International Conference DAYTON - TEN YEARS AFTER. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CO-OPERATION PERSPECTIVES. Sarajevo, 29. 11. – 01. 12. 2005

Program Abstracts Excursion

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International Conference DAYTON - TEN YEARS AFTER. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CO-OPERATION PERSPECTIVES Mednarodna konferenca: DAYTON – 10 LET KASNEJE. REŠEVANJE KONFLIKTOV IN MOŽNOSTI SODELOVANJA. Me ñunarodna konferencija: DAYTON – 10 GODINA KASNIJE. RJEŠAVANJE KONFLIKATA I MOGU ĆNOSTI SARADNJE.

SUPPORT FOR THE CONFERENCE COOPERATING INSTITUTIONS PODPORA KONFERENCI: IZVAJALCI IN SPONZORJI. PODUPRLI: IZVO ðAČI I SPONZORI • University of Primorska. Faculty of Humanities. Koper/Capodistria, Slovenia. • University of Primorska. Science and Research Centre. Koper/Capodistria, Slovenia. • University of Sarajevo. Faculty of Science: Department of Geography. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. • International Geographical Union, Commission on Political Geography. Paris, France. ------• Slovenian Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). • OSCE – Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. • CEI – Central European Initiative. Trieste, Italy. • ARRS – The Slovenian Research Agency; Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Slovenia.

THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE ORGANIZACIJSKI ODBOR / ORGANIZACIONI ODBOR Prof. Dr. Milan Bufon (Head of the Department of Geography, Faculty of Humanities, Vice-Rector, University of Primorska); Prof. dr. Safet Nurkovi ć (Head of the Department of Geography, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Sarajevo); Prof. Dr. Anton Gosar (Department of Geography, Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, Ambassador of Science of the Republic of Slovenia); Dr. Filip Tunji ć (Institute of Mediterranean Studies, Science and Research Center, University of Primorska); Ms. Tatjana Pirc (Member of the OSCE Task Force, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia) and Nina Bakši ć (Personal Assistant to the Head of Mission, OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina), Ms. Valentina Bertok, (Assistant to the Head of the Department of Geography, University of Primorska), and Simon Kerma (Assistant to the Head of the Department of Geography, University of Primorska).

THE SCIENTIFIC BOARD STROKOVNI ODBOR / STRU ČNI ODBOR Andree-Louis Sanguin (University of Paris IV - Sorbonne, Chair of the Commission on Political Geography of the IGU - International Geographical Union), Anton Gosar (University of Primorska, Vice- Chair of the Commission on Political Geography of the IGU- International Geographical Union), Safet Nurkovi ć (Head of the Department of Geography, University of Sarajevo), Milan Bufon (Head of the Department of Geography, University of Primorska), Carl Dahlman (Past-Chair of the Specialty Group on Political Geography of the AAG - Association of American Geographers, University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C.), Maria Paola Pagnini (Past-Head of the College of International Relations of the University of Trieste).

2 Contents VSEBINA / SADRŽAJ

THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO UNIVERSITY OF PRIMORSKA ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PRE- AND AFTER 1995: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE

THE CONFERENCE OUTLINE

THE CONFERENCE PROGRAM

EXCURSION

ABSTRACTS

ACADEMIC PARTICIPANTS (Name, Institution, E-mail)

GENERAL INFORMATION FOR THE VISITORS THE CONFERENCE SITE SARAJEVO – MAP TRAVEL, HOSPITALITY, CURRENCY, WEATHER, OTHER, … SARAJEVO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – MAP

AKNOWLEDGMENTS

3 THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS

∗∗∗ THE UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO

The University of Sarajevo descends from a century long tradition of higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The institutional beginnings of higher education are identical to the university tradition of Western Europe. In 1531 Gazi Husrev-beg established the Hanikah, a higher school of Souphey philosophy to which an institution for the study of Islamic Sciences was added in 1537. Here the three disciplines of Classical Catholic Universities were nurtured: theology, law and philosophy. The university had a respectable library. By the end of the 19th century, this institution was the largest institution of learning in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the beginning on it was on the same level as the Medresa (Islamic institution of higher education) of Sultan Bajazit in Istanbul, the institution upon which the old Istanbul University is based. In the Austro-Hungarian period or more precisely in 1887, the Sharia Law School began to operate as a five-year-long higher school.

The modern history of the Sarajevo University began with the establishment of the first secular institutions of higher education prior to World War II as well as during the war (the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry in 1940, the Medical Faculty in 1944). The Medical Faculty was re-established in 1946, the Faculty of Law, the Teacher Training College were opened and in 1948 the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry was re-established. In 1949 the Engineering Faculty was opened. On the 2nd December that same year with the appointment of the first rector, the University of Sarajevo was established. With the opening of the Faculty of Philosophy (1950) and the Economics Faculty (1952) the first, initial phase of establishment of the Sarajevo University was completed. The second phase of development (1955 - 1969) is characterized by the affirmation of the University, the opening of new institutions of higher education and the relative satisfaction of the needs for highly educated personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another significant achievement is the organization and initiation of postgraduate studies at the University. The third phase (1970 - 1982) is defined by more institutions of higher education being opened at the University, a scientific promotion of the University and its intensified involvement and promotion on the international academic plane. The University contributed directly and indirectly to the establishment of new universities in Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla. The fourth phase (1982 - 1992) is characterized by the separation of scientific activities from the University and the formation of favourized scientific institutes outside the University. This brought considerable damage to the University of Sarajevo, because the coherence of university education and scientific research was jeopardized. This resulted in a lower quality of education and a technological stagnation of the University. The uncontrolled enrolment of an enormous number of students resulted in a significantly lower efficiency of studies and a hyper-production of personnel in certain educational areas. The fifth phase (1992 - 1995) is a phase of barbaric devastation of the facilities and equipment of the University as well as a decrease of university personnel and an enormous decrease in the number of students. All this was caused by the war and aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite all the difficulties of life and work during the three-and-a-half-year-long siege of Sarajevo and thanks to the enthusiasm, professional attitude, patriotism and perseverance of university teachers and associates as well as the students, the University of Sarajevo managed to retain its continuity of work and life. This was a specific aspect of intellectual, academic resistance towards everything that is barbaric and against civilization, the University's contribution to the affirmation of freedom and democracy, the defense against aggression and fascism and the affirmation of the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the beginning of 1996 , the University of Sarajevo entered the phase of post-war physical and academic renewal and reconstruction. The physical renewal is aimed at the reconstruction of devastated and the rebuilding of destroyed facilities (through the realization of the New University Campus Project), the replacement of destroyed educational and scientific equipment and the reconstruction of student dormitories. Significant results have been achieved on this plane and the conditions for higher quality studies have been formed. The undergoing academic renewal comprises the realization of a new concept of organization and function of the University in accordance with contemporary standards, the modernization of curricula and the education of the necessary teaching personnel. The process of renewal and reconstruction of the University is supported by the activities of the European University

∗ http://www.unsa.ba/eng/ouni.php/

4 Association, the European Council, the European Union as well as a whole line of international organizations and institutions involved in the field of higher education.

Current conditions . The University of Sarajevo has partner relations with over 40 Universities in Europe, USA, Canada and the Arab countries. The main objective of all our current activities is to raise the quality of studies and to create a contemporary university of European provenance which will be a respectable representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina on an international level and a promoter of traditional, historical, cultural, scientific and artistic values of this part of Europe. University of Sarajevo is a large educational system taking into account number of employees (1.640 teachers and assistants and 893 non academic staff) as well as number of students (total 47000). According to current organizational structure it is loose association with many higher education institutions with strong legal identity (23 faculties and academies and other members of the University and associated members). Since the premise of members and associated members are dislocated around the city, higher priority is given to the building of the University Campus. For those members of the University, appropriate building and traffic work are required, in order to group them in four or five polycentric units.

∗∗∗ THE UNIVERSITY OF PRIMORSKA

The very first efforts to found university in the coastal part of the Adriatic coast settled by Slovenes were made almost one hundred years ago, whereas the first concrete steps towards the establishment of an additional, third university within the frame of the Republic of Slovenia were taken after the country had become independent in 1991. Thus 1992 saw the preparation of the expert study of the development of higher education in the region of Primorska, and a year later a letter of intent was signed envisioning the establishment of the University Study Centre. In 1995, the Science and Research Centre of the Republic of Slovenia was founded in order to garner the intellectual potential of the future university, while 1996 witnessed the formation of the University Study Centre of Koper, which facilitated the development of higher education in the region and prepared the legal basis for founding the university. Two years later, the letter of intent was also signed by representatives of the regional economic sector and by regional chambers of commerce. Finally, on 29 January, 2003, the Slovene Parliament passed the University of Primorska Charter. Two months later, on 17 March 2003, the UP was entered into the register of legal entities kept by the District Court of Koper. The newly established university comprised three faculties, two colleges and two research institutes. The Faculty of Humanities Koper and the Science and Research Centre Koper in Koper/Capodistria have participated in co-organizing (with the University of Sarajevo and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe) the conference DAYTON – 10 YEARS AFTER: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND CO-OPERATION PERSPECTIVES (Sarajevo, 29. 11. – 1.12. 2005).

The new, third Slovene university was established not only in an area bordering Croatia and Italy, but also at a meeting point of international cultural and economic trends. Its mission is based on the culture and tradition of areas of contact, on the collaboration with the regional economy orientated towards Western Europe and the Mediterranean, and on the vision of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and European Research Area (ERA). The main objectives of this young university are to carry out high quality study and research programs and to promote the excellence of educational and research work in Slovenia and abroad. By assuring autonomy in the fields of education, research and financial functioning, by cherishing academic culture and by taking responsibility for results of the study processes, the University of Primorska (UP) will transmit knowledge to future generations in order to form inquisitive thinkers and professionals. In accordance with the vision of the European Commission advocated in its document The Role of Universities in Europe that encourages European universities to take their part of responsibility for the economic growth and development, the UP will foster the transfer of academic knowledge and research achievements into practice and strive for the exchange of personnel and experience with the economic sector. Thus it will facilitate the sustainable development of not only the Primorska region, but also Slovenia and the European Union. In view of its geopolitical position, the aim of UP is also to develop into an open and innovative university and become a laboratory for collaboration, exchange and partnership in the common European area. By preserving rich natural and cultural heritages and cherishing national identity, UP will form a link between the past and future.

∗ http://www.upr.si/en/Univerza/TemeljniPodatki/

5 Currently, research activities are carried out by two research institutions (Science and Research Centre of Koper, Primorska Institute of Natural Sciences and Technology of Koper) and three higher-education institutions ( Faculty of Management of Koper, Turistica – College of Tourism of Portorož, Faculty of Education of Koper). Researchers employed at the other members of UP ( Faculty of Humanities of Koper, College of Health Care of Izola) collaborate in projects carried out by UP or other Slovene and foreign universities. The individual members conduct research either within institutes or within research programs and projects.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a pan-European security body whose fifty-five participating States span the geographical area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Recognised as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the OSCE is a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in its area. Its approach to security is unique in that it is both comprehensive and co- operative . It is comprehensive because it deals with three aspects or, in OSCE parlance, “dimensions’ of security – the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human. It, therefore, addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence-and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism, and economic and environmental activities. It is co-operative because all fifty-five States enjoy equal status. Decisions are taken by consensus and are politically but not legally binding.

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OSCE Mission's mandate was established under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP), drawn up in Dayton, Ohio and signed in Paris in late 1995, which ended nearly four years of bitter and divisive conflict in the country. In this Agreement the OSCE is specified as one of the agencies responsible for helping BiH make the transition into a stable, secure, and democratic society, one that respects the rights of all its citizens, regardless of their national background. In order to do this, the Mission has established programmes to promote the development of democratic political institutions, as well as to strengthen the rule of law and the observance of international human rights norms and standards, at all levels of BiH, from the municipal to the State. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina divides its work into the thematic areas of Democratization and Public Administration Reform, Education, Human Rights, and Security Co-operation. It divides its presence into a head office in Sarajevo, regional centres in Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, and Tuzla, and field offices in twenty-two municipalities across the entire country. One of the Mission's strengths, in fact, is this widespread field presence, for this enables it to work very closely at all levels of society and government. Increasingly the only civilian presence outside the country’s main cities, the Mission’s field staff monitors the ever-changing situation in the country and conducts the Mission's activities there. Selected activities are herewith raised.

Education. In July 2002, at the request of the High Representative and with the subsequent concurrence of the Peace Implementation Council, the Mission assumed responsibility for the co-ordination of the work of the international community in the education sector in BiH. Since then, the Education Department has been working to encourage sustainable solutions to the country’s education challenges. Among its main areas of focus are: Accessible, Acceptable, and Effective Education for All. If a secure, stable, and democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina is to take hold, it must have an education system free from political influence and bias in any form. Toward this end, the OSCE, in co-operation with a number of local and international partners, has been working to foster equal access to and an end to discrimination in the country’s manifold systems of education. The Mission’s field officers seek to ensure that returnee, Roma, national minority students, as well as students with special needs, are accommodated in classrooms through the adoption and implementation of agreements and action plans such as the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of the Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children and Action Plans on Roma and National Minorities, Inclusive Education and School Enrolment and Completion. Interim Agreement on Accommodation of the Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children. The primary objective of the Interim Agreement and its Implementation Plan was to support the return of students and teachers to their pre-war communities by significantly increasing the number of returnee students and teachers in schools in their area of return. Its goals also included providing guidelines on appropriate, non-political, non-divisive school names and symbols through the implementation of the Criteria for School Names and Symbols and, building upon the principle that textbooks in ‘national’ subjects – e.g., history and geography, which differ by ‘curriculum,’ of which

6 BiH has three that correspond to its three different Constituent Peoples – be free of inappropriate material, implementing the Guidelines on Textbook Writing for the Subjects of History and Geography which encourage multi-perspective approaches to material in order to respect all communities in BiH. Education Legislation. The Mission supports the development of legislation to ensure that BiH has the necessary legal frameworks and structural mechanisms for a reformed educational system In 2003, thanks in part to assistance from the Mission, the Parliamentary Assembly passed unanimously a State Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education that embodied the principles described above of access and non-discrimination. Since then, the Mission has in a similar fashion been advocating for the passage of a higher education law, as necessitated by the Bologna Process for the reform of higher education in Europe, to which BiH is a signatory member, as well as for a vocational education and training framework law. Raising Debate – Civic Involvement in the Education Reform Process. Without an engaged citizenry, it is unlikely that a reformed system of education will truly take hold. Since 2002, therefore, the Mission has been organizing fora, workshops, and seminars designed to encourage citizens to get involved in the education of their children. In spring 2005, the Mission published a report entitled Raising Debate: Is BiH living up to its international obligations in the field of education? This report described the many disparities and shortcomings in BiH’s fulfilment of its international obligations in education and posed questions it felt would be useful to the citizens of this country in their quest improve their systems of education. The Mission also seeks to foster the organization of parent councils, teachers associations, student unions, and pupil councils, for such groups, representing their interests to the public and responsible local authorities in a powerful and discernable way, can also aid in the achievement of the goal of a reformed educational sector in BiH.

Human Rights. As mandated by Annex VI of the GFAP, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina works to promote, protect, and monitor the human rights of all people in BiH. Among the main areas in which the Department focuses its work are: Economic and Social Rights. Sustainable societies are secured in part through governmental authorities meeting their obligations to ensure individual access not just to education, but also to healthcare, adequate housing, and other essential services. Vulnerable groups such as the disabled, indigent, returnees, and national minorities including Roma deserve particular attention. Through its human rights officers in the field, the Mission monitors the protection and delivery of essential social services throughout BiH and uses its findings to work with local authorities to diagnose problems and to develop solutions to remove barriers and to increase access to these services. Minority Rights . In order to ensure that Roma communities and other national minorities are not excluded or discriminated against, the Mission works to regularise their social and legal status. These efforts necessarily include working to improve access to education and other such fundamental human rights. In conjunction with such initiatives, the Mission also assists Roma communities in the completion of the civil registration process and in improving their security of tenure and adequacy of housing. Human Rights Institutions. In a democratic society, when human rights violations occur individuals must have guaranteed access to independent and effective remedies. The Mission has been engaged in verifying the implementation of decisions of the Human Rights Commission. Together with the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Commission (EC), the Mission assists the authorities of BiH to establish a unified, independent, and effective Ombudsman to replace the three existing Ombudsman institutions, which are not operating up to international standards. Combating Trafficking in Human Beings . Working directly with the Office of the State Co-ordinator, the Mission supports efforts to combat trafficking in human beings. These efforts include assisting with the implementation of the National Referral Mechanism for the handling of victims of trafficking as well as with the co- ordination of meetings with a variety of local organizations and governmental actors in an effort to avoid duplication in efforts. Through its trial monitoring program described below, the Mission also contributes to ensuring judicial effectiveness in trafficking cases by identifying procedural gaps as well as by identifying problems that prevent suspected traffickers from being indicted and tried.

Rule of law. Criminal Justice Reform. The establishment of functional democratic institutions that operate according to the highest international human rights standards is an overarching goal of the Mission. After BiH overhauled its criminal justice system three years ago, the Mission has sought to strengthen judicial institutions, particularly through work with the Criminal Codes Implementation Assessment Team (CCIAT), which is responsible for oversight and review of these legal reforms, and through cooperation with the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HFPC). Trial Monitoring . Simultaneous with the introduction of these criminal codes, the Mission established a structured programme to monitor the conduct of trials under the resulting new system of justice. Twenty-four national trial monitors covering thirty-six courts provide the Mission with systematic data collection from criminal proceedings throughout BiH. From January 2004 to August 2005, the Mission monitored more

7 than three thousand hearings in criminal trial proceedings across BiH to assess how well the new criminal procedure codes were being observed. It also regularly reports its assessments, findings, and recommendations to local actors involved in criminal law reform process, including those institutions responsible not only for proposing amendments to the law and legal practice but also for training judges and prosecutors. War Crimes . At the same time, the Mission has since its inception been monitoring war crimes cases tried by domestic courts and highlighting the obstacles that hinder the fair and effective prosecution of cases. It has assisted local authorities as well as the Office of the High Representative to establish the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court and it has participated in initiatives aimed at improving regional co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes cases. In future, a number of initiatives aimed at supporting grass roots initiatives promoting understanding of the necessity for such trials will also form an important component of the Mission’s work in supporting war crimes proceedings and, it is hoped, thereby aid efforts to enhance reconciliation through effective and impartial justice. Co-operation with ICTY . The establishment of the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court in March 2005 created a forum specifically to try the most sensitive of such cases, including cases transferred from the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) under its Rule 11bis Procedure. OSCE has agreed to co-operate with ICTY through the monitoring and reporting on fair trial aspects of these cases. This will coincide with and reinforce its activities at the entity level courts, which will continue to be responsible for the majority of war crimes prosecutions.

Security Co-operation. Since 1995, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina has played a central role in supporting BiH’s authorities in reducing the size of their defence establishments and holding of arms and thereby enhancing both local and regional military stability, as mandated by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Today, the Mission is working to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop, for the first time, unified and State-level defence structures, and while at the same time assisting it to fulfil its OSCE and other international politico-military commitments. Among the most important areas of concentration are: Parliamentary Affairs. The Mission continues to assist both Houses of the BiH Parliamentary Assembly to enhance democratic control over the Armed Forces. The Mission supported the establishment of the BiH Joint Defence and Security Policy Committee in December 2003 and continues to assist the professional development of this Committee. Confidence Building and Compliance Assistance. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a signatory to several regional defence and security commitments under both the GFAP and the OSCE Code of Conduct. The Mission’s Security Co-operation Department seeks to support BiH authorities in fulfilling these commitments. Small Arms and Light Weapons . The Mission works closely with EUFOR, UNDP, and local authorities to verify and limit holdings of ammunition, weapons, and military equipment throughout the country. These activities include assistance with inspections of military facilities and weapons arsenals as well as with the destruction of surplus arms and ammunition. In a pilot project spearheaded by the Armed Forces of BiH last year, 20,000 small arms and light weapons were destroyed. Regional Stabilization - Article IV. Article IV of Annex 1B of the GFAP strives to ensure regional stabilization and to provide a framework for arms control. The Mission continues to support the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, who is based in Vienna, in his work in this area. Defence Reform Commission. The OSCE Mission is an active participant in the Defence Reform Commission of BiH and provides both expert advice and support to the continued development of unambiguous state level command and control in all functional levels of defence, including the Armed Forces of BiH. This includes assistance in the development of a single defence budget. The Mission is committed to assisting the authorities of BiH to meet the legislative and institutional ‘benchmarks’ that have been established as a prerequisite for the country to join the NATO Partnership for Peace program. Intelligence Reform . In January 2004, the Mission, under the direction of the Office of the High Representative, established an Intelligence Reform Implementation Section committed to support the reform of the country’s civilian intelligence agencies. Since then it has worked to assist in the creation of a new BiH State Intelligence Agency as well as in the creation of a new organisational structure for it, one that includes all legal, personnel, budgetary, and institutional restructuring. DSC Commitment to Future of Armed Forces BiH . As a result of the Mission’s support, BiH authorities have continued to reduce the size of the Armed Forces as well as of arms stockpiles. They have also introduced a new doctrine of command and control for the Armed Forces. This has resulted in a more fiscally sustainable and a more legitimate defence capacity. The Mission is now lending a hand to the BiH Defence Ministry in developing training programmes for the Armed Forces of BiH to prepare for future participation in peace support operations in the Euro-Atlantic sphere.

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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PRE- AND AFTER 1995: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE

Dr. Milan Bufon University of Primorska

1. A war for a nation-state in a post-modern age.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only republic of former Yugoslavia where none of the Yugoslav ethnic groups had an absolute majority in the population. The constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the Bosniaks (or Bosnian Muslims), Serbs, and Croats. This situation was the result of a centuries- long historic development of this territory. However, past censuses did not reveal the whole and exact picture of Bosnia and Herzegovina's ethnic patchwork. The main reasons for this were problems in defining who the Muslims were and, after 1961, the introduction of ethnic "Yugoslavs" and "Other, nationality unknown" categories in the census.

During the end of the 1980s one could not ascertain larger changes in areas of settlement of individual ethnic groups. The Muslims had a majority in central Bosnia, in north-eastern Bosnia (south of Tuzla), in Cazinska krajina (western Bosnia), and in northern Herzegovina. The Serbs had the majority in Bosanska krajina, Semberija, and south-eastern Herzegovina. Croats were the majority in western and central Herzegovina, in parts of Posavina, and in some parts of central Bosnia. Ideas of nationalistic ethnic politicians that Bosnia and Herzegovina be reorganized into homogenous national territories inevitably required the division of ethnically mixed territories into their Serb, Croat, and Muslim parts. To a certain extent this was formalized after the Dayton Agreement was signed. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the 1991 population census, 44 percent of the population was Muslim, 31 percent were Croats, 17 percent were Serbs, and 6 percent were "Yugoslavs." Many people (regardless of nationality) in Bosnia and Herzegovina were happy under the “socialist” regime, which - by its dictatorship - suppressed ethnic hatred. That is why even today in Sarajevo one can see sculptures, posters and photographs of the late Marshal Tito (Josip Broz). "Ethnically cleansing" changed to large extend settled areas in such a way that the Serb territory had become 100 percent Serb, the Croat territory had become 100 percent Croat, etc. In Sarajevo and elsewhere it meant that division of ethnically mixed families, houses, villages, and towns took place. Sarajevo has become - like once Berlin - divided.

Such divisions seemed unthinkable in Bosnia and Herzegovina before 1992. The only alternative for the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (Bosniaks) seemed to be to live together in one state that would be neither Serb nor Croat nor Muslim and in which all three constituent nations would have the same rights. However, Croat and Serb nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia dreamed of dividing the country into three ethnically homogenous units, with the Bosniak unit being very small. Conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina worsened rapidly after the first free and multiparty elections, held on 18 November 1990. Then candidates of respective nationalistic parties won 202 out of the 240 deputy seats in the new Bosnian-Herzegovina parliament. The Muslim Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) gained 87 seats; the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS), 71 seats; and the Bosnian affiliate of the Croat Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ), 44 seats in the parliament. At first it seemed that the multiparty system would work hand in hand with power sharing among the individual ethnic groups, a system already introduced by the communists. Alija Izetbegovi ć, a Muslim, was elected president of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Mom ćilo Krajišnik, a Serb, was elected speaker of the parliament; and Jure Pelivan, a Croat, became the prime minister.

In spite of this spirit of cooperation, conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina started to worsen with the dawn of the Croat and Slovene declarations of independence. First, the Bosnian Serbs declared "their right" to remain living in Yugoslavia (the state where most of the Serbs lived). However, in February

9 1991 President Izetbegovi ć declared that Bosnia and Herzegovina is going to declare its independence (from Yugoslavia), if Slovenia and Croatia would proceed with their intentions to become nation-states. In this sharpened political standoff, no one was ready to compromise. The last chance for a peaceful solution disappeared in March 1991 when Milosevi ć and Tudjman, without including Izetbegovi ć in their discussions, discussed the possibility of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia. Consequently, Izetbegovi ć started to strengthen ties with Islamic countries. During a visit to Turkey, he even asked for membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Organization of Islamic States, causing the Bosnian Serbs to accuse him of trying to make the country an Islamic republic.

Under these conditions of general mistrust the SDS began to hinder governmental operations of the Bosnian government. At the same time the Serb population started to establish the s. c. Serb Autonomous Authorities (SAOs) in the regions where Serbs had a majority: SAO Bosanska Krajina with its seat in Banja Luka, SAO Romanija with its seat in Sarajevo, and SAO Eastern Herzegovina with its seat in Nevesinje. In October 1991, as the situation became more and more complicated, parliament members of the SDA and HDZ suggested independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a series of thunderous discussions, deputies of the SDS decided to leave the parliament, and on October 25 they established their own parliament. This Serb parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted only of the deputies of Serb nationality-members of SDS.

Bosnian Serb politicians, with the help of the Serb-dominated regime of Slobodan Miloševi ć of Yugoslavia, started to implement a plan to forcibly prevent the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence. In accordance with secret orders from Miloševi ć, they began to dispatch ethnic Serb officers and soldiers of the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) from other parts of Yugoslavia to Bosnia and Herzegovina - in particular those whose ancestors were from Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this military support, the Bosnian Serbs declared their own Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska republika Bosna i Hercegovina) on 9 January 1992 and proclaimed it to be a part of the Yugoslav federation.

By the end of 1991 it had became clear that Slovenia and Croatia would achieve international recognition for their independence. On 20 December 1991, the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to ask the European Union to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state. Both Serb members of the Bosnian presidency voted against this decision. In a referendum on 29 February and 1 March 1992, 99.45 percent of those who participated voted for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1.2 million eligible voters (36.96 percent) abstained. Votes against the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina were only 5,997 in total. A total of 5,070 (0.16 percent) of the ballots were invalid. The majority of the Serb population abstained, as their ethnic political leaders had already declared their own Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Srpska Republika Bosna i Hercegovina).

From then on it became clear, even to the greatest optimists that the Bosnian crisis would and could not be solved peacefully. In their last effort before the war, international peacemakers tried to reach a compromise acceptable to leaders of all ethnic sides (Muslim Alija Izetbegovi ć, Serb Radovan Karadži ć, and Croat Mate Boban). Fighting broke out only a week after the referendum, first close to Bosanski Brod following by skirmishes near Zvornik and Bjeljina. Tensions were also increasing in Sarajevo. Under these tense and complicated circumstances, the European Union recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992. The United States followed on 7 April 1992. However, the Bosnian Serbs continued to act independently! The "Assembly of the Serb Nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina" soon declared the independence of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later renamed Republika srpska/Serb Republic). Later in April, the Bosnia-Herzegovina’s president Izetbegovi ć and the speaker of the Republika srpska parliament Krajišnik secretly met to talk in Sarajevo, but the war could not be prevented any longer.

In the spring of 1992, one of the bloodiest wars in the history of Europe began in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the most ethnically mixed of all former republics of what was once the Socialist Federative

10 Republic of Yugoslavia. Subsequently, every clash on the battlefield provoked forced migrations of the populations. The Serbs, who were supported by the JNA as early as August 1992, and controlled at the beginning 70 percent of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wanted to get rid of all non-Serb nationalities on their territory. They started with a policy of ethnic cleansing. In the first year of the war Serbs succeeded in ousting the Muslims and Croats from eastern Bosnia (Zvornik, Višegrad, Fo ča), Posavina (Bosanski Brod, Derventa), and Banja Luka. Most of the Croats escaped to Croatia and Herzegovina, which was under Croat control (in July 1992 Herzegovina was renamed HercegBosna). The Muslim refugees moved to the regions around Tuzla and Sarajevo, which was under Muslim control, but some migrated to Croatia, Slovenia, some even to Western Europe and overseas. In 1992 some peacekeeping forces were already stationed on the ground, in Bosnia and Herzegovina; these troops were supposed to protect civilians. Their lack of success can be shown by the fact that by August of 1992, 1.7 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to leave their homes.

From the very beginning of the war, the international community tried to stop the fighting and to find a peaceful solution to all issues, especially because of the many refugees the war had produced. All the peace plans suggested by the United Nations and the European Union were based on the condition that Bosnian Muslims would not be forced to leave their homes in territories where they had been a majority before the war. They demanded that the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain unchanged, but failed to demand a nationally unified state. The January 1993 peace plan, produced by the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the former British Foreign Secretary Lord David Owen - the so-called Vance-Owen Plan - foresaw the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ten regions - three for every ethnic group, plus a neutral region of the capital city of Sarajevo. Neither this, nor many of the later peace plans proved to have any impacts on warring sides until 1995. None of the sides involved were prepared to give up plans far an ethnically divided Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Until April 1993, the Serbs were fighting the Muslims and Croats. However, in April 1993 fighting between Croats and Bosniaks began also for the control of the territory in hands of the Croats and Muslim forces, the former allies. As a result, ethnic cleansing occurred in regions where it had not taken place before. In spring 1993, the Croats began to force Muslims out of the Herzegovina towns of Stolac, Ćapljina, Ljubuški and from some settlements in central Bosnia (Busova ča, Kiseljak). Consequently, as revenge, the Muslims began to force Croats out of Jablanica and Konjic, and from the upper Neretva river valley, as well as from the regions of Vard and Bugojno, in central Bosnia. Muslim refugees found safe haven primarily in Western Europe, the Croats found refuge in Livno (Herzegovina) and in Istria (Croatia). During this period, clashes between the Croats and Serbs, whose forces were preoccupied with the fighting against the Bosnian Muslim army, nearly stopped. In spring of 1993 it seemed possible almost that the Serbs and Croats would succeed in dividing Bosnia in two. At the same time the Muslim fractions started to fight each other too. Fikret Abdić, a regional leader in Biha ć in Western Bosnia, refused to recognize the central Bosnian government of Alija Izetbegovi ć. On 27 September 1993 he declared Western Bosnia (with 350,000 inhabitants) as an autonomous region, with its capital in Biha ć. He was successful in making an agreement with the local Serb and Croat commanders and with a force of 6,000 soldiers started to fight the Muslim army of Alija Izetbegovi ć.

2. The Dayton Agreement: a cease-fire foundation for an assembled state.

The international community did not intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina until May 1993. At that time Serb forces surrounded several towns where the Bosnian Muslims have been traditionally a majority. The UN Security Council proclaimed the towns of Sarajevo, Biha ć, Goražde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Žepa to be "safe havens". UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) soldiers were sent to protect them. On 2 March 1994, international mediators practically forced the Muslims and Bosnian Croats to sign the Washington Framework Agreement, which unified the territories under their control into the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In August 1994 the international community, with an important Russian support, forced the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to close borders with Bosnia and Herzegovina, including regions where Serb control was established. The ties with the Bosnian Serb leader Karadži ć were reduced. This, however, did not stop the war. Despite seventy-seven cease-fires, proclaimed in the

11 time-frame March 1992 until May 1994, and numerous diplomatic missions, in particular by Richard Holbrooke (the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs during the US Clinton administration), ethnic cleansing continued. In July 1995 Serb forces captured Srebrenica and Žepa and killed almost 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. Consequently, NATO intervened with air raids on Serb positions, and, consequently, in August 1995, Serbs agreed to participate in the suggested peace talks. On 8 September 1995, the foreign ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia met in Geneva and agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina should become a viable state as it would be divided into two entities, a Croat-Muslim and a Serb one. In October 1995 a cease-fire (temporary peace) vent into effect, and on 1 November 1995 peace negotiations started at the US Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio. The peace negotiations came to a conclusion on 21 November 1995, and resulted in the signing of a peace agreement (The Dayton Peace Agreement) on 14 December 1995 in Paris, France.

The Dayton Agreement consists of a general document, 11 annexes, and 102 maps. In summing up, it states the following:

• The Republic of Serbia of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina. • Consequently, the U. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall stay as a unified, internationally recognized state in its pre-war borders. It will have a constitution that envisions Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal state. It shall have a bicameral parliament, federal constitutional court, common presidency, unified currency, and central government. • The state shall consist of two units: a Bosniak-Croat Federation, which shall consist of 51 percent of the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), which will control the remaining 49 percent of the territory. The Serb part will encompass the cities of Srebrenica, Žepa, and Pale. The Serb entity shall have access to the Adriatic coast. • The capital, Sarajevo, shall remain united with the Bosniak-Croat federation; the Serbs of Sarajevo shall have special rights in the school system and local self-management. • The east-west territorial corridor that connects the Serb territories shall be five kilometres wide. On the status of the city of Br čko, international arbitration shall decide. • Members of the presidency and the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be elected at free and democratic elections by the citizens of voting age in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Elections shall take place under the control of the international community; citizens shall vote in places where they have permanent residence. • The refugees shall be permitted to return to their homes. Citizens shall be allowed free and unhindered movement in the whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. • Convicted war criminals shall not be permitted to serve in the armed forces or occupy positions in states structures.It is agreed that 60,000 peacekeeping forces will be stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. • The United States will suggest that the UN Security Council pass a resolution to end economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The signatories of this agreement were Alija Izetbegovi ć, the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slobodan Miloševi ć, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia.

The three years of war entirely changed the ethnic structure of the once ethnically anarchically mixed former Yugoslav republic. As a result of ethnic cleansing, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is at present divided into more or less ethnically homogeneous regions. The region of the predominantly Serb population is within the entity of the Republika Srpska; the region with the Croat and Muslim settlements remains to be in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The extent of the consequences of ethnic cleansing is shown by data (estimations) on the changes of the ethnic structure in selected cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1991-1995. The percentage of Serbs in Banja Luka rose from 52 percent in 1991 to 91 percent in 1995; in Doboj, from 32 percent to 89 percent; in Mostar, the percentage of Serbs fell from18 percent to 3 percent. The number of the Serbs also substantially decreased in Biha ć (from

12 29,398 to about 1,000); in Tuzla (from 82,235 to about 15,000); in Zenica (from 79,233 to about 16,000); and in western Herzegovina and central Bosnia (from 43,595 to about 5,000). Similar trends of ethnic homogenization can be seen also in Sarajevo; in the part controlled by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the percentage of Muslims has risen from 52 percent to 85 percent.

More than 2 million refugees had to leave their homes as a result of the war. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and various government institutions, most of the refugees had originally lived within Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.2 million). Many settled in the successor states' of the former Yugoslavia. In November 1995 there were 453,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia, 38,600 in Montenegro, 28,000 in Macedonia, 405,000 in Serbia, and 24,000 in Slovenia. As for other Eu- ropean countries (estimates), most of the refugees settled in Germany (320,000), Italy (90,000), Switzerland (33,000), Austria (20,000), France (15,000), Sweden (50,000), and the Netherlands (33,000). For the most part, the Muslims found refuge in Turkey (52,000), Saudi Arabia (7,000), and Libya (3,500). In spite of all peace agreements, most refugees still had not been able to return to their homes as of late 2003. The consequence of the war, the changed ethnic situation, the continued ethnic hatred, the lack of security, and the poor economic conditions were among the key reasons why refugees of Croat and Muslim population emigrated from the Republika Srpska, the Serb refugees left regions in the Fed- eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Muslims left Mostar in Herzegovina respectably.

Peace came to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. The reaction to the signing of the Dayton Agreement was most euphoric in Belgrade, where the people honoured Slobodan Miloševi ć as a visionary, and in Zagreb, where Franjo Tudjman evaluated the agreement as a "victory of the Croat diplomacy", due to the fact that the Croats lost the least of all the three fighting sides in the conflict. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there were many who had doubts about the peace, though. With the exception of the Bosnian Serbs, most of the parties concerned were in agreement that Bosnia needed peace. However, every ethnic group wanted as much territory as possible and was unhappy with the proposed situations. For this reason the Bosnian Serbs opposed the agreement. The most critical was the president of the self-proclaimed Serb parliament in Pale, Mom čilo Krajišnik, who claimed that the agreement did not fulfil even the least of the Serb interests. He threatened that he would not respect the agreement, as the Bosnian Serbs had not signed it; Slobodan Milosevi ć had signed it for them. In spite of all doubts about the agreement, the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended, and conditions improved. The implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement has been overseen by 50,000 soldiers of the IFOR (Implementation Forces) and later the SFOR (Stabilization Forces), who came to replace the United Nation Forces (UNPROFOR). Being under the command of NATO, the IFOR and SFOR had the approval of the UN Security Council. Implementation of the agreement was not an easy task, because each side respected only those points of the Dayton Agreement that were in its favour.

In reality, many of the parts of the Dayton Peace Agreement had been fulfilled in its entirety. For example, although in Bosnia and Herzegovina all structures necessary for the state to survive were put to action, major problems in its functioning exist. In everyday life, each of the entities has lives its own separate life. In order to stop the “life of three states in one state” the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organized elections in September 1996. Inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina elected a three-member presidency and parliament for the country as a whole. Citizens of each of the two constituent entities also elected regional parliaments. Bosnian Alija Izetbegovi ć was elected the president of the three-member presidency, and the representatives of the Serb ethnicity Mom čilo Krajišnik and of the Croat ethnicity Krešimir Zubak became members of the presidency.

The elections showed that the refugee crisis could not be solved any time soon. In accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, citizens had to vote in the places of their permanent settlement. Even though there were 1.5 million refugees, only 14,500 Bosniaks, who lived as refugees in the territories of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, participated in the elections in the Republika Srpska; and v.v. only 1,500 Serbs who lived as refugees in the territories of the Republika Srpska voted in the elections in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This meant that the intentions of the Dayton Peace Accords to assist the return of refugees by including them in the political process in the place of their previous

13 permanent residence did not materialize. Most refugees abstained out of fear, but also because they were not informed about the election or because of the bad organization in transfers to the polling places. In spite of the troubles mentioned there, the international observers' reactions to the election process were positive. The elections of 2001 were organized again by the international community and went smoothly; although refugees were still in the country, more of them were able to vote. Even before the first elections in 1996 took place, all those who were indicted as war criminals by the Hague Tribunal had to withdraw from political life. Radovan Karadži ć left the political scene on 28 June 1996 (St. Vitus's Day, a commemorative day in Serb history). The new president of the Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavši ć, decided to respect the Dayton Agreement by issuing a statement of support. This meant that the Repub- lika Srpska would not oppose to the arrest of Radovan Karadzi ć, who was indicted as a war criminal. However, when the international community's forces tried to arrest Karadži ć, his guards fought back and close to fifty people were killed. Another result of the 1996 elections was a schism among the politicians of the Republika Srpska. The most radical faction, the socalled Karadži ć faction, slowly but surely began to lose its influence also, because of its leader's indictment.

Events took another course in the Croat part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the so-called Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna (although it was officially a part of the Muslim-Croat federation). Its political representatives, who were functionaries of the HDZ and who had 90 percent support from their voters, did not want to transfer power to the Croat-Muslim Federation, which they were required to do in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. They had the openly support Franjo Tudjman, who still hoped that Slobodan Miloševi ć would succeed in annexing a part of Bosnia so that Croatia could annex another part of Bosnia. Neither the death of Franjo Tudjman and the fact that the HDZ lost the elections in Croatia in 2001, nor the suspension of financial help to Herceg-Bosna by the new Croat authorities, changed the situation. Furthermore, at the beginning of March 200l, the Bosnian HDZ proclaimed local self-management and threatened that it would not recognize the common institutions and authority of the state organs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Wolfgang Petritsch, the UN administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had to intervene. He forced five functionaries of the HDZ in Bosnia to resign from all political positions; among them was the president of the Bosnian-Herzegovian HDZ, Ante Jelavi ć, who was also an elected member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Although the situation was calming down, the nationalists from all parties still had considerable influence. For example, when in spring 2001 the international community tried to rebuild the mosques in Trebinje and Banja Luka, the Bosnian Serbs protested. The intention of those who organized demonstrations was not only to prevent the building of mosques. It was a question of keeping these territories ethnically cleansed and ready for the annexation to “greater Serbia” in the near future. The governments of both entities acted together for the first time during a dispute with Croatia that, in 2002, had threatened the flow of oil and gasoline into Bosnia by hindering transportation on Croat roads from Slovenia due to “ecological reasons”. On a final note, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina decided that all inhabitants of both national entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina should have equal rights as citizens. This decision is now being implemented slowly but surely.

3. The re-integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina: a challenge for a common European future

The tragedy of Yugoslavia, and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, demonstrates the enduring potency of European territoriality. Although it is all too easy to assign blame to the warring factions and their leaders, the temptation to see the ongoing Yugoslavian crisis as visceral tribalism, the barbaric and primitive form of ethnic hatred, which was merely held in check under communism only to be unleashed when these 'backward' peoples were at last free to massacre one another, is both intellectually lazy and morally complacent. As David Campbell demonstrates in his brilliant analysis, Yugoslavia lies at the heart of Europe. It is populated by sophisticated, highly educated, thoroughly modern inhabitants. It is not over there; it is here. Its problems are the problems of Europe. As Campbell shows, even before the crisis descended into the fury of warfare and ethnic bloodletting, the 'international community' had privileged a territorial solution above all other alternatives. The terms of the debate were set in advance by enduring assumptions that national identity could only be expressed by authority over space.

14 While a territorial solution was at least feasible in the case of Slovenia, it condemned multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan Bosnia to a savage death of territorial attrition and attempted genocide. Most of the federal republics were ethnically mixed - but Bosnia, in the centre of the old federation, was a bewildering mosaic of different communities in the rural areas. In the capital city of Sarajevo, Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Bosnian Muslims fused in a seamless mixture and had lived in peace for generations. A neat territorial solution would never be possible here. The quest for ethnic homogeneity simply created the worst kind of heterogeneity: small, isolated and vulnerable minorities beyond each new suggested border, the targets for those who were willing forcibly to relocate people (or worse), practice which acquired the absurd euphemism of 'ethnic cleansing'. The belief in the inalienable right of the former Yugoslavian republics to secede and the failure to offer any kind of moral or intellectual defence of a non-territorial alternative to the resulting crisis made territorial conflict and 'ethnic cleansing' almost inevitable. The continual attempt to establish a neat cartographic solution (the dominant objective from the Lisbon accords in March 1992 through the Vance-Owen Proposals to the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Contact Plans of 1994) played directly into the hands of those in all communities, though particu- larly amongst the Serbs, who were itching to seize as much territory as possible by force. Despite a half century of European debate in which sovereignty and citizenship seemed to be increasingly uncoupled from land and territory, the Yugoslavian crisis demonstrates the remarkable persistence of older forms of geopolitical reasoning both amongst the participants in the war and amongst those who sought to arbitrate. Herein lies the 'sadness of geography'.

In the 90s, the EU, an organisation supposedly devoted to breaking down borders between European peoples and which had already welcomed former communist countries into the Council of Europe, manifestly failed to provide any kind of political leadership in Yugoslavia. Despite fears that the EU had become too political, the Yugoslavian crisis demonstrated it was still primarily an economic organisation. No coherent common policy was devised with respect to Yugoslavia, the different EU nation-states responding in quite separate and rather traditional ways, revealing thereby the weakness of the supposedly 'indissoluble' bonds between them. And yet, even as the war intensified, the familiar, by now rather depressing, arguments about the nature and pace of European economic integration continued.

Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina is not just a symbol for the Balkan instability and conflict nature, but it is the most visible expression of the fact that “nationalism, not federalism, is the concomitant development of European integration”, as Castells noted in 1998. New boundaries emerged in the post-1990 Europe, dividing on the horizontal level those who are in the Schengen zone and the “outsiders” within or on the edge of the EU, and on the vertical level the “truly” European citizens and the numerous minorities living in Europe, which are segregated to a second-class or even ghetto status. In conclusion, we could say that once again Europe, the mother-land of nationalism, and the continent where borders and different territorial and cultural identity are mostly inter-related, is facing new challenges of how best to represent its numerous interests within one system. As the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrates, there are at least two contradictory processes at work. The first is the opening up of Europe to democratic ideals and representative politics, the second trend is a conservative reaction which seeks to close, limit and protect the “national” character of single territories and societies, particularly from the “newcomers” and the “others”, even though it create tensions among the autochthonous ethno-linguistic minorities too. Thus the association of place with particularism and ethnos , and space with universalism and demos reflects the combination of two quite distinct philosophies.

These two views are also evident in discussions of building political community in the EU, in which both supporters and critics have been concerned with its apparent lack of a strong sense of identity and political community. Analysts have noted the EU’s “democratic deficit”, referring in part to the common view of its bureaucratic or rather Eurocratic origins and its relatively weak connections to the general populace of Europe. On the other hand we find cultural pluralist models that consider ethnic, regional, and national communities to be the locus of personal and group attachments and political identity. From this point of view, Europe is a composite of particularistic places and territories, usually associated with unassimilated cultures of various scales ranging from regions to nation-states, a model that implies at best a confederal common future. In this perspective a unified and integrated Europe becomes secondary to the goal of ethnic, regional, or national autonomy. And these are exactly the problems we may find in Bosnia and Herzegovina in its post-1995 attempts to combine the divergence processes connected with ethnos with the convergence processes related to demos .

15 4. Sources:

• The presentation of the political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed in this paper is based on the book: The Former Yugoslavia’s Diverse Peoples by M. Klemen čič and M. Žagar, Santa Barbara, ABC Clio, 2004, pp. 310 – 323. • An important publication on the human issue related to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also: National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia by D. Campbell, Minneapolis, Minnesota University Press, 1997. • Additional reflections on problems and processes related to 'unity' vs. 'diversity' , 'place' vs. 'space' and 'ethnos' vs. 'demos' discourse in Europe and beyond could be found in books as: End of Millennium by M. Castells, Malden, Blackwell, 1998; The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History by E. S. Casey, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997; Europe without Borders by M. Berezin and M. Schain (eds.), Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 2003; The Meaning of Europe – Geography and Geopolitics by M. Heffernan, London, Arnold, 1998. • The author discussed the broader geopolitical transformations in the region in the article Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: An Area of Geopolitical and Geocultural Contact. Annales (14/1), Koper, 2004, pp. 97 – 108.

16 THE CONFERENCE OUTLINE

1. B a c k g r o u n d

The multi-layered conference will bring together politicians, officials, scholars and experts from various disciplines who may contribute to the analysis of the geopolitical, historical, security, cultural, social and economic factors having an impact on divergence and convergence processes and prospects in the area of the former Yugoslavia and South-Eastern Europe, from the perspective of the Agreement.

The aim of the conference is to make a comprehensive assessment of the historical background leading to the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, to provide an analysis of the current situation, to discuss problems concerning integration and disintegration processes, to enlighten social and spatial, geopolitical and security trends, and indicate future opportunities for co-operation within a broader European and global context.

It is important to note that the Dayton Peace Agreement is a peace accord which had and continues to have, in terms of its structural, political and security stipulations, a profound impact on nation-building processes not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in the South-Eastern European region as a whole. The signature of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina put an end to a conflict that had ravaged the country for more than three and a half years, cost the lives of tens of thousands of civilians, and generated 1.2 million refugees abroad, and 1 million internally displaced people. The Dayton Peace Agreement laid the foundations for a new State structure, provided for a right of return for all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, set up a comprehensive regime of confidence- and security-building measures within the country and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and its neighbours, and called for free, fair and democratic elections. The Office of the High Representative was created to monitor the implementation of the Agreement.

After almost ten years of uninterrupted peace that have seen the return of more than a million displaced persons and refugees to their places of origin, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a dramatically different place from the one that emerged immediately after the conflict. The State-level institutions have acquired more and more competencies and authority and include, to name only a few, a single judicial and prosecutorial service, a State organized crime chamber, a unified customs service and an indirect tax authority, and a single military force under a single defense minister and a single joint command. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still facing a number of challenges yet to be resolved - a very complex and costly institutional structure, economic revitalization measures and the challenge of setting clear development perspectives Today, the goal of integration into the Euro-Atlantic family unifies the countries of the region and represents one of the main driving forces for continuing the reform processes.

Ten years after the establishment of the Office of the High Representative and the later institution of the so-called Bonn powers, the international community has to rethink its role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, specifically having in mind the country's strategic objective of joining Euro-Atlantic institutions.

2. A g e n d a

The opening session with keynote addresses will be followed by an open round table where politicians, senior representatives from key international institutions and academics will discuss the background and possible future developments and perspectives of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region. An interactive discussion with other participants is envisaged. The opening session and the round table are intended to provide a broader perspective and possibly to set the stage for comprehensive discussions at the working level in different sessions.

The conference will continue at the senior official/expert level in a number of working sessions.

The first working session at the official/expert level will be devoted to the security aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The discussion will focus on arms control implementation, and other aspects of the Agreement. Participants will analyse the restructuring of the military and the state-of-play of defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina and South-Eastern Europe at large, in the context of the ongoing process of integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

17

Further sessions at the expert level will touch, inter alia , upon the shape of the functional and administrative structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the regional context and the impact of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the post-Dayton demographic and migratory patterns.

Each session will have a moderator and a rapporteur. The moderators will facilitate and focus the dialogue among discussion participants and will stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the topics of the sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion. The rapporteurs' written reports should summarize issues raised during the sessions and should cover problem areas, improvements and suggestions made. The reports on sessions will be compiled in a comprehensive report to be presented at the closing session as the first perception regarding the outcome, and will be published in the Proceedings of the conference.

3. P a r t i c i p a n t s

The opening session and round table will be chaired by Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovenia. Participants at the expert level will include diplomats, officials, scholars, students and representatives from various universities, think tanks and research institutes from the region and beyond.

4. O r g a n i z a t i o n a l M o d a l i t i e s

The official language of the conference will be English. Simultaneous interpretation into local language will be provided during the first day of the conference. Academic session will be in English, the local language will be translated via overhead presentation (if needed); chairs will take care of the summary of questions and answers during discussion.

18 THE CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Pre-Conference Activity

Monday, 28 November 2005

9:00 - KOPER/CAPODISTRIA: Faculty of Humanities PRESS RELEASE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PRIMORSKA.

Conference Activities

Tuesday, 29 November 2005

8.00 - 9.15 Registration of Participants (Ground Floor of the UNITIC Building)

9.30 - 11.00 Opening session (Conference Hall, 1st Floor)

The opening session is intended to provide an opportunity for formal statements to be delivered, to set the stage for the substantive, focused and interactive discussion in the working sessions. This session will include the welcoming remarks by the Rector of Sarajevo University, Prof. Hasan Muratovi ć and the Rector of the University of Primorska, Prof. Lucija Čok; OSCE Chairman-in-Office and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia Dr Dimitrij Rupel; Representative of the Central European Initiative and a representative of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. James O’Brien, the lawmaking architect of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, a member of the Albright Group, and Lord Paddy Ashdown, High Representative and EU Special Representative in BiH will address the conference as a keynote speakers.

9.30 - 10.00 Opening remarks

Opening addresses by the Rector of Sarajevo University, and the Rector of University of Primorska Statement by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Statement by the CEI Representative Statement by a member of the BiH Presidency

10.00 - 11.00 Opening session continued

Keynote address by

James O’Brien , Former US Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans: CHANGING BOSNIA’S CONSTITUTION?

Keynote address by

Lord Paddy Ashdown, High Representative /EU Special Representative in BiH: TEN YEARS AFTER DAYTON: PROSPECTS FOR CO- OPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

11.00 - 11.15 Coffee break (Coffee, tea and light refreshments will be served.)

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11.15 - 13.15 Round table: TEN YEARS AFTER DAYTON - LESSONS LEARNED IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Moderator: Dr. Dimitrij Rupel, OSCE Chairman-in-Office

The session is to include a round table bringing together politicians, senior representatives from key international organizations and countries, academics and experts to discuss the background of the Dayton Peace Agreement and possible future developments. It is intended to provide a broader perspective and possibly to set the stage for a comprehensive discussion to make a broad cross- dimensional appraisal of the current stability and security environment for the region and to examine opportunities for its peoples, nations and States, especially in view of the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the South-Eastern European region as a whole.

Invited participants:

- Mladen Ivani ć, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia- Herzegovina (confirmed); - Vuk Draškovi ć, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro; - Kolinda Grabar Kitarovi ć, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia; - John Colston, NATO SG’s Senior Representative for Defence Reform in BiH (confirmed); - Wolfgang Petritsch, Permanent Representative of Austria to the UN, former High Representative (confirmed); - Vladimir A. Chizhov, Head of Mission of the Russian Federation to the EU; former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (confirmed); - Gerald Knaus, President of the European Stability Initiative; (confirmed); - Dr Pavol Demeš, Director for Central and Eastern Europe, German Marshall Fund.

Discussion

Conclusions and remarks by the moderator

Rapporteur: Prof. Dr. Anton Gosar, Ambassador of Science.

13.15 - 13.45 Press conference

13.45 - 15.30 Lunch break

20 15.30 - 17.30 Session I: Conference Hall, I. floor MILITARY ASPECTS AND REGIONAL STABILISATION IN THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT Moderator: General Claudio Sampaolo , Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for Article IV of the DPA

Session I is intended to present the politico-military role, mainly with respect to arms control, of activities relating to implementation aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement. An assessment of its implementation processes, conditions and achievements should be reached. Therefore, the discussion will focus inter alia on: achievements and results of the implementation of the DPA (Annex 1-B, Arts. II, IV and V); establishment of the structure and working methods of experts for the implementation of Arts. II, IV and V; contribution of the DPA, Arts. II and IV, to stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the final result of activities under the DPA, Arts. II and IV, in respect of arms capacities in the SEE region; the termination of Art. II; expectations related to the termination of Art. IV in the framework of the expressed plan for Partnership for Peace membership.

Tuesday 29 November 2005 15:30 – 17:30 Conference Hall, I. floor

Session I Chair: General Claudio Sampaolo MILITARY ASPECTS AND REGIONAL STABILISATION IN THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT M. Gen. David Leakey, EUFOR Commander Annex 1-A: Ten Years of Implementation and Current Situation Update B. Gen. Heinz Vetschera Annex 1-B: Art.II and IV Implementation; Amb. Helmut Werner Ehrlik, Sen. Adv. For Annex 1-B: Art.V Update Politico-Military Affairs at the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Nikola Radovanovi ć, Minister of Defense Defense Reform in BiH of BiH; Dr. Raffi Gregorian, Co-Chairman of the Defense Reform Commission in BiH Maj. Gen. John Drewienkievicz, Director of The Way Ahead Security Co-operation Department of the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo B. Gen. Heinz Vetschera The Way Ahead: Sub-Regional Arms Control and the Changed Security Situation in the Region Workshop Results

Other invited participants: - General Bernard Aussedat, former Coordinator for the implementation of Art. II and IV; - Major General Claudio Zappulla, former Personal Representative of the OSCE CiO for Art. II and IV; - Ambassador Henry Jacolin, Former Special Representative of the OSCE CiO for Article V of Annex 1-B; - Mr. John Colston, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning and the Secretary General's Senior - Gabriele Cascone, desk officer for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the - Political Affairs and Security Division (confirmed); - Rok Košnik, action officer for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Force Planning Directorate of the Defence Policy and Planning Division (confirmed); - Senior representatives from Ministries of Defence in SEE countries.

Rapporteur: Dr. Filip Tunji ć, Member of the OSCE Task Force.

19:30 - 22:00 RECEPTION Holiday Inn HOSTED BY THE SLOVENIAN CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE OSCE

21 Academic Sessions All academic sessions are to be held in the UNITIC Centre, in one of the two blue skyscrapers on the edge of the old town, in the part of the city called MARINDVOR and next to the Holiday Inn and former Marshall Tito Barracks. All sessions marked with A will take place on the first floor, in the UNITIC Centre Conference Room No. 1. Parallel sessions, marked with B, will take place on the nineteenth floor, in the Conference Room of the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Wednesday, 30 November 2005

Wednesday 30 November 2005 09:00 – 10:50 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session II - A Chairs*: Mladen DAYTON – THE HISTORICAL TIMES REVIEWED Klemen čić, Jože Pirjevec 09:00 – 9:30 Ivan Šimonovi ć COULD AND SHOULD WE HAVE DONE BETTER IN DAYTON? 9:30 – 9:50 Mladen Klemen čić CROATIA AND DAYTON 9:50 – 10:10 Jože Pirjevec DAYTON: THE BEGINNING OF THE AMERICAN UNILATERALISM 10:10 – 10:30 Matjaž Klemen čič INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE CRISIS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE WAR FOR SLOVENIA TO DAYTON 10:30 – 10:50 Allard Wagemaker TWISTING ARMS AND FLEXING MUSCLES

Wednesday 30 November 2005 09:00 – 10:50 Room: OSCE (19 th Floor)

Session II – B Chairs*: Nikola Kova č, FUNCTIONAL AND INSTUTUTIONAL STRUCTURES Alex Jeffrey IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 09:00 – 9:30 Safet Nurkovi ć; THE POLITICAL/TERRITORIAL SYSTEM OF BOSNIA Ranko Miri ć AND HERZEGOVINA AS A FACTOR IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REGIONAL/GEOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 09:30 – 9:50 Nikola Kova č THE PARADOX OF THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT 09:50 – 10:10 Dragan ðukanovi ć CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: INITIATIVES AND POSSIBILITIES 10:10 – 10:30 Alex Jeffrey WHAT BOSNIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN? LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES FROM BR ČKO DISTRICT 10:30 – 10:50 Damir Josipovi č SUITABILITY OF THE DAYTON TERRITORIAL DIVISION FOR THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Wednesday 30 November 2005 11:00 – 13:30 SARAJEVO SIGHTSEEING

11:00 UNIVERSITY OF THE SHAPE, STRUCTURE AND HISTORY OF THE SARAJEVO. FACULTY CAPITAL CITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA OF SCIENCES: (DEPARTURE BY BUS FROM UNITIC CENTRE) DEPARTMENT OF Geographic situation of Sarajevo. Morphologic parts of the city. The contemporary function of the city parts. Political geography of Sarajevo. Visit to GEOGRAPHY the Tunnel D.B. Route: UNITIC-a - Bentbaša - Bistrik (Panoramic View) – Vraca (Panoramic View) - Lukavica - Dobrinja I-IV - Tunel D-B - Stup - BAŠ ČARŠIJA. Guides: Magister Alma Pobri ć and Magister Ranko Miri ć.

12:30 SARTOUR, SARAJEVO SARAJEVO’S PAST AND PRESENT: BAŠ ČARŠIJA’S TREASURES (WALKING THE CITY CENTER IN TWO GROUPS) 13:30 - (RETURN TO THE UNITIC CENTRE BY BUS or WALKING)

22

13:30 – 15:00 LUNCH BREAK

Wednesday 30 November 2005 15:00 – 16:50 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session III - A Chairs*: Andre-Louis DESINTEGRATION AND REINTEGRATION PROCESSES Sanguin; IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA John Loughlin 15:00 – 15:30 Andre-Louis Sanguin FORMER YUGOSLAVIA LESS SLOVENIA. ERASING A “WHITE HOLE” UPON THE EU’S POLITICAL MAP 15:30 – 15:50 John Loughlin; ALBANIA: A STABILIZING NUCLEUS AT THE HEART OF Mirela Bogdani THE WESTERN BALKANS 15:50 – 16:10 Emmanuelle WHEN INTERNATIONAL DIVERGENCE ECHOES IN THE Chaveneau-Le Brun NATIONAL SPHERE: THE EXAMPLE OF CROATIA 16:10 – 16:30 Amael Cataruzza SOCIAL TERRITORIES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA’S POST-DAYTON AREA - A LIMIT TO POLITICAL BOUNDARIES? THE EXAMPLE OF MONTENEGRO. 16:30 – 16:50 Alexandru Illies; Oliver THE DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC Dehoorne, Corina Tatar RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES.

Wednesday 30 November 2005 15:00 – 16:50 Room: OSCE (19 th Floor)

Session III – B Chairs*: Anton BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE POST-DAYTON’S Gosar, POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING OF SOUTHEASTERN Mirko Pejanovi ć EUROPE 15:00 – 15:30 Anton Bebler FEDERALIST EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE AND THE POST-DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 15:30 – 15:50 Nenad Stojanovi ć FORMAL VS. INFORMAL “ETHNIC QUOTAS” FOR INCLUSION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES: SWITZERLAND, BELGIUM AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMPARED 15:50 – 16:10 Boštjan Rogelj BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FROM DAYTON TO BRUSSELS. 16:10 – 16:30 Mirko Pejanovi ć THE INTEGRATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION 16:30 – 16:50 Anton Gosar POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE POST-DAYTON BiH – SLOVENIA RELATIONS: SELECTED TOPICS 16:50 – 17:10 Srdjan Milasinovi ć NEOLIBERAL TOTALITARISM

16:50 – 17:30 COFFEE/TEA BREAK

Wednesday 30 November 2005 17:30 – 19:00 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session IV – A Chairs*: Mitja Bricelj SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE: THE ENVIRONMENT AND Selma Čengi ć COOPERATION IN FOCUS 17:30 – 18:00 Tarik Kopusovi ć; THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE MEDITEARRANEAN Selma Čengi ć ACTION PLAN (MAP) IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. CONTRIBUTION TO INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY. 18:00 – 18:20 Giorgio Andrian THE GREEN DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS. THE ROLE OF TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN STRENGHTENING THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION. 18:20 – 18:40 Mitja Bricelj PRINCIPLES OF TRANS-BOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: TOOL FOR A REGIONAL CO-OPERATION. 18:40 – 19:00 Aleksandar Popov BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN THE DAYTON TRIANGLE

23

Wednesday 30 November 2005 17:30 – 18:40 Room: OSCE (19 th Floor)

Session IV – B Chairs*: Darren PRE- AND POST DAYTON’S BOSNIA AND Purcell; HERZEGOVINA IN MEDIA Marek Sobzinsky 17:30 – 18:00 Marek Barwinski; IMAGE OF WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN Marek Sobczinsky POLISH NEWSPAPERS OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL OPTIONS. 18:00 – 18:20 Simon Kerma; BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ON THE INTERNET: THE Jug Bebler SLOVENIAN PERSPECTIVE. 18:20 – 18:40 Darren Purcell MEDIA-TED NEWSPAPER PERCEPTION OF BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA, CROATIA AND SERBIA SINCE DAYTON.

19:30 - 22:00 RECEPTION BY THE RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO PROF. DR. HASAN MURATOVI Ć AND THE RECTOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PRIMORSKA PROF. DR. LUCIJA ČOK

24 Thursday, 1 December 2005

Thursday 1 December 2005 09:00 – 11:10 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session V – A Chairs*: Carl Dahlman; POST-DAYTON MIGRATORY PATTERNS IN SOUTH- Alma Pobri ć EASTERN EUROPE 9:00 – 9:30 Carl Dahlman; HAS ETHNIC CLEANSING SUCCEEDED? Gerard O’Toal 9:30 – 9:50 Ivana Djuri ć REFUGEE REPATRIATION POLICIES: MINORITIES RETURNING TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA 9:50 – 10:10 Julien Vanderburie TEN YEARS AFTER: WHERE ARE THE REFUGEES? 10:10 – 10:30 Maja Nenadovi ć A DECADE OF POST-CONFLICT GOVERNANCE- BUILDING: ASSESING THE FACTORS AND LEVEL OF RETURN REFUGEE SUSTAINABILITY IN SOUTH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 10:30 – 10:50 Mateja Kraševec PROBLEMS COCERNING THE RETURNING OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE FRAME OF THE POST-DAYTON STRUCTURE OF BiH. 10:50 – 11:10 Alma Pobri ć SOME ASPECTS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Thursday 1 December 2005 09:00 – 11:10 Room: OSCE (19 th Floor)

Session V – B Chairs*: James WORLDWIDE PRACTICES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION Anderson; William Stanley 9:00 – 9:30 James Anderson FROM BORDER CONFLICT TO CROSSBORDER COOPERATION … AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION? THE IRISH EXPERIENCE TO DATE. 9:30 – 9:50 Oren Yiftachel DAYTON IN PALESTINE? ISRAELI ETHNOCRACY AND FAILURE OF PARTITION. 9:50 – 10:10 William Stanley DAYTON’S POTEMKIN VILLAGE? 10:10 – 10:30 Eiki Berg POOLING SOVEREIGNTY, LOSING TERRITORIALITY? MAKING PEACE IN CYPRUS AND MOLDOVA. 10:30 – 10:50 Anja Zalta THE NECESSITY OF THE INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE. FROM THE HISTORICAL SURVEY TO THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE COFLICTS. 10:50 – 11:10 Reinhard Henkel, CHURCH AS A “MIDDLE OPTION” FOR SERBS IN THE Laura Šakaja BANOVINA REGION, CROATIA

11:10 – 11:30 COFFEE/TEA BREAK

Thursday 1 December 2005 11:30 – 13:00 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session VI – A Chairs*: Halid THE POST-DAYTON ECONOMIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN Kurtovi ć; Constantin EUROPE Vert 11:30 – 12:00 Halid Kurtovi ć TOURISM AS MEANS OF RECONCILIATION OF NATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND BROADER 12:00 – 12:20 Elena Matei, SEVERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOUTH- Constantin Vert EASTERN EUROPE AFTER 2000 12:20 – 12:40 Frederic Dobruszkes THE RESHAPING OF AIR-TRANSFORTATION SUPPLY IN AREA OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 12:40 – 13:00 Jan Wendt CHANGES OF MOLDOVA GEOPOLITICAL POSITION AT THE PROCESS OF THE EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

25 Thursday 1 December 2005 11:30 – 13:00 Room: OSCE (19 th Floor)

Session VI – B Chairs*: Maria Paola THE BROADER PICTURE OF SOUTH-EASTERN Pagnini; Milan Bufon EUROPE’S NATION-STATES’ GEOPOLITICAL STANDING 11:30 – 12:00 Milan Bufon BETWEEN NATONALISM AND INTEGRATION: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE PROCESSES IN SOUTH- EASTERN EUROPE 12:00 – 12:20 Filip Tunji ć THE EUROPE INBETWEEN. OLD/NEW GEOPOLITICS IN EURASIA CONCERNING EUROPE’S STABILITY AND SECURITY. 12:20 – 12:40 Giuseppe Campione GEOPOLITICS OF ASIMMETRIES: TURKEY IN EUROPE 12:40 – 13:00 Maria Paola Pagnini; WESTERN BALKANS: GEOPOLITICS OF A CRISIS Raffaele Umana

13:00 – 15:00 LUNCH BREAK

Thursday 1 December 2005 15:00 – 16:50 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session VII – A Chairs*: Mateja MEMORIES AND IDENTITIES – DISCOURSE IN BOSNIA Sedmak; Jasna AND HERZEGOVINA Vukovi ć 15:00 – 15:30 Mateja Sedmak ETHNICALLY MIXED FAMILIES AS MEANS OF BRINGING ABOUT DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENECE PROCESSES IN THE TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 15:30 – 15:50 Jasna Vukovi ć THE PERCEPTION AND EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES IN POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: THE IDENTITY OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN SARAJEVO, BiH. ANTROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FIELDWORK RESULTS. 15:50 – 16:10 Monika Palmberger MAKING AND BREAKING BOUNDARIES: MEMORY DISCOURSES AND MEMORY POLITICS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON MOSTAR 16:10 – 16:30 Antonio Violante NEW SIMBOLIC VALUES OF SELECTED OLD AND MODERN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S BRIDGES 16:30 – 16:50 Carles Carreras THE SENSE OF PLACE IN SARAJEVO TEN YEARS AFTER DAYTON

Thursday 1 December 2005 15:00 – 16:30 Room: OSCE (19 th Floor)

Session VII – B Chairs*: Matjaž SOCIETAL FUNCTIONS AND DISFUNCTIONS IN Klemen čič; Filip TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE Tunji ć 15:00 – 15:30 J.C.H. Blom, HISTORICAL RESEARCH WHERE SCIENCE AND POLITICS Bob de Graaff, Dick MEET. THE CASE OF SREBRENICA. Schoowoord 15:30 – 15:50 Maja Ilijavec COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF THE CRIME-POLICE IN THE TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES IN THE AREA OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. INTERPRETATION OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK RESULTS. 15:50 – 16:10 Roman Romashov CRIMINAL CONFLICTS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE. 16:10 – 16:30 Gulnara Murtazeva DEPORTED CRIMEAN TARTARS, BULGARIANS, GREEKS, GERMANS, ARMENIANS. THE PROBLEM OF REPARTITION AND SOLVING OF INTERNAZIONAL CONFLICTS IN SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS.

16:30 – 17:00 COFFEE/TEA BREAK

26 Thursday 1 December 2005 17:00 – 18:30 Room: UNITIC 1 (First Floor)

Session VIII-A Chairs: Milan Bufon, CONCLUDING SESSION Safet Nurkovi ć 17:00 – 17:45 Anton Gosar, Filip Tunji ć, REPORTS BY RAPPORTEURS Mladen Klemen čić / Jože Pirjevec, Nikola Kova č / Alex Jeffrey, Andre-Louis Sanguin / John Loughlin, Anton Gosar / Mirko Pejanovi ć, Mitja Bricelj / Selma Čengi ć, Darren Purcell, Marek Sobzinsky, Carl Dahlman / Alma Pobri ć, James Anderson / William Stanley, Halid Kurtovi ć / Constantin Vert, Maria Paola Pagnini / Milan Bufon, Mateja Sedmak / Jasna Vukovi ć, Matjaž Klemen čič / Filip Tunji ć. 17:45 – 18:00 DISCUSSION 18:00 – 18:15 Andre-Louis Sanguin, IGU – INTERNATIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL UNION - President of the COMMISSION ON POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY: RESEARCH Commission on AND SCIENTIFIC RESULTS Political Geography at the IGU 18:15 – 18:30 CONCLUDING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HOST COUNTRY, CONCLUDING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OSCE, CONCLUDING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ORGANIZERS: THE UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO AND THE UNIVERSITY OF PRIMORSKA

* chairs are rapporteurs

27

EXCURSION

Friday, 2 December, 2005

Depending on weather conditions the organizers are planning to organize two separate excursions (MOSTAR; BR ČKO) if at least 25 participants would show interest in each. Please, forward your interest regarding your favourite excursion (Mostar or Br čko), you would like to participate on (!), not later than November 1, 2005 to [email protected]

I. MOSTAR Organisation: Department of Geography, Faculty of Science, University of Sarajevo, with the support of the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo

Price: Euro 45.- (includes: bus transportation, guiding and sightseeing of Mostar and selected sites, lunch). Geographic Characteristics Sarajevo – Mostar: Guide Prof. Dr. Muriz Spahi ć. 8:00 > Sarajevo – Ilidža – Ivan sedlo (959m) – Konjic (66 km) 10:00 > Konjic – Jablanica – Mostar (64km) 11:30 > Mostar: Sightseeing (walking route) 12:30 > Mostar: Lunch 14:00 > Mostar: Professional Discussion/Visits (to be announced) 17:00 > Mostar – Jablanica (52 km) 18:30 > Jablanica – Sarajevo (79 km) 20:30 arr. Sarajevo (approximately).

II. BR ČKO Organisation: Department of Geography, Faculty of Science, University of Sarajevo, with the support of the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo

Price: Euro 45.- (includes: bus transportation, guiding and sightseeing of Br čko, brief sightseeing of Tuzla, lunch). G eographic Characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kra ć, Olovo and Kladanj; short visit of Tuzla; Br čko; Mayor of Br čkog. Visit to the "Arizona Market". Guide: Prof. Dr. Safet Nurkovi ć

7:30 > Sarajevo – Vogoš ča – Olovo – Kladanj (86 km) 10:30 > Kladanja – Tuzla (44 km) 11:30 > Tuzla: Visit of Sites (to be announced) 12:30 > Tuzla – Lopare – Poto čari – Br čko (52 km) 13:30 > Br čko: Lunch 14:30 > Br čko: Sightseeing (walking tour) 15:30 > Br čko: Professional Discussion/Visits (to be announced) 17:00 > Br čko – Lon čari – Tuzla - Kladanj (116 km) 20:00 > Kladanj – Sarajevo (86 km) 22:30 > arr. Sarajevo (approximately).

28 ABSTRACTS Of Papers Presented in the Academic Sessions

FROM BORDER CONFLICT TO CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION... AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION? THE IRISH EXPERIENCE TO DATE

JAMES ANDERSON Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland

This paper focuses on the on-going attempt to resolve the Irish national conflict through the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998, particularly its Strand 2 dealing with formal North-South governmental co- operation across the contested border which partitions the island of Ireland. It contextualises this attempt by outlining some of the inherent limitations of territoriality as a basis for political organisation and the general problems of territorial 'solutions' such as partition; cross-border co-operation can be seen as attempting to transcend, undo or at least ameliorate these problems. The recent attempt under the GFA should also be seen in the context of two previous failed attempts to institutionalise cross-border co- operation: the still-born Council of Ireland set up with partition in 1920, and the failure to re-establish such a Council in the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. In comparison, the various cross-border institutions and procedures of governance established under the GFA have been relatively successful to date. They are also relatively advanced compared to other contemporary examples, and people involved in other national and border conflicts have been encouraged to look to the Irish experience for inspiration to resolve their own conflicts. However, the 'lessons from Ireland' are not as simple or straightforward as is usually implied. The success of the GFA is far from assured, with the Agreement itself under continuing threat. Cross-border co-operation, whatever its other advantages, may not necessary lead to conflict resolution. And for it to do so requires much more than formal cross-border institutions, important as these are as enabling mechanisms. At least equally important are the many cross-border projects involving different types of organisations in civil society many of them supported by the European Union, as well as more informal cross-border processes independent of state or EU sponsorship. Border crossings whose motivations owe little or nothing to conflict resolution may paradoxically prove to be the most important in resolving border-related conflicts.

29 GREEN DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS: THE ROLE OF THE TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION

GIORGIO ANDRIAN UNESCO-ROSTE, Italy

Within the rapidly changing geopolitical scenarios of the South-Eastern Europe, the natural resources management and the environmental issues are becoming more and more stakes of geo-political relevancy. Additionally, the damages caused by the armed conflicts and the consequent instable socio- economic development reflected on the legal, administrative and management frameworks are challenging the delicate passage from the phase of ‘environmental emergency’ to the new one of ‘environmental integration’. The recent experiences related to the major international environmental frameworks – the Regional Environmental Reconstruction Programme (REReP), the Green Belt, the Danube Convention, just to mention the few most relevant – tends to demonstrate how the need to define transboundary management plans for large naturally-relevant areas can play a role as a driving force to foster more fluent neighbouring relations. Nevertheless, the availability of ‘clean technologies’ - mostly provided by the international aid schemes - and the preparation of new generation technicians seems not to be enough to cope with the complexity of the local territorial dynamics. The lack of comprehensive vision to be framed into innovative multidisciplinary approaches resulted into vanishing most of the efforts posed in the transition towards the European Union and all the related issues. Ultimately, the role of a holistic and trans-disciplinary approach to be implemented into innovative territorial management practices seems to the be the key to promote the local sustainable development and the trans-scale governance.

30 FEDERALIST EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH – EASTERN EUROPE AND POST-DAYTON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

ANTON BEBLER University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

The influence of federalist ideas, practical experience and elements of modern federalism have been present in South – Eastern Europe since the second half of XIX century. Initially they appeared, albeit in a truncated form, within the dual Austro-Hungarian Empire (KuK) which included i.a. the territories of today’s Hungary, Croatia, Voivodina and Slovenia. In 1878 KuK expanded the territory under its jurisdiction in Western Balkans by occupying Bosnia & Herzegovina (B & H). Federalism was briefly present in the form of the short-lived “State of the Slovenians, Croats and Serbs” (November 1918), which was quickly absorbed by the “Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenians”, later renamed into the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia”. After the break-down of the unitarian and centralist “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” in 1941, regionally-based (con)federalism reappeared within the Yugoslav resistance movement. Post-war Yugoslavia in her three incarnations (DFY/FPRY/SFRY) had developed her own variety of “socialist federalism”, at first imitating the Soviet Union, obviously on a reduced scale. Her last constitution (1974) contained an incoherent mixture of centralism and confederalism which arguably heftily contributed to the breakdown of SFRY in 1991-1992. The idea of a wider “Balkan Federation” was floated and in 1947 debated behind closed doors among the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders but never got off the ground. Further to the North–East Moldova was made a federal unit within the Soviet Union enjoying the status of an “Autonomous Soviet Republic”, later (following the annexation of Bessarabia by USSR) was upgraded to the status of a full-fledged “Soviet Socialist Republic”. Both SFRY and USSR broke down in the same year of 1991. This coincidence was not accidental but connected with the downfall of a string of autocratic communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The collapse of the two federal structures mentioned above was accompanied and followed by low-level violence in some parts of USSR, by a war in Chechnya and by violence elsewhere in the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation). Even bloodier armed conflicts and localized wars accompanied the downfall of SFRY. To the list of unsuccessful federalist experiments in the Balkans one should also add the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” – FRY (1992-2003). In 1999 this asymmetric two-member federation lost its province Kosova/Kosovo, formerly an autonomous federal unit (region) in SFRY. In 2003 FRY was transformed into the “State Community of Serbia and Montenegro”. By 2006 this loose and malfunctioning confederation might in turn disappear altogether. During two periods separated by several decades of centralist authoritarian rule federalism operated also in connection with Bosnia & Herzegovina. Both times it appeared under abnormal circumstances and in two very different forms. Both times without referenda B & H was incorporated into much larger multinational states (KuK and DFY/FPRY/SFRY). During her first association with federalism B & H had been a non-self-governing territory, outside the two constituent parts of KuK. For four decades (1878-1918) she had been ruled jointly by Austria and Hungary through an Austrian military governor subordinated to the Common Minister of Finance (usually a Hungarian). She was formally annexed by KuK in 1908 and for about three years the country had a mostly consultative parliamentary assembly to which representatives of the Orthodox Serb (37), Moslem Bosniak (29), Catholic Croat (23) and Jewish (1) communities were elected on a limited franchise. After the Second World War, in Tito’s Yugoslavia B & H was given the much higher status of a full-fledged “People’s Republic” in FPRY and later of a “Socialist Republic” in SFRY. In the 1960s an internal system was instituted through which all important positions within B & H and in the B & H’s federal “slots” were distributed among the three largest national groups. This system had operated until SFRY’s demise and the outbreak of a war in B & H. Following a decisive military intervention by NATO in 1995 Bosnia & Herzegovina was officially reconstituted, this time as a quasi-federal state consisting of two ethnically cleansed “entities” – the “Federation B & H” and the “Serbian Republic”. The Dayton-Paris agreement (1995) incorporated some ideas taken from in the ill-fated Vance-Owen plan (1993), including the division of the country into “cantons”. Thus a very unusual compound structure was created in B & H containing 13 parliaments, 13 governments and about 150 ministries and ministers. Its founding document, called a “Constitution”, was elaborated by foreign (mostly US) experts and as Annex 4 included in an omnibus international treaty. The Dayton - Paris institutional arrangements were imposed on B & H by great powers, two international organizations (NATO, EU) and by two neighboring states. The text of the constitution was signed under duress by the leaders of three nationalist parties, each representing a major national group in BiH. Subsequently the document was never submitted to a referendum and approved by the population of B & H. Moreover the Dayton-Paris package contained several other important documents, signed by various

31 groups of signatories, which have considerable bearing on the implementation of the constitution and on the functioning of B & H. These additional documents still regulate i.a. the inter-entity boundary, human rights, military aspects of the peace settlement (including the long-term presence of foreign troops in B & H), regional stabilization, arbitration between two entities, elections etc. The Dayton godfathers, tired of the Balkans, were interested primarily in terminating as soon as possible the continuous bloodshed and trouble in B & H – an important source of regional instability. In a hurry they created a structure which has been clearly at odds with the proclaimed lofty goal of (re)creating a multiethnic and multicultural society in that country. Instead the Western powers imposed a system which has in fact cemented the lines separating the three national communities, did not resolve the problem of refugees and displaced persons and did not assure equal rights to the minorities. Thus a dysfunctional, top-heavy and wasteful bureaucratic structure was created in B & H. From the start it has been deficient in legitimacy, coherence and rationality. Its insufficient self-sustaining capability has been so far compensated by the imposed international protectorate, foreign military and police presence and by dictatorial powers still exercised by the High Representative. Given the progress achieved during the last ten years, the improved political and security environment inside B & H and in the wider region there is an obvious need to replace the present faulty institutional arrangements with a much lighter, more rational, effective and self-sustaining democratic political system which would be based on a wide political consensus and enjoy sufficiently strong support from the multinational and multiconfessional population of B&H. In spite of numerous failures in the past the future of federalism in South Eastern Europe does not look bleak. In addition to the continued existence of federal Bosnia & Herzegovina two so-called “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and on Cyprus might be resolved through the creation of new confederal structures consisting of (a) the Republic of Moldova and the Transdnestrian Republic, and (b) the Republic of Cyprus and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. An original association of two sovereign states might replace the present “State Community of Serbia and Montenegro”. Furthermore regionalism might be strengthened in the now centralist and unitarian Republic of Serbia, with a measure of autonomy granted (again) to the regions of Voivodina and of Sandzhak. More importantly the expansion of the European Union brings in a new form of confederalism which might be the best long-term solution for managing political conflicts within the region.

32 POOLING SOVEREIGNTY, LOSING TERRITORIALITY? MAKING PEACE IN CYPRUS AND MOLDOVA

EIKI BERG University of Tartu, Estonia.

Whereas territory contains a platform for units to participate internationally, it should also have sovereignty to render relations legitimate. Sovereignty is not only dispersed or pooled but also accumulated. Territory makes sense as long as there are attempts to strive for new nation-states or to maintain the territorial integrity of the old ones. One may argue that the less important is the territoriality nowadays the more complex and multifaceted the issue of sovereignty becomes. This comparative paper draws on the parallel developments in partition process, which gave birth to the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC) and Transnistria. The paper then analyses factual sovereignty and federalization attempts in Cyprus and Moldova, with the final focus on recent legitimizing constitutional provisions proposed in the Annan Plan and the Kozak Plan. My argument here is that even with the best intentions to agree on shared sovereignty, territoriality remains of primary concern for both parties in the conflicts.

Keywords: Sovereignty, territoriality, pseudo-states, conflict resolution, Cyprus, Moldova

33 HISTORICAL RESEARCH WHERE SCIENCE AND POLITICS MEET. THE CASE OF SREBRENICA

J.C.H. BLOM University of Utrecht, The Netherlands

On 11 July 1995 the Bosnian-Serb army took control of the Safe Area Srebrenica. During the subsequent days thousands of Muslims were killed in the environs of the enclave. At the time of these events, Dutch troops (Dutchbat) were stationed in that ‘safe area’ as part of the United Nations Protection Force within the framework of the United Nations peace mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN presence failed to prevent the fall of Srebrenica and the mass killings. These shocking events led to considerable debate in the Netherlands and elsewhere. During that discussion, questions about precisely what had happened were confused with questions of the responsibility of the troops and politicians involved. The debriefing report by the Dutch Ministry of Defence and a parliamentary debate in December 1995 which was intended to conclude the issue failed to put an end to the controversy. These issues continued to figure prominently in politics and publicity. In the summer of 1996 the Dutch cabinet stated that a broadly based international inquiry was called for to obtain a better insight into what had happened. That proposal met with considerable support in parliament, but the other countries involved and the relevant international organisations turned out not to be very keen on the idea. The cabinet then looked into the possibilities of holding an inquiry in the Netherlands. For that purpose it established contact with what is now known as the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), an Institute with a strong reputation for independent research on the history of the Second World War. The consultations between the cabinet and the NIOD led in November 1996, after parliamentary approval had been secured, to the issuing of a commission to the NIOD to conduct a scientific historical inquiry into ‘the events preceding, during and after the fall of Srebrenica’. In accepting that political assignment at a time when the issue was still very controversial, the NIOD took on a major risk. Not only was it questionable whether such an inquiry could lead to satisfactory results so soon after the events, but the danger that scholarship was or would be harnessed for political ends was not inconceivable either. After it had proved necessary to postpone the planned publication date several times, the NIOD finally presented an extremely detailed report on 10 April 2002. It attracted a lot of attention from politicians and the media, especially in the Netherlands. From the start that attention was focused more on the political consequences than on the actual contents of the report. That was particularly the case after the cabinet subscribed to the main findings of the report and tendered its resignation on 16 April (one month before the national election). The cabinet, and especially Prime Minister W. Kok, explicitly pleaded not guilty, but felt that it bore some responsibility for the complicated process of the intervention in the Former Yugoslavia that had so ostensibly failed. Parliament also decided to hold a Parliamentary Inquiry in the autumn of 2002 on the basis of the NIOD report. This article is devoted to the issues which emerged right from the start and which are relevant to the relation between politics and scholarship in the case of an inquiry commissioned by ‘the politicians’. Was it wise to accept the assignment? Were the conditions which had been agreed upon in consultation with the Government the right ones, and were they a sufficient basis for scholarly research? What was the effect of the highly charged political and emotional factors during the inquiry? What influence did the political setting have on the nature and contents of the report? What can be said in this light on the publicity aspects of the presentation and on the political consequences? And how did the world of academic historians react to the report? I shall distinguish four stages: that from the request to conduct the research to the acceptance of the assignment; that of the research itself; that of the presentation of the report and its short-term aftermath; and that of the longer-term reactions, including those from the academic world.

34 PRINCIPLES OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT - TOOL FOR REGIONAL CO- OPERATION

MITJA BRICELJ Ministry for Environment and Spatial Planning, Slovenia

The Balkan is a peninsula between Adriatic, Sava river and Ionian Sea. Regional legal framework for the water management in the area are Convention for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea (1976) and Convention for the protection Danube river (1994). The structure of both conventions is based on geographical principles - interactions between physical, social and economic environment. Implementation of those basic principles of international Laws and Conventions in cross border co- operation on Balkan region in last five years were fruitful. Slovenia actively advocated the elementary principles of integrated water management with high respectation toward ecological dimension of trans- boundary impact. By using this principles and mechanisms Slovenia successfully overcome (1990-1995) the conflict on border region where Austria constructed the hydro-power dam with significant impacts on Slovenian territory. Slovenia with all four neighbours countries for decades regulates the trans-boundary water issues on bilateral commissions for water management on regularly basis. Because of good results of this practice Slovenia actively participated in the process to prepare Framework Agreement for co-operation in Sava RB for transboundary water management and navigation. The Agreement was signed in Kranjska Gora (dec. 2003) and is on force from dec. 2005. Its main task is to implement decision of International commission for Sava river composed by members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia-Montenegro. Main challenges for Sava Commission are: - to prepare future oriented solutions which can contribute to sustainable management of water resources in the region - to enhance co-operation for development between the Sava countries, region, EU and other countries and international bodies and stakeholders. Such sub-regional approach as start in Sava RB for continental water is possible to introduce also for Adriatic. The Slovenian- Croatian - Italian Agreement for the protection Adriatic Sea and the coastal areas (1993) and Adriatic Ionian Initiative are clear signal that sub-regional activities can enhance regional co-operation (Mediterranean Action Plan/1995) for the effective management of the marine environment. Lessons learned: Integrated water management (IWM) is not business as usual. From early beginning holistic approach is very important by taking into account physical, social, cultural and economic dimension of the "water problem on the ground" what is basic for proposed (fair/sustainable) solution. For the success of IWM in trans-boundary (regional) context it is very recommended to be familiar with Agenda 21 and implementation of its principles in the international legislation (conventions, environmental and water laws, international agreements). Recent development of environmental dimension in international legislations (new legal framework on integrated management of RB) is real step forward and challenge to overcome existing conflicts and trying to avoid the new ones in the future. The main important principle in this process is to avoid sectoral (politic, economic, technic, ethnic) approach and solutions. Co-operation in transboundary context is becoming a reality in the Balkan again - via geographical approach to the management of shared water resources.

35 BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE PROCESSES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

MILAN BUFON University of Primorska, Slovenia

The paper will exam three major issues related to South-Eastern Europe as an area of geopolitical and geocultural contact, namely: problems concerning its geographical and geopolitical situation and delimitation; the political geographical past and current processes, frequently conflictual, related to its 'contact' status; and finally, co-operation and integration processes as a result of the shift from divergence to convergence potentials within the area and from its more recent stabilisation in the frame of growing European integration. This area is not easily defined: there is no ”correct“ geo-vision and all are equally useful, open to challenge, or biased. Thus this part of Europe is basically a product of the definer's imagination, determined not by its actual rooted geographical position but rather by its fluid geopolitical position among the European regional powers or most recently between the super-powers during the bipolar division of the continent throughout the second half of the 20 th century. It also functioned, however, as a geopolitical ”Shatterbelt“, a geocultural ”Gateway“, a ”Third Europe“ between Western and Eastern Europe, and thus was seen as a geopolitical ”gray zone“, a basically ”chaotic territory“ to be ruled and controlled, or as a ”buffer zone“ to be established and maintained as long as the geopolitical situation would allow, and within which the political map could be changed according to the variable ratio of influence among the regional powers. This paper will focus primarily on South-Eastern Europe as that part of Europe which has traditionally represented a European ”frontier“ or rather ”contact area“, even in the period when Europe has actually being commanded by ”marginal“ or ”extra-European“ forces. This region is now becoming crucial in terms of enlargement strategies of the EU and NATO, both trying to find a new way between convergence and divergence tendencies in this part of Europe, but also to test if the European "unity-in- diversity" integration programme is practicable as a real alternative to a possible global ”melting-pot“ future development.

36 THE SENSE OF PLACE IN SARAJEVO TEN YEARS AFTER DAYTON

CARLES CARRERAS University of Barcelona, Spain

This paper is based on different Sarajevo’s field works in Human Geography, did with University of Sarajevo and Barcelona students, from 1997 till 2003. The first conclusions are written on occasion both of the tenth anniversary of Dayton peace conference and the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the book Senses of place , of Professor John Eyles 1. The main objective has been the analysis of the reconstruction or rebuilding of the sense of place in Sarajevo after the war. A first theoretical question arises from the conflict between the old and traditional Sarajevo sense of place and the new ones. According Dayton agreements the continuity of the traditional Sarajevo’s collective images 2 would be desirable, but the new social situation puts many difficulties to any kind of continuity. Nevertheless ancient and new residents in Sarajevo have been developing their own senses of place, of course with many different meanings, rhythms and contradictions, according their social, ethnical or political differences. People analysed has been mainly the academic one, teachers and students, and international cooperants and researchers. This fact obviously implies an specific bias to the whole work. The methodology has been essentially qualitative, with field and fluctuant observation, mental maps analysis and a lot of deep interviews with Bosnian and foreign people, both in Sarajevo and in Barcelona during these eight years. The results of the research in progress 3 try to underline the relevance of the sense of place in order to achieve any pacific co-existence. In this direction we try to give some conclusions on which aspects need more implementation at the level of local and international policies and the significance of collective images production and consumption.

1 Eyles, J. Senses of Place . Warrington, Silverbrook Press, 1985. 2 The autor has published a little review on the traditional image os Sarajevo as a European Jerusalem (Carreras, C. (dir), Atlas de la Diversidad . Barcelona, Enciclopedia Catalana, 2004; pp. 132-133) 3 In February 1 to 8, 2006, we have one other field work in Sarajevo.

37 SOCIAL TERRITORIES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA POST-DAYTON, A LIMIT OF POLITICAL BOUNDARIES? THE EXAMPLE OF MONTENEGRO

AMAËL CATTARUZZA University of Paris IV-Sorbonne, France

The Dayton agreement has created new international boundaries in Balkans. But these new political borders, partially inherited of the administrative inter-republic delimitation of ex-Yugoslavia, do not fit in these areas with social territories of their populations. By social territories, we mean familial spaces characterized by the extension of the closest social environment (especially extension of the enlarged families), appropriated spaces (spaces frequently visited by populations, that belong to the sphere of their spatial behaviour or practices) and represented spaces (spatial unit that make sense in individual and collective representations). The confrontation of these three levels of observation, composing social territories, could maybe reveal a new former Yugoslavia’s map, with old transborder links and solidarities that can weaken border effect of the post-Dayton political space. In the other hand, invisible border seems to exist inside of these new states. These hypotheses are confirmed by our field work in Montenegro. Founded on 428 questionnaires diffused on 8 towns in the country, we have compared for each of these places maps of familial extension, maps of displacements and travels and mental maps. These methodologies provide a specific and complex vision of social territories that may influence our political analyzes of territories. Can we see here a limit of the new political boundaries sealed by the Dayton Agreements? Indeed, the shape of social territories in Montenegro looks more like an intricate transborder network of places than like areas clearly delimitate by borders. More generally, this method comparing adequation or non-adequation of social and political processes could be used to evaluate the sustainability of states borders and the potential risks of local conflicts, but also to find alternative solutions and create new cooperation, based on older social links and spatial solidarities.

38 WHEN INTERNATIONAL DIVERGENCE ECHOES IN THE NATIONAL FIELD. THE EXAMPLE OF CROATIA

EMMANUELLE CHAVENEAU-LE BRUN University of Lyon II, France

Dayton led to the emergence of National States ruled by nationalists. They had a centralized vision of their new States and the conviction that the new rule was “everyone for himself”. This met strong resistance from their internal regional level, where reconstruction demanded to renew ancient cooperation links. Slavonia, in Croatia seems to be a good example of this area torn between two opposite policies. 1. At the State level, divergence as a “political whitening” After 1995, Croatia tried to make everyone forget that she was, some days, part of Yugoslavia, seen as too balkanic. The government, through the official maps of the country that he issued, for example, attempted to re placed itself in the central European frame. One of its best success is the recognition by the EU that Croatia wouldn’t be obliged to wait for its later counterparts for eurointegration. 2. At the regional level, convergence as a pragmatic solution Slavonia was heavily damaged by the war (1991-1995). Instead of begin from the central State, the region saw its reconstruction through transnational borders cooperation with Tuzla region in Bosnia- Herzegovina and Nova-Sad region in Serbia. The political took the resources possibilities of their region into consideration, saw they had to share their position on transeuropean corridor and on the Danube/Sava waters system. They had the same social and economics problems as well. So they preferred to lunch a convergence process, established since 2002. 3. Internal divergence for reconstruction/recomposition Those two opposite trends in the same country are nourished by two opposite political vision of what must be Croatia, this newly independent State. A centralize one, according to State point of view. A regionalized one, according to Slavonia, and others. A “pure” Croatian State, for the first one, a multicultural country for the seconds.

39 CHANGE OR THE UPGRADING OF DAYTON

SELMA CIKOTI Ć University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Dayton peace talks were the most significant peace negotiations during the last decade of the second millennium. With regard to their character, the participants involved, and the consequences projected on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the region in which it is located, as well as on the relations of considerably more powerful actors on the world political scene, these peace talks exceed the dimensions and the borders of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A ten year distance from the time when these peace talks were held offers an opportunity for an assessment of the character and relevance of the consensus achieved in Dayton in November, 1995. Practice has shown that changes in the arrangements and solutions adopted in Dayton are frequently called for, but also that any movement in this direction is painstaking and difficult to accomplish. However, the essence of the dilemma of many officials meditating on the perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina and taking responsibility for its fate and future boils down to one question – whether to upgrade the solutions achieved in Dayton or change them completely. Parallel to this appears also the question of whether the approaching talks about constitutional and many other changes within the state structures and functions of Bosnia and Herzegovina should again include all the participants present in Dayton, or whether the attendance should be circumscribed to include only the subjects located within Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a participant of the Dayton peace talks I can observe that it is easy to criticise Dayton and far more difficult to achieve a consensus in a measure that could surpass the scope of the solutions achieved there. At the same time, I am concerned by the fact that in searching for solutions concerning the changing or upgrading of the Dayton peace agreement it is possible to observe a dissension between the approach of the officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina (of all ethnic groups), and the representatives of the international community present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The local officials expect that the big changes will be carried out by the international community, while the representatives of the latter believe that the circumstances have matured to the point where the institutions and representatives of the structures of the Bosnian and Herzegovian state are able to carry this out by themselves. In my opinion, this dilemma deserves a more detailed and thorough elaboration.

40 HAS ETHNIC CLEANSING SUCCEEDED? PART I: EVALUATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX 7 IN BIH.

CARL DAHLMAN, GEARÓID Ó’TUATHAIL University of South Carolina, USA

This paper considers the impact of the effort by the international community to implement Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Accords. It begins by outlining the nationalists’ goals in the 1992-95 war and maps the effects that the policy of ethnic cleansing had on the demographic structure of Bosnia. The paper then analyzes the localized geopolitical struggles that unfolded across Bosnia as the international community began to build local capacity in trying to fulfill the promises of Annex 7 for those who wanted to return.

41 REFUGEE REPATRIATION POLICIES: MINORITY RETURN TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND CROATIA

IVANA DJURI Ć University of Nottingham, UK

In October 2004, it was announced that the one millionth Bosnian returnee has been repatriated to its pre- war home. The same report has estimated that half of the total number of returnees repatriated to places where their ethnic group represents a minority. Certainly, this is a great achievement if recalling a total figure of 2.5 million Bosnian and Croatian refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) at the end of wars in 1995. Significant involvement of the international community helped the cessation of wars and the refugee repatriation that is being accomplished through enormous financial assistance and political pressures. Provisions guaranteeing refugees’ return to Bosnia and Croatia have been incorporated into the Dayton Peace Agreement and its Annex 7, in an effort “…to restore peace and stability to the region through, inter alia, reversing the effects of ethnic cleansing” (Bagshaw 1997:28). In practical terms, this meant that all refugees and particularly minority refugees were allowed and encouraged to return to their pre- war homes. In both, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia the refugee repatriation policies, which aimed to facilitate the minority return, have been adopted and implemented under the international pressures. In other words, the policy agenda on minority refugee repatriation was moved forward by internationals, it was structured top-down and lacking commitment from below and the local actors. Moreover, reports coming from various independent organisations engaged in human rights monitoring such as Helsinki Committee BH and Human Rights Watch, question the official numbers of minority returnees and suggest much lower figure of 20 percents at most. The aim of my proposed paper is analysis of governmental repatriation policies that were created to address return of minority refugees and IDPs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. I intend to examine to what extent those policies have been implemented and if they contributed to the goals proclaimed under the DPA in 1995. Focus of the research is on a study of so called ‘minority refugee repatriation’ i.e. refugees returning to the localities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, where their ethnic group constitutes a minority of population.

References

Bagshaw, S. 1997, Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? : determining the criteria for the repatriation of refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina European University Institute, Florence.

42 RESHAPING THE AIR SUPPLY IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 4

FRÉDÉRIC DOBRUSZKES Free University of Brussels - Laboratory of human geography, Belgium

The air supply evolution of the former Yugoslavian countries between 1991 and 2004 gives a fair idea about the conflicts of the 1990s, the current economic situation of those countries, and their geopolitical and economic restructuring. In 1991, the air supply was dominated by Belgrade and Zagreb, connected to Western and Eastern cities, while the JAT ranked among the big European airlines. The company, though anchored in Europe, operated several intercontinental air links. In 2004, the overall supply represents less than what it used to be in former Yugoslavia. There are as many networks and national airlines as there are new countries. Intercontinental links have almost disappeared, and the networks are generally recentred on the European space. The different national airlines are few significant, including the JAT, today national airline of Serbia, thus of a consequently reduced market. A good deal of the recent history is reflected in the post-Yugoslavian air market, sometimes close to caricature. For example, Air Srpska in the Republic of Srpska, half financed by Serbia, has only one airplane and one air link Banja Luka-Zurich; multicephalic States (BiH and Serbia-Montenegro) have several “national” airlines (Air Bosna / Air Bosna ; JAT / Montenegro Airlines); airlines from the Orthodox sphere are united by various cooperation forms. Lastly, the stake for Slovenia, and, in future, probably for Croatia too, is to see their national airlines resist the EU mode of sky liberalization, which automatically binds EU members. The liberalization opens the whole Community market to all EU airlines and forbids their funding, except for domestic activities validated as public service by the Commission: an open invitation to Western European airlines domination?

4 This paper proposal is drawn from a chapter of the book « L'ex-Yougoslavie dix ans après Dayton - De nouveaux Etats entre déchirements communautaires et intégration européenne » (“Former Yugoslavia, 10 years after Dayton – New States between community rifts and European integration”) (forthcoming).

43 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TEN YEARS AFTER DAYTON – INITIATIVES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR THE REVISION OF THE DAYTON AGREEMENT

DRAGAN ðUKANOVI Ć Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended on 21 November 1995 with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in Dayton (the Dayton Agreement). 5 The Agreement was signed by representatives of the central authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as by presidents of neighboring countries – the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Agreement was a measure of compromise between the conflicting sides and their nationalist elites. Starting from the situation in the field, the Agreement provided for the setting up of a federation with two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with the Bosniak and Croat majority) and the Republic of Srpska (with the Serb majority). Also, the following formula was established in keeping with the Agreement: one state (Bosnia and Herzegovina), two entities (Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska) and three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs). 6 However, it is important to note that with this Agreement both the international community and the signatories of the document had put the existing status of ethnic divisions of the former Yugoslav republic “on ice.” However, the Agreement had preserved the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was reasserted during and after World War II, particularly within the federal Yugoslavia (1945-1992). According to the Agreement, however, the statehood of Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily referred to external characteristics of statehood, while its constituent parts – entities, exercised most of the authority. Over the past decade of the Dayton Agreement implementation, this has, of course, caused numerous problems relating to the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a functional state. So far, the stagnation in the functioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state has been overcome through occasional interference by representatives of the international community (High Representative).

5 See: Dejtonski sporazum (special edition), Naša Borba, Fininvest, Belgrade, Novi Sad, 1996. 6 Dayton General Framework Agreement: Annex 4 – Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina , Preamble, paragraph 10.

44 POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE POST-DAYTON REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA – BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA RELATIONS: SELECTED TOPICS

ANTON GOSAR University of Primorska, Slovenia

Slovenia is at present in several ways involved in political, administrative and economic developments, which are taking place in Europe and its south-eastern part. In 2005, Slovenia holds the presidency of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and soon, in 2007, will share the responsibility of governing the European Union, together with Germany and Portugal. Several hundred Slovenian soldiers, fire fighters, members of the police force and humanitarian organizations serve in peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan, Cyprus, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. De-mining expertise of Slovene professionals is at most appreciated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Professional combat solders train with Hungarian and Italian partners to become in 2007 a useable quick deployment/response force.

The economic partnership with the area of former Yugoslavia is heterogeneous. It involves 1.) exchange of goods, 2.) construction of and investments into joint-venture enterprises and 3.) building-up innovative institutions and firms (like the Terme Čatež investments into the Aqua- and Wellness Centre of Sarajevo). The exchange of goods, the imports and exports, are in all nation-states of the discussed territory in favor of Slovenia. Actually the trade surplus is in average 14%, but with some partners it is closer to 20% and rising. Most Slovenian exports in the area were in 2004 directed towards Croatia (47.5%), the second in line remained to be Bosnia and Herzegovina (19.5%), closely followed by Serbia and Montenegro (16.5%), with a rising trend. Imports are in the same ranking but considerably lower. The Slovenian Chamber of Commerce reports that in 2004 560 Slovenian firms have had own or partnership ventures in Serbia and Montenegro (36.6%), Croatia (26.8%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (23.2%) and Macedonia (13.4%). According to the National Bank of Slovenia, Slovenian enterprises (Banks and Firms) have on 1. 1. 2004 had 1.151 million Euros investments in foreign countries - 62%, almost two thirds of them vent into businesses located in South Eastern Europe. According to the same report Croatia was with 33.1% leading, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.2%), Serbia and Montenegro (11.1%), Macedonia (4.3), Bulgaria and Romania (2.6%). According to the 2003 RS Statistical Office report 75.4% of Slovenian holiday-makers spend their leisure-time in the area of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina: 5.8%, Serbia and Montenegro: 2.1%, Macedonia: 0.4%), making Slovenes Croatia’s number four ranking visitors (following multi-million countries like Germany, Italy and Austria).

EU Slovenia’s economy is well back in the area of former multi-nation state of Yugoslavia. It enables well-being and growth through employment in respective countries, and at the same time produces profit in the local environments and investor’s enterprise. If democracy by European standards is on its way, the market-oriented economy is in the post-Dayton world in full swing. If the EU gateway towards South-Eastern Europe has to be identified by nation-states, Slovenia is among the leading (along with Austria, Italy and Germany).

45 A NICHE IN POST-CONFLICT SPACE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BAPTIST CHURCH AS A "MIDDLE OPTION" FOR SERBS IN THE BANOVINA REGION, CROATIA

REINHARD HENKEL, LAURA ŠAKAJA University of Zagreb/Croatia

One of the observable aspects of social change during the transition period in most post-socialist countries was the revival of religion. Resurgence of churches accompanied national revival and in some countries was connected with growing post-socialist nationalisms. This paper focuses on the development of different - trans-national - religious options in the area of ethnic conflict by presenting the case study of post-war growth of the Baptist Church in the Banovina region in Croatia, close to the Bosnian border. Research results are founded on half-structured interviews with church representatives and members. The research showed that there was a considerable post-war expansion of the Baptist Church in the Banovina region, and that it was mainly ethnic Serbs and people from mixed marriages who joined the Church. Most of them had been Communists. For them, neither the Catholic Church which is usually regarded a Croatian church nor the Serbian Orthodox Church are viable religious options. There are three factors making the "Baptist option" viable: a) It was grounded on an already existing historical tradition of the Baptist Church in this region and on myths and memories activated in war and post-war periods. b) The Baptist Church made available a middle “trans-national” option in ethnically mixed areas and attracted by that those who were searching for a niche of neutrality in an ethnically strongly divided conflict region. c) Considerable humanitarian work and help of organisations related to the Baptist Church during and after the war not only added to its image elements of existential shelter in the eyes of many people in need, but also brought the church out of the shadow and made it more “visible” - thereby improving its former perception as an obscure sect.

46 THE DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS SYSTEM BETWEEN ROMANIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES AT THE TURN OF MILLENNIUMS

ALEXANDRU ILIE , OLIVIER DEHOORNE, CORINA T ĂTAR, MARIUS T ĂTAR University of Oradea, Romania

The fall of the socialist system in Central and Eastern Europe has changed to a great extent the political and territorial configuration of this territory and implicitly the nature and intensity of the relations between the states composing this political area. At the turn of millenniums the dismantling of the federal Yugoslavian state system has brought a change in the relations between Romania and these new independent states. Thus, gradually, the bilateral Romanian-Yugoslavian relations have increased: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia, resulting at present in a complex and varied system with economic and political connections. From bilateral relations with each former Yugoslavian state it has come to complex systems to which same ”groups of interest” of more ex- Yugoslavian states participate as well as to a second category of relations to which other states outside this system participate. From a contiguous system determined by the common Romanian-Yugoslavian border which implies a direct relation between Slovenia or Bosnia-Herzegovina and Romania it has come to a limitation of the areas determined by this relation of contiguity and implicitly to the individual reconsideration of each ex-Yugoslavian state with a view to the cooperation relations. Thus this paper aims to analyse the evolution of the political relations’ and economic system at the turn of millenniums starting from a bilateral Romanian-Yugoslavian connection and getting to numerous possibilities of connections between them as a result of the state’s dismantling in 5 such independent systems. Furthermore the EU and NATO enlargement, the location at the eastern border have changed profoundly the geopolitical position of these states and implicitly the relations’ system created between them and Romania.

Key words: Central and Eastern Europe, Balkan region, political and economical relations, Romania.

47 COLLECTIVE IDENTITY OF THE CRIME POLICE IN A TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY IN THE AREA OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. INTERPRETATION OF SOME SELECTED ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELDWORK RESULTS.

MAJA ILIJAVEC Slovene Anthropological Society, Slovenia

The transition process is today very significant to all Eastern European countries where Slovenia is placed. For the period of transition are characteristic many changes and some of them we will try to explain. Slovene police force has been through some rough changes in the past fifteen years, since the Slovenia’s independence. The police force in every country is a repressive institution which role is to secure the citizens of the country. The hierarchical organization, as the police force is, is very inflexible and therefore the changes have even greater role. We will try to explain some of them through discussion of police culture, personality and collective identity. The last one is the most important part of the informal relations in the police force. The collective identity is studied through it’s symbols, formal and informal ones. We will especially discuss identification documents, language, image, collectivism, perception of time, etc. The paper is a result of a more than three years long anthropological fieldwork among Slovene crime detectives.

48 WHAT BOSNIA SHOULD HAVE BEEN? LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES FROM BR ČKO DISTRICT

ALEX JEFFREY Durham University, UK

In 1998 the International Crisis Group (ICG) stated that Br čko was “what Bosnia could be”. This seemed an unusually positive description of a town that had been the subject of much dispute at the Dayton Peace Accords. At the time of the ICG report Br čko remained mired in an international arbitration process, with both the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska retaining strong claims to the territory of the former Br čko Municipality. This ongoing dispute proved a barrier to refugee return and economic development. The solution of a multi-ethnic ‘Br čko District’, announced by the Arbitral tribunal in March 1999, marked a significant departure from the partition-based logic enshrined at the Dayton Accords and provided a working example of an alternative model of peace building in post-conflict Bosnia. The District was officially formed in March 2000 through the appointment of a multi-ethnic government and assembly, under the watchful gaze of the US State Department-appointed District Supervisor. This paper draws on ethnographic and quantitative field data gathered in Br čko since 1999 to focus on the learning opportunities provided by the District approach. There have been important successes in Br čko District, most notably rapid economic development through successful privatisation, high levels of refugee return and the creation of ‘multi-ethnic’ institutions of governance. However, these reforms have been achieved through careful management by a series of District Supervisors, leaving questions as to the sustainability of the Br čko model in the absence international supervision. The paper examines the logistical and theoretical challenges of applying the Br čko District approach to other localities or scaling- up the model to the Bosnian state level.

Keywords: Bosnia, Br čko, returns, privatization, civil society

49 SUITABILITY OF DAYTON TERRITORIAL DIVISION FOR THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

DAMIR JOSIPOVI Č Anton Melik Geographical Institute, Slovenia

The presented material includes review of changes in ethnic structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina especially during the second half of the twentieth century. The aim of the contribution is to point to territorial origin of the armed conflict and consequently war in the first half of nineties. The Dayton agreement as a political outcome of the four-year war was territorially based upon a cease-fire line from the end of 1995 massively rewording Serbian side. Thus the agreement actually abolished the main factors of pre-war ethnic distribution of population. The period of Socialist Yugoslavia after the Second World War marked the re-creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the six federal units of the new federation. Despite of not recognizing Sandžak as an autonomous federal unit, the formation of the Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave birth to the political formation of Muslims (in ethnic sense) as a separate ethnicity couple of decades later making them a political player. Nevertheless, pre- war (before 1992) Bosnia and Herzegovina was ethnically heterogeneous area par-excellence, with only few areas of uniform ethnic structure. Being the constitutive ‘homeland’ of three ethnic groups (Croats, Muslims and Serbs) together forming overwhelming majority, those three ethnic groups lived intensively intertwined creating so-called leopard skin pattern. With very slow or almost impossible progress of the return of refugees, especially in the Serbian part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is becoming apparent that Dayton agreement factually enables ethnic ‘purification’. Thus we deal on one hand with the simplification of ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other with the processes of divergence. As a result of such processes contemporary socio-economic development lacks the geographical integrity and losing a great deal of cultural diversity. The proposal for redefining Dayton territorial division is presented to suit more with regional-geographic resources and nodal-functional regions. At the same time, it is aimed at integration based on more realistic ethnic division to mirror the pre-war ethnic balance.

Key words: Dayton agreement, ethnic structure, Croats, Muslims, Bosniaks, Serbs, Bosnia and Herzegovina

50 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ON THE INTERNET: THE SLOVENIAN PERSPECTIVE

SIMON KERMA, JUG BEBLER University of Primorska, Slovenia

The image of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as presented in this paper, is based on the analysis of hits in the Slovene language on the selected internet browsers and various websites. When we consider the number of results for »bosna-hercegovina«, it becomes clear that on Slovene browsers (except for Arnes.si – Academic and Research Network of Slovenia) the presence of Bosnia and Herzegovina isn't particularly strong, while on two foreign browsers it is markedly weak (compared to the presence of some other selected countries close to Slovenia). The structure of the relevant topics, related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, differs according to the chosen browsers. War topics (i.e. war crimes) are still widely covered, nevertheless, 'integration processes' and economic topics are becoming increasingly significant. They are subsequently followed by the topics related to sport, culture and tourism. From the sites of Slovene travel agencies it is also evident that some parts and places in BiH are more exposed than others. As the global focus changed, some major Slovene (online) media switched their attention to other hot areas, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still frequently covered by them. On the other hand, some media have apparently only just recently »discovered« BiH and pay much more attention to it. Reason for that might also be the changes in official policy towards the wider area of Southeast Europe. The analysis of Slovenia's government websites by Purcell points out the country's efforts to »emphasize the “Europeaness” of Slovenia, in sharp distinction with Balkaness, which is seen as ‘un-European’« (Purcell 1999, 22). However, according to the latest messages from the sites in question, it becomes clear that as negotiations came to an end and Slovenia entered Euro-Atlantic alliances, the atmosphere within the political elite regarding the Balkans became less tense. In this sense, it is quite indicative that the websites of NGOs (and Bosnian minority organizations) in Slovenia are complementary to political and economic presentations of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Less pleasant topics are still very much present on NGO’s sites, but also accompanied by texts on cultural exchange, solidarity and help. To complete this one-way virtual picture, a shorter analysis of »Slovenia on the internet« (the Bosnian perspective) has been made as well.

51 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE CRISIS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE WAR FOR SLOVENIA TO DAYTON

MATJAŽ KLEMEN ČIČ University of Maribor and the Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia

What role did the international community play in the Yugoslav crisis in the first half of the 1990s? The team did not agree on question whether, if international community reacted sooner the bloody demise of Yugoslavia could be prevented. On the basis of current literature the role of particular international factors (UN, NATO, OSCE, EC/EU, WEU), key world powers (USA, Germany, Soviet Union/Russia, Great Britain, France, etc.), and standpoints of non-aligned countries, smaller countries of EC/EU, and other neighboring countries of former Yugoslavia are discussed. The international community attempted to perpetuate the ancien régime instead of seeking to facilitate a peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia and thus bears considerable responsibility for the violence and insecurity that followed. Both the United States and Russia, along with other states, ignored the truth that no state, whatever its origins, can expect to survive without the support and at least the passive allegiance of most of its citizenry. Different authors have different views on what were real intentions of the world powers in Yugoslavia. Some of them, and also almost all the pro-Miloševi ć’s Serb politicians are even of the opinion that the break up of Yugoslavia was the final goal of the West. Regardless of the policy of the foreigners towards the former Yugoslavia, it could not possibly have been kept in one piece. It might have been possible that the dissolution process would have been more peaceful if the superpowers had acted differently and if they were less ignorant. The U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia was inconsistent from the very beginning. The question is whether U.S. politicians were aware of the situation in Yugoslavia or whether they wanted to be aware of it. The CIA came out in October 1990 with the forecast that Yugoslavia would cease to function within one year and would probably dissolve within two. Also, according to this report: economic reform would not stave off the breakup. At the same time the U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, often said: “ We don’t have a dog in this fight ,” and President George Bush, Sr. asked U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft: “ Tell me again what this is all about .” The U.S.A. let the EU take the lead. The controversy is, whether EU diplomats were capable enough to handle the situation alone. Although U.S. diplomats closely followed the situation, including the building crisis in Kosovo, in the 1980s, they were not heard in the State Department. The controversy of Baker’s visit to Yugoslavia in June 1991 and the role of U.S. Congress in the Yugoslav crisis is also discussed – with special emphasis the role ethnicity of the constituents and members of Congress and U.S. Senators played. For the Slovenes and also for the Croats an important issue was to become a member of EC as soon as possible and as Slovenes and as Croats and not as “Yugoslavs.” Both the Yugoslav government and Slovene and Croatian politicians had been actively seeking explicit support from European institutions and governments for their separate programs and EC/EU countries for a very long time did not have a united standpoint towards the crisis. Also the European Parliament already in March 1991 passed a resolution declaring “that the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own future in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and internal borders.” It is interesting to note for a historian that Otto von Habsburg played quite important role in passing this and all the subsequent resolutions in European Parliament supporting the principle of self-determination. At the same time most European governments continued to support the Yugoslav government and to insist that the Yugoslavs stay together. The role of Germany, or better to say when did Germany decided to support the breakup of Yugoslavia, is discussed in quite a great detail. While most of the authors agree that Germany until late autumn 1991 did not intent to support the breakup, the others believe that this was the intention of Germany from the very beginning of the crisis. The Soviet Union also supported the preservation of Yugoslavia. Its support was based on the historical friendship of the Russians with the Serbs. Also the Orthodox religion bonded the Russians with the Serbs and Soviet Union had been already experiencing independent movements and declaration of independence of some of her constitutive republics. In spite of this, Soviet Union did not intend to help military to JNA. The neighbors with the possible exception of Austria did not support the breakup. The role historic ties of these countries with certain nations and worries about the destiny of their ethnic minorities and UN Secretary General support for the non-recognition in the second half of 1991 is discussed. In the report we discuss also: historic ties of Great Britain and France with the Serbs; Netherlands role as a country which presided EU; the role party affiliations of leading politicians played determine their standpoints towards the Yugoslav crisis.

52 The narrative of the breakup from Slovene “Ten-day War” to Croatian war and different attempts of EC and UN to solve the crisis is discussed. Different views on Slovenia’s and Croatia’s influence on European public opinion and successive European and U.S. initiatives in Croatia and Bosnia—the Vance Plan, the Cutileiro Plan, the Vance-Owen Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, the Z4 Plan, etc.—which were all ready to compromise the principle of republican sovereignty in one way or another are discussed in great detail. Also the problem of international recognition of “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and the role played by EU and USA is discussed. Also touched upon is recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and later Bosnia and Herzegovina and reaction of international community to the recognition by EU and USA. In the report the international community’s standpoints towards developments in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is described. Special chapter is devoted to the development of Bosnian crisis and the reasons for it. The history of the coexistence of the three ethnic groupings is another subject of controversy. In one view BiH was little short of a model of multiculturalism; in another it was a land of mutual terror. It is interesting to note that the international community hesitated and spent a large amount of time before deciding on any action, and even more before it actually acted. There are many reasons for such an attitude. Among the most important is the fact that the international community, including the United States, did not have any strategy on what to do with the former Yugoslavia, which was shaken by armed fights. The problem was complicated even more because some states had their own strategic interests, which depended on different historical sympathies (e.g.., between Serbia and Russia) or historical animosities (e.g.,. between Serbia and Germany). There were too many organizations and bureaucrats who dealt with the Yugoslav crisis in general. Also, the neutrality of UNPROFOR, which was demanded by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, had its impact—to slow down any action. Also states that had their soldiers in UNPROFOR were against any serious action, especially against any military intervention against the Serbs, because blue helmets, who carried only light arms, would not be able to resist any Serbian attacks. By opposing air strikes on Serbian targets and his determination to keep calm and keep talking objectively, Boutros-Ghali was supporting the Bosnian Serbs, who were happy with his policy. Boshniaks accused Boutros-Ghali of being too friendly with Miloševi ć and at an international conference in Kuala Lumpur, Izetbegovi ć said that among thirty UNSC resolutions on BiH, only the one that forbade Bosniaks to be armed was passed and implemented. Boutros-Ghali was trying to find excuses for his policy by saying that NATO’s attacks would be more dangerous for UN troops on the ground than for the Serbs. Boutros-Ghali, as former Egyptian foreign minister during the Tito period, suffered from “Yugonostalgia” and still recognized the existence of Yugoslavia. UN troop commandants opposed his policy because they knew the situation on the ground. They could not bear the fact that they could not intervene in spite of many war crimes. Therefore it is not surprising that there were many quarrels inside the UN mission in BiH, especially between “civilians” and “soldiers.” We should take into account also the negative side of UN intervention, with UN forces complicit in the assassination of Bosnian Prime Minister Hakija Turajli ć; UN forces complicit in upholding the siege of Sarajevo; UN commanders like Generals Mackenzie and Rose deeply hostile to the Bosnians; UN sources making false claims about the Bosnians shelling themselves. In report also the so-called CNN effect, i.e., the impression on public opinion provoked by television reporting on the events in the Balkans, is shown as it helped in acceptance of many decisions in attempts to reach peace. The process of decision making of Clinton administration and internal and external reasons for the U.S. to finally intervene in Bosnia are discussed. On the last pages of report the Dayton Peace Accord and process of reaching it and controversies surrounding it are described.

53 CROATIA AND DAYTON

MLADEN KLEMEN ČIĆ Lexicographic Institute, Croatia

In November 1995 a document called General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed in Dayton, Ohio. Its main aim was to put an end to a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and trace post-war reconstruction of the country. It came into force after its ratification in Paris in December 1995, but was always widely referred to as the Dayton agreement. The comprehensive Agreement document detailed military and political accords, timetables and implementation arrangements for regional stabilisation, the establishment of inter-entity boundary, elections, constitutional issues, arbitration of inter-entity disputes, human rights, refugees and displaced persons and so on. General agreement was accompanied by 11 annexes, including new constitution of the country. Dayton agreement introduced several features relevant from the viewpoint of political geography. Bosnia-Herzegovina was preserved as a single state within its international borders, but it was divided into two, completely newly-established, entities: the Muslim-Croat Federation, and the Republika Srpska (RS). Two entities were divided by the new line, called Inter-Entity Boundary Line or IEBL. The town of Br čko was initially left beyond two entities and was later established as separate district, subordinated directly to central government. Dayton agreement stopped the war and introduced new internal organisation into Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was an imposed peace settlement by the USA and leading European powers who continued overlooking political developments. Due to fragile balance between two entities and three ethnic communities within the country, the stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina during past 10 years of post-Dayton period has been guaranteed and kept by strong international presence. Republic of Croatia was one of the sides to signed the agreement. Because of its interpedence with developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia was important co-signing side alongside with FR Yugoslavia. But it is not the only reason to put Croatia as a subject in an overall discussion on the Dayton accord. It is less known that Dayton negotiations also resulted with another agreement which helped resolving conflict in Croatia. It was a document called the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Sirmium , brokered among participants of the Dayton talks and only formalised among representatives of Croatian government and Serbian community in Croatia. The Agreement provided the framework for reintegration of the region into Croatia and initiated a staged process which was completed within the transitional period of two years. The agreement established UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonija (UNTAES) and enabled clear, achievable mandate for the UN mission. The aim of the article is to evaluate the achievements of the agreement and to point out its relevance from the viewpoint of political geography.

54 THE PARADOX OF DAYTON

NIKOLA KOVA Č University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina received a constitution never voted for by the representatives of its Parliament. The constitution was enforced as a basis for a future constitutional order of a country that had just come out of a war. This decision speaks volumes about the political and legal status of Bosnia and Herzegovina within the community of European countries. Although the decisions made in Dayton were indispensable and helpful in ending the war, they left long-term negative consequences for the development of democratic relationships in Bosnia and Herzegovina: among other things, the agreement did not define the character of the war and award equal rights to both the aggressor and the victim. The agreement was therefore based more on the demands of political pragmatism than on the imperatives of ethics and common sense. But righteous peace can never be established without a confrontation with the truth and a confession of guilt for the crimes committed. The strategy concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina as adopted by the international community was in the course of the conflicts not only contradictory but also deeply unjust and inhumane: when there was need to protect a sovereign state, member of the UN, the international community showed no political will to prevent “ethnic cleansing,” massive bloodshed and genocide. When, on the other hand, they saw the need to end the war, the same community, with the UN’s blessing, deployed all its power to equate the aggressors with the victims and divide the territory according to the lines on which the aggressors carried out the worst crimes on civilian population. In this way the Dayton Agreement legalised the territorial conquests of war, which the aggressor had no intention of relinquishing at the negotiating table. In fact, the Dayton Agreement ratified a fait accompli , while Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself in a “world of consequences,” powerless before thousands of victims, unable to establish a just and lasting peace. Though such peace can never be achieved if justice is not served, the international community drew out a plan to end the aggression without a victorious and a defeated side, with the “belligerent sides” sharing the responsibility and the aggressor legislating its right over the territories that it had conquered manu militari . A literal application of the Dayton Agreement did not, therefore, eliminate the danger of separatist tendencies leading to a territorial, political, economic and cultural division of Bosnia and Herzegovina; i.e., to the disruption of its constitutional-legal order. This gave rise to the need for a change in the regulations of the Dayton Agreement and in the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a result of this agreement. The decisions of the international community with regard to the internal organisation of the country were no less paradoxical: though the community acknowledged a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina and its historical continuance, it legalised two states (hand on heart, not as international subjects) within the State. Further, with the help of the United Nations, it proclaimed protected zones in Bosnia and Herzegovina without undertaking any measures (except monitoring) to actually protect them. The community is tracking down people charged with command responsibility for the crimes committed, while hundreds of killers and butchers are still on the loose and even holding offices in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere. The international community continues to ignore the entreaties of the Srebrenica survivors to ascertain the role of the “Blue Helmets” in the July 1995 massacre, although according to all available documents the representatives of the international community who did nothing to prevent the carnage are just as answerable for the Srebrenica genocide as Mladi ć and his criminals. These paradoxes are an expression of an incoherent foreign policy within the international community: the interests and the strategy of the Americans were different from those of the Russians, French and the English. In fact, all these countries differed from one another with regard to their interests and strategies, as well as the positions of their governments. These political differences had fatal consequences for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In appealing to these facts and analysing the mission of the international community in the Balkans and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one logical question emerges: what does Europe want to achieve in its southeastern peninsula? In the past ten years it has shown that it wants a pacification of the regions: in this its war project has achieved a complete success. Its civil organisms (OHR, OSCE), however, have failed to establish a lasting or just peace; failed to ensure the rule of law or the functioning of community institutions; failed to create the basic premises for the normal existence of an independent state; failed to reform the political and social structure with the goal of strengthening the awareness of a civil society; failed to enable the return of refugees and displaced people--nor have they managed to make their return sustainable from the financial point of view as well as in terms of safety; and even failed to bring to justice the most important war criminals. In a word, they have not managed to create a legal and political

55 basis that could guarantee lasting peace and the strengthening of the forces committed to the rule of law and the movement towards the European and Atlantic integration currents. Paradoxical is also the position of the international community and its High Representative when allowing the national parties that are currently dominating the political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina to persist in their everyday parliamentary practice in demolishing the Bosnian and Herzegovian state by political means, just as they used to do with weapons during the war. No reasonable person can deny the will and the right of a nation to political organization (even on a national basis) according to its interests, needs and tradition. What cannot be accepted, though, is the practice of manipulation with a nation, its patriotic feelings and continuous intimidation. One should not tolerate emphasising national interests to the detriment of general and universal interests, nor should one watch with ‘stoicism’ the strengthening of secession tendencies within a State with international credibility and deep historical roots of sovereignty. The international community has not realised yet that emphasising the rights to the protection of national interests does not serve the nation and does not contribute to the reinforcing of the state’s foundations, but serves most the political oligarchy which sees in the multiplication of functions and institutions of the authorities a chance for the protection of their own privileges. A ten-year-long practice of managing state business shows that the cases in which the representatives of the three governing parties have tried to bring their positions closer and harmonise their opinions have been extremely rare. All the problems, from the most banal (such as the visual aspect of the passports) to the most important (i.e., the formation of one army and police force), were subject to the arbitration of the High Representative. On these premises of division and false defence of national interests it is not possible to build a common state governed by the rule of law, nor democratise the relationships or develop the idea of solidarity and mutual trust. One of the basic paradoxes of the policy carried out by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the lack of a strategic vision in the development of the political, economic and cultural systems; this is a policy without an ideological vision, without an “educated hope” ( docta spes ), without open horizons; its operative circle, marked by pragmatic actions and palliative solutions does not encompass deeper historical and cultural strata nor does it define specific terms of development of the Balkan regions supervised by the international community. Just like in the past war, even today, in conditions of unstable peace, the international community takes into account the factual state, while disregarding the legal, ethical and cultural viewpoints. Even when its projects and goals (of which nothing reliable is yet known) did succeed, their results in Bosnia and Herzegovina could not be the same as, for example, those in Kosovo. Therefore, the measures undertaken and applied by the representatives of the international community cannot be identical for all territories supervised by it. Finally, the international community has enormous moral obligations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina: although Bosnia and Herzegovina was left to defend itself in the war, today it has the right to demand help from the international community in finding its own way of restoration and its place among the nations of a united Europe. This means creating the preconditions for consolidating the spirit of democracy and the basis of a civil society, as well as faster economic development. Bosnia and Herzegovina expects the international community to help prevent the Bosnian state from ending up among the European countries as an economic protectorate of the colonial type, and to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina in transforming its potential and real possibilities into a chance for an equal collaboration, connecting the south and the north of Europe, the east and the west, as an important geopolitical crossroads and a meeting point of different cultures and civilisations.

56 PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE RETURNING OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE FRAME OF THE POST-DAYTON STRUCTURE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

MATEJA KRAŠEVEC Slovenia

Bosnia and Herzegovina was the republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia an armed conflict broke out in BiH followed by ethnic cleansing which was responsible for a large number of exiles and formation of ethnically homogeneous areas. The war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement signed in 1995 which divided the country politically and geographically into two entities, but at the same time it should enable the return of the displaced persons to their homes. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the Dayton Peace Agreement from the point of view of the possibility of returning of the displaced population, to handle the basic conditions for their return and to drawl the attention to the problems of the returned emigrants. A particular consideration is given to the returning of the population belonging to a certain ethnic group to the areas that are today demographically and politically dominated by another ethnic group. The analysis of the nine-year process of returning and of the events that accelerated or slowed this process reveals us its successfulness/unsuccessfulness. The attention is focused especially on the question whether the minority returns have been successful in restoring the ethnic-mixing, characteristic of the pre-war BiH, or it has come to the complete consolidation of ethnic groups in particular areas. A rough evaluation of the present-day ethnic structure, unfortunately confirms the consolidation. The present-day situation is actually a situation of states within a state, where there is nothing that indicates the withdrawing of the existent internal borders and where one of the ethnic groups dominates the others.

Key words: ethnic cleansing, displaced persons, post-Dayton structure of BiH, political geography, refugee/internally displaced persons return.

57 ENVIRONMENT AND MEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN (MAP) IN B&H - CONTRIBUTION TO INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTRY

TARIK KUPUSOVI Ć, SELMA ČENGI Ć B&H Office for Mediterranean Action Plan, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Sustainable development and growth in B&H depend at most on internal organization, legislation and cooperation between entities, but also on international cooperation and assistance of international community in supporting these activities. Soon after the war was stopped, environmental policy and importance of regional and international cooperation on this issue were in the whole country recognized as a key development issue. The result of that was that environment sector in B&H was one of the first sectors seeking for increased inter-entity cooperation why the first inter-entity bodies established in a country were Environmental and Water Inter-Entity Steering Committees. They were established in 1998 year with the support of international community. Consequently, the activities of B&H in the field of regional / international cooperation became very intensive and were performed in several directions: -Notification and acceptance of the international conventions in environment field; -Active participation in regional environment programs (Mediterranean, Danube); -Implementation of regional environmental projects. By the succession with former Yugoslavia B&H has become the member of Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) and undertook the obligations relevant for the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols. For the last eight years, since the Office for MAP in B&H was established, special attention was devoted to the mobilization of the institutions which deal with the environmental problems (on local, cantonal and entity level) and to participation in MAP’s capacity building programs. Communication with MAP’s Regional Centers was established through which B&H’s representatives participated in various trainings and seminars on coastal environment. Transfer of knowledge and dissemination of experiences and information contributed to the strengthening of human and institutional resources at all administrative levels. As a part of MAP’s Strategic Action Program (SAP) adopted by Mediterranean Countries in 1997 year, Bosnia and Herzegovina is elaborating Pre-feasibility study for waste water and solid waste management of Neum Municipality. This study is initiating cooperation of two bordering countries (B&H and Croatia) on solving common problems related to sewerage and solid waste in that part of the Adriatic coast. B&H is also, in the framework of SAP, elaborating National Action Plan (NAP) for the reduction of pollution from land based sources. This work is currently under way and is expected to be completed in September 2005 and further on adopted by B&H Government. Regional cooperation on environmental issues is being realized through the common project with Republic of Croatia “Integrated Ecosystem Management of Neretva and Trebisnjica River Basins (NTRB)" , supported by GEF and WB. The objective of the project is to improve the effectiveness of institutions for the regulation, control and management of water resources within the NTRB. The project is aiming to provide a comprehensive framework to manage natural systems across sectors, to utilize inter-sectoral and participatory approaches to transboundary water resource management and implementation on an ecosystem scale and facilitate prioritization and strategic sequencing of needed policy reforms, investments, and other interventions. The project objective and activities are fully consistent with the European Union (EU) Water Framework Directive (WFD). Environmental policy in B&H became strong integrating factor in B&H, progressing often step ahead from other sectors (legal, financial, police, etc), why in some cases is being forced to wait for other political conditions to be created and so being prevented from further development.

58 SEVERAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE AFTER 2000

ELENA MATEI, CONSTANTIN VERT University of Bucharest, Western University of Timisoara, Romania

The study has been set to three basic objectives: first, it is to assess the changes and losses of the income, the poverty and the unemployed rate like social and economic effects. Two basic methods of contemporary social and economic sustainable research was designed for this study: descriptive study designs , and action research methods and techniques. The South East Europe Region refers to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro (formerly the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). It is a diverse region of over 60 million people, with an average income per capita ranging from € 400 in Moldova to € 4,000 in Croatia. The last decade left the region with a legacy of inadequate growth and declining living standards. Since the end of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, however, there has been considerable improvement. The region’s economic growth has resumed, institutions of the emerging democracies and market economies are being created and strengthened, regional trade links are being restored, private investment is slowly growing and the prospects for poverty reduction have improved. In generally the region growth has been close to an annual 5% since 2000. Significant progress has also been made in reducing inflation. Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon both social and economic problem. Above all, poverty is relative and doesn’t mean hunger, absolute poverty (no shelter or heat, sickness without proper healthcare, unemployment, powerlessness, illiteracy and lack of education). Relative poverty lines are generally set as a share of median or mean consumption and define poverty in relation to a national average welfare standard. According to the most recent World Bank Poverty Assessments, The South East European countries are characterized by low incomes and a high incidence of poverty in comparison with – The western European countries. Poverty in the region is concentrated in smaller size towns and is least prevalent in capital cities, and it disproportionaly affects minority groups and low-skilled workers. In addition, the unemployment is high in all countries (8%, Romania to 15%), and the young groups are most affected. There also seems to be a trend towards longer-term unemployment, as unemployed workers find it more difficult to get new jobs or retraining. Two basic methods of contemporary social and economic sustainable research was designed for this study: descriptive study designs , and action research methods and techniques.

59 NEOLIBERAL TOTALITARIANISM

SRDJAN MILASINOVI Ć Megatrend University of Applied Sciences, Belgrade

Unexpected and swift changes that befell South-Eastern Europe in the last decade of the past century, primarily the failure of authoritarian and totalitarian regime of real-socialism, the beginning of transition process based on the principles of ideology and doctrine of radical neo-liberalism and transformation of traditional “asymmetric interdependence” into the concept of “complex interdependence”, as well as shifting focus from “hard” forms of power (military power) to “soft” ones (technologies, information science, trade and finances), were met by rather unprepared both Eastern and Western theory and critical thought. At the same time, theory today does not fully acknowledge the role and dynamics of new form of power of the global emerging society, i.e. information power. It is the union of ideology and doctrine of neo-liberalism and information power that creates space for possible emerging of totalitarian tendencies in political practice of some developed liberal democratic states and states in transition, which in their form and content are essentially different from those “classical” ones of Nazi, fascist or Stalinist type. However, they are not less dangerous because of that. The deepest roots of neo-totalitarian tendencies can be traced back in the very nature of conservative neo-liberal capitalism, its ideology and profit as the main goal. This is also contributed by colonial and imperialistic tradition of the developed Western countries and their increasingly more and more militarized economies. Special role in neo-totalitarian tendencies is played by media and contemporary information systems, which offer unlimited possibilities to manipulate and shape public opinion globally. All this is accompanied by a paradox in the form of revitalization and re-introduction of the terms from past epochs into political vocabulary of 21 st century, such as protectorate or high commissioner, which remind considerably of suzerainty that was considered to be the part of dark Middle Ages. This is why today more than ever the warning words by Alexis de Tocqueville dating two centuries ago impose as imperative, that the state and power should not be judged by whether they are held by many or a few but how much they are allowed to do. Starting from that premise, the assumption is that maturing of every historical situation reflects also in crystallization of theoretical issues referring to its essential characteristics. Proper scientific consideration and the analysis of great social changes and processes, especially those in progress, require certain time distance in order to be able to judge their causes, bearers, consequences and overcoming in an objective manner. That distance has already been achieved to a certain extent.

Keywords : neo-totalitarianism, neo-liberalism, imperialism, terror, democracy, human rights and freedoms.

60

POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL SYSTEM OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS A FACTOR OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REGIONAL-GEOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE

SAFET NURKOVI Ć, RANKO MIRI Ć University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Political-territorial system and administrative structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina that has been implemented by Dayton peace agreement are the expressions of compromised solutions for the regional, political, economical, cultural, and ethnical disagreements. Those disagreements were, in the last decade of last century, the cause of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that had a great affects on its social- economical and regional development. The subjects of this lecture are the affects of Dayton’s political-territorial ‘‘system’’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina on its regional-geographic structure and the regional development. Such affects are huge and complicated. They implicate disintegration of its social, political, economical and regional- geographical structure. Also, they are making it harder for Bosnia and Herzegovina to integrate into modern European courses while the process of stabilization in the country as well as in the region of South-Eastern Europe is stagnating. Research of those implications is primary geographical interest. We believe that the Dayton’s solution about political-territorial system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not just establishment of some sort of peace condition in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is more a strategy for stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole region of South-Eastern Europe that can be reached by combinations of the influences of political and democratic processes from outside and authentic political and intellectual potentials for faster development of economical transition, as well, that also implicates the necessity to build-up the actual political system as a safe area for a stabile and strong development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region of South-Eastern Europe.

Key words: Political-territorial system, Dayton peace agreement, regional-geographic structure, transformation, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

61 HAS ETHNIC CLEANSING SUCCEEDED? PART II: THE CONSOLIDATION OF ETHNONATIONALIST SPACE IN BIH.

GEARÓID Ó’TUATHAIL, CARL DAHLMAN University of South Carolina, USA

This paper considers the effort by local ethnonationalists to consolidate the wartime results of ethnic cleansing through resistance to returns, non-implementation of Dayton and policies of local integration, including land allocations. It examines the claim that local integration policies and land allocations are a ‘second wave of ethnic engineering.’ It evaluates the legacy of ethnic cleansing on the contemporary political scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

62 WESTERN BALKANS: GEOPOLITICS OF A CRISIS

MARIA PAOLA PAGNINI, RAFFAELE UMANA University of Trieste, Italy

Today, the States of the Balkan Peninsula, known as a Western Balkans (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania), have to face the challenges of the post- conflict reconstruction. At the beginning of the ’90-ies, the geopolitics of the modern world has changed, as the asset of the cold- war Europe has changed too. The collapse of the Soviet Union with the consequent displacement of the geopolitical centre of interests from the European continent into another parts of the world, has brought to the sort of disinterest for the Balkan conflict. The origins of the conflict in the ex Yugoslavia find their roots in the various political, economical, social and historical variables, which have accompanied the south Slavic nations through centuries. This reasons were often left out from the analyses directed to stop the war, which have become more and more cruel and unforeseen. The Dayton Agreement finally put an end to this interethnic conflict, laying and the same time the foundations for the peaceful and harmonic reconstruction and cohabitation among the Balkans nations. Today’s efforts of the whole international community are focussed on the rebuilding of the Western Balkans and therefore it should be an imperative for all parts involved to bear in mind the intrinsic factors that can make this plan accomplished. The role of geopolitics in these circumstances should embrace the whole Western Balkans reality, from the particulars of the past, to the expectancies of the future, from the aspects of economy to the anthropology of various cultures. The Balkans needs an accurate and widespread action by the side of international actors, with EU and NATO in the lead. They have a historical responsibility to offer to these countries the opportunity to become the full-membership of the modern world, in particular of the European Union.

63 MAKING AND BREAKING BOUNDARIES: MEMORY DISCOURSES AND MEMORY POLITICS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON MOSTAR

MONIKA PALMBERGER University of Oxford, UK

Journalists, scholars and everyday media consumers were puzzled by the intensity of the Bosnian war. What made it so hard to understand was the paradox between decades of peaceful coexistence under Tito and the seemingly sudden eruption of extreme violence. In the face of the tremendous war atrocities during the Bosnian war, many deduced that the peaceful coexistence could not have been anything than fake and that the violence now revealed was a result of ancient hatreds suppressed under Tito. This explanation, however, is too simplistic and, if not content with it, one has to delve deeper into the subject of memory and forgetting. Without suggesting that ancient hatred was passed on from generation to generation, I argue in this paper that memories and in particular memory politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina are crucial in order to understand processes of inclusion and exclusion. The present paper outlines central features of memory politics under and after Tito. Special attention is given to the role religious leaders played in constructing an exclusionary nationalist discourse. It is shown how memories that were silenced during Tito’s rule, but were passed on in the private sphere as counter-histories to the official memory discourse, were taken up and misused by nationalist propaganda. This is followed by a discussion on the nature of nationalist myths with a special focus on the element of timelessness. Moreover, it will be examined how the border between autobiographical memory (based on self-experience) and historical memory (e.g. nationalist myths) may blur. The paper ends by examining today’s situation – ten years after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. Drawing on the case of Mostar, where fieldwork has been conducted, the paper outlines different memory discourses that are present within the Mostarian society as well as on the political level. Hereby, not only memories that are expressed (verbally or embodied, e.g. in monuments) but also such which are silenced are of interest. It will be argued that, in order to allow good neighbourliness between all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is crucial not to suppress conflicting memories, which otherwise could be easily misused again.

64 THE ACCESSION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION – THE STRATEGIC QUESTION ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

MIRKO PEJANOVI Ć University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

The very question regarding why Bosnia and Herzegovina should be admitted to the European Union helps in the search for the answer. In fact, for some other state such a question would never even be posed, as there exist procedures and standards through which the terms for a country to obtain the EU membership are fulfilled. Certainly, these procedures and standards apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina as much as they do to any other country. Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state can neither bypass nor skip them. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina has found itself in a special social-historical situation. It is a country in which democratic processes and the development of state institutions proceed with the mediation of the international community. This means that the development of the Bosnian and Herzegovian state is internationalised through the role of the international community during the post-war reconstruction and strengthening of the peace based of the Dayton treaty.

65 THE PATH TO DAYTON / THE BEGINNING OF AMERICAN UNILATERALISM

JOŽE PIRJEVEC University of Primorska, Slovenia

In spring 1995, the Clinton administration came to the conclusion that the Contact Group (USA, GB, Russia, France, Germany) initiative to solve the Bosnian question through diplomatic means, namely mediation between Miloševi č, the Bosnian Serbs, the Muslims and Tudjman had no prospects. As the talks, which Robert Frasure had in Belgrade in the middle of May, ended, it became clear that words alone could not untie the Bosnian knot. It was believed that it had to be undone using more efficient means. The first signal in this direction was the action of General Rupert Smith, the commander UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, resulting in NATO air strike of Serb ammunition depot on Pale (by four American F-16s and two Spanish EF-18s) on 25 th May. Serbian decisive reaction struck mostly French and British ‘blue helmets’, causing a serious international crisis. This, however, did not prevent the Clinton administration from acting according to the plan, despite reserves of European allies. NATO attack on Serbian positions in Bosnia, launched in September to support Holbrook’s diplomatic action, was in this respect quite eloquent. Namely, it clearly showed that Washington is willing to use all means available to achieve its goals. These means being the coordination of NATO air-strikes, offensive actions by the Croat and Muslim field units, diplomatic moves at the UN and local level; all trying to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina within its historical borders, and at the same time divide it into two entities: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation. Masterly combination of carrot and stick resulted in the Dayton agreement, which secured Bill Clinton’s pre-election year (1996), in which the Bosnian problem could no longer serve his opponent, senator Bob Dole, as propaganda material, pointing to the administration’s incapacity when dealing with foreign affairs. Diplomatic–military action, decided in Washington, without the presence of allies, had characteristics of an act of unilateralism that in the following years formed a core of the US foreign policy.

66 SOME ASPECTS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

ALMA POBRI Ć University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Migration as a permanent companion of ethnic, political, cultural and economic evolution of humanity have very important role in the post-war transition. Many aspects of irregular events within migrational processes have started to be marked, and gained public importance. Illegal migration, along with overstaying on tourist and other visas, continues to be a significant problem in the Balkans region and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The cavity of country's boundary and the corruption of officials in selling semi-genuine visas and other documents are among key facets of this problem. Manifestations of a growing migration's wave are analysed as something that is an obvious consequence of the unenviable socio-economic situation and war and post-war climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lack of economic opportunities for population in general and for women creates the problem of trafficking in women. This is not a case only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in most of the Southern European states. Illegal migrations and trafficking in women have certain consequences for human rights as well as for the population dynamics in home and destination countries.

Keywords: Illegal migrations, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Traffic in women, post-war climate, human rights, population dynamics.

67 BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN THE DAYTON TRIANGLE

ALEKSANDAR POPOV Center for Regionalism, Novi Sad, Serbia and Montenegro

The pace of the normalization of relations in the Dayton Triangle has far exceeded the pace at which bilateral agreements between these states have been signed and implemented. The total number of bilateral agreements between these states can be numbered in the teens, rather than the hundreds shared by neighboring nations with long and healthy histories of relations. The reason for this is not a lack of political will, but reflects a lack of capacities within the responsible ministries within these states. With so much of the current emphasis on EU ascension and Euro-Atlantic integration, local capacities are taxed with these duties and their obligations towards Brussels and Washington. Bilateral agreements can serve as the most tactile expression of regional cooperation to the citizens of this region. These agreements affect the most basic facets of life in the area, in areas such as employment, education, sports and culture. Further, these agreements aid local governments by providing defined rules and operating procedures in treating specific governmental tasks. This is especially important in fields such as international cooperation in times of national disaster or the recognition of diplomas. In its role in developing and enhancing relations in the Dayton Triangle, the Igman Initiative has been working on a multiyear project to assist these nations in the implementation and adoption of bilateral agreements. The Igman Initiative is a movement of 140 non-governmental organizations from countries of the Dayton Triangle. Its mission is to promote and facilitate local and regional dialogue in the fields of politics, economy and culture; to promote confidence building and advocacy of democratic values; to monitor and apply positive pressure on the three Dayton Triangle governments to bring about a faster normalization of their relations; to confront and question governmental policies when human rights are violated; to create a space in which people can openly express opinions, feel comfortable responding to one another and act on behalf of their communities; and, finally to foster initiatives in Southeastern Europe to help this region become a zone of peace, cooperation and tolerance with open borders. In this spirit, the council of the Igman Initiative formed a group of experts to draft and lobby for the ratification of new bilateral agreements between the countries of the Dayton Triangle. These experts include former diplomats, legal scholars, and former government officials. Staff from the competent ministries aided in the work of the expert group. In 2004, a set of six draft bilateral agreements were completed. They have been personally presented to the appropriate ministers in all three countries and also have been presented to the public through a media campaign designed to educate and make people aware of how important these agreements are to the everyday lives of ordinary citizens. The set of six bilateral agreements were also presented to the heads of state of the Dayton countries at the 10 th session of the Igman Initiative, held in Belgrade in June of this year. Each of the three presidents warmly welcomed the assistance of the Igman Initiative and promised to do everything in their power to expedite the adoption of these important documents. The six agreements drafted are treaties on the recognition of diplomas, cooperation in times of national disasters, cooperation in the fields of culture and sports, regulation of employment, consular conventions and cooperation in the field of tourism. In addition, the group of experts from the Igman Initiative is also monitoring the signing, ratification and implementation of a number of other bilateral agreements that are already in process. The most important of these is the agreement on succession, which in fact serves as a peace treaty among the countries of the Dayton Triangle, making it of vital importance to the future peace and stability in the region.

68 MEDIATED – NEWSPAPER PERCEPTIONS OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, CROATIA AND SERBIA SINCE DAYTON

DARENN PURCELL, University of Oklahoma, USA

A variety of observers have noted the power of various media to shape the perception of places. Prominent newspapers such as the New Yor Times , Washington Post , Financial Times , Times of London, The Economist among others serve such roles in defining the characteristics od places. More populist papers like the NY Post and The Sun understandably cater to a very different audience. This content analysis will examine the coverage of selected newspapers in order to chart the changing coverage and vocabulary used to depict the countries exaimned. This work will be linked to debates in critical and feminist geopolitics in order to understand portions of the media's role in crafting our understanding of place.

69 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FROM DAYTON TO BRUSSELS!

BOŠTJAN ROGELJ University of Ljubljana, Slovenia

On 1 st May 2004 we have witnessed a historical enlargement of European Union by ten new countries. According to the promises made by European politicians the enlargement process is still not over. While Central Eastern Europe was the focus of 2004 enlargement process, the next steps will focus on countries of the South-Eastern Europe. With the exceptions of Bulgaria and Romania which are scheduled to join the Union in 2007, the date for the accession of other countries in the region is still unclear. As for other countries in the region the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina will depend on course of European integration process. 10 years after the end of war, every official statement on Bosnia mentions the need to move from Dayton to Brussels. According to foreign and domestic politicians the future of Bosnia lies in EU. But the integration process will not depend only on ability of Bosnia and other candidate states to comply all conditions or their actual readiness to take the obligations of full membership. It will depend also on the preparedness of present EU members for further enlargement. Different representations and narratives of future member states and of European Union will play crucial role in this process. They are constructed, reconstructed and used by different individuals and groups with various interests in enlargement process. The article will present some of narratives that according to author will have decisive role in future integration of Bosnia to European Union.

70 FORMER YUGOSLAVIA LESS SLOVENIA: ERASING A "WHITE HOLE" UPON THE EU'S POLITICAL MAP?

ANDRÉ-LOUIS SANGUIN University of Paris IV-Sorbonne, France

With the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into EU in 2007-2008, a "white hole" located in the heart of Southeastern Europe, will be surrounded by EU, then by Euro Zone and Schengen Space. This "white hole" is made up of former Yugoslavia less Slovenia plus Albania. At the same time, this exclave within European Union is raising a lot of questions regarding its circulatory, economic and political "docking" with the surrounding EU. Through a territorial and political outlook, the purpose of this paper is to scrutinize the key elements which are contributing or not towards the European integration of this former Yugoslavia less Slovenia: 1/ Transport and circulation: a difficult connection with the EU's networking but a slow emergence of the multimodal trans-European corridors. 2/ Weakness of cross-border cooperation and slow appearance of Euroregions. 3/ International tourism, a tool for European integration 4/ "De-knitting" Dayton in order to make Bosnia more "European-compatible". 5/ A "road map" for the Balkans: erasing the EU's"white hole". The process of Stabilization and Association Agreements can be viewed as a kind of prologue to the process of membership negotiations. A realist scenario can be already identified from 2005 up to 2010. The policies which are managed by EU aim at avoiding for the Western Balkans countries to be transformed in a ghetto surrounded by Schengen Space. The same policies have another target: preventing these peoples to sink into economic mediocrity, political disorder, corruption, delinquency, clanism, despair and resentment. This road map will allow to fulfill the Thessalonica European Summit's commitments (June 2003): integrating the Balkans into EU.

71 ETHNICALLY MIXED FAMILIES AS MEANS OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE PROCESSES IN THE TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

MATEJA SEDMAK University of Primorska, Slovenia

The paper discusses ethnically mixed marriages/partnerships and families as means of convergence and divergence processes in the territory of former Yugoslavia. As a result of the prevalent ideology in former Yugoslavia that perceived the common state as a multicultural, multilinguistic and multireligious formation, the significance of nationalities as one of the fundamental determinants of men was considerably reduced. The promotion of principles of 'brotherhood' and 'unity' aimed to reinforce interethnic equality, tolerance and symbiosis, and to strengthen the role of class over ethnic determinants. These factors, in addition to intensified spatial migrations within the borders of the former state, resulted in a relatively high level of interethnic fusion as well as the emergence of interethnic partnerships and families. The incidence of ethnic heterogamy was higher in areas of cultural contact, such as border and urban areas, areas that attracted a broad circle of economic migrants, areas populated by ethnic minorities, etc. A constantly increasing trend of ethnic heterogamy was apparent for the period from 1950 through the 1980s (15,973 [8.6%] ethnically mixed marriages were recorded in the territory of former Yugoslavia in 1950 and as many as 22,509 [13.0%] in 1981). Researchers of ethnic heterogamy agree that the incidence of ethnic heterogamy among individual nationalities of former Yugoslavia directly depends on the social and territorial proximity between the examined ethnicities, the number of ethnicity members, and social or ethnic obstacles (historical memory and experience, values, etc.). As indicated, the paper presents ethnically mixed marriages and families as a means and lever of divergence and convergence processes alike. A high level of ethnic heterogamy within a defined ethnic group represents a potentially divergent force; it weakens the internal stability of the group, reduces group solidarity and affiliation, confronts members of the ethnicity with loose or permeable ethnicity borders, and contributes to stronger assimilation pressure and the consequent potential extinction of the ethnicity. Concurrently, a high level of ethnic heterogamy acts as a convergence factor in relation to inter-group or interethnic processes; it results in a higher level of intercultural tolerance, symbiosis and knowledge, produces a multicultural environment and consequently multicultural and multi-language individuals, etc. The paper presents the results of several (qualitative and quantitative) empirical studies conducted among members of ethnically mixed families living in the territory of Slovene Istria during the period 1999- 2003. The examined multicultural area is characterized by the highest level of ethnic heterogamy in Slovenia, which is as high as 35%. The study included members of ethnically mixed families of different nationalities of former Yugoslavia who had moved into the examined area and married members of the Slovene ethnicity. The paper highlights the experiences and opinions of members of mixed families in relation to consequences of Slovene independence and the disintegration of the former common homeland, negative aspects and consequences of the war in the Balkans, and the quality of, and satisfaction with, life in a mixed marriage; however, the paper also suggests that there is potential for ethnically mixed families to be a means toward the normalization and stabilization of social life in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

72 DAYTON'S POTEMKIN VILLAGE?

WILLIAM R. STANLEY University of South Carolina, USA

Dayton promised much, encouraged still more but has had questionable success in providing durable resolution to Bosnia's dilemma much less in defusing the larger region. Realities of Bosnia's dual political structure and the looming crisis in defining Kosovo's future continue to demand external political and military presence. Papering over of contentious political-cultural conflict serves to provide additional candidates to the list of so called 'loose cannon' entities. This paper assesses the former Yugoslav conflict in the context of other worldwide problem areas. These range in scale of potential disruption from Palestine, the Basque Region, Sudan, Iraq and the Congo among others at the one end to Ulster, Gibralter, the Falklands, Kaliningrad and the Baltic countries among others at the other end of the potential to real incendiary spectrum.

73 FORMAL VS. INFORMAL ‘ETHNIC QUOTAS’ FOR INCLUSION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES. SWITZERLAND, BELGIUM, AND BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA COMPARED

NENAD STOJANOVI Ć University of Zurich, Switzerland

One of the major challenges for constitutional design in plural societies is the form of inclusion of national minorities (Tholen and de Vries 2004). In my paper I concentrate on political inclusion of national minorities through ‘ethnic quotas’ in representative bodies. This perspective joins the notion of power sharing , a fundamental element of the consociational theory. According to Lijphart (2004), in deeply divided societies “the interests and demands of communal groups can be accommodated only by the establishment of power sharing”. One of the most important aspects of Lijphart’s theory is the power sharing at the executive level: all relevant national groups should be represented in the government. As a matter of fact, there is a wide consensus that divided societies shall have mechanisms for power sharing. Today at least 34 countries provide specific mechanisms for special representation of ethnic, linguistic, religious and other minorities, mainly through the system of reserved seats in national parliaments (Reynolds 2005). So ‘ethnic quotas’ in representative bodies appear intuitively and empirically as an inevitable feature of democratic plural societies. Nevertheless, this approach has many dark sides. First, ‘ethnic quotas’ (together with other forms of ‘group representation’) collide with the very concept of political representation in liberal democracies. Even an author as Will Kymlicka, very sympathetic towards collective rights, states that “the idea of mirror representation should be avoided as a general theory of representation” (Kymlicka 1995: 140). Second, their implementation foster the institutionalisation of ethnicity. According to Bieber (2004: 243) “power-sharing systems enshrine interethnic relations that are driven by highly volatile group identities, which can change significantly over time”. And Belloni (2004: 334-35), in reference to Bosnia, affirms that “ethnic quotas reinforced the salience of ethnic identity and cleavages, entrenched many of the ethnic divisions that international intervention was supposed to soften and eventually overcome, and risked perpetuating instability”. To sum up, we are in front of a dilemma . On the one hand, it is seems inevitable and desirable to have some forms of power sharing in divided societies. On the other hand, ‘ethnic quotas’ are highly problematic, both theoretically and empirically, because they institutionalise ethnic identities and may produce counterproductive results for the very goal that is to be achieved: the establishment and/or maintenance of peace and democracy in divided societies. There is at least one possible solution to this dilemma: instead of using formal rules for group representation (e.g. in form of rigid constitutional regulations) the integration of national minorities can take place through informal rules and indirect mechanisms that incite cooperation. In the literature on consociationalism little attention has been paid to the distinction between formal and informal rules that regulate group representation. There is, in fact, a lack of normative theory that explores this distinction. In Lijphart’s theory we can spot a certain confusion about this issue. In some texts he claims that “informal rules generally work better because they are more flexible” (Lijphart 2002: 54). In other studies, however, he endorses the use of ‘ethnic quotas’ in countries like Belgium and Bosnia (Lijphart 2004). In my paper I argue that the distinction between formal and informal forms of representation for national minorities is an important factor for the success of power-sharing democracy. In my analysis I present (1) the outline of a normative theory that explores this distinction, and (2) an analysis of three countries that according to many observers represent ‘ideal-types’ of power-sharing democracies: Switzerland, Belgium, and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Switzerland has a long tradition of inclusion of its ‘ethnic’ segments (primarily linguistic and religious), both at the legislative and executive level. However, such inclusion has always taken place in an informal way, without legal, constitutional or other statutory measures. There is, however, a rich variety at the cantonal level. The exam of three bilingual cantons shows that in one case there are rigid and formal quotas (Bern), in another the quotas are less rigid and more indirect (Valais), whereas in the third canton (Fribourg) there are only informal mechanisms. Belgium represents an interesting case where we can analyse the impact of both informal and formal quotas. In fact, up to the 1970 constitution there was an informal system of power sharing between two main (ethno)linguistic groups. From 1970 on the fifty-fifty partition of government seats between Flemish and Walloons is formally mandated by the constitution. At the regional level, the government of the Region of Bruxelles-Capital has also a rigid fifty-fifty rule. Bosnia & Herzegovina has a long tradition of applying a statutory ‘(ethno)national key’ in institutional bodies. Political power (executive, legislative, civil service) is shared between three main ‘ethnic’ groups. This system of ‘ethnic quotas’ has

74 been explicitly provided for in the Dayton Agreement. A closer analysis shows a more complex situation at the local level. Rigid ‘ethnic quotas’ exist in Sarajevo but they are much softer in Mostar. The constitution of the District of Br čko, finally, does not provide for quotas but incite inter-ethnic cooperation and informal consensus.

References: BELLONI, Roberto (2004). “Peacebuilding and Consociational Electoral Engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, International Peacekeeping 11(2): 334-353. BIEBER, Florian (2004). “Power Sharing as Ethnic Representation in Postconflict Societies: The Cases of Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo”, in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ivan Krastev (eds.), Nationalism after Communism. Lessons Learned , Budapest and New York: Central University Press: 231-247. KYMLICKA, Will (1995). Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights . Oxford: Clarendon Press. LIJPHART, Arend (2002). “The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy”, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The Architecture ofDemocracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy . Oxford: Oxford University Press,37-54. LIJPHART, Arend (2004). “Constitutional Design for Divided Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 15(2): 96-109. REYNOLDS, Andrew (2005). “Reserved Seats in National Legislatures”, Legislative Studies Quarterly , May Issue. THOLEN, Berry and Michiel S. DE VRIES (2004). “The Inclusion and Exclusion of Minorities in European Countries: a Comparative Analysis at the Local Level”, International Review of Administrative Sciences 70(3): 455-476.

75 COULD AND SHOULD HAVE WE DONE BETTER IN DAYTON?

IVAN ŠIMONOVI Ć University of Zagreb, Croatia

International relations in the time of conflict in former Yugoslavia have been marked by the lack of clarity of the new division of the international security tasks after the end of the Cold war. It has led to a weak and delayed international response to the crisis, and it was not before the active involvement of the US that a serious effort to end hostilities has been invested. The US sponsored peace talks in Dayton in autumn 1995 gathered representatives of the three ethnic groups, neighbouring states, and politically influential members of the internationally composed six member Contact group, each of them trying to end the war, but also to promote some other specific interests and influencing the outcome of negotiations. When estimating the Dayton Agreement ten years after, it seems that more international pressure should have been exerted on regional participants of the peace talks to accept more viable constitutional framework for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with comparatively more competences vested centrally and locally than in the entities. Furthermore, from the outset more authority should have been granted to the High Representative, with the clear dynamics and benchmarks for the gradual transition of power.

76 THE EUROPE IN BETWEEN. OLD/NEW GEOPOLITICS IN EURASIA CONCERNING EUROPE’S STABILITY AND SECURITY

FILIP TUNJI Ć Ministry of Defense of Republic of Slovenia, Slovenia

The East –West relations over Eurasia may not any longer be seen in a globalisation's fantasy. Right in opposite, deepening of the abysm between the East and the West after the end of so-called the End-of- Cold War is not only its reminiscence; rather, it is continuation of the deterritorialisation, a process of changing and re/defining the old/new global and regional geopolitical structure over Eurasia. Perhaps the classical views of Kjellen, Spykman, Mahan, Mackinder, Fairgireve, Haushofer, and others running from the late nineteenth century until present have irrelevant become but, however, the process and Eurasian geopolitical pictures are only slightly different from these inside which Europe-In-Between has been created at the beginning of the 20 th century. This article intends to shed some light upon Europe-In- Between as an already empirical fact and a litmus paper of the new geopolitical relations over Eurasia and European security. Indeed, for peoples and nations in Europe-In-Between, the role of the bridgehead is neither good promising nor acceptable.

77 10 YEARS AFTER: WHERE DID THE REFUGEES END UP?

JULIEN VANDEBURIE Free University of Brussels, Belgium

Ten years after the Dayton agreements, one can wonder about the fate of the millions of refugees having fled from the wars in the former Yugoslavian space. Despite the promise of return of these refugees, this operation cannot obviously be called a success. It is therefore interesting to see where those refugees are today. This paper aims at studying the geography of the refugees’ movements from the former Yugoslavian space, Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia & Montenegro, FYROM, and more particularly Bosnia & Herzegovina. Most of the refugees come from Bosnia, but a great part of them also from Croatia and Serbia – especially from Kosovo in the latter country. The paper will focus on Bosnia’s situation, but in a regional context. By using UNHCR, US Committee for Refugees and Eurostat data, we will draw maps of origin and destination of the refugees in the last 10 years, including the flows of the refugees during the wars in 1991-95. This cartography will show the absolute and relative volume of the refugees by country of origin and by destination. It will show that the refugees go first to close countries, to the European Union and to the USA. It will also highlight the significance of the phenomenon of internally displaced persons, despite the lack of information on this issue. We will also discuss the reasons which have led to the present situation, through analysing asylum applications by countries (Eurostat data), and with the help of some explanatory paths linked to the economic, political and social situation prevailing in Bosnia for 10 years.

78 NEW SYMBOLIC VALUES OF SOME OF THE ANTIQUE AND MODERN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S BRIDGES

ANTONIO VIOLANTE University of Milan, Italy

Among the characteristics of a symbol there is the semantic variability, and with this we mean that by leaving a margin of an unexpressed meaning, it can easily be object of discordant interpretations. In today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country where the symbolic objects that mark the spaces are of great importance, the bridges that actually physically bond the two sides, a metaphor of passage and of testing, become loaded with identity values in the minds of those who deal with them each day; however, not always those values that the bridges represent become accepted by the entire community: in Bosnia sometimes the bridges separate instead of bringing together, and not only in the physical sense. In fact the “Stari most” in Mostar, a symbol of a city in which the national communities – unlike Sarajevo – use to live mostly separate, during the war it has been demolished by one of them since it was perceived as a cultural property of the rival nation. After it’s reconstruction, the new “stari most” frequented by the international tourism has become loaded with new symbolic values of western origin, something that has nothing to do with the cultural tradition in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Among all the bridges in Sarajevo on the Miljacka, places fulfilled with history, there are two of them on the whom got started the great tragedies of global dimensions in 1914 and 1992, and they respectively opened and closed one of the most tormented centuries of the modern age. In the city, each of these two bridges awakes contrasting emotions in the population. In Sarajevo there is also the Kozja Cuprija, an antique ottoman construction, which in the past facilitated the access to the city from the oriental Bosnia, today it separates the Serb Republic from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation, grotesque border in a region that no logical motivation could ever have divided. The symbol of Visegrad is the Mehmed Pasha Sokolovic bridge, an ottoman construction of the XVI century that Ivo Andric’s book made famous in the world. However, this cultural heritage too - which is both material and immaterial – is absurdly divided today. Even if the bridge has “Muslim” origins, the memory of the writer that has made it immortal is being hated by the “bosnjak” cultural elite; the proof of this is the fact that the Andric’s statue on the bridge has been crushed in peaces before the city became Serbian in the 1992. The cultural pride of Konjic is a “stari most” that doesn’t exist anymore in it’s original form, because it has been destroyed by the Germans in their withdrawing in the 1945. However, it is the emblem of the city; it is even in the city’s heraldic bearing. The Arslanagic bridge in Trebinje, vice versa, a magnificent asymmetrical construction of the XVI century, dismantled from it’s original site in the ‘60s and reconstructed a bit more downhill, today appears non-frequented, as if it was “forgotten” by the city that could recognize in other things it’s own identity emblems.

79 THE PERCEPTIONS AND EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES IN POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRY TO THE IDENTITY OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN SARAJEVO, BIH. ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE FIELDWORK.

JASNA VUKOVI Č Slovene Anthropological Society, Slovenia

The following text is the result of the anthropological fieldwork done in Sarajevo in 2001. Purely the fact that anthropological fieldwork took place in an urban environment makes it different to the “classical”, i.e. rural anthropological fieldwork. Besides that Sarajevo has a distinguish characteristics that set it apart from the other regions of the world, of Balkans and of the other cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Sarajevo, as the rest of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, is multinational, multireligious and multicultural. But apart of other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo and it’s inhabitants has experienced more than 1000 days of occupation and captivity of the city during the war in 1992-1995. The other important process that happened (and still is) in the life of the people of Sarajevo is the consequence of the war, the transition; a period of economical, political, social, cultural changes. The experience of the war itself and the consequences of it (including transition) has all resulted in a radical changes that has resulted as a “new” identity of the people of Sarajevo, especially of the young generation to which the experience of the war reflected in particular, entirely specific ways. All of that has leaded to their re-definition of some aspects that are basic for the existence of the society and culture and for the construction of everyday life, it’s institutions, values, norms, social roles.

80 TWISTING ARMS AND FLEXING MUSCLES

ALLARD WAGEMAKER Faculty of Military Science in Breda, The Netherlands

States traditionally have used several means by which to achieve their political goals where other states are concerned, the most extreme undoubtedly being war, with the external application of organized force either to change the policy of an adversary or to destroy it. In Richard Holbrooke’s end game strategy it was essential that force was used by an external force or third party to end the brutal civil war before principal mediation and proximity talks on the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina could start. Commander UNPROFOR, General Rupert Smith, called this ‘escalate to success’. Holbrooke’s diplomatic success was made possible by a short coercive intervention that resulted in a Mutual Hurting Stalemate (MHS): a cease fire covering the whole country, which went into effect on 10 October 1995. This MHS made the former warring factions “ripe” for realistic negotiations on peace and their own future. This paper examines the conduct and impact of the principal mediation efforts to end the Bosnian conflict by using the Contingency Model of Mediation Behavior (developed by Bercovitch and Houston) in order to create lasting circumstances for peace. It is argued that a third party intervention in Bosnia was necessary to create the circumstances for radical change, mediation and negotiation to manage and resolve the crisis. This had to be achieved before peace building and peace making activities could start. Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia 1995, is a typical and successful case of a third party intervention. Whether the intervention achieved its objectives is often assessed from an American perspective or seen as an American air force engagement. Since the operation was a UN and a NATO undertaking, the American involvement and the use of air power – although significant – is only a part of the story. Ground force provided by the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) formed by British, French and Dutch units is considered to be the force multiplier in the third party intervention and of eminent importance to Richard Holbrooke’s principal mediation efforts. The paper will start with a short discussion of theoretical approaches to crisis management and mediation. An assessment will be made of the role of the interveners’ power and strategy during the various stages of the mediation process in creating necessary prerequisites for success. The path from crisis or war to peace is viewed as a process that has an appropriate strategy for every phase: a strategic- value chain. It will be shown that a relation exists between the short-term and the long-term solution. While peace may not solely come out of the barrel of a gun, military force can sometimes be used to create more favorable conditions. Peace-making is more than ending hostilities and the role of military forces certainly does not end once hostilities have ceased. What the “mechanisms of a third-party intervention” are, constitutes the theme of the second part. Some researchers use a wide variety of indicators to evaluate the effectiveness in a range of situations. This is often so complicated and many of the indicators are arbitrary, with the result that such a system is virtually unusable. It is not possible to come up with a general recipe for conflict management as each third-party intervention is “tailor made”. The goal of this second part is to give an insight into the mechanisms of mediation and give indications of what makes an intervention likely to succeed in the short-term and the long-term. The third part is a case study on the role of the RRF ground forces in Operation Deliberate Force and their usefulness in the third-party intervention. This case study tests the model that has been worked out in the first two parts. The conclusion evaluates the theoretical approach and links it with the main results of the case study.

81 CHANGES OF MOLDOVA GEOPOLITICAL POSITION AT THE PROCESS OF UE AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

JAN WENDT University of Gda ńsk, Poland

In the Moldova case, same geographic, historical and political factors had the main influence on the geopolitical situations. We can notice very important change of geopolitical situations of Republic Moldova at XX century, and especially at beginning of XXI once. We can divide geopolitical positions of this Moldova/Besarabia state/ region at five periods. First of it has finished at 1917, after the soviet revolution, when Besarabia start to be part of Great Romania – Romania Mare. The second ones, time of changing the borders at the region, has finished with the end of II World War. During this time Moldova has been moved between Romania and Soviet Russia. Third period of changing the geopolitical position of Moldova, started after 1945, when region start to be part of Soviet Russia. This period finished with collapse of USSR, and Moldova got independence at 1989. Fourth period start with independence and has been connected with Moldovian problems at Transistrian Moldovian Republic, which is dominated by Russians, as well as Gaugasian authonomic region, and growing economical and political positions and influence of Romania. Together with Transistria problems, Moldova has been faced with process of enlargement NATO and EU. On 2004, the geopolitical positions of Moldova has change next time. Romania has joined NATO, and Ukraine has elected a new president. The geopolitical situations of Moldova will be more complicated after 2007, when Romania is expected to be member of EU. Every of this changes influenced on foreign and inner policy of Moldova Republic, and faced the country with a new problems. Between them, the most important once is question about Moldova future: reintegration with Romania or independence?

82 DAYTON IN PALESTINE? ISRAELI 'ETHNOCRACY' AND THE FAILURE OF PARTITION

OREN YIFTACHEL Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel

The lecture will contrast the relative effectiveness of the Dayton Accord with the repeated failures to partition Palestine. It will analyze the political geography of this failure, focusing on the making of the Israeli 'ethnocratic' regime, with its mixture of democratic façade and expansionist land and settlement policies. The paper will argue that Israeli policies have legitimized their action by using the logic of a 'normal' and threatened nation-state, but at the same time contradicted this logic, by rupturing the state's borders and undermining its 'demos'. This simultaneous strategy, and on-going Arab hostility, resulted in a powerful drive to colonize Palestine beyond the partition lines. Notably, the 'success' of the Judaization of Palestine has structurally undermined the possibility of a successful partition, and has thus threatened the very viability of the Jewish state. This tension, and radicalizing mobilization and violence, caused Israel to modify its territorial policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians, and reintroduce elements of partition into its official policies (Oslo, Camp David and the Roadmap). Yet, these efforts appear to be hamstrung by the political geography of Jewish colonialism, resulting in an emerging order of 'creeping apartheid'. This order is buttressed by the newly built separation barrier ('the wall'), as well as partial Israeli withdrawals, on-going colonization, the construction of ethnic roads and strict, uneven, segregation. As a result, unlike Dayton, the reintroduction of partition principles appears to be intensifying, rather than appeasing, the Zionist- Palestinian conflict.

83 THE NECESSITY OF THE INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE: FROM THE HISTORICAL SURVEY TO THE PROVENTION OF THE FUTURE CONFLICTS

ANJA ZALTA University of Primorska, Slovenia

Ever since the ancient times Bosnia and Herzegovina was a meeting point of different religions, which often lead to different conflict situations. The transformation from religious to the national-political self- awareness resulted in one of the bloodiest civil wars in human history. It was a distortion and an abuse of religion: to reach political goals, political leaders manipulated the masses with the use of religious stereotypes, national mythology and ideas of a greater state. As the history of mass-psychology shows - the masses always follow! What is it, that we can learn from the tragic semi-religious Bosnian war and how can we prevent the future wars in the name of religion? How can we educate the masses? Prof. Martin Forward, Director of the Centre for Faith and Action, suggests the necessity of an inter-religious dialogue. In 1971, a Sub-unit on Dialogue with People of Living Faith and Ideologies was founded within the World Council of Churches and they promoted these guidelines: - Dialogue begins when people meet. - Dialogue depends upon mutual understanding and mutual trust. - Dialogue makes it possible to share in service. - Dialogue becomes the medium of authentic witness. How could these guidelines be applied to the Bosnian situation? Most humans are not yet able to be psychologically or doctrinally objective about faith statements. Dialogicians recognize that their own traditions' resources, interpreted in an unprejudiced and open- minded way, influence their attitude towards others which gives them the confidence to meet with others and listen to them. In this context I am appealing to the monotheistic dialogue between three historically most present religions in the Balkans and in Europe - Judaism, Christianity and Islam. How much is Bosnia (and consecutively Europe) ready to cooperate in an Inter-religious Dialogue? The article presented at the International Conference in Sarajevo would try to point out the guidelines for such a Dialogue in Bosnian and European perspective, with the emphasis on Bosnian rich history of mutual tolerance between Jewish, Muslim and Christian (The Orthodox as well as Roman Catholic and Protestant) inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

84 ACADEMIC PARTICIPANTS

(Name, Institution, E-mail) J.Anderson@Queens- Anderson James Queen's University Belfast Belfast.AC.UK Andrian Giorgio UNESCO-ROSTE [email protected]

Barwinski Marek University of Lodz [email protected]

Bebler Anton University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences [email protected]

Bebler Jug University of Primorska, Faculty of Humanities [email protected]

Bloom J. C. H University of Utrecht [email protected]

Bogdani Mirela School of European Studies, Cardiff University

Berg Eiki University of Tartu [email protected]

Bricelj Mitja Ministry for Environment and Spatial Planning, Slovenia [email protected]

Bufon Milan University of Primorska, Faculty of Humanities [email protected] Human Geography Professor, University of Barcelona Carerras Charles [email protected]

Cataruzza Amael Paris IV- Sorbonne [email protected]

Campione Giuseppe University of Messina Chavebeau- Le Brun University of Lyon II [email protected] Emmanuelle Cikoti ć Selmo University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Political Sciences [email protected] B&H Office for Mediterranean Action Plan, Hydro- Čengi ć Selma [email protected] Engineering Institute Dahlman Carl University of South Carolina [email protected]

De Graaff Bob University of Utrecht / [email protected] Dehoorne Oliver University of Oradea ag.fr Djuric Ivana University of Nottingam (phd student) [email protected]

Dobruszkes Frederic Free University of Brussels (phd researcher) [email protected]

Dukanovi č Dragan Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade [email protected]

Eok Daša University of Ljubljana , Faculty of Arts [[email protected]]

Gosar Anton University of Primorska, Faculty of Humanities [email protected]

Henkel Reinhard, University of Zagreb [[email protected]]

Ilie Alexandru, University of Oradea [email protected]

Ilijavec Maja Slovene Anthropological Society [email protected]

Jeffrey Alex Durham University [email protected]

Josipovi č Damir Anton Melik Geographical Institute josipovic@zrc -sazu.si

Kerma Simon University of Primorska, Faculty of Humanities [email protected]

Klemen čič Matjaž University of Maribor, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja [email protected]

Klemen čić Mladen Lexicographic Institute [email protected]

Kova č Nikola University of Sarajevo [email protected]

Krašecec Mateja / [email protected]

85 B&H Office for Mediterranean Action Plan, Hydro- Kupusovi ć Tarik / Engineering Institute Loughlin John School of European Studies, Cardiff University [email protected]

Srdjan Milasinovic Megatrend University of Applied Sciences, Belgrade [email protected]

Miri ć Ranko University of Sarajevo [email protected]

Murtazeva Gulnara Institute of state and Law [email protected]

Nenadovi ć Maja [email protected]

Nurkovi ć Safet University of Sarajevo [email protected]

O' Tuathail Gearoid University of South Carolina

O' Brien Jim The Albright Group [email protected]

Pagnini Maria Paola University of Trieste [email protected]

Palmberger Monika University of Oxford (phd student) [email protected]

Pejanovi ć Mirko University of Sarajevo, Faculty of Political sciences [email protected]

Pirjevec Jože University of Primorska, Faculty of Humanities joze. [email protected]

Pobri ć Alma University of Sarajevo [email protected]

Popov Aleksandar Center for Regionalism, Novi Sad, SCG

Purcell Darren University of Oklahoma [email protected]

Rogelj Boštjan University of Ljubljana FF, Geography department [email protected]

Romashov Roman St. Petersburg University of Ministry of internal Affairs of [email protected]

Sanguin Andre Louis Paris IV- Sorbonne [email protected]

Schoowoord Dick University of Utrecht /

Sedmak Mateja University of Primorska, Faculty of Humanities [email protected]

Sobczynski Marek University of Lodz [email protected]

Stanley William R. University of South Carolina [email protected]

Stojanovi ć Nenad Institute of Political Science, University of Zurich [email protected]

Šimonovi ć Ivan Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb [email protected]

Šakaja Laura University of Zagreb /

Tătar Corina University of Oradea /

Tunji ć Filip Ministry of Defense of Republic of Slovenia [email protected]

Vandeburie Julien Free University of Brussels (phd researcher) [email protected]

Vert Constantin Western University of Timisoara, Romania

Violante Antonio University of Milan, Istituto di geografia umana [email protected]

Vukovi č Jasna Slovene Anthropological Society [email protected]

Wagemaker Allard Faculty of Military Science in Breda, The Netherlands [email protected]

Wendt Jan University of Gdansk [email protected]

Yiftachel Oren Ben-Gurion University [email protected]

Zalta Anja UP ZRS, Koper [email protected]

86 GENERAL INFORMATION FOR THE VISITORS

THE CONFERENCE SITE

All academic sessions are to be held in the UNITIC Centre (address: Fra An ñela Zvizdovi ća 1, 71000 Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina), in one of the two blue skyscrapers at the edge of the old town (picture on cover: centre in the far right position) in the part of the city called MARINDVOR and next to the Holiday Inn and the former Marshall Tito Barracks – future campus of the University of Sarajevo.

SARAJEVO MAP

87 TRAVEL, HOSPITALITY, CURRENCY, WEATHER, OTHER, …

1. T r a v e l

• Sarajevo International Airport Telephone: +387 33 289 100; web page: www.sarajevo-airport.ba

Daily arrivals to Sarajevo From Time of arrival Airline and flight number Munich 12:15 Lufthansa, LH 3500 Budapest 14:05 Malev, MA 450 Vienna 14:40 Austrian, OS 757 Ljubljana 15:00 Adria, JP 700 Milan 16:30 Alitalia, AZ 540 Belgrade 21:30 JAT, JU 108 Vienna 21:05 Austrian, OS 759 Zagreb 21:45 Croatia, OU 342

Daily departures from Sarajevo To Time of departure Airline and flight number Belgrade 06:30 JAT, JU 109 Zagreb 06:30 Croatia, OU 341 Vienna 07:30 Austrian, OS 760 Munich 13:00 Lufthansa, LH 3501 Budapest 14:50 Malev, MA 451 Vienna 15:25 Austrian, OS 758 Ljubljana 15:30 Adria, JP 701 Milan 17:15 Alitalia, AZ 541

• Public transportation in Sarajevo TAXI is the easiest and quickest way of transportation in Sarajevo. There are several TAXI companies in town. The oldest, most convenient and most reliable is “Sarajevo TAXI”. If you decide to stop a taxi on the street make sure that its TAXI sign reads “Sarajevo TAXI”. Fare for a TAXI ride from the airport to UNITIC Business Center is about 15 KM (7.5 EUR). From UNITIC to the Old town Baš čaršija the fare is about 5KM (2.5 EUR). Telephone number for Sarajevo TAXI is 1515. TRAM - you can also use a tram to get to the downtown. Fare for a tram ride is 1.5KM (less than 1 EUR). There are several tram lines, but line no. 3 is the one which takes you from one side of city to the other and is most convenient to use.

2. H o s p i t a l i t y

For the participants of the conference “Dayton – 10 Years After: Conflict Resolution and Cooperation Perspectives” have the University of Sarajevo and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina arranged special hotel discounts. If you would like to take advantage of the named discounts contact the hotel and act not later than November 01, 2005. The closest to the site of the conference are the hotels HOLIDAY INN (next to the conference site) and GRAND HOTEL (10 minutes walking). The farthest, but with a beautiful view of the town, is the SARAJ HOTEL (walking: 40 minutes). All other hotels are located between the City Center (Baš čaršija) and the conference venue, about 15 – 20 minutes of walking. Hotels have their Internet page.

• Accommodation Hotel Address Telephone / Fax E-mail Discounted Price* HOLIDAY INN Zmaja od ++387 33 288 000 [email protected] Single: Euro 94.- **** Bosne 4 ++387 33 663862 Double: Euro 138.- GRAND HOTEL Muhameda ef. ++387 33 205 444 hotelgrand_bh@hotelgrand. Single: Euro 53.- **** Pandže com Double: Euro 105.- OSCE Rate HOTEL *** Radi ćeva 19 ++387 33 213613 [email protected] Single: Euro 56.-

88 DARDANIJA ++387 33 213616 Double: Euro 94.- HOTEL Kundurdži- ++387 33 475100 [email protected] Single: Euro 50.- ASTRA *** luk 2 ++387 33 475200 Double: Euro 70.- BOSNIA HOTEL Kulovi ća 9 ++387 33 471251 [email protected] Single: Euro 39.- *** OSCE Rate EUROPA Skari ća 3 ++387 33 232855 [email protected] Single: Euro 95.- GARNI *** GRAND HOTEL Muhameda ef. ++387 33 205 444 hotelgrand_bh@hotelgrand. Single: Euro 53.- **** Pandže com Double: Euro 105.- OSCE Rate OMEGA HOTEL Omera Stupca ++387 33 277200 Single: Euro 69.- *** 19 SARAJ HOTEL Nevjestina 5 ++387 33 233500 [email protected] Single: Euro 54.- *** ++387 33 237810 Double: Euro 82.- *until November 01, 2005 (accommodation includes breakfast)

• Restaurants Receptions hosted by the OSCE Slovenian presidency and the University of Sarajevo and University of Primorska are planned for both conference evenings. Lunch and snacks during breaks are at participants’ own disposal. In the UNITIC center there are several restaurants, pubs and cafés. The downtown is famous for their Čavabdžinice (grills) and Buregdžinice (cheese cakes). According to geographers of the university HODŽI Ć is the best grill in town. Address Telephone ASDŽ aš činica Veliki čur čiluk 2 238 500 Bon Appetit Kranj čevi ćeva 11 223 715 Caballo Himze Polovine 37 221 819 Cappuccino Grbavi čka 8 526 637 Fellini Branilaca Sarajeva 5 441 716 Inat ku ća Veliki Alifakovac N/A La Taberna Skenderija 23 061 186 096 Lovac Petrakijina 24 664 176 Mori ća han Sara či 77 236 119 Park Prin čeva Iza Hrida 7 532 403 Plavi zamak Zvorni čka 27 657 192 Tavolla Titova 50 222 207 Via Del Corso Kolodvorska 11 718 595 Vinoteka Skenderija 12 214 996

Ćevabdžinice - Baš čaršija Buregdžinice - Baš čaršija Hodži ć Bosna Petica Željo I and II

3. E x c h a n g e ...R a t e

Local currency is Konvertibilna marka or KM.

1 EUR = 1.9558 KM 1 USD = 1.6057 KM 1 GBP = 2.8819 KM 100 SIT = 0.8186 KM 100 HRK = 26.5673 KM

• Banks Raiffeisen, Volksbank, and HVB/Central Profit Bank -- are located at the UNITIC Business Center. Within the Center are two ATM-cash machines.

4. I m p o r t a n t t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r s

• Police 122 • Medical Emergency Room 124 • Conference organizer: For more information check out the Internet City Info Service at http://sarajevo.mojgrad.com

89

5. W e a t h e r

In average, end of November and early December, Sarajevo experiences late Fall conditions: daytime temperatures would not exceed 15 0C, mornings are close to freezing. Occasional rain showers are likely. Fog is expected almost every morning.

But, due to the mountainous surrounding of the Sarajevo, weather in November and December can be quite rough. Instead of rain, we could experience snow. Temperatures could be near 0 0C during daytime as well.

90 SARAJEVO

Sarajevo is the capital and largest city of Bosnia and Herzegovina, located at 43 052’ N and 18 025’E. According to a 1991 census, its population was 429,672; currently estimated at below 400,000.

The city is considered one of the most important cities located on the Balkan Penninsula and has had a long and rich history ever since it was founded by the Ottomans in 1462. It was the site of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which sparked World War I. More recently Sarajevo has hosted the 1984 Winter Olympics and was besieged during the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990’s. Sarajevo is part of Canton Sarajevo, one of the ten cantons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The river Miljacka runs through the city.

The city is surrounded by five major mountains: Bjelašnica (2067 m), Igman (1502 m), Jahorina (1913 m), Trebevi ć (1627 m), Treskavica (2088 m). They are part of the Dinaric Alps that wind through Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Sarajevo has a continental climate, lying between the climate zones of central Europe to the North and the Mediterranean to the South. Sarajevo experiences warm summers, with temperatures of 35 °C (95 °F) not being uncommon, and cold winters, when snow is guaranteed due to the city's altitude. The warmest month of the year is July, when the average temperature is about 19 °C (66 °F), although August's average temperature is only a degree lower. The coldest month of the year is January when the average temperature is -1 °C (30 °F). The average year-round temperature is 10 °C (45 °F).

Tourism is one of Sarajevo’s major industry and is constantly growing now with stability in the region. Sarajevo's mountain ranges and Olympic facilities make it an ideal location for winter sports. Another reason for Sarajevo's popularity among tourists is its 600 years of accumulated history, which have been impacted by both Western and Eastern empires. Ever since the 1984 Olympics, Sarajevo has been a popular tourist attraction (save for the war years in the early 1990s). Indeed, even long before that Sarajevo was a popular stop for travellers in the Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian empires, and is mentioned in travelling books from all sides of Europe and the Middle East.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina's declaration of sovereignty in October 1991, was followed by a declaration of independence from the former Yugoslavia on 3 March 1992 after a referendum boycotted by ethnic Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs - supported by neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro - responded with armed resistance aimed at partitioning the republic along ethnic lines and joining Serb-held areas to form a "greater Serbia." In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats reduced the number of warring factions from three to two by signing an agreement creating a joint Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 21 November 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring parties signed a peace agreement that brought to a halt the three years of interethnic civil strife (the final agreement was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995). The Dayton Peace Agreement retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government. This national government was charged with conducting foreign, economic, and fiscal policy. Also recognized was a second tier of government comprised of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51%) and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation and RS governments were charged with overseeing internal functions. In 1995-96, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops served in Bosnia to implement and monitor the military aspects of the agreement. IFOR was succeeded by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mission is to deter renewed hostilities. SFOR remains in place although troop levels were reduced to approximately 12,000 by the close of 2002. SFOR was replaced by EUFOR in 2004.

Area: total: 51,129 sq km -- water: 0 sq km; land: 51,129 sq km. Land Boundaries: total: 1,459 km -- border countries: Croatia 932 km, Serbia and Montenegro 527 km. Coastline: 20 km. Elevation Extremes: lowest point: Adriatic Sea 0 m highest point: Magli č 2,386 m. Natural Resources: coal, iron, bauxite, manganese, forests, copper, chromium, lead, zinc, hydropower. Land Use: arable land: 9.8%; permanent crops: 2.94%; other: 87.26% (1998 est.). Irrigated Land: 20 sq km (1998 est.) Environment (current issues): air pollution from metallurgical plants; sites for disposing of urban waste are limited; water shortages and destruction of infrastructure because of the 1992-95 civil strife.

91 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – MAP

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The Organizers of the Conference: the University of Primorska, the University of Sarajevo and the Presidency of the Commission on Political Geography of the International Geographical Union would like to Express Thanks to the Following Supporters of the Conference:

• Slovenian Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). • OSCE – Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. • CEI – Central European Initiative; Trieste, Italy. • ARRS – The Slovenian Research Agency; Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology of the Republic of Slovenia.

Organizatorja konference Univerza na Primorskem in Univerza v Sarajevu ter predsedstvo Komisije za politi čno geografijo pri Mednarodni geografski zvezi se vljudno zahvaljujeta naslednjim podpornikom:

• SLOVENSKEMU PREDSEDSTVU ORGANIZACIJE ZA VARNOST IN KOOPERACIJO V EVROPI (OVSE). • OVSE – MISIJI V BOSNI IN HERCEGOVINI. SARAJEVO, BOSNA IN HERCEGOVINA. • SEI – SREDNJEEVROPSKI POBUDI. TRST, ITALIJA • ARRS – AGENCIJA ZA RAZISKOVANJE REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE; MINISTRSTVO ZA VISOKO ŠOLSTVO, ZNANOST IN TEHNOLOGIJO REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE.

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