Bunker Hill to Bastogne: Elite Forces and American Society

Bunker Hill to Bastogne ALSO BY BRITON C. BUSCH Alta California, 1840–1842: The Journal and Observations of William Dane Phelps, Master of the Ship “Alert” (Editor) Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914 Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921 Canada and the Great War: Western Front Association Papers (Editor) Fremont’s Private Navy: The 1846 Journal of Capt. William Dane Phelps (Editor) Fur Traders from New England: the Boston Men, 1787–1800. The Narratives of William Dane Phelps, William Sturgis, and James Gilchrist Swan (Editor, with Barry M. Gough) Hardinge of Penshurst: A Study in the Old Diplomacy Master of Desolation: the Reminiscences of Capt. Joseph J. Fuller (Editor) Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918–1923 The War Against the Seals: A History of the North American Seal Fishery “Whaling Will Never Do For Me”: The American Whaleman in the Nineteenth Century Bunker Hill to Bastogne ELITE FORCES AND AMERICAN SOCIETY BRITON COOPER BUSCH POTOMAC BOOKS, INC. WASHINGTON, D.C. Copyright © 2006 by Potomac Books, Inc. Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Busch, Briton Cooper. Bunker Hill to Bastogne : elite forces and American society / Briton C. Busch. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-57488-775-0 (alk. paper) 1. Guards troops—United States—History. 2. United States— History, Military. 3. Sociology, Military—United States. I. Title. UA25.B87 2006 356'.160973—dc22 2005054497 Potomac Books, Inc. 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Contents Publisher’s Note vii List of Illustrations ix Preface xi 1. The Colonial Tradition 1 2. The Revolutionary War 19 3. The Early Republic 41 4. The Civil War 65 5. From the Civil War to World War II 103 6. The United States Marine Corps 143 7. World War II: The Early Formations 161 8. World War II: The Later War 193 9. Conclusion 235 Notes 241 Bibliography 283 Index 297 About the Author 305 This page intentionally left blank Publisher’s Note Briton Cooper Busch died before this book went into production. Aside from some minor corrections, based on peer reviews that he did not have the opportunity to read, we have published the book as he wrote it. vii This page intentionally left blank Illustrations 1. Ethan Allen 37 2. Hiram Berdan 74 3. Zouave Cadets 85 4. Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt and the Rough Riders 111 5. U.S. 18th Regiment, 1st Division, 1918 119 6. Marines raising the flag at Iwo Jima 154 7. The 6th Marine Division on Okinawa 155 8. The 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne 171 9. U.S. Army Rangers on the Normandy beach 199 10. M-36 tank destroyer 227 ix This page intentionally left blank Preface Some men are more effective than others at making war. There is no commonly accepted formula to explain why this is so, and why— all else being equal—such men are more likely to emerge victorious over their opponents. Thomas Wentworth Higginson put it well; as colonel (1862–64) of the First South Carolina Volunteers (later the 33d U.S. Colored Troops), a worthy regiment formed of ex-slaves, he had an opportunity to judge men in battle, whatever their color. “In almost every regiment, black or white, there are a score or two of men who are naturally daring, who really hunger after dangerous adventures, and are happiest when allowed to seek them. Every commander gradually finds out who these men are, and habitually uses them; certainly I had such and I remember with delight their bearing, their coolness, and their dash. These picked men varied in other respects too; some were neat and well-drilled soldiers, while others were slovenly, heed- less fellows—the despair of their officers at inspections, their pride on a raid. They were the natural scouts and rangers of the regiment; they had the two-o’clock-in-the-morning courage, which Napoleon thought so rare.”1 Some causal factors can be identified, including such variables as individual intelligence, physical conditioning, training in martial skills, unit cohesion by reason of shared experiences and traditions, and leadership. On the battlefield, when such factors are found con- centrated in a particular group of men, the conditions exist for what may be termed an elite unit. Military elites may be defined in various ways as will be seen in the pages below, but in general, for the purpose of this book, an elite formation is one which believes itself to be supe- xi xii Preface rior, is so viewed by peer formations in its own army and likewise by that army’s commanders, and above all, is perceived to be so by its opponents. The reasons why they are elite are not always easily identified, let alone assigned a rank order of significance. Similarly, isolat- ing a clear self-image, or the image perceived by peers and enemies, may be equally difficult. Once won, however, a reputation of superior- ity, of elite status, may be a contributing factor on the battlefield. Few Greeks wished to do battle with Spartans, or Europeans of the Napole- onic era to face the Emperor’s Old Guard. But this book is about American history. In that context, a special problem arises, since America’s citizens have traditionally distrusted even the concept of a standing army. Past experience in both Europe and the colonies taught that such an institution could be used to sub- vert rights or freedoms that had been won at great cost. Given this attitude, it was not likely that military elites would flourish, and in a general sense they have not, at least not before the twentieth century. From pre-revolutionary days through World War II, America’s elected leaders have found perpetual difficulty in maintaining a standing army of a size adequate to complement the citizen militia which was ex- pected to respond to any serious emergency. In every crisis sudden expansion was therefore essential—most notably during the Civil War— followed, when the emergency had passed, by rapid demobilization. Effective military elites are not made in a day, and America’s mobiliza- tion patterns mitigated against their creation as much as her anti-army sentiment. Yet to such dominant tides there are always eddies and counter currents. American independence was won only through the searing experience of a major war. Every generation through the end of the twentieth century has experienced a war; some, such as the Civil War, were of equally determining impact upon American society. As a con- sequence, many of America’s heroes have been military men. George Washington, the greatest hero of all as “father of his country,” has always stood as a metaphor for America’s military history: the capable civilian rising to extreme military challenges when the time came, yet always resisting the temptation in a time of crisis to replace civilian with military authority. On the other hand, America’s roster of heroic images has long included esteemed elites, variously defined, from Rogers’s Rangers at Fort Ticonderoga to the paratroopers at Normandy and the Marines at Iwo Jima. Preface xiii It is the goal of this book to identify elite units from colonial days through World War II and, where possible, to explain how and why that elite status was gained—and sometimes lost. An essential part of that story is the question of by what means, if any, elite status—whether of individuals or entire units—has been instilled, singled out, or re- warded. The task is most complex, which perhaps explains why it has not before been attempted, at least to the author’s knowledge, in the same way. The thesis of this work, however, is simple. Even though American society on the whole has regarded its military establishment as little more than an unfortunate necessity required mainly for dealing with such problems as intractable Indians or urban disorder, elite formations have always been there, certainly in war and often in peace. They have regularly been supported in their continued existence by popular myths, but as will be seen, the myths have not always corre- sponded to reality. Above all, American military history has, for better or worse, cherished its favorite image: the legendary rifleman/ranger. A few limitations must be stated. With the exception of the Marines (whose history is treated in Chapter 6), discussion is limited to se- lected land and air forces, with apologies to the valiant Americans who fought at sea. Nor has any attempt been made to draw comparisons among American formations at a divisional or higher level, except when they were deliberately created to be elites. Units whose main purpose was not directly combat itself have not been included, even though some were certainly combat-capable and indeed saw considerable ac- tion, such as the combat engineers, or “Seabees,” intelligence teams from the Office of Strategic Services, and so on. On the other hand, as will be seen, it has been necessary to consider a few institutions, such as the United States Military Academy at West Point, whose very existence helped shape general American attitudes toward military elites. Sometimes the decision to include or omit may seem arbitrary, but then defining “elite” ultimately proves rather subjective. The author can only claim that the list is his own, and that the hunt for America’s military elites has been a great challenge, and a great pleasure.

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