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Iran and the Soviet Union Between Communism and Commonwealth 1985-1992 Mohammad Reza Taghizadeh Thesis submitted to the Department of Politics, University of Glasgow in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy October 1993 (c) Mohammad Reza Taghizadeh ProQuest Number: 13833809 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 13833809 Published by ProQuest LLC(2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 \ 9 (o53 .X DEDICATION I dedicate this work to my beloved daughters, Rieka and Elika. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a sincere debt of gratitude to people without whom it would have been impossible to complete this study. I should start with Dr. Jimmy White whose initial advice convinced me to take on the challenge of this study. I offer a great deal of appreciation to Professor W.V. Wallace, the Director of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, who offered me an opportunity to join the Institute and then continuously supported me until his retirement in September 1992. A very special note of thanks must go to Professor Stephen White, Head of the Department of Politics, who read my manuscripts, time and again, truly advised me and kindly brought to my attention, with a great deal of patience, so many points. I am convinced that without his enduring work in the research and writing of this study my thesis would have looked quite different. I am sincerely grateful to him. I am indebted to Mrs. Isabel Burnside and her husband who dealt with copy-editing of the chapters and contributed in no small measure to the improvement of my exposition. I am also indebted to the colleagues and friends who commented on early versions of this manuscript and provided help and encouragement at various stages including Chris Skillen, Graham Timmens, David Sinclair, Allan Bertram and Malcolm Kerr Hunter. I also wish to thank the Economic and Social Research Centre (ESRC) for the research grants which they awarded to me. I deeply appreciate my family's customary support and encouragement particularly that of my mother and my brother Ali Reza, who has always been attentive and helpful to me. It goes without saying that any shortcoming or mistake in this study remains the full responsibility of the author. Abstract This study is an inquiry into the history of political relations between the Soviet Union and Iran. The focus of the work is the Gorbachev period from 1985 up to 1991. Although geostrategic considerations, national security concerns and economic interests continued to be the fundamental determinants of Soviet-Iranian relations during these years, they assumed new dimensions resulting mainly from regime changes, alterations in ideological trends as well as political and military developments on both sides. The study evaluates the nature and implications of these changes in the light, in particular, of 'new thinking' in Soviet Third World policy. After 1985, growing evidence indicated that Soviet policy in the Third World was undergoing changes consistent with the basic principles of 'new thinking' in the theory and conduct of Soviet international relations. A revitalization of the Soviet role in the world and a move from standard policies practised in the past, just as it changed the nature of East-West relations, affected Soviet Third World policy too. During the period with which we are concerned the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran, still very much a political riddle to the outside world, was approaching a tumingpoint in its political orientation, one that was obscure at the time as a result of the fact that the expression of foreign policy developments in Iran after the Islamic revolution had been treated with secrecy and regarded as the exclusive right of the clergy. The study examines Iran’s national, historical and geographical motives in this context, considering its philosophy and political culture together with the basic mechanisms of its policy-making process especially in the most recent years. The study also addresses a number of crucial questions: Whether the shift in Soviet policy towards Iran after 1985 was substantive or merely involved tactical changes to increase the efficacy of old policies long in place? How did the former Soviet Union try to translate its power into political influence over Iran? How did Soviet foreign policy behaviour in the region change as a result of 'new thinking'? And how did the Soviet Union perform in relation to national security with reference to the Islamic issue and regional crises on its southern frontiers? The opening chapter of the work covers the entire historical background of relations between the Soviet Union and Iran, and the pre-Soviet monarchical relations of Tsarist Russia and Persia. Chapter two contains a review of the evolution of policy in the light of the Islamic Revolution and the developments which occurred during the post-Brezhnev period. The analysis of Soviet-Iranian relations under Gorbachev in a broader context of Third World issues is the core of chapter three. An investigation of the roots of regional crises with regard to Soviet-Iranian relations and the impact of 'new thinking' in the design and conduct of Soviet foreign policy is the backbone of chapter four. Chapters five and six investigate more general policy considerations and in Soviet policy towards Iran with particular regard to regional developments. Chapter seven deals with the final phase of the Soviet-Iranian relations. The concluding eighth chapter not only pays attention to the relationship between Iran and the CIS but also the relationship with the individual republics of the former Soviet Union with whom Iran has either a common border or strong cultural ties. Here and in other chapters the study draws upon the contemporary Soviet and Iranian press as well as documentary and statistical sources, memoirs and the relevant secondary literature in several languages. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Acknowledgements 1 Abstract ii Introduction Iran and Soviet Third World Policy: explanation of purpose and design The Ideological Dimensions in the Making and Conduct of Foreign Policy The New Era in the Kremlin's Political Thinking 8 Approaching Soviet-Iranian relations 11 Chapter 1: Russian-Iranian Relations During the Tsarist Period 17 Introduction 17 After the Bolshevik Revolution 19 During World War II 22 Postwar relations 26 After Stalin 29 Chapter 2: Moscow and the Revolutionary Regime in Iran 39 1979-1985 The power struggle in Iran 39 The birth of 'Hizbollah' in Iran 48 The Post-Brezhnev period 53 The Soviet media and Iran: Debate upon the 56 bilateral relations The policy of 'Neither East nor West': 59 . Moving towards a conventional regime The Policy of 'Open Doors' 64 Conclusion 66 Chapter 3: Soviet-Iranian Relations 1985-1986: 82 The Gorbachev Inheritance Soviet Policy Attitudes Towards South West Asia 85 The Chinese Factor: The Impact on Soviet 96 Iranian Relations Trade Relations 105 Conclusion 108 Chapter 4: Continuity and Changes 1986-88: 116 The Roots of Regional Crises The Soviet Union, the United States and 116 the Gulf Crisis The 'Vorontsov Visit', the United Nations 124 and Soviet Diplomatic Initiatives Soviet Preparation for Post-war Relations 129 with Iran Conclusion 137 iv Page Chapter 5: The Post-War Period 1988-89: Changes in the 147 Balance of Power in South West Asia and the Persian Gulf The Afghan Crisis and Gulf War 149 Khomeini and the Islamic movement in 153 the Soviet Union The Soviets' new diplomatic initiative in 160 the Middle East Chapter 6: A Major Swing towards Iran 1989-1990: 173 Superpower Competition Continues? The Domestic-Foreign Linkage 179 Soviet-Iranian relations and Afghanistan 184 USSR: Searching for a Common Language 187 with the US Iran and the Central Asian Republics: 190 the dynamics of the relations The Soviet Union, Iran and the Iraqi Invasion 193 of Kuwait Conclusion 203 Chapter 7: Terms of Obsession 1990-91: 210 West, USSR and the Gulf War Soviets looking towards the post-war situation 215 in the Gulf The Kurdish Question, OPEC and the Collapse of 223 the USSR Iran and the Final Days in the Life of the 231 Soviet Union Conclusion: Ideology, Regime Change and the Formulation 239 of Foreign Policy Russian Tsarist interest in Iran 243 Soviet Policy in Iran during and after the War 254 'New Thinking', the Soviet Union and the 264 Third World Gorbachev and the Dynamics of Soviet Policy 272 in Iran The Impact of the Collapse of the Soviet Union 277 Future Relations between Iran and the Soviet 283 Successor States Religious factors 286 Economic parameters and the CIS States' relations 293 with Iran Bibliography 314 1 INTRODUCTION IRAN AND SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY: EXPLANATION OF PURPOSE AND DESIGN Soviet-Third World * policy developments under Gorbachev have played a key role in the shaping of the new world political system. They have however often been overshadowed by the pre-eminent issues in Soviet foreign affairs, particularly East-West relations and arms control, and as a result have received rather limited attention from political scientists and academic institutions. This writer is convinced that the study of Soviet foreign policy after the implementation of the 'New Thinking' would demonstrate a noticeable gap if it failed to comprehend important implications of Soviet relations with the Third World countries.
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