The Terrorism Trap: the Hidden Impact of America's War on Terror

University of Tennessee, Knoxville Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2019 The Terrorism Trap: The Hidden Impact of America's War on Terror John Akins University of Tennessee, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Recommended Citation Akins, John, "The Terrorism Trap: The Hidden Impact of America's War on Terror. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2019. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/5624 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Terrorism Trap: The Hidden Impact of America’s War on Terror A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville John Harrison Akins August 2019 Copyright © 2019 by John Harrison Akins All rights reserved. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Krista Wiegand, and the other members of my committee, Brandon Prins, Gary Uzonyi, and Candace White, for their support and assistance during my research and writing. I would also like to thank the support of Richard Pacelle, the Political Science Department Head; Ian Down, the Director of Graduate Studies; and the Political Science Department staff—Laura Cosey, Dianna Beeler, and Leslie Tolman. iii ABSTRACT Nearly two decades after the declaration of the War on Terror, global terrorist attacks have increased. Beginning in 2005, the levels of domestic terrorism have drastically increased while international terrorism has not. This is a result of U.S. counterterrorism policy shifting towards “disaggregation” in which the U.S. government would focus on breaking up the global al Qaeda network into disconnected groups and rely on partner states’ militaries to target them. In particular, partner states’ focused their counterterrorism operations on the “ungoverned spaces” on their periphery, regions with a history of conflict with the central government and limited government presence in which it was feared al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliated groups would use as safe havens. Domestic terrorism within partner states rose as a result of revenge attacks from the targeted communities and groups in the periphery in response to the offensive military actions of the state, especially when they resulted in civilian casualties. The increase in domestic terrorism led to further U.S. pressure to expand the counterterrorism operations in the periphery, exacerbating the underlying conditions that led to the outbreak of domestic terrorism. This led partner states to sink deeper into a terrorism trap. This study uses quantitative analysis of a global dataset and case studies of Pakistan, Yemen, Mali, and Egypt to demonstrate and test the terrorism trap theory. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 Chapter Two: What’s in a Name? Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates ......................................... 38 Chapter Three: “The Mission Determines the Coalition”: The U.S. and Its Partner States in the War on Terror ......................................................................................................... 94 Chapter Four: The Terrorism Trap Explained ............................................................... 146 Chapter Five: Our Man in Islamabad: Pakistan and the Global War on Terror ............. 168 Chapter Six: Statistical Analysis ..................................................................................... 267 Chapter Seven: Testing the Terrorism Trap .................................................................... 311 Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations ........................................................ 385 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 427 Vita……………………………………………………………………………………...502 v LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1 Terrorist Attacks by al Qaeda Affiliates (Up to 2017)………………………..72 Table 6.1 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks………………………………..277 Table 6.2 Annual Count of International Terrorist Attacks…………………………….278 Table 6.3 Domestic Counterterrorism Operations by the Military……………………..282 Table 6.4 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks………………………………..286 Table 6.5 Annual Count of International Terrorist Attacks…………………………….289 Table 6.6 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks (W/O Iraq and Afghanistan)…295 Table 6.7 Annual Count of International Terrorist Attacks (W/O Iraq and Afghanistan)…………………………………………………………………………….300 Table 6.8 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks....……………………………..302 Table 6.9 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks………………………………..304 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 Annual Count of Global Terrorist Attacks, 1996-2012………………………..4 Figure 1.2 Annual Count of International Terrorist Attacks, 1996-2012…………………5 Figure 1.3 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks, 1996-2012…………………….5 Figure 4.1 Counterterrorism Cooperation Between the U.S. and Partner States……….152 Figure 4.2 The Impact of Domestic Counterterrorism Operations……………………..165 Figure 5.1 Annual Count of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 1996-2012………………...264 Figure 6.1 Domestic Counterterrorism Operations by the Military, 1996-2012……….272 Figure 6.2 Annual Count of Domestic Terrorist Attacks, 1996-2012………………….274 Figure 6.3 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism…………………………………...279 Figure 6.4 Marginal Effects on International Terrorism………………………………..280 Figure 6.5 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism…………………………………...287 Figure 6.6 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism…………………………………...287 Figure 6.7 Marginal Effects on International Terrorism………………………………..290 Figure 6.8 Marginal Effects on International Terrorism………………………………..290 Figure 6.9 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism…………………………………...297 Figure 6.10 Marginal Effects on International Terrorism………………………………297 Figure 6.11 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism………………………………….298 Figure 6.12 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism………………………………….301 Figure 6.13 Marginal Effects on Domestic Terrorism………………………………….301 Figure 7.1 Annual Count of Terrorist Attacks in Yemen, 1996-2012………………….315 Figure 7.2 Annual Count of Terrorist Attacks in Mali, 1996-2012…………………….343 Figure 7.3 Annual Count of Terrorist Attacks in Egypt, 1996-2012…………………...364 vii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION As morning broke on September 12, 2001, countless men, women, and children awoke to a brave new world, a world that would be re-shaped by the fear of al Qaeda and terrorism and America’s global quest to defeat it. In those early hours following the catastrophic events of the previous day, however, little did they know of the global repercussions which would follow from the momentous decisions a handful of individuals within the Bush administration would make in the coming days—hundreds of thousands of lives lost, millions displaced, societies and nations across the globe thrown into upheaval, and the world seemingly no safer from the lingering threat of terrorism nearly two decades later. But some senior American officials were becoming cognizant of the global impact U.S. actions would have. Exactly one week after the al Qaeda attacks, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld transmitted a message to commanders within the military stating broad U.S. objectives to be pursued in developing plans for counterterrorism campaigns against al Qaeda and its supporters. He concluded his message with a bland and understated turn of phrase, one which would be profoundly prophetic: “[A]s we continue to go after terrorism, our activities will have effects in a number of countries. We have to accept that, given the importance of the cause” (Feith, 2008, 57). Within governments, policy circles, academia, media, and even around countless kitchen tables, there has been an exhaustive analysis and debate over the United States’ military misadventures in Afghanistan and Iraq and the resulting chaos within both countries. In recent years, there also has been increased focus on the conduct and impact of the less publicized side of direct American action—covert operations, intelligence 1 gathering, and targeted killings. With U.S. counterterrorism increasingly relying on the cooperation of other states in the Global War on Terror, what is less well understood is the impact of this cooperation on partner states, especially within their own borders.1 U.S. national security has long been reliant on the political and military cooperation of partner states. During the Cold War, the containment strategy toward the Soviet Union was based on gaining the military cooperation of allied states on the periphery of the Soviet bloc and developing their military capabilities to stymie Communist expansion (National Security Council, 1950). In this regard, the War on Terror has been no different. The 9/11 Commission Report found, “Practically every aspect of U.S. counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation” (9/11 Commission, 2004, 379). Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from 2001-2005, similarly observed, “There was a general appreciation after 9/11 that for some purposes it would be necessary and for all purposes it would be desirable to have

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