Perception Without Awareness: Further Evidence from a Stroop Priming Task
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Perception & Psychophysics 2002, 64 (8), 1316–1324 Perception without awareness: Further evidence from a Stroop priming task M. TERESA DAZA and JUAN J. ORTELLS University of Almería, Almería, Spain and ELAINE FOX University of Essex, Essex, England In the present research,we examined the influence of prime–targetstimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on Stroop-priming effects from masked words. Participants indicated the color of a central target, which was preceded by a 33-msec prime word followed either immediately or after a variable delay by a pattern mask. The prime word was incongruent or congruent with the target color on 75% and 25% of the trials, respectively. The words followed by an immediate mask produced reliable Stroop interfer- ence at SOAs of 300 and 400 msec but not at SOAs of 500 and 700 msec. The words followed by a de- layedmask produced a reversed(i.e., facilitatory)Stroop effect, which reached significance at an SOA of 400 msec or longer, but never at the shorter 300-msec SOA. Such an differential time course of both types of Stroop priming effects provides further evidence for the existence of qualitative differences between conscious and nonconscious perceptual processes. The question of whether perception can occur without scious experience is indexed by some behavioral measure awareness has been the focus of considerableresearch and that demonstrates an observer’s inability to discriminate discussionfor many years (for recent reviews, see Merikle between alternative stimulus states (see, e.g., Balota, & Daneman, 1998; Merikle, Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001). 1983; Fowler, Wolford, Slade, & Tassinary, 1981; Green- The logic followed by the majority of studies within ex- wald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, perimental psychologyhas been to demonstrate a dissoci- 1980; Marcel, 1983a, 1983b). Considerablediscussion has ation between two indexes or measures of perception that taken place regarding whether subjectiveor objectivemea- are assumed to assess perception with and without aware- sures provide the more accurate method for demonstrat- ness, respectively. It has been widely assumed that a pre- ing perception without awareness (e.g., Eriksen, 1960; requisite for a dissociationbetween measures of conscious Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle, 1990). In either and unconscious perception is that the index of conscious case, a major weakness of traditionalapproachesusingthe perception must provide an exhaustive measure of all rel- dissociation paradigm is that the conclusiveness of find- evant conscious experiences and that such a measure ac- ings presumed to provide evidence for unconscious per- tually exhibit null sensitivity (Merikle, 1992; Reingold & ception depends entirely on the adequacy of the measures Merikle, 1990). Two general classes of exhaustive mea- used to define consciousness.As notedby Merikleand Joor- sures of conscious awareness have been used: subjective dens (1997b), the attempt to merely prove the existence and objective. With subjective measures, awareness is as- (or nonexistence) of unconscious perception does not ap- sessed on the basis of the observers’ introspective self- pear to be a particularly useful strategy. This is because it reports of their conscious perceptual experiences (e.g., is impossible to demonstrate convincinglythat a null sen- Cheesman & Merikle,1986; Forster & Davis, 1984;Sidis, sitivity equates with the absence of conscious perception 1898; see Adams, 1957, for a review of the earliest stud- of the relevant information, regardless of whether a sub- ies). With objectivemeasures, the absence of relevant con- jective or an objective measure of awareness is used. As an alternative to establishing dissociations between measures, a more interestingquestionthat can be addressed is how unconsciousperception differs from conscious per- This research was partly supported by Grant BSO2000-1411-C02-02 from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, Dirección General de Investi- ception.In other words, perceptionwith and without aware- gación (Spain), to the second author. The findingsof Experiment 2 were ness must be compared in order to determine whether a presented at the II Congress of the Spanish Society of Experimental Psy- stimulus can have qualitatively different effects on cogni- chology (SEPEX), March, 2000, Barcelona, Spain. Correspondence tive and affective reactions depending on whether it is ei- should be addressed to either M. T. Daza or J. J. Ortells, Departamento de Neurociencia y Ciencias de la Salud, Facultad de Humanidades y ther consciously or unconsciously perceived. As noted by Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de Almería, 04120 Almería, Merikle et al. (2001), the logic underlying this alternative Spain (e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]). approach assumes that the information consciously per- Copyright 2002 Psychonomic Society, Inc. 1316 STROOP PRIMING EFFECTS FROM MASKED WORDS 1317 ceived enables individualsto act intentionallyand to pro- prime word (RED or GREEN in gray color) for 33 msec, which duce effects in the world, whereas information perceived was followedeitherimmediatelyor after a delayof 134 msec without awareness leads to more automatic reactions that (dependingon the group of participants)by a pattern mask cannot be controlled by individuals (e.g., Marcel, 1988; (seven ampersands in gray color), thus resulting in a Searle, 1992). A good example of how conscious and un- prime–mask stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of either conscious perceptual processes differ comes from the ex- 33 msec1 or 167 msec, respectively. The masked prime clusion task used by Debner and Jacoby (1994; for other word was always followed by a central target, which con- interesting qualitative differences in the consequences of sisted of seven ampersands displayed, until response, in perception with and without awareness, see also Groeger, either red or green, with participants being required to 1984, 1988; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Marcel, make a buttonpressresponse to indicatethe target color as 1980; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). On each trial, a single quickly as possible. For both groups of participants, the word (e.g., table) was presented for either a short (i.e., 50- prime–target SOA remained fixed at 300 msec. The prime msec) or a somewhat longer (i.e., 150-msec) duration and and the target were incongruent (RED–green) on 75% of was followed by a mask. Immediately following the mask, the trials, whereas on the remaining 25% of the trials, the the first three letters of the word were presented again prime and the target were congruent (RED–red). Merikle (e.g., tab__), and the participants were required to com- and Joordens (1997b) found a significant crossover inter- plete the word stem with any word that came to mind ex- action between masking condition and prime–target con- cept the word that had just been presented (e.g., they could gruency: With a delayed mask (i.e., a prime–mask SOA of complete the word stem with taboo, but not table). Deb- 167 msec), the reaction times (RTs) were faster on incon- ner and Jacoby found that participants were able to fol- gruent than on congruent trials. Such a reversed (i.e., fa- low these exclusion instructions only when the word was cilitatory) Stroop effect suggests that participants con- presented for the longer 150-msec duration. But for the sciously identified the prime word followed by a delayed short 50-msec duration, they used the preceding words to mask and then used the predictive information provided complete the word stems on a proportionof trials that was by the word to anticipatethe forthcoming target color (see significantly above chance. This finding suggests that also Logan, Zbrodoff, & Williamson, 1984). In contrast, the words were unconsciously perceived in the 50-msec with an immediate mask (i.e., a prime–mask SOA of condition. 33 msec), a typical Stroop interference effect (slower RTs It is interestingto note that the exclusionprocedure pro- on incongruent than on congruent trials) emerged, sug- vides particularly compelling evidence for unconscious gesting that participants experienced no awareness of the perception, since conscious and unconscious influences primes when they were presented for 33 msec and were are placed “in opposition.” On the contrary, most of the immediately followed by a mask. This crossover in per- traditional approaches have used facilitation paradigms, formance across masking conditions (see also Merikle whereby effects on unconscious perception of a stimulus et al., 1995; Merikle & Joordens, 1997a) is consistentwith produce the same pattern (i.e., a facilitation in perfor- the view that perception with awareness and perception mance) as does conscious perception. According to Deb- without awareness can produce qualitativelydifferent be- ner and Jacoby (1994), because both types of processes havioral consequences. can contribute to performance in a similar vein (i.e., fa- Note, however, that the Stroop priming effects reported cilitating), it is difficult to determine whether the suppos- by Merikle and Joordens (1997b)were of a relativelysmall edly unconscious influences might partly or completely size. More importantly, to the extent that the reversed be attributedto residualconsciousperception.In contrast, Stroop effect under the delayed masking condition re- in studies using proceduressuch as the exclusiontask, ev- flected the contribution of strategic processes, such a re- idence of unconscious perception cannot be explained as sult could be viewed as an