December 2014

Policy Paper Czech-American Relations: A Roadmap for the Future

John K. Glenn | Policy Director, U.S. Global Leadership Coalition Bruce P. Jackson | President, Project for Transitional Democracies Lukáš Kovanda | Economic Consultant A. Wess Mitchell | President, CEPA Cameron Munter | Professor of International Relations, Tomáš Pojar | Vice President for International Relations, CEVRO Institute Jiří Schneider | Senior Fellow, Security Studies Institute | Director, Prague Centre for Transatlantic Relations (CEVRO Institute) Policyr Pape Czech-American Relations: A Roadmap for the Future

From Masaryk to Havel: coup d’etat in February 1948 were East, nothing was possible but every- A Desire to Bring a Piece just bitter consequences of Yalta. thing mattered; in the West, everything of America Home Thus, U.S. postwar policy towards the was possible but nothing mattered. region was shaped by realpolitik and After 1989, Czech and American On July 4, 1928 a bronze statue of consisted of defense commitment to policymakers have acted exactly in Woodrow Wilson was erected in front of Western Europe and a recognition of opposite: like everything mattered and the Prague main rail station. It was more Soviet sphere of influence in the East. everything was possible. than just a tribute to Wilson’s foreign That was a bitter pill to Hungary in The U.S. response to the 1990s policy and its support for the Czech and 1956 and to in1968. ­euphoria was quick and positive. Slovak right for their self-determination. However, the American engagement in Firstly, they focused on economy. In It also showed a remarkable Jeffersonian­ the half of Europe largely contributed to 1990, they supported Czechoslovakia inspiration at the cradle of Czechoslo- the victory of the West in the Cold War. in its entry into IMF and the World Bank. vak Republic in 1918. The founder of After the fall of the Iron Curtain in In 1991, Czechoslovakia was granted the new, independent republic, Tomáš 1989, democratic revolutions led to with the most-favored-nation-clause in Garrigue Masaryk, noted: “I devoted a comprehensive transformation of mutual trade, the bilateral Investment much time thinking to the idea that the countries of Central Europe into liberal Protection Agreement (BIPA) was Czechoslovak state would resemble democracies based on the rule of law signed, and the Czechoslovakian-U.S. America in that we too have no dynasty and market economy. Solidarity and Entreprise Fund has been established. of our own and dislike foreign dynasty”1. alliance among democratic states in The Czechs sought the U.S. investment Therefore it was quite symbolical that defense of common values were be- in strategic sectors like telecommuni- – on the occasion of the first ever visit of lieved to provide necessary institutional cation (Bell), energy (Westinghouse, the U.S. President to Prague in Novem- framework for abandoning bonds of Conoco) and defense (Boeing) in the ber 1990 – George H.W. Bush unveiled totalitarian past as well as for their 1990s. a plaque commemorating Wilson’s future “return to Europe”. New politi- Secondly, the Clinton administra- words: “The world must be made safe cal elites in Central Europe have been tion, with the support of Republicans- for democracy.” He spoke about Europe deeply convinced that a new order in lead Congress since 1994, provided whole and free and recalled high costs of the region should be based on a strong a leadership in the process of NATO the U.S. isolationism after the First World Transatlantic bond with the U.S., which enlargement. Between 1997 and 1999, War. Ronald D. Asmus and ­Alexandr has never had – unlike “other powers” the – together with Vondra have captured ­prevailing – hegemonic ambitions in Europe. The and Hungary – has became opinion: “In Central European eyes, it continuing U.S. engagement in Europe the member of NATO, and later on, the was America’s retreat from European was seen as a vital Czech strategic in- Prague NATO 2002 Summit offered the politics in the 1920s that paved the way terest. President Václav Havel, the first membership to other states of Central for the rise of Hitler and Stalin and even- statesman from former Soviet-bloc to and Eastern Europe (CEE) including tual destruction of their independence.”2 visit NATO HQ, was tireless in argu- . The American leadership in Clearly, a destruction of Czechoslovakia ing for NATO’s continued relevance shaping a post-Cold war architecture in 1938 was marked by absence of the after the end of Cold War: “It is only in Europe had paved a road to swift U.S. in Europe. By the same token, the now that the Alliance has a chance to big-bang EU enlargement in 2004. U.S. involvement in European battlefield become exactly what the Washington played indispensable role in liberation of Treaty meant it to be – an open alliance 1 “Masaryk and America: Testimony of Western Europe from Nazi rule. of all democratic countries in the Euro- a Relationship” by George J. Kovtun. In 1945, a demarcation line between Atlantic region, protecting its area and Library of Congress, 1988. U.S. and Soviet zones – only a part its shared values.”3 2 Asmus, Ronald, D. and Vondra, Alexandr: of western Bohemia was ­liberated “The Origins of the Atlanticism in Central by General Patton’s 3rd US Army – and Eastern Europe”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 18, Num- conceded Czechoslovakia to the The Romantic Era of 1990s: ber 2, July 2005. Soviet sphere of influence and sealed Values Matters, Everything 3 “NATO: The Safeguard of Stability and its geopolitical fate for more than four Is Possible Peace In the Euro-Atlantic Region”, decades. A rejection of Marshall Plan V. Havel‘s Speech at NATO Workshop by the Czechoslovak government upon Philip Roth once said the difference On Political-Military Decision Making, Stalin’s request in 1947 and communist between East and West was that in the Warsaw, Poland 19–23 June 1996.

PCTR // CEVRO Institute The policy paper is funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Jungmannova 17 / 110 00 Praha 1 / Czech Republic Czech Republic as a part of the wider projects of public diplomacy to tel. / +420 221 506 737 // e-mail / [email protected] // www.cevroinstitut.cz rise awareness of NATO and Security Policy of the Czech Republic.

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As a result, the Czech Republic has rights (“The One World”) and most states tend to seek the affection of gained the best security guarantees in recently has established itself as an distant powers to balance or offset its modern history and found itself in important venue for meetings bringing the unwanted attentions of their larger a relatively safe security havens, encir- together actors from the Middle East, neighbors. But this balancing game cled by states, with which it shared the Europe and the North America, includ- works best in an international system same values and interests. ing Israelis and people from countries of many roughly equal powers. In addi- The Czech Republic did not stay which do not recognize Israel. tion to the inequality of power (and thus aside as a mere consumer of security. Generally speaking, the Czech- also responsibility) between a small In 1991, Czechoslovak NBC battalion American relations between 1990 and state and a distant power, there are took part in Desert Storm operation 2009 enjoyed a kind of a “sunshine also asymmetries of interests, which to liberate Kuwait. The Czech Armed era”. Starting with the famous Presi- are magnified by different geographical Forces contributed to every peace- dent Havel’s speech before a joint ses- realities. The Czech Republic might see keeping effort in the Balkans. In 1999, sion of the U.S. Congress in February a powerful ally as useful in controlling only two weeks after the accession in 1990, Czech government officials were passions within CEE and in restraining NATO, Czech commitment was tested welcomed in the White House year by the power of Russia (or in in a heated domestic debate to ap- year as friends and allies. The last four past). By contrast, the United States prove air strikes against Belgrade and U.S. Presidents have visited Prague. might see all of Mitteleuropa as either in sending Czech troops to Kosovo. Both parties embraced a shared set of a bridge to or a barrier against Russia Following terrorist attacks of 9/11, values: Americans embraced Václav depending on the policy du jour. The the Czech Republic proved to be Havel as a secular saint, and Czechs only possible exception to a logic of a reliable ally taking part in operations embraced America as a symbol of geography could be terrorism, which in Afghanistan without any caveats. freedom. countries perceive in the same way The U.S.-led invasion to Iraq in 2003 People-to-people contacts were across great distances, but even brought a division of Europe. The driven by a similar enthusiasm and here capitals may differ on whether Czech Republic stood by the U.S. – a sense of culture proximity. It drew and when to fight in Iran, Iraq, Syria, along with Denmark, Hungary, Great young Americans to Prague in the Somalia or Mali. Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal and early 90s, and it inspired a steady In 2009, a turning point in Czech- Spain – and President Havel signed the stream of Czech students to the U.S. American relationship occurred. “letter of eight”4 to call for European In 2008, the U.S. administration finally When the Czech government was unity in enforcing of the UNSC Resolu- added the Czech Republic to the Visa approached in 2007 (after five years tion 1441. Waiver Program, which allowed Czech of diplomatic discussions) by the Thirdly, Czech and American citizens to visit America without having administration of G.W. Bush to be ­government institutions and NGOs to obtain a visa. part of the projected Ballistic Missile have been engaged in worldwide sup- Defense shield to address a threat port of human rights and transitions from nuclear Iran, it embraced the towards democratic and free societies Wake-Up into Reality: Logic proposal with no hesitation. It was over more than two decades. The of Geography and Large and seen as an opportunity to build a sort relocation of Radio Free Europe/Radio Small State Problem of “special relationship” with the U.S. Liberty from Munich to Prague has The Czechs believed that U.S. military been more than symbolic. The work of Twenty years after the Velvet Revolu- deployment on their soil would provide National Endowment for Democracy, tion, Prague and Washington suddenly a visible assurance against a possible NDI and IRI with Czech based partners have recognized that the romantic re-emergence of Russia as a European vis-à-vis the Balkans, Eastern Europe, period in their relationship was over. power. Meanwhile, in the late 2008, Middle East as well as Burma, Cuba, A superficial observer may argue that the economic crises hit the West as and V­ enezuela has started already in both sides became victims of their own a whole and foreign policies of the the 90’s. Significant projects have been success. A more nuanced perspective U.S. were profoundly altered by the done through the Open Society Institute would argue that a cultural comity of presidential elections and subsequent network and many respected Czech like-minded democracies was not the Obama presidency. The pressures of organizations have grown – People in product of closely reasoned political an extended recession have turned Need, Transitions Online, Forum 2000 thought and would question whether a domestically focused president into Foundation, Prague Security Studies shared values alone constitute a rock- a functional isolationist insofar as Institute, Central and Eastern European solid alliance in foreign and defense Europe is concerned. Law Initiative (CEELI), Aspen Institute policy. Prague and CEVRO Institute among The core of the problem derives 4 “Europe and America Must Stand others. Prague hosts the largest world from a relationship between large and United”, The Times, London, January 30, documentary film festival on human small states. As a general rule, smaller 2003.

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Central European concerns about a saxophone given to him by President the 13th biggest Czech ­trading part- President Obama’s policies towards Havel at a jazz club, President Obama ner (and 3rd biggest Czech partner the region were embodied by the dined alone in a Prague hotel with his amongst non-EU countries, after “Open Letter to the Obama Administra- wife. China and Russia). The U.S. share on tion from Central and Eastern Europe” Although in his Prague speech the Czech foreign trade amounts only signed by 22 influential former leaders,­ President Obama declared that “the to about two percent. Recent figures including Václav Havel and Lech Wale- U.S. will never turn its back on the related to the Czech-US mutual trade sa.5 “As friends and allies of the U.S.,” people of this nation”, in September (see Table 1) show a steady increase signatories were concerned about their 2009 he declared the Missile Defense of its total turnover since 2009, when security in the wake of the Russian project cancelled and transformed into the global financial crisis culminated. invasion of Georgia, and complained European Phased Adaptive Approach Since 2011, the Czech Republic has that “Central and Eastern European (EPAA) with no specific role for the maintained a favorable (positive) trade countries are no longer at the heart of Czech Republic. In October 2009, balance with the U.S. (whereas it had American foreign policy.” They ques- Vice-President Biden came to Prague a negative balance of trade with the tioned NATO’s ability and willingness on a damage-control trip and encou­ U.S. in the years before 2011). to defend them from potential Russian raged Czechs to “become partners The simple list enumerating the U.S. aggression and cautioned that “sup- rather than protégées of the U.S.” direct investors in the Czech Republic port for a more global partnership with Subsequently some attempts have may seem impressive, but a closer Washington in the region might wane been made to deepen the partnership. look tells us a different story. There over time.” While they said that they The U.S. proposed to host a Shared had been a steady decline of the U.S. “welcome the reset” with Russia, the Early Warning Centre in Prague. It was share of foreign direct investment in signatories also expressed concern designed as a few terminals jointly the Czech Republic, from 8.2 percent that the Obama administration might manned by the U.S. and Russia to in 1998 to only 2.8 percent in 2008. In be tempted to replace the current monitor missiles but it was rejected 1998, the US occupied the 4th position security architecture with a proposal by Czechs as a sheer “consolation amongst foreign direct investors in the for a “Concert of Powers” made at prize”, leaving aside an uncertain is- Czech Republic. Currently it stands the time by Dmitri Medvedev. Finally, sue of Russia’s military engagement. only as the 9th biggest foreign direct the letter called on the administration The Czechs, on the other hand, came investor. However, the U.S. still counts to “reaffirm its vocation as a European up with proposals to start a triangular as the biggest non-EU direct investor power” and to strengthen NATO’s cre­ U.S.-Czech-Afghan cooperation in in the Czech Republic, followed by dibility with new contingency planning modernizing Czech Air Forces and Japan and South Korea. to counter possible threats in their building helicopter capacity of ANA. A relative decline of the U.S. foreign region. It warned the administration They were not responded to by the direct investments in the Czech Re- not to make policy decisions for the U.S. at all. Nor has a research coopera- public could be marked by examples proposed missile defense in CEE on tion under the Office of Naval Research in strategic sectors. Boeing, which the basis of Russian opposition. developed into a permanent institu- had acquired a control share in Aero The letter and its messages, tional bond. The agreement facilitating­ Vodochody in 1998, failed to fulfill high ­however, did not propose a course of Research, Development, Testing expectations to establish a strategic actions. Already in the spring of 2009, & Evaluation (RDTE) was signed in cooperation with the U.S. defense it was not difficult to conclude that 2010. So far, only one project has been aircraft industry and pulled out in 2004. U.S.-Czech relations were suffering realized. In 2012, Reciprocal Defense All major U.S. companies already left from a hangover. Prime Minister Mirek Procurement Agreement (RDPA) was the Czech petrochemical industry. In Topolánek called President Obama’s concluded. Again, it remains to be 2007, ConocoPhillips sold its stake in economic policies after the financial seen, whether and how the Czech and the largest Czech refinery to ENI and collapse the “highway to hell”. Although U.S. companies will be able to utilize it. lately Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips he was just expressing loudly what his sold their retail business to Lukoil and German counterparts articulated in ENI. privacy, his “AC/DC language” caused A Missing Driving Force: It’s Following a modernization of the an alarm in the Oval Office. Ten days the Economy, Stupid. Russian made reactors at the nuclear before President Obama was to arrive power plant Temelín by Westinghouse in Prague for the U.S. – EU Summit, The famous James Carville’s phrase the Czech government collapsed due brings us to realities in current econo­ 5 “An Open Letter To The Obama Ad- to internal intrigue, at the same time mic and trade relations. Real numbers ministration From Central And Eastern that it held the rotating EU presidency. are less impressive than one would Europe,” Gazeta Wyborcza, July 16, Rather than invoking the iconic image expect taking into account the rosy 2009, reprinted by Radio Free Europe/ from 1994 of President Clinton playing rhetoric. The U.S. currently represents Radio Liberty, September 06, 2014.

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in 1990s, a public tender to build East (Russia, China). It was one of thought a “Free Europe” could best be two additional reactors was seen as the reasons why those companies realized by “less Brussels”. an opportunity for the Czech–U.S. lobbied the Czech governments to ­cooperation in nuclear energy. How- soften the sanctions called by the EU ever, the German “Energiewende” and after Russia’­ s intervention in Atlanticists or Europhiles: turbulent prices on the EU electricity in 2014. Statements by high ranking Are Czechs at the market together with a system of fixed Czech officials suggesting to change Crossroads? feed-in tariffs and other subsidies for the Czech foreign policy on human renewable energy producers, have rights could be also explained by In the mid of the Iraqi Crisis in 2003, caused a de facto collapse of the Eu- economically motivated lobbying. then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald ropean energy market in its traditional Carl Gershman, the President of the Rumsfeld had divided European Allies form. As a result, the biggest companies National Endowment for Democracy, between the “old” and the “new” ones. had to reevaluate investments plans. has publicly raised questions whether His expectation was that CEE countries When the Czech government decided the Czech Republic is giving up on would be natural “atlanticists” because not to provide financial­ guarantees moral responsibility by ignoring Havel’s they see the U.S. as a desirable coun- in 2014, CEZ company called off the legacy of a strong support for human terweight to the traditional threat of tender and thus put a development of rights and freedom around the world.6 Russia. Rumsfeld’s critics have argued new blocks on hold. It is noteworthy On November 19, 2014, the U.S. that this assumption was wrong. that Rosatom acted more proactively Congress has marked the 25th an- ­Allegedly a gravity of the EU integration than Westinghouse during the tender niversary of the Velvet Revolution by will prevail and the “New Europe” will process, with apparently firmer deter- unveiling a bust of Václav Havel in the be undetectable in one generation. mination to win the deal. U.S. Capitol. Only three other interna- From purely legal perspective, just The future prospect is uncertain. tional figures have been honored there modest changes occurred with the Improvements in bilateral trade are in this way (Churchill, Kossuth and adoption of acqui communitaire and held hostage to the successful con- Wallenberg). Czech Prime Minister the entry of the Czech Republic into clusion of trade negotiations between Bohuslav Sobotka used the opportu- the EU in 2004. Some Czech-U.S. bi- the EU and the U.S., which could be nity to assure his U.S. hosts about the lateral treaties and agreements related influenced by elections. The foreign Czech government’s determination to to economic and trade issues were direct investment is not limited by continue in Havel’s traditions of princi- terminated and certain competencies the political calendar but it is impos- pled foreign policy. were exclusively passed on the Eu- sible to direct them politically. Right However, doubts persist whether ropean Commission (EC). Since 2011 now American investors are wary of nice words would be translated into there have been talks between both investing in Europe for three reasons: practical policies. President Obama parties concerning renegotiation of the (1) the U.S. economy is recovering did not meet the Czech Prime Minister Investment Protection Treaty. While the faster than Europe’s and the dollar is during his last U.S. visit. Also it is hard Czechs want to eliminate its unilateral strengthening; (2) political leadership to argue that President Miloš Zeman asymmetry, the U.S. side so far has across Europe, including in Brussels, has actively sought to rebuild strained played a stalling tactics. is viewed as weak and indecisive and ties during his first year in office. His It is clear that bilateral Czech-U.S. ready to pander to populists on higher predecessor, former President Václav relations must be anchored in a proven taxes and penalties to business; and Klaus, did not do any better. Although framework of international relations (3) growing instability in Russia and Prague and Washington were speaking and organizations (NATO, EU). In July the Middle East are seen as a nega- about the same values, they have come 2013, negotiations on a proposed trea- tive for European economies over the to diametrically opposed conclusions. ty establishing the Transatlantic Trade long-term. While both G.W.Bush’s and Obama’s and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Since the Western economic crisis, administrations thought that the values began between the EU and the U.S. some larger Czech companies directed invested in a “Europe Whole and Free” TTIP would cover three broad areas: their offensive towards markets in the meant “more Europe”, Václav Klaus market access liberalization, specific regulations and principles and modes of cooperation. The EC estimates that Table 1: Czech-US mutual trade (combined figures, mil. USD) its passage could boost overall trade 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 and investments by as much as 50 %. Czech export 2430.6 2568.7 1933 2462 3344 3926 3920.6 Realistic estimates suggest modest, Czech import 2669.5 2926.6 2200.1 2797.9 2958.1 2961.1 3034.7 Turnover 5100.1 3947.1 2902.6 5259.9 6302.1 6887.1 6955.3 6 Carl Gershman: “Are Czechs Giving Up Balance −238.9 −357.9 −267.1 -335.9 385.9 964.9 885.9 on Moral Responsibility?”, Washington Source of data: Czech Foreign Ministry Post, November 16, 2014.

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but positive welfare gains for the Czech Europe varied widely (from Poland common for center-right parties, while economy. It is likely to experience with 72 % to Spain with 62 %). On the the more negative attitude is typical for gradual expansion of its exports to the other side of the Atlantic, about 57 % the Communists.­ Overall, 54 % of the U.S. and can benefit indirectly as well of Americans said it was desirable for Czechs believes the U.S. presence in (e.g. a German owned Czech subsidi- the EU to exercise strong leadership Europe is important as a counterweight ary produced components which are as well. Favorable opinion of the EU to Russia or Germany (see Figure 1). exported to Germany where they are remains stable at 50 % in the U.S. The The image of the U.S. among Czechs used to produce e.g. a car, which will same survey showed similar support looks favorable even if compared with be later exported to the US market). for transatlantic security partnership other institutions or important states in Another example of possible viewing NATO as “still essential” (58 % their neighborhood (NATO, EU, Russia, influencing the Czech-American of the EU respondents, 55 % of Ameri- Germany – see Figure 2). ­bilateral relationship is the EU inten- cans). TTIP project enjoys a bit lower The economic cooperation between tion to renegotiate the EU-U.S. Safe support (56 % of respondents in the the Czech Republic and the U.S. Harbor Framework agreement on data EU, 49 % of Americans). is important for 74 % of the Czech ­protection. As a result of PRISM affair, The Czech Republic was not included population. However, only 25 % of Brussels believes that U.S. compa- into GMF Transatlantic Trends survey respondents have noticed a spe- nies fail to meet the EU “adequacy” but the Prague Centre for Transatlantic cific example of such cooperation. standard for privacy protection. Věra Relations (PCTR) at CEVRO Institute Respondents were also asked about Jourová, a Czech appointed Com- managed an opinion poll focused on the their opinions on completion of the missioner for Justice, Consumers and perception of the importance of NATO Temelin nuclear power plant. Three- Gender Equality, will be in charge of as well as the role of the U.S. in Europe.8 in-four (76 %) Czechs believe that the negotiations on the EU side. The results of PCTR survey suggests government should take into account There are concerns that future Euro- there is a reasonably strong foundation International security aspects before American relations could be affected by among Czech public opinion for keep- making a final decision. Twice as many public criticism and anti-Americanism ing the transatlantic bond strong. Czech citizens prefer a U.S. company in Europe. A review of the German Support for NATO remains high rather than a company from Russia. Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends among Czechs with 70 % “satis- It is noteworthy that the survey was survey for 2013, however, shows that fied” with the accession to NATO, conducted before Russia’s annexation the standing of the U.S. in Europe has and even more respondents (77 %) of Crimea in the spring of 2014. not declined since 2008.7 A little more believe that NATO should be actively than half of the EU respondents (55 %) involved in the fight against global said it was desirable that the U.S. exert terrorism. Nearly two-thirds (65 %) In Need of More Robust strong leadership in the world affairs believe that the alliance with the U.S. Security and Defense and nearly three-in-four Europeans is important for ensuring the Czech Policy: Strength Begins (70 %) continued to hold favorable national security. Positive attitudes views of the U.S. although views across towards NATO and the U.S. are more at Home For the past 25 years, the smaller CEE states have not needed militaries. For Figure 1: Do you think U.S. presence in Europe is important to keep balance of powers on the continent regarding Russia and Germany

100 % 7 “Transatlantic Trends 2013”, German Mar- shall Fund and Compagnia de San Paolo, 90 % Survey was conducted in the U.S., Ger- 80 % many, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Swe- 70 % den and Turkey. http://trends.gmfus.org/ 60 % do not know transatlantic-trends/. 50 % definitely not 8 “Attitude of the Czech Citizens towards NATO and USA,” PCTR Papers 2014/5. 40 % rather not The survey was conducted by the Ipsos 30 % rather yes agency. The results were based on 20 % definitely yes the face-to-face questioning in many locations all around the Czech Republic 10 % (CAPI – computer assisted personal 0 % interviewing). In total, 1 031 respondents answered the questions. Data collect- total ODS KDU KSČ ČSSD others th TOP 09 71 more ing took place from 12 February to ANO 2011 age 18–29age 30–44age 45–59age 60–70 24th ­February 2014.

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that matter, they have not needed se- priorities, lack of negative attention Secondly, the Russia-Ukraine curity policies much at all—at least, not from Russia, etc.). war has exposed significant fissures in the way that small states throughout However, that environment has between the U.S.’s, and by exten- history have needed them, as tools changed. In the past five years, the sion NATO’s, abilities and the type of to guard the state against coercion, EU has focused all of its energy on defense necessary in the post-Cold invasion or extinction at the hands fixing the continuing deep institutional, War world. Doubts among CEE states of stronger actors. That is not to say financial and fiscal crisis. The U.S. have about America’s long-term staying that they have not had such policies, visibly rebalanced their focus from power as a security actor in Europe are just that they were not essential to Europe and the greater Middle East nothing new. What is new is the ques- the survival of the state. They needed towards the Asian pivot. The policy of tion of whether the U.S. would be able active security policies to gain entry reset towards Russia did not produced to effectively confront the new forms into, first, NATO and then the EU. results they were expecting. The Rus- of Russian military activity in the region Afterward, many of them found their sia’s annexation of Crimea and support even if it wanted to. Moreover, because small militaries useful for helping the for the continuing insurgency in Eastern NATO’s traditional defense-in-depth U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan – as a part Ukraine mean that peace in Europe can strategy (leaving frontline ­territory un- of the larger transatlantic bargain, in no longer be taken for granted. These defended until a crisis begins) will not which the U.S. has kept their common events have cast doubts on all three work against limited war, the Alliance defense commitments in Europe in components—Russian ­quiescence, the will need a preclusive defense in which exchange for Europe’s willingness to U.S. protection and the EU backstop- it is able to protect itself in-theater help the U.S. in fighting the war on ping—that comprised the foundation of with sufficient local assets to win in terror and maintaining stability around post-Cold War order. the opening phase of a conflict. This the world. First and most importantly, the will require CEE states to be able to The CEE states have not needed crisis has underscored the reality of conduct an effective defense of their security policies because their envi- Russia’s resurrection as a militarily own region, which has again become ronment has not required it. Russia revisionist power. The Russian inva- the frontline. was militarily weak, the U.S. provided sion directly challenged the legal and And thirdly, the EU, despite recent basic security against whatever threat territorial underpinnings of the post- advances in economic governance, is might emerge, and the EU seemed 1989 European security order. It also unlikely to provide the military ability poised to offer a “reinsurance” policy showed that Russia is more capable of that the CEE states would need to fill of economic security. In short, it has military-strategic adaptation than was the gap left by the U.S. A current mood “paid” for most CEE states to neglect commonly assumed. With its use of in a frontline state could be illustrated security. There was no force internally small units to achieve limited political on the situation of Poland. Earlier this or externally that would impose costs objectives that create a territorial fait summer in an unguarded moment, for such behavior. CEE states faced accompli, the invasion of Crimea ­Polish Foreign Minister Radosław no penalties and quite a lot of rewards marked the reintroduction of so-called Sikorski characterized his country’s (political votes, revenue for other limited-war techniques.9 alliance with the United States as “worthless”. From his perspective, the U.S. has defaulted on its obligation to Figure 2: Can you express your attitude towards/opinion about states NATO common defense. A widening or institutions listed bellow gap between verbal commitments and 100 % real security measures left Poland in a false sense of security. 90 % Then the 2014 Newport NATO 10 – very positive 80 % Summit has decided to increase NATO 9 military presence in Poland, Romania 70 % 8 and Baltic states, to design the Multi- 60 % 7 national Corps North East in Szczecin 50 % 6 as the future “article 5 headquarters”, 5 to establish the new spearhead forces 40 % 4 with high readiness alert and to held 30 % the next NATO Summit in Warsaw in 3 20 % 2 9 Jakub Grygiel, A. Wess Mitchell, “The 10 % 1 – very negative Return of Limited War: The Case for 0 % a Preclusive Strategy in NATO,” The USA Russia EU Germany NATO National Interest, Sept./October 2014.

7 Policyr Pape Czech-American Relations: A Roadmap for the Future

2016. Outspoken Poland thus became predation were validated by the inva- of resistance to Russia simply seem a sort of a winner in Newport. sion of Georgia in 2008. In 2014, Po- to outweigh the benefits. Those CEE The implication is clear: CEE states land, Romania and all Baltic states states have also resisted calls to sub- will have to rethink their relationship have responded to the Ukraine war stantially increase defense spending. with hard power. For the first time in by not only promising to increase their The Czech Republic has announced decades, they will actually need secu- military spending, but also by seeking an increase in defense spending from rity policies at the national level—poli- U.S. reassurance, and lobbying NATO 1.1 to 1.4 percent of its GDP, and while cies that embrace traditional concepts for permanent military infrastructure. Hungary is also flirting with the idea of force and strategy that run counter They are re-conceiving their militaries’ only Slovakia has ruled out an increase to these states’ self-images as post- doctrines, structures and weapons to in spending altogether (See Figure 3). modern EU member states professing be used not for out-of-area operations, However, this view is a shortsighted soft power. Even insulated states like as in the past, but for defense of their and undermines NATO solidarity and the Czech Republic will have to invest own neighborhood. the U.S. willingness to engage. If the in national and regional security if they But other states of the region – aim is to avoid the West and Russia want to retain the alliance with the U.S. Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, sleepwalking into a larger military The smaller U.S. allies of East Asia, Slovenia and Bulgaria – do not see confrontation, the first and most for example, have had to develop a compelling reason to do more mili- important step is to clarify and solidify stronger defenses to counter the eco- tarily yet. Unlike Poland, they do not the contours of the West, thereby re- nomic rise and military assertiveness perceive an immediate or even fore- ducing chances of miscalculation. This of China. In the Middle East, small U.S. seeable Russian military attack against means above all maintaining Western allies like Israel and the moderate Gulf their own territory, because they either solidarity in the face of Putin’s actions. States have had to develop strategies are geographically insulated, or have The Visegrad countries, including the for containing an increasingly aggres- better relations with Russia, or both. Czech Republic, must not stay aside. sive Iran. Where Taiwan and South Besides, antagonizing Moscow could Even smaller states can positively Korea spend 2.3 and 2.8 percent of jeopardize lucrative commercial or impact the military balance on NATO’s their GDP on defense, and Israel and energy deals. Above all, it could mean frontier. The introduction of Russian Saudi Arabia spend 6.2 and 9.3 per- diverting economic resources toward limited-war techniques have shifted cent respectively, the Czech Republic defense that publics at home would emphasis from large conventional and its small neighbors have hovered like to see spent on more popular invasions to “jab-and-grab” assaults slightly above 1 percent for the last social programs. by small forces with limited political several years (well below the global It is for some combination of these objectives. Militaries of smaller states average of 2.5 percent).10 reasons that some CEE states have can make a difference against such Poland, Estonia and Romania publicly rejected the idea of U.S. or threats by developing the ability to have maintained vigilance in national NATO troops on their soil and a few stop incursions in the early phases security already before Ukraine crisis, have refused to support further of an attack so that NATO has time mainly because their exposed geog- sanctions against Russia. From the to mobilize a wider response. Against raphy. Their fears of renewed Russian perspective of these states, the costs such threats, the military efforts of small states in-theater are the quick- est and most effective way to shore up Figure 3: Defense Spending as % of GDP the growing deficiencies of extended 2,5 deterrence. Since Russian limited- war techniques are often below the threshold required for a full Article 2 5 response (and are therefore likely to induce political division in NATO), the only way they can be countered is on 1,5 the ground where they occur. 2013 Beyond military, the CEE states projection have to take seriously also measures 1

10 The average for Czech defense spend- 0,5 ing since the Cold War is 1.8 percent, compared to around 5 percent in the Communist period, when Czechoslova- 0 kia was the third-largest spender among Poland Romania Latvia Lithuania Estonia Czech R. Hungary Slovakia Warsaw Pact CEE states.

8 Czech-American Relations: A Roadmap for the Future Policyr Pape

to combat cyber attacks and disinfor- the other hand some U.S. institutions of opportunity to make a “visible as- mation efforts as well as to strengthen and diplomats are even more tempted surance” now, as envisaged in NATO’s their independence by diversification to behave like ideological crusaders to 2010 Strategic Concept. Czech MOD of energy resources and routes and make the world a better place. already suggested regular exercises to means of their transportations. Herein lies the problem on the be conducted in Czech military areas American side because this behavior with participation of the U.S. rotational may have unintended consequences. force in Europe. Both governments Conclusions: Two For example, the recent publication of should explore the possibility to Commandments and Eight the Senate report on CIA’s detention conclude Status of Forces agreement Recommendations and interrogation programs is exposing (SOFA) in addition to existing NATO to uncomfortable situations some CEE agreements, which will provide addi- A possible assumption that closer ties allies for their confidential cooperation tional status coverage to U.S. personnel with the U.S. are little more than a res- with the U.S. during the war on terror. during exercises. In parallel, the Czech toration of the status quo ante is hard As a result, they may be less coopera- territorial defense capabilities should to support. The world is rarely remain- tive in future. Or from a different angle – be strengthened to respond threats ing the same and Prague has spent while Americans rightly recognize that of limited wars. The Czech Republic too much time trying to recover the Czech politics is hindered by cynicism should further develop its NATO niche pre-lapsarian state in Czech-American and corruption, some of their interven- capabilities like CBRN defense and the relations. Herein lies the problem on tions were out of proportions and thus Multinational Aviation Training Centre, the Czech side. Czech foreign policy could be counter-productive. which are important in the continuing vis-à-vis the U.S. has been reactive, Therefore the second command- fight against international terrorism. retrospective and nostalgic for the ment for the Czech-U.S. governmen- With regards to Czech helicopter fleet, lost past when CEE was at the heart tal relations should be in focusing on there is a plan to substitute the old of things. long-term shared security interests, Russia-made inventory with a new By contrast, Warsaw jettisoned its regardless of who leads the White platform upgraded to NATO standards. romantic ideas about the U.S. and House or Prague Castle. Working with the U.S., the Czech MOD hammered out a new relationship with More specifically, our recommenda- could create rollover programs that Germany, while building its influence tions regarding the Czech security and provide old equipment, for example, within the Weimar Group, a robust foreign policy towards the U.S. are to Ukraine, Iraq or Afghanistan, in economy and an active foreign policy. based on following practical measures exchange for more modern U.S. made As a consequence, Poland is today and steps: helicopters. a de facto Quad Power whose opinion 1. Bilateral Czech-U.S. relations 4. The Czech Republic should fo- matters on virtually all European and should be anchored in a proven cus on revitalization of the Visegrad Euro-Atlantic issues. By contrast, NATO framework and within the EU- cooperation with Poland, Slovakia the Czech Republic’s influence in U.S. cooperation. There should be and Hungary. Great powers tend to Washington has declined continuously no illusions that outside of NATO and notice groups and coalitions in much since its high-water mark when Havel EU we can build a “special” strategic the same way that rivals command was president. relationship between superpower and their attention. From the perspective Therefore the first commandment a small land-locked state in Central of Washington, allies who can bring should be to avoid sentimentality Europe. blocs of votes to the UN, EU, WTO, and romanticizing the past and to 2. Czech-U.S. security and defense or NATO councils get all the attention. start with a concerted effort to cre- relations should be ­strengthened The tragic weakness of Central Euro- ate conditions that would lead to by focusing on our commitment to pean states is their inability to build a new, more modern relationship NATO. The Czech Republic should vital coalitions. The Visegrad Group, with the U.S. increase its defense spending to originally a Czech initiative from 1990, Americans, for their part, look at the 2.0 % of its GDP within next ten years was successful in NATO expansion world in 2014 differently than they did as was projected, and not only to 1.4 % and is committed to build a joint EU in 1989. Enormous changes are taking of GDP in 2020 as was announced by battle group in 2016. place in the U.S., in part as a result of the government in Wales. This is the 5. The Czech government should demographics and migration, in part best way to be taken as serious partner support an early and successful as the world economic order reshapes by the U.S. conclusion of the EU-U.S. nego- itself, in part as a result of how the U.S. 3. The Czech government should tiations on TTIP. Deeper and broader copes with the post-9/11 era. There is support strengthening and building trade and economic relations would a paradox: on one hand the U.S. as NATO’s critical infrastructure in foster the transatlantic bond, which is a superpower is less tempted to lead Central Europe and a reliable con- in the vital interest of CEE. The Czech or to intervene in the world affairs, on tingency planning. There is a window Republic as an open country, which

9 Policyr Pape Czech-American Relations: A Roadmap for the Future

generates most of its national wealth 7. The Czechs should compete under oppressive regimes. This is by export and other external economic more aggressively for strategic exactly an area where the Czechs can activities, will undoubtedly benefit leadership positions in international transfer they know-how on transforma- from extended trade and investment institutions. The Czechs have not tion from a totalitarian dictatorships to partnership across the Atlantic. worked particularly hard to get its rising free and democratic societies. The es- 6. The Czech Republic should stars into key EU, NATO and IMF posi- tablishment of The Prague Civil Society bring energy security to the center tions. Despite some successes inside Center, which was initiated by the U.S. the Czech-U.S. agenda. The Czech NATO (Jiří Šedivý as ASG and Gen. Petr and would be jointly funded by several success in diversifying energy sup- Pavel as CMC) and EU (Štefan Füle as other governments and private founda- plies and vastly improving its energy the Commissioner for Enlargement and tions, should serve to similar purposes. independence established a compara- Neighborhood), there is not the sense And finally, we should also­ recognize tive advantage among CEE states. that the Czech Republic is aggressively that future Czech-American relations Considering that energy security after, competing for every open position will be shaped more by other players perhaps, terrorism and Russia is the in Euro-Atlantic institutions to attract than governments. Just as war is too most significant long-term challenge more attention in Washington. important to leave it only to generals, for Europe, the best way for the Czech 8. The U.S. should finally fix finan- international relations are too important Republic to command the attention of cial and managerial problems with to be left only to diplomats. The new the U.S. is to provide a guidance to the RFE/RL and use its presence in players will be, in addition, business a problem that the U.S. and EU have Prague to develop – in cooperation leaders, educational and scientific not been able to fix.On the other side, with the Czech Republic – a compre- institutions and NGOs. Their potential the U.S. should allow the LNG supply hensive program in assisting coun- and influence is now greater than ever to Europe. tries in transition or people living before.

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