CTC Sentinel Objective

june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents The Death of Usama bin Ladin:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Death of Usama bin Ladin: Threat Implications for the U.S. Threat Implications for the U.S. Homeland By Philip Mudd Homeland By Philip Mudd Reports 4 Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety By Shaun Gregory 7 The Syrian Uprising: Evaluating the Opposition By Mahmud Hasan 10 Can Al-Qa`ida Survive Bin Ladin’s Death? Evaluating Leadership Decapitation By Jenna Jordan 12 Hizb Allah’s Position on the Arab Spring By Benedetta Berti 15 Israel, Hizb Allah, and the Shadow of Imad Mughniyyeh By Bilal Y. Saab 19 The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence By Ben Brandt President Barack Obama attends a wreath laying ceremony at Ground Zero after the death of Bin Ladin. - Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images

23 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity ith the death of Usama that subsequent terrorist plots targeting 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts bin Ladin in May 2011, the homeland were tied directly back Americans will be to operational planners in al-Qaìda’s safer in the long-term. core organization.1 Threat briefings WWithout Bin Ladin’s magnetic appeal, at the time were not yet dominated by al-Qaìda’s revolutionary movement homegrown terrorists, or by militants will likely wither and its message, part of al-Qaìda’s affiliate groups. As a combined with the peaceful revolutions result, U.S. intelligence resources could About the CTC Sentinel in the Arab world, will lose credibility. focus on a hard target—al-Qaìda’s The Combating Terrorism Center is an In the short-term, however, the U.S. operationally savvy leadership—with independent educational and research homeland remains at risk. In many ways, the classic tools of human and technical institution based in the Department of Social U.S. security services today face more penetration and partnership with an Sciences at the United States Military Academy, challenges than ever before because the informal global network of security West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses threat profile has become so diverse, services. Today, authorities have to the Center’s global network of scholars and with multiple terrorist groups and detect plots that may have no connection practitioners to understand and confront individuals—many with no connection to established terrorist groups or known contemporary threats posed by terrorism and to established terrorist organizations— operatives. other forms of political violence. intent on striking the United States.

In the wake of 9/11, for example, al- The views expressed in this report are those of Qa`ida sought to maintain momentum 1 In the immediate years after 9/11, the mix of U.S.-centric the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, by planning and executing another intelligence reporting from human and technical sources, the Department of the Army, or any other agency “spectacular” attack on the U.S. of the U.S. Government. as well as detainees, regularly flowed from the tribal areas homeland. American authorities found of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

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Indeed, the stream of broken terrorist Bin Ladin’s Death Will Weaken Al-Qaìda’s Even if a plot is being prepared, the plots in the United States offers a Central Leadership group’s past operations clearly show striking contrast to those early, core al- In the long-term, Bin Ladin’s death that cell leaders will move when they Qaìda-driven plotlines. From Somali will reduce al-Qaìda ideological reach are ready, not according to symbolic youth in Minnesota to individuals across in the West. His ability to generate timetables. The security risks of regions of the United States, the broken star power that attracted a wave of delaying an operation for any amount plots frequently involve youth who were disaffected youth worldwide to the of time are too high to hold operatives ideologically inspired by the al-Qaìda al-Qaìda banner is now gone. Bin in check for long periods. Their failures revolution, but the plotters had never Ladin was a revolutionary, not just an met an al-Qaìda member. Bin Ladin’s operational leader, and the already- death in Pakistan may well accelerate declining revolutionary message of al- “An attack in six months this shift in plots from those with some Qaìda will wither faster without its would be a success in the linkage to al-Qaìda—training, funding, undisputed leading messenger. Over or operational guidance—to those only time, the decline in al-Qaìda’s ability eyes of the adversary, and inspired by a message. to recruit followers virtually will a six month timeframe, help reduce the threat to the United In conjunction with these unaffiliated States. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the group’s although long for extremists, the United States also second-in-charge, lacks Bin Ladin’s Americans, would seem faces growing threats from al-Qaìda’s global appeal, and he is not as respected affiliate organizations, such as its within the organization. Al-Zawahiri insignificant if the target branch in Yemen known as al-Qaìda was seen as fractious and difficult were substantial enough.” in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that during his time leading Egyptian Islamic was responsible for two recent plots Jihad, and he has never been nearly as on the U.S. homeland. Without the revered among al-Qaìda acolytes as leadership coherence Bin Ladin brought has Bin Ladin. Furthermore, he lacks in the United States have been frequent: to al-Qaìda, subordinate commanders Bin Ladin’s charisma globally, and his allowing a plot to sit on the back-burner might pursue their own plotlines more public pronouncements veer from those would strike an operator as a mistake in aggressively, resulting in different threat of a respected leader to angry diatribes. an environment where days and weeks strands directed against the United He almost certainly will lack the ability raise the risk that U.S. intelligence and States. Before Bin Ladin’s death, these to keep the organization focused with law enforcement will identify plotters. threats may have developed under a more strong leadership, and the group may unified al-Qaìda umbrella as documents suffer leadership fissures, or even Without Bin Ladin’s captivating appeal, recently found in Bin Ladin’s compound fractures, as leaders buck al-Zawahiri’s the key question in coming months, show that he had direct involvement in command and consider how to move beyond whether al-Qaìda members pressing for attacks against the U.S. forward among themselves. in the tribal areas unite or begin to homeland. Today, however, al-Qaìda fragment, will be whether affiliated operatives or affiliated militants may Some commentators have suggested that groups, especially in Yemen, redouble seek to attack the United States without the al-Qaìda core group in Pakistan efforts to strike an iconic U.S. target. any consultation with al-Qaìda’s core might execute an “off-the-shelf” Their motive would be not only to leadership or other al-Qaìda affiliates, operation quickly in retaliation. Yet avenge the death of Bin Ladin, but also making plot detection more difficult. al-Qaìda’s core leadership has been to highlight their emergence as a new These efforts might run in parallel to the struggling to conduct attacks against center of jihadist gravity for recruits cementing role of AQAP as the successor the U.S. homeland for years, and Bin and donors who feel they cannot travel to the leadership in Pakistan, especially Ladin’s death will only impede this to Pakistan’s border belt or who may for Western Muslims who might be further. Information acquired from Bin decline to donate to a group that is susceptible to the English-language Ladin’s compound in Pakistan indicate losing credibility because of inaction. propaganda of Samir Khan, Anwar al- that he was pressing, repeatedly and Àwlaqi, and Inspire magazine. over time, for more attacks; his group’s The Threat From Al-Qaìda’s Affiliates inability to act on his insistent demand AQAP, widely acknowledged as the This article explains why Bin Ladin’s for more plots suggests that al-Qaìda most significant threat to the U.S. death will weaken al-Qaìda’s central still lacks capacity in the West, and homeland outside of core al-Qaìda, leadership, as well as al-Qaìda’s rapid-turnaround plotting might simply already has leadership that is benefiting ideological attraction. Yet it warns that lead to less sophisticated attacks such from Westerners. Its propaganda the threat from al-Qaìda’s affiliates, as the shooting of the Saudi Embassy is augmented by an egotist jihadist, such as AQAP in Yemen, will only grow employee in Pakistan in mid-May. Anwar al-Àwlaqi, who appears to more pronounced now that Bin Ladin is Moreover, al-Qaìda’s leadership will be as focused on spreading his brand dead. The article concludes by showing highlight security in the coming weeks as on developing the more detached why U.S. authorities face an even greater as they absorb the implications of their Bin Ladinist image of a charismatic, challenge today, as threat detection has leader’s death and try to determine how thoughtful leader who is above the fray. become more labor intensive due to the it occurred. If there is an opportunity to insert a disconnected nature of current terrorist trainee from the Arabian Peninsula into plots. North America, AQAP will be able to

2 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 springboard from Bin Ladin’s death to outlier threat in coming years, pushing Bin Ladin’s mantle, such as AQAP, try an opportunistic strike focused as much not only for more strikes internally but to make a name for themselves to prove on casualties as on branding AQAP as for more targeting elsewhere. It is also to those who fund them and travel for the new al-Qaìda center of action. Al- possible that terrorists might target U.S. training that they are still in the game. Àwlaqi’s access to Western recruits, strategic interests, such as oil facilities, Even harder to track are the local in a country that is seen as both an but this is less likely. Strategic sites are threats, youth who lack connectivity to inexpensive center for Arabic language not easy to access for terrorists seeking couriers, communications, or trainers training and an easier travel destination a fast fix for vengeance. As with copycat from known terrorist entities. The than Pakistan’s tribal areas, may well plots in the United States during recent ideology that motivates them is dying, translate into a steady stream of plots years—such as the backpack bomb but its death is proving unsurprisingly against the U.S. homeland emanating plotters in New York—soft strikes slow. Bin Ladin’s message has been from Yemen, especially if AQAP’s overseas against cultural emblems such compelling: overthrow corrupt leaders leadership attempts a less strategic, as nightclubs could easily spark copycat and return to a time that better reflects more scattershot approach to targeting. attempts in the United States. Islam’s golden age. His death may accelerate the decline of that message— AQAP may redouble efforts to hit hard Time will favor jihadists from Yemen especially combined with the peaceful targets—embassies and other facilities and elsewhere as they seek to avenge the revolutions sweeping the Arab world— that were targeted earlier in the decade death of Bin Ladin by hitting Americans but it may take years. but that are now too difficult to reach for at home. They are committed, and their most extremist cells—but these efforts sense of time is different from the The expansion of the threat base in would take some time, perhaps months, the United States will raise the risk of to organize. Similarly, the attempt a successful, lower-level plot. More against a U.S. airliner over Detroit “Even harder to track are diverse plotters make intelligence in December 2009 suggests that they the local threats, youth and prevention far more difficult to might push again for an iconic target on track. With the overdone reaction to U.S. soil; with the number of recruits who lack connectivity to Bin Ladin’s demise, there is no focus from which they can draw, including a couriers, communications, on the nature of plots in the past few large volume of U.S. students in Yemen, years. There have been plots linked to homeland plotting is a certainty. The or trainers from known al-Qaìda’s core leadership, such as lawlessness of Yemen might now give terrorist entities. The Najibullah Zazi’s plan to attack targets them the time and space to plot carefully. in New York, as well as attacks from The training and plotting opportunities ideology that motivates like-minded militants, sometimes called in Yemen might be coupled with more them is dying, but its death homegrowns, such as Nidal Malik Hasan sophisticated recruiting. Al-Àwlaqi’s who went on a shooting rampage at Ft. use of the internet shows AQAP’s is proving unsurprisingly Hood in Texas. Additionally, there have media savvy toward the West, and the slow.” been plots or terrorist activity from al- recent plot involving a British Airways Qaìda affiliates or associated groups: employee underscores the fact that the Pakistani Taliban (implicated AQAP can be technologically adaptive, in the Times Square bombing and similar to the efforts of al-Qaìda’s core short lenses of Western publics and Miami funding cases), Lashkar-i- plotters to find potential candidates governments. From the Western optic, Tayyiba (implicated in David Headley’s from YouTube. no retaliatory response in the next two activities), AQAP (implicated in the months would lead many to suspect that December 2009 airliner plot as well as Revenge attacks by all al-Qaìda nothing is being prepared, and that the the October 2010 cargo planes plot), affiliates will put a premium on slow crippling of the al-Qaìda movement and al-Shabab (implicated in a number personal safety for U.S. businesses has accelerated. This would be a mistake. of recruitment efforts where members operating overseas. Companies and An attack in six months would be a of the Somali diaspora in the United individuals will probably witness success in the eyes of the adversary, and States traveled to fight in Somalia). All strikes against high-profile locations a six month timeframe, although long for of these disparate plots and activities such as hotels, resorts, nightclubs, Americans, would seem insignificant if demonstrate why security services in bars, or other locations in high-threat the target were substantial enough. the United States will be overburdened areas that are known as venues where in tracking multiple, unconnected Westerners gather; these are easy to The Growing Challenges for Security Services strands of intelligence. organize, have soft security, and are Time will not favor security services, highly recognizable internationally. including federal, state, and local law In the midst of budget limitations and Besides the threat from al-Qaìda in the enforcement in the United States. The competing priorities—Mexican cartels, Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), like-minded plots that crossed security officials’ the rise of national gangs, and the militants in Indonesia, for example, have desks every morning nine years ago continued threat of drug violence in city repeatedly targeted Westerners, and the often emanated from core al-Qaìda, streets—spending money chasing less rise of independents in Indonesia who and more plots—significant, but still sophisticated al-Qaìda fellow travelers appear at the center of plots there all declining in number—will appear on the may well lose traction. The operations raise the prospect that they might be an daily Threat Matrix as the inheritors of of today are labor intensive: finding

3 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 small clusters of youth in major cities Terrorist Tactics in to the international Fissile Material and following them to determine the Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), a treaty which extent of their networks is painstaking, Pakistan Threaten Nuclear would cap fissile material stockpiles. and these clusters’ lack of connectivity Weapons Safety means that they are hard to find Aside from the intricate politics of through national intelligence programs. By Shaun Gregory international arms control, the steady Local law enforcement, with federal rise in the size of Pakistan’s nuclear support, will be crucial, but expensive. two high-profile attacks by terrorists arsenal presents the rather more In the past, most plots were uncovered on highly secure military bases in prosaic, though arguably more serious, by federal authorities, who needed Pakistan, the first on the General challenge of ensuring the physical local support and who operated in an Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in security of an ever increasing number environment where there were fewer Rawalpindi in October 2009 and the of nuclear assets. This is not a simple questions about the threat or the need to second on the naval aviation base at PNS matter. Safeguarding 100 weapons is spend on counterterrorism programs. Mehran near Karachi in May 2011, have a significantly greater challenge than renewed international anxiety about safeguarding 50 weapons because Conclusion the safety and security of Pakistan’s strategic and operational realities The commitment of al-Qaìda nuclear arsenal. require that those weapons are dispersed ideologues has proven durable over and that dispersal locations are adapted time. They believe what they are This article addresses several worrying to the complex requirements of safely doing is not only right, but required, trends in Pakistan that are coming and securely storing nuclear weapons and religiously sanctioned. Too many together to suggest that the safety and in various degrees of operational commentators are already speaking of security of nuclear weapons materials in readiness.3 As Pakistan’s nuclear Bin Ladin’s demise as a “watershed,” Pakistan may very well be compromised arsenal grows in the years ahead, these with the implication that threat in at some point in the future. challenges will multiply. critical areas, particularly the United States, might decline as a result. The Growing Challenge of Securing Pakistan’s As many as 70,000 people in Pakistan Over the long-term, this makes Nuclear Arsenal reportedly have access to, or knowledge sense: a revolutionary movement will In recent months, a variety of media of, some element of the Pakistani ultimately fail if the message lacks sources have reported a significant nuclear weapons production, storage, credibility. Yet as the series of broken escalation of nuclear weapons production maintenance, and deployment cycle, homegrown plots in the United States by Pakistan. According to some of these from those involved in the manufacture has proven during recent years, the sources, Pakistan has been building of fissile material, through those half-life of revolutions is long. Smaller, between 12 and 15 nuclear weapons a engaging in nuclear weapons design, more dispersed, less lethal operations year, effectively doubling the size of its assembly and maintenance, to those might initially appear to represent a nuclear arsenal during the past three who transport and safeguard the rising threat of homegrown extremists. to four years to around 100 nuclear weapons in storage and would deploy This is unlikely. Without a standard- weapons.1 More disconcerting, Pakistan the weapons in crises.4 That number bearer, and in the midst of the decline is engaged in a rapid expansion of its will also rise steadily as the size of the in the al-Qaìda messaging draw in fissile material production through two nuclear arsenal grows. recent years, homegrown strikes in new reactors, the Khushab II, thought the United States would more likely to be operating in some form since 2009, represent the adoption of al-Qaìda’s and Khushab III, which has been under ideology by a small group who have construction since 2005-2006 and is 3 If concentrated in too small a sub-set of locations, the no hope of sparking the kind of global likely to come on-stream around 2013- weapons constitute a lucrative and vulnerable set of tar- wave many feared in the years after 2014. There is further evidence from the gets. 9/11. respected Washington-based Institute 4 This figure includes the 8,000-10,000 staff of Paki- for Science and International Security stan’s Strategic Plans Division and 7,000-8,000 scien- Bin Ladin’s death makes the United that a fourth Khushab reactor may also tists of whom 2,000 are reported to have “critical knowl- States safer in the long-term, but still be under early phase construction.2 edge” of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The latter figure at risk in the short-term. It is critical Intended primarily to offset rival India’s was originally attributed to the director of the Strategic not to lose focus on, or divert resources conventional military advantage, the Plans Division, Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, in from, the terrorist threat facing the U.S. open-ended escalation of Pakistan’s January 2009. For details, see David E. Sanger, “Obama’s homeland almost 10 years after 9/11. nuclear weapons production explains Worst Pakistan Nightmare,” New York Times, January 8, why Pakistan has led the opposition 2009. It also includes up to 18,000 troops reported to Philip Mudd is Senior Global Adviser, guard the nuclear assets. For details, see Andrew Bast, Oxford Analytica. He was the senior 1 Karen DeYoung, “New Estimates Put Pakistan’s Nu- “Pakistan’s Nuclear Surge,” Newsweek, May 15, 2011. For intelligence adviser at the Federal Bureau clear Arsenal at More than 100,” Washington Post, Janu- a development of these issues, see Christopher Clary, of Investigation until his departure in ary 31, 2011. “Thinking About Pakistan’s Nuclear Security in Peace- March 2010, and he was Deputy Director of 2 “Pakistan Appears to Expand Nuclear Site – Report,” time, Crisis and War,” Institute for Defence Studies & the Counterterrorist Center at the Central Reuters, February 10, 2011. For fuller details of this ex- Analysis, September 2010; Matthew Bunn, “Securing Intelligence Agency until his assignment to pansion, see the Institute for Science and International the Bomb 2010,” Belfer Center for Science and Interna- the FBI in August 2005. Security’s website at www.isis-online.org. tional Affairs, Harvard University, April 2010.

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This figure is important because of the nuclear weapons—across the weapons In none of these cases, however, were complex and highly polarized debates cycle—may not be robust enough to the terrorist attacks themselves aimed about nuclear weapons safety and withstand determined terrorist assault; at penetrating the bases or at seizing security in Pakistan. All sides of that b) that among the estimated 70,000 nuclear assets; rather, they were debate agree that Pakistan has, with people with access to the nuclear mass casualty bomb attacks that took considerable U.S. assistance, put in weapons cycle, some may be willing to advantage of the fact that Pakistani place a range of robust measures to seek collude in various ways with terrorists;6 security personnel were concentrated to assure the safety and security of its c) that the threat extends beyond and relatively static at base entry points nuclear weapons. The consensus breaks terrorists gaining access to complete as they waited to go through security down, however, on the issue of whether and viable nuclear weapons, and include barriers.8 Some analysts criticized the the immense political and security article, arguing that: a) terrorists in “Terrorist groups have implications of terrorists gaining access Pakistan had never shown themselves to fissile material, nuclear weapons capable of penetrating high security now shown themselves components, or penetrating nuclear bases; b) that the secrecy of Pakistan’s capable of penetrating even weapons facilities. nuclear weapons sites would ensure that terrorists could not know the the most securely defended A July 2009 article in the CTC Sentinel locations of the weapons. Within a of Pakistan’s military bases explained in detail the robust measures few months, the validity of both these Pakistan has established to assure counterarguments would be seriously and of holding space within the safety and security of its nuclear undermined when Pakistani militants those bases for many hours weapons. It argued that terrorists have penetrated the Pakistan Army’s General shown themselves able to carry out Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. even against the elite SSG, violent attacks at facilities that were more than enough time reliably identified as having a nuclear The Attack on Pakistan’s Army Headquarters weapons role. These facilities include On October 10, 2009, Tehrik-i-Taliban with the right equipment the military complex at Wah, suspected Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and sufficient numbers to be involved in the manufacture militants staged an audacious attack of nuclear weapons parts; Kamra, on the Pakistan Army’s GHQ in to carry out terrorist acts suspected to be the designated base Rawalpindi, arguably one of the most with enormous political or for the dispersal of nuclear assets in a secure military complexes in Pakistan, crisis; and Sargodha, suspected to be housing within its sprawling campus destructive pay-off.” a storage facility for nuclear delivery not only the chief of army staff, but systems.7 also many of Pakistan’s most senior military commanders, including the director-general of the Strategic Plans these measures provide adequate safety 6 There must also be a risk that among this number are Division (SPD) and the director-general and security for Pakistan’s nuclear terrorists or their sympathizers who have applied for of Strategic Forces Command (SFC)— arsenal. The Pakistan Army, which jobs to gain access to part of the weapons cycle, with the Pakistan’s two most senior operational has overall control of the weapons, and smuggling of fissile material a key vector of concern. For nuclear commanders. Pakistan’s government argue forcefully an insightful analysis of these issues, see Brian Clough- that they do, although even they have ley, “Fission Fears,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2011. recently moderated their statements of 7 It must be conceded here that the claimed roles of the reassurance.5 Critics point to a number sites at Wah and Kamra are robustly contested by some of vulnerabilities that place these in Pakistan and cannot be definitively resolved on the reassurances in some doubt. These basis of unclassified sources. Wah is Pakistan’s main vulnerabilities boil down to three core conventional weapons production facility and home to concerns: a) that the physical security of at least 14 separate complexes dealing with technolo- close to Wah, is reported to have a role in air-delivered gies including explosives, heavy artillery ammunition, nuclear weapons and to be a dispersal site for aircraft 5 It is interesting that the official Pakistani narrative has steel and alloy, propellants, and weapons manufacture. armed with nuclear weapons in crises. For details, see moved from a comprehensive insistence that Pakistan’s These are precisely the subset of technologies necessary www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/kamra. nuclear weapons are totally safe and secure, to a rather to manufacture and assemble the non-nuclear compo- htm and Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s less absolute (and more realistic) acceptance that Paki- nents of nuclear weapons (warhead cases, conventional Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” stan’s nuclear weapons are “at least as safe and secure as explosive triggers, etc.) into which the fissile core can be Congressional Research Service, January 13, 2011, avail- those of any other nuclear country.” This is an important fitted. In the absence of comparable alternative facilities able at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf. There change because all nuclear weapons states that have put in Pakistan, Wah remains the most likely location for the was no similar contestation of Sargodha’s possible role as information in the public domain have accepted that ac- manufacture and assembly of nuclear weapons parts. a storage facility for nuclear ballistic missiles. For details cidents, breaches of security, and unintended events are What is less clear is whether fissile material is enriched on Sargodha, see www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/ an inevitable part of operating a nuclear arsenal. None of or otherwise worked at Wah or whether fissile material pakistan/sargodha.htm. these states, however, face the terrorist threat level that is brought to Wah for final assembly. For details on these 8 The sources used in the article make entirely clear the confronts Pakistan. For senior Pakistani articulation of matters, see www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/paki- nature of the attacks to which the argument was refer- the latter position, see, for example, “Strategic Assets Are stan/wah.htm and www.cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/ ring. See Shaun Gregory, “The Terrorist Threat to Paki- Safe, Says FO,” Dawn, November 13, 2007. pakistan.pdf. Pakistan’s Air Weapons Complex Kamra, stan’s Nuclear Weapons,” CTC Sentinel 2:7 (2009).

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The modalities of this attack add up to a kill or capture all of the militants and plates, and possibly ID cards, point virtual blueprint for a successful attack free most of the hostages. Two civilians, to a high level of terrorist knowledge on a nuclear weapons facility: seven Pakistani soldiers and five SSG of sensitive military information and commandos were killed in the raid. protocols, whether through insider - the penetration of layers of security help or not. Furthermore, detailed checkpoints, barriers, and obstacles on In the months that followed the assault, knowledge of Pakistan’s security force the approach to the sensitive military several other disturbing aspects about movements and modus operandi has been site; the attack emerged. Among these was a consistent feature of terrorist actions the assertion that intelligence about the in Pakistan for many years, from the - the terrorist use of army uniforms attacks had been known to Pakistan’s repeated assassination attempts against and—according to some reports—a Punjab government well before October former President Pervez Musharraf, at military vehicle with appropriate least one of which included the insider license plates, and forged ID cards, to involvement of Pakistani military deceive checkpoint personnel; “A frontal assault of this officers,12 through the targeting of the kind on nuclear weapons ISI headquarters and vehicles,13 to the - the use of a safe house relatively close murders of senior military figures.14 to the target site for several weeks storage facilities, which are before the operation to allow the build- the most robustly defended Pakistan’s Nuclear Security at Risk up of a detailed intelligence picture; In this context, given that nuclear elements of Pakistan’s weapons and delivery systems demand - the use of a “sensitive” map (or maps) nuclear weapons cycle, is construction and other visible physical of the GHQ to allow detailed operational necessities (such as road widening, planning. The use of this map (or maps) no longer an implausible unusual levels of security, and bunker point to one of two main possibilities: event.” construction), and given that the growth either that the attack had inside help, or of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal will that this kind of sensitive information significantly expand the construction is poorly controlled by the Pakistan of nuclear weapons infrastructure and Army/ISI; 10 and that this intelligence had the number of individuals with nuclear- even been published in two Pakistani related roles, it is simply not possible - use of the kind of weaponry—small- newspapers, The News International and The that the location of all of Pakistan’s arms, grenades and suicide vests— Daily Jhang, four days before the attack, nuclear weapons can remain unknown which allow final tier barrier defenses but had been ignored by the Pakistan to terrorists in perpetuity.15 to be penetrated; Army and ISI.10 It also emerged that the terrorists had, ironically, almost As evidence of this, on August 28, - use of tactics that allow final tier certainly learned their tactics from 2009, the U.S. Federation of American barriers to be penetrated: grenades and/ the SSG, which had trained earlier Scientists published the first open or suicide detonations at entry points generations of Pakistani/Kashmiri source satellite imagery of a suspected which then allow penetration by follow- militants in similar tactics for operations Pakistani nuclear weapons storage up commando-style groups; against India. In addition, there was facility near Masroor airbase outside a concerted effort by the Pakistan Karachi.16 Within its perimeter walls, - use of diversionary tactics: attacking Army and ISI to manipulate the media one gate first to draw off and weaken reporting of the attacks, forcing several 12 “Air Force Officers Held for Attack on General Mush- the defenses at a secondary entry point, private TV channels temporarily off the arraf,” Daily Telegraph, November 5, 2006. 9 perhaps closer to the main objective. air, contradicting or retracting certain 13 “Bombers Hit Pakistan Spy Agency,” BBC, November details, and seeking to play down the 13, 2009. 11 In all, at least 10 terrorists were significance of the assault. 14 Those killed include Lieutenant General Mushtaq involved in the operation, with four Baig, at the time Pakistan’s surgeon general, blown up attacking the first gate, and a further The second set of features of the at a road junction in February 2008, and Major General six attacking the second gate. The attack relate to secrecy, and they Amir Faisal Alvi, former head of the SSG, gunned down terrorists gained entry to the complex weaken the argument that Pakistan on his way home. See respectively “Rawalpindi Suicide where they took at least 40 people can ultimately rely on concealment to Blast: Kills 8 with Pakistan Army Surgeon General,” hostage. It took the Pakistan Army’s protect its nuclear assets. The use of Pakistan Times, February 25, 2008; Syed Shoaib Hasan, elite commandos, the Special Service “sensitive” maps in the attack, the time “Top Pakistan Ex-Commando Killed,” BBC, November Group (SSG), more than 20 hours to and proximity to conduct intelligence 19, 2008. gathering, the level of knowledge of 15 Nor should it be doubted that some terrorists at least 9 This list has been put together from interviews and a details such as uniforms, military continue to seek nuclear weapons or components. For an range of sources, including: “Press Review: Rawalpindi interesting discussion, see Abdul Bakier, “Jihadis Dis- Attack,” BBC, October 12, 2009; Shahid Rao, “Terror At- 10 “GHQ Attack Report Published in Daily Jhang, The cuss Plans to Seize Nuclear Assets,” Terrorism Monitor tack on GHQ,” The Nation, October 11, 2009; Pakistan’s News on 5th October,” The News International, October 11, 7:4 (2009). Inter Services Public Relations, press releases, May 2011; 2009. 16 To view the U.S. Federation of American Scientists’ Hassan Abbas, “Deciphering the Attack on Pakistan’s 11 These are some of the reasons it is difficult to be defini- document, see www.fas.org/blog/ssp/category/paki- Army Headquarters,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2009. tive about all of the attack details. stan.

6 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 the satellite image shows three potential A frontal assault of this kind on nuclear storage bunkers linked by looping weapons storage facilities, which are The Syrian Uprising: roads.17 The fact that this image is the most robustly defended elements Evaluating the Opposition available online, and that the unusual of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons cycle, configuration of the base is clear, argues is no longer an implausible event. The By Mahmud Hasan strongly that knowledge of the location successful location and penetration of at least some nuclear weapons storage of such a site by terrorists, even if in mid-march 2011, the arrest and torture and other related facilities has reached they were ultimately unsuccessful in of teenagers who had written anti- terrorists in Pakistan. accessing nuclear assets, would itself be regime graffiti sparked a wave of a transformative event both in terms of demonstrations in the southern Syrian As the number of nuclear weapons the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship city of Deraa. As a result of the brutal facilities grows, and the number of and in terms of international anxiety reaction by security forces, protests those with access to nuclear weapons or about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear rapidly escalated and spread to the related components rises, the complex weapons. Such an assault would coastal cities of Latakia and Banyas, the challenge of assuring the security also critically undermine Pakistan’s suburbs of Damascus, and the central of nuclear weapons and nuclear reassurances about the security of governorates of Homs, Hama, and weapons components will become nuclear weapons elsewhere in the Idlib. Protestors initially demanded ever more difficult. Terrorist groups weapons cycle, particularly in transit. democratic reforms, yet the Syrian have now shown themselves capable As the number of Pakistani nuclear government’s violent response to the of penetrating even the most securely weapons inexorably continues to rise, demonstrations—which has now taken defended of Pakistan’s military bases and as the nuclear weapons security the form of armored divisions besieging and of holding space within those challenges thereby steadily multiply, the rebellious towns and cities—has led bases for many hours even against the the odds that Pakistan’s nuclear many to openly call for the fall of the elite SSG, more than enough time with weapons security will eventually be regime. the right equipment and sufficient compromised continue to rise. numbers to carry out terrorist acts From the point of view of the with enormous political or destructive Professor Shaun Gregory is Director authorities, the most threatening pay-off, from video broadcasts with the of the Pakistan Security Research Unit phase of the uprising so far was the attention of the world’s media, through at the University of Bradford, UK. He massive demonstration that saw tens of potentially destroying by explosions has published widely on nuclear and thousands flooding the main square of nuclear weapons or materials and the security issues in Pakistan and advises Homs, Syria’s third largest city, on April creation of a radiological hazard, to many governments, their agencies, and 19. Following the bloody suppression the possibility of the theft of nuclear international organizations. of the gathering, the Syrian Ministry weapons components or materials for of Interior declared that the country subsequent terrorist use. was witnessing “an armed insurgency” aimed at “establishing Salafi emirates.”1 Indeed, on May 22-23, 2011, only about Such discourse is beyond any doubt 15 miles from the suspected nuclear part of a poor attempt at concealing the weapons storage facility near Masroor, fact that the regime is actually facing a a major terrorist attack targeted the genuine popular uprising. Nevertheless, naval aviation base at PNS Mehran in it has succeeded in convincing part of Karachi. Early reports suggest that the population, in particular members between six and ten terrorists stormed of religious minorities that have been the high security base from several entry traumatized by the failed Islamic points, that they had knowledge of the revolution of the early 1980s, that location of intruder detection cameras Islamist militants are seeking to take that they were able to bypass, and that control of the state. Moreover, if the they penetrated deep inside the base situation deteriorates further, the before using rocket-propelled grenades, regime might well create the reality it explosives and small-arms to destroy pretends to fight, as its unrestricted several aircraft and take hostages. It use of violence against civilians and took the base security and additional manipulation of sectarian divides are Pakistan Army rangers and commandos likely to fuel Sunni radicalism. more than 18 hours to end the siege. At least 13 people were killed. Assessing the Depth of the Crisis To some extent, the bloody crushing of the 1979-1982 Islamist uprising in Syria was the last stage of the coup carried out by the Ba`ath Party in 1963. Indeed, what Syrians still remember as “the events”

17 Ibid. 1 Syrian Arab News Agency, April 19, 2011.

7 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 were nothing but the final showdown governorates of Homs, Hama and Idlib, while the redistributive capacities of between a regime dominated by sons in central Syria, where many villages the state have diminished. Of course, of peasants, the most powerful of them and agricultural towns (al-Rastan, the situation is no different in the north belonging to the Alawite minority,2 and Talbisa, Ariha) have witnessed large and and northeast, but in those regions, in the scions of their historical foes, the brutally suppressed demonstrations. the absence of Alawites, the intelligence conservative Sunni merchants. services have mostly recruited among Other major hotbeds of unrest have (Sunni) Bedouins and Kurds, which has As for the current wave of unrest, it been the suburbs and satellite towns possibly allowed for relatively smoother seems to be exactly the opposite. The of Damascus (in particular Duma, relations between the population and central quarters of Damascus and Ma`damiyya, and Dariya) that are home the security apparatus. Aleppo have remained relatively calm to members of the working and lower so far, which suggests that despite middle-classes. Since the rallying to the opposition of widespread corruption and unfair the merchant bourgeoisie of Damascus competition on the part of regime These developments at first suggest and Aleppo does not seem plausible cronies, the majority of the merchant that the current events have an obvious in the short-term, the real key to the bourgeoisie has benefited enough social and economic dimension and fate of the regime is the loyalty of the from the last decade of economic might be seen as consequences of the countryside of the north/northeast, and liberalization to prioritize stability. regime’s shift from socialism to a so- more particularly of the governorate called “social market economy.” Such a of Aleppo, which is home to 25% of the Instead, the uprising started in Deraa, reading of the situation, however, does country’s total population. Were the the administrative center of the Hauran, uprising to spread there, the Syrian a Sunni rural and tribal region that is “If the situation army would be quickly overstretched, a historical stronghold of the ruling since there are good reasons to think Baàth Party. Indeed, it is the homeland deteriorates further, the that only a small proportion of its of such senior officials as Vice President regime might well create 300,000-strong active manpower Faruq al-Shara` and Vice President would be as loyal against civilians as the of the National Progressive Front (the the reality it pretends to (predominantly Alawite) 4th Brigade, alliance composed of the Baàth and fight, as its unrestricted use which has been besieging Deraa, or the satellite parties) Suleiman al-Qaddah. Republican Guard, which defends the It must be noted that unofficial media of violence against civilians capital. outlets of the intelligence service have and manipulation of attacked al-Qaddah, apparently for The Role of the Islamists and the Prospects for his lack of enthusiasm at supporting sectarian divides are likely Radicalization the regime’s repressive policies, which to fuel Sunni radicalism.” Contrary to official allegations, Islamic have also been openly denounced by forces have played a minor role so several representatives of the Deraa far in the Syrian protests. The exiled governorate in the (rump) national Society of the Muslim Brothers, which parliament.3 All of this, in addition not explain why the uprising has taken was completely eradicated inside the to the rallying of senior local clerics roots in the cities of Latakia and Banyas, country following the insurgency of the and tribal leaders to the “revolution,” on the coast, and of Homs, in the center, early 1980s, kept a low profile for more suggests that the movement relies on a since these economies are much better than one month after the start of the broad popular base that encompasses than that of the rural hinterland. Nor uprising, probably to avoid feeding the both the grassroots and the notables. does it help explain the relative calm that regime’s propaganda campaign against prevails in the countryside of Aleppo the domestic opposition. The Brothers Other signs that a significant part of the (North) and in the Jezireh (North East), nevertheless changed their mind with Baàth’s rural support base has turned where social and economic conditions the conference of the Syrian opposition against the regime have come from the are by far the worst in the country, all held in Istanbul in late April, following the more so since local agriculture has which they issued their first formal call been devastated by drought since 2007. 4 2 The Alawites (“supporters of Imam Ali”), also known to demonstrate. under the (derogative) name of “Nusayris,” are a Muslim An alternative explanation is the sect that has been considered as “heretical” by most Sun- In Damascus, although some senior sectarian factor. Indeed, all of Latakia, ni and (until very recently) Shià theologians through- Muslim scholars initially vowed Banyas and Homs are home to sizeable out history. A downtrodden minority, they have lived support for demonstrations, most of Alawite communities that have migrated in the coastal mountains of Syria for centuries. During them have been quickly silenced through from the mountains and countryside the 1960s, Alawite officers became extremely influential a mixture of threats and concessions during the 20th century and live in within the Syrian military, to the extent that one of them, such as the closure of Damascus’ casino, relatively homogeneous neighborhoods. Hafiz al-Assad, became the head of the state in 1971. the opening of a new institute for higher Of course, the mere presence of Alawites Upon his death in 2000, his son, Bashar al-Assad, suc- Islamic studies, the reinstatement did not stir up Sunni resentment; rather, ceeded him as president of Syria. it could be their massive recruitment 3 Ignace Leverrier, “Des dissensions se font jour dans le 4 “Communiqué of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in into the local security apparatus, whose système syrien,” www.syrie.blog.lemonde.fr, April 24, Syria Concerning the Assessment of our Position,” www. corruption and voracity has increased 2011. ikhwansyria.com, April 28, 2011.

8 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 of face-veiled teachers that had been occurred in regions where tribal bonds fellow Islamic militants to identify Syria transferred to administrative positions, are strong. as a “land of jihad.” With U.S. troops and the creation of an Islamic satellite in Iraq, and because of Syria’s anti- channel.5 In addition to its ruthless character, the Western policy, the magazine failed to regime’s handling of popular unrest is attract any attention, with the result Local clerics have joined the opposition also distinctly sectarian, which might that it stopped printing after a couple of and, in some cases, have become its main help jihadist groups promote their issues. The current events have led al- speakers in rebellious cities such as narrative among the Sunni population. Tartusi to focus on Syria again.9 With Deraa (imam of Grand Mosque Ahmad As soon as the first demonstrations the rising number of (mostly Sunni) Sayasne and Mufti Rizq Abazayd, who started in the Sunni neighborhoods of victims of state repression, and the resigned from his position in protest Latakia, the government labeled them active involvement in the latter of de at the crackdown, then accepted to as a sectarian fitna (discord) while agents facto sectarian Alawite militias, there be reinstated under official pressure) provocateurs reportedly sought to create are some reasons to fear that he might and Banyas (Anas Àyrut). This is tensions between the Sunni and Alawite end up being more successful this time. apparently, however, not the result communities of the city. In addition to of any active involvement in the early the fact that repression chiefly relies on Conclusion stage of the protests but rather that the most loyal (predominantly Alawite) After two months of unrest and the demonstrators have put forward these units of the army, the authorities have killings of almost 1,000 people, the well-known and respected figures. resorted to Alawite paramilitaries and situation remains uncertain. Although thugs called “Shabbiha.” In a video President Bashar al-Assad has made Whereas the demands of the that quickly went viral on YouTube, full use of his military might, he has aforementioned clerics have remained plainclothes militiamen are seen beating failed to crush the movement. At the focused on democratic reforms rather trussed up prisoners in the Sunni village same time, the number of demonstrators than on a specifically Islamic agenda, of al-Bayda (Banyas) while shouting has remained limited to probably there were at least two substantiated to one another with distinctly Alawite less than 50,000 nationwide, and cases of men of religion giving fiery names such as “Ali Abbas.”7 protests have still not taken root in sectarian speeches in front of the the central districts of Damascus and demonstrators. In one of them, however, At the moment, Syria does not seem to Aleppo or in the populous northern the contrast between the speaker’s be home to organized jihadist networks countryside. The Syrian “revolution” is enthusiasm at vilifying “infidels” and that could exploit such a situation in the thus increasingly looking like a war of his refusal to call for the fall of the short-term. Throughout the 2000s, the attrition whose result is impossible to regime gives some credence to the theory country has exported most of its radical foresee, since neither side seems to lack that this established cleric was actually Islamists to Iraq and, to a lesser extent, determination. sent by Syrian intelligence services to Lebanon (such as to the group Fatah al- undermine the credibility of the protest Islam). As a result, Syria has suffered Mahmud Hasan is an independent movement.6 relatively little from terrorism during researcher on Syrian affairs. the last decade; with the exception of the The Syrian official press has repeatedly bombing in September 2008 that killed pointed to the killings of several 17 near a center of the intelligence service dozen soldiers and policemen as proof in Sidi Qazzaz, a suburb of Damascus, of the involvement of Saudi-backed the country witnessed only three “extremists” in the uprising. For its part, failed (and, for two of them, somewhat the opposition has accused the regime of curious) attacks by Islamic militants,8 executing members of the military who in addition to a series of skirmishes refused to shoot at civilians. In fact, between the latter and security forces there is no need to resort to any of these in 2005-2006. Moreover, dozens of theories to make sense of the death of jihadists perished in the suppression of security operatives. Light automatic a riot at the prison of Seydnaya in the weapons such as AK-47s are widespread summer of 2008. in the Syrian countryside and coastal region, where they are used for hunting, In late 2004, London-based Syrian protection of livestock against hyenas, jihadist scholar Àbd al-Munìm and feuds. Therefore, it would not be Halima (also known as Abu Basir al- surprising if people sought revenge Tartusi) launched the online magazine for relatives killed by security forces Risalat al-Mujahidin (The Mujahidin’s during the recent demonstrations, all Newsletter) with the aim to encourage the more so that the most violent clashes 7 This can be viewed at www.youtube.com/ 5 Al-Watan [Damascus], April 6, 2011. watch?v=PVPDZji4-f4. 6 Sermon of Sheikh Asàd Khalil on “Freedom Square” 8 Against an empty UN building in April 2004, an emp- 9 See, for example, “Important Advices and Orientations in Homs, April 18, 2011, available at www.youtube.com/ ty building of the national television in June 2006, and for Demonstrators,” www.abubaseer.bizland.com, April watch?v=owu3WF4VWxE. the U.S. Embassy in September 2006. 30, 2011.

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Can Al-Qaìda Survive Bin baseline rate of collapse for groups members, the rate of decline for over time. Organizations that have not decapitated organizations is 46% less Ladin’s Death? Evaluating had their leaders removed are more than for non-decapitated organizations. Leadership Decapitation likely to fall apart than those that have undergone a loss of leadership. While Third, religious and separatist groups By Jenna Jordan 53% of decapitated terrorist groups are difficult to destabilize through fell apart, 70% of groups that have leadership targeting, while ideological what will the death of Usama bin never experienced decapitation are no organizations are the most susceptible to Ladin mean for the war on terrorism? longer active. The marginal utility for targeting efforts.2 Religious groups that While Bin Ladin’s death was a major decapitation is actually negative—the have undergone decapitation are less tactical victory for the United States, rate of collapse is almost 20% less for likely to fall apart than those that did decapitation alone rarely results in decapitated organizations—particularly not. The rate of decline for decapitated the demise of terrorist organizations. for larger, older, religious, and religious groups is 15% less than for Killing Bin Ladin may destabilize al- separatist organizations. religious groups whose leaders have Qaìda temporarily, but his death is not been targeted, while decapitated unlikely to be a significant blow to the There are three key variables that can ideological groups fall apart about organization. help determine whether and under what seven percent less than non-decapitated conditions decapitation is likely to be ideological groups. Overall, the data This article examines the effectiveness effective: an organization’s age, size, shows that decapitation is not an of leadership targeting based on and type. effective strategy, and in certain cases a dataset compiled by the author. it actually increases organizational It shows what factors determine First, a group’s age was the strongest resilience. whether leadership decapitation will predictor of when decapitation results be effective, and it concludes that in group collapse. Older groups tend to Organizational Resilience the death of Bin Ladin is unlikely to withstand attacks on their leadership, To explain why small, young, and weaken the al-Qaìda terrorist group. and decapitation is counterproductive ideological groups are easier to the older a group becomes. This variable destabilize than older, larger, and Research on Leadership Targeting was coded according to the year in which religious, the author developed a To assess the effectiveness of leadership the organization began conducting theory of organizational resilience. decapitation against terrorist groups, terrorist activity and was coded in 10- Organizational resilience is a function the author compiled a dataset of 298 year increments. The data shows that of two variables: bureaucratization incidents of leadership targeting from organizations under 10 years of age and communal support. Decapitation is 1945-2004. In brief, the findings suggest were the most susceptible to collapse. unlikely to result in the demise of groups that decapitation is not an effective Decapitation is seven percent less that have bureaucratized administrative counterterrorism strategy. In fact, the effective than doing nothing for groups functions or that have high levels of rate of decline is lower for groups whose under 20 years of age, and becomes communal support. Groups have an leaders have been killed or arrested. 20% less effective for groups between easier time regrouping after an external Moreover, in certain cases decapitation 20-30 years of age. Groups that had shock if they have bureaucratic features can have adverse and counterproductive been active for more than 40 years were at the upper levels of the organization consequences. Decapitation is the least always resistant to collapse following or if they have significant levels of effective in the context of groups that the removal of a leader. There are strong communal support. are older, religious, or relatively large.1 reasons to expect that larger groups possess organizational attributes, First, bureaucratization is an internal Comparing the rate of decline for which increase their resilience to mechanism that increases group stability groups that have undergone leadership counterterrorism measures in general. and facilitates a clear succession process. decapitation to those that have not, Older or larger organizations are more the data shows that decapitation Second, large groups are better able to likely to develop bureaucratic traits does not increase the likelihood of regroup after the removal of leaders; including an organized administrative organizational collapse beyond a decapitation rarely works against staff, a hierarchy of authority, and groups with more than 500 members. a system of rules and regulations,

1 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Ef- This variable is coded according to the making it more stable and less likely fectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security Stud- number of active members. The smallest to fail. As organizations grow in size ies 18:4 (2009). For other studies on the effectiveness organizations, those with fewer than of leadership decapitation, see Michael Freeman, “The 100 active members, were susceptible 2 In the dataset generated for this study, cases are coded Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic As- to collapse. Generally, as a group gets as religious, ideological, or separatist. While religious sessment of Leadership Targeting,” Journal of Conflict larger, the success rate of decapitation organizations certainly have ideological aspirations, Studies 30 (2010); Patrick Johnston, “Assessing the Ef- declines. Once a group exceeds a “ideological” is a category that includes Marxist, Lenin- fectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsur- membership of 500, the rate of decline ist, social revolutionary, fascist, and white supremacist gency Campaigns,” Harvard University, 2010; Bryan C. is higher for groups that have not organizations. This is a dummy variable to allow for Price, Removing the Devil You Know: An Empirical Analysis experienced decapitation. Decapitation overlap. For example, organizations can be classified as of Leadership Decapitation and Terrorist Group Duration essentially becomes counterproductive. religious/separatist, separatist/ideological, or ideologi- (West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy, 2010). For groups with between 500-1,000 cal/religious.

10 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 and/or age, they often require a more repeated attacks on its leadership. the issue of whether al-Qaìda’s size complex administration to function Its bureaucratic hierarchy, combined will work in its favor is less clear-cut, effectively. An administrative staff, with a largely decentralized structure since experts disagree over the group’s hierarchy, and stable rules can allow of local networks, further increased exact numbers.11 Yet it is reasonable to the group to operate efficiently and, its ability to withstand decapitation.5 believe that the group has more than most importantly, increase its stability While the targeting of key leaders may 500 militants—which would put it and capacity to withstand leadership have decreased the lethality of Hamas’ over the threshold at which terrorist attacks. attacks, the number of operations organizations become better able to increased over time. withstand decapitation. Even if the Second, communal support is essential group has less than 500 members, the in providing the resources necessary Two top Hamas leaders, Shaykh Ahmad rate of decapitation success for groups for a terrorist group to function Yassin and Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, were with between 100 and 500 members is and survive.3 Accordingly, groups both targeted and killed by Israeli forces still very small. with higher levels of local support in 2004.6 Although the organization should have access to more resources, was temporarily disrupted, these and Religious and separatist organizations decreasing their vulnerability to other past cases of targeted killings often do not depend upon the specific destabilization. While not in all incited retaliatory attacks and outrage, ideology of the leader. While Bin Ladin cases, religious and separatist groups ultimately increasing communal has provided a key inspirational role, often have a higher degree of support support for the organization.7 Civilian the organization has an ideological from the communities in which they deaths, which can occur during the resonance that extends beyond the operate. As religious and separatist process of targeting leaders, have also spiritual leadership he provided. doctrine tends to be rooted within fueled Palestinian support for Hamas.8 Rather, Bin Ladin developed and local communities, its reproduction Eventually, public support reached broadened the appeal of al-Qaìda’s is not necessarily dependent upon the such a high level that Hamas won the ideology to attract a broad base of leader. As a result, the loss of a leader Palestinian legislative elections in support.12 His anti-Western message would be less disruptive to the group’s 2006.9 was able to attract widespread doctrinal coherence. In comparison, support. Some of al-Qaìda’s prime the doctrine upon which ideological Al-Qaìda recruiting tools this past decade have organizations are based is usually Al-Qaìda fits this pattern as been U.S. military actions in Iraq and dependent upon a particular set of well. While Bin Ladin’s death may Afghanistan, which may continue to beliefs that is exclusive to the group or destabilize the group in the short-term, draw fighters to Bin Ladin’s cause to the leader itself. Groups with higher decapitation alone is not likely to result after his death. It is this broad levels of local support should thus have in its demise. First, al-Qaìda formed ideological position that has made al- access to resources necessary to survive in 1988, which makes it more than 20 Qaìda’s support and infrastructure attacks. years old—this should significantly both global and resilient. increase its ability to withstand Bin Past Examples Ladin’s death. Decapitation is almost Bin Ladin’s death may temporarily Hamas 20% less effective than doing nothing destabilize al-Qaìda’s core in Pakistan; Many of the most prominent cases of against groups between 21-30 years however, its decentralized structure leadership decapitation fit this pattern. of age. Second, al-Qaìda is clearly a should increase its resilience to long- For example, Hamas leaders have been religious organization—its goals include term destabilization. The organization targeted repeatedly with unsuccessful the establishment of a pan-Islamic is highly bifurcated, with local results. Hamas has had a high amount caliphate, overthrowing non-Islamic affiliates—al-Qaìda in the Islamic of popular support, due in part to regimes, and expelling infidels from Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaìda in the its ability to provide social services, Muslim countries—which also tends to Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—operating education, and religious institutions make terrorist groups more resistant largely independently. Decentralized to the Palestinian community.4 Hamas’ to attacks on its leadership.10 Finally, organizations are more difficult to organizational structure has made it destabilize through leadership attacks.13 difficult to destabilize in the face of 5 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision Violence and Coexistence (New York: Co- 11 See Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Al- 3 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror lumbia University Press, 2000), p. 152. manac of Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy, 2010; Peter Bergen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 95; Au- 6 In another prominent instance of decapitation, Yahya and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” A drey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding Ayyash’s death in 1996 directly resulted in multiple re- Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Secu- the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, taliatory attacks with high causalities. rity Preparedness Group, 2010. NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 104; Robert 7 Khaled Hroub, “Hamas after Shaykh Yasin and Ran- 12 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism tisi,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33:4 (2004). Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), (New York: Random House, 2005), p. 81; Risa Brooks, 8 Ibid.; Daniel Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” pp. 71-72. Societies and Terrorist Violence: How Social Support Affects Foreign Affairs 85:2 (2006); Avery Plaw, Targeting Ter- 13 On the stability of decentralized organizations, see Militant Campaigns (Chicago: Northwestern University, rorists (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2008). Kathleen Carley, “A Theory of Group Stability,” American 2009). 9 Azzam Tamini, Hamas: A History from Within (Ithaca, Sociological Review 56:3 (1991); Kathleen Carley, Ju-Sung 4 Ziad Abu-Amr, “Hamas: A Historical and Political NY: Olive Branch Press, 2007), p. 18. Lee, and David Krackhardt, “Destabilizing Networks,” Background,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22:4 (1993). 10 Cronin, p. 182. Connections 24:3 (2002).

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While these affiliates initially focused support. In fact, public opinion polls in on local and regional affairs, they have Pakistan have found that substantial Hizb Allah’s Position on increased their efforts at transnational minorities feel that al-Qaìda’s cause is the Arab Spring terrorist activity. AQAP allegedly helped legitimate and believe that it is seeking plan the 2009 Little Rock recruitment justice for Muslims.15 It is the ideological By Benedetta Berti office shooting, the 2009 attempted resonance of al-Qaìda’s doctrine that Christmas Day bombing of a U.S. airliner allows the group to recruit new members in january 2011, before the arrival of over Detroit, and the 2010 cargo planes and can increase its ability to withstand the wave of massive sociopolitical bomb plot. Even if Bin Ladin’s death attacks. and geostrategic change that has significantly weakens al-Qaìda’s core, spread through the Middle East, which given the data seems unlikely, the American leaders could help dry up the regional balance of power began local affiliates have shown that they are this popular support for al-Qaìda by shifting in Beirut, when the Hizb committed to al-Qaìda’s larger agenda. beginning to withdraw ground forces Allah-led opposition forces resigned While al-Qaìda’s core has already from Afghanistan, thus neutralizing from Saad Hariri’s executive cabinet, been significantly weakened since one of the causes for which Bin leading to the collapse of the “pro- fleeing Afghanistan in 2001, its quasi- Ladin’s militants have been fighting. Western” March 14 government and bureaucratic system of administration While al-Qaìda is driven by religious to the rise of a Hizb Allah-dominated should increase its capacity to endure doctrine, the presence of U.S. ground parliamentary majority. In the months this latest setback. Groups can be both forces in Muslim countries has been a following its “takeover” of Lebanese hierarchical at the upper levels and key tool in recruitment. Much of Bin domestic politics, Hizb Allah is now decentralized at the lower and more Ladin’s support initially stemmed capitalizing on its enhanced domestic operational levels. It is the combination from opposition to U.S. forces in the status while attempting to improve its of these two factors that can make Arabian Peninsula in the 1990s.16 The regional standing and power. To do so, groups difficult to weaken.14 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan served Hizb Allah has been following the Arab to further resentment toward a U.S. spring closely, while using its political Conclusion military presence, incite attacks, and and military power to support—mostly Overall, the appeal of al-Qaìda’s promote recruitment. By completing indirectly—popular revolutions in the ideology, the growth of its decentralized the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Middle East and to increase its regional networks, and the regrouping of al- removing considerable troops from involvement. Qaìda’s leadership suggest that Bin Afghanistan, the United States could Ladin’s death will not destroy the group. mitigate critical sources of support for This article explores Hizb Allah’s There is also a potential not only for al-Qaìda. response to the ongoing protests in decapitation to be counterproductive, the Middle East and analyzes both the but to result in adverse consequences. Dr. Jenna Jordan received her Ph.D. from group’s direct and indirect support The killing of high-profile leaders such the department of political science at the for these movements, as well as the as Bin Ladin, who become symbols of University of Chicago. She is currently a post- strategic shift that took place within martyrdom, can generate a desire for doctoral research fellow at the Harris School the Lebanese-Shià organization in revenge and retaliation, resulting in of Public Policy Studies at the University of reaction to what the group views as a more attacks. Chicago. Her doctoral dissertation examines favorable shift in the regional balance the effectiveness of leadership decapitation of power. This all indicates the importance of against terrorist organizations. Her work following up on this successful attack has been supported by grants from the Smith Embracing the Protest Movements in ways that will decrease support for Richardson Foundation and the Program Hizb Allah’s stance with respect al-Qaìda. Terrorist groups depend on International Security Policy at the to the ongoing protest movements upon popular support to function, University of Chicago. in the Middle East has been one of survive as covert organizations, and unequivocal support. This should not execute attacks. Support is necessary come as a surprise. Since the end of for a group to replenish its membership, the July 2006 war against Israel, the raise money, provide resources, and group has gradually shifted away from ensure its ability to operate covertly. its traditionally conciliatory strategy While the type of support that al- with respect to existing Arab regimes. Qaìda depends upon is very different Instead, in the aftermath of its 2006 from that of Hamas or Lebanese Hizb confrontation with Israel, Hizb Allah Allah, it is still important that groups has been vocal in expressing its hostility have support in the areas where they with respect to the so-called “moderate Arab regimes,” while advocating in operate. The more support, the easier it 15 C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro, favor of radical change in the region. For is for them to carry out activity. While “Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from instance, during the September 18, 2009 its tactics are less popular, al-Qaìda a National Sample,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22:4 al-Quds (Jerusalem) day celebrations, has managed to build a sizeable base of (2010). Also see Jacob N. Shapiro and C. Christine Fair, Hizb Allah Secretary General Hassan “Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Paki- Nasrallah clearly stated that “we have 14 Hamas is a good example of a terrorist group that has stan,” International Security 34:3 (2009/2010). to replace the regimes in the Arab a highly organized hierarchy and is also decentralized. 16 Pape.

12 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 countries with other regimes that are during the 2009 Gaza War, and going what the group saw as “excessive” use convinced of war in order to send their as far as calling for a popular uprising of violence against the protestors.11 armies to war.”1 Under this predicament, against the government.5 Nasrallah’s accusations against Bahrain regime change among “moderate” in his March 19 speech eventually led to countries (including Mubarak’s Egypt, In addition, the Egyptian ousting of the country to file an official protest, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) is seen as an Mubarak has another, very concrete, with Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh important step to strengthen what the implication for the Lebanese group: Khalid bin Hamad al-Khalifah declaring group defines as the Iranian-led “axis it led to the escape of Sami Chehab they would hold Lebanon responsible of resistance.”2 (Muhammad Youssef Ahmad Mansour), for such statements and that, if the the leader of the Hizb Allah-affiliated criticism continued, it would directly Accordingly, following the outbreak Egyptian cell who—along with 26 more affect the bilateral relations of the two of mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt, alleged Hizb Allah militants—was countries.12 Hizb Allah has been extremely vocal in convicted in April 2010 by the Supreme expressing its ideological support for State Security Court on charges of In addition, in the case of Bahrain, these movements. conspiracy to perpetrate terrorist acts.6 the group’s involvement could have On February 2, 2011, following the extended beyond indirect support, into During his first public display of beginning of the popular unrest within direct participation, although evidence support for the Tunisian and Egyptian Egypt, Chehab and the other Hizb Allah proving this is thin. While the Bahraini people on February 7, 2011, Nasrallah militants managed to escape from the government’s accusations against explained that his group’s initial silence Wadi el-Natrun prison, where they Hizb Allah should be taken lightly—as over these movements’ achievements had been detained.7 A couple of weeks the Bahraini government has a direct was a measure adopted to shield them later, on February 16, 2011, Chehab interest in depicting the local protests from criticism. In fact, he argued that was spotted during a Hizb Allah- as a “foreign plot”—there have been past if Hizb Allah would have openly sided organized demonstration in Beirut,8 connections between the local Shià with them at an early stage, “it would where Nasrallah explicitly stated that community in Bahrain and the Lebanese- have been said that the demonstrators “this [Egyptian] revolution was the true Shià militia. As a result, Hizb Allah’s in Tahrir Square…are motivated by cells reason behind the liberation of brethren involvement in Bahrain is not an entirely affiliated to Hizb Allah or Hamas…or captive Muhammad Mansour who is new phenomenon: a recently leaked U.S. to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.”3 participating in our celebration and diplomatic cable from 2008 already Following this initial expression of whom we welcome whole-heartedly.”9 contained allegations that the country’s solidarity and vow to “defend” the opposition had been receiving training revolution and campaign in the media In the weeks following the revolutions from Hizb Allah.13 More recently, in to ensure its popularity, Hizb Allah in Tunisia and Egypt, Hizb Allah the wake of the local protests, the has maintained a high level of indirect continued with its line of indirect Bahraini authorities arrested a number support for the protest movements in support, openly speaking in favor of of Lebanese nationals, accusing them of both Tunisia and Egypt.4 the protest movements in Yemen and being Hizb Allah militants.14 On March Libya, while investing particular efforts 30, the Bahraini foreign minister, in an The fall of the Egyptian regime, in supporting the popular protest interview with the Saudi newspaper al- specifically, has been especially movement in Bahrain.10 Hayat, accused Hizb Allah of involvement welcomed by Hizb Allah, which saw in in the local protests, stressing that the the demise of Mubarak also the decline In the case of Bahrain, Hizb Allah country defined the group as a “terrorist of one of the group’s main regional immediately spoke out in indirect organization.”15 Hizb Allah responded opponents. Defined by the organization assistance of that country’s Shià to these accusations by denying any as an Israeli and American puppet, population, while sharply condemning

Mubarak had been critical of the 11 “Commenting on the Bloody Repression that Targeted Lebanese-Shi`a group during the 2006 5 Benedetta Berti, “Hizb Allah’s Domestic Containment Protesters in Bahrain,” press release, Hizb Allah, March Lebanon war and, in the past few years, and Regional Expansion Strategies,” CTC Sentinel 2:11 17, 2011. Hizb Allah has repeatedly expressed (2009). 12 Youssef Diab, “Lebanese Officials Trying to Contain its opposition to the Egyptian regime, 6 Yasmine Saleh, “Egyptian Court Convicts 26 Men Of Effect of Nasrallah’s Statement,” Asharq al-Awsat, March criticizing its relationships with Israel, Hizballah Links,” Reuters, April 28, 2010. 22, 2011, translation by Mideast Wire. its opposition to Hamas, and its role 7 “Sami Chehab and Members of the ‘Egypt Cell’ Escape 13 Oren Kessler, “Iran’s Opposition to Hold Mass Protest Natroun Prison,” al-Rai al-Aam, February 2, 2011, trans- Today. Demonstrators Return to Bahrain Capital’s Cen- 1 “Nasrallah Commemorates Al-Quds Day,” speech lation by Mideast Wire. tral Square. Wikileaks: Bahraini Opposition Got Train- transcript, September 18, 2009, translation by Mideast 8 Dominic Evans, “Hezballah Chief Threatens To Seize ing From Hezbollah,” Jerusalem Post, February 20, 2011. Wire. Control Of Galilee,” National Post, February 17, 2011. 14 “Bahraini Security Arrests Hezbollah Members, 2 Ibid. 9 “Speech Delivered By Hezballah Secretary General Controls Turbulent Areas,” al-Watan, March 18, 2011; 3 “Speech Delivered By Hezballah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During A Ceremony Marking Al-Akhbar, March 23, 2011, translation by Mideast Wire; Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During The Solidarity Rally The Anniversary Of The Martyr Leaders Held In Sayyed Sandeep Singh Grewal, “‘Hizbollah Links’ Five Arrest- With Egypt That Was Held In Ghobairy Municipality Ashuhada Compound On Wednesday February 16, ed,” Gulf Daily News, March 24, 2011. Square – Jnah,” press release, Hizb Allah, February 10, 2011,” press release, Hizb Allah, February 19, 2011. 15 Raghidah Dirgham, “Interview with Bahraini Foreign 2011. 10 “Hizb Allah Condemns ‘Heinous Crimes,’” al-Manar, Minister Shaykh Khalid Bin-Hamad Al Khalifah,” al- 4 Ibid. March 18, 2011. Hayat, March 30, 2011.

13 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 link or involvement, consistent with the It is the revolution…against…the its post-2006 military strategy with group’s strategy of rejecting accusations regime’s policy in the Arab-Israeli respect to Israel. This new approach, of any regional activism.16 struggle.19 first disclosed in the aftermath of the 2006 war, is centered on strategic The only exception to Hizb Allah’s In addition, he compared the protest parity and proportional retaliation in indirect and alleged direct support for movements to “the Lebanese resistance the context of a renewed conflict with the protest movement across the region in July War 2006 and the historic the Jewish State. Even if the shift in has been, unsurprisingly, with respect steadfastness of the Palestinian military doctrine is not necessarily a to Syria. In the case of its traditional resistance during Gaza War in 2008,”20 new element, in the aftermath of the political ally, in fact, the group has again riding the wave of regional turmoil Arab spring Hizb Allah has been more refrained from supporting the protests, to promote its cause. eager to publicly articulate this notion. while the Hizb Allah-controlled media As early as mid-February, Nasrallah has been engaged in a campaign to In addition to this propaganda campaign stated that, in the course of the next discredit the anti-regime movement by to shape the understanding of the round of confrontation with Israel, downplaying its size, or by accusing the ongoing political unrest in a way that Hizb Allah would respond to territorial protesters to have been paid to take part is favorable to the group’s agenda, Hizb invasion by the Israeli Defense Forces in the anti-regime demonstrations.17 Allah has also been promoting the idea with its own territorial invasion, by In addition, since February 2011 there that—as a consequence to the regional sending its units to occupy the Galilee have also been reports of Hizb Allah changes—the group’s strength and region.22 This concept was further units deployed along the Lebanese- power have increased exponentially. reiterated by Hizb Allah MP Hassan Syrian border to monitor the situation Fadlallah, who said that Hizb Allah was and assist Bashar al-Assad’s regime.18 In Hizb Allah’s discourse, the end of planning on “taking control of land in the Mubarak regime is described as return for taking control of land,”23 also Hizb Allah’s Strategic Realignment: tantamount to the beginning of the confirming the group’s renewed self- Emerging as a Stronger Regional Actor? “ousting” of the U.S. allies from the perception of power and its desire to In Hizb Allah’s worldview, the ongoing region and to the parallel rise of the use the regional events as a weapon in protest movements, from Tunisia to “resistance axis.” In his February 16, the psychological war against Israel. Egypt to Libya, are seen as marking 2011 speech, Nasrallah eloquently a watershed for the region, and the explained this paradigm by stating: Moreover, the same self-perception of group has been trying to capitalize on “The major blow to the resistance… strength has led the group to pursue the ongoing social and political unrest was the participation of the Egyptian an even more aggressive foreign policy to strengthen its regional standing and regime in Camp David Agreement and with respect to the Arab regimes that increase its strategic alliances. consequently the emergence of Egypt it deems too “moderate” or hindering from the Arab-Israeli struggle.”21 The the formation of a regional “resistance To accomplish this, the group has fall of Mubarak is then seen as marking axis.” The ongoing campaign against linked the protest movements to its own the end of the Israeli-Egyptian detente, Bahrain, for example, has to be “resistance” agenda and has attempted which will in turn change the balance interpreted as part of this larger anti- to portray the ongoing revolutions as of power in the Arab-Israeli conflict in status quo policy. Within Lebanon, part of a regional realignment away favor of the “resistance.” Similarly, the former Prime Minister Saad Hariri from the West and closer to the Shi`a political unrest in the broader Middle explained this posture by stating that organization and its allies, especially East is also seen as a sign of the local Hizb Allah wants to use Lebanon as a Iran. For instance, in his February 7, populations embracing Hizb Allah’s “base to fuel internal conflicts in the 2011 speech, Nasrallah claimed that the agenda of “resistance.” Arab countries,” while attempting to ongoing protests represented export the revolution “Iranian-style.”24 In other words, Hizb Allah believes the Hariri also specified that the “campaign the revolution of the poor, the current regional changes are weakening targeting Bahrain, the Kingdom of free, the freedom seekers and Israel and the United States and Saudi Arabia and all the GCC states is— the rejecters of humiliation and strengthening itself, along with its main to say the least—the implementation of disgrace which this [Egypt] nation regional partner, Iran. As a result of this a foreign operations order,” alluding to was subject to due to giving up to perceived geostrategic advantage, the the strategic interest of Iran in forcing the will of America and Israel… group has been more vocal in articulating the implosion of the “moderate” Arab regimes and the regional shift toward 25 16 Yusuf Diyab, “Lebanon: Hezbollah Denies Training 19 “Speech Delivered By Hezballah Secretary General its sphere of influence. Bahrainis and Underlines its Political Support for the Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During The Solidarity Rally Opposition. Source in ‘14 March’ Warns of Danger of With Egypt That Was Held In Ghobairy Municipality its Interference in Other Countries’ Affairs,” al-Sharq al- Square – Jnah.” 22 Evans. Awsat, April 1, 2011. 20 Ibid. 23 “Resistance Setting New Equations to Protect Leba- 17 “Lebanese Hezbollah TV Reports ‘Million-Strong’ 21 “Speech Delivered By Hezballah Secretary General non,” al-Manar, February 19, 2011. Rallies Backing Syrian President,” BBC Monitoring Mid- Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah During A Ceremony Mark- 24 “Al-Hariri: Hezbollah Demanding Change, Iranian- dle East, March 30, 2011. ing The Anniversary Of The Martyr Leaders Held In style,” March14.org, March 22, 2011, translation by Mid- 18 “Hizbullah Used in Syrian Security,” Middle East Sayyed Ashuhada Compound On Wednesday February east Wire. Newsline, February 7, 2011. 16, 2011.” 25 Ibid.

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Conclusion Israel, Hizb Allah, and attack, also in Buenos Aires, killing 85 Hizb Allah reacted to the ongoing people. processes of sociopolitical and the Shadow of Imad geostrategic change at the regional level Mughniyyeh Nasrallah’s threat to avenge by openly siding with the revolutionary Mughniyyeh, while real, creates a protest movements. For the most By Bilal Y. Saab dilemma for the group. If the militant part, this support has expressed itself group does follow through on its threat indirectly, with the group employing in mid-february 2011, the Israeli and conducts a spectacular terrorist its media apparatus and its grassroots government closed temporarily four operation against Israeli targets, this network to promote the Arab diplomatic missions abroad and put could cause a massive military reaction revolutions. In addition, in the case others on high alert, amid fears that on the part of Israel and possibly ignite of Bahrain, the open political support Lebanese Hizb Allah may attack Israeli war between the two belligerents. If may have been matched by more direct targets to mark the third anniversary Hizb Allah decides not to retaliate, its involvement in the protests, allegedly of the killing of Imad Mughniyyeh, the credibility and tit-for-tat approach through providing logistical assistance Lebanese-Shi`a group’s iconic military could be severely damaged, which could to the local protesters (although the chief.1 undermine its military strategy toward evidence provided by the authorities in Israel in the event of war or another Bahrain to substantiate this claim is at Since Mughniyyeh’s death, Israel has similar situation in the future. the moment thin). accused Hizb Allah and Iran of plotting to bomb Israeli embassies abroad and It is not at all clear which path Hizb The reason behind the group’s trying to assassinate senior Israeli Allah will choose. It is possible that unequivocal standing behind the diplomats and military chiefs.2 Israel Hizb Allah has already made a strategic local protest movements goes well has claimed publicly that its intelligence decision to avenge Mughniyyeh; beyond ideological affinity with these services have managed to foil several therefore, the only uncertain variables movements and their agendas, or “Arab attempted terrorist operations by are the timing, location, and lethality solidarity.” Specifically, Hizb Allah Hizb Allah and Iranian personnel in of the operation. Yet it is also accurate sees the wave of regional change as a Eastern Europe, Latin America, and to say that Hizb Allah does not want key element in shifting the regional the Middle East.3 Hizb Allah has denied to risk another large-scale military balance of power away from the West involvement in any of the alleged plots. confrontation with Israel given the and its local allies, and in empowering significant material losses it suffered the “resistance axis.” Furthermore, At Mughniyyeh’s funeral in 2008, following the summer 2006 war. Hizb Allah believes that such changes Hassan Nasrallah, Hizb Allah’s are equally beneficial to the group, secretary general, warned Israel that A closer look at the life story of boosting its regional status and power, Mughniyyeh would be avenged.4 There Mughniyyeh and an assessment of his as well as its military leverage on Israel, is little reason to believe that Nasrallah’s value to Hizb Allah could help shed and leading it to more openly embrace words are not credible or serious. In more light on Hizb Allah’s cost-benefit its post-2006 “tit-for-tat” military the past, Hizb Allah avenged several of calculations with regard to a potential doctrine with respect to Israel. its senior leaders, often in spectacular revenge operation against Israel. Aided fashion. For example, Israel’s February by extensive interviews conducted by Whether Hizb Allah is accurate in its 1992 assassination of Shaykh Abbas the author with several members of Hizb assessment of a new era of regional Moussawi was followed one month later Allah and Mughniyyeh’s own family alliances remains to be seen. Yet the fact by Hizb Allah’s bombing of the Israeli during the past two years, this article that Hizb Allah currently believes it is Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, offers a detailed, though not definitive, in a position of strength domestically, killing 29 people. In addition, Israel’s profile of Mughniyyeh, revealing new regionally, and with respect to Israel May 1994 kidnapping of Shaykh information about his life, beliefs, and will have an important impact in its Mustafa Dirani and bombing of a Hizb career as a leading member of Hizb future strategy and foreign policy. Allah training base (which killed more Allah. Emphasis is intentionally placed than 20 fighters) was followed in July on aspects of Mughniyyeh’s life that few Dr. Benedetta Berti is a research associate by Hizb Allah’s (and Iran’s) Argentine observers, specialists, and practitioners at the Institute for National Security Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) have known about, including his early Studies at Tel Aviv University specializing beginnings, his ideological influences, in terrorism and political violence in the 1 “Terror Threat: Number of Israeli Embassies Closed,” and perhaps most important his strong Middle East. She holds a Ph.D. and an YNet, February 15, 2011. ties to the Palestinians. MA in international relations and security 2 Yaakov Lappin, “Hezbollah Terror Attack on Israelis studies from the Fletcher School at Tufts Abroad ‘is imminent,’” Jerusalem Post, April 21, 2011; Se- A more comprehensive profile of the University. bastian Rotella, “Azerbaijan Seen as New Front in Mid- man who managed to elude some of the east Conflict,”Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2009. world’s most competent intelligence 3 “Tel Aviv Accuses Hezbollah of Plotting Attacks services is still relevant three years Against Israeli Targets in South America,” Yedioth Ahro- after his death because of the lasting noth, August 13, 2009. impact he will probably have on 4 “Hezbollah Warns Israel it Will Avenge Slain Com- Hizb Allah. Indeed, Mughniyyeh was mander,” Reuters, February 16, 2011. anything but an ordinary member of

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Hizb Allah. In fact, after Nasrallah, Mughniyyeh was a religious person at in the district of Bir al-Abed. In 1994, he might be the most influential yet an early age.6 As a teenager, he would Imad lost his other brother Fouad, a least acknowledged leader of the group spend most of his time in the evenings member of the “Lebanese resistance” to date. His mindset, work ethic, in the Sheikh al-Kobeissi mosque near against the then-Israeli occupation, unconventional strategies, and overall their house. When he turned 13, he who was assassinated, allegedly by the behavior have profoundly influenced planned to travel to Iraq to delve deeper Israeli intelligence services, in the area the thinking of Hizb Allah’s leaders and into his spirituality at Najaf.7 of al-Sfeir in the southern suburbs of future generations of the Shià group. Beirut. The onset of the Lebanese civil war The Secret Guardian of the Resistance (1975-1990) forced Mughniyyeh to The loss of his two brothers in a short In the murky world of intelligence and change his travel plans to Iraq and stay time frame had a profound impact on counterintelligence, few characters have in Beirut instead. The harsh realities of Mughniyyeh. It solidified his faith and elicited more awe and bewilderment sectarian conflict in Lebanon forced him consumed his intellect and worldview. than Imad Mughniyyeh. More than three to become a militiaman at the age of 14. Politically, solitude made him more years have passed since Mughniyyeh’s At first, he mingled with several leftist focused and attentive to the needs of the February 12, 2008 assassination in ideological movements, from the Syrian Palestinian resistance movement. His Damascus (most likely at the hands social nationalists to the communists, strong interest in the political thinking of Israel’s Mossad), yet his life story and from several Lebanese militias and activism of Lebanese-Shià leader and death continue to be shrouded in Imam Mussa al-Sadr notwithstanding, mystery.5 “In the murky world Mughniyyeh was equally fascinated by the revolutionary ideas of the A shadowy figure, Mughniyyeh avoided of intelligence and Palestinians and their biggest party, publicity. Keeping a low-profile was counterintelligence, Fatah. He had the opportunity to undergo as crucial to his work as conducting military training at several Palestinian military operations or training few characters have refugee camps in Beirut and outside Palestinian and Lebanese fighters. elicited more awe and Lebanon.8 His most intensive coaching Indeed, Mughniyyeh was very secretive, took place in the camp of Abou Louay, even to his own Hizb Allah colleagues, bewilderment than Imad where the famous Palestinian female who often complained to their superiors Mughniyyeh.” fighter and “martyr” Dalal al-Maghribi about the special status and flexibility trained and planned operations against he enjoyed. He only worked with people Israel.9 who he fully trusted (mostly from his own family and inner circle). He was a under the umbrella of the “National Mughniyyeh’s Relationship with the major part of Hizb Allah’s military and Front” to the Palestinians who at the Palestinians paramilitary apparatus, having created time had a sizeable military presence in Mughniyyeh’s relationship with Fatah and developed it since its beginnings Lebanon. His role as a young militiaman ran deep. He began as the deputy of Abu in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was initially limited to stuffing Hassan Salameh, the famous Palestinian but he was not bound by hierarchy or sandbags to protect party members from military commander who was responsible organizational rules. In a sense, he was snipers and to night shifts to guard his for countless operations against Israeli larger than Hizb Allah, an independent neighborhood. Despite his interest in forces.10 Yet despite his close relations operator who had one foot inside Hizb and close contacts with these Lebanese with Fatah’s leaders, Mughniyyeh did Allah and another in Tehran. parties, Mughniyyeh felt alienated and not last long with the movement. Some unwilling to join any of them. Palestinians saw him as a rebel, a loner Mughniyyeh’s Religious Upbringing who was not comfortable following Based on interviews with members of In 1985, tragedy struck Mughniyyeh’s orders or working within tight-knit Mughniyyeh’s family in southern Beirut family. Mughniyyeh’s younger brother, organizational structures. in the summers of 2009 and 2010, Imad Jihad, was killed by a heavy bombardment was born on January 25, 1962 in the poor that targeted Lebanese-Shià spiritual neighborhood of al-Jiwar in the district leader Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah of al-Shiyah, located in the southern suburbs of Beirut. His family is from 6 Even though Mughniyyeh was devout, he was fasci- 8 Personal interview, Ali Shibani, Hizb Allah member, the small southern town of Tayr Dibba. nated by the atheist ideology of Leon Trotsky. He was southern Beirut, Lebanon, August 28, 2010. Mughniyyeh went to elementary and eccentric, a dreamer who would read a lot and listen to 9 Ibid. preparatory school in al-Jiwar and lived the music of revolutionary singer and songwriter Mar- 10 Abu Hassan Salameh was a trusted lieutenant of and with his father Fayez and mother Amina cel Khalifeh. A short, handsome boy, he had a noticeable potential successor to Yasser Arafat, head of the Pales- Salamah at home until the age of 14. soft side. Yet he also had a passion for history and the tine Liberation Organization. As chief planner for the military sciences and an obsession with strategy and is- terrorist organization Black September, Abu Hassan sues of war. Carl von Clausewitz was his favorite military was behind the raid at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games historian. in which 11 Israeli athletes were killed, and a wide as- 7 Najaf is a major center of Islamic theological teaching sortment of other terrorist attacks and murders. He was (al-Hawza) for Shià and the site of the shrine of Imam killed by the Mossad in Beirut in 1979. See “Death of a 5 He was killed by a bomb placed in his car seat. Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad. Terrorist,” Time Magazine, February 5, 1979.

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Furthermore, Mughniyyeh was far Their most successful operation was divides (fitna), where all are united more religiously inspired than his on November 11, 1982, when “martyr” to fight the occupation.20 fellow Palestinian comrades. When Ahmad Kassir conducted a suicide Mughniyyeh heard the news of an operation against an Israeli military Mughniyyeh had a special relationship attempted kidnapping operation of base in Tyre/Sour, destroying it and with the leaders of Hamas and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein causing heavy casualties.16 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). He was Fadlallah, he returned to the Lebanese- determined to provide financial and Shià cleric’s neighborhood and decided Given his links to the Palestinians,17 media support (through Hizb Allah’s to serve with his friends as his personal Mughniyyeh had little difficulty satellite television station al-Manar and bodyguards.11 In 1980, he traveled with managing the relationship and steering radio station al-Nour) to the Palestinian Fadlallah to Mecca for pilgrimage and it in ways that were most effective intifada. He established a bond with the since then Mughniyyeh was known as in the fight against Israel. He led late Dr. Fathi al-Shikaki, the former Hajj Imad.12 several Lebanese-Palestinian military secretary general of PIJ and also his operations against Israel and trained successor, Dr. Ramadan Abdullah The assassination of Iraqi religious and armed many Palestinian fighters and Shalah. Contacts among Mughniyyeh, leader Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr in Iraq offered them logistical support. In 1984, Hamas and PIJ were so close that few in April 1980 was another turning point Abu Hassan Salameh, Mughniyyeh’s inside Hizb Allah knew that moments in Mughniyyeh’s life. He found himself old companion and former boss, before he was assassinated in Damascus at war with the secular Baàthist regime parted ways with Fatah and joined the in February 2008, he was purportedly of Saddam Hussein who he accused of Islamic Resistance, where he became in a meeting with Hamas leader systematically eliminating all Shià Mughniyyeh’s right-hand man.18 Khaled Meshal and other Palestinian leaders in Iraq. Because of Fatah’s militants.21 links to the Baàthists at the time, Mughniyyeh was proud of the close Mughniyyeh decided to completely sever links he and his colleagues in the With the help of Syria and Iran, his relationship with the Palestinian Islamic Resistance developed with Mughniyyeh was also in charge of movement in mid-1981.13 Palestinian groups inside the occupied transferring fighters and cadres from territories. He always spoke highly of inside Palestine to Syria, Lebanon, and When Israeli forces invaded Lebanon the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, saying Iran to undergo military training.22 His in 1982, Mughniyyeh was on his way that “the leftist and secular elements main preoccupation was the Palestinian to visit the holy places in Iran. Soon in Palestine were the first to work youth and how to train them to become after he heard the news, he returned with us. But now we have a strategic fighters against the Israeli occupation. to Syria and from there to Lebanon. On alliance with Hamas and Islamic Through his contacts, he would send his way home, he was kidnapped by the Jihad.”19 He added: directions on how to form elite and Christian rightist Lebanese party, the specialized units inside Palestine Phalanges (Kataeb), but was released we in Hizb Allah did not including infantry, engineering squads, after political intervention by Lebanese- accept that a movement in snipers, and missile, anti-tank, and Shià leaders and entered Beirut where Palestine would form and have guerrilla units. Mughniyyeh was so he rejoined ranks with his former allegiance to us organizationally, hands-on in the Palestinian theater Palestinian friends.14 Throughout administratively, or even that when the Gaza war broke out in his military encounters with the religiously. Those who became 2008, one senior commander in the Palestinian factions, Mughniyyeh Shià tried hard to convince us Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades said learned of the locations of several to create a Hizb Allah branch in that they felt Mughniyyeh was among heavy arms depots. With his close Palestine, but we rejected the idea them as a partner in the battles.23 When Lebanese inner circle, he formed an because we found in the resistance Palestinian militants were caught by the elite force that was later to be called not just a choice for liberation but Israelis, Mughniyyeh would help release the “Islamic Resistance.”15 The force also a place to counter sectarian them by kidnapping soldiers along the had fighters in Beirut, the western Lebanese-Israeli border.24 This was in Bekaa, and the south. They waged 16 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (Lon- large part seen by him as repaying his sophisticated military operations, set don: Saqi, 2005), p. 49. Palestinian friends in Lebanon who had ambushes and created sniper units 17 Although he tried to distance himself from the Pales- helped him create Islamic Resistance. against the Israeli occupying forces. tinians due to their divisions, links with the Baàthists, disorganization, and different belief systems, Mughni- 11 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Amin, chief editor, al- yyeh still had great sympathy for their cause. As many Akhbar newspaper, Beirut, Lebanon, July 12, 2010. Palestinian leaders and fighters were forced by Israel 20 Ibid. 12 Ibid. Hajj is a title preserved for Muslims who go on a to leave Lebanon and go to Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan, 21 Personal interview, Ibrahim Bayram, Hizb Allah in- pilgrimage to Mecca. Mughniyyeh stepped in to unite the remaining few and sider and Annahar newspaper columnist, Beirut, Leba- 13 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Amin, chief editor, al- encourage them to join the collective fight against the Is- non, July 11, 2010. Akhbar newspaper, Beirut, Lebanon, July 12, 2010. raeli army. 22 Personal interview, Ibrahim al-Amin, chief editor, al- 14 Personal interview, Ibrahim Bayram, Hizb Allah in- 18 Personal interview, Ala’a Musulmani, Hizb Allah Akhbar newspaper, Beirut, Lebanon, July 12, 2010. sider and Annahar newspaper columnist, Beirut, Leba- member, Beirut, Lebanon, July 14, 2009. 23 Al-Amin, “The Charmer of the Resistance.” non, July 11, 2010. 19 Quote taken from Ibrahim al-Amin, “The Charmer of 24 Personal interview, Mohammad Tihfe, Hizb Allah 15 Ibid. the Resistance,” al-Akhbar, February 12, 2010. member, southern Lebanon, July 21, 2010.

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Within the Palestinian resistance Mughniyyeh did not distinguish one assumed that in the event that Syria movement, Yasser Arafat, its late resistance fighter from another. He did regains the Israeli-occupied Golan chairman, had great admiration not believe in any political or logistical Heights and consequently terminates for the intelligent and determined constraints when it came to fighting the its state of conflict with Israel (and Mughniyyeh.25 He always made sure to Israeli occupation in Palestine. The fight manages to reinstitute direct control keep close contact with Mughniyyeh, was one, be it in Lebanon or Palestine. over Lebanon), Damascus’ military despite the religious differences For a Lebanese national, Palestine was relationship with Hizb Allah is likely to between the two. He often wrote letters his raison d’être. Everything began and end. Hizb Allah is acutely aware of that to Mughniyyeh with the introduction ended in Palestine.29 potential scenario and has most likely “Dear Son.”26 worked on contingency plans with Iran. No one inside Hizb Allah, not even The group has no interest in going back Mughniyyeh’s Accomplishments and Core Nasrallah, had a more instrumental to the days when Syria was militarily Beliefs role than Mughniyyeh in building the present in Lebanon (1990-2005) and in For Mughniyyeh, the goal of his Islamic relationship with Iran and taking it charge of its military actions and daily Resistance was clear: to eliminate Israel. to new heights. Soon after the Islamic political affairs. He once told a visitor of his that revolution in 1979, Mughniyyeh traveled to Tehran and began to form extensive Also affecting the durability and nature there is no debate or compromise, links with senior Iranian clergy and of the long-term relationship between and we are not concerned with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Syria and Hizb Allah is the very any decision by anyone in the (IRGC). He also built a military academy survival of the al-Assad regime. If the world to grant Israel the right to inside Hizb Allah that has become a regime collapses and a more democratic exist. We are not talking about military institute.30 government replaces it, it is possible, something unrealistic. Along with though not inevitable, that the new our religious convictions, we have His partnership with the Syrians leadership in Damascus will have less plenty of rational reasons which continued to be marred with mistrust. cooperative relations with Hizb Allah further our belief that Israel’s Yet he saw no alternative. He, just like and focus on more urgent domestic eradication will depend on what all Hizb Allah leaders before and after priorities instead. It is unclear whether we do, the people of Palestine him, understood that while Iran was the al-Assad regime will survive the inside and outside, in their Arabic the godfather of the group, related to ongoing popular uprising or how and Islamic environment.27 it by religion and ideology, Syria was exactly a potential Syrian-Israeli peace the necessary link, the weapons and agreement would affect Hiz Allah’s Mughniyyeh had a strategic plan after logistical facilitator that made the fight future and staying power. the liberation of southern Lebanon in against Israel possible. Mughniyyeh’s May 2000. He told the same visitor: mistrust of Syria was justified. After 2) Hizb Allah’s organizational structure all, it was on Syrian territory that he is hierarchical but also flexible. Open After the liberation in 2000, and was killed, prompting many analysts to source information on Hizb Allah’s when we got to learn more about speculate whether his death occurred organizational structure is accessible, the enemy and his capabilities, with the knowledge or even facilitation yet more detailed information on its the dream of liberating Palestine of the Syrian intelligence services. military apparatus is much harder became achievable. We formed to find and what is available is less a committee tasked with the Insights on Hizb Allah for the Future than reliable.32 Unlike other social elimination of Israel. In the Islamic Given the leadership role Mughniyyeh

Resistance, there is a special unit played inside Hizb Allah for more often witnessed tensions in the 1980s between Iran and for Palestine. We do not work than 15 years, it is reasonable to draw Syria on the one hand, and armed confrontations be- on behalf of the Palestinians, and inferences from his thinking and tween Syria and Hizb Allah on the other. In short, Hizb we will never do that. But we are activities about Hizb Allah overall. Allah is related to Iran in ways it can never be to Syria— in a political, moral, and religious through shared culture, ideology, and religion. Syria is position that requires us not only to 1. Hizb Allah has relatively low trust in Syria. far more pragmatic in foreign policy than Hizb Allah and help them stay alive where they are, Hizb Allah’s strategic alliance with Iran given that its leadership has fewer, if any, idiosyn- but also to resist the occupation and Syria has endured primarily because cratic characteristics that could prevent it from making force the Israelis to withdraw, even both parties continue to have an interest deals with Israel and the West (Syrian policy prior and 28 if on a gradual basis. in standing up to Israel and regaining during the 1991 Gulf War is one example). lost territory and rights which they feel 32 Hizb Allah’s organizational structure is complex and 31 25 Arafat could see Mughniyyeh’s unique potential and Israel has usurped. Yet it is widely highly compartmentalized, with several units and de- his ability to unite the Palestinian-Lebanese resistance partments and much functional differentiation. At the fronts against Israel. He also knew about Mughniyyeh’s 29 Personal interview, Makram Jaafar, Hizb Allah mem- head of the pyramid is the secretary general, currently solid operational relationship with the Iranians and the ber, Beirut, Lebanon, June 14, 2010. Hassan Nasrallah, but he operates within a seven-mem- Syrians, which made the establishment of close contact 30 Personal interview, Ali Fayad, Hizb Allah member ber consultative council—the group’s highest body. Per- with him even more important. and al-Manar satellite television producer, Beirut, Leba- haps the most important aspect about Hizb Allah’s orga- 26 Al-Amin, “The Charmer of the Resistance.” non, June 13, 2010. nizational structure is that it is hierarchical. Yet that does 27 Ibid. 31 The triangular relationship between Syria, Iran, and not mean that Nasrallah is involved in every aspect of 28 Ibid. Hizb Allah has not been easy or without fault lines; it decision-making or in all the details of military planning

18 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 movements, Hizb Allah’s ability to keep and Lebanese fronts against Israel. Of The Taliban’s Conduct its secrets has been remarkable and course, given the ambitious and perhaps since its creation there have been no unrealistic nature of Hizb Allah’s of Intelligence and defections (that are publicly known) from strategic goal, it is not likely to cause Counterintelligence the group’s military and paramilitary much anxiety in Tel Aviv, radically wings. The result is that little is known change Israeli threat perceptions, or By Ben Brandt on how Hizb Allah conducts its military force serious reallocation of military and clandestine affairs. resources. Hizb Allah’s objectives, throughout the history of the post- while real, face obvious organizational 9/11 insurgency in Afghanistan, reports Mughniyyeh’s life story suggests that and technical limitations, political have emphasized the Afghan Taliban’s when an exceptional military commander challenges and realities, and Israel’s impressive ability to collect and exploit or operative comes along, he is given own, so far successful, efforts to intelligence effectively. Researchers much operational independence, on counter them. Yet that could change if and media outlets describe the Afghan the condition that he undergo proper political and military circumstances in Taliban as possessing an “impressive indoctrination and develop close the Middle East become more favorable, intelligence network”1 which conducts relations and maintain coordination including, among other developments, numerous functions such as giving with Iranian and Syrian personnel. the emergence of a more pro-Palestinian Taliban fighters early warning of U.S. or Whether Hizb Allah has decided to leadership in Cairo. International Security Assistance Force institutionalize Mughniyyeh’s special (ISAF) patrols, or providing U.S. forces role is unclear but it is assumed that Revenge, but on Hizb Allah’s Own Terms with misleading information.2 U.S. and given the instrumental role he played A successful and spectacular revenge ISAF soldiers have been consistently throughout his career and the benefits he operation by Hizb Allah against Israel quoted regarding the efficacy of Taliban accrued to the organization, Hizb Allah is an immediate trigger and flashpoint intelligence operations, stating that “the would have an interest in retaining that for a return to arms between the two enemy intelligence network is on top of multidimensional capacity in its skills belligerents. The next war, according every move we make,” “there is always repertoire. Some news reports have to Hizb Allah, will make the previous someone who can be listening to what suggested that Hizb Allah has already conflict look like a “walk in the park.”33 we are saying,” and that the group has found a replacement for Mughniyyeh, Israel knows that Hizb Allah will not sources “in many places.”3 A striking although his identity and skill-set are, forget Mughniyyeh, or for that matter example of the Taliban’s intelligence unsurprisingly, still unknown. any of its fallen “martyrs.” Instead, collection capability occurred last Hizb Allah honors their memory when year, when UK Prime Minister David 3) Hizb Allah is actively and unchangingly it sees fit as it has done so in the past. Cameron was forced to cancel plans committed to the Palestinian cause. Since its to visit a military outpost in Helmand creation, Hizb Allah has had a keen Hizb Allah is likely to be prudent, Province after intercepts indicated that eye on developments in the Palestinian however, with the timing, target, and the Taliban was aware of his itinerary.4 Territories (even during times when techniques it might use. It is expected Israel was occupying Lebanese that it will wait for the moment when Given the efficacy of the insurgents’ territory), speaking against the Israeli Israel is vulnerable and caught sleeping. intelligence operations, detailed occupation and often offering material Most important, Hizb Allah is likely to analysis of the history, scope, and and non-material support to armed conduct its operation at a time when structure of the Taliban’s intelligence Palestinian groups in the West Bank Israel will not be in a position to retaliate function is crucial for successful and Gaza. with massive force. Hizb Allah’s goal is counterinsurgency operations, as is assumed to be limited: to hurt Israel and an understanding of the collection and Mughniyyeh was devoted to developing restore some level of deterrence. Should counterintelligence tactics it employs, the military and paramilitary wings of war happen, however, the organization and the aims which it seeks to achieve Hizb Allah to more effectively fight the says it will be ready for it. by the use of intelligence. Israelis, but he was equally determined to help his Palestinian contacts wage Bilal Y. Saab is a Ph.D. Candidate at the their armed struggle against Israel. If University of Maryland’s Government & his beliefs and career are any indication, Politics Department, a monthly contributor 1 Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy,” Hizb Allah, as a movement, is also to IHS/Jane’s, and a senior consultant for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009. committed to unite the Palestinian Oxford Analytica and Centra Technology 2 C.J. Chivers, “In Eastern Afghanistan, at War with the Inc. Taliban’s Shadowy Rule,” New York Times, February 6, and implementation. He is more like a master coordina- 2011. tor and strategic communicator, working closely with his 3 James Astill, “Taliban Spies Keep Strong Grip on consultative council, his personal advisers, and the lead- South,” Guardian, December 11, 2003; Bill Graveland, ership in Tehran and Damascus. An imperfect analogy is “Troops Told Loose Lips Can Kill, Taliban Spies Ev- the U.S. director of national intelligence, whose primary erywhere,” The Canadian Press, 2008; Tim Shipman, role is to coordinate the affairs of the U.S. intelligence 33 Interview by Nicholas Blanford with Hizb Allah com- “Taliban Have Spies Everywhere,” Daily Mail, August community (and not so much to get involved in the CIA’s manders, the content of which was revealed to this au- 27, 2010. and other spy agencies’ operational planning and imple- thor in person during a conference in Virginia in summer 4 Matthew Green, “More on the Taliban Plot to Kill Cam- mentation). 2010. eron,” Financial Times, June 10, 2010.

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Taliban Intelligence Operations Prior to 9/11 the Ministry of Intelligence possessed reportedly a close ally of Mullah Omar, Media and government accounts some 20,000 spies and 100,000 appears to have retained control of the indicate that the Taliban possessed informants in 2001, with children Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue a massive and effective, if somewhat or former KHAD agents constituting and Prevention of Vice from 1998- fractious, intelligence apparatus prior many of its informants.11 Informants 2001.20 The Taliban enjoyed a number to 9/11. It operated in both Afghanistan were reportedly recruited on every of significant intelligence successes, and Pakistan and was responsible for city block to monitor neighborhoods, such as the capture and execution of gathering information on opponents while foreign journalists were closely Pashtun opposition leader Abdul Haq,21 to the regime, as well as covert actions monitored.12 The Ministry for the and the possible uncovering of a U.S. such as bribing Northern Alliance Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of plot to assassinate Usama bin Ladin.22 commanders to switch sides and Vice reportedly supplemented this with At the same time, Taliban intelligence conducting assassinations.5 Taliban informants in ministries, hospitals, suffered setbacks such as the escape of intelligence officials maintained aid agencies, and military units.13 The imprisoned Northern Alliance leader extensive ties with Pakistan’s Inter- Ministry of Intelligence was notorious Ismail Khan in 1999,23 and the failure Services Intelligence (ISI),6 as well as for detaining suspected spies and to detect a former intelligence chief with members of the Pakistani political Northern Alliance personnel, and using who defected to the Northern Alliance party Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI)7 and torture tactics such as electric shocks in late 2001 after maintaining a secret foreign terrorists. Evidence presented and beatings during interrogations.14 dialogue with Ahmad Shah Massoud for at the administrative review board of several years.24 former Taliban Deputy Intelligence The leadership of the Taliban’s Minister Abdul Haq Wasiq, who is intelligence ministry appears to have Taliban Intelligence Operations Post-9/11 currently imprisoned in Guantanamo changed frequently, likely due to Operation Enduring Freedom had a major Bay, described Wasiq as having Mullah Omar’s commonly described impact on the Taliban’s intelligence “arranged to have an Egyptian Al Qaida predilection for reshuffling ministerial services, with numerous key leaders member, Hamza Zobir, teach Taliban portfolios.15 Mullah Khaksar Akhund such as Khairullah Khairkhwa, Qari intelligence officers about intelligence was described as having been the head Ahmadullah, and Ahmadullah’s deputy work.”8 of intelligence prior to September Abdul Haq Wasiq captured or killed 1996,16 Khairullah Khairkhwa was by U.S. and Afghan forces.25 At least Accounts of the Taliban’s pre-9/11 described by the U.S. State Department some Taliban intelligence personnel, intelligence infrastructure indicate that as the Taliban’s minister for intelligence however, managed to evade capture or in addition to the Ministry of Intelligence, in late 1997,17 and Mullah Hamdullah death, and appear to have assisted in the Ministry for the Promotion of was listed as intelligence minister in the formation of insurgent efforts.26 In Virtue and Prevention of Vice was an 1998.18 Qari Ahmadullah, who was addition, the ISI provided significant important collector of intelligence,9 later killed in a U.S. airstrike, was the support for fleeing Taliban members with the two ministries sharing Taliban’s minister for intelligence when (Ahmed Rashid has described how information on an informal basis.10 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom ISI officials “waved” fleeing Taliban Contemporary accounts suggest that occurred.19 Maulawi Mohammad Wali, fighters across border checkpoints into Pakistan and helped facilitate Mullah 27 11 Julian West, “Child-Spy Network a Key Weapon in Omar’s arrival in Quetta), and lingering 5 “Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Pakistan to Con- Intelligence War,” Telegraph, October 31, 2001. The Tali- sider the Security and Human Rights Situation in Af- ban’s use of children to conduct espionage continues in 20 “Terrorism Finance: Updating the Taliban Names ghanistan,” Danish Immigration Service, November 1, the post-9/11 era as well. For details, see Alex Crawford, Designated under UNSCR 1267,” U.S. SecState Cable, 2001; “Taliban Intelligence Chief Killed in US Bombing: “Ruthless Taliban Using Children As Spies,” Sky News, May 2002. Afghan Officials,” Agence France-Presse, January 2, October 17, 2010. 21 Rahimullah Yusufzai and Tim McGirk, “Taliban 2002. 12 Ibid. Spies: In The Cross Hairs,” Time, November 12, 2001. 6 Ibid.; B. Raman, “Buddha, Taliban & Gen. Mushar- 13 Ibid. 22 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: raf,” South Asia Analysis Group, June 3, 2001. Raman, 14 “Taliban Intelligence Head Reported Killed in U.S. Knopf, 2006). a former head of the Indian intelligence agency Research Bombing,” CNN, January 2, 2002. 23 Khan was assisted in his escape by a Taliban intel- and Analysis Wing, described Taliban intelligence as 15 “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Decision-Making Pro- ligence officer. See Carlotta Gall, “A Nation Challenged: being “run” by ISI officers. Other reports indicate that cess and Leadership Structure,” U.S. Embassy Islam- Warlords,” New York Times, January 27, 2002. Pakistani intelligence officers were heavily involved in abad, December 31, 1998. 24 Peter Baker, “Bin Laden Reportedly Used Cash to training their Taliban counterparts. 16 “Biographical Data on Mullah (Omar) and the Coun- Curry Taliban Favor,” Washington Post, November 30, 7 Mashal Lutfullah, “Al Qaida Planning Next Phase,” cil of Ministers,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 2001. Christian Science Monitor, December 28, 2001. 2001. 25 According to his own account, Ahmadullah had been 8 Summarized transcripts from Abdul Haq Wasiq’s ad- 17 “Afghanistan: Taliban Decision-Making and Leader- tasked by Mullah Omar with organizing a guerrilla effort ministrative review board, July 18, 2005. ship Structure,” U.S. Embassy Islamabad, December 30, prior to his death. See Mashal Lutfullah, “Al Qaida Plan- 9 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer- 1997. ning Next Phase,” Christian Science Monitor, December sity Press, 2001). Rashid described the Ministry for the 18 “Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Decision-Making Pro- 28, 2001. Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice as the Tali- cess and Leadership Structure,” U.S. Embassy Islam- 26 “Taliban Names Anti-U.S. Leadership Council,” Reu- ban’s most effective intelligence agency. abad, December 31, 1998. ters, June 24, 2003; Representative Robert E. Andrews, 10 “Report on Fact-Finding Mission to Pakistan to Con- 19 “Taliban Intelligence Chief Killed in US Bombing: Af- “Message of the Day,” May 6, 2002. sider the Security and Human Rights Situation in Af- ghan Officials,” Agence France-Presse, January 2, 2002. 27 Tim McGirk, “Rogues No More?” Time, April 29, ghanistan.”

20 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 pro-Taliban sympathies coupled with one Western official has stated that the intimidation or murder.40 As noted in grievances against U.S. and ISAF forces Afghan Taliban have a de facto head of many media outlets, the Taliban derive helped the Taliban quickly reactivate intelligence, although the identity of actionable intelligence from informants formidable intelligence networks in this individual remains unclear.34 With within military bases, prisons, and in southern provinces such as Helmand, this in mind, it is reasonable to speculate the Afghan security forces, including and commence plotting attacks.28 that Hafiz Abdul Majeed, a member of the those hired by military contractors; Quetta shura with significant intelligence these have been used to identify Military authors have described the experience, continues to oversee Taliban informants,41 provide intelligence on Taliban’s current intelligence gathering intelligence efforts to some extent.35 military movements and facilities of structure as being one where local interest to the Taliban,42 and intimidate Taliban units collect intelligence and The Taliban continue to utilize a wide or coerce other Afghan personnel.43 share it with neighboring units and the variety of largely human intelligence The Haqqani network is believed to Taliban’s “higher hierarchy,” which and open source intelligence based possess high-ranking informants within provides top-down intelligence support collection methods, with the group’s Afghan security forces as well.44 as well.29 At the same time, a recent signals intelligence capability stunted Given a recent spate of attacks against article in the Los Angeles Times argued that by an inability to listen in on the security facilities and the reported the Taliban’s decentralized structure heavily encrypted radio transmissions collusion of guards in a recent mass makes it difficult for the group to of U.S. troops.36 As during the pre- escape of Taliban prisoners from a collate and effectively analyze the 9/11 era, village and neighborhood facility in Kandahar city, it is possible information gathered; if so, increased level intelligence networks continue that Taliban informants are used to U.S. and ISAF efforts against the to provide the Taliban with a large help facilitate direct action as well.45 Taliban’s field commanders are likely quantity of information on U.S. and to have exacerbated this weakness.30 ISAF movements37 and potential Taliban informants appear to be In addition to collection efforts spies or government collaborators,38 motivated by multiple factors, by local Taliban units and other as well as providing a population including ideological fervor and personnel who conduct intelligence control function: fear of the Taliban’s financial inducements.46 It is unclear collection alongside alternative purportedly omnipresent spies is where the Taliban’s dedicated roles,31 the Taliban possess dedicated a major factor in many Afghans’ intelligence personnel receive their intelligence officers.32 These are decision to obey the Taliban’s edicts training, although it is possible deployed to at least the regional and and avoid assisting counterinsurgency that the ISI continues to train some provincial levels, and presumably efforts.39 Taliban intelligence efforts individuals. It should be noted as well help facilitate the flow of information focus heavily on Afghan government that the Afghan Taliban and its close and run informant networks.33 At least employees (such as police) and Afghans ally the Haqqani network likely obtain working for foreign militaries (such

2002; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States as interpreters), who are monitored while entering or departing foreign and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan 40 See, for example, Ruhullah Khapalwak and Carlotta military bases, and later targeted for and Central Asia (New York: Viking Press, 2008). Gall, “Taliban Kill Afghan Interpreters Working for U.S. 28 James Astill, “Taliban Spies Keep Strong Grip on and its Allies,” New York Times, July 4, 2006; Chivers, South,” Guardian, December 11, 2003; “Car Blast Kills “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government.” 4 Near U.S. Afghan Airfield,” Washington Post, April 14, 27, 2011. 41 Carol Grisanti and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Taliban-style 2003. 34 Daragahi. Justice for Alleged U.S. Spies,” NBC News, April 17, 29 Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples and Thomas Wood, 35 Bill Roggio, “The Afghan Taliban’s Top Leaders,” The 2009. “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” Military Re- Long War Journal, February 23, 2010. 42 Chivers, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Govern- view, May-June 2008. 36 Daragahi. It is unclear whether the Taliban conduct- ment.” 30 Borzou Daragahi, “Afghan Taliban Intelligence Net- ed signals intelligence collection prior to 9/11. However, 43 “Inquiry into The Role and Oversight of Private Se- work Embraces the New,” Los Angeles Times, April 13, given numerous accounts of Northern Alliance person- curity Contractors in Afghanistan,” U.S. Senate Armed 2011. nel listening to Taliban radio frequencies and imperson- Services Committee, September 28, 2010. 31 Dexter Filkins, “Karzai is Said to Doubt West Can ating Taliban fighters on the radio to gather intelligence 44 Matthew Rosenberg, “New Wave of Warlords Bedev- Defeat Taliban,” New York Times, June 11, 2010; “Taliban during Operation Enduring Freedom, it is reasonable to ils U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2010. Member Responsible for Selecting Suicide-Bomb Sites assume that the Taliban possess a similar capability. For 45 NATO has indicated that 10 of the 21 incidents since Targeted,” ISAF, December 29, 2010. an example of the Northern Alliance’s use of signals in- March 2009 where a purported member of the security 32 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “The Dirty Dozen,” telligence, see “Interview: U.S. Special Forces ODA 555,” forces attacked coalition troops were executed by Taliban Newsweek, April 10, 2011. Additionally, Amrullah Saleh, PBS Frontline, undated. members impersonating Afghan government security the former director of Afghanistan’s intelligence service, 37 One article described members of the Taliban’s infor- personnel, while a number of the remaining incidents and General Hilaluddin Hilal, a former Afghan deputy mant network using mirrors and smoke signals to pro- were related to combat stress. With this in mind, it is interior minister, have made reference to “senior Taliban vide advance warning of U.S. patrols. See C.J. Chivers, possible that Taliban informants in the security forces intelligence officials.” For details, see Filkins, as well as “Afghanistan’s Hidden Taliban Government,” New York helped provide attackers with credentials, schedules, “Government’s Writ Extended to 95% of Afghanistan: Times, February 6, 2011. and access. See Rahim Faeiz and Lolita Baldor, “9 Ameri- Saleh,” PakTribune.com, March 5, 2008. 38 Antonio Giustozzi, Decoding the New Taliban (New cans Dead after Afghan Officer Opens Fire,” Associated 33 Ron Moreau, “Do the Taliban Get PTSD?” Newsweek, York: Columbia University Press, 2009). Press, April 27, 2011. December 6, 2010; Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, 39 Gretchen Peters, Crime and Insurgency (West Point, 46 Giustozzi; “If you have a problem, the Taliban solves “How the Taliban Lost Its Swagger,” Newsweek, February NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010). it,” Herald Scotland, January 3, 2009.

21 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 information from liaison with the ISI.47 military personnel’s unwillingness group has made efforts to improve its As noted above, the Taliban have to wear the trauma plate inserts in communication security (COMSEC) attempted to exploit open source their body armor, as well as photos regime over the years to deny ISAF intelligence to gain useful information of his base and Afghan National Army access to signals intelligence; Taliban on U.S. and ISAF operations, with counterparts.52 In addition to social COMSEC tactics now include the use perhaps the best-known example being media, Richard Barrett, the coordinator of radio codes, throwaway phones, and the Taliban’s stated intent to search for the Al Qaida Taliban Monitoring shorter range radio communications.59 Afghanistan-related reports posted Team at the United Nations, has noted Some reports have claimed that on Wikileaks to uncover possible that the Taliban monitor the foreign the Taliban use Skype for secure government informants, following the news media and NGO publications, communications, although it is unclear citing as examples the Taliban’s prompt how widely this is used.60 Couriers are responses to a UN report on civilian also used to avoid U.S. and ISAF signals “The Taliban utilize its casualties, and articles in Time and intelligence efforts,61 along with use of own network of informants the Sunday Telegraph.53 An International local business owners to pass along Crisis Group report in 2008 indicated messages.62 in attempts to identify and that the Taliban monitor Afghan media eliminate suspected spies and engage in retribution against Looking Forward journalists deemed unsympathetic to its The U.S. troop surge and increased for the Afghan government cause;54 the Taliban’s prompt disavowal counterinsurgency operations under and ISAF.” of a bloody suicide attack in Jalalabad Generals Stanley McCrystal and David in February 2011 following the airing Petraeus have had a disproportionate of CCTV footage of the attack on Tolo effect on lower and mid-ranking Taliban TV indicates that the group continues to leadership, degrading their ability to failure of the Wikileaks organization monitor Afghan media closely.55 communicate, and possibly to share to remove identifying information intelligence in a timely manner.63 In about informants such as their names, As illustrated above, the Taliban addition, it remains possible that the home villages, and family members.48 utilize its own network of informants defection or desertion of a reported 1,000 Although the U.S. military later in attempts to identify and eliminate Taliban members in recent months may concluded that no intelligence sources suspected spies for the Afghan have degraded the Taliban’s intelligence had been compromised by the leaked government and ISAF,56 and has also network in specific locations, as well as documents,49 numerous tribal elders occasionally forced cell phone service providing intelligence to U.S., ISAF, and in southern Afghanistan reportedly providers to shut down their networks Afghan forces.64 Should Afghan citizens received death threats within days of in southern Afghanistan either after begin to perceive that the Taliban the Wikileaks release.50 dark or altogether due to the group’s are in retreat and that their ability to concerns about ISAF informants monitor and punish transgressions has The Site Institute has also reported equipped with cell phones.57 This diminished, the Taliban’s intelligence that the Taliban appear to have phenomenon recently occurred in collection and early warning capability attempted to gather information Helmand, where the Taliban induced could be affected further.65 At the same via Twitter, noting that the group’s private Afghan cellular networks to account was following the Twitter shut down for two weeks in March- Helmand Province raises questions regarding the level of feeds of several U.S. military April 2011, affecting nearly a million success achieved by such operations. 51 58 personnel as of early 2011. One of the cell phone users. In addition, the 59 Rowan Scarborough, “Taliban Outwits U.S. Eaves- individuals followed by the Taliban’s droppers,” Human Events, February 16, 2009. In his Twitter account was a U.S. Air Force 52 Ibid. article, Scarborough quotes a “senior intelligence source” logistics officer, whose Twitter account 53 Richard Barrett, “What the Taliban Reads,” wwword, as stating that Iranian agents have advised the Taliban linked to a personal blog containing 2009. on how to secure its communications. discussions of military passenger 54 “Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?” 60 Antony Savvas, “Taliban Use Skype VoIP Bug to screening at airports and Afghan International Crisis Group, July 24, 2008. Evade Capture,” Computer Weekly, September 15, 2008. 55 Habib Khan Totakhil and Matthew Rosenberg, “Tali- 61 Afsar et al. 47 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires (New York: ban in PR Scramble After Attacks,” Wall Street Journal, 62 Peters. W.W. Norton, 2010). February 26, 2011. 63 Carlotta Gall, “Losses in Pakistani Haven Strain Af- 48 Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai, “Taliban Seeks 56 The Taliban have promulgated rules designed to cre- ghan Taliban,” New York Times, April 1, 2011. Vengeance in Wake of Wikileaks,” Newsweek, August ate a system of due process for the punishment of sus- 64 “50 Taliban Surrender to Kandahar Government,” 2, 2010; Robert Mackey, “Taliban Study WikiLeaks to pected spies; it is unclear how widely this system is fol- Associated Press, April 13, 2011; Deb Riechmann, “900 Hunt Informants,” New York Times, July 30, 2010. lowed, however. See Christopher Dickey, “The Taliban’s Afghan Militants Join Reintegration Program,” Associ- 49 Robert Burns, “Wikileaks: US Says Limited Damage Book of Rules,” Newsweek, December 12, 2006. ated Press, February 7, 2010; Yousafzai and Moreau, from Leak of Afghan War Logs,” Associated Press, Oc- 57 Night being when U.S. and ISAF forces conduct raids “How the Taliban Lost its Swagger.” tober 15, 2010. against suspected Taliban members. 65 It is difficult to assess at present whether the Taliban’s 50 Moreau and Yousafzai, “Taliban Seeks Vengeance in 58 Rahim Faiez and Patrick Quinn, “Taliban Turn Cell intelligence networks have been degraded significantly Wake of Wikileaks.” Phones Back on in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, at the village level, although recent high-profile attacks 51 “Social Jihad Network: Taliban Twitter,” Site Insti- April 5, 2011. The Taliban’s ability to enforce such a de- have illustrated the group’s continuing ability to develop tute, February 21, 2011. cree despite intensive counterinsurgency operations in and exploit intelligence on hard targets such as the Af-

22 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 time, Afghan citizens emboldened by the handover of security responsibilities Taliban’s weakened capabilities and the to the Afghan government is an Recent Highlights in establishment of the Afghan Local Police additional source of uncertainty for Terrorist Activity program66 could provide additional Afghans as well, many of whom doubt intelligence to government forces, a their government’s ability to provide April 1, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A mob process which ISAF claims is currently effective security without significant attacked a UN compound in Mazar-i- underway.67 Lastly, attempts by NATO foreign assistance,73 and they may hedge Sharif, killing seven UN employees. to vet army and police recruits,68 as their allegiances accordingly. The demonstrators were angry over the well as train counterintelligence agents, burning of a Qur’an by a Florida pastor in may help stanch the Taliban’s efforts to Given the aforementioned questions March. – Washington Post, April 2 infiltrate Afghan security forces.69 regarding the government’s ability to reconcile Taliban members and protect April 2, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Violent Although the trends described above civilians from reprisals, the effort to protests spread through the city of provide some grounds for optimism, degrade the Taliban’s intelligence and Kandahar, leaving at least nine people it is worth noting that the reportedly counterintelligence capabilities may dead. The demonstrators were angry over 1,000 Taliban members who have prove to be a difficult and protracted the burning of a Qur’an by a Florida pastor defected or deserted represent a endeavor. in March. – Washington Post, April 2 relatively small fraction of the group’s strength. Furthermore, Ben Brandt is currently a threat analyst April 2, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Three the majority of these personnel in the private sector, prior to which he suicide bombers attacked the Camp are from Afghanistan’s northern, monitored South Asian extremist issues Phoenix NATO base in Kabul, but there central, and western regions, which at the NJ Office of Homeland Security and were no reported casualties other than the have historically displayed greater Preparedness, and researched terrorist deaths of the assailants. – CNN, April 2 antipathy to the Taliban’s cause.70 attack planning methodologies at Booz Pakistani intelligence has reportedly Allen Hamilton. He holds an MA in Security April 3, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide used the presence of many Taliban Studies from Georgetown University. bombers attacked the prominent Sakhi commanders’ families in Pakistan to Sarkar Sufi shrine in the Dera Ghazi Khan ensure loyalty, while the ability of district of Punjab Province, killing at least ISAF and Afghan forces to protect 50 people. – AFP, April 3 reintegrated Taliban members from reprisal attacks remains uncertain.71 April 4, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The The issue of the planned withdrawal of Afghan Taliban relaxed an order to cell U.S. and ISAF forces72 and subsequent phone companies to shut down networks in Helmand Province, and mobile service will now be available from 9 AM to 3 PM. ghan Defense Ministry. All mobile telephone networks were shut 66 The ALP program serves as an armed community off in Helmand on March 23 in response to watch designed to maintain security at the village level. Taliban demands. The Taliban argue that There are indications that the program has been beset by NATO-led forces can track them through logistical problems, as well as concerns that armed ALP phone signals. – Reuters, April 4 members may prove to be an additional source of insta- bility. See, for example, Rob Taylor, “Afghan Local Police April 4, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Stoke Fears of New-Generation Militia,” Reuters, April bomber attacked a bus station in Lower 25, 2011. At the same time, at least some reports indicate Dir District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that the ALP program is a source of concern to the Tali- Province, killing at least seven people. ban leadership. For details, see “Afghanistan: Glimmers According to the BBC, “A member of a of Hope,” Economist, May 12, 2011. government-backed peace committee… 67 Matt Millham, “Coalition, Afghan Forces Continue was reported to have been killed in the to Seize Insurgent Weapons,” ISAF HQ Public Affairs, blast.” – BBC, April 4 March 10, 2011. 68 Rahim Faeiz and Heidi Vogt, “Taliban Militant Kills April 6, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Top 2 Inside Defense Ministry,” Associated Press, April 18, Afghan official Mohammad Massoom 2011. Stanekzai confirmed that Kabul has been 69 Mohammed Abbas, “West Trains Spies to Hunt Tali- in peace talks with the Taliban. According ban in Afghan Forces,” Reuters, April 12, 2011. to the New York Times, Stanekzai’s remarks 70 Riechmann. “were the most public confirmation by 71 Ibid. a senior Afghan official that talks with 72 The recent death of Usama bin Ladin has further ag- the Taliban were under way.” – New York gravated some Afghans’ fears that the United States 73 “NATO Pressuring Harper’s 2014 Afghan With- Times, April 6 will seek to withdraw forces from Afghanistan without drawal,” CTV, November 19, 2010. Should the U.S. and establishing stable governance first. See Alissa J. Rubin, Afghan governments reach an accord on establishing “Afghans Fear West May See Death as the End,” New permanent bases in Afghanistan after 2014, it may or York Times, May 2, 2011. may not serve to address such concerns.

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April 7, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A group bomb metro stations in the Washington, April 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Multiple of Taliban gunmen and suicide bombers D.C. area. According to one media suicide bombers attacked a police training attacked a police complex on the outskirts report, “Ahmed, who has lived in the center in Aryub Jaji in Paktia Province, of Kandahar city, killing at least six United States since 1993, was under FBI killing three police officers. – Los Angeles members of the Afghan security forces. surveillance from last April until his Times, April 14 – Los Angeles Times, April 7; New York arrest in October. According to a federal Times, April 7 indictment, he repeatedly collected April 14, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A information, including video images, of suicide bomber attacked a government April 7, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide train stations around Washington and office south of Kabul, detonating a car bomb bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle gave it to people he believed were part that injured three police officers and one killed a police constable in Quetta, of al-Qaida and were planning multiple civilian. – Los Angeles Times, April 14 Baluchistan Province. The attack targeted bombings.” – National Journal, April 11 the house of a senior investigations officer, April 14, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani who was injured in the blast. – AFP, April April 11, 2011 (YEMEN): Yemeni security officials announced that two alleged 6; Dawn, April 8 forces killed 11 suspected al-Qaìda in the Islamist extremists from France were Arabian Peninsula militants in Abyan arrested in Lahore in late January. One April 7, 2011 (LIBYA): U.S. Secretary Province. Authorities said that at least of the men is of Pakistani origin, while of Defense Robert Gates said that it two of the killed militants were foreigners. the other is a convert to Islam. The was highly unlikely that al-Qaìda – Reuters, April 11 Frenchmen were caught meeting with an could “hijack” the uprising in Libya. individual who is suspected of having ties According to Gates, “I think that the April 13, 2011 (FRANCE): Contributors to al-Qaìda. – AP, April 14 future government of Libya is going to be to Islamist militant web forums called for worked out among the principal tribes. attacks on France due to that country’s April 14, 2011 (TURKEY): Turkey’s So I think that for some outside group or ban of the Muslim full face veil. – Reuters, foreign minister confirmed that the some element of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic April 13 Afghan Taliban will be allowed to open Maghreb to be able to hijack this thing a political office in Turkey to help at this point looks very unlikely to me.” April 13, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan. – AFP, April 6 suicide bomber killed at least 10 people in – AFP, April 12; Voice of America, April 14; Kunar Province in an attack that targeted Reuters, April 15 April 8, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A 14-year-old tribal elders. Among the dead was the boy arrested in Pakistan told the media prominent pro-government tribal elder April 15, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A that 350-400 “would-be suicide bombers Haji Malik Zarin, who was a close ally suicide bomber wearing a police uniform are getting training in Mir Ali in North of President Hamid Karzai. According killed Kandahar provincial police chief Waziristan…I was trained for two months to the district police chief, who spoke Khan Mohammad Mujahid. His bodyguard and saw many boys being trained there.” to Agence France-Presse, “The suicide was also killed. The slain police chief had According to Agence France-Presse, “He attacker approached them, hugged Malik survived three previous assassination made the remarks in an interview aired Zarin and then detonated the explosives attempts. – Los Angeles Times, April 16 Friday from his hospital bedside, where strapped to his body.” – BBC, April 13 he is being treated after detonating a hand April 15, 2011 (GAZA STRIP): Vittorio grenade in the April 3 attack that killed April 14, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda Arrigoni, an Italian pacifist who had lived 50 people at a 13th-century Sufi shrine.” second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Gaza Strip for three years, was The boy said, “A man called Ayyaz gave appeared in a new video calling on Arab hanged by a Salafi-jihadi group in Gaza. us the suicide jackets on April 3 (the day armies to intervene in Libya to help Arrigoni was kidnapped on April 14, and of the attack). At 4 or 5 pm we visited the remove Muàmmar Qadhafi from power. his captors demanded that in exchange Sakhi Sarwar shrine and he told us each He also called on Muslims to attack NATO for his release, Hamas had to free their where to carry out our attacks.” – AFP, and U.S. forces should they be deployed leader, Hesham al-Sa’eedni, from a April 8 on the ground in Libya. – ABC News, April Hamas-run prison. Hamas was given 30 14; Reuters, April 15 hours to release al-Sa’eedni, but failed to April 10, 2011 (CANADA): A Canadian comply to the demand. The Salafi-jihadi official told the media that approximately April 14, 2011 (UNITED STATES): group, which calls itself the Brigade of 20 Canadians traveled to Somalia to join According to senior FBI official Mark the Gallant Companion of the Prophet the al-Shabab terrorist and insurgent F. Giuliano, “While core AQ remains a Muhammad bin Muslima, was previously group. Of the 20, three may have been serious threat, I believe the most serious unknown, but it is believed to be a front killed in the country. – National Post, threat to the homeland today emanates for a larger extremist organization, al- April 10 from members of AQAP [al-Qaìda in Jihad wal-Tawhid. On April 19, Hamas the Arabian Peninsula].” AQAP realizes said one of the men responsible for the April 11, 2011 (UNITED STATES): “the importance and value of reaching hanging, Abdel Rahman al-Brizar, “shot Farooque Ahmed, a 35-year-old man of English-speaking audiences and are himself dead” upon being confronted by Pakistani descent living in Ashburn, using the group’s marketing skills to Hamas security forces. – Telegraph, April Virginia, was sentenced to 23 years in inspire individuals to attack within the 15; Reuters, April 14; Bloomberg, April 19 prison after pleading guilty to charges homeland.” – Bloomberg, April 14 stemming from his role in plotting to

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April 15, 2011 (JORDAN): Islamist authorities subsequently found that he leaders in a bid to undermine public protesters attacked police in Zarqa, was wearing an undetonated suicide vest. trust in the security forces, officers and wounding 51 officers. The demonstrators Militants claimed that the high-profile analysts said...The apparent trend is were armed with swords, daggers and attack was aimed at France’s visiting a major shift from the spectacular car clubs. The protesters, described as defense minister, Gerard Longuet. – AFP, bombs and suicide attacks that Al-Qaeda, Salafists, were demanding the release of April 18 which have been blamed for a recent spate 90 Islamist prisoners. – AFP, April 15 of targeted killings in Baghdad, appeared April 21, 2011 (PAKISTAN): According to focus on in 2009 and much of 2010.” April 15, 2011 (JORDAN): Jordanian to Reuters, the United States will provide – AFP, April 21 security forces arrested Ayman al-Balawi, Pakistan with 85 “Raven” drone aircraft. the brother of triple agent Humam al- The “Raven” is a non-lethal, short-range April 24, 2011 (LIBYA): U.S. Senator Balawi, who blew himself up at a CIA surveillance aircraft. – Reuters, April 21 John McCain said that the United States outpost in Afghanistan in December should escalate its involvement in NATO 2009. According to a Jordanian security April 21, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants airstrikes in Libya, warning that a official, Ayman al-Balawi was arrested beheaded a sympathizer of an anti-Taliban stalemate would likely bring al-Qaìda with 102 other Salafists in the wake of lashkar (tribal militia) and dumped his into the conflict. McCain said, “…nothing violent protests in Zarqa. – AP, April 19 body on the road in the Peshawar suburbs. would bring Al-Qaeda in more rapidly – Dawn, April 22 and more dangerously than a stalemate.” April 15, 2011 (INDONESIA): A suicide – AFP, April 24 bomber targeted a mosque—situated in a April 22, 2011 (RUSSIA): Russian federal police compound—during Friday prayers officials announced the death of Khaled April 25, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): More in Cirebon, located in West Java. At Yusef Mukhammed al-Emirat, identified than 450 prisoners escaped from a jail least 26 people, including police officers, as al-Qaìda’s top emissary to the Islamist by crawling through a 1,180-foot tunnel were wounded by the blast. It was not insurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus dug by the Taliban in Kandahar Province. immediately clear who was responsible region. According to Reuters, “known by – Reuters, April 25; Christian Science for the attack, but authorities believe his code name Moganned, al-Emirat had Monitor, April 25 that the bomber may have been a local been in the North Caucasus since 1999 and resident. – Voice of America, April 15; was shot and killed by law enforcement April 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Bloomberg, April 17 agencies in Chechnya.” – Reuters, April 22 Taliban fighters attacked two buses carrying naval officials in Karachi, killing April 16, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A April 22, 2011 (KENYA): Kenyan police four people and wounding 56. – Reuters, suicide bomber wearing an Afghan army spokesman Eric Kiraithe warned that April 26 uniform detonated explosives inside a Somalia’s al-Shabab terrorist and military base in Laghman Province, killing insurgent group threatened to execute April 27, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A five NATO soldiers, four Afghan soldiers attacks on Kenyan government buildings, veteran Afghan military pilot opened fire and an interpreter. The Afghan Taliban bus terminals and places of worship over on trainers at a military compound near claimed responsibility for the attack, and the Easter weekend. – Bloomberg, April 22 Kabul International Airport, killing eight said that the bomber was a sleeper agent U.S. soldiers and an American contractor. who joined the army a month ago. – AP, April 23, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A According to the Los Angeles Times, “The April 17 gunman assassinated Abdul Zahir, the pilot opened fire about 10 a.m. after an deputy of Helmand Province’s peace argument with a foreign colleague at a April 16, 2011 (YEMEN): Suspected al- council, in Lashkar Gah. – AP, April 24 meeting in the operations room of the Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula militants Afghan air force building…The pilot, shot and wounded a Yemeni army officer April 23, 2011 (NORTH AFRICA): Al- identified as Ahmad Gul Sahebi, 48, in Abyan Province. The two gunmen, who Qaìda in the Islamic Maghreb militants was from the Tarakhail district of Kabul were on a motorcycle, opened fire on the who are holding four French hostages province and had served in the Afghan officer’s vehicle. – AFP, April 16 want France to withdraw its troops from army for decades, according to a man who Afghanistan in exchange for their release. claimed to be his brother.” – Los Angeles April 16, 2011 (ALGERIA): Islamist – AFP, April 23 Times, April 28 militants killed at least 13 Algerian soldiers at an army post in Kabyle, located April 23, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide April 28, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber 80 miles east of Algiers. Two militants bomber assassinated Malik Manasib Khan, attacked a Shià mosque in Balad Ruz, died in the assault. Al-Qaìda in the the chief of the Salarzai tribe, in Bajaur north of Baghdad, killing eight people. Islamic Maghreb later claimed credit for Agency of the Federally Administered – Denver Post, April 29 the operation. – International Business Tribal Areas. Khan was the leader of an Times, April 16; AFP, April 21 anti-Taliban militia. Four others died in April 28, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A roadside the blast. – AFP, April 23 bomb destroyed a bus carrying Pakistani April 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A navy personnel in Karachi, killing five gunman wearing an Afghan army April 24, 2011 (IRAQ): According to people. – Voice of America, April 28 uniform opened fire inside Kabul’s Agence France-Presse, insurgents in Defense Ministry, killing two soldiers. Iraq have “stepped up deadly gun attacks The gunman was shot to death, and against senior officials and military

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April 28, 2011 (MOROCCO): A remotely- to London: Hit Los Angeles, not just New (ASEAN) are to arrive in Jakarta to attend detonated bomb ripped through a York, he wrote. Target trains as well as a regional meeting. According to a police crowded tourist café in Marrakech, planes. If possible, strike on significant spokesman, “They [militants] planned to killing 16 people. Among the dead were dates, such as the Fourth of July and the use the six pipe bombs for another terror 14 foreigners, at least half of whom were upcoming 10th anniversary of the attacks attack like the one which was carried out” French. Morocco’s interior minister said of Sept. 11, 2001. Above all, he urged, on April 15. – AFP, May 4 that the bomb had the hallmarks of al- kill more Americans in a single attack, to Qaìda. There was no immediate claim of drive them from the Arab world.” – New May 5, 2011 (UNITED STATES): According responsibility. – AP, April 29; New York York Times, May 4; AP, May 13 to Voice of America, “U.S. officials say an Times, April 29 initial review of documents seized from May 1, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide Osama bin Laden’s compound shows al- April 29, 2011 (GERMANY): German bomber, who was reportedly a 12-year-old Qaida considered carrying out a terrorist police arrested three suspected al-Qaìda boy, killed four people in Paktika Province. plot against the United States on the 10th members, and claimed to have averted “a The bomber detonated his explosives in anniversary of the September 11 attacks… concrete and imminent danger.” All three a bazaar filled with civilians. The attack The document says al-Qaida thought suspects were young men of Moroccan killed the head of a district council for the about tampering with rail tracks so a train origin, and they were arrested in Shakeen area. – Voice of America, May 1 would fall off the tracks in a valley or over Düsseldorf and Bochum. Police reportedly bridge.” – Voice of America, May 5 seized large quantities of explosives during May 2, 2011 (GLOBAL): U.S. House the raids. A U.S. official told reporters Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike May 5, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber that at least one of the men had been Rogers told reporters that at least a dozen detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at a trained by al-Qaìda. According to NBC senior al-Qaìda leaders are likely in police training center in the mainly Shià News, “The [U.S.] official added that the Pakistan. According to Rogers, “Of the 20 city of Hilla, south of Baghdad. Twenty- men had already put together ‘precursor senior leaders in al Qaeda, at least a dozen five people were killed by the blast. chemicals’ for a terror attack and were of them we believe to be traveling around The Islamic State of Iraq later claimed planning a ‘test run’ on Friday morning. Pakistan someplace.” – Reuters, May 2 responsibility. – Los Angeles Times, May 6; Although the test was postponed, German New York Times, May 5; AFP, May 9 authorities decided to move in and arrest May 2, 2011 (INDONESIA): Abu Bakar them.” – Reuters, April 29; NBC News, April Bashir, who is accused of involvement in May 5, 2011 (YEMEN): A U.S. aerial drone 29 the 2002 Bali bombings, commented on killed two suspected al-Qaìda operatives the death of Usama bin Ladin from his jail in Shabwa Province. Various media April 30, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The cell in Indonesia. Bashir said that if the reports suggested that the strike also Taliban said they will launch a spring news of Bin Ladin’s death is true, “then it targeted Yemeni-American cleric Anwar offensive against U.S.-led forces in will not put al-Qaìda to death. Osama’s al-Àwlaqi, but he survived the attack. Afghanistan, and that the operation will death will not make al-Qaìda dead…[the] According to press reports citing U.S. begin on May 1. – Voice of America, April jihad will keep on going because [the] officials, the incident was the first time 30 jihad movement it’s not political, but since 2002 that the United States used a Sharià (religious law).” – AFP, May 2 drone to attack a target in Yemen. – Los April 30, 2011 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Angeles Times, May 5; Reuters, May 6 detonated explosives at an Iraqi Army May 3, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda checkpoint next to a market in Mosul, confirmed the death of Usama bin May 5, 2011 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi Ninawa Province, killing eight people. Ladin and vowed to avenge his death Arabia announced that Khalid Hathal al- Five of the dead were Iraqi soldiers. – al- by retaliating against the United States Qahtani, a senior member of al-Qaìda Jazira, April 30; New York Times, April 30 “soon.” – Los Angeles Times, May 7 in the Arabian Peninsula, surrendered to Saudi authorities earlier in the week. May 1, 2011 (GLOBAL): U.S. Special May 4, 2011 (FRANCE): Loic Garnier, – Guardian, May 5 Operations forces killed Usama bin the head of intelligence gathering at the Ladin, the founder and head of al-Qaìda, French Interior Ministry, said that Usama May 6, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Documents bin Ladin’s death reduces the risk of a strike killed 13 suspected militants in recovered from Bin Ladin’s compound terrorist attack against France. “France North Waziristan Agency of the Federally show that he remained actively involved has moved to the background as a target for Administered Tribal Areas. According to in organizing plots for the al-Qaìda ‘core’ al Qaeda, but it remains a top priority the Los Angeles Times, “The strike involved organization. According to the Associated for AQIM,” he said. – Reuters, May 5 eight missiles fired at suspected militants Press, Bin Ladin’s “personal, handwritten in a car, a restaurant and a local seminary journal and his massive collection of May 4, 2011 (INDONESIA): Indonesian in the Datta Khel area.” – Los Angeles Times, computer files show he helped plan every police found six unexploded pipe bombs May 7 recent major al-Qaida threat the U.S. is in a river in Cirebon city. The explosives aware of, including plots in Europe last were similar to the device detonated by a May 7, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): The Afghan year that had travelers and embassies on suicide bomber inside a mosque in Cirebon Taliban launched a series of coordinated high alert, two [U.S.] officials said…bin on April 15. The latest explosives were attacks in Kandahar city, killing at least Laden dispensed chilling advice to the discovered just days before leaders of the two people. Taliban militants attacked leaders of al-Qaida groups from Yemen Association of Southeast Asian Nations the Kandahar governor’s compound, as

26 june 2011 . Vol 4 . Issue 6 well as an intelligence service building, a glowing brighter.” – Voice of America, May May 17, 2011 (KAZAKHSTAN): A suicide foreign special forces base, and multiple 11 bomber detonated explosives outside Afghan police checkpoints. Fighting the headquarters of the security service continued into May 8. – Voice of America, May 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Two suicide in Aktobe, wounding three people. May 7; Christian Science Monitor, May 8 bombers killed 98 people in Charsadda According to Agence France-Presse, “The District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. mysterious bombing was a rare event in May 7, 2011 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s al- The bombers targeted paramilitary Kazakhstan, a majority Muslim country Shabab terrorist and insurgent group recruits. The Pakistani Taliban later that prides itself on being the most stable vowed to avenge the killing of Usama bin claimed responsibility for the attack, and nation in Central Asia and a hub for Ladin. – Voice of America, May 7 the group said it was to avenge the killing Western investment.” – AFP, May 17 of Usama bin Ladin. – Christian Science May 8, 2011 (IRAQ): Abu Huzaifa al- Monitor, May 13; AFP, May 16 May 18, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide Batawi, the head of the Islamic State of bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle Iraq (ISI), managed to overpower a guard May 13, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. drone attacked a minibus carrying police cadets inside Baghdad’s Interior Ministry—where killed four suspected militants in the Datta in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, killing he was imprisoned—arming himself and Khel area of North Waziristan Agency in 13 people. – Reuters, May 18 freeing a number of al-Qaìda-affiliated the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. detainees. The militants proceeded to – CNN, May 13 May 18, 2011 (IRAQ): Iraqi security forces kill a number of police officers, including apprehended four senior al-Qaìda in Brigadier Muaeid Mohammed Saleh, the May 14, 2011 (UNITED STATES): The Iraq militants in Samarra. According to chief of a department responsible for FBI arrested three Pakistani-Americans Reuters, “The four men included Mikhlif combating terrorism and organized crime on charges of providing financial and Mohammed Hussein al-Azzawi, known in eastern Baghdad. Al-Batawi was shot other material support to the Pakistani as Abu Radhwan, suspected of leading to death as he tried to escape the Interior Taliban. According to the New York Times, the local group’s military operations, Ministry compound in a vehicle. – al- “Arrested in the United States were and Qassim Mohammed Taher, accused Jazira, May 8; Los Angeles Times, May 8 Hafiz Muhammed Sher Ali Khan, 76, of of orchestrating a March attack on a Miami; and two of his sons, Izhar Khan, provincial building that killed more than May 9, 2011 (GERMANY): A German 24, of Miami; and Irfan Khan, 37, of North 50 people.” – Reuters, May 18 court sentenced a German-Syrian man, Lauderdale. Hafiz Khan is the imam at only known as “Rami M.,” to four years the Miami Mosque, also known as the May 19, 2011 (GLOBAL): Al-Qaìda and nine months in prison for being a Flagler Mosque. Izhar Khan is an imam released a posthumous audio recording of member of al-Qaìda. The man confessed at the Jamaat Al-Mu’mineen Mosque in Usama bin Ladin, where the deceased al- to a Frankfurt court that he traveled to Margate, Fla. Hafiz and Izhar Khan were Qaìda leader praised the revolutions in Pakistan’s tribal regions and trained with arrested Saturday in South Florida, while Tunisia and Egypt. Bin Ladin reportedly al-Qaìda between 2009 and 2010. He Irfan Khan was arrested in Los Angeles. failed to mention the uprisings in Libya, also said that he engaged in attacks on All three are originally from Pakistan.” Syria and Yemen. – Christian Science Monitor, the Pakistani military during that time by – New York Times, May 14 May 19 transporting rockets, among other duties. – Reuters, May 9 May 16, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. May 20, 2011 (UNITED STATES): The FBI Lieutenant General David Rodriguez and the Department of Homeland Security May 9, 2011 (IRAQ): The Islamic State told reporters, “We still think that there issued an alert to law enforcement and the of Iraq pledged its support to Ayman are just less than a hundred al Qaeda energy industry that al-Qaìda considered al-Zawahiri in the wake of Usama bin operatives in Afghanistan…But what they attacking tanker ships and other marine Ladin’s death in Pakistan. Al-Qaìda do is a cadre-type organization that helps infrastructure in the summer of 2010. has not yet named Bin Ladin’s successor. out to bring both resources as well as The alert was issued after U.S. authorities – AP, May 9 technical skills to the rest of the Taliban reviewed documents seized from Usama fighting here.” – Reuters, May 16 bin Ladin’s compound in Pakistan. – Los May 10, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): Hundreds Angeles Times, May 21 of Taliban fighters attacked police May 16, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants checkpoints in Nuristan Province. The shot to death a Saudi diplomat in the May 20, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A Taliban car insurgents failed to overrun government Khayaban-i-Shahbaz neighborhood bomb struck an armored vehicle carrying positions, however. The operation was of Karachi. The Taliban claimed U.S. government employees to the U.S. part of the Taliban’s recently announced responsibility. – Dawn, May 17 Consulate in Peshawar. Two Americans spring offensive. – AP, May 10 were injured, while a Pakistani civilian May 17, 2011 (GLOBAL): Noman was killed. The Pakistani Taliban claimed May 11, 2011 (YEMEN): Nasir al- Benotman, a former associate of Usama bin responsibility and said that it was to Wihayshi, the leader of al-Qaìda in the Ladin who now lives in London, claimed avenge the killing of Usama bin Ladin. Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), warned that that Sayf al-Adl was acting as al-Qaìda’s – AP, May 20 the United States faces more attacks in interim operational leader in the wake of the wake of Usama bin Ladin’s death. He Bin Ladin’s death. Benotman’s statement, May 21, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide said that “what is coming is greater and however, could not be confirmed. bomber detonated explosives at a military worse” and that the “ember of jihad is – MSNBC, May 18 hospital in Kabul, killing six people. The

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Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility. May 28, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide CTC Sentinel Staff – CNN, May 21 bomber targeted a security gathering inside the governor’s compound in Takhar Editor-in-Chief May 22, 2011 (GLOBAL): A new audio Province. The blast killed two NATO Erich Marquardt message from al-Qaìda’s Ayman al- soldiers from Germany, in addition to Senior Editor, CTC Zawahiri appeared on Islamist web four other people. Among the dead was forums. The message, which was Afghan General Daud Daud, one of the Editorial Board recorded before the death of Usama country’s most experienced anti-Taliban COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. bin Ladin, supported the revolutions military commanders. The bomb also Department Head sweeping the Arab world. He called injured a provincial governor as well as Department of Social Sciences (West Point) on North African Muslims to join the the German commander of NATO troops fight against the Libyan regime, and told in the region, General Markus Kneip. COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Egyptians to implement Sharià. Al- The assailant was wearing an Afghan Deputy Department Head Zawahiri also addressed Syrians, telling army uniform. – Los Angeles Times, May 29; Department of Social Sciences (West Point) them to continue their uprising against McClatchy Newspapers, May 28 the regime in Damascus. – AFP, May 22 LTC Reid Sawyer May 29, 2011 (YEMEN): Yemen’s Director, CTC May 22, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Militants government claimed that militants from attacked the PNS Mehran naval aviation al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula Christopher Heffelfinger base in Karachi, killing 10 government overran Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan FBI Fellow, CTC security personnel. The militants managed Province. – Los Angeles Times, May 30 to gain entrance to the base, and it took about 16 hours for Pakistani security May 30, 2011 (AFGHANISTAN): A forces to kill the fighters and secure suicide bomber in an explosives-laden the facility. According to Bloomberg, vehicle targeted the gates of an Italian Contact “The insurgents in Karachi damaged or military base in Herat, wounding five Combating Terrorism Center destroyed U.S.-made surveillance planes Italian soldiers. – RFE/RL, May 30 U.S. Military Academy in the biggest strike against a leading 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Pakistani military installation since a raid May 30, 2011 (SOMALIA): A suicide West Point, NY 10996 on the army’s Rawalpindi headquarters bomber and other militants attacked a Phone: (845) 667-6383 in October 2009.” As few as six militants peacekeeping base in Mogadishu, killing Email: [email protected] may have been involved in the operation. two African Union soldiers. Al-Shabab Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ – Bloomberg, May 23; BBC, May 23; Reuters, May said that the suicide bomber was a Somali- 24 American. – New York Times, May 30; AP, * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 June 2 May 24, 2011 (KAZAKHSTAN): A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden May 31, 2011 (UNITED STATES): U.S. vehicle outside the headquarters of the federal officials announced that two Iraqi security services in Astana, causing a men living in Kentucky have been taken number of casualties. – AFP, May 23 into custody and arraigned on a number support of terrorism charges for helping al-Qaìda The Combating Terrorism Center would May 25, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide in Iraq conduct operations against U.S. like to express its gratitude to its financial bomber drove an explosives-laden vehicle troops. – CNN, May 31 supporters, for without their support and into Pakistan’s Criminal Investigation shared vision of the Center products like the Department (CID) in Peshawar, killing May 31, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you seven police commandos and one army journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad was are interested in learning more about how soldier. The Pakistani Taliban claimed found murdered near the town of Mandi to support the Combating Terrorism Center, responsibility. – The News International, May Bahauddin, about 75 miles southeast of please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call 26; NPR, May 25 Islamabad. According to the Los Angeles Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association Times, “Shahzad, the Pakistan bureau of Graduates at 845-446-1561. May 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): Pakistan chief for the Asia Times Online news agreed to allow a CIA forensics team to website, had recently written an article examine the compound where Usama bin saying that Al Qaeda had infiltrated the Ladin was killed. – Washington Post, May 26 ranks of the navy. The piece also asserted that a 17-hour siege on a naval base in May 26, 2011 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Karachi that was carried out by militants bomber in a pickup truck detonated was meant as retaliation for the military’s The views expressed in this report are those of explosives near government offices in refusal to release a group of naval officials the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Peshawar, killing at least 32 people. The suspected of having militant links.” – Los the Department of the Army, or any other agency Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility. Angeles Times, June 1 of the U.S. Government. – AP, May 26