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POLICY BRIEF 06 NOVEMBER 2018 #ELECTIONS 2019 2019: THE PARLIAMENT AND TO COME

This paper is the result of a Summary In total, even if a majority hostile to European working group chaired by integration, or capable of tweaking the current PASCAL LAMY, President emer- The European Parliament (EP) elected on 26 programme, is less plausible than suggested, itus of the May 2019 will not likely resemble the current majorities will be harder to build in future, and Institute, with CHRISTINE one. These elections will occur in a context of inter-institutional relations could change. VERGER, Advisor at the internal tensions within the , As such, the “centre” group has an impor- Jacques Delors Institute act- turbulence on the international stage, migra- tant role to play, regardless of the choices ing as rapporteur, and com- tion-related and social challenges, spreading made by La République en Marche, as do the posed of PERVENCHE BERÈS, fears, identitarian flare-ups, and populism. All , who are expected to gain new seats Member of the European these phenomena could lend a significantly and be more influential than in the past. Parliament, JEAN-LOUIS more European, and less national tone to the BOURLANGES, Member of the campaign than usual. Re-adjustments, or even a re-shuffle based French Parliament, MONICA Is extremism on the rise? around a charniere group, could have sub- FRASSONI, Co-President stantial consequences on the appointment A rise in extremism is likely, but limited to the of a European political of the new President, Parliament level: only major countries send party, VALENTIN KREILINGER, who is elected by the European Parliament sizeable quotas of MEPs, and the departure researcher at the Jacques and will, as a result, become the leader of a of British MEPs will shrink the size of the Delors Institut–, ALAIN parliamentary coalition which must be built. nationalist camp. Right-of-traditional-right LAMASSOURE, Member of groups already represent 20% of the current Habitually, European elections are first and the European Parliament, Parliament, and will likely remain divided. foremost national elections, and attract ALESSIA MOSCA, Member of low voter turn-outs (49.5% in 1999, 42.6% the European Parliament, A significant reconfiguration of the radical in 2014). The outcome may differ in 2019, and GENEVIÈVE PONS, Director left is not expected, though it could win a few however. of the office of the more seats. Jacques Delors Institute. Various signs, be they political stances, or Internal troubles in the two major traditional media opinions, indicate that these elections parties, the EPP (European People’s Party), could occur under different auspices and in and the S&D (Socialists and Social-Demo- another context than previous ones: tensions crats), could weaken them to the point of los- within the European Union, turbulence on the ing their current 55% majority. international stage, migratory issues, social conflict, spreading fears, identitarian flare- ups and populism. All of which surpass the national framework.

1 ▪ 10 Currently, stable, centre-right majorities form 1 ▪ A more “European” election? on economic issues, and stable centre-left The 2009 Treaty has given the Europe- majorities form on social issues, with varia- an Parliament greater legislative powers and ble geometry alliances between the two big- growing political clout. In addition to its legis- gest groups and the and Greens, and lative role, the Parliament elects the Commis- sometimes even the GUE. sion and its President (and can dismiss them as well). It auditions for all lead- These majorities will be harder to negotiate and ership positions in Europe, including the Ex- more complicated to build in the future; inter-in- ecutive Board of the . stitutional relations could change as a result. It also ratifies international treaties such as the deal. Its role as a political sound- ing board is evident. The composition of the 3 ▪ An increase in extremes and - future Parliament, resulting from elections in alist tendencies? 27 Member States, will have decisive conse- This is likely, and the parties concerned, quences on the future functioning of the Un- which have successfully relied on proportion- ion and its policy stances. al voting in the past, take European elections very seriously. This phenomenon will likely be limited to the European Parliament-level for 2 ▪ The likely emergence of new political several reasons, however. balances Firstly, only the most populated countries Trends observed over the course of the cur- send large numbers of MEPs: (96), rent term, combined with current survey re- (74 in 2014, 79 in 2019), (73 in sults, suggest the possible emergence of sev- 2014, 76 in 2019) and (54 in 2014, 59 eral shifts, including the departure of British in 2019). In comparison, has just 21 MPs, which will decrease the total number of MEPs in total. members from 751 to 705, and the re-adjust- Secondly, the departure of British MEPs from ed number of MPs from certain countries to the conservative and UKIP parties will weak- correct imbalances and account for demo- en the nationalist camp, even if this departure graphic changes. A simple majority will there- will be amply offset by the arrival of a large fore require 353 votes. number of MPs from Italy (current- It is often suggested that a Eurosceptic, or ly 28 seats), as well as Alternative for Germa- even Europhobic, majority could emerge ny (AfD) MPs from Germany (15 seats). which would contribute to paralysing the Un- Right-of-traditional-right parties are currently di- ion – in numerous domains at least. Though vided into three political groups1: ECR (the third this scenario is unlikely at this stage, other re- biggest Parliamentary group, which includes sults could be equally worrying for the future the soon-to-disappear British conservatives of . and the Polish and Justice (PIS) party, One possibility is an accentuation of trou- with 71 members), the EFDD (which includes bles within the two major traditional political the British UKIP party and the Five Star Move- parties, the EPP and the S&D, which would ment, currently with 45 members), and the ENF weaken them to the point of losing their cur- (which includes ’s rent 55% majority and deprive them of the party and ’s Lega party, with 35 ability to single-handedly implement a tradi- seats, making it the smallest group in the EP). tional policy of ongoing compromise (that is According to current and available estimates, challenged internally by some). This policy ENF could from 35 to 59 members, concerns internal parliamentary matters and EFDD from 45 to 53, and ECR could slip from approaches to more political issues. 71 to 48, for a total of 160 members across the three groups, up from 151. 1. See the appendix for an explanatory note on the European Parliamentary groups.

2 ▪ 10 In total, then, the rise would be limited in rela- on the other, more generally, the divi- tion to the critical mass embodied by the fur- sion between eastern and western rights is thest right-wing parties since 2014, given that less clear: Orbán is generally pro-Putin, while some other populist parties belong to other the Slovaks (influenced by SNS, a member of groups (Orbán’s party in the EPP or France In- the government coalition), the Czechs (the soumise in the GUE). president Milos Zeman), the Bulgarians and Romanians are ambiguous to say the least. Also, it is not likely that these political parties Another example, of course, are the orthodox will work together or form a coherent unit. countries of , All signs point to these parties having more and Macedonia. Only the Polish and the Balts differences than similarities. They could, how- continue to employ a categorically anti-Rus- ever, form an ‘against’ bloc, which has some- sian political discourse (despite the very re- times obliged other groups to form a coalition cent victory in ’s legislative elections of since 2014. Harmony, a pro-Russian party). Even within the ECR, a group which currently All these countries have conflicting interests includes 19 nationalities and is expected to as a result. survive despite the departure of British mem- bers, a more liberal right composed of Belgian As Denis McShane, a former of Eu- and Dutch members co-exists with a more ropean Affairs from the UK, recently wrote in authoritarian right composed of the Polish , the Austrian chancellor announced PIS, which would become the biggest dele- a - axis, but both countries dis- gation. No one in this group is anti-Union, but agree on how to manage the migratory situa- all favour a ‘confederalist’ right over a federal tion: Hungary, , and the Czech approach. Divisions do exist within the group Republic derive 4% of their GDP from EU on important topics such as the European transfers and benefit from the free movement budget (an East/West split). of workers. None wish to leave the European Union or NATO. Concerning the EFDD, the party has left the group to join the ECR. The In this context, former American presidential position of the very diverse Five Star Move- advisor Steve Bannon has created a foun- ment is uncertain, as is that of the AfD. Not dation in Brussels called The Movement, to able to find similar partners and unwelcome federate nationalist and populist right-wing in other more left-wing groups, the Five Star parties. The idea is to create a “super group” Movement may join the ENF, one of its MPs within the EP representing a third of all fu- has suggested. The AfD, originally an anti-Eu- ture MPs. The project, rooted in the behav- ro party and then an anti-immigrant one, has iour of these groups over the current term, adopted more extreme ideological positions. has been viewed with scepticism until now Most of the national parties in the EFDD only by those concerned and even rejected by have one member, making the group very the Swedish, Danish and Finnish parties. The fragile. Some predict it may even disappear, Freedom Party of (FPÖ) has suggest- particularly if the and ed punctual joint endeavours, while the AfD AfD joined other groups. appears divided on the issue, as many view Trump and Bannon as deterrents. Viktor Or- At present, the ENF is primarily pro-Russian bán is not ready to break from the EPP and due to the large number of western Europe- vice-versa, and even the Italian Lega has ex- an members, much unlike the two previous pressed doubts. Only Marine Le Pen’s party groups. As such, the western right prefers to has shown interest, though it has since tak- find pro-Putin allies while the eastern right is en some distance (expressed when Le Pen generally anti Russia. met with Salvini in Rome on 8 October). Last Beyond the fault line between the ECR and July, Matteo Salvini indicated his interest in a EFDD on one hand, and the ENF regarding Pan-European, anti-immigration and

3 ▪ 10 proposes a Europe which protects its citizens primacy of economic performance over so- over one which has no borders. He intends to cial justice; the break from pro-war ideology use this issue to build bridges with the Chris- as embodied by “Defence Europe” and NATO, tian Social Union in (CSU), the Austri- and handling migratory flows by fighting what an FPÖ, or Orbán. causes them (e.g. wars, ‘unfair’ free trade deals and climate change). Developments in Germa- In total, at this stage, and though their num- ny’s Die Linke party, Benoît Hamon’s Généra- ber could increase significantly, populists will tion.s party, and Yánis Varoufákis’s Diem 25 most likely hold between 20–25% of seats in party are observed with interest by this move- Parliament (they hold 20% now). Their rela- ment. Since April 2018, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s tive influence could grow, however, in a Par- positions have moved towards a more restric- liament made smaller by Brexit and in which tive approach to managing migration. the two largest groups are weakened. It will be difficult for them to form a coherent group, It will be important to follow Jean-Luc Mélen- except possibly a ‘negatively cohesive’ one. chon’s campaign in France as well as devel- Reshuffles are possible too, either within all opments on the Spanish political scene (e.g. three groups, or among them. ) to ascertain the impact of these movements, even though major changes In truth, the presence of populists is, and within the GUE should not be expected, de- will be, more tangible on the Council than spite the possible emergence of major internal the Parliament, particularly due to voting divisions between pro- and anti-European fac- rules. In a number of areas outside the scope tions. Even within Die Linke, a new impetus has of the Council/Parliament co-decision proce- accompanied the creation of Sahra Wagenk- dure, only the Council decides – often unan- necht’s ‘Aufstehen!’ anti-immigration party. imously – with the participation of heads of government and even sectoral ministers hav- The feasibility of an alliance between France ing close ties to populist or extremist move- Insoumise and its Spanish and Portuguese al- ments that block decisions. lies is therefore dubious. France Insoumise’s leader has managed to impose an alternative The , which defines overall to so-far unsuccessful attempts by Yánis political guidelines, adopts them by consen- Varoufákis and Benoît Hamon to unite ‘left-of- sus. In its areas of competence, the Parlia- the-left’ , ecologists and socialists ment can produce progress and/or compro- around a Pan-European platform. mise depending on applicable voting rules which sidestep or even exclude populist and The transnational European movement extremist elements within it. launched in March 2018 in Naples by Benoît Hamon’s Generation.s movement (the big- gest member), Yánis Varoufákis’ Diem 25, members of Poland’s Razem party, members 4 ▪ A restructuring of the radical left? of ’s Free party and members of Den- According to current estimates, the GUE mark’s Alternativet party, has not appeared to could obtain a total of 58 seats, up from 51. generate the desired. The movement was established in Lisbon in April 2018 by its three founders: Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France 5 ▪ Weakened and divided central forces Insoumise party, Spain’s Podemos party, Though it seems unlikely that an uptick in ex- and Portugal’s Bloco de Esquerda. Three tremist party presence will result in major up- additional parties have since joined: ’s heavals, important changes should not be ex- , ’s Red-, cluded so long as weaknesses and divisions and Sweden’s . remain in central forces in Parliament. For Jean-Luc Mélenchon, three lines of ac- The EPP group is tied up in the Orbán is- tion take precedence: the struggle against the sue despite it being in the interest of all that

4 ▪ 10 Fidesz remains part of the group. If the EPP will give that up for greater coherence within wishes to remain the biggest Parliamentary the group. While it is likely at this stage that Vik- group (and largest minority), all of its current tor Orbán’s party will remain part of the EPP, it member parties must remain present. is also probable that neither the Polish PiS nor Salvini’s Lega party will join the EPP. The latter While only 57 EPP members voted against a is pursuing a relatively centre-oriented position resolution calling for an Article 7 procedure to within to avoid being overshadowed be initiated against Hungary, the exclusion of by extreme-leaning parties, as this would lead Fidesz from the group is not expected. to a significant number of departures. Preserving the broad According to current estimates, the EPP may which has powered the EPP until now will be hold on to only 178 of the 219 seats it holds. difficult nonetheless due to a weakening of its original major cohorts, in Germany and Italy, The state of European S&D parties in Member for example. States, with the exception of Spain and Portu- gal, is a cause for concern. Furthermore, the The group’s traditional “Christian-Democrat” departure of Labour MPs will shrink the group component is increasingly outpaced by a hard- considerably. The future within the group of er right faction, even if Viktor Orbán poses as Italy’s (PD), which became the “saviour of the European right”, an heir of the group’s main delegation in 2014, is under who fights against immigration discussion. The PD could possibly split in and reconnects with supposedly Christian val- the next few months. If this occurs, Matteo ues. Within Austria’s government, the conserv- Renzi’s new party could potentially join ALDE, ative party is allied with the far right, though the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats. An- relations between them are not stellar. other question mark is the possible arrival of Noteworthy, then, is an interview with Hunga- ’s party, which would reinforce ry’s Prime Minister in the 27 July 2018 edition -leaning side of the new group. This is of Bild, and the speech delivered the next day not likely however, given that Alexis Tsípras to the minority of Hungarians living in Roma- prefers to act as a ‘bridge’ between differ- nia. In it, he presents himself as the head of a ent left-wing parties. As for the SPD and the new generation of Eastern European leaders, French , both are in difficulty. A who came of age in the 1990s and best em- re-shuffle in favour of Eastern countries – Ro- body the future of European construction. Or- mania, for example – could also occur. bán calls for the “removal of 68s-era elites” and EPP members point out that ‘Orbáns’ exist in says that the European Commission’s days are other groups too, and view the leaders of the numbered. European Parliamentary elections Slovak, Romanian and Maltese socialist par- therefore play a decisive role, with migration ties as equally unsavoury. They also stress issues – the only subject potentially capable that the current downward slide of the Party of “toppling the liberal elite” – as a necessary of European Socialists (PES) and its resulting focus. He also criticises France, which seeks withdrawal is counter-productive to coopera- to impose a French leadership “financed with tion and compromise. German money”. Setting himself apart from other Eastern leaders, he wants a friendlier ap- According to current estimates, the S&D proach to Russia and highlights the stability af- group may only retain 137 of its 188 seats. forded to by Erdoğan. According to the The EPP and PES are expected to remain, Hungarian researcher Szentpéteri Nagy Rich- respectively, the largest and second-largest ard, however, “it’s a minority position; Orbán is groups in the European Parliament, but with- using the European elections to consolidate out securing an absolute majority together, his power and position in Hungary”. they are likely to offer a more heterogene- In any case, there is little chance that the EPP, ous political structure than in the past, and overly concerned with its strength in numbers, hold less weight.

5 ▪ 10 An entire political generation only familiar in a Parliament nevertheless accustomed to with this predominant situation will disap- “right and left both” approaches. pear, from other EU institutions as well. He has two options: Coalitions aimed at securing majorities will no 1. Succeed in forming an independent par- doubt become more fluid, more volatile and liamentary group, which requires a mini- less predictable. The traditional “European mum of 25 MPs of at least 7 different na- establishment”, which made nearly every de- tionalities. This involves finding partners cision, including major nominations (not least in other – politically compatible – coun- of which the Commission presidency), will tries. In due course, this would allow him lose power. The EP could become a perma- to adopt joint positions, and be an organ- nent arena of negotiation, with variable ma- ised partner, vis a vis other groups. jorities and toe-to-toe stand-offs on amend- ments to texts, without the compromises of The months ahead will reveal whether the past. For some, such an outcome would these intentions translate into a commit- be somewhat positive to the extent that it ment to working together in a new group re-establishes a clearer political struggle. For (note: Italian democrats and Maltese La- others, it would lead to a form of “Dutchifica- bour MPs are currently members of the tion”, in reference to the 13 political parties S&D), or whether the “poaching” of figures and groups in the country’s parliament, four from other groups is possible. of which are needed to form a majority. Even if the latter occurs, a new group cre- ated this way would likely lack a solid foun- dation: in the case of the EPP, for example,

6 ▪ An essential centre? ‘catches’ would be limited to individuals. Centrists will no doubt weigh heavily in the In the absence of positive signals, the elections. Regardless of the score obtained plausibility of this option is decreasing by Emmanuel Macron’s La République en over time. Marche (LREM) party (estimates predict 21 2. Join ALDE with the goal of strengthen- seats), the issues addressed above will like- ing it, reforming it, and negotiating an up- ly bestow a key role on the party at pivotal dated agenda. This option presents the ad- moments. For some analysts, Macron could vantage of creating a strong group which “lose in France”, but “win in Europe”. weighs in on decisions and nominations, The LREM’s European ambitions took form is likely to have significant influence on the in an appeal entitled “Réveillons l’Europe”, formation of future coalitions, and, accord- launched on 27 September 2018 and signed ing to some, may even become the second by Christophe Castaner (La République en biggest group in the EP. Some expect the Marche), (former Prime Min- emergence of new ties with . ister of ), (former Prime The problem here is the expectation this Minister of Italy), Albert Rivera (President of creates to agree to compromises with an the Citizens party), (Labour already established political family whose Prime Minister of ), parliamentary group is headed by a strong (of the Democrats 66 party in the ) figure: the former Belgian Prime Minister and Dacian Cioloș (former Prime Minister of Guy Verhofstadt. This Parliamentary group and President of Romania Together). has been formed by two political parties The French President is very partial to a “nei- since 2004: The Alliance of Liberals and ther right nor left” line and in his speech to the Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Eu- Parliament on 17 April 2018 stated: “At the ropean Democratic Party (EDP), created at moment I do not belong to any political fam- the time by François Bayrou and Francesco ily represented here”. Paradoxically, the “nei- Rutelli based on a common agenda. ther right nor left” stance is difficult to take

6 ▪ 10 The third option would be to join the Non-At- bly France. Very promising results in recent tached Members (NA), which would preclude regional elections in Bavaria, Belgium and any possible influence and be absurd. are noteworthy. Therefore, a Parliament controlled by a broad, In Bavaria, the CSU lost nearly as many votes pro-European centre remains purely hypo- to the Greens as it did to the AfD. This trend thetical at this stage. Nevertheless, it is clear will only be of significant interest if similar that the Centre (LREM and MODEM parties as outcomes are observed in other regional elec- far as France is concerned) will play a bigger tions, notably the one in Hesse on 28 October role within a Parliament forced to transition 2018. from bipartisan condominium to multiparti- In any case, the is resolute- san balance. ly pro-European (even if it seeks change). It Timing remains an issue: some wonder wishes to mobilise ‘dormant’ pro-European whether it is best to choose one of these votes, among young voters, for example. In two options before or after the elections. The principle, the party wouldn’t refuse alliances speed with which negotiations will begin in with other pro-European forces in to fo- the days following the elections in order to cus on the three challenges of safeguarding prepare July’s “inaugural” session means that democracy, climate change and migratory is- choices should be “considered”, if not “made”, sues. A detailed manifesto will be approved at even before the polls. the 22-24 November congress in Berlin. Given current estimates, and uncertainties In any case, alliances will only be an issue af- surrounding LREM’s position, the two biggest ter the elections. delegations of the ALDE group are likely to be The question also remains as to whether Spain (Citizens) and Germany (Free Demo- new pro-European citizen movements and cratic Party). Surveys suggest that the future trans-European parties will break through: centre-leaning group will have some 93 MPs one example is , launched in March if LREM members join them. 2017 and driven by an ample base of young With a small quarter of populists, and a quar- pro-Europeans opposed to the Europhobic at- ter EPP, there will be no absolute majority on tacks of certain governments or parties and the left in Parliament: this is an opportunity who consider themselves ‘progressive’ rather for this to play a pivotal role (no than on the right or left. They hope to secure centre-left, or centre-right majority without elected members in at least seven countries in the ALDE). order to form a parliamentary group. It should be noted that the liberal/centrist They claim to have 15,000 members in 30 family already wields certain clout on the countries (the European Union, , Mac- Council, with eight liberal prime ministers (the edonia and ) and kicked off their French President excluded). programme at a summit organised in Am- sterdam on 27–28 October. The three largest groups, with support from the Greens, could be forced into a structural This movement draws its strength from an cooperation arrangement to move past ob- ability to mobilise and organise young voters struction from extremist parties. on the ground and on social media with a res- olutely trans-European approach. “National parties are powerless against the challenges we face: these cross national borders and 7 ▪ The Greens and new pro-European- must be met by us, the people”, the move- movements ment states. Forecasts indicate stability at least for the It remains to be seen whether other pro-Euro- Greens. Despite the loss of British MPs, an pean, non-political forces such as the singer increase is expected in Germany and possi- Bono or the NGO Avaaz, will succeed, as ex-

7 ▪ 10 pected, in playing a role in the election cam- ers are tasked with building, on the basis of paign to highlight and influence it in line with an agreement, a coalition led (or not...) by one the values they defend. of them. This may even require negotiation between both chambers: the lower chamber (European Parliament) and the upper cham- ber (European Council). 8 ▪ A broader and immediate issue: the appointment of the European Commis- While party candidates will be announced this sion and its President fall at “primaries” organised by most Europe- an political parties, in which The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 gave the Europe- will compete with Alexander Stubb in the EPP, an Parliament the role of formally electing and Frans Timmermans with Maroš Šefčovič the Commission. Prior to 2014, the Europe- for the PES, the liberal family is asking itself an Council alone took this decision behind questions about the utility of using such a closed doors. In 2014, with the introduction procedure again. It is considering a propos- of the “Spitzenkandidaten” process (a term al to establish a “team” headed by the Danish designating the leaders of European political Commissioner , though families), it was clear that the next Commis- the modalities of such a formula are not clear sion President would belong to one of the two at this stage. major political parties, with the EPP expected Whatever turns the upcoming campaign to have an advantage. Jean-Claude Juncker takes, a more traditionally parliamentary re- was elected on this basis with additional sup- gime for the European Union is taking shape, port from other groups. beginning with the creation of a multiple nom- The situation will be very different in 2019. ination ‘package’, the day after the elections The choice of the Commission President (Commission presidency, Council presidency, will be determined to a lesser degree by the EP presidency, the choice of the High Rep- respective weight of the two major political resentative of Common Foreign and Securi- forces, and more so by a broader parliamen- ty Policy, and possibly the European Central tary coalition. The President of the Commis- Bank presidency). Only time will tell if these sion will become the leader of this parlia- trends contribute to the legitimacy of the Un- mentary coalition by default, with a veritable ion and its institutions in the eyes of Europe- coalition agreement similar to those seen in ans. many Member States with a parliamentary system. Should none of the candidates designated by the various political families be elected Commission President, in the absence of a majority, and/or due to reluctance on the part of the Council (the French president and Ger- man chancellor are critical of the procedure followed in 2014), the sudden appearance of one (or more) outsiders cannot be excluded. In these conditions, the full version of the Spitzenkandidaten system would have been short-lived (the candidate of the winning par- ty the evening of the election will become Commission President, an outcome which the Council must accept) and this system would be replaced by the parliamentary mod- el predominant in Europe, in which party lead-

8 ▪ 10 Appendix 1 ▪ Political groups in the European Parliament (2014-2019)

Appendix 2 ▪ Political groups in the European Parliament The European People’s party (Christian Democrats) Group (EPP) The group formed by the European People’s Party (EPP group) is the largest of eight political groups in the European Parliament. It has 219 MPs, or 29% of all parliamentary seats. From 1999 to 2009, the group was named the “European People’s Party – EPP-ED group” and was composed of two European political parties: the European People’s Par- ty and the European Democrats. Now, its members are from the European People’s Party only; the European Democrats (the British and ’s Civic Democratic Party) split off to form a new group: the and Reformists (ECR). Viewed as the EP’s centre-right group, it has been led by Manfred Weber, a German MEP and CSU member, since June 2014. The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats European Parliamentary Group (S&D) The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats European Parliamentary Group is com- posed of members of the Party of European Socialists (PES) and includes Italy’s Democratic Party (PD). It brings together EP members from socialist, social-democratic and labour parties as well as Italian democrats. The S&D group is led by of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. With 188 MPs, it is the second-largest group in the EP. European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR) The European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR) brings together a series of right- wing and right-leaning nationalist parties. Founded in 2009, the ECR has 73 MPs from 19 different countries. It is the EP’s third-largest group. The ECR is known for being an anti- centre-right group. Its members support economic

9 ▪ 10 but are critical of EU institutions. Unlike certain members of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD), however, they do not support the withdrawal of their coun- tries from the European Union. The group is led by Syed Kamall of the Conservative Party. The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group (ALDE) The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) parliamentary group, formed in 2004, is composed of two European political parties: the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Party (ALDE, previously called European Liberal Democrats and Reformists, ELDR) and the Eu- ropean Democratic Party (EDP). With 68 MPs from 22 EU Member States, it is the fourth-largest political group in the European Parliament. It is led by the Belgian Guy Verhofstadt. This centrist group defends and European values. Greens– group (ALE) The Greens–European Free Alliance group is composed of two different European parties: the and the European Free Alliance group, formally part of two distinct groups: the Green group and the European Radical Alliance. Since the 2014 elections, it has held 52 seats. It is led by of Alliance 90/The Greens, and of the Ecologistes Confédérés pour l’Organisation de Luttes Originales (). It is the EP’s fifth-largest group. The European –Nordic group (GUE/NGL) The European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group brings together left-leaning, socialist, anti-liberal, anti-capitalist, eco-socialist and communist parties. It primarily includes groups within the Party of the European Left (PEL), as well as the Nordic Green Left Alliance (NGLA), the European Anti-Capitalist Left (EACL) and non-affiliated members. Members come from radical left-wing and extreme left parties. This group of 51 MEPs, presided by Gabriele Zimmer of The Left party, is the sixth-biggest political force of the EP by number of seats held. Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD) The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD) is a European parliamentary group composed of 42 MEPs. Composed of populist and Eurosceptic parties, it is the sev- enth-largest group. Initially, it was mainly composed of Britain’s UKIP party and the Italian Lega Nord party. The latter left the group in May 2014 to join the and Freedom group. Europe of Nations and Freedom group (ENF) Europe of Nations and Freedom is a European parliamentary group created in June 2015. It Managing Editor: Sébastien Maillard positions itself on the right, to extreme-right, of the European political spectrum. The Move- ▪ The document may be reproduced ment for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENL) is the party associated with the group. in part or in full on the dual condi- With 35 MPs, the ENF is the smallest parliamentary group (only 4.7 % of MPs). tion that its meaning is not distorted and that the source is mentioned ▪ After the 2014 elections, members of the European Alliance for Freedom, with Marine Le Pen The views expressed are those of of National Rally (RN), of the (PVV) and Matteo Salvini of Lega the author(s) and do not necessarily Nord created this extreme-right parliamentary group. It is co-presided by Nicolas Bay of the reflect those of the publisher ▪ The National Rally and Marcel de Graaf of the Party for Freedom (PVV). Jacques Delors Institute cannot be held responsible for the use which Non-attached Members (NA) any third party may make of the This group is composed of 23 MPs. document ▪ Translation from the French by Emma Morton Saliou ▪ © Jacques Delors Institute

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