NEWS from SOUTH AFRICA Edited ~D Published Moothly B) CULTURAL RE~ISTANCE for "-"Taj 1.F
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NEWS FROM SOUTH AFRICA Edited ~d published moothly b) CULTURAL RE~ISTANCE for "-"taJ 1.f. tI*& r.... ,.-... 1 ~ . , JiIt" "I" -~" weekend's'qq, summit to me," Buthelezi said last year. on violence comes But. just days after a meeting with almost a year after Mandel&, Buthelezi played his next townships on the Reef card in the quest for a seat at the erupted Into war. At negotiating table and ~roposed a " We conceive of our country as a IeaIt 1 000 lives have been IoIt In "troika", which w:u to mclude NP single, united, democratic and non~ the conftkt durina the past nine leader FW de Kim. He presented months alone and entire 'amilles this as the only way of taking the racial state, belonging to all who live wiped out or dlslodICed 'rom their peace process further. homet. Communities have been The ANC rejC(:ted the troika out in it, in which all shall enjoy equal rendered homeless with shacks of hand, saying that any peace pro- rights, and in which sovereignty will razed and residents run out or cess would have to include a wider come from the people, and not from a their settlements. spectrum or political forces. Clear· In the process. well-defmed polit Iy. Inkatha had failed to convince collection of bantustans and tribal ical agendas have unfolded. And the ANC that the IFP had 10 be ele groupings organised to perpetuate allegations that the war was vated 10 equal StaIuS. HWldreds have unleashed primarily to propel died since Buthelezi proposed the minority power. " Inkatha to the negotiating table and troika. ensure that the ANC would limp Since then. Inkatha has been most Pre.ldent OR Tambo away from it with the worst possible vocal in its criticism of the ANC deal, gained substance. and has increasingly found ccmmon From Jnkatha's poinlofview, the pUT?se with the government. In war had become necessary as a addition to rejecting the A."'lC's call result of a combination of political for a constituent assembly and an changes, locally and international to develop strategies and tactics ly. interim government, Buthelezi has gone as far as saying that he feels Raymond which will get us to the point where The net eCfect of these changes proud to be led by De Klerlc, even we could, for example, implement a resulted in, essentially, two primary though he has not had a hand in Suttner: "At democratic economy. ICton emerging as the major insti electing him 10 power. "So the focus of the ANC at this tutional contenders for power in the core of the PRAISE conference should, first of all, be on South Mrien - the ANC and the conference Is how the ANC should be structured. National Party (NP). Constitutional development We need to ask ourselves how we can Inkatha slipped inlO the political minister Gerrit Viljoen recipr0c3t· the battle for crcate an ANC constitution which shadow of these forces and also lost cd and has demonstrated an unLL~U' conforms to the stated aim of mak prominence as an actor within NP al willingness to beap praise on the character ing it the organisation whose policies circles. Inkatha and Buthelezi. At the height 01 the ANC." are determined by the membership." MARGINALISED of violence on the Reef, he found At another level, the question of This tum of events forced the the courage to describe Inkatha as whethcr the ANC should be formu a party genuinely committed to lating a vision of a post-apanheid organisation into a \'Urely reactive peace. ay Suttner, head or the role. Sensing that It was rapidly ANC's department of South Africa with a view to contest But this is not the only evidence being marginalised in the national political education, says ing an election must also be dealt that suggests a convergence of political equation, it moved 10 refur the slgnlncance or the with. Sultner agrees, but says this bish its image. Inkatha and NP agendas. should not be a priority. It cannot, for example. be written conference Is manifold. Hence the decision to launch R''But at the core of the conference Is "We are not anywhere near the off 10 comcidence that violence has Inkatha as a politiCal party in mId· the battle ror the character or the point of having an election," he says. 1990. But this in iL&elf was not peaked each time the ANC and its "Some people want to create the allies have taken a firm position on ANC." Question!! that will have to enough, and the Inkatha Freedom be asked are: ''what type or ANC illusion that we are already in a new Party (IFP) remained largely a key political issues. Violence has South Africa and that we do not need also subsided with every major are we buildIng and whether the regional and elhnic phenomenon. type or ANC we are building Is transformation, an interim govern It is in this context thaI the international visit by De KIm. ment or a constituent assembly. But this is not enough to IUggest related to the type or South Arrica unleashing of violence in the that we want', says Suttner, "This is designed to remove the Transvaal can be said to have that the government is necessarily question of power from the debate. It interested in the preservation of "If you look at the conference marked a clear attempt to break out is very crucial for us 10 keep power at lnlcatha as a rnajor political player. agenda, it is concerned with strategy of its traditional mould and to and tactics, negotiations and violence. the centre of the debate," says Sut. While Buthelezi remains a useful tner. laWlCh itself as a factor in national actor, the NP's priority is 10 hold on But it is also concerned with policy negotiations. to as much power as possible. documents such IS those on land, "I don't agree with these forecasts It i, no coincidence thatlFP lead· To this end, the government has health etc." that we will have a new constitution er Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi sug not baclced away from the opportu S ullner agrees that the movement by the end of this year - there is I)ot gested that only a meeting between nity 10 exploit the violence and has ITWt prepare itself for an election and the slightest chance of thaI. himself and ANC deputy president tried hard 10 present itself as a neu develop policy on areas such as land "The chasm between us and them Nelson Mandela would end the vio tral party in the conflict. and health. However, he adds: "I am is much greater than some are pre lence. This has taken various forms, suggesting that our priority at con pared to concede," Suttner argues. "People are actually dying with law and order minister Adri ference must not be to develop a land In assessing t}-:c distance the ANC bocause the ANC will not talk with nan Viole preaentin, himself a. policy. Our main objective must be has tra~elle~ on the road to a post Inlcatlul ard Mandela will not talk medWor in cmmet situations In the apartheId penod. the key qUC!Slioothat ton~.IIi!!L,.;·. (bHT. 0fI JIG.II- page 2 ''"The VlOL&lT Media aHrlbutlon of aggre•• or. in 1990/91 Reef violence AQetJl>A • j ~HTlWIUii.1:) FRO,", PA6I1& I. township . Police have on several SPEAR OFTHE OCICUlons claimed the role of ;'JCaCC' makers by attempting to convene peace meetings between Inka1ha and theANC. The objoc:tive is sd(-evidcnL Inter· I NATION sj.:-'I.'~I nationa1Jy, the image of a peace br0- ker will JO down well, especially 111 a time when the government is pre S The King of the Zulus told the faithful pared 10 coounit vast resources 10 re ~ gathered at Johannesburg's Soccer City establish its legitimacy abroad. ~ that 'the call to ban the bearing of cultural More important. however, are its ~ weapons is an insult to the manhood of objectives 111 home. At best. it hopes every Zulu'. DREW FORREST reports ~t. by emerging as the only force S truly committed to peace, it could erl!liln.i ,I-_________--' seare \he vast majority of votes of a battered and mauled electorlUC. o 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 At wc:na. it could seek a place in a Media attribution of weapons In gOVemmetl1 0( national unity as the only stabilising influence between 1990/91 Reef violence \ I ~ ~................................... ..... .......... -, ~Iy violent partners. Inkatha -- -- IS clearly not indispensable in the process. 50 ::: Inkatha I Ooe option. however, that the NP : ANC has cenainly abandoned is drawing the ANC into an alliance wilh it. JtJeJJ\IIO I What be very much pan of ilJ short-term objective is to lay the basis for a centrist-right coali tion, in which it will retain maximum I power. 10 PEACE SUMMIT ADd the wcekmd "peace summit", o I FIr.wnw • Tradition.' ESPLENDENT in his "tiger-skin" head more than an attempt to end the Attributed ...pon. dress and monkey-skin kilt, with his mul town hip war, seems just another e A S E R.... rch SUI/.flu ticoloured bead annlets and anklets, carry step in the plan to consolidate a I ing an elegantly crafted rawhide shield, DTA-typealliance. k.nobkierie and spear, Victor Ndlovu per While the JOvernment may con .----.--~~~~.....-,---, S the sonifies the popular idea of Zuluhood. sider itself ready to lay basis for Around him swirls a kaleidoscope of such an alliance. the question that R men in more or less customary garb - and a few has yet to be answettd is whether it Weapons of women.