JUNE 2011 . VOL 4 . ISSUE 6 COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT CTC Sentinel OBJECTIVE . RELEVANT . RIGOROUS Contents The Death of Usama bin Ladin: FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Death of Usama bin Ladin: Threat Implications for the U.S. Threat Implications for the U.S. Homeland By Philip Mudd Homeland By Philip Mudd REPORTS 4 Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety By Shaun Gregory 7 The Syrian Uprising: Evaluating the Opposition By Mahmud Hasan 10 Can Al-Qa`ida Survive Bin Ladin’s Death? Evaluating Leadership Decapitation By Jenna Jordan 12 Hizb Allah’s Position on the Arab Spring By Benedetta Berti 15 Israel, Hizb Allah, and the Shadow of Imad Mughniyyeh By Bilal Y. Saab 19 The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence By Ben Brandt President Barack Obama attends a wreath laying ceremony at Ground Zero after the death of Bin Ladin. - Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images 23 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity ith the death of Usama that subsequent terrorist plots targeting 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts bin Ladin in May 2011, the homeland were tied directly back Americans will be to operational planners in al-Qa`ida’s safer in the long-term. core organization.1 Threat briefings WWithout Bin Ladin’s magnetic appeal, at the time were not yet dominated by al-Qa`ida’s revolutionary movement homegrown terrorists, or by militants will likely wither and its message, part of al-Qa`ida’s affiliate groups. As a combined with the peaceful revolutions result, U.S. intelligence resources could About the CTC Sentinel in the Arab world, will lose credibility. focus on a hard target—al-Qa`ida’s The Combating Terrorism Center is an In the short-term, however, the U.S. operationally savvy leadership—with independent educational and research homeland remains at risk. In many ways, the classic tools of human and technical institution based in the Department of Social U.S. security services today face more penetration and partnership with an Sciences at the United States Military Academy, challenges than ever before because the informal global network of security West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses threat profile has become so diverse, services. Today, authorities have to the Center’s global network of scholars and with multiple terrorist groups and detect plots that may have no connection practitioners to understand and confront individuals—many with no connection to established terrorist groups or known contemporary threats posed by terrorism and to established terrorist organizations— operatives. other forms of political violence. intent on striking the United States. In the wake of 9/11, for example, al- The views expressed in this report are those of Qa`ida sought to maintain momentum 1 In the immediate years after 9/11, the mix of U.S.-centric the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, by planning and executing another intelligence reporting from human and technical sources, the Department of the Army, or any other agency “spectacular” attack on the U.S. of the U.S. Government. as well as detainees, regularly flowed from the tribal areas homeland. American authorities found of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 1 JUNE 2011 . VOL 4 . ISSUE 6 Indeed, the stream of broken terrorist Bin Ladin’s Death Will Weaken Al-Qa`ida’s Even if a plot is being prepared, the plots in the United States offers a Central Leadership group’s past operations clearly show striking contrast to those early, core al- In the long-term, Bin Ladin’s death that cell leaders will move when they Qa`ida-driven plotlines. From Somali will reduce al-Qa`ida ideological reach are ready, not according to symbolic youth in Minnesota to individuals across in the West. His ability to generate timetables. The security risks of regions of the United States, the broken star power that attracted a wave of delaying an operation for any amount plots frequently involve youth who were disaffected youth worldwide to the of time are too high to hold operatives ideologically inspired by the al-Qa`ida al-Qa`ida banner is now gone. Bin in check for long periods. Their failures revolution, but the plotters had never Ladin was a revolutionary, not just an met an al-Qa`ida member. Bin Ladin’s operational leader, and the already- death in Pakistan may well accelerate declining revolutionary message of al- “An attack in six months this shift in plots from those with some Qa`ida will wither faster without its would be a success in the linkage to al-Qa`ida—training, funding, undisputed leading messenger. Over or operational guidance—to those only time, the decline in al-Qa`ida’s ability eyes of the adversary, and inspired by a message. to recruit followers virtually will a six month timeframe, help reduce the threat to the United In conjunction with these unaffiliated States. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the group’s although long for extremists, the United States also second-in-charge, lacks Bin Ladin’s Americans, would seem faces growing threats from al-Qa`ida’s global appeal, and he is not as respected affiliate organizations, such as its within the organization. Al-Zawahiri insignificant if the target branch in Yemen known as al-Qa`ida was seen as fractious and difficult were substantial enough.” in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that during his time leading Egyptian Islamic was responsible for two recent plots Jihad, and he has never been nearly as on the U.S. homeland. Without the revered among al-Qa`ida acolytes as leadership coherence Bin Ladin brought has Bin Ladin. Furthermore, he lacks in the United States have been frequent: to al-Qa`ida, subordinate commanders Bin Ladin’s charisma globally, and his allowing a plot to sit on the back-burner might pursue their own plotlines more public pronouncements veer from those would strike an operator as a mistake in aggressively, resulting in different threat of a respected leader to angry diatribes. an environment where days and weeks strands directed against the United He almost certainly will lack the ability raise the risk that U.S. intelligence and States. Before Bin Ladin’s death, these to keep the organization focused with law enforcement will identify plotters. threats may have developed under a more strong leadership, and the group may unified al-Qa`ida umbrella as documents suffer leadership fissures, or even Without Bin Ladin’s captivating appeal, recently found in Bin Ladin’s compound fractures, as leaders buck al-Zawahiri’s the key question in coming months, show that he had direct involvement in command and consider how to move beyond whether al-Qa`ida members pressing for attacks against the U.S. forward among themselves. in the tribal areas unite or begin to homeland. Today, however, al-Qa`ida fragment, will be whether affiliated operatives or affiliated militants may Some commentators have suggested that groups, especially in Yemen, redouble seek to attack the United States without the al-Qa`ida core group in Pakistan efforts to strike an iconic U.S. target. any consultation with al-Qa`ida’s core might execute an “off-the-shelf” Their motive would be not only to leadership or other al-Qa`ida affiliates, operation quickly in retaliation. Yet avenge the death of Bin Ladin, but also making plot detection more difficult. al-Qa`ida’s core leadership has been to highlight their emergence as a new These efforts might run in parallel to the struggling to conduct attacks against center of jihadist gravity for recruits cementing role of AQAP as the successor the U.S. homeland for years, and Bin and donors who feel they cannot travel to the leadership in Pakistan, especially Ladin’s death will only impede this to Pakistan’s border belt or who may for Western Muslims who might be further. Information acquired from Bin decline to donate to a group that is susceptible to the English-language Ladin’s compound in Pakistan indicate losing credibility because of inaction. propaganda of Samir Khan, Anwar al- that he was pressing, repeatedly and `Awlaqi, and Inspire magazine. over time, for more attacks; his group’s The Threat From Al-Qa`ida’s Affiliates inability to act on his insistent demand AQAP, widely acknowledged as the This article explains why Bin Ladin’s for more plots suggests that al-Qa`ida most significant threat to the U.S. death will weaken al-Qa`ida’s central still lacks capacity in the West, and homeland outside of core al-Qa`ida, leadership, as well as al-Qa`ida’s rapid-turnaround plotting might simply already has leadership that is benefiting ideological attraction. Yet it warns that lead to less sophisticated attacks such from Westerners. Its propaganda the threat from al-Qa`ida’s affiliates, as the shooting of the Saudi Embassy is augmented by an egotist jihadist, such as AQAP in Yemen, will only grow employee in Pakistan in mid-May. Anwar al-`Awlaqi, who appears to more pronounced now that Bin Ladin is Moreover, al-Qa`ida’s leadership will be as focused on spreading his brand dead. The article concludes by showing highlight security in the coming weeks as on developing the more detached why U.S. authorities face an even greater as they absorb the implications of their Bin Ladinist image of a charismatic, challenge today, as threat detection has leader’s death and try to determine how thoughtful leader who is above the fray. become more labor intensive due to the it occurred. If there is an opportunity to insert a disconnected nature of current terrorist trainee from the Arabian Peninsula into plots.