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Battling for the Saratoga Landscape 1777 I have always thought Hudson's River the most proper part of the whole continent for opening vigorous operations. Because the course of the river, so beneficial for conveying all the bulky necessaries of an army, is precisely the route that an army ought to take for the great purposes of cutting the communications between the Southern and Northern Provinces, giving confidence to the Indians, and securing a junction with the Canadian forces. —Letter written from Burgoyne to Gage, 1775.1 In my Last Letter I had the Honour to acquaint Your Excellency of the March of The Army from Van Schaacks Island to Stillwater; Thursday last I reconoitred the Ground in advance from thence, and found This Incampment the properest Station the Army could take in the present circumstances—from hence to Saratoga… —Letter written from Gates to Hancock, 15 September 1777.2 Introduction Burgoyne and Gates' meeting-place was preordained by their aims and the landscape. British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne intended to move his army south from Canada to Albany, taking advantage of the natural corridor made by the combined valleys of Lake Champlain and Hudson River. His action was part of a larger scale offensive, which intended to isolate the colonies by controlling the forts along the waterways from Canada to the City of New York. The route described by these glacial valleys was well worn by the advance and retreat of armies earlier in their century. Lake Champlain, Lake George, Wood Creek, and the Hudson River together made up the traditional and rational routes serving purposes and forces such as Burgoyne's American Major General Horatio Gates aimed to halt Burgoyne's advance and force the British back into Canada; this had been accomplished the year before. Gates believed that he had chosen the best ground available between his army (which had previously been in Stillwater) and the British force, then encamped about a dozen miles to the north. Burgoyne chose the north-south avenue of approach along the Hudson River based on the strategic location of and the logistical support provided by the river and the paralleling Road to Albany (the River Road). Gates consciously placed his east-west line of defense at Bemis Heights, in the valley between the Bemis Heights' bluffs and the river, and at the summit west of the bluffs, primarily in consideration of the terrain. The bluffs were fortified and strengthened with artillery—they would present a great obstacle to the advancing British force. Given the resolve of the combatants, a battle was predictable at either the bottleneck that both nature and Gates had placed in Burgoyne's way, or in the surrounding countryside. Landscape terrain is decisive in battle. The rational analysis of landscape character in the strategy of warfare has been of grave concern to armed forces well before recorded history. The author of a sixth-century B.C.E. text entitled "The Art of War" wrote: "Do not attack an enemy who occupies key ground; in accessible ground, do not allow your formations to become separated." Modern armies have incorporated terrain analysis in the study of battle since the nineteenth century. Prior to World War I, the German Army introduced an exercise known as the "staff ride," to extract lessons from the sites of historical battles. This teaching tool was later adopted and used by the U.S. Army between 1906 and 1911, visiting battlefield parks under the stewardship of the War Department as outdoor classrooms. Future officers were required to perform an analysis prior to a group horseback ride over the historic battlefield, preparing themselves to declaim its facts, 1 and to place themselves in the intellectual shoes of its field commander, giving account of decisions based on available intelligence and what might have been done differently with the benefit of hindsight and better information.3 Terrain analysis made its way into the U.S. Army Field Manual in 1938 as war raged in Europe. At that time, this particularly military approach to deconstructing the landscape was reduced to the mnemonic acronym—KOCOA—its letters representing: • Key terrain—features, such as high ground, which must be controlled in order to achieve military success; • Obstacles—features, such as swamps and ravines, which protect the defender and/or impede the attacker; • Cover and concealment—areas where elements of an army may be placed without detection or fear of direct or indirect fire, such as woods, buildings and man-made fortifications, even tall grass or crop land; • Observation—viewshed areas, such as high ground or buildings providing vantage points for observation of enemy movements; • Avenues of approach and retreat—landscape features such as roads, lanes and areas that allow effective movement of troops during assaults or retreat. The following brief account of the events leading to the battles of Saratoga, the battles themselves, and their dénouement, has been written to highlight the role of landscape features, used traditionally and as part of the more contemporary analysis discussed above. The following account is developed primarily for the purposes of highlighting and summarizing the role of the landscape in the battles and building of fortifications. Thus, the narrative that follows draws on original sources and the author's knowledge of events, yet does not even come close to exhausting the collection of sources or conclusions made from analyses relating to the theme of this report. This is done out of a desire to synthesize a simplified and accessible narrative of events. The American Positions at Bemis Heights In the uplands, the Hudson gently meanders within its narrow valley. The outside curves of the river bends are areas of hydraulic scouring and riverbank erosion. The inside curves of the river are areas of alluvial deposition, places of flat, wet ground. Bemis Heights, named for the tenant who lived at the base of the bluffs of Great Lot #13, was more than a proper place for Gates to make his defense. Here, the outside curve of the river bends westward to scour the base of the bluffs, after having deposited mud and silt inside its arc just to the north. To an army moving south, this swampy ground would impede movement, just before the road funneled into the constrained and dangerous space below the heights. The combination of the alluvial flats to the immediate north, known as the "Vley," 4 and the natural defile created by the near-intersection of the bluffs, road, and river, severely limited an enemy army's maneuverability and tactical options. Due to Burgoyne's dependence on the Hudson and the parallel Road to Albany to move his unwieldy army southward, Gates understood that Bemis Heights was key terrain. The heights possessed a commanding view of the river valley below and its entangling swampy ground to the north. Amongst Gate's able staff officers was Colonel Thaddeus Kosciuszko, an engineer trained in France in the art and science of military fortification. Kosciuszko quickly perceived the natural advantages of the area 2 surrounding Bemis Heights, and with his colleagues began developing plans to fortify and arm the defensive landscape characteristics that geology had so conveniently provided. While fortifications on the bluffs would be most difficult to attack from below, they were vulnerable from the rising ground of the plateau to the west. Recognizing this, the 8,100-man American army encamped on and fortified not only the valley and the bluffs, but also all of the terrain from the bluffs to the high ground of the Neilson farm. This high point, called the summit, was about three-quarters of a mile west of the bluffs. Most of the American army was encamped on and around the Neilson farm itself to ensure protection in that vulnerable quarter, and to protect the command headquarters of generals Gates and Arnold. Trees were felled to obstruct the three roads leading into the American camp (Road to Albany, the Quaker Springs road, and the road to Saratoga Lake), hindering the possibility of enemy movement, especially their artillery. Troops and fortifications were placed on a commanding high ground west of the summit (as well as the low ground between), were the Neilson house stands, as well as in the narrowing river valley itself to defend against any enemy movement along the Road to Albany. Bemis' farm and buildings were heavily fortified. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Varick, Deputy Commissary General of Musters, briefed former commander of the army Major General Philip Schuyler as to the arrangement of forces prior to battle: …As You are no Doubt very well acquainted with the Situation of the Ground I shall forbear saying any thing further on that Head, than that we occupy It from the Heights near near [sic] Bemus's to the Summit at & North of the Read [red] House where Head Quarters now is: —Genl. Arnold is on the highest part of the Hill at the house on the Road about North from Head Qurs as also Genl. Poor's…5 The American force had the span of one week to prepare their defenses. Fortifications were constructed in the narrow valley below the heights, on the key terrain of the bluffs, and on the heights themselves for three- quarters of a mile along the crest of the ravine draining into Mill Creek all the way to the summit and the Quaker Springs road. There, the line turned southwest and crossed the road to Saratoga Lake. Thousands of trees were cut and piled to make fortifications. The cutting of trees not only created clear fields of fire but also an open space that would give the defensive lines immunity to surprise attack.

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