Council Directive 24 and from October 1947 to March 1948 in Connection

Home , March 1948

Book Reviews

Council Directive 24 and from October 1947 to March 1948 in connection with Or- der No.201 of the Soviet Military Administration—Ulbricht was anxious to speed up the process, punish the worst perpetrators, and get back to other work.Meanwhile, German Communists like Johannes Becher, the poet and Kulturbund leader, urged a more thoroughgoing approach to denaziªcation, one that would turn political and so- cial life into a permanent confrontation with Germany’s terrible past.The Soviet au - thorities themselves were typically inconsistent in this connection.The result was a great deal of autonomy for the local commissions. Formal denaziªcation procedures were abandoned in the SBZ in March 1948.In May 1948 the National Democratic Party of Germany, the party of the so-called “lit- tle Nazis,” was formed.In this connection denaziªcation was declared completed, and there was to be no more talk of Nazis in government, industry, and the police.Al - though Erich Mielke and his secret police continued to chase down ex-Nazis, the East German regime basked in self-satisªed triumphalism about its antifascist purity. Meanwhile in West Germany, under the glare of a free press and subject to genuine oppositional politics, very similar formal processes of denaziªcation were roundly condemned as cosmetic and were subjected to critical scrutiny.Vogt’s book balances the picture.The most egregious criminals of the Third Reich were tried, interned, and removed from political and economic life; but, on the whole, the formal denaziªca- tion of German society was not successful in either east or west. ✣✣✣

Robert S.Jordan. Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander: Airman, Strategist, Diplomat. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000. 329 pp. $45.00.

Reviewed by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Uni- versity

General Lauris Norstad’s professional career coincided with the rise of the United States to superpower status and the evolution of military aviation from its infancy to the indispensable role it came to play in national power.This is not only an outstand - ing biography of an important military leader, but also a fascinating analysis of the Cold War years and the political-military landscape that Norstad helped to shape. Robert S.Jordan has drawn extensively on Norstad’s personal papers, as well as rele - vant documentation from the U.S. National Archives and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During much of World War II Norstad worked closely with Dwight D.Eisen - hower, forging a professional relationship that was to last until the end of Eisenhower’s presidency.Norstad was a key ªgure in planning for operations in North Africa and later for the Paciªc.But it was the Cold War that was to take Norstad to the pinnacle of his career.His crucial role in the creation of the air force as a separate military ser - vice is discussed in great detail.The book contains an informative account of the de - bates leading to the National Security Act of 1947, as well as Norstad’s part in shaping the respective roles and missions of each of the military services and the uniªed com-

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mands—the basis for the national security framework that, with some modiªcations (as in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that restructured the Joint Chiefs of Staff) endures to this day. When Eisenhower became NATO’s ªrst Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in 1951, Norstad was given responsibility for coordinating the mission of the Strategic Air Command with SACEUR’s plans—an enormously important task because of the U.S. transatlantic nuclear guarantee. When Norstad was SACEUR, the question of nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense came to the forefront of NATO’s agenda.The alliance faced the enduring Cold War dilemma of how to deter the outbreak of war in Europe despite the persistent imbalance of conventional forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact.In this regard, Norstad came up against French president Charles de Gaulle, who insisted that any intermediate range ballistic missiles and other nuclear weapons deployed in France be placed under French control.Norstad’s various meetings with de Gaulle on this issue make for fascinating reading.At one such meeting in 1959 Norstad rebuffed de Gaulle’s request for detailed information about the targets assigned to U.S.nuclearweapons deployed in France.After asking their respective staffs to leave the room, Norstad told de Gaulle that he could not provide such information.De Gaulle replied that this was “the last time, and make your- self understand it, that a responsible French leader will allow such an answer to be made” (p.122).The widening gap between France and its NATO allies led eventually to de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from the integrated command structure, but this came in 1966, four years after Norstad stepped down as SACEUR.In Jordan’s outstanding discussion of Norstad and de Gaulle there is only one minor error or mis- print, in which de Gaulle is referred to as the “grandiose President of the Third Re- public” (p. 219) rather than the Fifth Republic. The ªnal years of Norstad’s term as SACEUR were taken up with the second Berlin crisis.He had to coordinate NATO plans and policies for a crisis in which the Americans, British, and French exercised jurisdiction in Berlin under the postwar oc- cupation, while the other members of NATO had no direct responsibility for the status of the divided city.Here again Jordan provides an excellent account of Norstad’s dual-hatted role as SACEUR and Commander-in-Chief of U.S.Forces, Europe.In this capacity Norstad worked closely with the military headquarters of the tripartite command in Berlin on contingency planning for what was called “LIVE OAK,” the Western military response to a Soviet disruption of Western access.The essential issue was the Soviet announcement in late 1958 that Moscow would sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic to deprive the Western allies of their rights in West Berlin and force them to deal with the East German Communist government, which they did not recognize as legitimate. In the midst of the Berlin Crisis the U.S.presidency changed hands.With the departure of the Eisenhower administration, Norstad lost his strongest supporter.The new president, John F.Kennedy, wanted a major conventional force buildup to in - crease available options and to provide additional nonnuclear rungs in the crisis escalation ladder.Norstad did not favor immediate and automatic escalation to nuclear war, but he feared that the policy advocated by Kennedy would be interpreted in Eu-

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rope as a decoupling of transatlantic security.Increasingly Norstad was marginalized, as Kennedy, in sharp contrast to Eisenhower, turned more to his civilian aides than to the professional military for advice. Norstad’s problems with the Kennedy administration stemmed in part from the fact that, as Jordan concludes, the general saw himself “as a NATO commander ªrst, and an American commander second; as for Kennedy, he regarded Norstad as an American commander ªrst, and a NATO commander second” (p.199).Although SACEUR is responsible to the members of NATO, his authority derives from the role played by the United States, the country from which all SACEURs have come.In this sense every SACEUR has a difªcult task, as Norstad had seen in the nuclear issues that he faced with de Gaulle.Under Eisenhower, Norstad enjoyed the conªdence and sup - port of his patron in dealing with the prickly persona of de Gaulle and his aspirations for French grandeur and independence.In 1961 Norstad sought on behalf of the Eu - ropean members of NATO to explain why the Kennedy administration’s policies might lead to a de facto decoupling of European and North American security.This was an unwelcome message in Washington that contributed to Kennedy’s decision to replace Norstad. Throughout his eventful career Norstad seized opportunities for authority and responsibility.Except for the early 1960s, he had managed to be in the right place at the right time.His World War II and Cold War contributions were extensive and important, as Robert Jordan amply discusses and documents in this impressive volume.

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Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds., Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 319 pp. $60.00.

Reviewed by John Van Oudenaren, European Division, Library of Congress

In July 1945, midway through the Potsdam Conference, British prime minister Winston Churchill was swept from ofªce by a war-weary British electorate.Six years of postwar Labour Party rule began when Clement Attlee replaced Churchill at Potsdam.Upon returning to power in the fall of 1951, Churchill called for a meeting that in a sense would take up where Potsdam had left off.He believed that a summit with Josif Stalin and Harry Truman would recapture some of Britain’s faded wartime prestige and help to resolve the outstanding issues between East and West, most of which had roots in the failed peacemaking efforts of 1945. But Churchill was not to have his summit.The ªrst postwar meeting of Soviet and Western leaders did not take place until July 1955, more than two years after Tru- man had left ofªce and Stalin had died.The meeting came some three months after Churchill himself had relinquished his post to Anthony Eden. Cold War Respite chronicles the tortuous diplomatic path that the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the United States took from Churchill’s initial proposal to the Geneva meeting.It dis - sects the key issues covered at the summit and examines the importance of Geneva as a

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