THE SOUTH AFRICA . INSTITUTE of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS T« .A. INSTITUTE OF mmmom ARCHIVES TO BE REMOVED NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA Jan Smuts House Johannesburg * *. # October 1969 * * Kiis paper has been prepared for the information of members of the South African In- stitute of International Affairs, The Institute is precluded by its Constitution from expressing any opinionso All opinions expressed in the articles in this paper are solely the responsbility of the respective authors• Jan Smuts House P.O. Box 31596 Johannesburg (i) NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA CONTENTS Introduction (ii) An Alliance for All Seasons 1 Warren H. Jones NATO and the Cape Sea Route - 9 General H.J, Kruls Sea Power in the Indian Ocean and South. Atlantic 11 Fice Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, K.B.E. Annexure 16 - Extracts from "Die Burger" and "The Star". - Notes on Contributors- # * -x- (ii) INTRODUCTION As this year is the twentieth anniversary of .the establish- ment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, it seemed appropriate to circulate to members information about the achieve- ments of NATO. The article "in Alliance For All Seasons" by Warren H. Jones provides such:;'information in some detail, although it does not purport to. be an overall evaluation of NATO's role and the problems it has faced during the past twenty years. The two articles which follow reflect the concern felt in some NATO quarters about the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, and relate to. .South Africa's strategic position in this regard* This concern Was highlighted at a recent non-official NATO meeting in Washington, when the British delegation (not an official Government delegation) suggested in a working paper that NATO should extend its activities to the South Atlantic area - "with the possible inclusion of South "Africa" - to meet the r growing threat of Soviet sea-power in the region. ' '., . As reported in "The Star" of October 21, 1969, the British delegation to the Washington meeting urged NATO to extend its defence limits south of the Tropic of Cancer, because of the increasing importance of the Cape Sea route following the closure of the Suez Canal. They suggested that discussions on the problem might cover the supply, if South Africa requested it, of naval vessels and reconnaisance planes to assist in defence of the Cape of Good Hope sea route against submarine attack. The British working paper acknowledged problems over the attitudes by some NATO members towards South Africa1s apartheid policies, but posed a blunt question: "If .the importance of these routes need any underlining, it is Only necessary to ask the , question of how Europe's shipping would fare if a hostile South. Africa were to forbid its ports to vessels of NATO flag nations?"; South Africa had co-operated in the past in joint naval exercises and provided port facilities to NATO countries, tankers and cargo ships at Cape Town and Durban. Through the Toungfield radio station at Cape Town, South Africa also provided NATO shipping with weather information and intelligence about Soviet naval movements. "With the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy and the increased importance of the Cape sea route following the closure of the Suez Canal, it can be argued that the limit on the treaty is politically and militarily obsolete, that it imposes an anachronistic restriction on efficient defence of NATO's interests", the British delegation's working paper said. (A report on this meeting, which appeared in "Die Burger" of 21 October, 1969, is reproduced in an annexure, together with an editorial comment which appeared in "The Star" of the same date.) /Earlier this*.. (iii) Earlier this year there were reports that the South African Government was discussing with other Governments the question of arrangements for the defence of the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, including the idea of some sort of Southern Hemisphere pact with Brazil and Argentina on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other. All the Governments concerned have denied that any such pact is contemplated. There have, however, been official visits "by units of the South African Navy to South American ports and to Australia, and next year a ship of the Argentine Navy will join the South African Wavy in manoeuvres. On the 25th May, 1969, "The Star" noted: that a Government White Paper on defence reflected the concern regarding the impending power-vacuum in the Indian Ocean. The White Paper : revealed that the Republic would concentrate on strengthening and expanding its maritime defence programme.. To add striking power to its naval vessels, and to provide for greater defence off the coast of South Africa, steps to be taken would include, the purchase of fast coastal patrol craft, the acquisition of light reconnaisance patrol aircraft to police coastal waters, possible provision of guided missiles on naval vessels, construction of a R14.4 million tidal basin and submarine base at Simonstown- ! On 30th September, 1969, it was reported that Mr. Raymond V.B. Blackman, editor of the journal "Jane's Fighting Ships", : 1969-70, had suggested that there be a new role for-South Africa and other South Atlantic powers as part of a Greater Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He asked: "But why a separate SATO and NATO? Why not a combined SATO and NATO in the shape of a GATO or Greater Atlantic Treaty Organisation? Mr. Blackman recalled Dr. Hilgard Muller's visits to the Argentine and Brazil and the South. African Navy's courtesy visits to the Argentine and Australia'. He added: • "All these exchanges reflect the growing concern of South Africa, - custodian of the today never so important sea route round the Cape, over the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic • caused by the withdrawal of British forces east of Sues and from the South Atlantic." AN ALLIANCE FOR AIL SEASONS . ' By Warren H. Jones Two hundred years ago Edmund Burke spoke of "Men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense, full of resources..." Had he spoken these words in our time he might well have been, referring to the representatives of the post-World War II free world nations who, realizing that peace was not finally assured, assembled under a banner of collective security. This assembly resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, an alliance to prevent aggression, an instrument for joint permanent co- operation in the political, military, economic and social fields. Signed in 1949, the Treaty proclaimed, with the strength and wealth of the member nations at its; service, the importance of economic and social progress while reaffirming a security policy based on the inherent right of collective self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. When the Alliance came into being 20 years ago even the most confirmed optimist could not fail to see the threat in the East. As the wartime Allied Forces reduced their armed, strength and settled down to-peace, the Soviet Union maintained its forces on a wartime footing. It was soon apparent that the Soviet territorial expansion that had begun during the war and ended with the annexation of about 390,000 square miles of territory in which more than 90,000,000 people lived, was an extension of an imperialist policy which was a threat to peace and security, Extraordinary Achievements ,In its pursuit of the defense of a way of life, NATO has made some extraordinary achievements and has maintained the cohesion of member states in the strategic and political fields, NATO also has continued to examine the important and complex problems confronting it in the field of conventional and nuclear weapons? and has advanced rapidly in the study of the various formulae proposed, or. which might be proposed in the future, with particular respect to the sharing of nuclear responsibilities within the Alliance. As a result, NATO has become a supereminence of defense, a center of expertise in the difficult profession of keeping the peace. How did NATO reach such a stage of defensive maturity? High- minded ideals and principles aimed at guarding freedom and humanity are not, in themselves, effective weapons against.an enemy. Communism respects only physical power, and the only meaningful deterrent to plans for world domination is the knowledge that aggression will be met by armed resistance. C.J ft . » — 2 — Prom the very outset it was obvious that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be useless unless it were backed by effective military force. In 1950 the North Atlantic Council, supreme political authority for the Alliance, directed the creation of an integrated military command under a Supreme Commander who had sufficient authority to insure that national forces could "be organized, trained and equipped as an Allied force in peace as well as in war.' Thus^ came into being Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe - SHAPE - (from 1950 to 1967 near Paris, since then in southern Belgium) and Allied Command Europe - ACE« To insure adequate regional defenses under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), SHAPE has three major subordinate commands: AFNORTH, Allied Forces Northern Europe, with headquarters near Oslo, Norway; APCENT, Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, The Netherlands; AFSOUTH, Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples, Italy. There are two other major NATO commands, Allied Command Atlantic, which defends the sea lanes between North America and Europe, and Allied Command Channel, charged with defense of the English Channel and the protection of communication lines between the United Kingdom and the Continent, ACE and its sister commands are constantly developing strategies, force requirements and future programmes. Two of their main characteristics stand' out: Overall control of total military power is vested in the political authority; and all plans and concepts of defense submitted to this authority for approval, carry prior, unanimous acceptance by the top military authorities of the member nations, Czechoslovakia ••••'" Soviet military capabilities are a.