Dissertation, Lester

When Should Secrets Stay Secret? Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence By Genevieve Allison Lester A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Bruce E. Cain, Chair Professor Joel D. Aberbach Professor Ron E. Hassner Professor Neil Fligstein Spring 2012 When Should Secrets Stay Secret? Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence © 2012 by Genevieve Allison Lester Abstract When Should Secrets Stay Secret? Accountability, Democratic Governance, and Intelligence by Genevieve Allison Lester Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Bruce E. Cain, Chair This dissertation investigates how intelligence activities, largely opaque from the public view, are held accountable in a democracy. Much of regulation and what is considered good governance is the result of strong, transparent regulatory structures, the activities of interest groups, openness to the media, and to the public. National security and intelligence matters, by necessity, do not fit neatly within these expectations of transparency. This dissertation explores how the three branches of government maintain control over the intelligence agencies, describes the mechanisms that have been developed to assure accountability, and explains what causes them to change over time. The institutional development of oversight mechanisms described above contributes to an original theoretical framework of accountability that disaggregates the nebulous concept of accountability into two sets of characteristics that can help understand the concept of accountability on a more granular and, eventually, operational, level. This project divides “accountability” into two sets of components: those that correspond to external accountability— through mechanisms external to the supervised agency—and those that relate to internal accountability—incorporating internal control mechanisms, institutional culture, and organizational standard operating procedures. The objective of this disaggregation of accountability within the context of intelligence is to understand how to assess the oversight mechanisms for both weaknesses and strengths when it comes to their oversight responsibility over the intelligence function. Specifically this approach facilitates understanding how responsibilities for oversight and control over intelligence activities vary across government institutions. Beyond contributing a unique theoretical framework to the academic assessment of accountability and intelligence, this project contributes to the study of intelligence oversight in the breadth of its operational analysis. While many studies focus on one branch of government, usually Congress, to understand how intelligence is supervised, this study incorporates the oversight mechanisms from all three branches of government. The purpose of this expansive approach is to understand how the mechanisms interact in practice, and thus to understand how ! 1! they may be developed to meet the needs of an emerging threat environment and thus an adaptive intelligence community. ! 2! Table of Contents ! Abstract………………………………………………………………………………1 Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………i List of Figures………………………………………………………………………..ii List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………...…...iii Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………...iv Chapter One: The Theoretical Foundations: Accountability and Intelligence…………………………………………………………………...1 Chapter Two: The CIA, Culture, and the Executive Branch: Internal Accountability……………………………………………………..37 Chapter Three: External Accountability: Congress, Opposition, and Oversight Development…………………………………………………………………84 Chapter Four: An Independent Judiciary? The Domestic Implications of Intelligence and the Politics of Secret Oversight………………………….128 Chapter Five: Conclusions, Policy Recommendations, and Future Research…..159 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………165 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! i! List of Figures Figure 1: US Intelligence Community (2007)…………………………………..6 Figure 2: Conventional Intelligence Cycle……………………………………..50 Figure 3: Covert Action Responsibilities………………………………………54 Figure 4: Intelligence Community post-IRTPA (2004)……………………….118 Figure 5: Congressional Intelligence Authorization and Appropriations Responsibilities…………………………………………………………..124 ! ii! List of Abbreviations CIA: Central Intelligence Agency COINTELPRO: Counterintelligence Program (FBI) DCI: Director of Central Intelligence D/CIA: Director, CIA (post advent of Director of National Intelligence) DHS: Department of Homeland Security DI: Directorate of Intelligence DNI: Director of National Intelligence DO: Directorate of Operations FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act FISC: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court FISCR: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review HPSCI: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence HUMINT: Human Intelligence IC: Intelligence Community IG: Inspector General IRTPA: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force PFIAB/PIAB: President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board/President’s Intelligence Advisory Board NCS: National Clandestine Service NSA: National Security Agency NSC: National Security Council OGC: Office of the General Counsel OIG: Office of the Inspector General OSINT: Open Source Intelligence SSCI: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence TECHINT: Technical Intelligence TIARA: Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities TSP: Terrorist Surveillance Program WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction ! ! iii! Acknowledgments This dissertation is the creation of countless individuals, who dedicated their time, patience, and knowledge to its completion. My gratitude goes first to Carole and Omar, who made it a group project, with edits, humor, love, and endless support—emotional, academic, financial, and lasagna-related. To Dad for listening, helping me break the academic spell, and sending me hookahs in the mail. To my dear, patient friends, especially Alissa Pelkola, Allison Theodore, Jill Clark, and Emily Horgan, who have always provided sanity checks and a glass of wine when I needed them. A special mention goes to Alissa who heard about this so much and continued to contribute wonderful food, comfort, a great intellect, a couch, and cats to pet. Angelo Gonzales deserves special praise for being a fantastic cheerleader through years of the peaks and valleys of my graduate school experience. I owe a tremendous amount to the advice of early mentors, particularly Robert Gallucci, who made sure I understood the seriousness and focus that security requires, and Todd LaPorte, whose kindness has always been unique and very important to me. Detlof von Winterfeldt will always be dear, not least because he made sure I tried to fix the problem, not make it bigger. To Bruce Hoffman, Daniel Byman, and Robin Dillon-Merrill, thank you for the support and home at Georgetown. Thanks to all of you for challenging me to try difficult things. I owe many thanks to the members of my very supportive dissertation committee, Bruce Cain, Joel Aberbach, Ron Hassner, and Neil Fligstein, who weren’t afraid to trust that the experiment with spies would end up viable. All of them provided vital assistance in the completion of this project. I am at a loss to express my gratitude to Bruce Cain, the chair of my dissertation committee and my adviser, who made it all work. Knowing that I am without words is probably expression enough to him, but he made everything possible—in the broadest and biggest sense. He delivered what he promised; in the best Charlie and Lucy way, it was fun, and I am optimistic about the future. Really. This project was devised and completed at the University of California Washington Center, my intellectual home for four years. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to the faculty and staff of the Center, many of whom actively helped me grow into whatever the future will hold. Again, to Bruce, who made sure I had a home base, avenues for my spies, and a continuous focus on the final objective, for better or worse… ; to James Desveaux, who always listened, and is to the core, kind and generous. To our graduate student posse at the Center; it made all the difference to go through this together, and finally, to Alfreda Brock and Chantal Quintero, who are geniuses at smoothing over the cracks and making really crazy things possible. A final note must remain anonymous, but over the course of this project I have been truly humbled by the generosity and openness of the intelligence community. Some of my early interview subjects have become good friends; almost every single individual I have spoken to has remained in contact. I still cannot believe my luck in having had the opportunity to get to experience at least a small piece of the reality of a world I find so fascinating, and I owe many, many thanks to the array of individuals who contributed to this work with their life experiences, opinions, and wisdom. This is, I hope, just the beginning. ! iv! Chapter 1: The Theoretical Foundations: Accountability and Intelligence For decades Congress and the courts as well as the press and the public have accepted the notion that the control of intelligence activities was the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Executive and his surrogates. The exercise of this power was not questioned

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