the Mental Capacity for Multiple Simultaneous Perspectives Rainer Mausfeld Table of Contents The dual character of pictures Conflicts in cue integration with respect to depth or spatial representations Conjoint representations in picture perception Triggering and parameter setting: The dual function of sensory inputs with respect to representational primitives Conjoint representations as a general structural property of our basic cogni- tive architecture Examples from visual psychophysics Examples from other areas of cognitive science Vagueness, smooth transitions between representational primitives, and the need of a ʹproximal modeʹ References 1 Mens videt, mens audit: Cetera surda et coeca. It is the mind that sees and the mind that hears; the rest are deaf and blind. Epicharmos 1 Common-sense taxonomies were, inevitably, the origin from which the natural sci- ences, at their earliest stages of development, derived their categorizations of phenom- ena. This can be witnessed by the classical division of physics into e.g. optics, acoustics, theory of heat, and mechanics. During the process of its theoretical development, phys- ics became increasingly divorced from these kinds of classifications and rather grouped phenomena in accordance with its own internal theoretical structure (the classical the- ory of heat, for instance, disintegrated into statistical mechanics, on the one hand, and electrodynamics, on the other hand). In perceptual psychology corresponding pre- theoretical classifications of phenomena are mirrored in the standard textbook organi- zation in terms of salient perceptual attributes, such as colour, depth, size, or form. -
Gregory, Richard
TODAY'S NEUROSCIENCE, TOMORROW'S HISTORY A Video Archive Project Professor Richard Gregory Interviewed by Richard Thomas Supported by the Wellcome Trust, Grant no: 080160/Z/06/Z to Dr Tilli Tansey, Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine, UCL, and Professor Leslie Iversen, Department of Pharmacology, University of Oxford. Interview Transcript Early years and influences I was brought up in London where my father had his observatory. He was an astronomer and he was the first director of the University of London Observatory, which was, and still is in fact, in Mill Hill, and was being built when I was quite small. There were three telescopes in the observatory, and the smaller one I actually used a lot. We sort of called it ‘my telescope’ and it was quite small. It was an 8-inch refractor, and I used to look at globular clusters and stuff like that, and I had my own spectroscope and I had a little laboratory with instruments. I always loved playing about with them. Luckily, the kind of play wasn’t serious science. I used to sort of play with instruments and look through telescopes without really doing much in the way of making proper measurements, that sort of fooling about, which I must admit I still do to some extent. Then I went up to Cambridge. I got a scholarship from the Air Force actually, and I went to my father’s college, Downing, in 1947 to read philosophy and also experimental psychology in my third year, but started off really in philosophy. -
Do 3D Visual Illusions Work for Immersive Virtual Environments?
Do 3D Visual Illusions Work for Immersive Virtual Environments? Filip Skolaˇ Roman Gluszny Fotis Liarokapis CYENS – Centre of Excellence Solarwinds CYENS – Centre of Excellence Nicosia, Cyprus Brno, Czech Republic Nicosia, Cyprus [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Visual illusions are fascinating because visual per- The majority of visual illusions are generated by two- ception misjudges the actual physical properties of an image or dimensional pictures and their motions [9], [10]. But there are a scene. This paper examines the perception of visual illusions not a lot of visual illusions that make use of three-dimensional in three-dimensional space. Six diverse visual illusions were im- plemented for both immersive virtual reality and monitor based (3D) shapes [11]. Visual illusions are now slowly making their environments. A user-study with 30 healthy participants took appearance in serious games and are unexplored in virtual place in laboratory conditions comparing the perceptual effects reality. Currently, they are usually applied in the fields of brain of the two different mediums. Experimental data were collected games, puzzles and mini games. from both a simple ordering method and electrical activity of the However, a lot of issues regarding the perceptual effects brain. Results showed unexpected outcomes indicating that only some of the illusions have a stronger effect in immersive virtual are not fully understood in the context of digital games. reality, others in monitor based environments while the rest with An overview of electroencephalography (EEG) based brain- no significant effects. computer interfaces (BCIs) and their present and potential Index Terms—virtual reality, visual illusions, perception, hu- uses in virtual environments and games has been recently man factors, games documented [12]. -
Illusions: the Magic Eye of Perception Openaccess Papers
Illusions: The Magic Eye of Perception Madalena Grimaldi transtechnology research openaccess papers | i Executive Editor Prof. dr Michael Punt Editors-in-Chief Dr Martha Blassnigg Dr Hannah Drayson Managing Editors Amanda Egbe Martyn Woodward Associate Editors Rita Cachão Edith Doove Joanna Griffin Claudy Op den Kamp Jacqui Knight Marcio Rocha Production and Design Amanda Egbe, Martyn Woodward Please contact the original authors and /or copyright holders for permission to reproduce these materials. Transtechnology Research • Reader 2012/13 Plymouth University Portland Square, Drake Circus Plymouth PL4 8AA United Kingdom © 2013 Transtechnology Research ISBN 978-0-9538332-3-8 ii | Grimaldi•Illusions Illusions: The Magic Eye of Perception Madalena Grimaldi [email protected] Abstract This paper focuses on the abilities of visualisation and spatial reasoning, based on studies of hu- man perception and the associative structures that are formed in the memory. Perception is an activity of the brain that allows us to apprehend a situation objectively when stimulated by the senses. It is an inherently ambiguous process, where perceptual discrepancies may arise in differ- ent individuals who experience identical stimulation. These variations can be caused by different factors – optical, sensory or cognitive – and are called ‘illusions’. All the senses can be confused by illusions. The focus of this study is the visual illusions that ‘trick’ the human visual system, causing it to see something that is not present or to see it in a misleading way. Visual illusions are useful tools for investigating the cognitive processes associated with perception and memory. The construction of three-dimensional vision Pawan Sinha (2009), another expert on vision and neuroscience, states that formerly blind Although human beings possess five basic sen- patients can sometimes recover, even if they sory systems – sight, hearing, smell, taste and have experienced great visual deprivation. -
Visual Ambiguity Priming Promotes Uniqueness in Art-Viewing Responses
Visual Ambiguity Priming Promotes Uniqueness in Art-Viewing Responses. by Francesco V. Donato A Dissertation in Cognition & Cognitive Neuroscience Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved Dr. Michael Serra Chair of Committee Dr. Roman Taraban Dr. Tyler Davis Dr. Keith Jones Dr. Mark Sheridan Dean of the Graduate School December, 2019 Copyright 2019, Francesco V. Donato Texas Tech University, Francesco V. Donato, December 2019 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Gratitude is extended to my entire dissertation committee; Roman Taraban, Keith Jones, Tyler Davis and especially to my committee chair, Michael Serra. Their willingness and availability helped ensure that I finished in a timely manner. I also reflect warmly on the support I received from the close friends I gained during my time in Texas. These magnanimous people include John Schumacher, Elizabeth Briones, Serena Mangano, Elizabeth Green, Brittney Neilson, Ethan Dahl, and Sean O’bryan. Two of my oldest friends, Bobby Davidson and John J. Briggs were tirelessly available whenever I needed to vent frustration or share a small accomplishment. These two gentlemen provided constant encouragement and support throughout this endeavor. Finally, I am absolutely certain that this document would never have existed if it was not for the sacrifices of my mother, Concetta Donato; a seventeen-year-old farmgirl from Sicily who would eventually only graduate high school while still struggling with English. After flatlining and being resuscitated during my birth, she dedicated herself simply to making sure I had as many opportunities to grow, learn and express myself as possible. -
Chapter 6 Visual Perception
Chapter 6 Visual Perception Steven M. LaValle University of Oulu Copyright Steven M. LaValle 2019 Available for downloading at http://vr.cs.uiuc.edu/ 154 S. M. LaValle: Virtual Reality Chapter 6 Visual Perception This chapter continues where Chapter 5 left off by transitioning from the phys- iology of human vision to perception. If we were computers, then this transition might seem like going from low-level hardware to higher-level software and algo- rithms. How do our brains interpret the world around us so effectively in spite of our limited biological hardware? To understand how we may be fooled by visual stimuli presented by a display, you must first understand how our we perceive or interpret the real world under normal circumstances. It is not always clear what we will perceive. We have already seen several optical illusions. VR itself can be Figure 6.1: This painting uses a monocular depth cue called a texture gradient to considered as a grand optical illusion. Under what conditions will it succeed or enhance depth perception: The bricks become smaller and thinner as the depth fail? increases. Other cues arise from perspective projection, including height in the vi- Section 6.1 covers perception of the distance of objects from our eyes, which sual field and retinal image size. (“Paris Street, Rainy Day,” Gustave Caillebotte, is also related to the perception of object scale. Section 6.2 explains how we 1877. Art Institute of Chicago.) perceive motion. An important part of this is the illusion of motion that we perceive from videos, which are merely a sequence of pictures. -
Chapter 2: Basic Processes in Visual Perception
Chapter 2: Basic processes in visual perception There has been considerable progress in understanding visual perception in recent years. Much of this is due to the efforts of cognitive neuroscientists, thanks to whom we now have reasonable knowledge of the brain systems involved in visual perception. Vision and the brain There are three major consequences when a visual stimulus reaches receptors in the retina: reception, transduction and coding: The amount of light entering the eye is determined by the pupil. The lens adjusts in shape to bring images into focus on the retina. There are two types of visual receptor cells in the retina: cones and rods. There are 6 million cones, mostly in the fovea, which are specialised for colour vision and sharpness. There are 125 million rods, which are specialised for vision in dim light and for movement detection: Impulses leave the eye via the optic nerve. The main pathway between eye and cortex is the retina-geniculate-striate pathway. Two stimuli adjacent to each other in the retinal image will also be adjacent to each other at higher levels within that system (retinopy). Signals proceed along two optic tracts within the brain. One tract contains information from the left half of each eye and the other tract from the right half. Nerves reach the primary visual cortex (V1) within the occipital lobe before spreading to secondary visual areas. There are two relatively independent channels within this system: The P (parvocellular) pathway, sensitive to colour and detail, has most input from cones. The M (magnocellular) pathway, sensitive to movement, has most input from rods.