Department of Political Science Punjab University, Lahore II

Geo-Politics of Pakistan – China Strategic Partnership

Submitted By: Mukhtar Ahmad Roll No: 01

Supervisor Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid

A thesis submitted for the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Department of Political Science Punjab University, Lahore II

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Degree

Ph.D. in Geo-Politics of Pakistan – China Strategic

Partnership

Supervisor Submitted by

PROF. DR.UMBREEN JAVAID Mukhtar Ahmad Chairperson Roll No. 1 Department of Political Science Ph.D. University of the Punjab, Lahore. Session:- 2014-2019

Department of Political Science University of the Punjab Lahore

III

Research Completion Certificate

Certified that Research Work contained in this thesis titled "Geo-Politics of Pakistan – China Strategic Partnership (1962-2018)” has been carried out and completed by Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad, PhD, under my super vision during this PhD in Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore.

Dated _____ June, 2018.

Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid Chairperson Department of Political Science Punjab University, Lahore.

DECLARATION

I, Mukhtar Ahmad Ph. D. Scholar at Department of Political Science, University of the

Punjab, Lahore hereby declare that the present thesis titled “Geo-Politics of Pakistan –

China Strategic Partnership” has been written by me and is my original and personal work.

______Dated Signature of Deponent

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research work to my beloved parents, my wife and my children.

Contents

Description Page

List of Abbreviations IX List of Tables and Figures X Acknowledgment XI Abstract XII

Chapter No. 1 Introduction: Geo-Politics of Pakistan-China Strategic Partnership 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2. Geo-politics: An Introduction 3 1.3. Definitions of Geo-politics 4 1.4. Researcher's Definition 7 1.5. Theoretical debate b/w Academic Geography and Classical 7 Geopolitics 1.6. Types of Geopolitics 11 (1) Critical Geopolitics 11 (2) Popular Geopolitics 12 (3) Practical Geopolitics 13 1.7. Theoretical Debate of Geopolitics 14 1.8. German Geopolitical Theories and its Links with Nazism 17 1.9. Mackinder's Heartland Theory 19 1.10. Kissinger, Brzezinski and Grand Chess Board 22 1.11. French Geopolitical Theoretical Doctrine 26 1.12. Russian Theoretical Doctrine of Geopolitics 29 1.13. Post-War American Containment Theory 29 1.14. Conclusion 32

Chapter No. 2 Literature Review & Research Design and Procedure 2.1. Abstract 41 2.2. Introduction 41 2.3. Literature Review 44 2.4. Significance of Study 56 2.5. Research Objectives 56 2.6. Research Questions 57 2.7. Research Design 57 2.8. Research Method 59 2.9. Data Collection Technique 60 2.10. Selection of the Sample-The Purposive Sampling 61 2.11. Data Analysis 61 2.12. Availability of Resources 61 2.13. Work Plan 62 VII

2.14. Outline of Chapters 63 Chapter No. 3 Pakistan China Relations: Historical Perspective (1962-2018) 3.1. Introduction 69 3.2. How Pakistan sees China 71 3.3 How China sees Pakistan 74 3.4. Diplomatic Relations 78 3.5. Diplomatic Relations in 21st Century 83 3.6. Economic Ties between Pakistan-China 89 3.7. Defense Ties of Pakistan and China 96 3.8. Conclusion 101 Chapter No. 4 Pakistan-China Strategic Regional Partnership as an emerging pattern to Indo-US Strategic Partnership 4.1. Pakistan-China Ties: Regional Strategic Partnership 111 4.2. China's String of Pearl Policy and Pakistan 113 4.3. Space Pearls 114 4.4. Pak-China Every-Energizing Ties 116 4.5. Challenging US Interests in the Region 118 4.6. Strategic Dominance Politics in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 120 4.7. Strategic Significance of IOR 120 4.8. US-India Alliance in IOR 122 4.9. Pak-China Alliance: Challenging India in IOR 126 4.10. Sino-Pakistan Collaboration to Counter India-US Nexus 128 4.11. Chinese Naval Objectives 129 4.12. Pak-China Collaboration on Strategically Important Gwadar Port 130 4.13. Pakistan-China-India-US Strategic Quadrilateral Relationship 133 4.14. Conclusion 138 Chapter No. 5 India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan and China 5.1. Afghanistan-India Ties: A Historical Perspective 149 5.2. Soviet Invasion Until Taliban Government 150 5.3. Ties in Post 9/11 World 151 5.4. Reasons Why Afghanistan is Significant for India 157 5.5 Indian Objectives in Afghanistan 158 (a) Indian Economic Policy in Afghanistan 158 (b) Countering Pakistan in Afghanistan 159 (c) Countering Chinese Influence in South Asian Region 161 (d) Enhance Access to Central Asian Region 161 (e) Increasing Regional Influence 163 (f) Project Power and Demonstrate Global Interests 164 (g) Seek Political Influence in Afghanistan 165 (h) Regional Solutions for Afghan Stability and Security Issues 168 (i) Indian Soft Power in Afghanistan 169 5.6. Implications for Pakistan 170 VIII

(a) Security Dilemma 170 (b) Diplomatic Encircling 171 (c) Economic Debilitation 172 (d) Indian Sponsored Terrorism in Pakistan 173 5.7. Implications for China 175 (a) Impact on CPEC 175 (b) Economic Restrictions 175 (c) Regional Dominance Rivalry 176 (d) Indian Ocean Dominance 176 5.8. Conclusion 177 Chapter 6 Iran's Chahbahar Vs CPEC: Cooperation or Rivalry? 6.1. China Pakistan Economic Corridor Strategic Significance 185 6.2. CPEC: Revisiting the Historic Silk Road 186 South West Route 189 Route Frtom to sea 189 6.3. CPEC: Development and Projects 189 . Development in CPEC 190 Investemnt in major projects uner CPEC 192 6.4. Chahbahar Port: An Introduction 193 6.5. Strategic Location of Chahbahar Port 195 6.6. Chahbahar and Iran‟s Global Strategy 196 6.7. Iran-Indai-Afghanistan Strategic Coalition 197 6.8. Transit Trialeteral Agreement 199 6.9. Chahbahar-Zehedan-Bam-Hajigak Raiwlay 200 6.10. Mashhad-Heart-Mazar-e-Sharif Railway 201 6.11. Investment by Prive Sector 201 6.12. Srrategic Significance of Chahbahar Port 202 6.13 Security Issues to Chahabar 204 6.14 Comparative Analysis of Chahbahar and CPEC‟s Gwadar Port 205 6.15 Economic, Strategic Vitals of CPEC‟s Gwadar 206 6.16 Economic, Strategic Aspects of Chahbahar 209 6.16 Conculusion 211 Chapter 7 Pakistan's Strategic Options: Conclusion 7.1. Summary 222 7.2. Findings 239 7.3. Pakistan's Strategic Options 240 (a) Enhancement of Strategic Ties with China and Russia 241 (b) Promotion of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 241 (c) Participation in Chahbahar Port's Development 241 (d) Reduction of Lack of Trust with Afghanistan 241 (e) Sharing Indian Sponsor Terrorism Information with Rest of the 242 World .4. Conclusion 242 IX

Table for Abbreviations

Abbreviations Descriptions

UN United Nations

CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor

OBOR One Belt One Road

IOR Indian Ocean Region

NSG Nuclear Supplier Group

SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

UNSC United Nations Security Council

NPT Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty

List of Tables and Figures

2.13. Work Plan 62

3.1. Pakistan Map 71

3.1. China Exports to Pakistan 90

3.2. Pakistan China Trade Balance 93

5.1. India's Aid to Afghanistan 156

6.1. CPEC Map 188

6.2. Investment in major projects of CPEC 194

6.3. Chinese investment in CPEC 195

6.4. Chahbahar Port Map 200

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Almighty Allah for his countless blessings as without his blessings and grace for me I would never be able to complete this research work. He gave my strength and courage to put my full effort in this work.

I would like to thank our Head of Department and my supervisor Prof. Dr.

Umbreen Javed who provided us full educational atmosphere in the Department along with many other opportunities to learn. She also provided us complete resources in the

Department and its library to carry out the research work comprehensively.

I am really grateful to my friends for their support and encouragement during this whole time, they made my moments memorable and stood with me when I needed them most. I am also grateful to my family who helped me in my hard times during these years.

Finally I would like to state that I have conducted this research work with my full effort and tried to remain unbiased but if still there is any mistake or error in this work, I will be sole responsible for this error.

Mukhtar Ahmad

XII

Abstract

Geo-Politics of Pakistan-China strategic partnership are highly vital and critical for both regional and global politics. Both countries have enjoyed “all weather friendship” in last seven decades. The major reasons for strong ties of these two states are ever increasing

Indo-US ties and emerging of China as economic power. With passage of time both neighbouring states have further strengthen their relationship through numerous ventures like CPEC, JF-17 Thunder and various military and economic agreements. Sino-Pakistan ties are also important for strategic balance in South Asia to counter Indo-US influence in the region. Although Pakistan has enjoyed close ties with United States but its increasing tilt towards India has forced Pakistan to look for other options and China is natural and best option for Pakistan in every aspect. Another aspect of Sino-Pakistan ties is Gwadar port which has emerged as strategically significant especially against Iranian Chahbahar port which is being developed through Indian investment. Hence, to maintain the economic, military, and strategic balance in South Asian Region, the Pakistan-China ties are not only vital but also essential.

The Pakistan-India ties are also essential for the regional stability especially in context of the US-India nexus in the South Asia. Both India and USA are trying hard to tilt the geo strategic balance in their favor tackling Pakistan-China policies and strategic steps in the region i.e. Gwadar Port, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and presence in

Indian Ocean. Although Pakistan was the front ally in War Against Terrorism with the

US, but the America has shown its clear tilt towards India signing major trade, military and nuclear deals, hence Pakistan has strengthened its ties with China and further seeking strong relations with Russia and other regional states. 1

Chapter 1

Geo-Politics of Pakistan-China Strategic Partnership

1.1. Introduction

Pakistan and China are two of them most important states in South Asian politics and global community. The ties between both neighboring countries have been impacting on regional politics for last seven decades. The geo-strategic importance, geo-political locations of both countries and international politics have made these states a focus of global and regional actors. Pakistan and China have enjoyed close relations since 1947 mainly due to mutual interests, similar stances on regional and global issues and interdependent economic benefits. They have cooperated in economic, political and military sectors. The Sino-Pakistan relations are considered to be critical for balance of power and strategic balance in South Asia (BBC, May 17, 2011; Masood, 2008).

The ties between China and Pakistan have become stronger over the time mainly due to aggressive foreign policy of India. India has been trying to achieve a dominant role in

South Asia. The Indian nationalist centric policy of dominance has gotten support of

United States of America in last two decades. The Indo-US alliance have made Pakistan and China to come closer and to maintain a balance in South Asia both states have took major steps including military, economic and trade. Geo-political ties of both countries have tackled Indo-US policies and aggression in numerous areas including Indian Ocean,

South China Sea and recently against China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (China

Daily, November 14, 2006). 2

CPEC is a mega project and part of China‟s Silk Route One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. The project will connect Pakistan Gwadar port with China through Karakorum

Highway (KKH) via Khunjrab border. The project consists of numerous roads, rail tracks and bridges from Balochistan, Punjab, and KP to China. The project is considered to be game changer for Pakistan and whole region as it will enhance the economic interdependence and development hugely. The project which was initiated two years ago has started to show its impacts already as Gwadar port is operational now and truck goods have travelled from China to the deep sea port.

CPEC has faced opposition from India and its ally United States of America. India has been claiming the project is being constructed on disputed territory of Gilgit Baltistan and urged global community to stop the project. Indian ally and global power USA have also supported Indian stance but the project is under development with rapid speed. India has opted several non-state policies including terrorism and providing monetary funding to militants but both China and Pakistan have tackled Indian policies (BBC, June 17, 2010;

Dawn, March 16, 2017).

The geo political ties of China and Pakistan are not only strategically significant for both sides but also for South Asia. Both countries are creating balanced strategic situation in

South Asia while countering regional and global aggressions. The partnership will ensure stability and certainty in the whole region including Afghanistan and Kashmir which are highly grave issues and have been turning into more serious due to Indian intervention policies in both Kashmir and Afghanistan. China and Pakistan need to strengthen their relations more rapidly as their geo-political ties are essential for stable South Asia (BBC

World Service Poll, 2014). 3

1.2. Geo-Politics: An introduction

Geo-politics is the study of political science which focuses on implications of geography both political and human on global and domestic politics. While the geopolitics mostly discusses about the countries and relations between them, it can also focus on two other types of countries i.e. Defacto independent states with limited global recognition and ties between sub-national geopolitics entities like federated countries that develop into federation, confederation or a quasi-federal system. Furthermore, in international relations geopolitics is a method of studying foreign policy, land territory of state and water boundaries in relation with diplomatic history of the world (Devetak, 2012; Evans,

1998).

The study of above mentioned sectors in done through understanding, explaining and predicting global political attitude through geographical variables. This study includes climate, demography, applied science, area studies, topography and natural resources of the region being studied. Moreover, the geopolitics focuses on political might with relation to geographic space especially in land territory and water boundaries of the state linking with diplomatic tactics. In academics, the geopolitics analyses social science and history with linkage to geography and politics of a state (Fruhan, 2014; Toncea, 2006).

Outside scholastic field, geopolitics, diverse gatherings gives a geopolitical anticipation, including non-benefit gatherings and for-profile private associations like business house and counseling organizations. The subjects of geopolitics incorporate ties between interests of worldwide political performing artists, interests center around particular territory or space, geological component or means, ties which set up a geopolitical 4 framework. In the mean time, the 'basic geopolitics' deconstructs traditional geopolitical hypotheses by demonstrating their ideological and political capacities for super powers amid and after period of dominion (Okur, 2014).

Christopher Cogwilt and other politics scholars believe that this term is currently been used to explain a vast spectrum of idea, commonly use as „synonym for global politics‟ but more essentially „to entail the international structure of such ties” which builds on

„early 20th century term for so-called science of political geography and pseudoscientific theories of geographical and historical determinism.

Since early 20th century numerous scholars and experts have worked and developed the studies of geopolitics. Major scholars of this theory are Alfred Thayer Mahan, Emil

Reich, Homer Lea, Mackinder and Heartland, Henry Kissinger and Brzezinski (Dittmer,

2014; Gogwilt, 2014).

1.3. Definitions of Geo politics

Nuemorous scholars of political science and geopolitics have defined and explained the terminology as per their ideas and study. Following are some major definitions of Geo- politics.

Karl Haushofer whose ideas inspired Hitler‟s Nazi-regime defined the concept as:

“Geopolitics is the new national science of the state, a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially of political geography” (Cokmen, 2010).

Taylor (1993) stated that revival of geopolitics had shaped in three different ways: 5

“geopolitics has become a popular term for describing global rivalries in world politics the second form…is an academic one, a new more critical geopolitics. Critical historiographical studies of past geopolitics have been a necessary component of this

„geographer‟s geopolitics”

“the third form…is associated with the neo-conservative, pro-military lobby which have added geopolitical arguments to their „Cold War rhetoric‟. Such studies talk of

„geopolitical imperatives‟ and treat geography as „the permanent factor‟ that all strategic thinking must revolve around” (Efferink, 2009).

In his book, Saul Bernard explained the idea:

“Geopolitics is the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. (…) Both geographical settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction”

(Saul, 2003).

Colint Flint has discussed the idea extensively in historical perspective and noted that power has always remained central in the definition of geopolitics although meaning of power has remained subject to number of changes:

“Geopolitics, the struggle over the control of spaces and places, focuses upon power. (…)

In nineteenth and early twentieth century geopolitical practices, power was seen simply as the relative power of countries in foreign affairs. In the late twentieth century, definitions of power were dominated by a focus on a country‟s ability to wage war with 6 other countries. However, recent discussions of power have become more sophisticated”

(Flint, 2006).

Gerar Toal in his work “Critical Geo politics” wrote that:

“To study geopolitics we must study discourse, which can be defined as the representational practises by which cultures creatively constitute meaningful worlds. (…)

Most cultures do this by means of stories (narratives) and images. Since geopolitics is a discourse with distinctive „world‟ constitutive ambitions. We must be attentive to the ways in which global space is labelled, metaphors are deployed, and visual images are used in this process of making stories and constructing images of world politics” (Toal,

2006).

Toal further defined the concept through ideas of journalists, politicians and strategic advisors rs while highly appreciate the geopolitical discourse:

“Geopolitical discourse deals with compelling questions of power and danger in world affairs. The critical point to grasp at the outset is that geopolitics is already involved in world politics; it is not separate neutral commentary on it.”

“Second, geopolitics is attractive because it purports to explain a great deal in simple terms. It provides a framework within which local events in one place can be related to a larger global picture. Many geopolitical narratives are enframed by essentialized oppositions between „us‟ and „them‟. Whole regions of the world are divided into oppositional zones, a frame working we can call „earth labeling‟.” 7

“Finally, geopolitics is popular because it promises insight into the future direction of world affairs. Geopolitics has a certain magical appeal because it aspires to be prophetic discourse. Because those most interested in international affairs live in a globalizing world characterized by information saturation, the desire for simplified nostrums packaged as „strategic insight‟ is strong” (Toal, 2006).

David Criekemans, the author of first Dutch book on Geopolitics since World War II. He wrote his work based on critical genealogical study, and defined the concept as

Geopolitics is part of both Political Geography and International Relations. Interestingly,

Haushofer‟s definition focused on the former and Taylor‟s on the latter (Criekemans,

2007).

1.4. Researcher’s Definition:

After studying the definitions of major scholars and analysts of international relations, the researcher has developed own definition:

“Geopolitics is study of relationship among states based on geographical and diplomatic interests that can be both regional and international.”

1.5. Theoretical Debate between Academic Geography and Classical Geopolitics

To understand this school of thought and intellectual and political concerns of geopolitics, one must need to study the trouble relationship between Classical Geopolitics and Academic Geography. The Classical geopolitics scholars tend to take the traditional balance of power, statist and Eurocentric concept which ruled international relations in 8 early twentieth century and this closely linked up to the study of geography. This is a relationship in which geography cannot be happy or proud. This unhappiness and relationship goes back to birth of self consciously geopolitical analysis under concepts of imperialism and nationalism of the fin-de-seicle Europe. From the very start, geography has to be linked to the competitive policies and ambitions of European states (Andrew,

1999).

In such manner, the thoughts of living by Friedrich Ratzel's became out of the far reaching uneasiness about position of Germany in governmental issues of Europe. Then,

Halford Mackinder's Heartland Theory reflected same tensions of United Kingdom.

Numerous journalists, both inside and outside the scholarly topography trust that geopolitics guaranteed a special 'logical' point of view on global issues. It appears that as a goal science, it is a segregated god's eye perspective of the material substances of worldwide governmental issues. This traditional geopolitics decides governmental issues as training for an area in which countries and states normally take a stab at control over an area and its assets which is very like developmental battle. In that capacity, it likewise advocated interstate ill will all through twentieth century. Amid day and age of 1940s, geopolitics got an affiliation and prevalence with scholarly researchers of Third Reich, to some degree due to the examination and work of well known German researcher Karl

Haushofer (Agnew, 2005).

This aspect was eventually used in American political agenda and geography to nullify the whole field of geopolitics and to treat it as synonymous with Nazi policies of expansionism even there is no evidence that Hitler was influenced with study of 9

Haushofer. Subsequently geopolitics became one of the most controversial field of study and terms in modern history of international relation discipline (Coleman, 2007).

Due to its negative image in post-World War II, academic geographers virtually ignored the discipline of geopolitics. Geography‟s method of dealing with troubling baggage of the term was to exclude it from historiography of discipline. In most of the book and articles written on geopolitics during era of Cold War, they had little or no mention to discipline of geography. The study of geopolitics during that time was specifically based on strategic analysis closely bound up with foreign and security politics of developed states. Although the tradition of „classical‟ geopolitics had been rejected by scholars due to presumed relation with Nazi regime, the daily use of term geopolitics treated geography as a stable independent variable of sorts as it was speaking to natural realities.

The rhetorical power of geopolitical claims stems in significant part from its link to such potential self-evident of facts of geography (Cowen, 2007).

After the end of Cold War, which contained territorial structure of political thoughts for over forty years, geopolitics developed anxiety about the spatial organization of power.

The scholars found trouble to the analyses that were analytically premised on rivalry of superpowers across the social sciences and re-emerged the sub-discipline of political geography. Geographic studies focusing specifically on geopolitical though and practice was not long in coming (Dalby, 1990).

This new work on this subject was an essential part of a broader rethinking of concept of power in social sciences. In geography as well as in other disciplines, it grew out in shape of wide-ranging interest in Foucauldian genealogy. This new method of study conceived 10 power not only as coercive and disabling but also as enabling and productive. It states that power relations are not forcibly imposed on already existing entities as it is within and through power ties that politics entities come into being. These kind of processes of subject-developing are among key themes of analysis in this cast scholarship (Dittmer,

2005).

In geology, the counter fundamental and social work delivered a checked enthusiasm for rambling improvement of political space and part of geographic learning amid this entire procedure. Moving toward topographical information as an innovation of energy both outcome and constitutive part of energy ties-it drove topography out of deception of political unbiased position and built up a basic examination of train itself. In the mean time, conventional geopolitics regards topography as a non-desultory examination that preexists geopolitical cases of basic geopolitics hypotheses geological information as a fundamental piece of present day talk of energy. Henceforth, 1990s created quantities of investigation of complicity of topography and geographers in government, Cold War, patriotism and imperialism (Dodds, 2004).

Numerous of these early analyses were based on history. They traced geopolitical theories to emergence of European geopolitical imagination during Age of Exploration.

They showed how geopolitical perspective-the god‟s eye view of globe as a structured whole that can be perceived and managed from only European point of view-emerged as an essential of European exploration which led to colonialism. Pointing out that many of main territorial assumptions of global politics of European origins-often more especially northern European origins-this work showed that history of geopolitics is also the history of implying these concepts both outside and inside Europe. It also reevaluated key 11 scholars of classical geopolitics, highlighting role of geographical knowledge in legitimizing balance of power politics of 19th and 20th centuries (Hepple, 1986).

The critical research work on geopolitics was further enhanced by increased popularity of critical geopolitical claims in mainstream analysis of politics. The term critical geopolitics was first introduced by Simon Dalby in his work of representational strategies of Committee on Present Danger Group in 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1990s, after several articles and numerous books, critical geopolitics were rapidly developing strand with political geography of international relations studies.

1.6. Types of Geopolitics

Major types of geopolitics are mentioned below:

 Critical geopolitics

The basic concept behind the critical geopolitics is that scholars of statecraft construct ideas and works about different places. The ideas have impact and implication on the political behavior and policy choices of officials and these policies affect how people process their notions of different places and politics. According to different experts critical geopolitics sees the geopolitical ideas consisting of four links facets including formal geopolitics, practical geopolitics, formal geopolitics and popular geopolitics.. The critical geopolitics continue to engage critically with queries surrounding geopolitical method and its practice like foreign policy and the history of geopolitics (Kuus, 2009).

Based in poststructuralist method, this holds the realists of international political space and do not simply reveal themselves to detached observers. Rather, the knowledge of 12 geopolitics is seen as concrete and partial, emerges from particular subject positions. In this context, geopolitical policies and practices result from rather complex methods of composing ideas and discourses which they gradually come into a shape. The links between geographical patterns and processes, it has these patterns on one hand while various kinds of discourse of the other hand and these are key contribution to the geography of media and communication. These kinds also imply that geopolitical practice is not categorically natural or right. Furthermore, since geopolitical knowledge is seen as rational, vital and situated, the nation-states are not the only legitimate entities of geopolitical analyses within critical global geopolitics. Rather, geopolitical study is consider as more diffuse with popular geopolitical method considered alongside practical and formal geopolitics (Parker, 2000). There are three types or strands of geopolitical through which are discussed below:

1. Popular geopolitics

Popular geopolitics is one of the methods under which this school of thought is produced.

Popular geopolitics argues that geopolitical ideas are not only developed by the state, policy makers, politicians and intellectual elite of a state but also it can also be shaped and communicated via popular culture and everyday traditions of a society. Popular culture develops a common sense understanding of international politics through use of media including movies, dramas and literature book and magazines (Painter, 2009).

The political geographers have studies widely the role of popular geopolitics and culture in shaping the popular understanding of politics. One of the famous scholar, Klaus

Dodds, studies the conveyance of geopolitical methods and idea through movies. While 13 analyzing famous James Bond movies, he found a frequent message of anxieties of

Western States in these movies. He gave example of move 'From Russia with Love' which conveyed United States anxieties during Cold War and another movie 'The World is Not Enough' shows the potential threats posed by Central Asian States to the Western country (Dodds, 2004).

2. Formal Geopolitics

The formal geopolitics describes the geopolitical culture which is adopted by more of

„traditional‟ geopolitical entities. The accounts of formal geopolitics deal with and focus on methods in which formal foreign policy professionals and actors including Think

Tanks and Academics, focus on geopolitical issues like that specific understandings and policy prescriptions become hegemonic or even common sense (Dalby, 1996).

3. Practical Geopolitics

This sort of geopolitics portrays the real routine with regards to geopolitical methodology like remote approach. The investigations of commonsense geopolitics primarily center around geopolitical thinking and geopolitical activity and the techniques in which these two are connected recursively to 'famous' and 'formal' geopolitical talk. This strategy is received on the grounds that basic geopolitics is worried about geopolitics as primary talk, deal with reasonable geopolitics not just spotlight on geopolitical activities which incorporates military arrangement yet additionally to the desultory procedures used to clarify these activities. The basic part of geopolitics identifies with two articles, Firstly it looks to open up geopolitics, as an idea and train. It does this halfway by taking the formal and well known parts of geopolitics alongside commonsense geopolitics. 14

Additionally, it primarily centers around control relations and progression by implies which particular understandings are set up. Furthermore, the basic geopolitics connects broadly with 'customary geopolitical topics. The improvement of elective clarification of geopolitical issues anyway could conceivably be predictable with formal geopolitics

(Dalby, 2004).

1.7. Theoretical Debate of Geopolitics

Over the decades several theorists and scholars have presented their own theoretical perspectives on geopolitics in international relations. These scholars presented traditional as well as modern debate of the discipline. Geopolitics has been discussed for numerous in global politics mainly for significance which increased with time especially after Cold

War. Following are some of main theorists and their theoretical of geopolitics.

Freidrich Ratzel was a German geographical scholar who was introduced the phrase of

“anthrogeographical” which indicates the combination of disciplines of anthropology, politics and geography. For Ratzel the nation-states had several kind of characteristics of living organisms. As per another scholar Haggman, Ratzel introduced the idea that a state had to develop and grow, had to expand and must establish living frontier or territorial borders that were subject to change as well as dynamic (Cahnman, 1944; Cohen, 2003).

According to another Cahnman, Ratzel is the main figure in development of geographical though of late 19th century. Although his earlier works focused on United States, his concept of the border as zone of transition and a peripheral element rather than a confirmed defined boundary-line was applied to European continent as well. Ratzel‟s main contribution is the concept of life space also known as Lebensraum which is 15 directly consisting of his Law of Expansion. In his work, he asserted that life is infinite movement that is hemmed in boundaries and borders of static space and, dominant individuals, groups or species, are those which remain successful in increasing their life- space by incorporating life-space of defeated entities, groups and individuals. Invariably

Ratzel was referring to German Prussian superiority and expansionism (Deibel & Gaddis,

1986; Kearns, 2004).

Ratzel also offered the idea of Weltmacht and the sea. This specific idea refers to the expansion of German nation-state which should eventually take it to the sea and beyond, ultimately dominating the sea politics and land by German forces. He believed that only people possessed a great Kultur would be able to achieve this kind of success and reach.

German Naval forces reach as understood by Ratzel was constructed on the idea of sea dominance and power as unlike land power, this self-sustaining would pay by control on trade and other economic benefits (Kennan, 1991).

The German scholar influenced analysts like Kjellen and Karl Haushofer. Both were greatly influenced by Darwinism in addition to Ratzel‟s time spent in the Americas.

Cahman suggest that Ratzel relied too extensively on theories of both Malthus and

Darwin to create an anthropo-and-politico-geographical corpus (Kjellen, 1917; Knox,

2001).

Ratzel‟s contributions were very significant and his work was extensive in the discipline.

He is credited with being one of the pioneers of geopolitics and such is hugely influential in shaping subsequent theory in the field. Cahman argued that for Ratzel, the experience gained while traveling across America provided the source material and initial 16 stimulation for this scholarly work. He was also influential not only with regard to

Kjellen but also to other scholars like Vidal de la Blanche and Semple and Sauer. Ratzel basically established a foundation for German variant of geopolitics, influenced by the

American geo-strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. The geopolitical theory of Ratzel was majorly criticized by the scholars for being too sweeping and his interpretation of geography and human history being too simplistic and mechanistic. Critically, he also undermines the significance of social organization in development of power (Kjellen,

1917; Mahan, 2008).

Meanwhile, Alfred Thayer Mahan, a regular commentator on global naval strategic and diplomatic affairs, believed that greatness of a nation was directly and essentially linked to the sea and particularly with its economic and trade benefits in peace and its control during a conflict. Mahan‟s theoretical work was extracted from Antoine-Henri Jomini and asserted that strategic location i.e. chokepoints, canals and ports as well as strong levels of fighting war in a naval fleet, were conducive to control over the sea. Mahan suggested six conditions required for a nation to have a sea power

Advantageous geographical position

Coastline which can be functional, abundance of natural resources and suitable climate

Expansion of territory

Population large enough to protect the country

Society with an aptitude for sea trade and commercial enterprise

Government with influence and inclination to control and dominate sea through strong navy (Mahan, 2008; Meyer, 1955). 17

Furthermore, Mahan distinguished a key region of the world in the Eurasian context which he named the Central Zone of Asia lying between 30 and 40 degrees north and stretching from Asia Minor to Japan. In this mentioned Zone of Mahan, independent states still survived including Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan, China and Iran. He considered those countries, located between United Kingdom and Russia, as if between “Scylia and

Charybdis” two mythological monsters. Between these two monsters, Mahan considered

Russia more threatening as compared to Britain for the fate of Central Asia. Mahan was hugely impressed by Russia‟s transcontinental size and strategically favorable position for southward expansion. Hence he found it necessary for Anglo-Saxon “sea power” to resist Russia (Nauman, 1917).

1.8. German Geopolitical Theories and its Links with Nazism

In post-World War I era, numerous German and scholars picked up the work of Kjellen and Ratzel and inspired from them. Major names in this list were Karl Haushofer, Erich

Obst, Otto Maull and Hermann Lautnsach. In 1932, Karl Haushofer, started Journal of

Geopolitics which later was used by Nazi Regime in its propaganda. They key assumptions and concepts of Haushofer‟s geopolitics were Pan Region, Autarky, and

Lebensraum and Organic border. As per him, states an undeniable right to seek for natural borders which would ultimately guarantee autarky (O'Tuathail, 1996).

Haushofer‟s influence within Hitler‟s Nazi Party has recently been challenged arguing that he failed to incorporate with racial ideology of Nazi regime in his research work.

Famous concepts of role of geopolitics in Third Reich of Nazi suggest a basic importance on part of the geo-politicians in the ideological basics of the Nazi state. Bassin reveals 18 that these famous concepts are in significant ways incorrect and misleading. Despite several similarities between Nazi and Haushofer doctrines, geopolitics was always treated suspect by National Socialist Ideologists. This was however understandable, for underlying philosophical orientation of geopolitics did not go with that of National

Socialism. Geopolitics shared Ratzel‟s scientific materialism and geographic determinism and belief that human society was determined by external aspects which qualities held innately by groups or individuals with little or no significance (Bassin, 1987).

Moreover National Socialism rejected on a fundamental level both determinism and realism and furthermore expanded inborn human characteristics, if state of conjectured

'racial character" to the factor of greatest essentialness being developed of human culture.

These real contrasts drove post 1933 contact and in the end open to condemnation of geopolitics by Nazi researchers. In spite of this, German Geopolitik was dismissed by its abuse in Nazi Expansion Policy of World War II and it has never accomplished essential significance equivalent to pre-war period. The final product negative linkage, particularly in American scholarly circles, between traditional geopolitics and Nazi otherwise called

Imperialist Ideology., depends on free avocations. This has been found specifically by commentators of current scholarly topography and promoters for 'neo established geopolitics particularly. The advocates of this thought incorporate Haverluck et al. who contended that defamation of geopolitics in scholastic circles is unhelpful as geopolitics as field of positivist request underpins potential in settling topical and inquiring about. It is frequently politicize issues like clash counteractive action and determination and alleviating environmental change (Ratzel, 1940; Spykman, 1938). 19

The negative linkage of term geopolitics and its practical implementation stemming from its association with World War II and pre-World War II German students and scholars of geopolitics are mainly targeted to the field of academic Geography and its sub-disciplines of Human Geography like Political Geography specifically. However, this negative links does not exist or at least not to same extend, in disciplines like Political and History

Science that make use of geopolitical concepts (Ullman, 2006; Weigert, 1942).

The Classical Geopolitics shapes a huge component of examination for Military History alongside its sub-controls of Political Science, for example, Security Studies and

International Relations. This distinction in disciplinary point of view is tended to by Bert

Chapman in his work Geopolitics: A Guide to the Issues. In this book Chapman brought up that scholastic and expert worldwide relations diaries are more alterable to study and examination of Geopolitics and particularly Classical Geopolitics when contrasted with

Contemporary scholarly research diaries in field of Political Geography. Besides, in school of contemplations outside Geography, Geopolitics isn't contrarily seen as it was among scholarly geographers, for example, Kalus Dodds and Carolyn Gallaher as apparatus of Imperialism or loved with Nazism however observed as a predictable and legitimate way of evaluating major worldwide geopolitical conditions and occasions, not basically identified with military tasks or furnished clash (Haverluk, 2014)

1.9. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory

The Heartland Theory by Mackinder received little attention outside subject of geography but some scholars gradually claimed that it is largely influenced the foreign policies of major world powers. Those writers who looked Mackinder through lens of criticism later 20 accept that he is a organic strategist who tried to build a vision for foreign policy for

Great Britain with his Eurocentric analysis of historical geography. Mackinder formulated his Heartland Theory in one of his article titled The Geographical Pivot of

History published in England in 1904 (Mackinder, 1912; Sloan, 2002).

His doctrine of geopolitics largely involved concepts of diametrically opposed to the stance of Alfred Thayer Mahan about importance of naval forces combined with sea power in global conflict. He saw naval forces as foundation of Colombian Era Empire which prolonged roughly from 1492 to 19th century, and predicted that 20th century will be domain of land power. The Heartland Theory gave hypothesis that a major empire being brought to existence in Heartland-which would not need transoceanic and coastal dominance to remain coherent. The basic assumption of Mackinder‟s doctrine involved considering geography of the globe as being divided into two sections. First, the World

Island also called Core, comprising Eurasia and Africa, and Peripheral Islands consist of

Australia, America, British Isles, Japan and Oceana. In his doctrine not only periphery islands were noticeably smaller than World Island but is required much sea transport to remain functional at technological level of the World Island, which holds large reserves of natural resources for a developed economy (Mackinder 1904; Okur, 2014).

Mackinder further argued that industrial hubs of periphery islands were essentially located in widely separated locations. The World Island would use it navy power to destroy each one of them in turn and could establish its own industries in a region further inland than the periphery islands-so they would have longer struggle to reach them and eventually face a well-stocked industrial bastion. Mackinder called this whole region the

Heartland. It eventually, comprised Ukraine, Mitteleuropa, Western Russia and Eastern 21 and Central Europe. Mackinder‟s Heartland contained the huge reserves of Ukraine, and numerous other natural resources. His concept of geopolitics was summed up in one of his sayings:

“Who rules Central and Eastern Europe commands the Heartland. Who rules the

Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the

World” (Gray, 2014; Mackinder, 1919; Okur, 2014).

American scholar Nicholar J. Spykman is both a critique and follower of Alfred Mahan and Mackinder and his work is based on assumption similar to Mackinder‟s. Spykman is agreed with him including unity of global politics and the world sea. He extends his agreement to add the unity of the air. Spykman adopts Mackinder‟s division of the globe while renaming some:

The Rimland which is analogous to Mackinder‟s “inner or marginal crescent” and is also an intermediate area located between marginal sea powers and Heartland

The Offshore Islands and continents which are similar to “Outer and Insular Crescent”

(Spykman, 1998).

As per Spykman‟s theory, a Rimland is territory which separates Heartland from seaports that are usable throughout the year means not frozen in winters. He also suggested that this needed that attempts by Heartland nations especially from Russia to capture ports in

Rimland must be prevented and stopped. Spykman altered Mackinder‟s formula on ties between Heartland and Rimland also known as inner crescent, claiming that “Who controls the Rimland will conquer Eurasia and who rules Eurasia will control the fortunes of whole world.” His theory can be traced back to origins of Containment which was a 22

US policy on stopping the spread of Soviet influence after World War II (Hefferman,

1998; Spykman, 1942).

Karl Houshofer was another follower of Mackinder who called Mackinder‟s work as

“genius scientific tractate.” He commented on work of Mackinder stating: "Never have I seen anything greater than those few pages of geopolitical masterwork." He further said that Mackinder‟s work in one of the solid geopolitically and geographically irreproachable maps, presented on of the earliest scientific forums of the world-the Royal

Geographic Society United Kingdom. He adopted methods of both Mackinder and his concept of German-Russian alliance- these powers were seen by Mackinder as major contenders for control of Eurasia in 20th century. While following work of Mackinder,

Haushofer suggested an alliance with Soviet Union and while advancing Mackinder‟s propositions, he added Japan to his design of Eurasian Bloc (Haushofer, 2004).

In 2004, famous Historian Paul Kennedy wrote at centenary of The Geographical Pivot of

History "Right now with hundreds of thousands of US troops in the Eurasian Rimlands and with administration constantly explaining why it has to stay the course, it looks as if

Washington is taking seriously Mackinder's injunction to ensure control of the geographical pivot of history."(Haushofer 2004; Weigert, 1942)

1.10. Kissinger, Brzezinski and Grand Chess Board

Both were two famous security advisers during Cold War era. Kissinger and Brzezinski both cared lest the America lose its geopolitical focus on Eurasia and foremost on Russia despite fall of Soviet United, Communism and end of ideological struggle in 1991. Cold

Warriors ideologically both turned into convinced geo-politicians after leaving policy 23 making at end of Cold War. Both former policy makers wrote immensely influential books on geopolitics and diplomacy during 1990s. Kissinger produced his famous work

Diplomacy and Brzezinski wrote The Grand Chessboard; American Primacy and Its

Geostrategic Imperatives and through these books the Anglo-American Classical

Geopolitical Theories were revived (Kissinger, 1994; Okur, 2014).

In Diplomacy Henry Kissinger wrote that students of geopolitics and history are uneasy about the approach that hostile objectives have vanished and traditional foreign policy intentions cannot be applied in today‟s world. "They would argue that Russia, regardless of who govern it, sits astride the territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland, and is the heir to one of the most potent imperial traditions." The United States must "maintain the global balance of power vis-à-vis the country with a long history of expansionism" (Kissinger, 1994).

After the finish of Soviet Union, second geopolitical real danger remained was Germany and as Mackinder anticipated and dreaded ninety years back, its organization together with Russia. Amid the Cold War period, Kissinger contended the two conditions of the

Atlantic perceived that unless US is naturally engaged with European Region, it would be obliged to include itself later under improvements far less ideal to the two sides of

Atlantic and that is all the more valid in the present governmental issues. He additionally composed that Germany has turned out to be so intense and solid that current European foundations can't without anyone else make a harmony amongst Germany and other

European accomplices. 24

“Nor can Europe, even with Germany, manage by itself Russia it is in no country's interest that Germany and Russia should fixate on each other as principal partner. They would raise fears of condominium Without America, Britain and France cannot cope with

Germany and Russia; and "without Europe, America could turn into an island off the shores of Eurasia" (Brzezinski, 1997).

In the mean time, the Spykman's vision of Eurasia was unequivocally affirmed which is, geopolitically US is an island off the shores of immense landmass of Eurasia, whose normal assets and populace far surpass those of America-Asia and Europe-remains a decent meaning of vital risk for United States, Cold War or no Cold War. For such a gathering will have ability to exceed U.S. financially and in the long run militarily. That threat must be opposed even the overwhelming force is evidently generous. On the off chance that the aims at any point changed, USA will wind up with horribly reduced limit with respect to solid obstruction and developing powerlessness to shape worldwide legislative issues. The significant enthusiasm of US pioneers is keeping up adjust of energy in Eurasian Region (Brzezinski, 1997).

After converting to geopolitics from idealism, Kissinger is retrospect explained the Cold

War in Geopolitical analogies stating it is an approach not characteristic for his work in

Cold War era. Now, however, he asserted on beginning of Cold War. He argues that objective of moral opposition of communist ideology had merged with geopolitical task of controlling expansion of Communism especially in Europe. He added that President

Nixon was more geopolitical rather than ideological Cold Warrior. 25

Three years after Henry Kissinger wrote Diplomacy, Brzezinski followed his footsteps and published The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geopolitical

Imperatives. It was followed by The Geostrategic Triad: Living with China, Europe, and

Russia after three years. His first book explained the US success in the Cold War in terms of control of Eurasia. He wrote that for first ever a non-Eurasian power emerged as key mediator of integrated and comprehensive Eurasian geo-strategy is actual purpose of this book. In his next book, Brzezinski confirmed that despite power configuration has gone revolutionary change, Eurasia was still a mega-continent. Like Spylman, he acknowledges that “cumulatively, Eurasia‟s power vastly overshadows American power”

In classical and exact Spykman concepts, Brzezniski developed his geostrategic

“chessboard” doctrine of Eurasia which focues to prevent the unification of this mega- continent.

"Europe and Asia are politically and economically powerful…. It follows that…

American foreign policy must…employ its influence in Eurasia in a manner that creates a stable continental equilibrium, with the United States as the political arbiter.… Eurasia is thus the chessboard on which the struggle for global primacy continues to be played, and that struggle involves geo- strategy – the strategic management of geopolitical interests…. But in the meantime it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America… For America the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia…and America's global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained" (Brzezinski, 1997). 26

1.11. French Geopolitical Theoretical Doctrine

French geopolitical theoretical doctrine lies majorly in opposition to German Geopolitik and reject the concept of fixed geography. This doctrine is mainly focused on evolution of polymorphic territories being result of making‟s actions. It also focuses on consideration of long time durations through a refusal to take special events into account.

This method has been theorized by Professor Lacoste who presented three principles

Diatopie, Diachronie, Representation. In his work, The Spirit of Laws, Montesquieu outlined view that societies and individuals are influenced by their climate. He advocated that hotter climates develop hot-tempered people whereas colder climates create aloof people, whereas the mild climate of France is ideal for political systems (Claval, 2000;

Cohen, 1982).

Elisee Reclus, considered as one of the organizers of French geopolitics, composed a book considered as a kind of perspective in present day topography. Like Ratzel, he likewise takes topography through a universal vision. He in any case, in entire Ratzel's vision as he thought about topography as unchangeable. He trusts that it should advance comparably to improvement of human culture. He decreases political perspectives finished in his dismissal the scholarly world. French geo-government official Jacques

Ancel is hailed as first geopolitical scholars in France. He gave perceptible arrangement of addresses at European Center of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Paris and distributed his work Geopolitique in 1936. Like Reclus, Ancel rejects German determinist sees on geopolitics including precepts of Haushofer (Haushofer, 2004). 27

Meanwhile, Barudel‟s broad view used insights from other disciplines of social sciences, employed the concept of Longue Duree and dismissed the significance of specific events.

He was inspired from French geographer Paul Vidal de La Blache-who himself was influenced by German ideas especially from Freidrich Ratzel whom he met in Germany.

His method was to study and analyze the interdependence between environment and individuals. Vidalian geopolitics is majorly based on different forms of cartography and on Possiblism which was found on societal approach of geography like principles of spaces polymorphic faces depending from numerous factors among culture, mankind and ideas and it was opposed to determinism.

Due to large influence of German Geopolitik on French Geopolitics, the French were banished from academic works considerable long time. In the mid-1970s Locaste, was directly inspired by Ancel, Vidal and Braudel wrote La Geographine, Ca Sert D‟abord a

Faire La Guerre (Term Geography first use in War) in 1976. His work which became very famous in France symbolized the inception of this new school of geopolitics. This school of thought initially linked with Communist party gradually evolved to a less liberal idea. Till end of 1980s he founded that French Institute of Geopolitics that published the Herotote Revuew. While rejecting generalizations and broad abstractions implemented by Anglo-America and German traditions, this school does focuses on spatial aspects of geopolitics affairs on several levels of analysis.

This approach further focuses the significance of multi-level analysis and maps at opposite of critical geopolitics which avoid these tools. Locaste suggested that every conflict both global and domestic can be considered from a perspective grounded in three basic assumptions: 28

Diatopie means doing a cartographic survey through multi-scale mapping

Representation means each individual or group is product of an education and is developed by special representations of the globe or others groups or people. Hence, basic societal beliefs are based in their specific location or ethnicity. The study of representation is a common aspect with more contemporary critical geopolitics. Both are linked with work of Henri Lefebvre

Diachronie means doing a historical analysis examining long periods and short periods as suggested by French historian Fernand Braudel (Braudel, 2001).

Having connection with this stream and former member of Herodote Editorial Borad, the

French Geographer Michel Foucher created a long term analysis of global borders. He started term numerous neologism among them like Horogenesis: Neologism explains the concept of studying the Inception of Borders, Dyade: Border shared by two neighboring countries e.g. US shares border with Canada and Mexico. The main work of this researcher Fronts and Borders was published in 1991, without equivalent remains as of yet un-translated in English. More or less connected with this school of thought, Stephane

Rosier can be named as eidot of Chief of Online Journal. This journal established in

20077 became most prominent French Journal of political geography (Braudel, 2001).

In the mean time, significantly more moderate stream is set up by Fracois Thual, a French master in geopolitics and a previous authority of Ministry of Civil Defense. Thual was an educator of geopolitics of the religions at French War College and has composed 30 books construct predominantly in light of geopolitical technique and its application to various parts of the world. He particularly was occupied with Shiite, Buddhist and

Orthodox religions and in agitated districts like Caucasus. While associated with Thual, 29

Aymeric Chauprade, ex-teacher of geopolitics at French War College and individual from extraordinary Rightist Party Front National connected to an assumed "new" French school of geopolitics. This school advocates the arrival to Realpolitik and 'Conflict of

Civilizations" belief systems. The idea of this school is depicted through French Review of Geopolitics and International Academy of Geopolitics. Chauprade is additionally a supporter of an Europe of Nations. He stated an European Union barring Turkey and approach of trade off with Russia. He likewise bolsters thought of multipolar world- including adjusted ties between United States and China (Cohen, 1995).

1.12. Russian Theoretical Doctrine of Geopolitics

The Russian doctrine in Geopolitics is rather contemporary when a senior researcher at

Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences,

Vadim Tsymbursky introduced the term “Island-Russia” and developed his concept of

Great Limitrophe. Further, Russian Colonel General (retired) Leonid Ivashov, a Russian geopolitics specialist of early 21st century, led the Academy of Geopolitical Problems.

This Academy analysis both domestic and global situations and develops geopolitical doctrine of Russia. Earlier Ivashov headed the Main Institutions of International Military

Cooperation of Ministry of Defence of Russian Federation. Another Russian scholar

Vladimir Karyakin who is prominent researcher at Russian Institute of Strategic Studies has proposed the term “Geopolitics of the Third Wave” (Kariakin, 2013).

1.13 Post-War American Containment Theory

George Kennan is considered pioneer in initiating the American geopolitical strategy of containment as response policy to post World War-II era. The policy was adopted to 30 contain Soviet Union and Communism influence in Europe, developing states and nonaligned countries during Cold War. Kennan argued that Containment policy was not initiated to halt the growth and development of Soviet Union rather to prevent that state from imposing its own particular ideology of Communism on neighboring countries especially Eastern Europe and other countries seeking for development cooperation in global community (Gaddis, 2011).

Kennan who worked with US President Harry Truman believed that Soviet Union can be contained in different parts of the world by providing economic and other kinds of assistance to developing states and by stopping the Soviets from acquiring much influence over regional or international relations. Deibel and Gaddis believe that

Kennan‟s “X” article advocated the belief that Soviet Union‟s policies were to promote peace and love towards Western countries henceforth containment was designed to confront the Soviets with unchangeable counter-force at every front where they showed signed of expansion or encroachment on the interests of stable and peaceful world.

Paul Nitze, was another geopolitical scholar who supported containment policy against

Soviet Union. Being one of the authors of National Security Documents of United Sates which laid out the principles of containment, he was strong supporter of containment.

According to Gibbs and Deibel, Nitz asserted that Soviet Union was trying not to achieve parity rather strategic dominance through arms race and other such policies. Eventually, t was Nitze‟s point of view that it was essential to stop Soviets from achieving superior nuclear weapons even at const of potential arms race in the world (Kennan, 2002). 31

Deibel and Gaddis further argued that policy of containment remained the dominant policy and assumption in US foreign policy from end of World War-II to collapse of

Soviet Union in 1991. During Cold War era, all prominent policy makers including

Henry Kissinger and Zbignew Brzezinski were completely committed in maintaining the containment policy. As per both writers, Kissinger felt that achieving Détente in terms of nuclear weapons race and development would be an ideal achievement of containment policy. Kissinger and President Nixon never believed that Détente represented a departure from containment‟s vision of Soviets. Both Kissinger and Brzezinski believed that Soviet Union could no longer be dealt directly through US military power-either though actual deployment of US forces or deterrent. Nixon proposed the appointment of surrogate powers across the world to do job of containment against Soviet Union such as

Shah of Iran in Persian Gulf and China in Far East (Schuessler, 2009).

Brzezinski who also worked in Jimmy Carter‟s administration called the global strategy of Soviet Union as a unique organic kind of imperialism that was extracted from territorial insecurity. He further asked for establishment of three pillars of containment which were continued US diplomatic and military presence in Eurasian Region with alliance of NATO, a resurgent and strong European continent and an independent China.

Gaddis and Deibel suggests that containment policy evolved with time as United States moved away from direct military conflict with expansion of Communism in Vietnam and

South Korea to a less military response that employed foreign aid and economic assistance as a means of leading nonaligned countries in Western sphere of influence. At same time, the continued willingness of America to indulge in arms race which kept ongoing during Reagan administration was very much a military response to perceived 32 threat of Soviet Union. The policy of containment emerged as strategy that was formulated to tackle Soviet hegemonic policies in terms of Eurasian heartland and states within periphery or the Rimland. It is a major example of great power politics being played in bipolar world politics wherein two major superpower are willing to compete with each almost indefinitely for dominance (Kelly, 2002).

1.14. Conclusion

Geopolitics of Pakistan-China relations are vital and critical for both South Asian

Regional politics but also for international relations. The importance of geopolitics in international relations has grown with time especially in mid-war period and post-World

War-II era. The research work of German scholars like Freidrich Ratzel, Kjellen and Karl

Haushofer made significant impacts on policies of Nazi Germany. It was widely believed that Third Reich was heavily influenced by work of these scholars especially in aspect of territorial expansion. Furthermore, post-World War-II era introduced several classical geopolitical scholars including famous policy makers Henry Kissinger and Brzezinski.

Both of these scholars advocated and shaped policy of containment during Cold War which was party of major stance of US to tackle Soviet Union expansion in Europe and nonaligned states. Moreover the French Doctrine of Geopolitics which remained influenced by German doctrine gradually shaped its own concepts especially regarding impact of climate on human beings. Russian Theoretical Doctrine which is relatively contemporary as compared to others have made its impact on international relations and in Eurasian Region. The strategic importance of geopolitics in global politics especially rapidly developing close ties of China and Pakistan have and will leave vital influence 33 especially through their military ties e.g. Jf-17 Thunder and economic relationship e.g.

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

References

Agnew, J. (1999) Mapping Political Power beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity,

and Movement in World Politics. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28

(3).

Agnew, J. (2005a) Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in

Contemporary World Politics. Annals of the Association of American

Geographers 95 (2).

BBC. (June 17, 2010). China Says Pakistan Nuclear Deal 'Peaceful'

BBC. (May 17, 2011). Pakistani PM Hails China as a 'Best Friend'

BBC. (2014). BBC Wolrd Service Poll.

Braudel. (2001), The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II.

La part du milieu,1.

Cahnman, W.J.(1944).The concept of raum and the theory of regionalism. American

Sociological Review,9(5).

China Daily. (November 14, 2006). China-Pakistan Relations

Claval, P., (2000). Hérodote and the French Left. (Ed.). London, Routledge.

Cohen, S. B. (1982). A new map of global geopolitical equilibrium: A developmental

approach, Political Geography Quarterly, 1(3). 35

Cohen, S.B. (2003).Geopolitics of the World System. Lanham, MD: Rowman &

Littlefield.

Cokemen, Semra. (2010). Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations. Thesis:

School of Social Sceinces, Middle East Technical University.

Coleman, M. (2007) A Geopolitics of Engagement: Neoliberalism, the War on Terrorism,

and the Reconfiguration of US Immigration Enforcement. Geopolitics 12.

Collins, R. (1999). Macrohistory, essays in the sociology of the long run, Stanford:

Stanford University Press.

Cowen, D., and Gilbert, E. (eds.) (2007) War, citizenship, territory. New York:

Routledge.

Criekemans, David. (2007). Geopolitiek Garant.

Dalby, S. (1990) Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. New York:

Guilford.

Dalby, Simon (July–September 1996). Writing critical geopolitics: Campbell, Ó Tuathail,

Reynolds and dissident skepticism. Political Geography, special issue: Critical

Geopolitics. Elsevier. 15 (6–7)

Daniel Kelly. ((2002). James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life

Dawn. (March 16, 2017). China Pakistan Agree to Further Increase Military Cooperation.

Deibel, T. L. & Gaddis, J. L. (1986).Containment. Washington, D. C.: National Defense

University Press. 36

Devetak, etal. (2012). An Introduction to International Relations.

Dittmer, J. (2005) Captain America‟s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture,

and Post-9/11 Geopolitics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers

95 (3).

Dittmer, Jason. (2014). Geopolitics: An Introductory Read. London: Routledge.

Dodds, K., and Sidaway, J. (2004) Halford Mackinder and the “Geographical Pivot of

History”: A Centennial Retrospective. Geographical Journal 170(4).

Efferink, Leanhardt. (2009). The Definition of Geopolitics-The Classical, French and

Critical Tradition. Exploring Geopolitics.

Evans, G Newham. (1998). The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London:

Penguin Books.

Flint, Colin. (2006). Introduction to geopolitics. London: Routledge.

Fruhan, Mathew. (2014). Large and Mega-Cap Stocks: Look For Opportunities in

Financials and Energy. Fidelity.

Gogwitt, Christopher. (2014). The Fiction of Geopolitics. Stanford: Stanford University

Press.

Gaddis, John, Lewis. (2011). George F Kennan: An American Life.

Gary, C. S. (2004). In Defence of the Hearltland: Sir Halford Mackinder and his Critics a

George F. Kennan. (2002). Memoirs 1925-1950 . 37

Hundred Years On. Comparative Strategy, 23(9).

Haushofer, Karl. (2004). Pan-Ideas in Geopolitics, 1931. Moscow.

Haushofer, Karl. (2004). The Continental Bloc: Mittel Europa. Moscow.

Haverluk, Terrence W. (2014). The Three Critical Flaws of Critical Geopolitics: Towards

a Classical Geopolitics. Geopolitics, 19.

Hefferman, Michael. (1998). The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics.

London: Arnold.

Hepple, L.W. (1986) The Revival of Geopolitics. Political Geography Quarterly,

supplement to 5 (4).

John M. Schuessler. (2009) Absorbing The First Blow: Truman And The Cold War,"

White House Studies.

Kariakin, V. V. (2013). Geopolitika Tretiei Volny: Transformatsiia Mira v Epokhu

Postmoderna [Geopolitics of the third wave : The Transformation Of The World

In The Postmodern Epoch] (in Russian). Moscow: Granitsa.Kearns, G.(2004).The

political pivot of geography. The Geographical Journal, 179(4).

Kennan, G. F. (1991). Measures Short of War. Washington, D.C.: National Defense

University Press.

Kissinger, Henry, (1994). Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster.

Kjellén, R.(1917).The State as a Living Form. Leipzig: University Press. 38

Knox, P.L., &Marston, S.A. (2001). Places and Regions in Global Context. Upper Saddle

River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Knox, P.L.,& Marston, S. A.(2001).Places and Regions in Global Context. Upper Saddle

River, NJ: Prentice-Hall

Kuus, Merje. (2009). Critical Geopolitics. British Columbia: University of British

Columbia.

Mackinder, H. (1904).The Geographical Pivot Of History. Geographical Journal,23(2).

Mackinder. (1912). The Day of the Saxon. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Mackinder, H. (1919).Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of

Reconstruction. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Mark Bassin. (1987). Race Contra Space: The Conflict Between German 'Geopolitik' and

National Socialism. Political Geography Quarterly, 6(2).

Masood, Salman. (October 13, 2008). Pakistan President to Visit China, A Valued Ally.

New York Times.

Meyer, H.C.(1955). Mitteleuropa: In German Thought and Action, 1815–1845. The

Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Naumann, F.(1917).Mittel-Europa. New York: Knopf.

O; Tuathail, Gearoid. (1996). Critical Geopolitcs: Politics of Writing Global Space.

Berlin. 39

Okur, Mehmet. (2014). Classical Tests of Geopolitics and the "Heart of Eurasia". Journal

of Turkish World Series. 76(90).

Okur, Mehmet Akif. (2014). Classical Texts Of the Geopolitics and the "Heart Of

Eurasia, Journal of Turkish World Studies, XIV/2.

Painter, Joe; Jeffrey, Alex (2009), Geopolitics and anti-geopolitics", in Painter, Joe;

Jeffrey, Alex, Political geography: an introduction to space and power (2nd ed.).

Los Angeles.

Ratzel,F.(1940).Erdenmacht und Voelkerschicksal. Stuttgart: Stuttgart University Press.

Saul, Cohen. (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. New York: Rowman and

Littlefield.

Sloan, G.R. (2000). Sir Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now. (Ed.).

London: Frank Cass.

Spykman, N. (1938).Geography and foreign policy. American Political Science

Review,32(1).

Spykman, N.(1942).America‟s Strategy in World Politics. New York: Harcourt.

Toncea, Vladimir. (2006). Geopolitical Evolution of Borders in Danube Basin.

Toal, Gerard. (2006). Critical Geopolitcs. London: Routledge.

Ullman, H.(2006).Turning Mahan on his head.US Naval Institute Proceedings,132(7). 40

W. H. Parker. (2000). Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Weigert, H. W. (1942). Haushofer and the Pacific. Foreign Affairs,20(4).

Zbignew Brzezinski, (1997). The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its

Geostrategic Imperatives, Perseus Books, New York.

Chapter 2

Literature Review & Research Design and Procedure

2.1. Introduction

2.2. Introduction

Pakistan – China relations have been characterized as profound and multi-faceted bonded through an element of trust and confidence. Pakistan over the years has extensively gained in terms of military, economic and technical assistance, maintaining close ties with China. For many years, China has been Pakistan‟s principal partner for supplier of 42 weapons. They have been engaged in many joint projects for producing armaments, jets and missile frigate. The economic aid given to Pakistan by China is much appreciated for not only is it greater than what is granted to it by the U.S., but also it has no “strings” attached to its programs of assistance.

In recent years, two factors called for developing and strengthening strategic partnership between Pakistan and China; 1) The recent lead of China as an emerging economic power and 2) ever-increasing patterns of cooperation between U.S and India. As India makes its stride out into global hierarchy of the international system, making stronger its ties with the U.S., Pakistan‟s role in the foreign policy of China is expected to mature and rise. A rising India adds to Pakistan becoming important for China‟s subcontinent strategy. The

South Asian region is changing into a strategic front of rivalry amongst the U.S and

China and China and India (Rousseau, 2014).

During 2015, both China and Pakistan concurred to promote their ties to „all-weather strategic cooperation partners. ‟ Also, many agreements and memorandum of understanding (MoUs) relating to development projects in the sector of energy and communication under the realm of China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC) was observed. With regards to regional cooperation, Pakistan and China encouraged the maintenance of peace and stability, which would uphold common regional prosperity. On

Afghanistan, both countries shared concerns of evolving security and its regional implications for Pakistan, recognizing China‟s constructive position for peace and stability. Therefore, both sides were in agreement of supporting an „Afghan –owned and

Afghan-led‟ process for peace and reconciliation. Efforts regarding defense and fighting terrorism were also discussed for promotion of coordination and common understanding 43

(Manan, 2015). However, Indian ambitions in Afghanistan for countering Pakistan , strengthening its political and economic position in Afghanistan , gaining access to

Central Asian Republics , making Pakistan captive of its market and encircling Pakistan

(Gulshan, 2014) is a barrier to Pak-China aims of Strategic Partnership.

Intensified antagonism between China and India also is having an unfavorable impact on

Pak-Iran relation, for the Pakistani Port of Gwadar and Chahbahar Port of Iran are the major reason for their geo-strategic and economic competition. Further developments in

Indo-Afghan and Indo-Iranian relations for isolating and encircling Pakistan have some serious apprehension in Pakistan. The security concerns of Pakistan, Afghanistan and

Iran are interlinked (Khan, A.Z.) Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, Pakistan‟s former ambassador states that, “We have important assets in a campaign to counter India‟s predominant power through economic, cultural and ideological activism. We have regional linkages with West Asia, South and Central Asia and also maintain close and time-tested relations with China, in order to counter Indian influence in the region” (Dawn, 2006).

Pakistan is looking to its East (China) not only because China provides it with an influential motivation to do so, but also because the West provides it with an evenly disincentive for coming across against it. Showing common displeasure with Pakistan,

Washington began efforts for bolstering its relations with India, with signs of retaining permanence. Its confrontation with India too is likely to remain indefinite. In these circumstances, Pakistan‟s look east policy should not come as a surprise (Wirsing, 2003).

A strong Indo-U.S. regional alliance should make Pakistan reconsider its partnership with the US. The shifting dynamics of global politics and power structure requires Pakistan to expand it foreign strategy, strategic vision and diplomacy. Fortunately, China is our 44 direct neighbor and in advancing strategic partnership with China, Pakistan can accomplish improved national, regional and global interest (Ijaz, 2015).The strategic alliance between Pakistan and China did not materialize as a subject of convenience, rather it surfaced as a concern of strategic compulsion and convergence. Pakistan needs to play its cards prudently engaging China, further in economic relations, expanding its cooperation regarding countering terrorism for attracting Chines investors and act as a balancer to counterweight and dilute India‟s regional hegemonic desires (Rana, 2015).

2.3. Literature Review

Wirsing (2003) has summarized about the initial years of Pakistan-China Partnership in his study. Proceeding with little debate on the alliance between Pakistan and China, the writers present the changing scenario of global dominance by the U.S. and its strategic shift of alliance in Asia. Pakistan„s relations with China for the future are likely to endure since the strategic interest of containing China is shared by both. Nevertheless, the article concludes that although there remains misunderstanding and obstacle in Pakistan-U.S. relations, Pakistan would desire for a continued relationship with both the U.S. and China with an alliance with China proving to be of a greater advantage.

Dumbaugh (2010) in his report has given some key arguments on Pak-China Relations. It summarizes , the themes as; -Pakistan Relationship strengthened by geo-political interests, geographical and historical apprehensions with considerations to India, China‟s increasing evenhandedness with India and its effect on Pakistan, concerns on terrorism, complications in Beijing‟s request for cracking down on extremist groups and countervailing difficulties from its indigenous population, weak but growing economic 45 relations , investments by Beijing as exposing itself to extremist threats, alleges of

China‟s strong relations with the military and decision –making in Pakistan , U.S. and

China‟s mutual existential fears in Pakistan, U.S .complementary investment and aid to

Pakistan and the need of extensive study on regional players for in-depth perceptive on

Pak-China relations.

Zicheng (2010) in his book provided his readers with a rough outline of China‟s cultural history and its idea of the grand strategy. Establishing Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping ideology of peaceful development while focusing on economic progress, China holds the political, cultural, historical and economic order for accomplishing its national renascence. The book disapproves of predictions made on China‟s disintegration while stating that China‟s strategic choices are still to be identified according to its economic precedence. China is to become an enormous democracy, one based on Chinese-Style rather than adopting a model of democracy drawn on its Western guided style.

Achievement of its strategic objectives is to come while maintaining friendly relations with the U.S. with the concept of war as outmoded between the two, with Russia, whose partnership has withstood in all times, India with whom relations have improved from time to time and Japan with which after a rough patch, relations between the two countries improved. With respect to Pak-China relations, the book is to provide guidance for studying how China views Pakistan‟s economic partnership in terms of achieving its own grand strategy.

Kardon (2011) in his study has talked about the murky dimension in Pakistan –China

Partnership. The “entente cordiale” between Pakistan and China has continued for almost for half a century, rooted in the geopolitical partnership of antagonism against India 46 nourished by transfer of arms, technical and military support and cooperation on intelligence. Despite the pronouncement of the partnership considered as higher than the mountains, its actual relations are fraught. For China, Pakistan presents many challenges which include categorical tolerance for the Republic‟s dysfunctional political system and corruption, insurgency at home, irregular nuclear brinkmanship eternal insolvency, opposed to the fundamentals of China‟s foreign policy. Uncertainties in Pakistan ranging from Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism across Pakistan‟s tribal belt, attacks on citizens of China in Pakistan, risky investments that of an undesirable client described in the words of a Chinese analyst as, “Beijing is troubled by the fluctuation "from totalitarianism to power-sharing to totalitarianism again. Democracy always has a hard time reconciling multiple relationships. In the end, the iron fisted rule is needed to resolve the issues,” inside Pakistan are concerns which need to be addressed.

Kabraji (2012) in her research study has talked about the certain chief limitations in

China-Pakistan Alliance. The paper attempts to understand the multi-dimensional cooperation between the two countries, which includes strategic and traditional friendship, expanding relations in business, cultural and social exchanges, working on cooperating upon international concerns, promoting civilizations for enhancement of world harmony supported through an effective media strategy. Official statements by

China and Pakistan have made media as reflecting „aspirations for deeper ties.‟ The rhetoric of “all-weather” “fair –weather”“good brothers sharing weal and woe” has been contrasted against relations between China and Pakistan based on mutual alliance and that of the United States and Pakistan based on trust deficit. With Beijing Review organizing particular website celebrating their relations, discussing setting up of 47 universities of media in Pakistan through support by China are seen as examples of securing cooperation for dealing with propaganda from the Western media .While studying challenges, topics concerning Pakistan as a uncertain ally for Pakistan, implications for regional security, concerns of security relating to the Indian Factor and regional cooperation on terrorism have been detailed.

Kondapalli (2012) in his research study has talked about the importance of Pakistan as a country occupying a unique space in China‟s foreign policy. Guided by six major objectives, with its biggest concern on counter-terrorism cooperation, China for overcoming this problem has suggested a multi-pronged advancement. First is the political level, where China has begun a revision of its policy towards the Taliban.

Second, for countering extremism, China is enhancing capacity of Pakistan‟s military and third, direct actions on countering terrorism have been initiated by both countries. Many reports also indicate China‟s growing cooperation in the program of Pakistan‟s Strategic weapons, intensification of nuclear cooperation, bilateral engagement regarding outer- space and provincial level cooperation and decrease of their reliance on US dollar diversifying their reserves of foreign exchange. Grabbing the initiative, China is looking into advancing on a comprehensive approach to Pakistan and Afghanistan, including integration so as to maintain the rise of China.

Zeb (2012) in his study analyzed Pakistan –China friendship as that of „ higher than mountains, deeper than the oceans” and recently that of sweeter than honey provides for unique friendship given the uncertain international system in which we live in. While analyzing this relationship, it is concluded that the partnership is based on two factors of geostrategic and realistic estimations. Relations further would be strengthened and 48 diversified when both the countries would be able to improve their relations, economically. While it is argued that there exists no problem in their emerging relationship, Pakistan would have to endow into the mindset, compulsion and limitations of China‟s partnership. A few years back, analyst, Dr. Farukkh Saleem aptly wrote that

“the new Peking Man has a singular goal -- to double, triple and quadruple China's $4 trillion GDP by 2050. And, any country that can help China go where it wants to go is a friend -- or you are on your own.” Pakistan –China relations can change with respect to issues of terrorism, security of Chinese personnel in Pakistan-China projects, India and people to people contacts.

Ghani, Alam, Gul and Shah (2013) in their working paper have highlighted the Pak-

China relations of cooperation as fostering sustainable developments not only among the two countries but also countries of the region. Advocating that peace and stability only can be ensured through regional cooperation intend at wide –based economic improvement all the countries of the region would need to play their respective role.

While discussing on the front between China –Pakistan front , the authors discuss the need for establishing a comprehensive mechanism on information sharing, ensuring a peaceful environment for the smooth management of the Gwadar port , pursuing projects on the Oil City Project , establishment of particular security arrangements for Pakistan‟s coastal belt, creation of private investments for a strong balance between the two sectors, realization of 2006 China-Pakistan Five-Year Development Plan on Trade and Economic

Development, China‟s enhancement of financial and operational abilities fighting militancy and terrorism foreign-funded, instituting deeper dealings via think tanks and academic connections, expansion of Chinese cadre in the universities of Pakistan, 49 inauguration of a joint journal focusing on the global context of Pak-China relations.

Discussing opportunities as challenges in this relationship, the US, Iranian and

Afghanistan factors have been elaborated concluding in a recommended domestic strategy of cooperation between Pakistan and China.

Zhongping and Jing (2014) in their report have provided a brief, yet comprehensive insight into the logics and motivations of China-Style Strategic Partnerships with countries, since 2000. Progressing with its “partnership boom,” China has been able to institutionalize relations with some of the world‟s most important players. While initially

China remained focused on establishing its strategic relations only with the great powers, the beginning of the twenty-first century China expands its scope of strategic partnership.

As said by Chinese research Chen Zhimin, “China had five policy options: unilateralism, balance of power, partnership diplomacy, multilateralism and bandwagoning.” China‟s defensive logic would allow it to merge into the world, peacefully by far till its foundations remain protected, while its offensive logic i.e. having many partnerships would allow the country a favorable political environment. Observations by Fareed

Zakaria conclude that, “China has been remarkably adept at using its political and economic muscle in a patient, low-key, and highly effective manner” making effective its diplomacy of strategic partnership.

Rousseau (2014) has discussed foundations of what constituted China –Pakistan in his article. Constructed on mutual trust and confidence, Pakistan has benefitted from China economic, military and technical ties. On the nuclear front, Pakistan‟s program of nuclear weapons is dependent upon China. On the economic front, Pakistan is more appreciative of aid received from China than the U.S. While India makes strides out into the hierarchy 50 of global politics, strengthening its relations with the U.S, Pakistan‟s role in the foreign policy of China is likely to develop and no one is analyzing changes in their partnership, but as of India it would have to confront a two-front war should relations with either

China or Pakistan come to a breakdown. In the years to come the region of South Asia is going to be transformed, as two new strategic fronts of rivalry i.e. Between U.S. and

China and between China and India are going to increase the weight of the region‟s global politics.

Rana and Mahmood (2015) in their journal article have discussed about China –India entente to Pakistan-China traditional relations. Analyzing this theme, the paper establishing four themes of consideration concludes that Pakistan-China friendly entente cannot be undermined through Sino-India détente. Firstly, Pakistan for China is of high strategic importance, providing secure routes to Central, South, West Asia and the

Middle East, offering routes to Gwadar granting China access to Central Asia‟s market and energy. Further, analysis by a retired Brigadier of India wrapping up China –

Pakistan concludes that, “The Sino-Pakistan joint venture of Gwadar seaport is meant to provide logistic base to the Chinese navy and would enable China to maintain its presence in the Indian Ocean.” Secondly, under the Strategic Partnership and the „Treaty of Friendship , Cooperation and good neighborly relations the two nations have desisted to joining alliances and blocs with is to infringe their sovereignty and territorial integrity and lastly, both countries share common perceptions on India‟s regional ambitions and nuclear policy. Changing international and regional scenario, Pakistan would need to consider on policy options fortifying its relation with China. 51

Vandewalle (2015) in his research report has introduced its readers to the build-up of a multifaceted network of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is to alter the geopolitics and economy of South Asia. From All-Weather friends, this project aims to fulfill China‟s need of growing infrastructural markets, investment and its pivot to Asia.

Much said about its advantages, on both sides, arguments and skepticisms remain which include corruption and China‟s non-payment of its promised payment. The project also gives motivation for trade and dealing with the volatile situation of security, in Pakistan, for the project cross areas where Taliban and militants are active. As for China‟s own concerns about security, Beijing hopes to eradicate poverty in its XUAR province reducing angry sentiments against the government.

In an interview Small (2015) gives insight into the sensitive relationship of strategic partnership between India and Pakistan. Being allies neither in treaties, culture, values and militaries, their strategic partnership remains deeply rooted. Pakistan has greatly benefitted, in terms of military capabilities, given the importance of weapons in South

Asia and China in its year of isolation has benefitted from Pakistan acting as a mediator ascertaining its relations with the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the Taliban. In the words of a

Chinese expert, “If China decides to develop formal alliances; Pakistan would be the first place we would turn. It may be the only place we could turn." While economic relations have remained weak, much of the determined arrangements have tailed off because of reasons of corruption, setbacks in the economy of Pakistan and eye-to-eye non dealings with considerations to India. Pakistan would be the principal winner as of China rising as the world‟s global power given that the country keeps moving in the right political 52 direction and its internal security does not deteriorate. Otherwise, all opportunities to be gained would be lost.

Dahiya and Panda (2015) in their research study have taken an account in the meaning of

„sovereignty‟ and „history‟ as being selectively employed while discussing the cases of

South China Sea (SCS) and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing all the way through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), in spite of Indian concerns. The author articulates that India should state a clear stance regarding questions of legality on CPEC asking China to discontinue from its projects of CPEC, for it affects the sovereignty of

India. Debating and reasoning Indian claims, the author conclude that China needs to take on a rational approach regarding the concerned and evaluate its strategy. India needs to have a serious discuss its political, academic and diplomatic forethought on the subject, for it is known to New Delhi that presence of China in POK and Beijing‟s expression of

CPEC as its “livelihood project” is a nifty attempt justifying the unjustified. India needs to raise the issue with complete vitality rather than pursuing the matter irregularly or disjointedly.

Khan (n,d.) in his research paper evaluated China‟s strategic and economic objective and extension of its occurrence in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Conversely, India for securing its energy requirements and countering China‟s influence in the Arabian Sea the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Resultantly, Iran was brought into an alliance of economic and strategic partnership leading to working on Chahbahar port in the province of Sistan Baluchistan resulting into an open competition of rivalry between Chahbahar of

India and Gwadar of China. This increasing struggle between China and India is having an adverse impact on Pak-Iran relations. Having dual objectives, India wants to encircle 53

Pakistan by creating friendly relations with both Iran and Afghanistan. Investing heavily in constructing roads connecting the port of Chahbahar to Central Asia and Afghanistan,

India is cooperating keenly with countries of the region, posing a tough competition against the port of Gwadar. Competition among the two ports would not be a „ winner take all‟ result, only one of the port is to earn the bigger share of trade and in this consideration the winner is to be Chahbahar, for Iran is to be more secure than Pakistan.

Hamid and Hameed (2015) in their research article have presented a study focusing on qualitative investigation of the news articles on the image of Pakistan‟s media projection on CPEC. The newspapers of Pakistan did not only focus on admiration, it was also stated by the editorials that developments on CPEC depended on accurate considerations, opportunities and performance of deeds on part of Pakistan. The print media also remained distressed concerning the nature of the deal, terms and conditions of the investment. The narrative of news also showed concern as regards polluting the environment and displacement of people. Newspapers , the Daily Times and the He News emphasized issues of lack of general linguistics , religious or ties, of culture required for solidifying ties of „ iron-brother-friends-forever.‟ Concerns regarding the transparency of the projects were also discussed as an important problem forwarding proposals for the government. It was advised by journalists that Pakistan should ask for assistance on eradication of corruption and on policy considering management.

Sial (n,d.) in his study has talked about the economic cooperation between China and

Pakistan being expanded and strengthened through the initiative of Pakistan China

Economic Corridor (CPEC). In his report the author evaluates probable threats and dangers upsetting the implementation of the project with respect to violence and 54 insecurity pervading in Pakistan, its internal political and economic limitations in addition to obstacles existing at the regional and global level. This evaluation would help to comprehend and assess Pakistan‟s geostrategic dynamics and its economic and security environment needed for exploring practicability of the proposed outlook on the projects and for organizing threats hindering its implementation. More significantly, chances of threat with respect to „extremist militancy, nationalist insurgency and criminal violence‟ have been exploring on areas crossways Pakistan through which the corridor traverses. Closing details state that for smooth completion of the project, Pakistan needs to work on rising, above its political instability and crisis of economic meltdown.

Small (2015) in his book introduced “ Pakistan is China‟s Israel ” in the words of General

Xiong Guangkai , making Pakistan a fundamental player in China‟s transition of becoming a global power to a regional power. Acting as an asset for providing intelligence regarding the networks of jihadist endowing with threats to its internal stability , China for Pakistan is a ticket out of its economic failing and insecurity. China would want to see a better-functioning economy of Pakistan , exercise caution in its dealings with India and do a more convincing job against combating militancy in Uighur

, but in no way would all of these concerns avert India forced to turn to its western neighbor and make relations with Beijing easier to manage. The founding chapter of the book deals with China-India relations for establishing foundation of Pak-China relations, then comes the issue of terrorism and extremism, the imperatives of China‟s economic cooperation as overcoming obstacles, instability in Afghanistan, China as an actor for its long-term solution in the country and a probable stabilizer for the region. 55

Chandra (2016) in his book reviewed the partnership centered on the theme described by

Hussain Haqqani as, “For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India. For

Pakistan, China is a high-value guarantor of security against India.” In this limited strategic partnership, while China in Pakistan is an essential ally, China does not rely on

Pakistan to a great degree. Cooperation on a range of issues, including infrastructure projects of highways , mining of gold and copper , projects on electricity and projects on nuclear power , intelligence sharing , combating terrorism and restoration of ties with the

Muslim World have been discussed. While the visit of Chinese Premier to India is viewed in the context of economic prospects that made in Pakistan is characterized by political and strategic perspective. Indo-China relations have an independent dynamics not being constrained by “All-Weather Friendship” between Pakistan and China. Sino-

Pak and Sino-Indian Relations, the threat perceptions for India, China and Pakistan,

Pakistan –China Nuclear deal and concerns of non-proliferation and China-Pakistan

Strategy have been detailed.

Husain (2016) in his book introduced the world as a place of anarchy and disorder with acts of aggression being practiced even by liberal democracies violating principles of the charter of the UN or that of international law. Matters of strategic gains and partnership follow standards of power politics relatively than those of peace and security. The setback becomes more delicate when there is no solution provided through domestic politics and the international system, examples of which include the issue of Palestine,

WMD and nuclear proliferation. As US and other countries of the West set example for double standards regarding issues of nuclear security, developed on the lines of economic and commercial linkage, a policy followed by China strengthens the essence of friendly 56 relations and a milieu of international security. Trends of globalization, regional economic integration, knowledge as an imperative of strength also have certain implications for Pakistan under which Pakistan needs to formulate its own grand strategy protecting its national interest taking account of the changing global and regional environment.

2.4. Significance of Study

This study will be conducted to analyze the Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership and its regional implication. The existence of foreign forces from neighboring Afghanistan began in 2014 which underlined the need of intimacy in relations between Pakistan and

China. Both the countries share mutual interests and a vision of commitment, preservation, protection, promotion and stability of the region. The prospective for strategic partnership in this 21st century has been rightly declared as the‟ Asian Century‟; hence its significance needs to be strengthened. In light of the above mentioned developments the conclusion and results of this research would add to scholarly research, policy options and its practice for researcher, in terms of establishing developing trends and constraints between Pakistan and China and for practitioners to have an analysis with regards to various dimensions of strategic partnership aiding revision of its foreign policy options and strategies.

2.5. Research Objectives

Objectives in a research proposal identify goals which are linked to each of the research questions. The research objectives of this study include:

To know the context of Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership. 57

To study the changing regional and bilateral security and strategic environment, developing with Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership.

To study future policy options and their implications with regard to Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership.

2.6. Research Questions

In qualitative research, research questions for the researcher narrows down the purpose to definite questions. The following are research questions for the concerned research proposal

What developments were made for the strategic partnership between China and Pakistan?

How Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership is affecting its bilateral relations with the U.S. and its regional relations with India , Afghanistan and Iran?

What are the new areas of cooperation and what policy options can Pakistan pursue in light of this strategic partnership?

2.7. Research Design

In social science, qualitative research provides for skills needed for studying intricate textual descriptions of the manner in which people understand a given issue of research.

Characterized by its aims and methods it generates data analysis in words rather than in numbers. Where there is little information regarding a situation, it is best to start research using qualitative methods which will help in creating hypothesis, which if needed can then be tested through quantitative research. Methods in qualitative research intend to answer questions as regards to the phenomenon of „what,‟ „how‟ and „when‟ rather than 58

„how many,‟ or „how much.‟ When one wants to comprehend on how a particular community or its individuals identify and observe a particular concern , then using qualitative methodology is more appropriate , since it concentrates on people‟s experience , consideration of various perspectives and experiences , incidents and outlook affecting behaviors (Patton & Cochran, 2002).

Cresswell (1998) has mentioned about the use of qualitative research as a method of inquiry by anthropologists and sociologists. Qualitative research is not entirely accurate and investigators of research have to turn to human involvement, providing them with guidance, organization and direction. The structure, of course is needed and is essential for the investigation to be scientific, however the social world is neither methodical nor is it organized and therefore it is important for the researcher to proceed in a manner which is structured and organized. The following would then be the elements constituting qualitative research

The theoretical framework is not fixed, for it straightforwardly is driven from data.

The research being text bound makes the researcher sensitive to the text.

The research would be engrossed in its natural setting with people whose thoughts and feelings are to be explored.

The research would focus on emic perspective, views, perception, interpretation and meanings viewed by people.

Collection of data and its analysis proceed together. 59

Adopting a research approach should not depend on the ease and the interests of the researcher. Instead methodology and the procedure, rely on the nature and type of research question. A researcher stance considering its epistemology and its skill also matters. Moreover, accessible resources are used for research projects.

For the researcher, research methodology and its methods are not the only thoughts to ponder upon. Janesick (2000) mentions that methodolatry i.e. having fascination and overemphasis with research methods rather than its substance without reflection is some of the dangers of the research.

2.8. Research Method

The qualitative method which I will use for my study will be of Action Research.

“Action research...aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to further the goals of social science simultaneously. Thus, there is a dual commitment in action research to study a system and concurrently to collaborate with members of the system in changing it in what is together regarded as a desirable direction. Accomplishing this twin goal requires the active collaboration of researcher and client, and thus it stresses the importance of co- learning as a primary aspect of the research process.”

Figure 1

DIAGNOSISNG ACTION TAKING EVALUATING PLANNING ACTION Identifying or Study the defining a Considering Selecting course consequence of problem alternative course of of action an action action

SPECIFYING LEARNING

Identification of general findings

Source: Gerald I, S. (1983) Action Research: A Socio technical Systems Perspective. Ed.

G. Morgan. London: Sage Publications. Pp. 95-113.

2.9. Data Collection- Technique

The following research was make use of reading, analyzing and extracting relevant data from the books, official documents, research articles and the newspapers.

The data was thoroughly researched from the different sources including the Political

Science Department and Main Library of University of the Punjab with the consultancy of thesis supervisor. The official data from the government reports and documents were extracted from the government institutions and offices to make the research more authentic and reliable. 61

2.10. Selection of the Data

As a method, the research was conducted after selecting the data and the sources for extracting the said data. The sources were thoroughly analyzed and researched for an dependable and factual thesis.

2.11. Data Analysis

For analyzing data, content analysis would be used. The paper states that this kind of research categorizes for comparison collected data into themes and sub-themes. A major advantage of this analysis is that it helps the collected data to become reduced and simplified. Content analysis provides researchers the facility of structuring the collected qualitative data satisfying the completion of research objectives. Nevertheless, in content analysis, there are risks of human error being involved since it is feared that the researcher might misread the gathered data, generating changeable conclusions.

2.12. Availability of Resources

The following resources will supplement the available literature:

1. Library of Political Science, University of Punjab

2. HEC Digital Library

3. HEC recognized local journals of social sciences

4. Topic Relevant Books

5. Conference Papers 62

6. Websites

2.13. Work Plan

The duration of the study was of two years. The general plan of the study was as

following.

Activities Months

January-June May- Sep 2018- Feb Mar-June July -October

2017 Aug 2018 2018 2018

2017

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Literature search & review

Development of instruments

Data Collection

Data Analysis

Report wing

2.1.4. Outline of Chapters

Chapter 1: Introduction

The chapter briefly details the concept of strategic partnership and reason Pak-China

Strategic Partnership as developed from the year of U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan during 2014, India‟s strategic objectives in Afghanistan and its relations with Iran and implications for Pakistan.

Chapter 2: Literature Review & Research Design and Procedure

The chapter details the analyses of the literature, presenting to them the overview of the research conducted on the related topic.

Chapter 3: Pakistan China Relations: Historical Perspective (1962-2018)

The chapter looks into the relationship between Pakistan and China especially from 1962 to 2018 in historical perspective

Chapter 4: China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership as an emerging pattern to U.S.-

India Strategic Partnership

The chapter discusses areas of strategic partnership between India and U.S. in terms of civil-nuclear deal, economic, military and other areas of cooperation developing parallel to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) economic, military, countering terrorism , constraints and limitation in their areas of cooperation.

Chapter 5: India in Afghanistan – Implications for Pakistan and China

The chapter discusses in detail an overview of how India‟s presence and doctrinal ambitions in Afghanistan is acting as a constraint and hurdle in Pakistan-China vision of peace and regional stability.

Chapter 6: Iran’s Chahbahar Vs CPEC - Cooperation or Rivalry?

The chapter discusses how and to what extend is the port of Chabahar and CPEC comparable and whether it is to act as a bridge to cooperation or conflict affecting

Pakistan –India and Pakistan –Iran relations.

Chapter 7: Pakistan’s Strategic Options: Conclusion

The chapter provides for policy options and strategies which Pakistan needs to adopt keeping in mind its geostrategic position, national interests and relationship with its neighbors and will present the conclusion including findings to the research conducted.

References

Akif, H. M., & Huma H. Z. (2016). Pakistan‟s Print Media Presentation of Pakistan China

Relation and New Silk Route Corridor Project (A Case Study of Chinese President Xi

JinPing Visit Days).

Chandra, D. S. (2016). China-Pakistan Relations: Implications for India . Vij Books

India Pvt Ltd.

Dahiya, R., & Panda, J. (2015). A Tale of Two Disputes: China's Irrationality and India's

Stakes. IDSA Policy Brief.

Dumbaugh, B.K. Exploring the China-Pakistan Relationship Roundtable Report. Retrieved

August 2, 2010 from: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022883

Ghani, O. A., Alam, M., Gul, A. A., & Shah, A. (2013). Regional geo-strategic

challenges and opportunities for China-Pakistan co-operation. Islamabad: The

China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank.

Gulshan (2014, September 9) Genesis of Indian Ambitions in Afghanistan: Implications

for Pakistan. From http://www.ipripak.org/genesis-of-indian-ambitions-in-

afghanistan-implications-for-pakistan/Retrieved August 20, 2016

Husain, J (2016) Pakistan and the World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-first

Century. Palgrave Macmillan.

Husain, J. (2016). Pakistan and a World in Disorder, A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-

First Century. Palgrave Macmillan US.

Ijaz, A (2015, February 3) Pakistan‟s Strategic Partnership: China Vs US. The London

Post. 66

Janesick, V.A (2000) The choreography of qualitative research designs. In Handbook of

Qualitative Research (eds) pp. 209-210. Thousands Oaks, Saga.

Kabraji, R. (2012). The China-Pakistan Alliance: Rhetoric and Limitations. London:

Chatham House.

Kardon, I. B. (2011). China and Pakistan:Emerging Strains in the Entente Cordiale. The

Project 2049 Institute.

Khan, Z. A. (n.d.). China‟s Gwadar and India‟s Chahbahar: an analysis of Sino-India

geo-strategic and economic competition. Strategic Studies, pp. 79-101.

Kondapalli, S (2012) Testing China‟s Rise China-Pakistan Relations. In Misra , A &

Clarke , M.E.(Eds.), Pakistan‟s Stability Paradox: Domestic , Regional and International

Dimensions. Routledge.

Langkos, S (2014) Research Methodology: Data collection method and Research tools.

Manan, A (2015, April 21) Strategic Partnership: Pakistan-China ties hit a new high. The

Express Tribute.

O'Brien, R. An Overview of the Methodological Approach of Action Research. Retrieved August

10, 2016 from : http://www.web.ca/~robrien/papers/arfinal.html

Patton, Q. M. & Cochran, M (2002) A Guide To Using Qualitative Research Methodology. From

https://evaluation.msf.org/sites/evaluation/files/a_guide_to_using_qualitative_research_m

ethodology.pdf Retrieved August 10, 2016. 67

Rana, W., & Mahmood, H. (2015, April). Changing Dynamics of Pak-China Relations:

Policy Recommendations for Pakistan. American International Journal of

Contemporary Research, 5(2), 98-103.

Rousseau, R. (2014, May 14). How China and Pakistan Shift the Balance of Power in

South Asia. Retrieved August 20, 2016, from http://www.diplomaticourier.com:

http://www.diplomaticourier.com/how-china-and-pakistan-shift-the-balance-of-

power-in-south-asia/

Senator, H. M (2012) Pakistan and China : Strategic Partners in the 21st Century. From

http://www.nihao-salam.com/article-detail.php?id=Mjk3 Retrieved August 12, 2016.

Sial, S. (n.d.). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: an assessment of potential threats

and constraints.

Small , A. ( 2015). The China Pakistan Axis : Asia‟s New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press.

Susman, Gerald I (1983) Action Research: A Sociotechnical Systems Perspective. Ed. G.

Morgan. pp. 95-113. London: Sage Publications, 1983. 95-113.

The Sino-Pakistan Axis :Asia‟s „ little understood ‟relationship. (2015, January 15 ) DW. (April

30, 2006) .The Dawn.

Vandewalle, L. (2015). In-Depth Analysis Pakistan and China:'Iron brothers' forever?

Policy Department, European Union.

Wirsing, R. G. (2003). “The Enemy of My Enemy”: Pakistan‟s China Debate. Asia-

Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Zeb, R. (2012). Pakistan-China Relations: Where they go from here? UNISCI. 68

Zhongping , F., & Jing, H. (2014). China‟s strategic partnership diplomacy: engaging

with a changing world. European Strategic Partnerships Observatory .

Zicheng, Y. (2010). Inside China's Grand Strategy: The Perspective from the People's

Republic . University Press of Kentucky.

Chapter 3

Pakistan China Relations: Historical Perspective (1962-2018)

3.1. Introduction

The relations between Pakistan and China started in 1950, when Pakistan was among the first states to recognize China and end official diplomatic ties with the Republic of China or Taiwan. Since then, both states have given significance importance on keeping extremely cordial and supportive relations with each other as both sides have exchanged regular diplomatic high-level visits leading to a number of agreements. China has provided military, technical and economic assistance to Pakistan and each state consider other a close strategic ally. The ties have recently been the topic of fresh attention mainly due to mega projects like China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Masood, 2008).

Bilateral relations have evolved from an early Chinese policy to develop a partnership with a smaller but military powerful Pakistan. Diplomatic ties were officially established in 1950, all border issues were resolved in 1963, military cooperation started in 1966, a strategic alliance was established in 1972 and economic cooperation began in 1979.

China has shaped into Pakistan's biggest arms supplier and its third largest trade partner.

China has lend Pakistan loan of $60 million which was later turned into a grant after creation of Bangladesh. Recently both states have decided to cooperate in enhancing

Pakistan‟s civil power sector (BBC News, May 17, 2011).

Maintaining cordial ties with China is vital part of Pakistan‟s foreign policy. In 1986, then-President General Zia-ul-Haq visited China to further improve diplomatic ties. In addition, Pakistan was on the only two states, along with Cuba, to offer critical support to 70

China after Tiananmen protests of 1989. China and Pakistan also share close military ties, with China supplying a range of modern technology and weapons to Pakistani armed forces. China also supports Pakistan‟s stance on issue of Kashmir while Pakistan has always supported China on issue of Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. Military cooperation has increased with joint projects developing weapons ranging from guided missile to fighting jets (China Daily, 2006)

Pakistan-China cooperation has reached economic high points, with vital Chinese investment in Pakistan infrastructure sector expansion including development of deep-sea port Gwadar. Both states have an ongoing free trade deal. Pakistan has played role of

China‟s main connecting bridge between Muslim states. Pakistan also played a vital role in reducing the communication gap between China and Western countries by facilitating

1972 US President Nixon‟s visit to China. The ties between both sides have been described as higher than mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, dearer than eyesight, sweeter than honey and so on. The relationship has also been called All-

Weather Friendship.

As per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Pakistan is Chinas biggest weapons buyer, countering for almost 47% of Chinese exports. A BBC 2014 service poll revealed that 75% Pakistani citizens view Chinese influence positively while 15% expressed a negative view. In the Asia-Pacific region, Chinese people hold third most positive opinion about Pakistan‟s influence in the world, behind Indonesia and Pakistan itself (Haider, 2013).

Figure 2

Source: http://lahoredispatch.com/indias-border-dispute-with-china-1353

3.2. How Pakistan Sees China

For Pakistani citizens and government, China is a powerful neighbor, economic partner, defense ally, and vital for the new issues related to regional and global community and enhancing the commercial interests of the country. Pakistan lauds the bonhomie, it has received from China. Some analysts term it as a Chinese tactic to “smother the barbarian with love.” Pakistan as country feel that it has been victimized and targeted by the global states as the so-called “black sheep”, producing militants like Bin Laden and providing 72 nuclear equipment to states like Iran and North Korea, among many other baseless allegations. The country, hence, enjoys China‟s friendly developments and stance and the bond which has only thickened over the years (CNTV, May 24, 2013)

As China growing to be an dominant global power, which is in national interest of

Pakistan to stand with it and utilize the relations. On the other hand, the United States is seen as “ordering” Pakistan to “do more” despite the sacrifices, the country has given since 2001 (PCII, 2013).

The major reason and impetus leading Pakistan to look to and further reinforce its ties with China is rather vital. First, Beijing is a strong friend to have. By Pakistan‟s point of view, China is a rapidly growing global power and a cordial relations will give Islamabad with the immense benefit and upper hand which it demands in global community-for example, China has veto vote in the United Nations. Beijing is also a member of Nuclear

Suppliers Group (NSG), which is vital for Islamabad as Indo-US nuclear relation and

Islamabad‟s status as a non-signatory of the NPT (Khan, 2012).

Further, Islamabad also needs to develop the economy, and in this regard Chinese ties is important. The strategic deep-sea maritime Gwadar port provides Islamabad with an invaluable chance to strengthen commercial and economic ties with the Central Asian

Region which is energy rich. Gwadar port also significantly reduces distance by 500 kilometers between Central Asia and Pakistan, by providing trade of gas and oil resources from Central Asian Region to the global market, Pakistan open the possibility of important transit fees. 73

Moreover, to control and counter Indian regional influence, the Pakistan-China relation is considered as crucial. The relationship is also significant for raising the profile of

Pakistan among regional actors and states including neighboring states. Pakistan is also the only state that, as per PEW (2012) survey, can boast a near 90% favorable opinion for

Beijing. China is very famous among Pakistani masses, and same cordial point of view seems to be largely compact-cutting in several sectors of the society.

As discussed earlier, a major aspect in Pak-China ties has been the defence and industrial sector, specifically the “transfer of technology” is largely considered as a clear sign of

China‟s strong ties with Pakistan. China is sole states known to provide military technology to Pakistan, as well as encouraging self-reliance to Pakistan's military, along with significantly bolstering the “indigenous-isation” of Islamabad‟ defense power.

Within Pakistan military and civilian top leadership, it is agreed to give priority to strong relations with China (Pessler, 1993) .

After 2013 general elections, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who belong to the business family and Beijing follows a tight policy on business, on paper this shows a close harmonious alliance. Nawaz Sharif had also a past of cordial ties with India and

Western countries. The former prime minister of Pakistan in camping of 2013 election, had chosen on the anti-American emotional wave. Shehbaz Sharif, his brother and Punjab

Chief Minister, banned all USAID projects in Punjab as protest against US drone attacks on territory of Pakistan. (Rashid, 2013). 74

In November 2013, Opposition party PTI Chairman Imran Khan, holding power in

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), stopped NATO supply to Afghanistan in protest against

American drone campaign in FATA region.

Islamabad to depend significantly on Beijing‟s foreign policy agenda, which was shown in the visit of Chinese premier Li Kequang‟s to Pakistan in start of 2013. It was near the general elections 2013 in Pakistan, and in caretaker government when visits from foreign leaders especially high profile delegations, is rare. It was Chinese premier‟s first foreign visit as a premier. During the visit, outgoing President Asif Ali Zardari reiterated the importance of China to Pakistan. “Friendship with China is cornerstone of out foreign policy.” Chinese premier told Asif Ali Zardari and caretaker prime minister and next premier Nawaz Sharif (Rashid, 2013).

The tour focused on enhancing trade relations with next government, and was based on the agenda of similar visit India, where bilateral ties were only centre of discussion. Tariq

Fatimi, ex-US envoy, said that Chinese visit during this time period as essential and establish new policies and agenda for next government.

3.3. How China Sees Pakistan

China holds a highly favorablilty for Pakistan, as per PEW Research Centre as of 2017, out of ten, nine Pakistani citizens sees Beijing as a close partner of the country. On the other hand, however, one-third (31%) of Chinese citizens view Pakistan is favor prism., while 23% viewed India in positive side, and 43% have positive opinion about America.

The less favorable ratings in China about Pakistan is possibly because of global negative image of Pakistan. (PEW, 2012) 75

Rejecting the famous notion that Islamabad “needs” China more, there apparently exists school of experts exists in China that believe that “China needs Pakistan more” as per analysts who have know-how of regional and global dynamics. It can be say that closeness between Islamabad and Beijing thrives where both sides can offer the other something acceptable equally. Firstly, the countering India through Islamabad is significant for China. India without a doubt is critical issue and significant for both states

(PEW, 2012).

As a rising regional power, Beijing wants to establish a group of allies in the region; it has any policy of hegemony, however, it seems through its stature in South Asian Region which is mainly controlled by two major policies: energy and security.

Firstly, about the security, Beijing seems to be keen to establish stability on its own territory. Looking to further solidify its economic grip, Beijing‟s outlook for the next decades is critical for achieving its economic goals that, in return, require peace in the region. In South Asian Region, China is constantly promoting the slogan that “economy is the new currency of security”. To this end, Beijing attempts to ensure that even Indo-

Pak ties keep stable (Arango & Klaus, 2013).

Unstable political circumstances in Pakistan and energy shortage directly impacts Foreign

Direct Investment (FDI) of the country. According to one Chinese official in the past,”

As the political situation stabilizes and the economy keeps on growing, there will increased potential for investment, and Pakistan exports will gradually grow.” Beijing is interested in making the region into an economic hub. This can be traced back to reform policies introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1983, converting the small village of Shenzhen 76 city-then population of 70,000-to a huge 7 million metropolis. China‟s top priority in the next two to three decades will remain economy centric.

Secondly, with regard to energy, in order to keep up with its rapidly growing energy requirements, Beijing seeks new and expedient routes. The, before mentioned, security policies provides China safe passages. Hence China appears geared to developing

Gwadar on faster track where expanding road inter-links to the city is underway and the establishment of railway tracks is also discussed. During 1980s, industry of China was established in its western province Xinjiang with Kashghar as a main city, as Beijing needs more energy and needs to enhance its sources. Gwadar port offers a critical access to sea routes to the Indian Ocean from Chinese province of Xinjiang (Washington Times,

January 17, 2015).

The geopolitics of Pakistan is vital for China as 50% of Chinese oil trade come from the

Middle East and 20% imports come from Africa. Currently, the oil is mostly passing through the Strait of Malacca, a sea-borne supply route that be easily intervened by the world powers. US and Indian military bases are established in the region, potentially leading to disturbance to Chinese economy in case of conflict. They can interfere Chinese shipments in sea rich oil under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

As current Gulf of Aden route is dominated by the US military bases, Chinese strategic military interests-running till 2025-includes expanding the role of its Naval presence for countering this expected threat. Chinese presence in Gwadar is henceforth strategically significant. There is an ongoing academic debate whether Gwadar port is established to work as part of Chinese “String of Pearls” policy along the sea-lanes in the region. In 77

2005, it was reported that China had already established “electronic eavesdropping posts” in Gwadar that monitor “sea traffic through Arabian Sea and Strait of Hormuz (Al-

Jazeera, November 27, 2013).

Especially in context of Pakistan, China wants to establish a more secure situation by raising pro-China sentiments and suppressing anti-China stances, including those related to terrorist groups with bases in, or links to, Pakistan‟s FATA region. Beijing is also interested in using Pakistan‟s good ties with Muslim states, especially Middle Eastern countries. Beijing, possible rendered unease by the US military and economic engagement in its own territory: Including the deployment of the US troops in Australia, the increased Trans-Pacific Partnership that excludes Beijing and the support of the states that are in territorial conflicts with China in South China Sea. In this regard, on

November 26, 2013, in defiance of China‟s newly expanded Air Defense Identification

Zone (AIDZ), America flew two unarmed planes over the disputed islands in East China

Sea, claimed by both China and Japan (Peper, 2018; Sengupta, 2015) The United States also hinted that more military flights into China-claimed defense zone would be conducted. Divergence in approach to nuclear program of North Korea and missile program has also fueled to tensions in China-US ties (Dai, 2014; Dumbaugh, 2010)

In such a unstable circumstances, China is likely to protect its partnership with regional friends, like Pakistan, which has continuously supported interests and political positions of China in the regional politics-in order to counter American advances (Siddique, 2014).

3.4. Diplomatic Relations

By most accounts the flattering cliché statements often exchanged between Pakistan and

China praising each other of their friendship is not an entire exaggeration. Leaders of both states have typically been effusive and often poetic while talking about their ties.

Since the inception of bilateral relations in May 1951, Islamabad and Beijing have had relatively smooth diplomatic ties over the years (Hongmei, 2018; Pakistan Today, May

15, 2016). The hyperbolic jargon use to explain the Pak-China relationship is almost used by all top ties officials of both countries, pointing at the preeminence of diplomatic ties. This is vital because 1) China is considered as all-weather friend, in that it will never abandon Pakistan as the United States is known to have done repeatedly, 2) Self-reliance, it offers a chance for Islamabad to stand on its own through transfer of technology through China, 3) Counterpoise India by keeping strong ties with power like China and maintaining the balance of power in South Asian Region, 4) Cooperation in

Counterterrorism efforts (Amin, 2000; Javed, 2015)

The blueprint of Pakistan-China relationship precedes the present government in

Islamabad as there is an actual understanding that no matter what government is in power, the ties with China are considered vital. Every government in Pakistan-military or civilians have supported strong and friendly relations with Beijing. Despite that Pakistan was part of US-led western block during Cold War and member various military alliance like, SEATO and CENTO, which are arguably at containing Chinese influence, ties were forged between these two South Asian states, most notably during the 1954, Bandung

Conference (a forerunner to the Non-Aligned Movement), in Indonesia. Bandung provided an interface to start Pakistan-China dialogue, where Islamabad assured Beijing 79 that it only joined SEATO to protect itself and not as a containment policy or strategy against China (Barnds, 1975; Goswami, 1971).

During this time period, China was facing a revolution, it was struggled with under- development and a relative international isolation at large. Pakistan played a critical role in entering China to global politics and establishing a bridge between China and United

States. Pakistan prides itself in leading the campaign for the restoration of Chinese legitimate right in United Nations. In China, Pakistan is remembered as “the bridge with which it crossed the river.” Islamabad bolstered Beijing‟s diplomatic position, President

General (r) Ayub Khan supported China at United States Security Council (UNSC).

Pakistan at the time had British learning to impart and include China to rest of the globe

(Bhola, 1986; Butt, 2007).

In 1971, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger officially visited Pakistan, during which

Islamabad facilitated Kissinger‟s secret visit to China. This established the foundation for a subsequent visit by Nixon and the “opening up” of China to rest of the world. In the mindset of establishment of Pakistan, the event in Pak-China history to have congealed

Chinese friendship and trust in the role by the latter in the starting mainland China to recognized by the US government and the international community. Beijing has repeatedly stated that it has “not forgotten” the cooperation and help Pakistan provided during that time (Jain, 1981).

At Bandung, Islamabad has also communicated to China the threat posed by India.

Although during 1950s, China and India relationship were hailed under the famous slogan Hindi Cheeni bhai bhai (Hindu and Chinese are brothers), the border conflict in 80

1962 between both countries gave Islamabad an opportunity to water the seeds of friendship planted at Bandung. Meanwhile, India was significantly projected as the major overlapping regional interest to connect Islamabad and Beijing (Khan, 2006). The ties sprouted more with the establishment of Non-Alignment Movement (NAB) in Belgrade in 1961, comprising states not formally part of any alliance during Cold War, and through prevailing Sino-Soviet schism that was accompanied by an Indo-Soviet alliance.

Convergence of strategic mutual interest, threat perceptions and same approach to major regional and international developments pushed Pakistan-China diplomatic liaison. In this regard, the agreement to form Annual Meeting Mechanism at the leadership and

Dialogue Mechanism at level of foreign ministries hold strategic significance. There could be said to presence of a mutual genuine appreciation, respect and understanding, specifically at the state-to-state level. Strict fidelity to the Five fundamentals of Peaceful existence is mostly hailed as the hallmark of this unique union (Naseer & Amin, 2011)

The five principles of Peaceful Existence was first formally formed in a pact between

India and China in 1954 and formulated following five following tenants:

Mutual respect for territorial sovereignty of integrity of other state

Non-aggression on mutual level

Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs

Mutual benefit and equality

Peaceful co-existence

Beijing often associate itself from these five principles. As India and China lapsed on the pact, entering into issues, conflicts, Pakistan‟s adherence to these principles was 81 advertised (Sarwar, 1996). While China was continue to experience conflicts and confrontations with most its 22 geographic neighboring countries including Japan, India,

Russia, Vietnam and Korea, Pakistan remains one of the few neighboring states with whom Beijing hold cordial ties (Khan, 2011; Zaki, 2010).

Kashmir territory held the potential conflict between Pakistan and China, as the borders were not clear since 1946. Pakistan, however, in 1963, quietly handed over 5, 180 square kilometers of Kashmir to China. Some experts believe however, despite what is often presumed in Pakistan, it was China that ceded territory to Pakistan. Nevertheless, the issue was peacefully resolved, highlighting and further strengthening Pakistan-China bond. The reason for no serious conflict having erupted is buttressed hugely in the fact that Pakistan-China security concerns do not confrontation (Guruswamy, 2010; Khan,

2013).

Indeed, Pakistan extend its support to all major political issues important to China, including Beijing‟s right to Taiwan and its claim over the disputed territories in the region, supporting “One China” policy. In return, China-an emerging global power-holds record of defending Pakistan in global bodies and world forum an promulgating interests of Pakistan. At the UNSC, for example, Beijing has used its veto power at Bangladesh‟s request to UN, imposing the condition that Prisoners of War (POWs) of Pakistan returned first (Afridi, 2009; Jain, 2010).

In recent past, the a threat to jangle Pakistan-China relationship is the threat of rapidly emerged phenomenon of terrorism and instability in Pakistan. However, despite, the graveness of the issue of Uighur militancy in China, sand one that has reportedly links 82 with militants in Pakistan, state-to-state ties remain stable and resolute. Instead, there prevails a thought and understanding that anti-Pakistan “secret hands” wanted to sabotage the regional security and derailing the Pak-China relationship are at work.

In fact, Beijing has expressed considerable sympathy for Islamabad despite the latter being referred as “terror-sponsor” or “failing” state by huge sections of the global community. China has-in total contrast to the US-largely appreciated Pakistan‟s counter- terrorism efforts. Over the years, China has tackled American dissatisfaction with

Islamabad for “not doing enough” to fight militancy. Moreover, in response to the

American drone strike on Pakistan, Beijing has stressed it support for Pakistani integrity.

Chinese premier Li Keqian expressed this in a statement:

We recognize the positive contribution Pakistan has made to maintain peace and stability, combat terrorism and promote development in South Asia as well as the huge pressure from various sides on it. The international community should give Pakistan full understanding, recognition and necessary support. On behalf of the Chinese government,

I wish to reiterate solemnly China‟s continued firms support to Pakistan in its efforts to uphold independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and achieve national stability and development (Chang & Halliday, 2011).

The constant and public support for Pakistan by China in the aftermath of American raid on Osama Bin Laden‟s hideout in Pakistan in May 2011 is evidence of Chinese timely assurance of strong solidarity with Pakistan. The gesture, was largely taken as symbolic of the two states continued strategic correspondence, from the bilateral to world level.

Similarly, after the Mumbai attacks in 2008, Pakistani Foreign Office immediately 83 looked towards China, possibly seeking assistance-indicating the level of trust between both states. Further, when foreigners, including Chinese, were attacked in mid-2014,

Pakistani officials personally flew to Beijing to discuss the issue and ensure the future complete security of Chinese citizens in Pakistan, making it priority to stop any adverse affects of the incident on underway Pak-China development projects. These action show the continued cordial cooperation and supported shared by both sides.

Other instances, marking bonhomie includes the 100,000 pieces of commemorative coins national flags of both states with inscriptions “Sixty years celebration of the

Independence of Jamhoria China” and “Long Live Pak-China friendship” that were issued by State Bank of Pakistan in 2009 in an development to express its solidarity with people of China. Another major example is “Year of Pak-China Friendship 2011” was designated to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties between both states (Raza,

January 24, 2011)

3.5. Diplomatic Relations in 21st Century

In 21st century, Pakistan-China ties entered in new phase of cooperation and development. When former Pakistani president General Pervaiz Musharraf became new chief executive of the country, he mainly focuses to improve ties with China in wake of hostility with India. In January 2000, General Musharraf visited China after few months of holding office. Musharraf met the his Chinese counterpart Premier Zhou Ronhji and discusses the issues and problems related to US sanctions of Pakistan‟s nuclear policy and discussed issued related to democracy. He also emphasized on enhancing Pak-China trade and economic ties. Premier Zhoue Rongji said military government in Pakistan 84 would not affect the bilateral ties of both countries and stated: “In our nation-building endeavors, our two countries have supported each other and have carried out fruit full cooperation”. Meanwhile, President Musharraf said that “Pakistan considers China as its most reliable time tested friend” (Mahmood, 2000; Tao, 2012).

In 2001, both countries celebrated a huge scale on 50th anniversary of Pakistan-China bilateral relation. In May 2001, Chinese premier Zahou Rongji visited Pakistan to attend the anniversary of Pakistan and China bilateral relations. Zahou Rongji announced that

China would initiate cooperation on an the initial development of deep sea port Gwadar and coastal highway in Pakistan (Sattar, 2010). Rongji also said that peace and stability in

South Asian Region is the priority of China.

The 9-11 attacks shocked the world and the international community reacted with shock.

All states condemned the attacks and expressed sympathy with people of America.

President Musharraf issued a strong statement condemning the attack. He also affirmed

Pakistan‟s readiness to join the United States in its war against terrorism. US attacked

Afghanistan, in context of the 9-11 attacks, and urged Pakistan to become the front ally in the war. Pakistan‟s alliance with the US in this war did not, however, affect its ties with

China (Umer, 2013).

After becoming party of war against terrorism, President Musharraf immediately visited

China. In December 2001, reached China on invitation of Chinese President, where he met President Jian Zemin and discussed Pakistan‟s role in war against terrorism and regional security situation. Musharraf stated that “The cornerstone of Pakistan‟s Foreign policy is its cordial relation and association with People‟s Republic of China.” 85

Furthermore, China ensured its support for Pakistan as a part of US war (Sattar, 2010;

Tao, 2012).

In 2002, China also joined United States and European Union efforts to prevent a potential war between Pakistan and India. US Secretary of State, Powell, later praised

Chinese role “helpful role.” On March 2003, then-Prime Minister Zafrullah Jamali was first foreign prime minister who visted China to meet new Prime Minister Wen Jiabao.

Both sides signed agreement on peaceful civil nuclear transmission, as well as economic sectors. Both countries agreed to establish Pak-China friendship forum (Kataria &

Naveed, 2014).

Further, in 2003, President Musharraf visited China and signed the Pak-China Joint

Declaration for mutual cooperation in all the fields. President Musharraf met President

Hu Jinato and discussed the circumstances of terrorism at both regional and global level.

Musharraf also attended the second annual conference of Boao Forum for Asia in

Chinese province of Hainan.

In 2005, Chinese President Wen Jiabao‟s visit to Pakistan marked as a fresh stage in already strong ties between good friends, good neighbours and good partners whose friendship has withstood the test of time and global changing circumstances. Shaukat

Aziz and Wen signed Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Ties, pledging mutual support in defence of integrity, independent and terrorist sovereignty.

Meanwhile, both leaders jointly declared to start dialogue on a free trade region between

Pakistan and China and signed twenty one agreements to promote close economic and trade relations (Kataria & Naveed, 2014). 86

In April 2005, Chinese President and Prime Minister sent sympathy messages to Pakistan after a train clashed in Sindh. Furthermore, in 2005, President Musharraf visited China and stated that Pakistan is proud of its tied with China. “Out ties with China are time- tested and broad-based and this tour will be a landmark in further increasing our political and economic friendship.”

In February 2006, President Musharraf sought Chinese support for Pakistan to become full member of Shahghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stating Pakistan can play an active role in the stability, peace and progress of the region. Chinese Chairman of

National People‟s Congress, Wu Bangguo, ensured their support against terrorism and praised Paksitani role in counter terrorism in the region. Meanwhile, On China‟s world

Affairs, an author launched a book on President Muhsarraf. In this the author described

President Musharraf as universally recoganized leader who has contributed in the regional peace as well as globe. Professor Yang Daoin, the author of the book, titled the book “Iron-willed statesman of the 21st Century, himself present a copy to Musharraf who was on five-day visit to China.

In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jinato visited Pakistan and stated that

“Pakistan was one of the first states to recognize China. Since the beginning of our diplomatic ties in 1951, we have enjoyed bilateral understanding, trust, support and respect and our cooperation and friendship have flourished over the years. We, in true meaning, have good neighbours, cordial friends, dear brothers and trusted partners.”

Meanwhile, Pakistan awarded highest civil award of Nishan-e-Pakistan to Jintao for idealist leadership and his great contribution to further enhance Pak-China ties. Both 87 states signed deal related to Pak-China Free Trade Agreement and their common cooperation in several fields.

After 2008 elections, Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP) came into power and Prime Minister

Yousaf Raza Gillani visited China to attend the Beijing Olympics. During his visit, he met President Hu Jintao, and Premier Wne Jiabao and signed a few agreements. In

October 2008, on his first visit as President, Asif Ali Zardari met Chinese political leadership, businessmen, and Chinese media. During his visit, he signed several agreements related to trade, agriculture, economy, technology and communications.

In October 2008, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani again visited China. He especially went to attent the Asia Europe Summit Meeting (ASEM). The prime minister met the several Chinese corporal leaders. He also invited Chinese businessmen to invest in

Pakistan and establish joint ventures with Pakistan. He also met the heads of state and

Government during ASEM in which he met prime ministers of Italy, Poland, India, Japan and Malaysia (FMPRC, 2009).

In April 2009, Asif Ali Zardari visited Hainan Island to attend Annual Meeting of Moao

Forum for Asia. This meeting was attended by eleven heads of states. The President met with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. He also met Chinese President, China International

Offshore Oil Corporation Head and Chinese Investment Corporation leaders and welcomed them to invest in Pakistan. In August 2009, President Zardari agains visited

China and went to Hangzhou and Guangzhou. He met with new leadership of Communist

Party of China. Both countries signed three MoUs for cooperation in the field of fisheries. 88

President Zardari stated the significance of relations between both countries (Business

Recorder, August 26, 2009)

In 2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo announced that next year would be celebrated as

Pak-China friendship year. In 2011, both countries celebrated their ties on the occasion of

60th anniversary of bilateral Pak-China ties. On May 2011, governments and common people of both countries sent messages to one another. The year witnessed remarkable progress in the field of trade, defence, sports, education development, economic, and cultural development. During 2012, both sides exchanged high level visits as top leadership from Pakistan including Speaker and Deputy National Speaker, Chairman

Senate, Prime Minister, President and officials of different delegations went to China.

Furthermore, military leadership, Chief of Army Staff General Afaq Kiyani and Naval

Chief, visited China and attended Maritime cooperation ceremony of PNS Aslat.

(Reuters, July 4, 2011).

In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China on invitation of Premier Li Keqiang where he met with Chinese president, premier and chairman of standing committee of the

National People‟s Congress. In the same year Chinese envoy to Pakistan told National

Defence University (NDU) that “the Chinese government attaches great importance to developing relations with South Asia, and takes South Asia as a key direction of China‟s opening up to the west and a prominent position in China‟s neighboring diplomacy”.

(Dawn, July 7, 2013).

3.6. Economic Ties between Pakistan China

“We hope to create a giant economic corridor that would not only enhance China‟s strategic significance but would also help in restoring peace and stability to Asia.”

The trade volume between both countries surpassed US $22billion in 2012 with Pakistan increased by 48%, and Chinese investment reached the figure of $12 billion. While

Pakistan-China has exceeded that of Pakistan-US, Pakistan‟s exports to the United States are higher than Chinese exports. That is, the whole volume of trade between Pak-China clearly tilts in Beijing‟s favor. As per some experts, this imbalance is not essentially is not a bad sign, since Beijing trade balance with most of the states including India, is in its favor (Ghausi, 2008; Rahman, 2010).

Under the increasingly comprehensive structure Sino-Pak mutual economic cooperation in form of Joint Economic Commission, Economic Cooperation , Joint Energy Working

Group and a joint Investment and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in addition to other projects and collaborations. Better economic framework cooperation still exists, specifically Framework Agreement on Expanding and Deepening Bilateral Economic and

Trade Cooperation (signed February 2006), Free Trade Agreement (November 2006), and China Pakistan Economic Corridor (started in 2013), and the extended Joint Give

Year Economic Plan are also have been in place (Kumar, 2006; Rahman, 2013).

The 2006, saw the signing of bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and five-year

Development Program on Economic and Trade Cooperation-tend to enhance the bilateral trade between both countries. The agreements were implemented in 2007. It set a target of $ 15 billion by 2010, while the said target was not attained, bilateral trade-which stood 90 at ca. $ 7 billion in 2006, increased to $ 12 billion by 2012, which was also a 17.6 % increase on the passing years. In 2006, China became Pakistan‟s third largest trading partner, including for 9.8% of Islamabad‟s imports, while it ranked eleventh (3 %) for exports of Pakistan. Meanwhile, in comparison, Pakistan was China‟s 54th biggest trading partner (0.13% of China‟s imports) and 33rd biggest for exports 0.44 percent (Crilly,

2011; Dawn, January 15, 2012; Haq, 2014).

In 2013, Beijing was Islamabad‟s second largest trading partner, while 2004-2008 exports from Beijing to Islamabad reached on average 55% per six months, while exports from Islamabad to Beijing rose to 35% (Khan & Baloch, 2014; Pakistan Today, April 24,

2014).

Figure 3

Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/china/exports-to-pakistan

In late 2010, the development program was renewed and add 36 different projects- including energy, water, care, health, information and environment and communication technology. The two states again set to follow a trade target of $ 15 billion, this time by the year 2015. Mainly, due to Islamabad‟s long unstable economy. Islamabad officials have been more expensive in pushing for greater imports and investment trade between

Pakistan and China, eagerly reaching for the $15 billion set target and encouraging and inviting Beijing to explore more and more economic opportunities across Pakistan (Jia,

2015).

Currently, Pakistan is the only state in South Asia with a free trade agreement and a currency exchange with China. The agreement includes annexes that contained the end of tariff reduction and import custom duties was set to complete within next five-year period, effectively by January 2012. In 2013, Beijing stated that it will establish consultation with Islamabad on second phase tax reduction dialogue. To increase trade growth, on May 7, 2013, State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) and People‟s Bank of China

(PBC), agreed on a currency exchange agreement (CSA), stating the two states can now conduct trade directly without the use of American dollars as the intermediary trade currency (Kasi, 2017; Memon, 2014).

Amid political and economic corridors, however, there is a vital recognition that the trade potential between two states has not been fully achieved. Bilateral economic trade and cooperation, along with people-to-people contact, is frequently known as “weak points” in Pak-China ties. The imbalance of trade is one of Pakistan‟s measures and concerns to lessen the gap are often discussed and measured steps have been taken to increase the exports levels to China. To bring the economic cooperation at level of political and 92 defense ties on the front burner Pakistan‟s policy vis-à-vis China. Islamabad, takes this imbalance rather seriously and a constant pressure exist on the federal government, specifically by the Punjab Board of Trade and Investment, to counter all obstacles to higher trade (Lee, 2016; Zhendong, 2013).

Ministry of Commerce officials from Pakistan have asked for establishment of complete database on all items that can be exchanged with China; for Islamabad to enhance its business practices, proper linkages; along with overcoming the language barrier and contribute to cross border exhibitions. Furthermore, emphasize on implementing and providing security to the land routes, especially to CPEC, connecting both states, so that connection among people can deepen, hence strengthening the bond the two countries

(Jinhai & Zweig, 2015; Kyani, 2013)

The discourse in Pakistan centers on increasing the state‟s “exportable” and the need for the government to establish diversification policies. A top priority is to work towards export-oriented step-including building factories, enhancing structural range and design, value added, and raw materials, export to Beijing and then “fast track” the whole process.

The conventional in Pakistan seems to be that it should able to take more advantage of

Beijing‟s fast growing demands for imports for foreign items and goods. If Islamabad could get only slight slice of this whole amount, the state‟s economy would only benefit immensely. Beijing is to assist Islamabad with latter‟s crisis in energy sector by establishing Bunji and Basha dams (Aneja, 2006).

Figure 4

Source: https://www.brecorder.com/2017/10/11/374174/pakistans-failure-in-trade-with- china/ During March 2013, then-Pakistani envoy to China, Masood Khalid, encouraged Chinese businessmen to explore more opportunities and increase the cooperation between the two nations, especially he encouraged constant improving “connectivity” between Chinese

Xinjinag region that situated along border of Pakistan‟ Northern areas. In fact, the government of Pakistan is known to invite and persuade Chinese investors by providing special incentives and proper assistance. As per Chinese economic expert Zu Ziang,

“Pakistan‟s business environment is very liberal, with all sector open to investment and no limitations on foreign equity. (…) Chinese entrepreneurs can invest in special economic zones and our embassy will provide assistance”.94 Previously Pakistan had provided China with its first Overseas Economic and Trade Cooperation Area (OETCA)

– the Haier-Ruba Economic Zone (HRZ) (Robins, 2017). 94

As of 2017, there are approximately 30, 000 Chinese in Pakistan and over 150 Chinese companies operational in the country, several working on energy and infrastructure projects. Chinese Orient Group has invested over $700 million in energy sector of

Pakistan, and was lauded by former President Asif Ali Zardari in 2012 for leading

Chinese, at that time, in Pakistan. Zardari further encouraged the Group to invest and explore in other sectors. “We look forward to benefit from Orient Group‟s expertise in port development, financial services, banking and investment.”(The Nation, May 8,

2012).

In return, Beijing stated that it will assist and cooperate with Pakistan in “all” sectors and support the country in its efforts to establish “national stability and enhance economic and social development.” In 2016, Chinese authorities states that they take trade imbalance between both states seriously and are taking measures to address the issue. The

Chinese premier visited Pakistan in May 2013, after general elections and signed numerous important agreements focused on the establishment CPEC. That visit is seen as pivotal where China announced the plant to construct the CPEC. On July 4, 2013, then-

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China which was his first overseas destination as head of the state (Rifaat & Mian, 2015)

The prime minister of Pakistan conducted meeting with leaders of Chinese corporate and financial sectors and visited major industrial centers and special Economic Zones in

China. It is also to be mentioned that chief minister of Balochistan was also part of the

Pakistani delegation visiting China. The Chinese major bank executives met with the delegation and aimed not only to finalize the major economic and regional issues but also to give green light to several projects, and task forces related to CPEC (Markey, 2016). 95

Along with trade sector, China has had deep impact on fields of heavy industry, energy including nuclear, promoting Pakistani self-sufficiency at different platforms. The projects by China total $25.89 billion as of 2016. Future cooperation is geared at coordination and in space and technology, climate change, UN reform, maritime security and most importantly, in resolving Pakistan‟s energy crisis. An Energy Cooperation

Mechanism have been established to promote collaboration in renewable, conventional and civil nuclear energy.

Over 150 Chinese companies are presently working in Pakistan. Mineral resources

Development are ongoing to assist Pakistan with its energy needs and explore alternative energy sources, major examples include Gold Mine Project and Saindak Copper, Duda lead-Zinc Mine Project and Thar Coal Mining Project. Moreover, in communication sectors, China has strong presence as China Mobile has invested over $700 million in communication in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China

(ICBC) has opened its branches in Karachi and Islamabad. Beijing offers assistance with regard to Forex, Keeping it at a point that ensures better exchange rates. In response, however, Pakistan has argued that it should receive a large share of Chinese exchange reserves going to African countries and South American states.

In last few years, the land trade between both countries has been increasing constantly reaching $13.77 billion in 2017, and there are more talks of further expanding road linkages. The famous Khunjerab pass connects Pakistan to China and is built on the both sides, and road is further widened around the Sust checkpoints with expansion up to four lanes. Initially there were skepticism in some quarters that the CPEC can be a “gimmick” implying that inhospitable terrain renders it impossible to connect all the cities in the 96 area. However, the others argue that the mega project feasible when considering Chinese feats in constructing rail networks in more difficult areas in its own terrain (Saeed, 2017).

3.7. Defense Ties of Pakistan and China

The most time-tested side of Pakistan China ties remains within the sector of defence.

Beijing is known to supply material support to Pakistan armed forces including Army,

Navy and Air Force. According to a 2013 report, Pakistan was the largest recipient of

Chinese export weapons. Islamabad has also bought to benefit from Chinese plutonium- based nuclear program It is widely believed that Chinese support contributed to Pakistan being nuclear state. Beijing remains a vital source of nuclear and military technology for

Pakistan. Starting from forum of Defence and Security Talks established in 2002, both countries signed a landmark deal in December 2008 to enhance military cooperation.

Pakistan-China military ties have been source of worry for other regional states, especially India (Gady, 2017; Wong, 2018)

Pak-China military cooperation has been a source of worry for other regional state specifically India. In 2016, Indian Defence Minister said” The increasing nexus between

Pakistan and China in military sphere remains an area of serious concern of India.”

Between 2008-2021, Beijing‟s weapons exports increased by 162% compared to the last five-year period, and its share in the international weapons exports increased to 2% to

5%., thereby replacing UK as the fifth largest global exported of arms. It was also the first time in last 20 years that a shift was observed in the list of top exporters of weapons.

According to SIPRI Arms Transfer Program: “Beijing rise has been driven, mainly due buying by Islamabad at large scale.” Indeed, above held of Chinese exports- 97 approximately 55%, during 2008-212 were to Pakistan. During same time, Pakistan ranked third in top five importers list, taking 5% of the international arms imports, following Indian (12%) and China (6%) (Global Security, 2005; IRNA, 2010; Niazi,

2005)

Furthermore, while the international expenditure on arms fell by 0.5% from 2011-2012, states like China and Russia were seen to increase their spending on them. China was the second biggest arms spender in 2012 (increasing the military expenditure by 7.8%) and

Russia holds the third largest place (increase by 16%). Until now, it has remained unclear that whether Islamabad is importing its lion share from China, the Pakistani military establishment, however, terms China as “one of its closest partners” along with US and

France. There is small indication that Beijing will stop selling weapons to Islamabad and will lose a major market. The US remains the top partner in arms supplying including defense hardware and military programs however, it is more cost-effective to receive the same equipment from China (Curtis, 2009; Makhdoom et. al., 2014)

As per a declassified CIA report in April 2013, China was exporting the material regarding nuclear arms to Third World countries, including Pakistan, without set safeguards. Beijing is believed to assist Pakistan in enhancing the nuclear weapons capability. The main development in this regard includes “verbal consent in 1974, to help

Islamabad to develop a “nuclear blast” capability, conditional and hedged commitment in

1976 to supply technology of nuclear weapons and unspecified excised information that increased the “possibility that China has provided a fairly comprehensive package of proven nuclear design information.” The documents mention that is also possible that 98 exchange between both sides was two-way as Pakistan likely supply the centrifuge technology to Beijing (Adnan, 2011; Economic Times, March 17, 2017)

Beijing developed two nuclear plants in Pakistan during 1990s and pen an agreement in

2009 to establish two more-a deal to which it continues to accept that it was initiated in

1986, before China became member of Nuclear Supply Group (NSG). The Chashma

Nuclear Power Plant of Pakistan is known as the first nuclear power plant imported from the Beijing (Akhtar, 2008; Malik, 2016).

Although US-India ties are believed to face issues on numerous front, further development in their defense deals are nevertheless worrisome for both China and

Pakistan. Beijing‟s dealing with Islamabad has always been conducted with a careful eye on India. As such, both states are interested in counterbalancing the nuclear deals between United States of America and India. Although India has not signed Non

Proliferation Treaty, still in 2005, American signed a controversial deal with India to assist in developing its nuclear program. India is strategically vital for US as a counterweight to China. Establishing strong ties with India is a key element of US, and most of the Western states, foreign policy regarding South Asia which views India as more beneficial and favorable ally as compared to Pakistan (Bokhari, 2016).

This US-India nuclear deal was opposed by China on the grounds that it is not equitable and it favoured a similar NSG, exemption for Pakistan. Similarly, the US vouched for

Indian membership in the group which has ruffled the feathers in Islamabad and Beijing, for it made India the only state outside the NPT to enter the group (Meng & Chan, 2015) 99

The Chahsma Nuclear Power Plant Complex is the cornerstone of Pakistan-China located near Chahsma city in Punjab. The Chahsma Power Plant 1 and Chahsma Nuclear Power

Plant 2 have been constructed with Chinese assistance while Chahsma 3 and 4 are more of domestic products. In the international community, the news of these deals were received with high controversy and skepticism, Earlier, the agreements signed by China in 2009 for Chashma 3 and 4 plants came at the point of Chinese membership at the

NSG. The Beijing, however, argued that the “grandfather” clause namely 3 and 4 plants were penned as part of earlier agreements between both states which China had already declared as part of its commitment when it joined NSG. This may hold the water since it was in 1986 when both signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that said that Beijing would by 2011 establish four nuclear reactors in Pakistan (Khan &

Ahmad, 2015; World Nuclear Organisation, 2018)

The issue created concerns among other states such as United States and more specifically India because India had to sought a waiver from NSG before finalization of its civil nuclear deal with the US. The US government has time and again urged China to apply for a waiver if it wants to continue its nuclear assistance to Pakistan. The pressure being put on China, however, was adverse and was notice by the international community as more than half of the world's reactors are being constructed in China and the country has become the global living laboratory for new nuclear reactor design (Paul, 2013).

Pakistan-China civil nuclear cooperation continued uninterrupted as in 2016, both countries agreed to establish another 1000 MW reactor in Pakistan, either at Karachi

Nuclear Power Plant complex or Chahshma Nuclear plant. In 2013, both states reportedly agreed to build another reactor in the complex, under name of Chashma 5. Moreover, in 100

2013, the Pakistani government announced the go-head for the Karachi Coaster Power

Plant Project with 11, 00 MW in Karachi with Chinese cooperation. The project was started in 2015 (BBC, 2013; Pande, 2015).

Furthermore, in context of controlling Pakistan consistent energy crisis, it was also reported that the Pakistani government was in negotiations with China regarding development of two more nuclear power plants with a combined capacity of 2, 000 MW, which will be utilized for establishing Karachi Nuclear Power Plant-2 and Kannup-3.

Meanwhile, the Karachi Coaster Power Project was initiated by then prime minister

Nawaz Sharif in 2014 (Express Tribune, January 25, 2015).

China has repeatedly stated that nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is directed only at meeting the urgent civilian energy crisis in the country. It further stated that nuclear plants in Pakistan do not violate NSG regulations and will remain under the rules of

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pakistan has also asserted that these reactors are vital to its efforts to produce 88,000 MW nuclear energy by 2030. There is a thin line between military and civilian nuclear cooperation, despite IAEA-aegis, peaceful nuclear collaboration is un-checked for arms production. While China's technology transferred to Islamabad is under supervision of IAEA, the United Nations agency is not allowed to inspect the sites or plants that fall under the jurisdiction of military.

Meanwhile, in military weaponry sector, most recently, the Chinese Chengdu J-10B fighter jet was compared to its closest US counterpart, which is Lockheed Martin F-16

Block 52/60, considered to be most advanced F-16 jet, for orders either jet for Pakistan

Air Force (PAF), resulting in the victory of Chinese J-10B. Similarly, J-10B holds more 101 advanced technology with regard to OLS targeting system and radar, and its latest generation stealthy features. i.e. it's DSI intake gave it an edge over F-16 (Hornby, 2010).

Pakistan and China have also been involved in several other projects to increase weaponry and military cooperation, which include the joint development of fighter jet JF-

17 Thunder, K-8 Korakoram advance training aircraft, and tailor developed training aircraft for the PAF based on China's domestic Hongdu L-15, AWACS systems, Al-

Khalid Tanks, and space technology which Chinese government granted license production and tailor developed changes based on the first Chinese Type 90 or MBT-

2000. The Chinese military has designed tailor made advanced arms for Pakistan, making it stronger military force in South Asia. The armies of both countries have a schedule for conducting military exercises.

On January 25, 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a conclusion of a two- day visit to then-army chief General Raheel Sharif to Beijing called Pakistan, China's "all weather and irreplaceable friend." In 2015, China concluded the sale of eight conventional submarines worth $5 billion, the biggest military sale by China to other country in its history. The vessels are supplied by the China Shipbuilding Trading

Company and financed for Pakistan at a very low interest rate. (Express Tribune, April

25, 2015).

3.8. Conclusion

Pakistan and China have historically enjoyed cordial ties and have passed through all the ups and downs of international relations. Since 1949, both sides developed friendly relations. The ties became more cordial and friendly after China-India border conflict in 102

1962, in which Pakistan supported China. On one hand, during Cold War, Pakistan supported China and played the role of a bridge between Chinese Republic and Western states and played a major role in ending its isolation in world community, while on the other hand, China has not forgot the help of Pakistan. China has extended its support to

Pakistan on all international organizations and states including Kashmir issue, nuclear cooperation and Pakistan's membership effort in Nuclear Supplier Group. Both countries further boosted their ties with inauguration of mega China Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC) project. The project is considered to be a game changer for both Pakistan and

China. The project will connect Pakistan to Central Asian States along with giving the country a strong base in Indian Ocean in shape of Gwadar port. Both countries have vowed to continue this 'higher than mountains and deeper than oceans' friendship.

103

References

Adnan, R. (May 4, 2011). Sky Wars: Pakistan, India and China. The Dawn.

Akhtar, S. (2008). Sino-Pak Relations: An Assesment. Islamabad: ISS.

Al-Jazeera English. (November 27, 2013)

Amin, Shahid. (2000). Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reprisal. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Aneja U. (2006). Pakistan-China Relations: Recent Developments. New Delhi: IPSC.

Arango, Tim Clifford Klauss. (June 2, 2013). China is Reaping Biggest Benefits of Iraq

Oil

BBC. (May 24, 2014). China Media: Li Keqiang's Pakistan Visit.

Bokhari, Farha. (January 12, 2016). Closer Pakistan-China Ties irk West. Financial

Times.

Boom. The New York Times.

Barnds, William (1975). China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst

Discontinuity.

The BBC News. (May 17, 2011). Pakistani PM hails China as his country's 'best friend'.

Bholla, L. (1986). Pakistan-China Relations: Search for Political-Strategic Relationship.

Jaipur: RA Publishers. 104

Business Recorder. (August 26, 2009). Eight MoUs Signed During Zardari Visit to

China.

Butt, Ijaz. (2007). Focus on China: Relations with Pakistan and Domestic Concern.

Lahore: Advance Publishers.

Chang, Jung. Halliday, Job. (2011). Mao: The Unknown Story. Beijing: Vintage Books.

China Daily. (November 14, 2006). China-Pakistan Relations

CNTV English. (May 24, 2013). Enhancing Cultural Ties Between China and Pakistan.

Crilly, Rob. (September 30, 2011). US Finds New Friend in Uzbekistan After Pakistan

Fallout. Telegraph.

Curtis, Lisa. (2009). China's Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan. Heritage.

Org.

Dai, Wai. (2014). What do Chinese People Think about Pakistan? Quora

Daniel S. Markey, James West. (May 12, 2016). Behind China‟s Gambit in Pakistan. The

Council for Foreign Relations.

Dawn. (January 15, 2012). Top Ten Trading Partners.

Dawn. (July 7, 2013). Nawaz to set up 'China Cell' for Projects' Supervision.

Dumbaugh, Kerry. (2010). Exploring the China-Pakistan Relation. New York: CNA.

Economic Times. (March 17, 2017). China to Boost Military Ties with Pakistan. 105

Express Tribune. (January 25, 2015). Pakistan an 'Irreplaceable' Friend, Chinese Foreign

Minister Tell Army Chief.

Express Tribune. (April 2, 2015). PM Approves Deal to Buy Eight Chinese Submarines.

FMPRC. (2009). Prime Minister Gilani's Visit to Advance China-Pakistan Relations.

FMPRC.

Gadym Fraz. (2017). China, Pakistan Hold Defence Talks. The Diplomat.

Ghausi, Sabihuddin. (April 21, 2008). Banks Eying Business on Rising Trade..Dawn.

Global Security. (2005). Al Khalid MBT-2000/Type 2000 Main Battle Tank.

Goswami, N. (1971). Pakistan and China: A Study of Relations. Mumbai: Allied

Publishers.

Guruswamy, Mohan. (2010). Pakistan-China Relations: Higher than the Mountains,

Deeper than the Oceans. CLAWS Journal. 9(2).

Haider, Ziad. (2013). Could Pakistan Bridge the U.S.-China Divide? Foreign Policy

Haq, Khawaja. (2014). Economic Relations between China and Pakistan. Academia.edu.

Hongmei, Li. (2018). What Trump's Pakistan Policy Means for China. The Diplomat.

Hornby, Lucy. (2010). China Air Force Woos Allies with J-10 Fighter Jet. Reuters.

IRNA. (2010). Pakistan Enjoys Strong Ties with China.

Jain, K. (1981) (Ed.) China South Asia Relations 1947-1980. New Delhi: Radiant

Publishers. 106

Jamal, Afridi. (2009). China-Pakistan Relations. Council on Foreign Relations.

Jain, LC. (February 7, 2010). The Lost Heart of Asia. The Hindu

Jia, Chen. (April 4, 2015). Silk Road Fund Makes First Investment. China Daily.

Kasi, Mirwais. Khan, Majeed. (2017). Pakistan-Economic Relations: Developments in

Economic and Security Areas in 21st Century. Islamabad: ISSI.

Kataria, Jafar. Naveed, Anum. (2014). Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations.

South Asian Studies.29(2).

Khan, Ali Zahid. (2012) China‟s Gwadar and India‟s Chahbahar. Islamabad: Institute of

Strategic Studies.

Khan, Azam. Baloch, Farooq. (April 23, 2014). Next Generation License: Govt Raises

Over $1.1 billion in Spectrum Auction. Express Tribune.

Khan, Raja. (2013). Pakistan-China Strategic Relations: Regional and Global Impacts.

Regional Studies. 31(1).

Khan, Riaz (2011). Pakistan-China Relations: An Overview. Pakistan Horizon. 64(4).

Khan, Sarwar. (2006). Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario.

The Muslim World. 96(2).

Khan, Zahid. Ahmad, Shabir. (2015). New Trends in Sino-Pak Defence and Strategic

Relations Since 9/11: Indian Concerns.

Kumar, Atul. (2006). China-Pakistan Economic Relations. New Delhi: IPSC. 107

Kyani, Farukh. (2013). China-Pakistan Economic Relations: Lessons for Pakistan.

Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Science. 7(3).

Lee, Raymond. (2016). The Strategic Importance of Chinese Pakistan Relations. Muscat:

Aljazeera Centre for Studies.

Mahmood. T. (2000). Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Quarterly Survey. 53(2).

Makhdoom, Waqas etal. (2014). A Study of Pakistan-China Defence Relations (2000-

2012). ISSN. 4(22).

Malik, Rashid. (2016). The Growing Pakistan-China Defense Cooperation. Islamabad:

ISSI.

Markey, Daniel .(2016). Behind China;s Gambit in pakistan. Council on Foreign

Relations.

Masood, Salman (13 October 2008). Pakistan President to Visit China, a Valued

Ally. New York Times.

Memon, Noor Ahmed. (2014). Pak-China Economic and Trade Relations. Chinese

Review.

Meng, Angela. Cheng, Minnie. (2015). Beijing Eyes Bigger Arms Exports After Pakistan

Deal, Experts Say. South China Morning Post.

Naseer, Rizwan. Amin, Musarat. (2011). Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance

against Common Threats. Berkely Jounral of Social Sciences. 1(2).

Niazi, Tarique. (2005). Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the India Ocean. AFAR. 108

Pakistan Today. (April 24, 2014). China Mobile to Invest $1b in Pakistan.

Pakistan Today. (May 15, 2016).

Pande, Savita. (2015).. Sino-Pak Strategic Relationship: Implications for India. CLAWS

Journal.

Paul, T.V. (2013). Chinese-Pakistan Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power. The

Nonproliferation Review.

PCII. (2013). Pakistan-China Institute Islamabad, interview.

Perper, Rosie. (2018). China may be Looking to Exploit a US Move to Cut Aid to

Pakistan. Business Insider.

PEW. (2012). Pakistan Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S. Islamabad: Pew

Research Centre.

PEW. (2012). Growing Concerns in China About Inequality. Islamabad: Pew Research

Centre.

PEW. (2012), What Pakistanis Think About China. Islamabad: PEW

Pressler, Larry. (1993). Historycommons.org

Rahman, Fazal. (2010). Pakistan-China Trade and Investment Relations. Strategic

Studies. 30(4).

Rahman, Hasib. (April 9, 2013). Deepening Banking Cooperation of Pakistan and China.

Youlin Magazine. 109

Raza, Rahib. (January 24, 2011). Commemoration: Pakistan-China friendship to be

celebrated. Express Tribune.

Rashid, Ahmed. (2013) What Nawaz Sharif‟s Win Means for Pakistan‟s Neighbours.

BBC.

Reuters. (July 4, 2011). Ties Binding China and Pakistan.

Robin, Lee. (2017. No Deeper than the Indian Ocean? An Analysis of Pakistan-China

Relations. SISA

Rifaat, Hamzah. Miani, Tridivesh. (2015). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Washington DC: Stimson Centre.

Saeed, Amir. (2017). Pakistan-China Trade Volume Reaches $ 13.77 billion in 2016-17.

Business Recorder.

Sarwar, Ghulam. (1996). Sino-Pakistan Efforts to Maintain Peace and Promote

Development. National Development and Security. 5(1).

Sattar, A. (2010). Pakistan's Foreign Policy 19470-2009. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Sengupta, Pallavi. (2015). What China sees in Pakistan, But not in India. One India.

Siddique, Qandeel. (2014). Deeper than the Indian Ocean?: An Analysis of Pakistan-

China Relations. Oslo: SISA

Tao, JR. (2012). 60 years of Pakistan-China Relations Landmarks, Trends and

Approaches. Islamabad: IPS. 110

The Nation.(May 8, 2012). President Asks Chinese Group to Set up Oil Refinery in

Pakistan.

The Washington Times. (January 17, 200).

Umbreen, J. (2015). Pakistan-China Strategic Relations: A Glorious Journey of 55 Years.

JRSP. 52(1).

Umer. M. (2013). Pakistan-China Relations: Problems and Prospects. Lahore: PU.

WNO. (2018). Nuclear Power in Pakistan.

Wong, Catherine. (2018). China-Pakistan Ties to set to Get Even Close as 'Iron Brothers"

Eye New Alliance. South Asian Morning Post.

Zaki, Akram. (2010). China of Today and Tomorrow: Dynamics of Relations with

Pakistan. Islamabad: IPP.

Zhendong, Pu. (2013). Pakistan Ambassador Urges Much More Trade. China Daily.

Zweig, David. Jainhai. (2015). China's Global Hunt for Energy. Foreign Affairs. 48(5).

111

Chapter 4

Pakistan-China Strategic Regional Partnership as an emerging pattern to Indo-US

Strategic Partnership

4.1. Pakistan-China Ties: Regional Strategic Partnership

Regional security norms in Third world are quite different from the developed part of the globe as this phenomena is used for more for “ Soft- Balancing “ in IR theory which means the power full state cannot impose its laws on weaker states and hence in Third world it is being used for prevention from the influence of power full states and these states want to make policies according to their own national interest so the regional security orders can help them in making the policies which were be beneficial for the interest of the region.

In the end one can say the regional security is determined y the international norms, political ideas and international affairs, but these all aspects must be compatible to the regional circumstances and for that , nation- state policies of the region have very vital importance for the whole regional security and cooperation in political, economical and security policies (Pugh, 2017; Reinold et. al., 2009).

Over the years China has emerged as strong and powerful state not only at regional level but also at global level. In this emergence the economy of the people republic has played a significant role. China has been also an important character in Cold war in which it was in the communist bloc and then become a close ally of the US afterwards which shows the geopolitical importance of China in the international politics and interests. Soft diplomacy has been remain the basic tool for the China to be a dominate actor in the 112 regional and international relations and this will also help in the future (Asian Sentinal,

March 26, 2018; Farley, 2018)

In next 10 to 15 years, the continues and stable political-military progress of China will reshape the regional security order in the South East Asia and it will specially leave its impact on the smaller countries in the region like Taiwan, Korea and along with that the political-military progress if China will also affect the security balance of major powers like US, Russia and Japan and these states have to increase the diplomatic Relations with the China to meet their interests in the South and South East Asian Region, especially it is important for USA (Charles, 2000; The Economic, April 20, 2017)

Emerging China will challenge the interest of US in the region mostly which include the security pacts and the deployment of US forces in the region as China will not allow the

Capitalist state to establish and army base in its surroundings any more especially in the maritime areas. These both states have been remain at the verge of hostility relations over the years and seldom come to friendship level, US see China as interventionist state in the regional security and affairs issues and have been showing its concerns over it (Ikenberry,

2014; Kang, 2012).

Along with the US many states in the region has been criticizing the role of China as bully and offensive like India and Japan but on the other hand China sees itself as the historical leader of the region and has been using its economical power to gradually increase its dominant role in its surroundings without threatening its rivals and making them to establish an ally against it. China is playing the game of dominance in the region 113 wisely and without using any covert policies it is getting its interests not only the region but also in the world (Elina, 2012).

The role of Public Liberations Army (PLA) is also very important in expansion and upper hand in security policies of China as the forces have convert themselves from the role of being a survivor of nation to the developer of nation. PLA has increasing cooperation, making military pact with the neighboring states and also taking their relations to new high with the major powers of world especially with US (Dapeng, 2007).

4.2. China’s String of Peal Policy and Pakistan

China has been increasing its relations with its neighboring states in South, South East and Central Asia. The People‟s Republic is taking these actions on the bases of its strong economy and because of its policies to rule the region in security and geo strategically.

China has establishing many industries and signing important infrastructure mega projects in the region and the state is investing or cooperating in the projects which are at critical points of the area and these points and places are called as the “String of Pearls” of China (Panda, 2017; Washington Time, January 17, 2005).

Analysts believe that China is spreading these pearls at vital places and choke points to keep a dominant role in the region and most importantly to meet its every day increasing energy needs. The economy and industry of the peoples Republic is one of the fastest growing around the globe and to maintain and increase this progress, it has to generate and import energy resources so that its emerging role in international sphere will be sustained. To establish this string, China has captured points in South East Sea and Indian

Ocean specifically (Baker, 2015; Marantidou, 2014). 114

These “pearls” are spread form upgraded military strip in Hainan Island to an upgraded air strip in Woody Island which is located in 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam to construction of container shipping facility in Chittagong , Bangladesh to the establishment of deep water port in Sittwe, Myanmar, to the construction of deep sea and

Navy port in Gwadar, Balochistan. These all points have been constructed at vital trading points strategically critical points (Brewster, 2014).

These pearls are spread from the Coast of mainland through littorals of South China Sea to the Strait of Malacca to the Indian Ocean, across the coasts of Arabian Sea and Persian

Gulf. China has built all these pearls without shoeing any covert, offensive policies and with any colonial intentions. The state is developing these sites with the help of strategic treaties and with the forward presence along the sea communications (SLOCs) which connects China with the Middle East. These pearls are mostly noncontroversial and takes as a part of China‟s soft power policy but some major states like India in region and major powers like US at international level has shown their concerns about these actions of China (Khurana, 2008; Pejic, 2015).

4.3. Space Pearls

China has been establishing its string of pearls to increase it maritime regional security and to tackle the interests of US in Indian Ocean and to give India message that Indian

Ocean do not belong to them only and China has strong position in the regional security, for that China is investing in its surrounding in maritime security and shipping ports and other coastal developments which are called the “String of Pearls” of China but The 115

People‟s Republic is not only interested and investing in the maritime pearls but also has deep interest in cyber and satellite technology and this is China‟s “Space Pearls”

World has mostly focused on the satellite program of China which is increasing with time and gaining its importance both strategically, technological advancement and military fields but on the other hand China is investing in communication field around the world but interests of the state are varied in Latin and Africa and are totally different in South

Asia according to the regional and global needs (Kulacki, 2014).

China has sponsored the Latin American states like Brazil, Venezuela and Nigeria.

These states have signed important deals with China in communication and satellite technology and behind these apparently there are political motives of China as most these states has give recognition to Taiwan as separate sovereign state, so China is increasing its cooperation to change their stance about Taiwan and support Chinese point of view about the issue but interests in Asian region for China are quite different from these global political motives (Kaufman & Linzer, 2007).

China has been assisting many Asian countries like Thailand, Turkey, Bangladesh,

Indonesia, Laos and Pakistan. Lately China has controlling the Indian Surroundings quite sensibly. In this context in 2011, China has launched a communication satellite for

Pakistan and net joint venture of both countries in this field will be launched in 2014. In

2012 China has announced its global navigation system operational for Asia- Pacific region and under an agreement Pakistan has the authority to use that system. In Sri Lanka

, China is operating differently as it is not ealing with the government of the state rather investing with a private company named Supreme sat which has start working in 116 partnership with a Chinese state owned company China Great Wall Industry Corporation

(CGWIC; Kulacki & Lewis, 2008).

As in Maldives, China has invested heavily in Communication fields according to some reports China has invested $ 60 million in Maldives for developing its infrastructure of telecommunication sector and negotiations are also continue for the a Chinese Satellite available for Maldives to use. China has already invested in Nepal in this field and the war struck country Afghanistan will be eager to have an agreement with China to develop its communication sector and China is already taking part in re – establishing the private television and radio stations in the country and obviously Afghanistan has to rely on the

Chinese Satellites for the military purposes (Ajay, 2013)

4.4. Pak-China Ever-Energizing Ties

Pakistan has been most close ally of China since its establishment as both states has started to cooperate with each other since beginning especially in security and military ties. China is increasing ties with Pakistan because it is the only country in the region which has capability to compete with India as the democratic secular state is challenging the expanding of China and also China is supporting Pakistan to tackle the interests of US because of Pakistan‟s geopolitical and geo Strategic place for regional and global issues.

Relations were start to increase in 1950‟s when on May 21, 1951 both states exchange high level diplomatic visits which smoothed the relations for the future. Friendly ties reached to new level between 1957 and 1969 during which most important agreement was on the China‟s Xinjiang and its adjacent areas where Pakistan has practiced defense control this settlement of Sino-Pak borders issue and Pakistan got assistant in strategic 117 and security along with give it opportunity to balance the power status with its major contenders in the region.

Economic relations are also based on mostly military and technological agreements which were forged in 1951 and both concluded their first trade agreement in 1963. In

1982 China-Pak Committee of Economy, Trade and Technology was setup. The conclusion of Free Trade Agreement was done in 2007 and a 5 year plan for the Trade and Economy Cooperation was directed to the increase and acceleration of the bilateral trade which is $ 9 billion right now and China stands as the second biggest trade Partner of Pakistan. China is mostly investing in the developing of latter‟s infrastructure development, Energy, mining, telecommunication, agriculture etc (Kumar, 2010)

Relations between both entities are never doubtful or decayed but since the start of 21st century Chinese foreign policy has dramatically changed towards India as the peoples

Republic has started to accelerate relations with India economically and putting aside the political differences aside. Both states have agreed to take the bilateral trade to the whole new level and work together in the region for more economical interdependence. It has been increased since the visit of Chinese President in 2006, both states have shown deep interest in trading with each other but on the other hand this is an alarming situation for

Pakistan.

Pakistan has watched these developments between China and India with alarming eyes and many considered as the policy shift in the region by China for their economic interests. India has started propagating the old slogan “Hindu Cheeni Bhai Bhai”. As

Pakistan‟s front strategic and security and weaponry partner and supplier China has its 118 vital importance for Pakistan and its policy makers and government has had to work hard and sensibly to re-energize the Sino- Pak relations. Due to strong diplomacy and relationship the situation started to become positive for Pakistan again (Menon, 2016).

The Agreement between both states regarding the construction and developing the military equipment together and the venture of making JF-17 Thunder was most prominent step for both states, especially for Pakistan forces and after that the decision of

Pakistani Authorities to hand over the strategically very important Gwadar port to China in 2013 was a major step in making the relations which has again push India on back foot in regional security order and give an upper hand to China and Pakistan axis (Kashif,

2012).

4.5. Challenging US Interests in the Region

China and USA has never been so friendly relations form the very start and main reason for their differences is the different political thoughts because of which America has been opposing China in international sphere and especially in early years of Cold war as China was the ally of communist bloc. US even did not recognize the communist government in

China after the revolution in 1949 rather it supported the KMT regime in Taiwan so the conflict arose from the start and America even refused to allow China to become the member of United Nations but things started to change in 1970‟s.

At the peak era of Cold War, China started to have its differences with USSR so the friendly atmosphere was started to develop between both states in 1970 decade and

Pakistan played an important role to make both states close. The relations were better and

China became the member of UN and China got the recognition from the Capitalist state 119 and because of that got the status of state form others major states as well. China was an important Cold War ally for US as it was the neighbor state of USSR and emerging economy so it played a critical role for the regional security in the favor of US but relations started to be decayed again.

After the disintegrations of USSR and establishments of the uni polar world under USA the differences started to become more prominent as China also started to emerged a rapid growing economy to clash with the interest of US especially in the South and South

East Asian region. The issues of Taiwan and most importantly the conflicts in South

China Sea where US clear its ambitions of free navigations and wanted from China to resolve it s clashes with smaller states which China refused to do so (Munir, 2012).

After the start of 21st Century although the China has transformed its economy system in

Capitalist and became the member of WTO, the rivalry between both states increased with passage of time although the Chinese government is smart enough to avoid any direct conflict and arms race with US like the Soviet Union The Chinese government is seem to be only in search of new markets and places who can meet their needs of energy and for that it is challenging the interests of US not only in world but specifically in this region (Marwaan, 2013).

The expanding dominance in the Indian Ocean is the most prominent and strong step taken by China as Indian Ocean region is the trade passage for 70 percent of world and also very important for the regional security. China has challenged the movement of US movement in the Ocean and also by his String of Pearls gradually capturing the Choke points of the Area which US is watching with skeptical eyes. China‟s developing security 120 relations with Pakistan is also not well received by US and in reply of that US is openly supporting India to make it stand against China (Nasar, 2018; Chandran, 2018)

As India has the capability and its developing economy make it only actor in the South

Asian region who can compete China and US is playing this card very intelligently. The navy joint exercises of Indo-US in the Indian Ocean under the name of MALABAR are very important so to challenge that China has engaged Pakistan in joint military exercises and now the taking over of Gwadar port by China is not well accepted by US along with that Chinese support for Iranian stance is also challenge to US interests in the region.

Both states are head to head to meet their interests and as a super power US is facing serious challenges from China in the region and regional Security.

4.6. Strategic Dominance Politics in Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

4.7. Strategic Significance of IOR:

After the end of Cold war, the attention of international actors turned towards IOR, due to various issues of this region like drug trafficking, nuclear proliferation, piracy gave super powers the chance to intervene in this region. States in this region are mostly have critical economic conditions and to resolve this problem the states have tried to established different groups among them but these efforts have proved to be futile as these entities have different bilateral issues, Also these states have the technological dependency on super powers, so they have to act according to interests of these major powers

(Ranasinghe, 2011).

IOR region has several important islands and choke points which have proved to be strategically and economically important and history tells that controlling these important 121 points, makes the holder able to get the strategic dominance in the region. Indian Ocean region has 30 choke points and straits having significant importance. Some of them are given below:

Bab-el-Mandeb (between South Yemen and Djibouti);

Bass Strait (between Australian continent and Tasmania);

Strait of Hormuz (between Iran and Oman);

Lombok, Bali, Sunda and Makassar Straits (in the Indonesian archipelago)

Singapore Strait (between Singapore and Riau island of Indonesia)

Malacca Strait (between Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore)

Mozambique channel (between Mozambique and Malagasy Republic.

Also Indian Ocean routs connects Middle East to Europe, East Asia, African and US

(Essays, 2013; Mukherjee, 2017).

Indian Ocean contains remarkable amount of energy resources especially oil, gas and coal, in addition it is one of the most important sea route of transportation in the globe.

This region has the states with substantial population and economic growth rate like

India, china Indonesia which make them to strive hard to get control over the region and sense of „energy nationalism‟ is developing in these states. The regional powers are trying to capture the key points in Indian Ocean like Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mozambique,

Bangladesh, Nepal, Tanzania and Burma. These states are competing to get more and more control over the energy resources and fresh waters of Indian Ocean (UK Essays,

2015).

122

4.8. US-India Alliance in IOR:

As Robert Kaplan has famously claimed that Indian Ocean will be most important strategic point in 21st Century and A US a Navy and Marines 2007 Strategic concept paper also mentioned that Indian and Pacific Ocean will be the regions where naval powers will be increasing in the coming years and will prove to be important strategically. Importance of Indian Ocean Region increased especially in last few years but The January 2011 Defense guidance is more doubtful about the US role in the Indian

Ocean Region which clearly shows that US needs to change its policy regarding the importance of region (Litner, 2017; Reuters, 2017; Statfor, 2018).

China has emerged as a strong naval power in the East Asia which are not in the favor of

US interests in IOR. As different theorists are arguing about the importance of US role in the region, some of the US policy features are getting clear such as:

1. US thinks that there are numerous potential and real threats for its interests in the

Indian Ocean Region which contain both state-based and non-state actors based threats.

The state level threat is from China and Iran which are adopting the policies against the

US interests and the non-state base threats are about the security concerns, nuclear proliferation in developing states and to some extend the threat of Islamic terrorism

2. China has become a concerned threat to the US interests in the IOR although the any threat from China will be rise in East-Asian Region but with its policy of “String of

Pearls” China has become a real threat to the US interests in the region.

3. As US is reducing its defense budget in coming years that will make a negative impact on fulfilling the US commitments in the Indian Ocean Region. It is also predicted that 123 major portion of the defense resources will be used in East-Asia as compared to the

Indian Ocean region (Future Direction, 2016). .

4. This reduction in defense budget will certainly create a gap between its resources and capability of action in the Indian Ocean. This can be partially solved if US focus more in the South west pacific Region including Australia, Indonesia and Guam with this US will be able to be more operational in the IOR and reliance on Diego Garcia will be increased.

5. The major part of this capability has to be filled by the US allies in the region and India will be the centre power for this purpose. Although may be Australia and Indonesia can be taken as more responsible for the regional security but the US and interests in IOP are highly same and so forth cooperation between both states is increasing (Erickson &

Miolay, 2010).

6. US have go out of the way in the matter of cooperation with India and there is quite optimistic opinion that India will increase its strategic support to US to provide security in the IOR.

7. US power projection strategy seems to be changing in IOR as the US Chief of Naval operation Admiral Jonathan Greenert has called as „offshore option‟ to the US strategy under which the role of Navy be more prominent and significant than the land forces in the Indian Ocean Region (David, 2012).

The two most important choke points In the Indian Ocean for the US strategic and economic interests are the strait of Hurmaz and strait of Malacca with south Chinese Sea.

These both points are under immense pressure by the hostile states to be shut down in the case of any aggressive action against them. As in 2011 Iran has threatened that the state 124 will shut down the Strait of Hurmaz if more economical sanctions will be imposed on them same is the case with the Strait of Malacca which is under the naval influence of

China (Albert, 2015).

US Naval forces are quite sure that they can secure thee choke points against in overt action by these both states but the increasing naval power of Public Liberation Army

(PLA) and the Iranian nuclear program has certainly endangered the US interests and capability to be strategically operational in the IOR. US has to be more focus in the region because this region will certainly become more important in the emerging economy based politics and international relations (Holms & Yoshihara, 2008; Shear,

2012).

As India has emerged as the strong economic power in the region and its highly interested in becoming a hegemonic power in the region but it is not possible for her to achieve these desired goals single handily because its geo graphical neighbor China has much more strong position in region both strategically and economically. Hence India seeks a strong ally at international and US is the best option for this purpose.

Although deployment of US Naval forces in the Indian Ocean has severely neutralized the operational ability of Indian navy. As US 7th fleet is deployed in Japan and the positions and power of Chinese and Japan Naval forces in the South China Sea will never be make India to control strait of Malacca. Along with this the US 5th fleet is operational

Persian Gulf and the high sensitivity of Middle Eastern and European powers towards that region will not allowed India to intervene there and will face a strong opposition from international community in case of any offensive action by the Indian Naval forces

(Izuyama & Kurita, 2017) 125

Despite these all scenarios the cooperation between Indian and US are extensive and increasing rapidly in economic, strategic and energy fields. US is making India a strategic partner in the region mostly because of emerging economy and dominant role of China

(Sufyan, 2011).

Former presidents of US Clinton and Bush have visited India and have made important pacts and treaties of cooperation. Present US president Barrack Obama has declared

“India as the most important partnership in the 21st century, one which will be vital for

US interests in Asia-Pacific region and around the globe. Our relationship is rooted in common values, including the rule of law, respect for diversity, and democratic government. We have a shared interest in promoting global security, stability, and economic prosperity through trade, investment, and connectivity. The United States and

India have a common interest in the free flow of global trade and commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean”

US are supporting India to maintain stability in the region and because of that the economic ties are increasing, the strategic relations has reached to new heights. Both states are also increasing military cooperation and research base projects. Strategic dialogues between US and India were started in 2009 under which both states agreed to cooperate in sectors of industry, education, defense and counterterrorism. The third meeting under these strategic dialogues was being held in June 2012. In 2012 only seven

US cabinet members have visited India which shows the strong relations between both states (Fact Sheet, 2012).

126

4.9. Pak-China alliance Challenging India in IOR:

Another important aspect to be noted is that these regional actors have more common interests than the controversial issues and if they increase cooperation especially in maritime security and safe guarding of routes for the trade, it will leave very positive impact on this region as a whole. Although this measure has been taken in 1960 between

Pakistan and India by the name of Indus water treaty but it is need of the time that more treaties like that must be signed among these states (David, 2012).

IOR is the battle ground of the numerous conflicts both local and international. This aspect also increased the strategic importance of the region. Involvement of super powers in the local conflicts leads to self-defense precautions or requests for protection. Number of nuclear states also have been increased in the region and this make this region more vulnerable and at more risk for confrontation among them. Major disputes in the region are Pak, India disputes, US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, Several Arad- Israel clashes and notably these conflicts are land-based but give super powers an excuse to deploy their naval forces in the region (SAAG, 2011)

Indian Ocean has extremely strategic importance as it is third-biggest water body in the world and according to the General of Indian Ocean Region its sea lanes control the 80 percent transportation of sea born oil through its choke points, with 40 percent passing through Strait of Hurmaz, 35 percent through the strait of Malacca and 8 percent is passing through Bal-el Mandab Strait. Not only its Sea lanes are strategically significant but its region has high importance at international level as almost half conflicts of world is occurring in this region and with that several new potential issues are rising like 127 increasing competition between India and China, potential nuclear conflict between

Pakistan and India, Piracy in and around horn of Africa

.In this whole scenario, almost all major powers of world has deployed their naval forces in the region like US has established its 5th fleet headquarter in Bahrain for giving their forces operational support in Iraq and Afghanistan and uses island of Diego Garcia Indian

Ocean for all these activities. Along with that US has deployed many task forces like combined task force 152 for the safeguarding of oil trade in the Gulf and combines task force 150 to counter the piracy from the Gulf to Kenya. On the other hand France is only

European power which has prominent bases in north and southwest region of Indian

Ocean. It has bases in Abu Dhabi, reunion and Djibouti.

Most important conflict in the region is race of dominance between China and India.

China is achieving its goals through soft power diplomacy like investing in the mega infrastructure projects such as construction of dams, roads, power plants, offering military and political support to the UN Security Council and offering loans to small states on generous conditions. On one side China has replaced Sri Lanka s their biggest donors in place of Japan and on other hand increasing its influence in Kenya at west quadrant of Indian Ocean.

As China is increasing its influence in the region, India is also trying hard to keep its pace with its counterpart state. Through Indian Ocean, India imports its 70 percent of oil so that‟s why the state is steadily increasing its strategic power in the Indian Ocean region

(IOR) with heavily investing in oil, mining and other infrastructure projects. In addition

India has extensively increased its naval power in region by establishing number of bases 128 namely in Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius. India has accused been accusing China that it is creating a string of pearls around them but by looking at Indian naval activities, the case seems to be totally opposite (Ranasinghe, 2011)

4.10. Sino-Pakistan Collaboration to Counter Indo-US Nexus

Importance of Indian Ocean is increasing with passage of time as the state need a reliable path way for its trade and energy sources. South-west of China open up in the Indian

Ocean coastal region and thus make it very significant for the Chinese economic activities. In this whole scenario Myanmar has become a important strategic state for

China as it is near Yunnan and it is extremely important for China to use that land connection between Yunnan and Myanmar so that relation between China and Indian

Ocean region could be enhanced to resolve the energy sources issues (Zheng, 2012).

Meanwhile, Pakistan‟s foreign policy mostly depicts the unnecessary involvements in region affairs and the point of view and posture of strong military establishment of the country which become the cause of negative consequences both internally and externally.

If these policies have some benefits, they are most of the time short term and futile. Like all other states of the world Pakistan‟s foreign policy is affected by many host factors and aspects which have significance both regionally and internationally under the historical and geographical limitations.

Along with these aspects, foreign policy is also designed according to current considerations and future plans, and could be change according to the national interest and changing scenarios, under all these possibilities, most challenging factor for Pakistan is its geographical location, which connects it with China by Himalaya at one side and on 129 other side Indian Ocean which is a vital route to reach the Persian Gulf resources. In East it shares a long border with India, in West Afghanistan and Iran is located which make its location more important, While on the other hand this location gives Pakistan several advantages (Ishtiaq, 2011)

4.11. Chinese Naval Objectives

Chinese Navy force wants bases in Indian Ocean which must be reliable, sustainable, contain facilities of communication, offer refuel of the vessels, re-supply of the rations and have the capacity for the recreation. For this purpose china has to establish a base in its ; string of pearls‟ and in this context the Bangladesh and Myanmar in Bay of Bengal are way to out of the transit route in Arabian Sea and could not give the state needed strategic support so the ultimate choice for the China would be Gwadar in Pakistan and

Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

Other options for China will be the string of islands of Maldives and Seychelles. These locations provided China a complete strategic and holistic dominance in Indian Ocean.

China has been giving economical, strategic, infrastructure developments and easy loans and grants to both Maldives and Seychelles to established vital bases on the territories of these countries. There is also a rumor that Maldives has leased the “Marao tell” to China for constructing the naval base.

A base in Seychelles will be very appropriate for Chinese Navy as it is located in Western

Indian Ocean and very close to energy transit route of Red Sea and heading from the

West African coasts around the Cape of Good Hope. It will make PLA navy to monitor this important transit route and also provide the security when needed to passing vessels. 130

Seychelles island located near the Somalia, where PLA ships are deployed (Agnithori,

2010).

4.12. Pak-China Collaboration on Strategically Important Gwadar Port

Pakistan and China agreed to develop a deep-sea port in 2001 at the location of Gwadar,

Baluchistan. The site is 72 km away from the Iranian border and almost 400 km from the

Strait of Hurmaz. Gwadar port will be effecting the transit traffic of Iranian ports namely as Abbas port and Chabahar port and it will be happened in the time when Iran is already in critical economic condition. Another important point is that India has heavily invested in Chabahar port and has promised Iran to invest$ 84 million in 213 km long Zaranj-

Dilaram road with the view that it will link it with Central Asia for trade through Iran and

Afghanistan. This Gwadar port will also negatively affect the economy and port activities of United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Work on Gwadar started in 2002 with estimated cost of $1.16 billion and first phase was completed in 2005 with $198 million investment of China and $ 200 million in construction of a road connecting Gwadar to Karachi. Along with it 450 Chinese engineers worked on this project. By building and investing in this project China is securing its energy route as China import its 80% of the oil through Strait of Malacca.

China feels insecure on that route because of the US presence in that region. Through

Gwadar China will import its oil from Iran and Middle east to Xinxiang (Yousaf, 2005).

Geographically Pakistan does not have much strategic depth from east and west but the establishment of Gwadar port will provide the much needed strategic depth. Gwadar is 131

460 km away from the India which decrease the vulnerability of Pakistan in this regard. It will also help Pakistan to keep an eye on the Sea Lanes of communications (SLOCs) which are located from Persian Gulf to the bottle neck of Strait of Hurmaz. By establishing naval bases at Gwadar and Ormara will also help Pakistan to monitor the

Chinese naval Assets, domination of US 5th fleet in Persian Gulf and Indian struggle for becoming a Blue Water Navy.

The establishment of this port will also make able Pakistan-China alliance to move and to keep an eye on Indian movements in Indian Ocean. Gwadar Port also has the potential to acquire the place of Strait of Hurmaz and it also can compete with UAE ports with some alternations and improving the links to Caspian Region. China will also have alternative route in the shape of Gwadar port in the case US Naval forces blocked its transit route at

Strait Hurmaz.

Gwadar Port will be a highly strategic important site and has the ability to become a full hub and centre of shipments but on the other hand it can become a centre of conflicts because UAE and Iran will defiantly oppose its establishment because it will negatively impact on their economy. China will got most benefits from this port but on the other hand interests of China and US could be conflicting and diverse (Malik, 2012).

The agreement between Pakistan and China on the issue of was signed in the presence of

President Asif Ali Zardari, China-owned overseas port holding company, several ministers and Chinese Ambassador Liu Jian. Previously this port was refused to be handed over to the Port of Singapore Authority on the bases of its demand for the vast 132 land for their development work. Hence on 6th February 2013 Pakistani government officially handed over the Gwadar port to Chinese based company.

India has most reservations on this step by Pakistan because they feel China is trying to build “Strings of pearl” of ports and bases around them to get strategic dominance in the

Indian Ocean. Indian defense minister A.K Anthony has expressed “serious concerns” in a press conference revealing the anxiety of its states over this deal. He said: “In one sentence, I can say that it‟s a matter of concern to us,”

Ignoring the Indian Concerns, Pakistani foreign office spokesperson Muazzam Ali Khan has stated: “other country should have any reason to be concerned about [this agreement].”He dismissed the “Indian concerns” over the deal. The Chinese Ambassador

Jian also stated that this bilateral agreement was: “in the economic interest of people of

China and Pakistan” A Pakistani Newspaper The Nation published that Jian refused that

“thinking that China will use this port for Military purpose is totally baseless”

However India do not believe in this Chinese statement and hence forth this agreement will provoke Washington to accelerate its cooperation with India to maintain the balance in the region. As the New York Times wrote “Some American strategists have described it as the westernmost link in the „string of pearls,‟ a line of China-friendly ports stretching from mainland China to the Persian Gulf, that could ultimately ease expansion by the Chinese Navy in the region” (Parera, 2013).

This willingness shown by China has emerges at the time when US has evacuated its troops from Afghanistan. Although China has refused to take over the Gwadar port some 133 years ago and allowed Singapore to handle the port. But after US will leave the region than more routes will be open which will be connecting Central Asia to Gwadar port and ultimately to China and the state will get rid of its famous “Malacca Dilemma” on which it is too much dependant for the import of energy resources from Middle East (Kaplan &

Robert, 2013)

4.13. Pakistan-China-India-US Strategic Quadrilateral relationship

Along with power struggle in Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Gwadar port, the South Asian

Region strategic balance of power dynamics also concerns about the study of power politics in the fields of nuclear clout, military expenditures and expansions between both traditional arch rivals, Pakistan and India, and global power, China and the US.

Henceforth it is necessary that strategic balance of power in this region may comprehend as compared to the other regions in the world. The fundamental features of the power politics and balance of power in South Asia are different from old European ones but the core of the whole concept is same. In field of features, the South Asian balance of power model is bipolar in nature having multilingual and heterogeneous societies along with acute interstate conflicts. The "Western Power Politics" have left its impact on strategic

(nuclear) based balance of power in South Asia, Similarly, balance of power has not been clear at all in this whole sub-system in the region under which sometime either China or

US do play their role. It is noteworthy, however, that in the case of nuclear power struggle among Pakistan and India, China has emerged as balance for Pakistan, unbalance for India, but US has played the same role for India (Bokhari, 2012; Jahangir, 2013)

The main strategic triangle of South Asia consist of three player i.e. Pakistan, India and

China as these three states have been forming the South Asian Strategic Triangle (SAST) 134 since 1947/1949. Currently all three states are engaged in economic and political engagements, still non-conventional weapons race is underway. In this whole engage- and-resisit based triangle, the flexibility is high in India and China ties rather than

Pakistan-India. In aspect of South Asian power politics question, Pakistan-China have developed ties with each other on bases of common interests against India. The major common interest between both states is to keep check on military might of India for gaining regional dominance (Ahmad, 2006; Louise, 2012).

Meanwhile, considering the Pak-China relations and Chinese nuclear support to Pakistan and China's rise as major regional and global power has made a direct threat to Indian politics of supremacy, therefore, India has underpinned its relations with the US as a counter to China-Pakistan ties and for regional dominance. The rapid strengthening of

India-US especially after 2005, nuclear civil deal has enhanced the political difference especially between China and India and further increase the strategic alliance between

Pakistan and China. Pro-Indian approach of the United States, after nuclear deal, has caused major changes in strategic positioning as well as power politics in South Asian

Region. The major aspect of this policy is further increasing affinities between India and

America will not reduce the tensions among the strategic triangle of this region which has led to the well-built biding amid Pakistan and China against India-US nexus (Beckley,

2012; Ganguly & Scobell, 2005)

Strategic balance of power in SAST is essentially based on Kautliya's balance-of-power principle "as enemy of my enemy is my friend." Similarly, John J. Tkacik believes that

Pakistan-China strategic alliance is simple based on countering India-US increasing ties.

Such type of strategic balance is suitable for nuclear countries of South Asian Region for 135 maintaining the balancing ties of cooperation and confrontation among the players of

SAST (Jahangir, 2012; Jaspal, 2012).

Since 1998, the western countries and India has been blaming China for its extensive nuclear assistance to Pakistan, while China has expressed that Indian nuclear explosions of 1998 were indeed and alarming factor for global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and

"to the peace and stability in South Asia and in the world at large."As India and United

States are claiming to cooperate in "civil nuclear energy field", similarly, Pakistan and

China cooperation in nuclear sector is aimed for energy objectives and somehow strategic balance against India (Saalman & Haenle, 2011; Jervis, 2003).

The regional strategic balance of power, between Pakistan and India at one side and

China and India on other side in context of US leading support to India is underway rapid changes with respect to complex and dynamic strategic quadrilateral Pakistan-China-US-

India ties. The structure considerably favors India and therefore US, which is forming strategic partnership bases on "engaged and resist" hedging strategies by means of bilateral and multilateral cooperation strategic triangle states but leveraging India regarding regional dominance with reference to Pakistan-China alliance. The US is starting a range of strategic dialogues with its partners to offset balance of power dynamics in South Asia (Kapur, 2011; Lee & Zinnes, 1993)

It is, however, noticeable that United States has been following dual policies while engaging all three strategic players in asymmetry and soft balancing strategies. The US government is supporting India to counter China at large and Pakistan after the end of

Cold War, hence introduced new strategic balance of power in the region. Pakistan and 136

India has long been arch rival and China's support to Islamabad in its conflict with India are considered as a major reason of enduring tensions between India and China.

Meanwhile, Pakistan-US conflicts is widening because of its increasing relations with

India especially after civil nuclear deal in 2005 and violating Pakistan's strategic sovereignty as result of Bin Laden's operation. Indo-US growing ties and their increasing involvement in Afghanistan have brought major concerns for Pakistan and China

(Nadkarni, 2010; Naseer & Amin, 2011).

China deems risk from US encirclement policy which in return compels Beijing ties with both the US and India. Eventually, Pakistan and China are strengthening their relationship to balance and countering US-India within its strategic quadrilateral context.

As the result of above mentioned aspects, it can easily be said that a new strategic framework has emerged that is strategic quadrangle. In this way, a unique configuration of equilibrium scale has been forming, As dan Markey has describe it: This (strategic) quadrangle could stretch towards two poles, with the United States and India gravitating towards one end and China and Pakistan towards the other, leaving these two sets of players diametrically opposed." Pakistan and China are establishing strong ties against

Indo-US nexus. Both US and India have signed a nuclear deal to counter China and offset its support to Pakistan, while China has done the same to counter their alliance. This whole scenario raised the question, how Pakistan would like to counter Indian influence after Indo-US nuclear deal in South Asian and US refusal of equal treatment regarding supplying advanced technology in nuclear sector as it provide India (Bull, 2012;

Raghvan, 2001). 137

The answer is that Islamabad has been trying to offset India through external strategic balancing in terms of qualitatively superior arms and diplomatic support from major powers of the region and world. However, after India struggle of achieving nuclear capability, Islamabad has found nuclear option has the most suitable equalizer as strategic and geopolitical threat to India through its internal efforts. Pakistan wants to counterweight the threat of India-US deal through Chinese support in the nuclear energy field. After US non-responsive attitude of Pakistan's demand of signing same agreement was the former had with India, Islamabad's eagerness to enhance its nuclear relations with China and countering the US-India civil nuclear energy plan. The act of Pakistan is also shows that it has supportive and strong alternative sources of acquiring nuclear deal with China rather than America. Meanwhile, on the other hand, China also wants to expand its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan with context “any nuclear cooperation would be for peaceful purposes only and would accept international safeguards”.

Furthermore, in the same way, both Pakistan and China are pursuing the counter strategies to hedge all regional and global challenges but not through violating international law and norms (Riley, 2013; Tasleem, 2003). As compared to Indo-US nexus which has become an alarming factor not only for South Asian strategic stability but also for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Both Pakistan and China hold the stance that nature of India and US ties is disturbing the strategic balance of South Asia.

Although, it is being argued that in the long run India-US alliance might be beneficial for future geopolitics but emerging Pakistan on the world map as nuclear power in 1998 caused serious setbacks to India and UN interests (Tellis, 2009; Yuan, 2007) 138

Pakistan being a nuclear state, has diminished the imbalance in South Asia strategic power politics which used to be sensed in post-Cold War era for example in 2000, India was forced to take her forces back to the Garrisons, when Pakistan leadership conveyed that it would go to any extent for defending its borders. This was the time of nuclear war threat in South Asia. Another setback, for India-US strategic partnership was when US forced to accept bailout deal from China as her dissipated economy. Henceforth, this is to say that Pakistan nuclear capbility and Chinese strong economy are the invisible actors which caused strategic equilibrium in South Asian Region (Yusuf, 2007; Zeb, 2012)

4.14. Conclusion

Since the start of 21st century and more importantly post 9-11 era, strategic balance of power dynamics in South Asia has been changing as one of the strategic centers of Asia in which current geo-economics and geopolitical realities have further increased its geostrategic importance in global politics after strong India-US strategic ties. This alliance of world superpower with India has altered the geopolitical and security scenario of South Asian strategic equation. Balance of power theory argue that "just a system of countervailing power" may well ensure the autonomy and sovereignty of small and great countries. In view of Pakistan-China strategic partnership has enhanced due to alliance of

India and US. In this scenario, the most important convergence lies in the geostrategic interests of Islamabad and Beijing. Yet, American estrangement from Pakistan and China does not give an idea of two confrontational camps but enmity and realignment is obvious in this new strategic balance of power structure in the region. In this whole situation, US is not playing the role of balancer as it must do being the superpower in global politics. In the context of Indian policies and rapidly increasing capabilities at one 139 place and provision of the nuclear alliance with US at other hands as the result of this agreement, Islamabad has to rely more on nuclear arms by following the rules of self- help and establishing alliance with the already existing nuclear powers like China for stability and peace to counter Indian policies. In fact, the balance of conventional forces is in favor of India but Pakistan counters it with its nuclear deterrence. In the current scenario, the unique and delicate strategic balance of power in South Asian Region is rising in which United States should play its vital role as a balancer in post US withdrawal from Afghanistan and will have to treat Pakistan and India as equals. This strategic quadrangle-Pakistan-India-China-US, will identify the new ties among the regional and global players as the scale of South Asia is enhancing in world politics.

140

References

Agnihotri, Kumar Kamlesh ( 2010). China‟s quest for Naval Base in the Indian Ocean:

Possible options for China. National Maritime Foundation. Retrieved from:

http://www.maritimeindia.org/article/chinese-quest-naval-base-indian-ocean-

%E2%80%93-possible-options-china

Ahmed, Ishtiaq (2011). Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy: Motivations and Constraints.11 Feb,

Retrieved from:

http://www.ishtiaqahmad.com/item_display.aspx?listing_id=825&listing_type=4

Albert, Eleanor. (2015). Competition in the Indian Ocean. Council on Foreign Relations.

Alexander, David. Ali, Ameer. Et al.(2012). Indian Ocean: A Sea of Uncertainty. Future

Directions International.

Ali, Kashif (2012). Will China- India Relations dent Pak- China Relations? The Express

Tribune.

Asia Sentinel. (March 26, 2018). China Rearranges its Bureaucracy for Regional

Hegemony.

Baker, Benjamin. (2015). Where is the 'String of Pearls' in 2015? The Diplomat.

Beckley, Micheal. (2012). China and Pakistan: Fair-Weather Friends. Yale Journal of

International Affairs. 12(2). 141

Bokhari, Syeda Aysha. (2012). Pak-China, India-US Strategic Quadrilateral. Islamabad:

LAP Academic Publishing.

Brewster, David (2012). US Strategic Thinking about the Indian Ocean. 26 June, The

interpreter. Retrieved from:

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/06/26/US-strategic-thinking-about-the-

Indian-Ocean.aspx

Brewster, David. (2014). Beyond the 'String of Pearls': Is there Really a Sino-Indian

Security Dilemma in Indian Ocean? Academia.Edu.

Bull, Hedley. (2002). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New

York: Palgrave.

Chandran, Nyshka. (2018). Pakistan is Ditching Dollar for Trade with China-24 Hours

after Trump Denounced the Country. CNBC.

Dapeng, Qi (2007). The PLA‟s Role in China‟s Regional Security Strategy. S.

Rajatranam School of International Relations.

Dowdy, William (2013). Chinese and Indian geo political competition in the Indian

Ocean Region. IPSA.

Fact Sheet (2012). US Relations with India. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm 142

Farley, Robert. (2018). The One Important Ingredient for Regional Hegemony that

China's Still Missing. The Diplomat.

Freeman, Charles (2000). China and Regional Security Dynamic. CSIS. Washington DC.

Future Directions. (June 23, 2016). The United States and the Indian Ocean: The Security

Vector.

Erickson, Andrew. Mikolay, Justin. (2010). Diego Garcia and the United States'

Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy. Researchgate.net.

Ganguly, Sumit, Scobell, Andrew. (2005). India and the United States: Forging a

Security Partnership. World Policy Journal. 22(2).

Haenle, Paul. Saalman, Lora. (2011). Partners in Peril. US-India-China-Pakistan.

Washington DC: Carnegir Endowment for International Peace.

Holmes, James. Yoshihara, Toshi. (2008). China and the United States in the Indian

Ocean. New Port: US Naval War College.

Ikenberry, John. (2014). From Hegemony to Balance of Power: The Rise of China and

American Grand Strategy in East Asia. International Journal of Korean

Unification Studies. 23(2).

Izuyama, Mari. Kurita, Masahiro. (2017). Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Regional

Responses to China's Growing Influence. NIDS.

Jahangir, Asifa. (2012). Changing Dynamics in Pakistan-China Strategic Partnership:

Challenges and Prosects. Mphil Thesis: National Defence University. 143

Jahangir, Asifa. (2013). Changing Dyamics of South Asia Balance of Power. Journal of

South Asian Studies. 1(1).

Jaishankar, Dhruva (2012). India‟s Ocean. Foreign Policy.

Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. (2013). The Indo-US Strategic Relationship and Pakistan's Security.

South Asian Strategic Stability Institute Research Report. 9.

Jervis, Robert. (2003). The Compulsive Empire. Foreign Policy.

Kabalaan, Marwan (2013). China‟s Interests are Regional not Global. Gulf News.

Kang, Wang. (2012). Managing Regional Hegemony in Historical Asia: The Case of

Early Ming China. Chinese Journal of International Politics. 5.

Kaplan, Robert (2013). China‟s String of Pearls? 15 Feb, Real clear World. Retrieved

from

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/02/15/chinas_string_of_pearls_1005

58.html

Kaufman, M. Lizner. (January 19, 2007). China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test.

Washington Post.

Kapur, Ashok. (2011). Indian and the South Asian Strategic Triangle. New York:

Routledge.

Khurana, Gurpeet. (2008). China's 'String of Pearls' in Indian Ocean and Its Security

Implication. New Delhi: IDSA. 144

Kulacki, Gergory. (2014). An Authoritative Source on China's Military Space Strategy.

Cambridge: UCS.

Kulacki G. Lewis (2008). Understanding China's Anti-Satellite Test. Nonproliferation

Review. 15(2).

Kumar, Ravi (2010). Relations Between China and Pakistan. China Centre, Calcutta

University.

Lees, SC. etal. (1993). The Friend of my Enemy is my Enemy: Modeling Triadic

International Relationships. Synthese. 100(3).

Lele, Ajey (2013). China‟s „String of Pearls‟ in Space. New Delhi: IDSA

Litner, Bertil. (2017). A New Cold War in the Indian Ocean? National Interest.

Louise, Merrignton. (2012). The India-US-China-Pakistan Strategic Quadrilateral. Asia

Pacific.

Majid, Munir (2012). South East Asia between China and the United States.

Malik, Hasan Yaser (2012). Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port. Journal of Political

Studies. Retrieved from: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-

files/gwadar%20article-winter2012.pdf

Martantidou, Virginia. (2014). Revisiting China's 'String of Pearls' Strategy. Washington

DC: CSIS. 145

Menon, Shivshankar. (2016). As China's Pakistan Ties Deepen, India Needs a Strategy to

Mitigate the Fallout. The Wire.

Moaz, Zeev (1997). Regional Security in Middle East: pat Trends, Present Realities and

Future Challenges. JCSS.

Mukherjee, Anit. (2017). Indian Ocean Strategic Outlook. Brooking. edu.

Mukherjee, Krittiwas (2010). China‟s Growing focus on Indian Ocean irks India.

Nadkarni, Vidya. (2010). Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances.

New York: Routledge.

Nasar, Rahim. (February 4, 2018). US-Pakistan Relations: A Troubling Scenario for

South Asia. Asia Times.

Naseer, Rizwan. Amin, Musarat. (2011). Balance of Power: A Theoretical Explanation

and Its Relevance in Contemporary Era. Berkley Journal of Social Sciences.

1(10).

Noor, Elina et al (2012). Impact of Rise of China on Regional Security. East- West

Centre.

Panda, Ankit. (2017). Sri Lanka Formally Hands Hambantota Port to Chinese Firms on

99-Year Lease. The Diplomat.

Parera, Sampath (2013). Pakistan transfer Strategic port to China. 26 Feb, World

Socialist Website. Retrieved from:

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/02/26/gwad-f26.htmlhe 146

Pejic, Igor. (2015). China's 'String of Pearls' Project. South Front.

Pugh, Jonathan, (2017). Is China New Hegemon in East Asia? IRE

Raghavan, RV. (2001). Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia. The

Nonproliferation Review.

Ranasinghe, Desilva Sergie (2011), why Indian Ocean Matters. The diplomat.

Reinold, Therisa, Dembinski, Methias (2009). The Culture of Regional Securitize and

AU Approaches to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

Report (2010). Relations Between China and Pakistan. China Centre, Calcutta University

Reuters. (November 22, 2017). Indian Navy the odd man out in Asia's 'Quad' Alliance.

Riley, James Whitcomb. (2013). How Realistic is Realism?

Roy, Sumit (2005-06). China and India “The Emerging- Giants” and Africa: A Note.

SAAG. (2011). The Indian Ocean: The Strategic Situation- Analysis. Eurasia Review

June 02. Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiareview.com/02062011-the- indian- ocean-the-strategic-situation-analysis/

Shamshad, Ahmad. (November 25, 2006). A Special Friend Comes Calling. The Nation.

Shear, Andrew. Green J, Michael (2012). Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy. CSIS.

Singh, Abhijet (2012). The Indian Navy‟s New Expeditionary Outlook. Observer

Research.

Statfor. (2018) I.ndian and US find Common Ground in Indo-Pacific. Worldview. 147

Sufyan A. Khan (2011). Greater Indian Ocean- A Peaceful geo political pivot.

Pakpotpourri2‟sblog. Retrieved from:

http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2011/06/24/greater-indian-ocean-

%E2%80%93-a-peaceful-geo-political-pivot/

Tasleem, Sadia. (2008). Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation: Altering Strategic Positioning and

Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia. RCSS Policy Studies. 99.

Tellis, Ashlay. (2009). US and Indian Interests in India's Extended Neighbourhood.

California: Stanford University.

The Economist. (April 2, 2017). China's Battler for Regional Hegemony.

The Washington Times. (January 17, 2005). China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes.

UK Essays. (2015). Strategic Importance of Indian Ocean Region. UK Essays.

Yousaf, Mohammad (2005). Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy in Changing World. ISMICA.

Retrieved from: http://ismica.com/2007/03/pakistans-foreign-policy-in-a-

changing-world/

Yuan, Jing-Dong. (2007). The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in 21st

Century. The Washington Quarterly. 30(3).

Yusuf, Moeed. (2007). The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: An Impact Analysis. ISYP Journal

and World Affairs. 3(2). 148

Zeb, Rizwan. (2012). Pakistan-China Relations: Where They Go from Here? UNISCI

Discussion Paper 29(56).

Zheng, Christoph, Zhihua (2012). Raising important Support for China in Indian Ocean.

28 April. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200038

149

Chapter 5

India in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan and China

5.1. Afghanistan-India Ties: A historical perspective

Bilateral ties between Afghanistan and India have traditionally considered as cordial and strong. While, India was the only South Asian state to recognize the Soviet backed

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in 1980s, its ties became hostile during the 1990s, during Afghan Civil War and the government of Taliban. India supported and assisted the overthrow of Taliban government after 9/11 and became the biggest regional provider of reconstruction and humanitarian aid to Afghan government. Indian citizens are currently working on several infrastructure projects, as part of rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan

(Crosette, 1989). Pakistan has blamed on a number of occasions that Indian Intelligence

Agency RAW is working in cover to malign the country and train and support the militants, a claim which has been rejected by both India and Afghanistan along with the

United States, the latter historically a close ally of Pakistan (Council on Foreign

Relations, 2007; Rajghattai, 2009; Tarzi, 2006).

A cousin of former Afghan president Hamid Karzai said in 2007, that India is the "most celebrated partner of Afghanistan". Afghanistan envoy to India, Shaida Mohammad

Abdali, said in April 2017 that India "is biggest regional donor to Kabul and fifth largest internationally with over a $3 billion in assistance. New Delhi has constructed over 200 private and public schools, assisted over 1000 scholarships, hosts over 16,000 students from Afghanistan ((Talukar, August 23, 2017). After the Indian embassy bombings in

2008, the Afghan Foreign Ministry quoted New Delhi as a "brother country" and the ties 150 between both states as one which "no enemy can destroy". Ties between India and

Afghanistan reached to a new peak in 2011, after the signing of strategic partnership deal, which was Kabul's first since the Soviet 1979 invasion (Global Bearings, November 2,

2011; Shrivastava, 2013).

As per a Gallup Survey in 2016, which interviewed 1000 Afghan adults, 50% of Afghans approved the job performance of Indian leadership and 44% disapproved with 6% undecided. According to the same survey, Afghan adults are more likely to approve of

Indian leadership than the US or Chinese leadership (English, 2016)

5.2. Soviet Invasion Until Taliban Government

As mentioned earlier, India was the only South Asian state to recognize Soviet backed

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the present of Soviet military in the country.

India also provided humanitarian aid to Afghan government led by Najibullah. After the with drawl of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, India kept on supporting government of Najibullah with humanitarian aid (Barbara, 1989). After the fall of the government, India alongside the global community supported the coalition government that was established, but tied and contacts ended with the start of another civil war in

Afghanistan, which led to the Taliban in power, and Islamist militia supported by

Pakistan (Newsweek, June 3, 2008. The Taliban government was only recognized by

Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The destruction of historical site, Bamiyan Buddha monuments, by the Taliban was met by outrage and angry protest from India (Propham, March 10, 2001). In 1999, the hijacked airplane of

Indian Airline Flight 814, which landed and stayed in Kandhar in Afghanistan, was 151 suspected being supported by Taliban. India became the one of the major supporters of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance (Jane, 2008).

5.3. Ties in Post 9/11 World

After the American attack on Afghanistan in 2001, India offered its intelligence and other kinds of support for the Coalition forces. After the Taliban government was overthrown in Kabul, Indian established diplomatic ties with the new formed democratic government in Afghanistan, provided aid and participated in reconstruction process. India has provided $650 to $750 million in economic and humanitarian aid, making it the biggest regional aid provider to Kabul. Indian support and cooperation extends to rebuilding of power plants, investing in health and education sectors, establishing air links and assisting to train Afghan diplomatic, police and civil servants. Indian government also assisted in establishing the supply line of electricity, natural gas and oil. It also gave scholarships to Afghan students (Bennet, 2005).

Further, Border Roads Organisation of Indian Army constructed a major road in 2009 in the remote region of Nimroz, an Afghan province, connecting Zranj and Delaram. The road has provided viable reliable route for the duty free investment of goods via

Chahbahar port in Iran to Afghanistan. The key to Indian strategy in Afghanistan is to establish transportation routes that bypass Pakistan, helping reduce economy dependence of Kabul on Islamabad (IBP USA, 2008). In 2005, India proposed Afghanistan's membership in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Both states,

India and Afghanistan, developed military and strategic ties against militancy (Tarzi,

2006). After the killing of Indian national in 2005 by Taliban, India deployed 200 152 soldiers of the Indo-Tibaten Border Police (ITBP) to provide security to Indian nationals and projects initiated and supported by Indian government.

Afghanistan further strengthened its relations with India in wake of continue problems and tension with Pakistan, which was blamed to shelter and support Afghan Taliban.

India followed a policy of close cooperation with states like Afghanistan, Iran and Bhutan in order to enhance its position as regional hegemonic power and counter its arch rival,

Pakistan, which India has been baselessly blaming of abetting and supporting freedom fighters in Indian Occupied Kashmir and other states of India (CFR, 2008).

During Hamid Karzai's 2006 visit to India, both states signed three MoUs for strengthening cooperation in the sectors of education and standardization between

Afghan National Standardization and Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), and rural development. A deal providing $50 million to promote bilateral business ties between

India and Afghanistan was signed during the visit of Afghan Foreign Minister Dr Spanta between June 29 and July 1 in 2009. During the same year, India increased its aid to

Afghanistan by $150 million to $750 million. In 2007, Afghanistan finally became the member of SAARC (RRTD, 2008).

In 2008, India embassy in Kabul was targeted by a suicide attack-the deadliest attack in

Kabul since the fall of Taliban government in 2001. The attack killed 58 people and injured 141. Senior Indian Army officer Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehta was entering the embassy building in a car along with V. Venkateswara Roa, when the attack happened.

Both officials died in the blast. Kabul's official position blamed Pakistan was behind the attack (Hindustan Times, July 7, 2008; IBN, July 7, 2008). 153

During the 15th SAARC summit in Sri Lanka, India pledged another $450 million with a further $750 million already promised for ongoing and future projects in Afghanistan. In

2008, then-Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited New Delhi which further strengthened the bilateral ties of both states. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh promised further aid for Afghanistan during that visit (NDTV, December 3, 2008).

In October 2009, Indian embassy in Kabul was once again attacked by a suicide car bomb, little more than a year after the last attack. The attack killed at least 17 people

(BBC, October 8, 2009). Another terrorist attack was conducted at the Arya guest house where Indian doctors were staying, resulting in another 18 deaths. Indian government pledge to rebuilt Afghanistan reached a total of $2 billion as of May 2011 after Indian

PM Singh visited Kabul for a two-day tour. In same year, India donated 250, 000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan as part of humanitarian aid (Kakar, 2011).

India condemned the killing of former Afghan president Buhanuddin in September 2011 and the statement by Indian government read: "Tragically, the forces of terror and hatred have silenced yet another powerful voice of reason and peace in Afghanistan. We unreservedly condemn this act of great brutality," and reiterated the steadfast support of the people and government of India in Afghanistan's "quest for peace and efforts to strengthen the roots of democracy". (TOI, September, 2011). Indian promised to stand by the Afghan people as they prepare to take the responsibility for their governance and security after the withdrawal of global forces set in 2014 (Mohan, 2011; Outlook India,

March 9, 2012). In October 2011, Afghan government signed its first strategic pact with

India which included military assistance and training of Afghan security forces (DNA,

October 8, 2011). During his visit to Indian Afghan President Karzai told media that the 154 strategic pact is not directed towards any other state, adding that Pakistan is our twin brother, while India is a great friend. The deal we signed with our friend will not affect our brother. He also stated that however, our engagement with Pakistan has unfortunately not yet extracted the results we want (Dhar, 2011). Both countries launched partnership council, topmost body to implement the Strategic Partnership Pact in 2012.

In May 2014, the Indian consulate in Herat was attacked by three militants with arms and weapons. Following the attack, India stated that our premises have been repeatedly targeted by those who do not support Indian development projects in Afghanistan. The attack will not reduce Indian development assistance and its contribution to restructure and redevelop Afghanistan, Indian envoy to Afghanistan Amar Sinha added (India

Gazzette, May 24, 2014).

In December 2015, Indian government donated three Mi-25 attack helicopters with an option to supply one more in the future to Kabul as part of the bilateral strategic pact to counter Taliban (Sridharan, 2015).. In same month, Indian Prime Minister Narendra

Modi visited Afghanistan to inaugurate the newly constructed Afghan parliament building opposite the ruins of Darul Aman Palace, which was built by India for $90 million. On the visit Indian prime minister said:"The building will stand as the symbol of the relations of values and emotions, of aspirations and affection that bind both sides in a special bond." Afghan President Ghani in reply tweeted" Though, Afghanistan and India need no introduction, we are bound a thousand binding forces. We have stood by each other in the worst and best times" (Hindustan Times, December 25, 2015). 155

In June 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Afghan President Ghani formally inaugurated the $290 million Salma Dam with a capacity of 42MW power generation. Water from the said dam will also use for irrigation in the region. The dam is expected to assist Afghanistan capitalize on the chances that will further open up once the

Iranian port Chahbahar project, linking Iran and Central Asia's road and railway tracks, is completed (Economic Times, June 4, 2016; Vohra, 2016).

India wants to expand its economic presence in Afghan territory especially after the withdrawal of International forces in 2014 and to fight Taliban in the country. India is mainly focusing on transport connectivity and economic cooperation with states in South and Central Asia. Indian government has already invested almost $10.8 billion in

Afghanistan. The Indian government is building more projects like transnational pipeline and roads connecting the Iranian port and Central Asian states. The mega projects of

India in Afghanistan includes setting up Iron ore mines, a 6 MTPA steel plant, an

800MW power plant, transmission lines, roads, and more hydro electric projects. India has helped Kabul in the redevelopment of Salma Dan in Herat Province. Besides producing the electricity, the India-Afghanistan friendship dam is providing irrigation water for 75, 000 hectares of farmland in the Chisti Sharif district (GCA, March 24,

2013). 156

Source:https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/why-india-aids-afghanistan-and-why-it- matters.389263/

Further, India and Iran and set to sign a transit del on transporting the goods to landlocked Afghanistan. While India is investing heavily in Chahbahar port, which will serve as the hub for transportation of the goods, the Indian government, in a goodwill gesture, has also constructed the new Afghan parliament building. Meanwhile, after refusal from Pakistan, both India and Afghanistan have developed two air corridors to facilitate their bilateral trade (Dhaiya, 2014; Sharma, 2017).

In 2017, both counties held second Strategic Partnership Council meeting in New Delhi.

Afghan Foreign Minister Rabbani led the Afghan delegation comprising senior members of Afghan government. Making use the fresh aid of $1 billion by India, both countries 157 launched a New Development Partnership. Indian government worked with Afghanistan to identify the projects and priorities where Kabul needed the Indian assistance to be directed. India agreed to start some vital new projects such as drinking water in Kabul and Shahtoot Dam, which will also facilitate the irrigation and water supply for Charikar

City, road link to Band-e-Amir in Bamyan Province that would enhance the tourism, low cost housing project for returning Afghan refugees in Nagarhar Province to confirm their resettlement, a gypsum board manufacturing plant in Afghan capital to promote value added local industry and for import replacement and a polyclinic in Mazar-e-Sharif

(Indian Ministry of External Affairs, September 11, 2017; Roy, 2017)

Furthermore, India agreed to take up 116 high Impact Community Development projects in 31 different Afghan provinces. These vital investments by India will be in areas of health, agriculture, education, drinking water, renewable energy, micro-hydro power, sports, flood control and administrative infrastructure. India has also announced that ongoing projects for education including capacity building skills and human resources development of Afghanistan, one of the biggest such project in the world, will continue for a further timer period of five years from 2017 to 2022 (Chaudhary, 2017; Live Mint,

March 1, 2018)

5.4. Reason Why Afghanistan is significant for India

Indian government has been claiming that her interest in Afghanistan is to bring stability and peace in the country however, the real objectives behind Indian strategy are yet to be revealed to the world. Meanwhile, on the other hand, Dr Shubash Kapila argued that

Afghanistan is not vital strategic aim of Pakistan and its army. Besides, Indian strategic 158 stakes in Afghanistan's stability, are same stakes, as of Iran, Central Asian States, and

Russia. The factors clearly draw the Indian interest and outline of the invested economic interests of Indian in Afghanistan (Kapila, 2009; Nye, 2006).

For India, Kabul is a potential route to access the Central Asia's energy resources.

Further, India is looking to establish Afghanistan as a base to counter Chinese growing regional influence along with Central Asia's energy and economic sectors. For that purpose, India is developing Iranian port Chahbahar which would connect India to Iran, and thereby, the Indian goods can be transported to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan altogether. Afghanistan is also, a potential market for Indian business and goods. The bilateral trade between Afghanistan and India has reached $2.16 billion for the fiscal year of 2013-14 from March 2009. India also want to ensure its influence and presence in numerous oil and gas projects, which runs through Afghan territory to Pakistan (Rahim,

2018).

5.5. Indian Objectives in Afghanistan

(a) Indian Economic Policy in Afghanistan

India has been supporting both the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference in

Afghanistan (RECCA) and the "Heart of Asia" dialogue processes. As an initial policy,

Indian government needs to take the step to seek the support of international community to provide more financial aid to Kabul to help her counter its financial hurdles to the run the country till it can stand on its own (Haidari, 2017).

In post 9-11 world, India has reinforced its economic policy and interests in Afghanistan through adopting the several policies. India is using the political levers and means to 159 capture the Afghan market as it wanted to create the economic dependency of Kabul on its goods through control of investment and capital. To further strengthen its control in

Afghanistan, India has been participating in water, power, infrastructure and agriculture sector projects exclusively along with building resilience via constant engagement in

Afghan politics. Further, India is proactively defending its interests through giving full support to Indian businessmen and companies in Afghanistan to invest in both mega and small projects (Lakshman, 2009; Singh, 2008).

(b) Countering Pakistan in Afghanistan

To a large extent, Indian approach towards Kabul has remained a function of its anti-

Pakistan policy. It is vital for India that Islamabad does not get a strong foothold in

Afghanistan, hence, historically India has attempted to prevent Islamabad from dominating Kabul. India would like to further minimize Pakistan's involvement in

Afghan affairs and to ensure that a radical Taliban regime does not establish again.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has always viewed Afghanistan as a good means of balancing out

Indian efforts of dominance in South Asian Region as it is highly critical for its national security interests as the two, East and West, states flank the country's borders. A friendly political presence in Kabul is viewed by Pakistan as necessary to avoid the strategic dilemma of being caught between a powerful arch rival India in the East and unstable

Afghanistan, with claims on the Pashtun dominant region in the Western border. Basing on its Pashtun-ethnic linkage with Afghanistan, Islamabad considers its role to be a dominant and privileged one in the affairs of Kabul (Pant, 2012; Weinbaum, 1991). 160

Given these conflicting circumstances, both Pakistan and India have tried to neutralize the influence of the other in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Both states are stuck in a classic security dilemma in so far as their policies towards Kabul are concerned. Any policy, either by India or Pakistan to enhance its security causes, the other to act in response, thereby leading to deterioration in the whole regional security situation

(Hussain, 2002; Khalid, 2011)

A constant fear among some Indian policy makers is that once US troops completely withdraw, Pakistan will move to dominate Afghanistan's political landscape, which will enable Islamabad to use the state as a safe haven and training ground for anti-India extremist entities. As the editorial page of Indian newspaper Mint wrote:

Once Islamabad is assured of a friendly government in Kabul, it will unleash all the terrorists at its disposal on India. This will only mean more trouble in Jammu and

Kashmir, and it will embolden terrorist groups to attack our cities with greater frequency

(Live Mint, January 27, 2010).

To counter such situation, New Delhi is seeking a democratic, multi-ethnic Afghan government that can establish its hold and control over the whole territory of

Afghanistan, maintain stability, prevent the return of Afghan Taliban, and stops the anti-

India extremism (Chandra, 2009; Mukhopadhaya, 2009). To get such arrangements, however, India is required to counter Pakistani political influence in Afghanistan.

Describing Indian perspective, a retired Indian Brigadier Arun Singh wrote, who once headed the Indian military's long-range strategic planning staff: 161

"the most important issue is to prevent Pakistan from becoming the sole arbitrator of the

Afghan political and strategic discourse, as this would not only reinforce the proxy war against India, but also fuel Islamic radicalism in the country" (Sahgal, 2011).

India is a developing stat, still it is providing large amount of aid to Kabul. There are a number of political reasons behind its aid policy and one of them is to counter China. All major South Asian regional actors are occupied with the task of making their states in the territory by using several ways and means, India is trying to achieve this by intervening in Afghanistan (Khalid, 2011). There is a clear race going on between New Delhi and

Beijing in this region. China is an emerging regional and global superpower, and India has intensified its efforts in Afghanistan to make itself prominent in the region and to limit Chinese influence in South Asia. China is increasing its influence in Kabul to use its undiscovered natural resources. While, India is providing assistance in several projects of infrastructure to counter the increasing influence of Beijing in the country. In Post 9-11 world, the launch of "Operation Enduring Freedom" by the US, has given India and opportunity to pursue its foreign policy goals of attaining hegemonic position in South

Asia (Miani, 2017; Tagotra, 2017).

(d) Enhance Access to Central Asian Region

India need new energy sources to fuel for its growing and modernizing economy sectors.

Indian economic growth for more than seven percent annually since 1997 has made it the world's second fastest growing economy energy market, with estimates that the economy will need to import more than 80 percent of its fuel by 2030. The proposed 1,000 mile, 162

$7.6 Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI pipeline would carry 33 billion cubic meters per year of Turkmen gas, creating much needed $1.4 billion/year in transit fees for Kabul. Both Pakistan and India would receive 14 bcm/year each, representing 1.5 percent of Indian total annual energy usage and 15 percent of Pakistan's (Bedi, 2002).

The transport of Central Asia's energy resources to both Pakistan and India needs a stable

Afghanistan, whose territory the TAPI pipeline must cross, giving both states strong reasons and benefits to promote security there. Afghanistan is viewed as a gateway to the

Central Asia where India hoped to expand its influence in coming years. India does not have direct access to energy rich Central Asia, hence it has to depend on Afghanistan for the access. The increasing Indian influence has advantage for New Delhi that it acts like a bridge enter into CARs. Cordial ties and its collaboration in almost every field in

Afghanistan give prospect of developing good relations with Central Asian states. Indian developing economy demands further exploration of energy and Central Asia is the best available option for it (Blank, 2007; CIA World Fact Book, 2011).

Furthermore, Central Asia is vital for India not only because of its natural resources but also because other big powers like China, Russia and US have already competing for regional influence. The regional states view Afghanistan as potential source of instability even as their geo-political enmity remains and significant reason of Kabul's troubles.

India has been forced to increase its military expenditure and profile in Central Asia after the diplomatic defeat it faced in 1999 when and Indian Airlines flight was hijacked by the militants. New Delhi had to negotiate a deal with Afghan Taliban that involved the release of aircraft in exchange for three hardcore militants arrested by India (US Info

Admin, 2010). 163

Following the incident, India decided to establish its first foreign military base in Farkhor in Tajikistan, close to border of Afghanistan, that was used to provide assistance to

Taliban enemy, Northern Alliance militants and government in Kabul. This base is operation since May 2002, which shows Indian strong presence in the region to keep check on China and Pakistan. As the geo-political significance of Central Asian Region has increased in recent years, all the major powers have been keen to increase their influence there and India is no exception (Pant, 2010).

India shares a number of interests of major powers like Russia, US and China vis-a-vis

Central Asia, including access to regions energy resources, controlling the spread of militancy, ensuring political stability and further strengthening of regional economies.

But unlike Russia and China, India's interest linked with that of the US interests to have a greater Indian presence in Central Asia to counter increasing Russian or Chinese presence.

(e) Increasing Regional Influence

A major factor behind Indian pro-active Afghan policy is Indian attempt to develop for itself a greater role in regional affairs, more in linkage with its developing economy and military profile. India wants to establish itself as a regional major power that is willing to take responsibility to ensure peace and stability in the region. By providing economic aid to Kabul, New Delhi is trying to project itself as a vital economic power that can give necessary aid to the needy states in the region. It is contended that Indian pro-active

Afghan policy was predicated upon New Delhi's keenness to be of use US regional policy 164

"to the determent of a traditional "independent" Indian approach towards its neighboring countries (Ashraf, 2013; Gulsha, 2014).

It is, however, not clear what alternative policy, India can pursue given that US "war on terror" as its strategic priority has at its centre that goal of achieving Afghanistan's stability. Though Indian interests are best served in assisting the America achieve that aim, New Delhi will have to make some difficult choices now that the American commitment to create an enduring environment in Afghanistan has decreased and its plans to leave before its long-term objectives. New Delhi will find this going tough if the

US decides to roll back its policy of the 1990s when despite common security interests, it failed to develop an effective counter-terrorism partnership with New Delhi.

(f) Project Power and Demonstrate Global Interests

Indian growth and integration to the international economy have enhance the significance of trade and commercial objectives of Indian foreign policy. Perhaps, more vital is the aspect that these trends formed a perception among Indian citizens that their country is a global power and should work to shape the world around it. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh of the Norwegian think tank Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) wrote that India considers its aspiration as an extra-regional power to be legitimate and it commensurate with the growing economy of the country (Lynch, 2011; Pant, 2011).

India has long used its military as a tool to project its influence around the globe. Over

100,000 Indian military personnel have participated in 40 United Nation peacekeeping missions since 1950s, over 8,000 of whom are still serving in UN. Further, Indian Navy has deployed ships to counter piracy in coast of Somalia, although these vessels are not 165 formally part of multi-national naval task force. Even within the Central and South Asia,

Indian military has taken increasing pro-active role. It has built an air force base in

Tajikistan, from which the country is transporting construction material, humanitarian aid and other goods into Afghanistan. The base also enables it to project military might in

Central Asian Region. Indian military trained Kyrgy military personnel in peacekeeping skills, and developed a framework for bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation in 2011. In

2012, India resumed military cooperation with Nepal that were halted during Nepal's political instability. India has also deployed small number of military personnel to

Afghanistan, mainly to protect Indian diplomatic embassies and development projects

(Defence News, July 19, 2011; Ploch, et. al., 2011).

Despite all mentioned steps, many Indians feel that their country should exert more influence in South Asian Region as w hole if it is to be taken seriously at global level.

Harsh V. Pant writes that Afghanistan is a litmus test for India's rise as regional and global power. "Indian capacity to deal with the instability in its own backyard will in the last analyses determine its rise as a international power of major importance. Former

Indian Army Deputy Chief of Staff R. K. Sawhney writes more openly that India cannot afford a beat a retreat from Afghanistan if it wants to remain an important regional power

(Sawhney, 2012).

(g) Seek Political Influence in Afghanistan

India has taken numerous steps to increase its influence in Kabul's political circle. To ensure that Afghanistan does not again become have for Afghan Taliban, India actively supported both Karzai and Ghani governments, build democratic enclaves with multi- 166 ethnic participation to reduce the Pashtun influence, and improve the Afghan security forces' capabilities. India has established several substantial diplomatic presence in Kabul to further advocate for its interests. After the fall of Taliban, New Delhi immediately reopened its embassy in Kabul and consulate in Jalalabad and Kandahar. The country also opened consulates in Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, the major commercial regions in the northern and western parts of Afghanistan. These diplomatic enclaves enable India to build ties with local leaderships facilitate the investment and trade, and enhance the awareness of regional development (Pattanaik, 2010)

Meanwhile, Pakistan has alleged that India is using these diplomatic centers to gather intelligence and support militants in Pakistan province of Balochistan., with the Pakistani

Foreign Ministry stating: “Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar are a veritable base for RAW [Research and Analysis Wing, India‟s intelligence service] and its accessories.” (Dawn, August 2, 2003). India, however, has denied these allegations.

Further, during the Taliban regime, India supported the Northern Alliance, which is made up of mainly ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks, because of its enmity to Pakistan supported

Taliban mujahideen. New Delhi provided the movement of its equipment maintenance, defense advisors, weapons, material and the Indian military constructed a field hospital in

Tajikistan to be used for its fighters. Some Indian analysts suggested that Indian government resume its support to NA allies as a counterweight to Pashtun insurgents and policy against the Taliban's potential return (Fair, 2010; Ganguly & Howenstein, 2009).

However, rather than work as a deter to Pashtun aggression, such move by India could end up uprising it. Resuming military support to NA could increase tensions between

Tajik-dominated northern Afghanistan and the Pashtun-dominated central administration 167 in Kabul., leading to a much "hotter" proxy war in Afghanistan. Though it is not in Indian interest to fuel up greater instability in Afghan territory, this kind of option could enable

India to retaliate in kind if Islamabad increase its support to Taliban; if Pakistan urges its proxy powers to become more aggressive in India, New Delhi could urges its proxies to do the same in Afghanistan (Fair, 2011; Verma, Karthikeya & Schaffer, 2010).

India fears that any shape of reconciliation that brings back the Taliban into Afghan political sphere and government will enable Pakistan-backed forced to resume using

Kabul as a haven in which they can safely plan and execute terror attacks India and its interests in Afghanistan. Addressing this apprehension, a major Indian think tank wrote:

“India‟s security interest primarily revolves around denying any political or military space to the ISI-backed Taliban and other such fundamentalist groups.” Until now, India has remained unsuccessful in blocking the Afghan Taliban from playing a role in Kabul, however, it has increased its position in an effort to maintain some measures of influence in the country. After 2010-multi-national-peace negotiations, left the possibility of

Taliban role in government despite rigorous efforts by Indian opposition. India reached to conclusion that some kind of reconciliation would occur with or without Indian support, and it accepted the idea of dialogue with Taliban leaders who renounced violence. Such a radical change in Indian policy, it seems, represented an acknowledgement in India that it will need to have links with power brokers in Afghanistan whatever the composition of the government. While several Indians have criticized their government for assenting to the Taliban involvement in a future Afghan government, leaders in New Delhi assessed to that would be better positioned to counter Islamabad influence if they keep a voice in 168 the reconciliation process than if they oppose the whole process from outside (Gundu &

Schaffer, 2011; IIS, 2011)

(h) Regional Solutions for Afghan Stability and Security Issues

India has been following the regional solutions for Kabul's stability and security problems to give governments throughout South and Central Asia stakes in its success and in the words of New Delhi's foreign affairs minister, to enable all states in the region to "advance together through free trade, regional economic integration, and open borders.

This multi-level approach also the extra benefit of reducing Pakistan's influence over

Afghan affairs, which, in return, as an Indian think-tank writes, assists, "Afghanistan to be more independent and less subject to Pakistan's arm twisting". (Tellis, 2010)

A vital aspect of India's regional approach has been to promote Kabul's membership in

SAARC, both to institutionalize Afghanistan's integration with regional states and to establish two-way trade among these countries. Integrating Afghanistan into the South

Asian economy could produce as much as $2 billion in regional activity, including $600 million for Kabul. Such a strategy also assists Afghanistan as a vital bridge between India and energy rich Central Asia (Bhasin, 2007)

Although much of their ties has been zero-sum in nature, both Islamabad and New Delhi did manage to agree on one important regional project that would produce mutual benefits; the TAPI gas pipeline that would provide much needed gas to both Pakistan and

India.

169

(I) India Soft Power in Afghanistan

India has been investing its soft power into Afghanistan to counter Pakistan's hard presence. Henceforth, New Delhi has expanded its partnership with Kabul in multi-level socio-economic sectors. India is often described as acting as a soft power in Kabul. India has already invested $ 10.8 billion in Kabul. As a multi-ethnic, democratic country with a rapid developing economy and vibrant media, India projects a very positive image. Its

Bollywood movie industry, which produce up to 800 movies per year, mostly portray glamorous lifestyles and extravagant events. The cultural products have extensively penetrated Afghan society and market, indeed, one of the most widely watched television programs in Afghanistan for a time was an India soap opera dubbed in Dari (Newround,

2013; Tharoor, 2008).

Projects at grass-root level have also helped India to project a favorable image among

Afghan citizens. Many of its aid programs are being developed high-profile deliberately, such as the construction of the new parliament building, the donation of the planes to

Afghan Airlines, the construction of a large hospital in Kabul named after former Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi. Furthermore, India has heavily invested in education, training programs, and construction of vocational schools and clinics across Afghanistan, and delivered humanitarian aid and offered free medical care for more than 350,000

Afghans in a period of less than two years. These and other projects related to reconstruction of infrastructure have provided New Delhi with a ready-made platform through which it can win Afghan's hearts and minds. In part of this policy, India has spread its development assistance across the country to ensure that all ethnic and regional groups in Afghanistan have benefited from Indian aid (Fair, 2010). 170

In the end, New Delhi has made a conscious effort to establish strong ties with elites of

Afghanistan who have long-standing relations with India or to movements backed by it.

Former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, for example, attended a university in Himachal

Pradesh during Soviet occupation, while former foreign minister and administrator of

Afghanistan Abdullah Abudllah, former parliament speaker Younus Qanooni and other senior Afghan officials played vital roles in the Indian-supported Northern Alliance during Taliban regime (Pant, 2010).

5.6. Implications for Pakistan

(a) Security Dilemma

In historical context, Pakistan has mainly focused on eastern border but India is increasing its influence at western border, in Afghanistan, Pakistan has to reconsider and redevelop its military strategy. Enemy India on East, pro-India Afghanistan on western border and Indian intelligence agency in Afghanistan are posing serious security threats to Pakistan. For Islamabad, there is a serious competition, even challenges from other regional countries already exist in Afghanistan, one of them being New Delhi. Former

Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, stated: “If you want Pakistan focused more on the [threat from Afghanistan in the] west, then we have to feel more secure on the east. There is a linkage there.”

Moreover, the Indo-US and US-Afghan strategic partnerships are mainly directed towards Pakistan with ulterior design which creates a huge security dilemma for

Islamabad (Gulshan, 2012). 171

It has been said that India-Afghanistan ties have been a classic case study of Kautilyan

Theory, that is 'an enemy's enemy is a friend'. India, in case of war with Pakistan, would be able to open second front against Pakistan on the North-Western Front. India has sponsored the construction of a road in Afghanistan's Nimroz province linked to the

Iranian border, which has its own long term implications. The region along this road is demographically the province dominated by the Baloch and Pashtuns and it is the only border province that shares a border with both Pakistan and Iran. Further, this project was expected to give a major push to Indian trade relations with Afghanistan and extend to it

Central Asian Region as it would not only shorten the trade route, via Chahbahar port and then by road into Afghanistan by over 1400 kilometers, but it would also free Indo-

Afghan trade from being counter by Pakistan (Noorzai, 2016).

Indian made weapons are being flooded through Afghan territory to Pakistan's security prone areas, which mentioned earlier, are being used by the militants to destabilize the country. Through active collaboration and partnership with other regional and global power players in Afghanistan, India is trying to reduce Pakistan's influence in major sector of the country. Due to Indo-Afghan nexus, Pakistan's security is mainly under constant threat specifically in FATA, and Balochistan.

(b) Diplomatic Encircling

In post 9-11 world, New Delhi has been acting as a spoiler and is continuing to develop strategic to Keep both Pakistan and Afghanistan destabilize and on war path.

Afghanistan-India alliance become an impediment for Islamabad's reach to Central Asian

Region and will also place New Delhi in a position of advantage to maintain the status 172 quo over unresolved main issues. Iran-India ties, Indian economic ties with China and assistance to Kabul in a means to encircle Pakistan diplomatically. Indian muscle-flexing is disturbing the regional balance of power which will further destabilize the South Asian in near future (Rajghatta, 2012).

India's access to Afghanistan and Central Asian markets through Pakistan would flood domestic markets with cheap Indian goods and destroy the local businessmen, manufacturing industries and would also fulfill Indian dream of dominating the economic sphere of South Asia and Central Asian states. If Pakistan remained unable to compete with India, it will eventually impact Pakistan's local manufacturing industries and will also impact Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia negatively. Rail and road connectivity will allow landlocked Afghanistan an alternative and will reduce its dependence on Pakistan and also reduce latter's leverage over former. Delaram-Zaranj project is aimed to bring Afghanistan and Iran into an strategic and economic relationship and to isolate Pakistan (Ashraf, 2009)

By developing the Chahbahar port in Iran and road links to the port, India is attempting to undermine the strategic significance of Pakistan's Gwadar port for Central Asian States and Afghanistan. Although, Indian participation in the construction of Iranian port and road linking in Afghan territory is more of a propaganda than a real strategic deal but it still poses a serious economic threat to Islamabad. The only feasible and shortest trade route for India with Central Asia is the land route that passes through Pakistan.

Meanwhile, Chahbahar port is an impossible trade dream for India due to its length, 173 increased duties and taxation and sea-land switch-over. But Pakistani goods and business is directly affected it comes in direct comparison of Indian goods and it would leave a long-term impact on economy of Pakistan (Gulshan, 2012).

(d) Indian sponsored Terrorism in Pakistan

The pro-Indian Afghan government and establishment is not a friend of Pakistan, nor, the anti-Iran Jundullah or the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi entieis. Deadly proxy was is being waged in

Pakistan's tribal region and Balochistan by India-backed militants. Indian sponsored weaponry was recovered from terrorists during Operation Zarb-e-Azb by Pakistan in

North Waziristan. Indian leverage on Afghan territory will create further space for Indian

Intelligence agency RAW to continue clandestine operation against Pakistan.

It is not the first time RAW is acting against Pakistan. During Soviet war in Afghanistan,

Pakistan became a front-line ally of the US to thwart Soviet Union forces. At that time,

India aided to Soviet Union through RAW and provided complete assistance to Soviet

Intelligence Agency KGB and Afghan spy agency Khad against Pakistan through sedition, sabotage, acts of terrorism and subversion. The seeds of militancy were sown in

Balochisan, the fires of which are being again fueled by RAW. Sarobi is the nerve centre led by an Indian General officer, who also commands the Border Road Organisation

(BRO) (Iftikhar, 2009).

The dissident militants from Pakistan are trained at Sarobi for missions inside Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan. Meanwhile, Kandahar has it forward bases at

Nawaz and Laskargah and their target is Balochistan. The dissidents from the province are trained at Lashkargah for undertaking the terrorist activities in Balochistan as well as 174 in support of the militant Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Approximately 600 BLA terrorists, or Baloch tribal dissidents, are getting specialized training to handle explosives, engineer bomb attacks and use of sophisticated arms in these camps.

International policy magazine, Foreign Policy, also issued a report confirming that the

Indian were neck deep in supporting TTP in Pakistan.

“While the U.S. media has frequently reported on Pakistani ties to jihadi elements launching attacks in Afghanistan, it has less often mentioned that India supports insurgent forces attacking Pakistan. “The Indians are up to their necks in supporting the

Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” a former intelligence official who served in both countries said. “The same anti-Pakistani forces in

Afghanistan also shooting at American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there.” (Marty, 2018).

Furthermore, Afghan officials have also confirmed that India is using Afghan soil to stir unrest and trouble in Pakistan. Afghan government's former Advisor, Ehsanullah Aryanzi said on the sidelines of Pak-Afghan Parliamentary Jirga in 2009:

“India is using Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan and Afghan security agencies are unable to stop Indian intervention due to absence of centralized government mechanism.” (Khan, 2015)

175

5.7. Implications for China

(a) Impact on CPEC

India has constantly been opposing China Pakistan and Economic Corridor (CPEC) since its inception. Meanwhile, according to Wang Yi, China wants to extend this mega project though Afghanistan. As per details, China wants to connect CPEC through Afghanistan will China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor. While, Indian presence in

Afghanistan creates a direct threat to Chinese project. The threat to CPEC's extension is a serious implication for people's republic and to counter that Chinese government has been increasing its influence in Kabul. India is of the view that CPEC passes through

"disputed territory" henceforth it should not be completed hence it has been opposing its extension in Afghanistan.

(b) Economic Restrictions

One of the major Indian interests in Afghanistan is to enhance its economic presence, while China which has emerged as the strongest regional power in South Asia also wants to seek economic benefits in Afghanistan. One of the major examples of Chinese interests is the issue of Mes Aynak Copper Mines, which is still to be started while India is trying to stop this Chinese project. Furthermore, to counter Chinese economic interests, India is using anti-Pakistan card as China is a close ally of Pakistan, hence, India is promoting

China as an enemy in Afghanistan.

176

China and India both are emerging economies but China has surpassed India in numerous sectors including GDP, military might and global impact. India considers itself equal to

China still and has been trying to countering its influence in South Asia. In Afghanistan,

India got the chance to counter Chinese influence and it has been doing mainly though economic aid. The Indian presence in Kabul is definitely a serious threat to China as it challenges its regional dominance. The India however, is also challenging Beijing in

Kabul through its alliance with USA, which started war against terrorism in Afghanistan and China and the US are rivals at both regional and global level.

Indian Ocean is highly critical for China as most of its trade is conducted through Strait of Hurmaz and Malacca. United States alongside India is trying to counter Chinese influence in Indian Ocean. The US have sent its naval fleet in Indian Ocean and South

China Sea to counter China Furthermore, both India and US are conducting regular military exercises in India Ocean. India is especially targeting Pakistan-China Gwadar port and claiming that China will use this as a naval post to keep an eye on US-Indo naval movements in Indian Ocean. The Indian and US presence in Indian Ocean is a serious implication and constant threat to China especially for its trade as US wants to choke both important points, Malacca and Hurmaz, of Chinese trade. Although China along with Pakistan has taken serious steps to counter Indo-US presence in Indian Ocean including providing Pakistan submarines and maritime weaponry but the IOR and challenges related to it are creating serious security and economic implications for China. 177

5.8. Conclusion

Since the fall of Taliban government in Afghanistan after 9-11, India has increased its influence in Afghanistan mainly to counter Pakistan's influence in the country. To portray itself an regional power, and to counter Pakistan-China alliance in the region, New Delhi has become the largest regional aid provider to Kabul. India has been involved in constructing mega projects, including parliament dam, Salma Dam, road and rail links to

Iranian Chahbahar port, and have constantly been providing humanitarian aid to Kabul.

Indian growing interest is also to develop its trade links with Central Asian states, which is a energy rich region. For its rapidly growing economy, New Delhi needs CARs. India has been increasing the influence because it does not want the return of Afghan Taliban in the government because it has supported Taliban's rival, Northern Alliances and return of Taliban means retreat for India. Furthermore, through India is targeting Pakistan through terrorism as it has established its diplomatic enclaves in regions like Kandahar.

Through these centers, India is training the militants to stir up terrorism in Pakistan especially in FATA and Balochistan. Influence in Afghanistan means, India can strike

Pakistan from both eastern and western borders, which is a serious security threat to

Pakistan. Indian presence means, constant economic threat to Pakistan also, as India wants to bypass Pakistan through roads and railway links it has been constructing in

Afghanistan and Iran. New Delhi has been working hard to reduce role of Pakistan in

Kabul affairs, mainly to show itself regional and global power as many Indians feel that their country has the capability to play role of a superpower. Along with its economic and military power, India has been using its soft power in Afghanistan through its movies, dramas, education, health and social aid across Afghanistan so that Afghans have more 178 positive opinion about Indian government. To counter this constant threat Pakistan needs to increase its diplomatic efforts specifically at region level. China can once again play a vital role for Islamabad as it also has a concrete economic presence in the Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Pakistan need to sooth its military relations with Afghanistan so can the unstable western border can be stabilized as it is essential for peace in both Afghanistan and Pakistan's FATA region and with collaboration of both countries, the whole region can be peaceful and stable but for that both sides needed to increase trust between them, otherwise, the situation will get worse and India will most definitely take advantage from this whole situation. Henceforth, a stable Afghanistan is need for Pakistan and to some extend for India too and both states need to work together for the stable region.

179

References

Ashraf, Fahmida. (2009). India-Afghanistan Relations: Post 9/11. Islamabad: ISSI.

Ashraf, Sajjad. (2013). India and Pakistan Compete for Influence in Afghanistan. East

Asia Forum.

BBC. (October 8, 2009). Afghan Bomb Strikes India Embassy.

Bedi, Rahul. (2002). India and Central Asia. Front Line. 19(19).

Bennet, Adam. (2005). Reconstructing Afghanistan. IMF.

Bhasin, Avtar Singh. (2008). India's Foreign Relations,2007: Part I. New Delhi:

Ministry of External Affairs and Geetika Publishers.

Blank, Stephen. (2007). US Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them.

Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College.

Chandra, Vishal. (2009). The Afghan Maze and India's Options. New Delhi: IDSA.

Chaudhary, Dipanjan. (September, 12, 2017). India to Partner Afghanistan for 116 'High

Impact' Projects. Economic Times.

Crossette, Barbara (7 March 1989). India to Provide Aid to Government in

Afghanistan. New York Times.

Dawn. (August 2, 2003). RAW Active in Indian Consulates: Pakistan.

Defence News. (July 19, 2011) India to Train Kyrgyz Armed Forces: Establish Military

Ties in Central Asia. 180

Dhaiya, Sandeep. (2014). Afghan Parliament Being Built by India to be Ready by 2015.

Outlook.

Dhar, Sujoy. (October 5, 2011). Pakistan a Twin Brother, Talks to Go on: Karzai.

Pajhwok News.

DNA. (October 8, 2011). US Hails India's Key Role in Afghanistan.

Economic Times. (June 4, 2016). Narendra Modi, Ashraf Ghani Inaugurate Landmark Rs

1700 Crore Afghan-India Friendship Dam.

English, Cynthia. (2016). Indian Leadership More Popular in Afghanistan Than China's,

US's. Gallup.

Fair, Christine. (2010). India in Afghanistan: Opportunities and Constraints. Washington

DC: Century Foundation.

Fair, Christine. (2010). India in Afghanistan, Part I: Strategic Interests, Regional

Concerns. Foreign Policy.

Fair, Christine. (2011). Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India's End Game in

Afghanistan?. Washington Quarterly.34(2).

Ganguly, Sumit. Howenstein, Nicholas. (2009). India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan.

Journal of International Affairs. 63(1).

GCA. (March 24, 2013). India Plans Shipping Afghan Goods Via Iran. Gazette of

Central Asia. 181

Global Bearings. (November 2, 2011). Indian Influence in Afghanistan: 2011 and

Beyond.

Gulshan, M. (2014). Genesis of Indian Ambition in Afghanistan: Implications for

Pakistan. Islamabad: IPRI.

Haideri, Ashraf. (2017). Afghanistan in 2017: Achievements and Challenges. The

Diplomat.

Hindustan Times. (July 7, 2008). Militants Attacked Indian Embassy in Kabul.

Hindustan Times. (December 25, 2015). Modi Inaugurates New Afghan Parliament Built

by India in Kabul.

Hussain, Riffat. (2002). Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan Continuity and Change.

Strategic Studies. 22(4).

IBN. (July 7, 2008). IFS Officer, Brig Among Indians Killed in Blast.

Ibp Usa (2008). Global Logistics Assessments Reports Handbook: Strategic

Transportation and Customs Information for Selected Countries. Int'l

Business Publications.

Iftikhar, Omar. (October 17, 2009). Geography: The Border of Pakistan. Dawn.

IISS. (2011). India's Role in Afghanistan.

India Gazette. (May 24, 2014). Indian Consulate in Afghanistan Attacked by Gunmen. 182

Indian Ministry of External Affairs. (September 11, 2017) Joint Statement on the 2nd

Strategic Partnership Council Meeting between India and Afghanistan, New

Delhi. New Delhi: IMEA.

Jane. (2008). India Joins Anti-Taliban-Coalition.

Javaid, Umbreen. (2016). Indian Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan.

Journal for Political Science. 3(2).

Kakar, Javed Hamim. (2011). Singh Given Ceremonial Reception. Pajhwok News.

Kapila, Subhash. (2009). Afghanistan: India Has Legitimate Strategic Interests in Its

Stability. New Delhi: South Asian Analysis Group.

Karthikeya, Gundu. Schaffer, Teresita. (2011). India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile

Sports. South Asia Monitor. 117.

Khan, Usman Ali. (2015). India, Pakistan Relations: Ending Terrorism, Myths and Blame

Game. Foreign Policy.

Khalid, Iram. (2011). The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani

Perspective). Journal of South Asian Studies. 26(2).

Lakshman, Kanchan. (2008). Fault Lines. Mumbai: ICMA.

Live Mint. (January 27, 2010). Clueless in Afghanistan.

Live Mint. (March 1, 2018). India Welcomes Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's Initiative

for Direct Talks with Taliban. 183

Lynch, Colum. (2011). India Threatens to Pull Plug on Peacekeeping. Foreign Policy.

Marty, Franz. (2018). Afghan-Pakistani Cross-Border Terrorism Cuts Both Ways. The

Diplomat.

Miani, Tridivesh. (2015). China and India: Competing for Influence in Afghanistan. The

Diplomat.

Mohan, Archis. (2011). Deal for Larger Role In Kabul. The Telegraph.

Mukhopadhaya, Gautam. (2009) (Ed.). India. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace.

NDTV. (December 3, 2008). India, Afghanistan United Against Terrorism.

News round. (2013). What Is Bollywood?

News Week. (June 3, 2008). Afghanistan's Troubled Border.

Noorzai, Najibullah. (2016). Afghanistan, between India and Pakistan. The Diplomat.

Nye, Joseph. (September 25, 2006). Springing Tiger. India Today.

Out Look India. (March 9, 2012). India Condemns Rabbani Assassination. Popham,

Pant, Harsh. (2010). India's Challenges in Afghanistan: With Power Comes

Responsibility. New Delhi: CASI.

Pant, Harsh. (2011). India's Changing Role: The Afghanistan Conflict. Middle East

Quarterly. 18(2). 184

Pant, Harsh V. (2012). India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?. New

Delhi: Centre for International Peace and Security Studies CIPSS.

Pattanaik, Smruti. (2010). India in Afghanistan: Engagement without Strategy. IDSA

Comment.

Peter (10 March 2001). Taliban vandalism stirs India's oldest hatreds. The Independent.

Ploch, Lauren. etal. (2011). Piracy off the Horn of Africa. Washington DC:

Congressional Research Service.

Rahim, Shoaib. (2018). Why Pakistan is TAPI's Biggest Hurdle. The Diplomat.

Rajghattai, Chdanand. (July 31, 2007). US Bails Out India from Balochistan Wrangle.

Times of India.

Rajghatta, Chidanand. (2012). America Persuades India to Expand Afghan Footprint.

Times of India.

Roy, Shubhajit. (September 12, 2017). India Steps up Development Partnership with

Afghanistan. Indian Express.

RRTD. (2008). India. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

Sahgal, Arun. (2011) (Ed.). US Af-Pak Strategy and Afghanistan's Alternative Futures:

Options for India. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

Sawhney, R.K. (2011) (Eds.). Afghanistan Today. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare.

Sharma, Smita. (December 17, 2017). Kabul to Mumbai: Second India-Afghan Corridor

Opens. Tribune India. 185

Shrivastava, Sanskar. (March 30, 2013). India, Russia and China in Race to Expand

Influence Over Afghanistan: Preventing Re-Talibanization After 2014. The

World Reporter.

Singh, Sushant. (2008). Indian Presence in Afghanistan is Essential. New Delhi: ISN.

Sridharan, Vasudevan. (December 24, 2015). India Delivers Attack Helicopters

to Afghanistan to Counter Taliban Offensive. IBT.

Tagotra, Niahrika. (2017). How India Can Counter China's Growing Influence in Asia.

WION.

Talukar, Sreemoy. (2017). Donald Trump's Afghanistan Policy Presents India a Chance

to Increase Sphere of Influence in South Asia. First Post.

Tarzi, Amin. (2006). Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worries Pakistan. Radio Liberty.

Council on Foreign Relations. (December 5, 2007). India's Northern Exposure.

CFR.

Tharoor, Shashi. (Janaury 7, 2008). Hooray for Bollywood: India's 'Soft Power'. Taipei

Times.

Tellis, Ashley. (2010). (Ed.) Implementing a Regional Approach to Afghanistan: Multiple

Alternatives, Moddest Possibilites. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace.

TOI. (September, 2011). Former Afghanistan President Burhannuddin Rabbani

Assassinated. 186

US Energy Information Administration. (2010). India: Country Brief. Washington DC:

US EIA.

Verma, Arjun. Schaffer, Teresita. (2008). A Difficult Road Ahead: India's Policy on

Afghanistan. South Asian Monitor. 114.

Vohra, Anchal. (May 17, 2016). Narendra Modi to Visit Afghanistan in June to

Inaugurate Salma Dan. News 18.

Weinbaum, Marvin. (1991). Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship. Asian

Survey. 31(1).

World Factbook. (2011). India. Washington DC: CIA.

187

Chapter 6

Iran's Chahbahar Vs CPEC: Cooperation or Rivalry?

6.1. China Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC) Strategic Significance

China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the mega project comprising collection of several infrastructure projects which are currently under development across Pakistan.

The project which was originally valued worth $46 million, has increased over the years to $62 billion until 2017. The mega project is being developed to modernize the infrastructure rapidly and to further increase the strength of country's economy by constructing the latest transportation system, several energy-power projects and most important Special Economic Zones (SEZ). In 2016, the project, CPEC, was partially operational zed by Pakistan and China when the cargo from China travelled from

Khunjerab pass to Gwadar port for further sea and maritime travel to West Asia and

Africa, while few energy projects were initiated in 2017 (Hussain, 2015; Kiani, 2016;

Ramchandaran, 2016)

Furthermore, a huge network of railways and highways are being constructed under

CPEC that will travel across length and breadth of territory of Pakistan. The network is being updated because the inefficient and old transport structure was estimated to cause

3.55% of Pakistan's annual GDP. The latest system of transport are being developed under this mega project will like the ports at sea in Karachi and Gwadar with the northern region of Pakistan, along with, ports in Central Asia and China. For this purpose, 11,00

KM long road will be constructed in the metropolis cities of Lahore and Karachi. 188

Meanwhile, the KKH between Islamabad and China border will be redeveloped and reconstructed completely (Shah, 2015; Rakisits, 2015; Zhen, 2015)

Meanwhile, the Peshawar-Karachi railway line will be also be redeveloped and upgraded to permit the trains to travel up to 160 Kilometers/hour by the end of 2019. The railway network of Pakistan will also be further enhanced and being connected to Chinese

Southern Xinjian Railway system in China. The experts have estimated the $11 billion will be required to modernize the network of transportation which will be financed and subsidized through the loans on concessionary (Kuglman, 2015; Shah, 2015)

Further, almost $ 14233 billion worth of intensity and vitality undertakings will be developed by the privately owned businesses to help increment Islamabad's vitality deficiency constantly, which will routinely increment to over 45,000 Megawatt and have decreased almost 2-2.5% off, nation's yearly GDP. More than 10,400 MW of vitality generation limit is to be acquired online before the finish of 2018 with the greatest built under CPEC's Early Harvest, which is a fast tracked, projects. Meanwhile, a pipeline network to transport the oil and natural gas will also be constructed as part of this mega project, which will also includes $2.5. The power generation of these projects will majorly by produced from the fossil fuels, through wind power and hydroelectric projects which are added as part of the development of one of largest solar system of the world

(Express Tribune, April 4, 2016; Daily Pakistan, February 2, 2016)

6.2. CPEC: Revisiting the Historic Silk Road

The road was connected the West and East. For many centuries, the road remained the centre of regional trade. The Silk road was referred to both sea and land routes which 189 connected South Europe, West Asia, East Africa and Southeast Asia and East Asia. The road was named due to it extensive silk trade along its whole length, starting from the

Han Dynasty (207-BCE-220 CE)This dynasty was stretched throughout section of

Central Asia of the trade routes in around 114 BC via the travel explorations and mission of the envoy of China, Zhang Qian. Chinese dynasty showed extensive enthusiasm for the security of their exchange products and further extended the Great Wall of China to affirm their merchandise and exchange streets (Gan, 2009; Elisseff, 2001; Boulnos,

2005).

The exchange on this street assumed a crucial job in the development and improvement of nations and human advancements of Arabia, Africa, Afghanistan, Iran, India, Korea,

China, and Japan, opening long-stretched economic and political ties between these civilizations. Although the silk was the main item of trade exported from China, several other items were also traded, along with sciences, religions, technologies and philosophies. Other than that, the diseased, most signifcant plague, was also spread through the Silk Road. (Xinru, 2010)

The people of Central Eurasia were famous for their horse breeding and the Steppe Routs was is use long before the Silk Route. The archeologists have found the graves in

Kazakhstan, confirming that nomadic from the region were horse raisers for exchange as well as were awesome skilled workers who could proliferate extraordinary craftsmanship pieces along the course of Silk Road.

190

The antiquated Silk Road included various courses since it extended towards West from the old business urban areas of China, the overland, the Silk Road isolated into Southern and Northern courses passing alongside Lop Nur and Talkamakan Desert. The trades along these ancient routes were doing the trade known as relay trade under which the goods and items passed through several hands before reaching its last destination.

The route in north or northern route which started from Xi'an. This route was found and described around first century BC when ruler Han Wudi ended the harassment of nomadic tribes. This rout further goes northwest via the Chinese province of Shanxi and

Gasnu and divided into three more rotes. Two of these routes passed through the mountains Turpan which is now known as South Kazakhstan (Hansen, 2000).

The southeastern route of the Silk Routes is the current Korakoram Route, the main route, comprised of between China and Pakistan. The road then truns tow. After passing through the mountains, and reach to Afghanistan, reconnecting the northern route near

Turkmenistan, and Merv, the road followed almost straight road west passing through the montains of Meopotamia and Iran, into the northern side of Desert of Syria to the Levant, where the trading ships in Mediterranean sea would gather the goods and travel to

Europe, while the routes on land went to either Anatolia or North Africa (Cooley, 2015).

South West Route

The route in South West is termed as Ganges Delta, which has remained the focus of interest for the international traders and regimes. Now travel from Egypt as far as

Ganges, they are only private citizens. The Ptolemy map of the Ganges Delta is remarkably same as of current region. It is without a doubt was a major global trading 191 centre, way before than the common era. Traders from Java and Thailand did business in this delta and passed through it (Strayer, 2009).

Route From the Sea

The maritime Silk Route is called as the sea section of the ancient Silk Road that connected Central Asia and China, Indian subcontinent, Arabia, Egypt and Europe. The ancient trade route was passed through several bodies of waters which includes Strait of

Malaca, India, Ocean, Arabian Sea, Read Sea, Persian Gulf, Gulf of Bengal and South

China Sea. This route over crossed with the ancient Southeast Asian maritime trade of spice under Indian Ocean trade and following eighth century, the Rabian naval network of trade. This historical network also stretched towards East to Yellow Sea and East

China Sea to interlink China with Japan and Korean Peninsula (Xinru, 2010).

6.3. CPEC: Development and Projects

The plan and talks to construct an economic corridor from Pakistan's Gwadar port to

China were started in 1950s and it was further strengthened with the start of the construction of KKH in 1959. The interest of China in Pakistan's Gwadar port were re- emerged in 1998 and in 2002, Beijing took the task of constructing Gwadr port which was eventually completed in 2006. The Gwadar port expansion was stopped mainly due to political and security instability in Pakistan, end of General Pervez Musharraf regime in 2008 and the militant issue in the country (Cooley, 2016) 192

In 2013, after much stable circumstances, then president of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari and

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang agreed to further increase the bilateral connectivity. A MoU regarding the long-term cooperation on CPEC was signed by Pakistan-China officials. In

2014, President Mamnoon Hussain visited Beijing to talk about an economic corridor between both countries. In April 2014, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had a meeting with

Chinese premier in Beijing and discussed future plans on the mega project, bringing about the full framework of the undertaking to be created under the Nawaz Sharif's legislature. In 2014, the legislature of China reported its intends to contribute and bolster

Chinese organizations as a component of CPEC inside Pakistan

Developments in CPEC

In 2014, in the city of Karamy, Pakistan and China inked 20 deals worth $ 1.6 billion to further increase the scope and scale of the mega project, the details of the plans, however, remained vague, but the reports suggested that major focus on enhancing the generation of power and energy. Under the deal, China and Pakistan consented to co-work in the field of room look into. Further, in 2015, the UK reported two unique gifts to Pakistan for the development of streets that are a piece of CPEC. In 2015, Beijing incorporated the

CPEC into its thirteenth 5-year advancement venture, in the mean time in 2015, Pakistan and China consented to additionally contribute $1.5 biliion to build up an innovation and data stop as the piece of this uber venture (Kiani, 2015).

In 2016, amid the visit of Chinese Communist gathering head Zhang Chunxian, the privately owned businesses from China with Pakistani organizations inked another $2 billion worth arrangements on development of sun based power ventures, foundation and 193 coordinations. The principal transport guard from China achieved Pakistan on November

13, 2016, hereafter operational punch the remote ocean port. While in 2016, the primary payload prepare, beginning he coordinate rail track with 500 tones of merchandise left

China from where the freight was moved on boats and sent to Karachi, beginning another exchanging course. The new ocean, rail courses will diminish the expense of coordinations, including the transportation by 50%.In 2014, Beijing announced further $

8.5 billion financial investment in Pakistan along with $4. 5 billion kept for the up gradation of Pakistan's railway system from Peshawar to Karachi including signal system, speed and tracks and further $ 4 billion were kept for the projects of LNG terminal and transportation lines to reduce the shortage of energy in the country. In 2017, the envoy of Egypt to Islamabad expressed his country's interest in the mega project. In

2017, the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pervez Khattak said that he was assured by the Chinese organizations that they would contribute nearly $20 billion for activities. In 2017, an arrangement was inked for the more activities including $1.5 billion oil and farming ventures worth $2 billion alongside a $2 billion street between DI

Khan and Chitral and $7 billion hydro-electric tasks (Haider, 2016).

Until 2017, over $14 billion worth of activities were a work in progress in Pakistan.

While in March 2018, Islamabad reported that after the finishing of under-development tasks of vitality and power, CPEC vitality undertakings would be turned towards hydropower ventures

Chahbahar port is a seaport in Chahbahar situated in Iran, on the Gulf of Oman. The port fills in as Iranian just maritime port, and in view of particular ports named Shahid

Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari, with five births on each port. India, Iran and Afghanistan 194 marked a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and have submitted in any event $21 billion to Chahbahar-Hajigak Corridor, including $85 million for the port advancement by India, $8 billion for India-Iran MoU for Indian modern interest in Chahbahar Special

Economic Zone (SEZ), and $150 million are given to Iran by India. $ 11 billion Hajigak steel and iron mining venture gave over to seven Indian organizations in Central

Afghanistan and Indian $2 billion pledge to Afghanistan for creating essential foundation including the Chahbahar-Hajigak Railway, with potential for various occasions more exchange through availability to 72, 000 kilometer-long-multi-mode North-South

Transport Corridor (INSTC) interfacing these states to Europe and Turkey (Seas Ark,

2018; Aneja, 2013) (Express Tribune, March 8, 2018).

Investment in major projects under CPEC:

Source: http://boi.gov.pk/InfoCenter/CPEC.aspxChinese investment in CPEC 195

Source: http://www.riazhaq.com/2017/05/campaign-of-fear-uncertainty-and- doubt.html

6.4. Chahbahar Port: An Introduction organizations that they would contribute nearly $20 billion for activities. In 2017, an arrangement was inked for the more activities including $1.5 billion oil and farming ventures worth $2 billion alongside a $2 billion street between DI Khan and Chitral and

$7 billion hydro-electric tasks (Haider, 2016).

Until 2017, over $14 billion worth of activities were a work in progress in

Pakistan. While in March 2018, Islamabad reported that after the finishing of 196 under-development tasks of vitality and power, CPEC vitality undertakings would be turned towards hydropower ventures

Chahbahar port is a seaport in Chahbahar situated in Iran, on the Gulf of Oman. The port fills in as Iranian just maritime port, and in view of particular ports named Shahid

Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari, with five births on each port. India, Iran and Afghanistan marked a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and have submitted in any event $21 billion to Chahbahar-Hajigak Corridor, including $85 million for the port advancement by India, $8 billion for India-Iran MoU for Indian modern interest in Chahbahar Special

Economic Zone (SEZ), and $150 million are given to Iran by India. $ 11 billion Hajigak steel and iron mining venture gave over to seven Indian organizations in Central

Transport Corridor (INSTC) interfacing these states to Europe and Turkey (Seas Ark,

2018; Aneja, 2013)

Source: http://www.wroseco.com/news/75/port-of-chabahar-the-final-stop-before-the- world 197

Besides, R297 Amur Highway and Trans-Siberian Highway crosswise over Russia, and arranged Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat railroad giving access Uzbekistan, Krygstan, Tajikistan and Turkemistan. The port will likewise give guide access to Indian Farkhor Air Base in

Tajikistan. Chahabahar course will prompt 60 % decrease in shipment costs and half diminishing in shipment time from Central Asia to India (Bose, 2015; GCR, 2016)

The possibility of improvement of the port was displayed in 1973 by the last Shah of

Iran, however advancement was postponed till 1979 Iranian Revolution. The initial segment of the undertaking was started in 1983 amid the Iran-Iraq War as Iranian administration started moving seaborne exchange east towards the Pakistani fringe so as to lessen the reliance on ports in the Persian Gulf which were frail to assault by the Air

Force (Haroon, 2017; Eurasia Review, 2017)

Iran and India initially consented to additionally create Shahid Beheshti port in 2003, however the arrangement was not grown for the most part because of assents on Iran.

Starting at 2017, the port had the ten compartments. In May 2016, Iran and India marked a respective arrangement in which India consented to repair one of the compartments at

Shahid Beheshti port and develop the 600 meter long holder taking care of office at the port by and by. The port was produced with goal to give an elective course to exchange among Afghanistan and India. The said Chahbahr port is 800 kilometers near

Afghanistan than Pakistan's Karachi port. The port dealt with 2.1 million tons of freight in 2015, which is wanted to additionally upgrade to deal with 8.5 million ton by 2017, and 86 million tons soon (Vatakanake, 2015; Alahmad, 2010) 198

In July 2016, Indian started the delivery $150 million worth of rail tracks to Chahbahar to build up the port' compartment tracks and construct $ 1.6 billion Chahbahar-Zahedan railroad worked by Indian Ircon International for which Indian government consented to give extra $400 million while Iran designated $ 125 million in December 2016, subsequently taking the general distribution to $575 million out of $ 1.6 billion dispensed for rail course till the finish of 2016. In October 2017, Indian first shipment of wheat to

Kabul was delivered through Chahbahar port (Economic Times, January 18, 2018; JOC,

May 9, 2016)

6.5. Key Location of Chahbahar Port:

The Chahbahar port is situated at the Makran bank of Balochistan and Sistan territory, contiguous the Oman Gulf and at the skirt of Strait of Hormuz. It is the main Iranian seaport which has the immediate access to Indian Ocean. Being near Afghanistan and

Central Asian States of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and so on, the port has been called as the "Brilliant Gate" these land bolted states. Chahbahar is 700 kilometer far from

Zahedan, the capital of Sistan area which is 950 kilometers from Milak, and the nearest city of the Afghan outskirt and 1, 827 kilometers from Sarakhs on the Turkmenistan fringe (Roy, 2012; Rorry, 2013)

The marine separation of the port to UAE is 353 nautical miles, Karachi is 456 nautical miles and Mumbai port is 843 nautical miles. In the mean time, Gwadar port is additionally on the Makran drift, at separation of just 72 kilometers. Gawadar additionally holds the immediate access to Central Asian states and experts have routinely made the examinations between these two ports. As the 90 % Iranian populace 199 is situated in western piece of the nation, the eastern side is moderately less created.

Iranian administration is intending to change that by advancement around the Chahbahar port, alongside an unhindered commerce zone, and rails connections and street between

Central Asia and the port. Its will likely utilize this port as the passage to Central Asian states and keep the Bandar Abbas port, which right currently is controlling 85% of the

Iranian seaborne exchange, as a center of exchange with Europe and Russia (Jaffrelot,

2011; Mollazehi, 2016)

The amazingly congested Bandar Abbas port isn't likewise not a remote ocean port and does not has the ability to deal with 250,000 ton maritime load ships. As of now, such ships dock in the UAE, from where the payload is moved to littler 100,000 ton ships for ahead voyage to Bandar Abbas. This change makes Iran reliant on the UAE for shipments and prompts loss of income for the nation. Not at all like, Bandar ABbas,

Chahbahar has the ability to deal with the payload ships (Tanchum, 2014)

6.6. Chahbahar and Iran's Global Strategy

With steady intend to substantiate itself an imperative territorial player, Iranian administration has made the move to draw in with all the neighboring states to expand the travel capability of Chahbahar port. The nation has marked MoU with Tajikistan and

Afghanistan to develop the railroad lines, vitality transmission lines and water pipelines.

Further, the state has been anxious to expand the Khvaf-Heart railroad line to set up association with railroads of Central Asia Region, Europe, and Turkey. The state has additionally gone into a concurrence with Qatar, Uzbekistan, Turkemnistan and Qatar to create and transport hallway among these states. It is additionally a noteworthy 200 accomplice in the International South Transport Corridor (INSTC) alongside Turkey,

Oman, India, Central Asian states, Syria, Russia and Ukraine, which means to interface

South and Central Asian states to Northern Europe through Russia and Iran (Bhatnagar,

2013; Sputnik News, May, 30, 2016)

With uncommon setting of Chahbahar, Iranian government has imagined itself as crucial port in connecting Afghanistan with India and Central Asia and tasks in such manner incorporate a street from Chahbahar to Milak on the Afghan fringe, Chahabahar-Faraj-

Ban railroad, Chahbahar-Zahedan-Mashhad rail track, which be reached out to Herat and

Mazar-eSharif in Afghanistan and Termez in Uzbekistan. The Iranian administration has likewise intended to assemble the Iranrud, Suez Canal like water entry through Iran to interface Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea. (Bhatnagar, 2013; Sputnik News, May, 30, 2016)

6.7. Iran-India-Afghanistan Strategic Coalition

In 2016, India consented to an arrangement with Iran relating $8 billion interest in

Chahbahar port and enterprises inside Chahbahar Special Economic Zone, including a urea making industrial facility, and aluminum smelter, the port is being assembled was a travel course to Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Indian government has effectively settled a 240-kilometer interfacing Iran with Afghanistan. Likewise, the future tasks incorporate rail track interfacing Chahbahar with India-created $11 billion Hajigak iron and steel mining venture in focal Afghanistan, which holds Asia's biggest store of iron metal. India has consented to Afghanistan to put $2 billion in creating and upgrading the foundation Hajigak railroad to Chahbahar. This advancement will convey load shipments to Bandar Abbas port and Chahbahar port, and free Afghanistan from its reliance on 201

Pakistan to achieve the ocean and external world, offering access to India to Afghanistan and in Central Asia, Russia and Europe through 72,00-kilometer long multi modular

INSTC (Business Line, 2016)

In 1990s, India and Iran, alongside Russia, teamed up in supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against Taliban, sponsored by Pakistan. Amid that time, Iran welcomed

India to build up the Chahbahar port to procure guide access to An afghan area. In 1997, a three-nation bargain was marked in Turkmenistan to extend exchange into Central

Asian states, and in 2000 another arrangement with Russia was marked to give continuous transport among Europe and India through INSTC. After 9-11 assaults and

US military mediation in Afghanistan, Iran, India and Afghanistan concurred on a joint advancement of transportation connects to Kabul. India consented to additionally spread the port and to build up a railroad tack among Zarank and Chahbahar (Cheema, 2014;

Behuria, 2015)

Tehran has finished the 70% of the port with expense of $ 340 million, while India has contribute $134 million, amid 2005-2009, to build a street interface from Afghanistan's

Delaram to Zarank at Iran-Afghan fringe. Tehran has likewise finished a street connect between Mikal, close Zarank, and Chahbahar going through Iranshahr and Zahedan.

Going through Deleram, Milak and Zaranj, network has been framed to the Afghanistan's

'wreath street' which is association among Afghan real urban communities including

Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. In 2012, shipment from India docked at

Chahbahar conveying 100, 000 tons of wheat under compassionate guide to Kabul.

Afghanistan has begun to move its business from Karachi to Chahbahar for exchange and travel (Bhatnagar, 2013; Iranian Diplomacy, 2012) 202

These all activities particularly the streets, in any case, will remain unutilized until the further improvement at the port. Regardless of declarations and goals, Indian contribution in the improvement of foundation has stayed insignificant, primarily because of Western strain to force endorse on the administration. Tehran is additionally accepted to have indicated tilt towards Iranian temporary workers when contrasted with Indians. The task was restarted in 2012, in another trilateral gathering on the sidelines of Non-Alignment

Summit (Kutty, 2016)

6.8. 2016 Transit Trilateral Agreement

In 2016, New Delhi marked a progression of twelve MoUs concentrating on Chahbahar port. The travel assention marked by India, Afghanistan and Iran, enables merchandise by

India to achieve Afghanistan through Iranian region. The arrangement joins ports in

Western shore of India to the Iranian Chahbahar port and covers the rail tracks and streets between Afghan outskirt and Chahbahar. Then, another two-sided assention among Iran and India, gives New Delhi the privilege to build two billets of the port as concurred already in 2015 and enables them to be worked for a long time by Indian Ports Global, a joint endeavor between Kandla Port Trust and Jawaharlal Port Trust, in a joint effort with

Iranian Aria Banadar. India Ports Global has guaranteed treatment of 30,000 TEUs by the third year of the activities at the port, and focuses to in the end handle the 250, 000 TEUs

(JOC, May 23, 2016)

203

6.16. Economic, Strategic Aspects of Chahbahar

In 2015, Iran and India singed a long awaited agreement to complete the Chahbahar port which is at the distance of around 100 miles from Pakistan's Gwadar port. Indian government is investing $ 500 million in the Iranian port which eventually will provide

India easy access to newly unlocked Iran and Central Asian states. Out of total share,

$85.21 million has been allocated for the edifice of a container terminal and multi-cause cargo terminal at the port. Through this port, India will increase its ingress in Middle

East, Central Asian Region and Afghanistan. India is taking Chahbahar as an political and economic rival to Gwadar port and a bypass of Pakistan to form strong trade ties with

Afghanistan and other Central Asian states (Abraham, 2016)

Under the project, a road has been built connecting Deleram in Afghanistan and Zeranj at

Afghan-Iran border. The first phase of the port has been completed at cost of $340 million. The port has a strategic significance as it drives India to counter Chinese influence in Indian Ocean and South Asian Region and to undermine Gwadar port's output. In a nut-shell India has planned to bring Chahbahar port in competition to

Pakistan-China port project and make it alternative business centre (Falak, etal, 2016)

India is expecting to counter the increase influence of Pakistan in South Asia and to reduce the trade volume of Gwadar through Iranian port. The rival port will give India access to gas and oil resources of Iran and Central Asia. Bypassing Pakistan, India is planning to connect to the gas and oil capitals of Turkmenistan by constructing a pipeline through Afghanistan to Iran and Gujrat through Arabian Sea. Indian industrial sector contributes 24.2% to national GDP and the momentum of its economy is increasing 204 rapidly. India is in need of Iranian port economically to govern Iranian 1187.3 trillion cubic feet gas reserves and 157.8 billion barrels of oil reservoirs.

Through Chahbahar India is securing its energy needs which will help India to fulfill its current energy requirements and to tackle any energy shortage in near future hence safeguarding the economic progression. The Indian export volume will definitely increase as the country wants to export computers, information technology products, and cars to states involved in the deal. Indian exports to Iran have been doubled in recent last couple of years reaching to around $4 billion. India has also promised to build a railway line between Zahedan and Chahbahar at cost of $ 400 million which would not only assist Indian steel industry but also generate employment opportunities in both states

(Ahmad, 2016; Khan, 2016)

There are, however, many challenges India and Chahbahar have to face as there is variance in behavior about Iran's economic and strategic partner status. Indian Ministry of

Finance is advancing with extreme caution as it few reservations about returns of investment. Further, institutional incompetence would lead India to underutilize the

Iranian port in its full capacity and remain impotent to procure concentrated economic benefits. Indian dream to get direct access to Afghanistan may remain in hung state mainly due to instability in Afghanistan and its weak economy which may linger Afghan role in Chahbahar port. India has expressed intend in developing an oil field in Iran but

Iran regime decline to give India it gas marketing benefits. Hence, India should be ready to face these kinds of disappointments in future (Watts, 2013; Arif, 2016) 205

Furthermore, the potentials and capacity of Gwadar port are far bigger and enhanced, much plentiful and copious as compared to Chahbahar. The annual cargo handling capacity of Gwadar is 300 to 400 million tons whereas Chahbahar only has the potential to handle mere 10 to 12 million of cargo. At one hand Gwadar connects the world to colossal economy of the realm figuring $20 trillion while, Chahbahar joins the globe to an economy of $8 trillion. The Pakistani port gets an edge over Chahbahar as the transportation cost though route of Gwadar to Afghanistan is comparatively much less due to proximity of almost to all Afghan cities. Moreover, the security and law and order situation along Pakistani path is increasing hence Gwadar provides an feasible, secure and economical trade route to Afghanistan. Hence, it can be concluded that Chahbahar is definitely a step on the way to regional trade developments prosperity but the volume of cargo handling and other aspect and potentials of Gwadar port are much more than

Chahbahar. Moreover, it is strategically and economical reputation is immense and substantial as compared to the Iranian port (Ahmad, 2016; Khan, 2016)

6.16. Conclusion

China Pakistan Economic Corridor's (CPEC) Gwadar Port and Iranian Chahbahar Port has been considered as two rival ports. China and India are battling over the regional dominance through these sea ports and constant comparison has been conducted between these two. According to experts, both regional and global, has compared these two ports on strategic and economical scale and Gwadar has emerged as the winner with big margin. Since the inauguration of CPEC, India has been trying to counter it and development of Iranian port is one of its policies to counter the mega project specifically its deep sea port, Gwadar. Although both strategically vital, Gwadar has both strategic 206 and economic benefit over the Chahbahar as it has the capability to handle more containers and shipments. As it is a deep sea port, the huge ships can be docked directly at the port whereas Chahbahar lacked this capability hence in a way it will benefit

Chahbahar as heavy shipments will dock at Gwadar and from there it would be transferred to Iran through small vessels. Both Gwadar and Chahbahar will prove highly important for all involving states i.e. India, China, Iran and Pakistan. Beside, a strategic and economic rivals for all regional actors, these ports have also the capability to become a trade hubs for not only the region but also for the international trade as Indian Ocean handles the major share of global oil and gas trade route. With regional cooperation and collaboration, both Gwadar and Chahbahar, can be turned into the beneficial ports not only for their states but also for other states as landlocked countries like Afghanistan,

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and rest of Central Asian Region will be direct beneficiaries from these ports.

207

References

Gan, Fuxi (2009). "Ancient Glass Research Along the Silk Road". Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Boulnois, Luce (2005). Silk Road: Monks, Warriors & Merchants. Hong Kong: Odyssey Books

Elisseeff, Vadime (2001). The Silk Roads: Highways of Culture and Commerce. UNESCO Publishing / Berghahn Books

Hansen, Valerie (2000), The Open Empire: A History of China to 1600, New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Cooley, Alexander (July 2015). "New Silk Route or Classic Developmental Cul-de-Sac? The Prospects and Challenges of China's OBOR Initiative". PONARS Eurasia

Strayer, Robert W. (2009). Ways of the World: A Global History. New York: Bedford/St. Martin'

Ulric Killion. (2006). A Modern Chinese Journey to the West: Economic Globalisation And Dualism, (Nova Science Publishers

Hussain, Tom (19 April 2015). "China's Xi in Pakistan to cement huge infrastructure projects, submarine sales". McClatchy News.

Kiani, Khaleeq (30 September 2016). "With a new Chinese loan, CPEC is now worth $62bn". Dawn

Ramachandran, Sudha (16 November 2016). "CPEC takes a step forward as violence surges in Balochistan". www.atimes.com.

Shah, Saeed (20 April 2015). "China's Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in Pakistan". The Wall Street Journal.

Rakisits, Claude (Fall 2015). "A Path to the Sea: China's Pakistan Plan". World Affairs Journal.

Zhen, Summer (11 November 2015). "Chinese firm takes control of Gwadar Port free- trade zone in Pakistan". South China Morning Post.

Kugelman, Michael (9 July 2015). "Pakistan's Other National Struggle: Its Energy Crisis". The Wall Street Journal. 208

Shah, Saeed (9 April 2015). "China to Build Pipeline From Iran to Pakistan". The Wall Street Journal.

Chohan, Usman. (2017). What is One Belt One Road? A Surplus Recycling Mechanism

Approach. Papers. Com.

Hussain, Tom (April 19, 2015). China's Xi in Pakistan to cement huge infrastructure projects, submarine sales. McClatchy News.

Kiani, Khaleeq (September 30, 2016). With a new Chinese loan, CPEC is now worth

$62bn. Dawn

Hyder, Danish. (January 11, 2017). CPEC: The Devil in Not in the Details: Herald.

Ramachandran, Sudha (16 November 2016). CPEC takes a step forward as violence surges in Balochistan. Asia Times.

Shah, Saeed (April 20, 2015). China's Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in

Pakistan. The Wall Street Journal.

Rakisits, Claude (Fall 2015). A Path to the Sea: China's Pakistan Plan. World Affairs

Journal.

Salman, Rafi (October 23, 2016). A new 'East India Company' in the making? .Asia

Times.

Kugelman, Michael (July 9, 2015). Pakistan's Other National Struggle: Its Energy

Crisis. The Wall Street Journal.

Shah, Saeed (April 9, 2015). China to Build Pipeline From Iran to Pakistan. The Wall

Street Journal. 209

Shah, Saeed. (2016). Big Chinese-Pakistani Project Tries to Overcome Jihadists,

Droughts and Doubts. The Wall Street Journal.

Mirza, Zahid. (2016). Chinese Vision of One Belt One Road and Strategic Dimensions of

China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Islamabad: ISSRA.

Li, Xin. Worm, Verner. (2009). Bulding China's Soft Power for Peaceful Rise.

Islamabad: Asia Research Centre.

Shira, Deza. (2017). Understanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Silk Road

Briefing.

Qamar, Waheed. (February 6, 2017). One Belt One Road-CPEC-Pakistan. China Daily.

Rahman, Saif. Shurong, Zhao. (2017). Analysis of Chinese Economic and National

Security Interests in ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Framework of

One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative/ Arts and Social Sciences Journal. 8(4).

Mantraya (2016) One belt One Road, one Singapore Analysis. The Eurasia Review.

Ferdinand P (2016) Westward to-the China dream and „One Belt, One Road: Chinese

Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping. International Affairs. 92 .

Jingjing, M. (2017). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Aims to Boost Trade Between

Two Countries. The Global Times.

Shi, Zhiqin LY (2016). The Benefits and Risks of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Beijing: The Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy. 210

Marantidhu, V. (2014). Revisiting China's 'String of Pearls' Strategy Places with 'Chinese

Characteristics' and their Security Implications: Issues and Insights.

Ramay, SA. (2016). CPEC: A Chinese Dream Being Materialized through Pakistan.

Islamabad: SDPI

Xuetong, Y. (2014). Silk Road Economic Belt Shows China's New Strategic Direction:

Promoting Integration with Its Neighbors. Beijing: Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global

Policy.

Desk. N. (2017). 52 Countries Interested in CPEC: Nawaz. Pakistan Observer.

Strasser, F. (2016). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Road to Peace. New York:

USIP.

Zhang, J. (2016). What's Driving China's One Belt, One Road Initiative?.Beijing: East

Asia Forum of Economic and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific.

Abid, M., &Ashfaq, A. (2015). CPEC: Challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. Journal of Pakistan Vision, 16(2),

Javaid, U. (2016). Assessing CPEC: Potential Threats and Prospects. Journal of the

Research Society of Pakistan, 53(2).

Jianmin, W. (2015).One Belt and One Road, Far-reaching Initiative. China-US Focus

Digest

Hali, S. M., Shukui, T., & Iqbal, S. (2015). One Belt and One Road: Impact on China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor. Strategic Studies, 34(4). 211

Monnoo, D. (2017). The Geo-economics of CPEC. CPEC: Macro and Micro Economic

Dividends for Pakistan and the Region, Islamabad: IRPI. 17-36.

Ahmed, D. M. (2017). Sectoral Impacts of CPEC on Pakistan‟s Economy. CPEC: Macro

and Micro Economic Dividends for Pakistan and the Region, Islamabad: IRPI.

Seas, Ark. (2018). Chahbahar Port.

Aneja, Atul. (May 5, 2013). India to Develop Iranian Port. The Hindu.

Bose, Pratim. (2015). On a Railroad from Russia to Iran. Business Line.

GCR. (September, 20, 2016). Afghanistan Starts Railway that Will Like it to the World.

GCR.

Haroon, Iqrar. (November, 5, 2017). Politics of Trade Corridors. DND.

Eurasia Review. (March 4, 2017). India and Tajikistan Ties: Partners in Development-

Analysis. EA.

Vatanaka, Alex (2015). Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American

Influence..B. Taurus & Co. Limited.

Alahmad, Nida; Keshavarzian, Arang (Winter 2010). A War on Multiple Fronts. Middle

East Report. 40

Economic Times. (January 18, 2017). Connectivity Projects Should be Consonant with

Sovereignty Principles: Vijay Gokhale.

JOC. (May 9, 2016). India, Iran Moving Forward on Redeveloping Chahbahar. 212

Daniels, Rorry (2013), "Strategic Competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the

Risks of Infrastructure Development", American Foreign Policy Interests, 35 (2).

Roy, Meena Singh (2012), "Iran: India's Gateway to Central Asia", Strategic

Analysis, 36 (6).

Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2011). A tale of two ports. Yale Global Online.

Mollazehi, Pir-Mohammad. (2016). The Coast of Makran: An Arena for Rivalry among

Powers, Iran Review.

Michael Tanchum (May 1, 2014). "Iran's Chabahar port transforms its position". The

Jerusalem Post.

Bhatnagar, Aryaman; John, Divya (October 2013), Accessing Afghanistan and Central

Asia: Importance of Chabahar to India. Observer Research Foundation

Sputnik News. (May, 5, 2016). Iran Will Need Russia's Help to Build Its Caspian Sea-

Persian Gulf Canal.

Behuria, Ashok K.; Rizvi, M. Mahtab Alam ( May 13, 2015), India's Renewed Interest in

Chabahar: Need to Stay the Course, New Delhi: IDSA Issue Brief, Institute for Defence

Studies and Analyses

Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya (2014), "India-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War: A Neo-

Realist Analysis", in Goud, R. Sidda; Mookherjee, Manisha, India and Iran in

Contemporary Relations, Allied Publishers. 213

Iranian Diplomacy. (August 28, 2012). Chahbahar Port: India, Iran, Afghanistan to Set up Group.

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty. (2016). India Cements Role in Iran with Chabahar Deal.

Foreign Policy.

JOC. Com. (May 24, 2916). Easing Sanctions Allows Iran to Develop Key Port Project.

The Hindustan Times. (May 24, 2016). India, Iran and Afghanistan Sign Chahbahar Port

Agreement.

Chowdary, Anirban. (May 23, 2016). Five Things About Chahbahar Port and How India

Gains From It.

Swami, Praveen. (May 27, 2016). Why Chahbahar Deal is a Rebellion Against History.

The Indian Express.

Yousaf, Kamran. (2016). Iran Offers Pakistan to Join Chahbahar Port Deal. Express

Tribune.

Raghavan, Srinath. (May 26, 2016). The Takeaway From Tehran. The Hindu.

First Post. (May 23, 2016). India Eyes Iran's Energy Resources, Commits over Rs 1 Lakh

Crore Investment in Chahbahar.

UNECE. (2010). Iran Railway Transportation.

MEHR News Agency. (July 20, 2017). Khaf-Herat Railway to Open Within Weeks. 214

Salehi, Zarghona. (November 28, 2016). Afghan-Turkmenistan Railroad Inaugurated.

Pajwok Afghan News.

Pandya, Dhwani. (March 30, 2017). Indian Billionaires are Interested Managing Delayed

Iran Port: Sources. Bloomberg Markets.

Brown, Peter. (March 16, 2017). Chahbahar Port is an Unlikely Litmus Test for the US in

Iran. Asia Times.

Padukone, Neil (2014), Beyond South Asia: India's Strategic Evolution and the

Reintegration of the Subcontinent, Bloomsbury Publishing.

The Hindu. (May 25, 2017). Watching India-Iran Ties 'Very Closely': US.

Weija, Hu. (May 27, 2016). Indian Deal with Iran Shows Commitment to Infrastructure that will Benefit China Too. Global Times.

Lancha, Shi. (June 5, 2016). In Iran's Chahbahar, India Seeks Leverage Point Over

Pakistan. Global Times.

Latif, Aamir. (June 1, 2016). Iran's Chahbahar Won't Vie with Pakistan's Gwadar: Exprts.

Andalou Agency.

Jorisch, Avi. (2016). Port Of Damaged Goods: India's Dangerous Investment In Iran's

Chahabar. Forbes.

Al Jazeera. (June 20, 2010). Jundullah: Iran's Sunni Rebels.

Zambelis, Chris. (January 14, 2011). Back With Vengeance: The Baloch Insurgents in

Iran. Terrorism Monitor. 215

Corbert, James. Winebrake, James. (2008) The Impact of Globalisation on International

Maritime Transport Activity. International Transport Forum.

Khetran, Mir Sherbaz. (2015). The Potentials and Prospects of Gwadar Port. Strategic

Studies. 34(35).

Hassan, Ahmad. (2005). Pakistan's Gwadar Port: Prospects of Economic Revival.

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive.

Khan, Shabbir. (2013). Geo-Economic Imperatives of Gwadar Sea Port and Kashgar

Economic Zone for Pakistan and China. IPRI. 13(2).

Review of Maritime Transport. (2015). Maritime Transport in Indian Ocean.

Fahad, Sheikh. (2015). China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Defense Pact. New York:

Monograph, Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research.

Abraham, Anu. (2016). Chahbahar and India: Securing Regional Interests. New Delhi:

IPCS.

Falak, etal. (2016). Chahbahar : India's Economic Gambit. Islamabad: CSCR.

Ahmed, Naveed. (April 12, 2016). Analysis: Chahbahar-Gwadar Port Contest Does Not

End in a Tie. Express Tribune.

Khan, Masood Khalid. (June 29, 2016). Gwadar Vs Chahbahar. The Nation.

Watts, Jake Maxwell. (2013). The Great Game: China and India are Battling Over Two

Strategically Important Middle East Ports. QZ. 216

Arif, Areeba. (2016). Gwadar and Chahbahar: Implication for the Region. Islamabad:

ISSI.

217

Chapter 7

Pakistan's Strategic Options: Conclusion

7.1. Summary

Pakistan-China ties started in 1950 made a major turn in 1960s after Sino-Indian War, when Pakistan sought the moment and established strong relations with China. The

Chinese state has always provided Pakistan military, economical and diplomatic support and in return Pakistani governments have always supported Chinese stance in international forums. Both states consider each other a close strategic ally and it has been proven with recent mega project deal of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) between both states. Bilateral relations started to evolve in 1950s and both states resolved their border issues in 1963,which proved to be a major breakthrough in context of ties between both states. With passage of time, China has become Pakistan's biggest arms supplies as well as trade partner. The Chinese government lend Pakistan $60 million in

1964 which were later changed into a grant after 1971 disintegration of Pakistan.

One of the major visits to boost ties with China was conducted by then president General

Zia-ul-Haq which became a major foreign policy achievement for Pakistan. In 1989,

Pakistan and Cuba were only two states which supported China after Tiananmen protests in the same year. Further, Pakistan has always supported China on issues of Taiwan and

Tibet, while China extended its full support for Pakistan on issue of Kashmir over the years. Along with military cooperation, the economic ties reached to its peak, when

China decided to invest in Pakistan's vital strategic deep sea port of Gwadar. Not only the 218 states are cordial with each other but the citizens of both countries also like each other.

According to a PEW survey almost 90% Pakistanis have favorable views about China.

The reason behind this likeness is that Pakistan have always felt victimized by international community even after its sacrifices in war against terrorism. While almost all other states have been blaming Pakistan and calling it a "black sheep", China has stood by Pakistan in all crises. Furthermore, China is a powerful friend to have and with regard to regional and global situation, the alliance with China is essential for Pakistan.

Furthermore, the Islamic Republic wants to revive its economy and China is the best available option for Pakistan. On nuclear front, China is member of Nuclear Supplier

Group (NSG), which is highly relevant for Pakistan especially in context of aggressive

India.

To counter Indian regional influence and Indo-US nexus, Pakistan needs a strong ally like China as the country has the power to support Pakistan, while China also needs

Pakistan for the same reason hence it is a two-way relation. In this context, the military ties between Pakistan and China holds high significance as China has not only assisted

Pakistan in weapons, arms and military technology but also focused on "transfer of technology" which is a clear sign of Chinese strong relations with Pakistan.

Meanwhile, in China almost 31% of Chinese people holds favorable opinion about

Pakistan as compared to 23% for India. But the Chinese experts, who are familiar with regional and global circumstances believe that "China needs Pakistan more" which is totally opposite to the famous opinion that Pakistan needs China. It is because the policy 219 makers and international relations experts know that both countries can provide each other at equal level.

As mentioned earlier, the diplomatic ties between both states escalated during 1960s and it was mainly due to approach by Pakistan. During the mentioned time period, China was phasing though a revolution and facing largely isolation at international level, Pakistan at that time assisted China to establish relations with Western Countries. Islamabad played the role of a bridge between China and West and lodged a campaign to restore the legitimate role of China in United Nations. In 1971, US Secretary of State Henry

Kissinger reached Pakistan on an official visit and during that visit, Islamabad arranged

Kissinger's secret visit to China, which established a strong foundation for a long lasting relationship between Pakistan and China.

Beijing has never forgot the role of Pakistan during 1960s and 1970s and supporting

Pakistan in current situation when whole world blamed Pakistan for being a "terror state".

In 2011, after Bin Laden's killing after a US raid, China timely supported Islamabad while in 2008, China supported Islamabad and slammed Indian propaganda of blaming

Pakistan. In 21st century the relations between both states have enhanced immensely as both states celebrated 50th anniversary of mutual friendship through huge celebrations.

The economic ties between both states reached to new level after signature of Free Trade

Agreement in 2006 which led to immense economic and trade cooperation between both sides. By 2016, Pakistan was second largest trading partner of China. Currently Pakistan is the only South Asian state which have a free trade agreement and currency exchange deal with China. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the biggest economic 220 agreement between both states. The mega project will connect Pakistan's Gwadar port to

Chinese city Kashghar and will further develop a connection with Central Asian States.

On military front, along with civil nuclear cooperation, under which China has been assisting Pakistan in establishing nuclear power plants to meet the energy crisis in the country, Beijing has also supported and cooperated Pakistan in developing indigenous weapons and war machines. The JF-17 Thunder fighting jet is the biggest example between two sides. The jet is developed and made by both countries and have boosted the fighting capacity of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) at huge scale. Furthermore, China vetoed

Indian effort to join the NSG group because it knows that it will imbalance the strategic balance of power in South Asia. China also took this step to counter Indo-US nexus which is trying to dominate South Asia but alliance of Pakistan and China has been successfully countering it. The diplomatic, economic and military ties between Islamabad and Beijing are highly significant for not only both country but also for stable and balance South Asian Region hence forth both sides have been further strengthening their relation with passage of time.

Both countries have established their ties keeping in the mind regional scenario and strategic balance of power of South Asia. In International Relations, the term of soft balancing is used which means the powerful states cannot impose their policies on weaker states through means of physical forces hence they need to implicate them through policies and economic fronts. The global norms, in the context, play a vital role which are compared to regional circumstances and the policies are evolved according to them. China has emerged as a strong power in South Asia and it is believed that in near 221 future the state will slowly but surely dominate both regional and international affairs and its alliance with Pakistan will benefit both.

The emerging China along with Pakistan is challenging the US interests in the region, which is establishing close ties with India. Although Indo-US have been blaming China as an aggressor but Beijing sees itself as regional leader hence wants to play an important role in its surroundings. To establish its dominance, China has introduced its famous

"Strings of Pearls" policy which is to establish series of sea ports in Indian Ocean to counter the influence of India and United States. The biggest pearl for China in Indian

Ocean is Gwadar port, which is being developed as a strong trading point by China and

Pakistan.

The US-India alliance in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a major concern for both Pakistan and China. Both US and India have been increasing their maritime cooperation and partnership especially in 21st century. US has been looking to establish its dominance through establishing strong points at Malacca and Strait of Hurmaz as these are major trading points for China. US policy makers believe that once they dominate these points, they can choke Chinese economic and trade activities. As India is emerging as a strong economical country, it is the best option of US to use it against China while India want to establish alliance with US to counter regional influence of China and Pakistan. Since the

Clinton government, the relations between India and America started to develop and reached to its peak during Bush government when both countries signed Civil Nuclear

Deal in 2005 and Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2006. Former US President Barrack

Obama has called India as the most significant partner of US in 21st century one which will be critically vital for US interests in South Asian Region. 222

Meanwhile, China and Pakistan is establishing strong policies to counter the US-India nexus in Indian Ocean. Gwadar port will be playing a vital role for both countries in near future. The port which was decided to be established in 2001, will be leaving a deep impact on the transit traggic of Indian sponsored Chahbahar port. The Gwadar port also holds a significant military importance for both China and Pakistan as both countries are focusing to enhance their presence in Indian Ocean Region. The Gwadar port will also help Pakistan to keep a close eye on the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) which are located from Hurmaz strait to Persian Gulf. By establishing a naval base at Gawadar along with at Omara, will help Islamabad to monitor Chinese Naval assets, US 5th fleet in Persian Gulf and Indian efforts to become a dominant power in Indian Ocean.

In 2013, the Gwadar port was officially handed over to China under the agreement signed by former President Asif Ali Zardari in presence of Chinese owned overseas port holding company and several ministers and Chinese ambassador Liu Jian. Before China,

Singapore Port Authority was set to handle the port but the authority remained unable to operational the port hence it was handed over to Chinese authorities. India on the other hand, showed reservation over this development because it felt China is trying to build a naval base under its "String of Pearls" strategy. Former Indian Defence Minister A.K

Anthony expresses serious concerns in a media talk in 2013 stating In one sentence, I can say that it is a matter of concern for us.

Ignoring the Indian apprehensions Pakistan moved on with the development as then-

Foreign Office Spokesperson Muazzam Ali Khan stated no other country should have any reason to be concerned about this agreement. He rejected "Indian apprehensions". 223

Meanwhile then-Chinese envoy to Pakistan Jian said that this agreement was in the economic interests of people of Pakistan and China.

Along with the major power struggle in Indian Ocean especially regarding Gwadar port,

South Asia's strategic balance of power dynamics also talks about the aspect of power politics in military expenditure, nuclear clout, and expansions between arch rival,

Pakistan and India and global powers. These all developments have made it essential that balance of power in this region may comprehend as compared to other regions of the world. The basic aspects of power politics in South Asian Region are starkly different from old European ones but the base of the whole issue is similar.

The South Asian balance of power model is bipolar in nature with multilingual and heterogeneous societies along with acute interstate issues. The regional balance of power game, between Pakistan and India at one side, and US and China on the other hand, in context of US extending its support to India is underway rapid changes with the respect to dynamic and complex quadrilateral Pakistan-China-India-US relations. Currently, this model is favoring India because of its rapid economic power, and therefore US, which is establishing a strategic partnership with India on bases of resist and engaged hedging strategies. To counter this nexus China and Pakistan are merging their regional and strategic interests so that this four-side balance of power game can remain balanced in

South Asian region and all four involving states including India, Pakistan, China and US cannot gain a clear dominance over the other alliance. These four states are in constant game of strategic balance of power and are expected to keep it intact in near future for their own national interests and foreign policy objectives. 224

To maintain an upper hand on the other, Pakistan and India have invested in two mega projects, CPEC and Chahbahar Port, respectively. With CPEC, Pakistan wants to boost its economy and acquire an access to mineral rich Central Asian Region, meanwhile with investing in Iranian Chahbahar port, India wants to counter Pakistan's CPEC especially

Gwadar port and also want an access to Central Asia. CPEC is the important part of

Chinese dream of One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative as this project will bring a strategic implications in bilateral ties of China and Pakistan along with enhancement in geopolitics to geo-economics of South Asia.

CPEC, the pilot project of OBOR is not a mere road rather it is a huge network of road links, railway tracks, pipelines connecting Gwadar port with China. The development of fundamental infrastructure is the base of this mega project. After the OBOR summit, held in 2017, the significance of CPEC has immensely increased. Through CPEC and OBOR,

China wants to revive the old Silk Route which was started by Chinese General Zhang

Qian in second century BC. The route remained functional for thousands of years but was named Silk Route by a German geologist Baron Ferdinand.

CPEC is the choke point of OBOR because of this mega project Chinese dependence on

SLOCs will reduce massively through CPEC. This will be the shortest route for China to reach Middle East. This mega project is a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and

China. The project will also provide the shortest route to Indian Ocean through the unique deep sea port of Gwadar. Through CPEC, Pakistan is receiving unprecedented investment which has the potential to resolve the economic crisis of the country. 225

CPEC was initiated in 2013, when Chinese President Li Keqiang arrived in Pakistan and discussed the initial plans of this project with Pakistan. After 2013 elections, the new government head Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited China for several times to further finalize the details of this plan. In July 2013, a Joint Cooperation Committee was formed to discuss the different aspects of this project between two countries. In April 2014, the project was formally launched when Chinese President Xi visited Pakistan to oversee the signing ceremony. At the occasion Chinese premier stated that CPEC further cemented the all weather strategic friendship of cooperative strategic partners in South Asia.

CPEC is basically a connection between maritime links of OBOR which is One Road to the land trade corridors which is One Belt. Through CPEC, Pakistan has received biggest ever investment of its history, $46 billion which was increased to $52 billion. This has helped the Pakistan's fragile economy mainly hit by the War against terrorism because of which the country has faced loses of $70 billion in last decade or so. Further, the energy crisis has remained Pakistan's biggest issue and obstacle in development. Almost 36% of the CPEC investment is concentrated on power projects. The second major investment under project of CPEC is in water infrastructure which is the second biggest issue of the country. Through these investments, Pakistan has brightest chance to stand on its feet once again.

Iranian Chamber port is a seaport located on Gulf of Oman and it serves as Iran's sole oceanic port. This port is based on two different ports named Shahid Behehshti and

Shahid Kalantari having five berths on each side. To counter CPEC, India along with Iran and Afghanistan has signed $21 billion worth MoU for Chahbahar-Hajigak corridor, with

$85 million for the development of the port by India. Furthermore, $8 billion has been set 226 for Iran-India MoU for Indian industrial settlements for the port's Special Economic

Zones, and $150 million are handed over to Iran by Indian government.

The idea of developing the Iranian port was firstly discussed in 1973 by Iran's last King, though development work was delayed until Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. The first phase of this mega project was started in 1983 during the first Gulf War as Iran began shifting the seaborne trade to East towards Pakistan's border in order to reduce its dependence on its sea ports in Persian Gulf which had become weak due to constant air strikes by Iraq. In 2003, both India and Iran agreed to develop the first phase at Shahid

Behehsti but it could not be turned into operation mainly due to international sanctions on

Iran.

As of 2017, the port had ten berths. In 2016, India and Iran signed an agreement under which India agreed to redevelop one of the berths at Shahid Behehshti port and construct a 600 meter long container handling facility at the port. The port is being developed with intention for an alternative trade route between India and Afghanistan. The port is 800 kilometers closer to Afghanistan as compared to Pakistan's Karachi port on which

Afghanistan's trade is heavily dependent.

An American policy analyst Rorry Daniels has called Indian investment in Chahbahar port and Chinese investment in CPEC's Gwadar port as strategic encirclement which is developing perceptions in the South Asian Regions. According to her China fears

American encirclement, while India is afraid of China, and Pakistan feels threaten by

India hence all of these states are trying to encircle one another through their containment strategies. Meanwhile, another IR scholar, Neil Padukone disagrees with Daniels theory 227 and believes that India is investing in Iran because it wants direct access to Afghan

Hajigak mine and other natural resources of Afghanistan. and Central Asian States like

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Padukone, however, does believe that India needs to develop a naval counterweight to China's presence in Gwadar port through

CPEC as India sees the port as an manifestation of a strong Pakistan-China relations that seeks to choke Indian presence and investment in Indian Ocean Region. Christophe

Jaffelor believes that CPEC's Gwadar port gives China an important leistering post to monitor US and Indian naval movements in Indian Ocean and Persian Guld with using it as a dual military-civil base of Chinese submarines and ships.

The relations between India and Afghanistan which have been considered as close and cordial since last few decades as India was the first state in South Asia to recognize

Soviet backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. During 1990s, the relations between two states turned hostile because of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. India supported

Taliban rivals Northern Alliance in the war and also supported world powers to overthrow Taliban regime after 9-11. Following that, India became the biggest regional state which provided humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan.

The ties between both states reached at its peak during the Karazai government as one of the cousin of former Afghan president termed India as the most celebrated partner of

Afghanistan. In April 2017, India became the biggest donor in region for Afghanistan and fifth largest at global level with $3 billion in aid. India had announced to construct almost

200 public and private schools, have provided 1000 scholarships to Afghan students, have hosted over 16,000 Afghan students until now. Following 2008 attack on Indian 228 embassy in Kabul, the Afghan government called India as a brother country and the relationship between both states as no enemy can destroy.

According to a Gallup Survey conducted in 2016, during which 1000 Afghan citizens were interviewed, 50% of Afghan citizens approved the performance of Indian government in Afghanistan and 44% were against it while 6% remained undecided. The same survey said that Afghan youth is more likely to approve India than US or China in their country.

During democratic government of Najibullah in Afghanistan, India not only recognized it but also provided the aid to the government. Even after the downfall of his government,

Najibullah continued to receive the India support. India also supported coalition government in Afghanistan but the relations between both countries came to a halt after a civil war broke out in the country, which led to Taliban government in Kabul, which had the support of Pakistan. Only Saudi Arabia, UAE and Pakistan recognized the Taliban government and to counter them, India supported Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

The situation, however, rapidly changed after 9-11 when US-led NATO forces attacked

Afghanistan and toppled Taliban government. Following the establishment of a democratic government in Afghanistan, India quickly started to establish the cordial ties with it. It became the biggest regional aid provider to Afghanistan. The Indian support extended to the construction of power plants, roads, education and health facilities, formation of air links, and providing training to Afghan officials including diplomatic, police and civil servants. 229

Furthermore, Indian Army's Border Roads Organisation (BRO) constructed a major road in 2009 in Nimroz, a remote region of Afghanistan. The road connected Delaram and

Zranj regions of Afghanistan and provided reliable route for the duty free investment through Iranian Chahbahar port to Afghanistan. The key to Indian policy in Afghanistan is to develop transport links in Afghanistan to bypass Pakistan, to reduce Afghan dependence on Pakistan. In 2005, India advocated for the Afghan membership in South

Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Both, India and Afghanistan, further strengthened their military and strategic ties against Taliban. After the killings of

Indian nationals in 2005 in Afghanistan, India deployed 200 Indian soldiers of the Indo-

Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) to provide security to Indian and its projects in

Afghanistan.

The constant hostile and unstable relations with Pakistan, also made Afghanistan to look towards India as the Indian government sought close ties with Afghanistan, and Iran to increase its regional dominance against Pakistan. During the Karzai visit to India in 2006, both countries signed three MoUs for strong relations and cooperation in education and standardization between Bureau of Indian Standards and Afghan National

Standardization. A deal worth $50 million was also signed to enhance the bilateral trade and busies ties between both countries. During 2009, India increased its aid to

Afghanistan by $ 150 million.

In 2008, after the Indian embassy attack in Kabul in which senior Indian Army officer

Brigadier Ravi Datt Mehra was killed, the Indian blame game against Pakistan once against started as Kabul also supported Indian stance. 230

Meanwhile, during 15th SAARC summit in Sri Lanka, India once again pledge another

$450 million along with further $750 million already promised for projects construction in Afghanistan.

The IR experts and South Asian analysts believe that India has special interests in

Afghanistan which it is promoting through strategic deals and investment in

Afghanistan. The top priority for India in Afghanistan is its economic interests. India has been supporting both RECCA and Heart of Asia conference for Afghanistan. Along with its own Indian government has been trying to convince international community to give more aid to Kabul. After 9-11, India reinforced its economic policy in Kabul through adopting different policies. India is using different tools to capture Afghan goods markets to create economic dependency of Kabul on its goods.

India mainly wants to counter Pakistani influence in Afghanistan as its major approach remains anti-Pakistan. It is highly important for India that Pakistan does not establish a strong foothold in Kabul hence India has been trying to stop Islamabad for dominating the policy making process in Kabul. Pakistan has always viewed Kabul as good mean to maintain balance against India in South Asia as well as it is highly important for Pakistan because of the western long border along Afghanistan.

Along with Pakistani influence, India also wants to counter Chinese influence in

Afghanistan. China is the most powerful regional states in South Asia and has emerged as a super power in global politics, henceforth, the country want to increase its influence in the region and Afghanistan is the one of the best options mainly due to its natural resources. Meanwhile, New Delhi has increased its efforts to counter Chinese influence 231 in Afghanistan because it considers that Chinese influence means Pakistani influence in

Kabul. Through its immense aid and cooperation, India has been trying to counter the

Beijing influence in Afghanistan and want to remain the dominant state in Kabul as well as the other part of the country.

The access to Central Asian states is another major objective of India to increase influence in Afghanistan. The major reason for this policy is that India needs new energy resources to meet its energy demands because of its rapidly growing economy and oil and gas reserves of Central Asian Region are the best available options. The 1,000 miles, $7.6 billion Trukeminstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline is the mega projects to meet India and other countries energy demands. Meanwhile, transport of natural resources to India demands a stable Afghanistan, from where TAPI pipeline has to cross, giving both Pakistan and India a strong reason to promote security in

Afghanistan. India sees Afghanistan as the gateway to natural resources of Central Asia and it hopes to expand its influence in the region in future. New Delhi does not have a direct access to Central Asia, hence it largely depend on Afghanistan for the access. The increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is a huge advantage for New Delhi because

Afghanistan will work as a bridge between it and Central Asia.

Furthermore, Central Asia is becoming a power battle ground for major powers like

Russia, China and United States and India wants to adjust its place among them for the regional influence. Post 1999 diplomatic humiliation, when India had to strike a deal with

Afghan Taliban that involved the release of the passenger airjet in exchange for three hardcore militant leaders arrested by India, the New Delhi has increased its military expenditure and presence in Central Asia. After the incident India decided to develop its 232 first foreign military base in Central Asia, close to the border of Afghanistan, which will provide assistance to Taliban rival, Northern Alliance.

India also seeks to increase its influence through its soft power which is its film industry and dramas. Afghanistan, in recent past few years, has emerged as a huge market for

Indian movies as former External Affairs Minister of India, Shashi Tharoor wrote an article 'Hooray for Bollywood' because of its role in developing a positive image of

Indian in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Indian dramas are immensely famous among

Afghans as they are presented after dubbing in local languages.

Furthermore, India wants to increase its influence in Afghanistan through involving the regional states as it has been promoting the idea of regional solution of Afghan issue.

Though, India does not want to let any other country to increase its influence more than

New Delhi but changing situation in Afghanistan has forced India to involve other actors.

This policy has been adopted by India especially in context of increasing Taliban influence in Afghanistan as US forces have remained unsuccessful to eliminate the power of Taliban even after one-and-half decade war in Afghanistan. Earlier, India had refused to engage in negotiations with Taliban but current scenario forced it to agree on launching a dialogue with Taliban mainly to secure its investment in the country, otherwise, all will go in vain as Taliban are still tilted towards Pakistan as compared to

India.

The Indian presence in Afghanistan has presented serious implications for Pakistan as the country is facing constant issues and threats from Indian presence in Kabul. First of all,

Islamabad is facing a security dilemma due to Indian presence especially along Pak- 233

Afghan border. Traditionally, Pakistan has focused on its eastern border but due to war on terror and Indian presence, the western border, along with Afghanistan, has become more unstable and dangerous for Pakistan hence the country has to focus on it more.

Furthermore, India has established its consulates along Pak-Afghan border and Pakistan has been alleging that New Delhi is using them as the base to launch terrorists on territory of Pakistan. Former Foreign Minister of Pakisan Shah Mehmood Qureshi once said: "“If you want Pakistan focused more on the [threat from Afghanistan in the] west, then we have to feel more secure on the east. There is a linkage there.”

Indian policy, for Pakistan has been purely based on classic case study of Kautliyan

Theory, which is 'enemy's enemy is a friend'. India, in case of a war with Pakistan would be able to open two fronts for Islamabad, east and west, and it will be highly difficult for

Pakistan to fight on both ends.

Through its presence in Afghanistan, India is trying to encircle Pakistan diplomatically.

India wants to keep Pakistan out of diplomatic circles of Kabul because Pakistan presence means, reduction in Indian influence. India has been supporting Northern

Alliance against Taliban, and India does not want Pakistan to re-establish its diplomatic influence in Kabul because it means the Northern Alliance will be eliminated and the investment of India will be at risk, if Taliban become in the power with support of

Pakistan.

On economic front, India will be able to dominate Pakistan's market, if it is given permission to conduct trade to Afghanistan and Central Asian States through Pakistan.

The cheap Indian goods will take over local market of Pakistan effecting the local 234 businessman. Furthermore, though rail and road links for landlocked Afghanistan will give the country an alternative to Pakistan and it will reduce Afghan dependence in context of sea route trade through Karachi port. Though developing Iranian Chahbahar port, India wants to increase its economic influence though Iran and Afghanistan which will be a huge negative for Pakistan.

The biggest implication for Pakistan of Indian presence in Afghanistan is Indian sponsored terrorism in Pakistan. Through Afghan border, India has launched a proxy war, in Pakistan especially in tribal region of FATA and Balochistan. Through the unstable border, the terrorists are being sent into Pakistan to carry out attacks on both civilians and security forces. According to intelligence reports, Indian military is providing training to militants from Balochistan in Sarobi, from where they are sent on missions of terrorism to KP, FATA and Balochistan. Meanwhile, India has a base in Kandahar's Nawaz and

Lashkargah, from where it is undertaking terrorist activities in Balochistan. This Indian sponsored terrorism is the biggest issue for Pakistan but the country is gradually countering and controlling these terror efforts through military operations across the country.

7.2. Findings

After detailed research, following findings have been extracted by the researcher:

The relations between China and Pakistan have highly strategic depth and value for both bilateral and regional power politics

Both China and Pakistan have enjoyed cordial ties since Cold War especially due to their mutual interests in South Asian and international politics 235

During 1960s, Pakistan played the role of a bridge between China and Western

Countries, especially USA, to end the Beijing's isolation in global community.

From 1962 to 2018, both countries have increases their bilateral ties in all sectors including economic, trade, military and diplomacy

The mega project of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has emerged as the biggest example of Pakistan-China friendship which will not only benefit both countries but also Central Asian States

To Counter CPEC, India has been heavily investing in Iranian Chahbahar port to increase its regional influence and reduce Afghanistan and Iran dependence on Pakistan for trade

In post 9-11 world and end of Taliban regime, India is increasing its influence in

Afghanistan to counter Pakistan influence and presence in Kabul

Through Afghanistan, India wants to increase its regional influence to Central Asian states for its energy resources

India has established its consulates in Afghanistan through which it is spreading and sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan

Through its presence in Afghanistan, India wants to dominate Pakistan economically, diplomatically and politically

The major policy of India through Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan especially in tribal regions of FATA and Balochistan

7.3. Pakistan's Strategic Options

(a) Enhancement of Strategic Ties With China and Russia

Although Pakistan and China has always enjoyed cordial ties especially since 1960s,

Islamabad needs to enhance its strategic ties with China and Russia especially after US 236

President Donald Trump's 2017-18 South Asian Policy announcement. Although

Pakistan is the front ally of US in war against terrorism but US government has never recognized Pakistan's sacrifices hence forth stronger relations with China and Russia will give Pakistan more options for ties and strategic relations. Russia has once again emerged as a strong state in international relations hence ties especially military, will be highly beneficial for Pakistan

(b) Promotion of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the world

Although mega project has been welcomed and well received by the other states, but

Pakistan need to promote the project well especially in South Asian Region. Pakistan must use the tool of diplomacy to promote the mega project and seek the investment from other regional states in CPEC. Islamabad should especially focus on Iran, Afghanistan and even India because the inclusion of these countries will not only increase the regional integration but also changed the Pakistani image among these countries along with the investment it will bring to the country.

Although this Iranian port is being developed as a counter to Gwadar port but Pakistani inclusion, along with China, in Chahbahar port will eventually benefit Gwadar as

Chahbahar port is not a deep sea port and Gwadar can be used as an alternative for docking of huge ships. Furthermore, inclusion in Chahbahar port will increase the relations with Iran which will be e huge benefit for Pakistan especially in Indian Ocean

Region.

237

(d) Reduction of Lack of Trust with Afghanistan

Pakistan and Afghanistan share one of the longest borders with each other and the hostile relations will not benefit any of them. The issue of terrorism has hit both states hard after

9/11 and both states have been blaming each other for cross border terrorism which is not the resolution of the issue. Through establishing cordial ties with Kabul, both countries can tackle the menace of terrorism. For this collaborative border forces, constant communication between militaries of both sides, intelligence sharing and combined military operations against militants will resolve the issue, not the blame game.

(e) Sharing Indian-sponsor Terror information with Rest of the World

Through Afghan border and its consulates along with it, India has been sponsoring and sending terrorists inside Pakistan. Islamabad need to tell the world about it and through its diplomatic embassies across the world, the proofs should be shared with the host countries. Furthermore, the sacrifices of Pakistan in war against terrorism should also be told to the world on constant bases as it will help the world to understand Pakistan's stance more and the negative image of the country will reduce. Through showing proofs against India, Islamabad can surely show the real face of New Delhi, which has been trying to destabilize Pakistan through terrorism.

7.4. Conclusion

The strategic relations of China and Pakistan are highly critical at bilateral and regional level as the ties between these countries will maintain the balance of power in South

Asia. Both countries have been enjoyed the cordial ties since decades and have strengthened them through projects like CPEC and Jf-17 Thunder. CPEC is one of its 238 kind project which will surely be a game changer for Pakistan at regional and global level. The relations between Pakistan and China are also essential for countering the

Indo-US nexus in South Asia especially in Indian Ocean Region. Further, to counter

CPEC and its deep sea Gwadar port, India is investing in Indian port of Chahbahar to reduce Iranian and Afghan dependence on Pakistan. Along with Chahbahar, India has been increasing its influence in Afghanistan to strengthen its stronghold, to increase its regional dominance, to get access to Central Asia and to encircle Pakistan economically, diplomatically, strategically and politically and above all through terrorism through

Afghanistan, India has been trying to destabilize Pakistan and Islamabad need to counter it on emergency bases and Pakistan can only do it through diplomacy and using its embassies across the world. Furthermore, decreasing trust deficit with Afghanistan will also help Pakistan to counter this issue and Indian-American aggression in South Asia.

The economic dependency, diplomatic relations and end of blame game with Kabul will help Pakistan to increase its regional dominance alongside China.

239

References

Abid, M., &Ashfaq, A. (2015). CPEC: Challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. Journal

of Pakistan Vision, 16(2),

Abraham, Anu. (2016). Chahbahar and India: Securing Regional Interests. New Delhi:

IPCS.

Adnan, R. (May 4, 2011). Sky Wars: Pakistan, India and China. The Dawn.

Agnew, J. (1999) Mapping Political Power beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity,

and Movement in World Politics. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28

(3).

Agnew, J. (2005a) Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in

Contemporary World Politics. Annals of the Association of American

Geographers 95 (2).

Agnihotri, Kumar Kamlesh ( 2010). China‟s quest for Naval Base in the Indian Ocean:

Possible options for China. National Maritime Foundation. Retrieved from:

http://www.maritimeindia.org/article/chinese-quest-naval-base-indian-ocean-

%E2%80%93-possible-options-china

Ahmed, D. M. (2017). Sectoral Impacts of CPEC on Pakistan‟s Economy. CPEC: Macro

nd Micro Economic Dividends for Pakistan and the Region, Islamabad: IRPI.

Ahmed, Ishtiaq (2011). Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy: Motivations and Constraints.11 Feb,

Retrieved from: 240

http://www.ishtiaqahmad.com/item_display.aspx?listing_id=825&listing_type=4

Ahmed, Naveed. (April 12, 2016). Analysis: Chahbahar-Gwadar Port Contest Does Not

End in a Tie. Express Tribune.

Akhtar, S. (2008). Sino-Pak Relations: An Assesment. Islamabad: ISS.

Alahmad, Nida; Keshavarzian, Arang (Winter 2010). A War on Multiple

Fronts. Middle East Report. 40

Albert, Eleanor. (2015). Competition in the Indian Ocean. Council on Foreign Relations.

Albert, Eleanor. (2017). China's Big Bet on Soft Power. Council on Foreign Relations.

Al Jazeera. (June 20, 2010). Jundullah: Iran's Sunni Rebels.

Al-Jazeera English. (November 27, 2013).

Ali, Kashif (2012). Will China- India Relations dent Pak- China Relations? The Express

Tribune.

Alexander, David. Ali, Ameer. Et al.(2012). Indian Ocean: A Sea of Uncertainty. Future

Directions International.

Amin, Shahid. (2000). Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reprisal. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Aneja, Atul. (May 5, 2013). India to Develop Iranian Port. The Hindu.

Aneja U. (2006). Pakistan-China Relations: Recent Developments. New Delhi: IPSC. 241

Arango, Tim Clifford Klauss. (June 2, 2013). China is Reaping Biggest Benefits of Iraq

Oil Boom. The New York Times.

Arif, Areeba. (2016). Gwadar and Chahbahar: Implication for the Region. Islamabad:

ISSI.

Ashraf, Fahmida. (2009). India-Afghanistan Relations: Post 9/11. Islamabad: ISSI.

Ashraf, Sajjad. (2013). India and Pakistan Compete for Influence in Afghanistan. East

Asia Forum.

Asia Sentinel. (March 26, 2018). China Rearranges its Bureaucracy for Regional

Hegemony.

Baculino, Eirc. (2017). Belt and Road Initiative: China Plans $ 1 trillion New Silk Road.

NBC News

Baker, Benjamin. (2015). Where is the 'String of Pearls' in 2015? The Diplomat.

Barnds, William (1975). China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability Amidst

Discontinuity. The China Quarterly. 63.

BBC. (October 8, 2009). Afghan Bomb Strikes India Embassy.

BBC. (June 17, 2010). China Says Pakistan Nuclear Deal 'Peaceful'Bhasin, Avtar Singh.

BBC. (May 17, 2011). Pakistani PM Hails China as a 'Best Friend'

BBC. (2014). BBC Wolrd Service Poll.

BBC. (May 24, 2014). China Media: Li Keqiang's Pakistan Visit. 242

Beckley, Micheal. (2012). China and Pakistan: Fair-Weather Friends. Yale Journal of

International Affairs. 12(2).

Bedi, Rahul. (2002). India and Central Asia. Front Line. 19(19).

Behuria, Ashok K.; Rizvi, M. Mahtab Alam (May 13, 2015), India's Renewed Interest in

Chabahar: Need to Stay the Course, New Delhi: IDSA Issue Brief, Institute for

Defence Studies and Analyses

Bennet, Adam. (2005). Reconstructing Afghanistan. IMF.

Bhatnagar, Aryaman; John, Divya (October 2013), Accessing Afghanistan and Central

Asia: Importance of Chabahar to India. Observer Research Foundation

Bholla, L. (1986). Pakistan-China Relations: Search for Political-Strategic Relationship.

Jaipur: RA Publishers.

Blank, Stephen. (2007). US Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them.

Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College.

Bokhari, Farha. (January 12, 2016). Closer Pakistan-China Ties irk West. Financial

Times.

Bokhari, Syeda Aysha. (2012). Pak-China, India-US Strategic Quadrilateral. Islamabad:

LAP Academic Publishing.

Bose, Pratim. (2015). On a Railroad from Russia to Iran. Business Line.

Brewster, David (2012). US Strategic Thinking about the Indian Ocean. 26 June, The

interpreter. Retrieved from: 243

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/06/26/US-strategic-thinking-about-the-

Indian-Ocean.aspx

Brewster, David. (2014). Beyond the 'String of Pearls': Is there Really a Sino-Indian

Security Dilemma in Indian Ocean? Academia.Edu.

Brown, Peter. (March 16, 2017). Chahbahar Port is an Unlikely Litmus Test for the US in

Iran. Asia Times.

Brunner, Peter Hans. (2013). What is Economic Corridor Development and What can it

Achieve in Asia‟s Sub Regions? Asian Development on Regional Economic

Integration. 117

Bull, Hedley. (2002). The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New

York: Palgrave.

Business Recorder. (August 26, 2009). Eight MoUs Signed During Zardari Visit to

China.

Butt, Ijaz. (2007). Focus on China: Relations with Pakistan and Domestic Concern.

Lahore: Advance Publishers.

Cahnman, W.J.(1944).The concept of raum and the theory of regionalism. American

Sociological Review,9(5).

Cai, Peter. (S2017). Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative. Sydney: Lowy

Institute 244

Chandran, Nyshka. (2018). Pakistan is Ditching Dollar for Trade with China-24 Hours

after Trump Denounced the Country. CNBC.

Chandra, Vishal. (2009). The Afghan Maze and India's Options. New Delhi: IDSA.

Chang, Jung. Halliday, Job. (2011). Mao: The Unknown Story. Beijing: Vintage Books.

Chaudhary, Dipanjan. (September, 12, 2017). India to Partner Afghanistan for 116 'High

Impact' Projects. Economic Times.

Cheema, Sujata Ashwarya (2014), "India-Iran Relations in the Post-Cold War: A Neo-

Realist Analysis", in Goud, R. Sidda; Mookherjee, Manisha, India and Iran in

Contemporary Relations, Allied Publishers.

China Daily. (November 14, 2006). China-Pakistan Relations.

China Daily. (2008). India's Foreign Relations,2007: Part I. New Delhi: Ministry of

External Affairs and Geetika Publishers.

Chohan, Usman. (2017). What is One Belt One Road? A Surplus Recycling Mechanism

Approach. Papers. Com.

Chowdary, Anirban. (May 23, 2016). Five Things About Chahbahar Port and How India

Gains From It.

CNTV English. (May 24, 2013). Enhancing Cultural Ties Between China and Pakistan.

Cohen, S.B.(2003).Geopolitics of the World System. Lanham, MD: Rowman &

Littlefield. 245

Cokemen, Semra. (2010). Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations. Thesis:

School of Social Sceinces, Middle East Technical University.

Coleman, M. (2007) A Geopolitics of Engagement: Neoliberalism, the War on Terrorism,

and the Reconfiguration of US Immigration Enforcement. Geopolitics 12.

Corbert, James. Winebrake, James. (2008) The Impact of Globalisation on International

Maritime Transport Activity. International Transport Forum.

Cowen, D., and Gilbert, E. (eds.) (2007) War, Citizenship, Territory. New York:

Routledge.

Council on Foreign Relations. (December 5, 2007). India's Northern Exposure. CFR.

Criekemans, David. (2007). Geopolitiek Garant.

Crilly, Rob. (September 30, 2011). US Finds New Friend in Uzbekistan After Pakistan

Fallout. Telegraph.

Crossette, Barbara (7 March 1989). India to Provide Aid to Government in

Afghanistan. New York Times.

Curtis, Lisa. (2009). China's Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan. Heritage.

Org

Dai, Wai. (2014). What do Chinese People Think about Pakistan? Quora

Dalby, S. (1990) Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics. New York:

Guilford. 246

Dalby, Simon (July–September 1996). Writing critical geopolitics: Campbell, Ó Tuathail,

Reynolds and dissident skepticism". Political Geography, special issue: Critical

Geopolitics. Elsevier. 15 (6–7)

Daniels, Rorry (2013), "Strategic Competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the

Risks of Infrastructure Development", American Foreign Policy Interests, 35 (2).

Daniel S. Markey, James West. (May 12, 2016). Behind China‟s Gambit in Pakistan. The

Council for Foreign Relations.

David Christian. (2000). Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in world history.

Journal of World History, 11(1). 1-26

Dawn. (August 2, 2003). RAW Active in Indian Consulates: Pakistan.

Dapeng, Qi (2007). The PLA‟s Role in China‟s Regional Security Strategy. S.

Rajatranam School of International Relations.

Dawn. (March 16, 2017). China Pakistan Agree to Further Increase Military Cooperation.

Dawn. (July 7, 2013). Nawaz to set up 'China Cell' for Projects' Supervision.

Dawn. (January 15, 2012). Top Ten Trading Partners.

Defence News. (July 19, 2011) India to Train Kyrgyz Armed Forces: Establish Military

Ties in Central Asia.

Deibel,T.L.& Gaddis,J.L.(1986).Containment. Washington, D.C. :National Defense

University Press. 247

Desk. N. (2017). 52 Countries Interested in CPEC: Nawaz. Pakistan Observer.

Devetak, etal. (2012). An Introduction to International Relations.

Dhaiya, Sandeep. (2014). Afghan Parliament Being Built by India to be Ready by 2015.

Outlook.

Dhar, Sujoy. (October 5, 2011). Pakistan a Twin Brother, Talks to Go on: Karzai.

Pajhwok News.

Dittmer, J. (2005) Captain America‟s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture,

and Post-9/11 Geopolitics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers

95 (3).

Dittmer, Jason. (2014). Geopolitics: An Introductory Read. London: Routledge.

DNA. (October 8, 2011). US Hails India's Key Role in Afghanistan.

Dodds, K., and Sidaway, J. (2004) Halford Mackinder and the “Geographical Pivot of

History”: A Centennial Retrospective. Geographical Journal 170 (4).

Dowdy, William (2013). Chinese and Indian geo political competition in the Indian

Ocean Region. IPSA.

Dumbaugh, Kerry. (2010). Exploring the China-Pakistan Relation. New York: CNA.

DW Asia. (May 14th, 2017). China‟s New Silk Road Summit Opens with Major Funding

Vision

DW News. (April 20th, 2015). China‟s Xi Jinping to visit Pakistan, Invest $46 billion 248

Economic Times. (March 17, 2017). China to Boost Military Ties with Pakistan.

Economic Times. (January 18, 2017). Connectivity Projects Should be Consonant with

Sovereignty Principles: Vijay Gokhale.

Economic Times. (June 4, 2016). Narendra Modi, Ashraf Ghani Inaugurate Landmark Rs

1700 Crore Afghan-India Friendship Dam.

Efferink, Leanhardt. (2009). The Definition of Geopolitics-The Classical, French and

Critical Tradition. Exploring Geopolitics.

English, Cynthia. (2016). Indian Leadership More Popular in Afghanistan Than China's,

US's. Gallup.

Erickson, Andrew. Mikolay, Justin. (2010). Diego Garcia and the United States'

Emerging Indian Ocean Strategy. Researchgate.net.

Eurasia Review. (March 4, 2017). India and Tajikistan Ties: Partners in Development-

Analysis. EA.

Evans, G Newham. (1998). The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London:

Penguin Books.

Express Tribune. (January 25, 2015). Pakistan an 'Irreplaceable' Friend, Chinese Foreign

Minister Tell Army Chief.

Express Tribune. (April 2, 2015). PM Approves Deal to Buy Eight Chinese Submarines.

Fact Sheet (2012). US Relations with India. Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm 249

Fahad, Sheikh. (2015). China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Defense Pact. New York:

Monograph, Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research.

Fair, Christine. (2010). India in Afghanistan: Opportunities and Constraints. Washington

DC: Century Foundation.

Fair, Christine. (2010). India in Afghanistan, Part I: Strategic Interests, Regional

Concerns. Foreign Policy.

Fair, Christine. (2011). Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India's End Game in

Afghanistan?. Washington Quarterly.34(2).

Falak, et. al. (2016). Chahbahar : India's Economic Gambit. Islamabad: CSCR.

Farley, Robert. (2018). The One Important Ingredient for Regional Hegemony that

China's Still Missing. The Diplomat.

Ferdinand P (2016) Westward to-the China dream and „One Belt, One Road: Chinese

Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping. International Affairs. 92 .

First Post. (May 23, 2016). India Eyes Iran's Energy Resources, Commits over Rs 1 Lakh

Crore Investment in Chahbahar.

Flint, Colin. (2006). Introduction to Geopolitics. London: Routledge.

FMPRC. (2009). Prime Minister Gilani's Visit to Advance China-Pakistan Relations.

FMPRC.

Freeman, Charles (2000). China and Regional Security Dynamic. CSIS. Washington DC. 250

Fruhan, Mathew. (2014). Large and Mega-Cap Stocks: Look For Opportunities in

Financials and Energy. Fidelity.

Future Directions. (June 23, 2016). The United States and the Indian Ocean: The Security

Vector.

Gadym Fraz. (2017). China, Pakistan Hold Defence Talks. The Diplomat.

Ganguly, Sumit. Howenstein, Nicholas. (2009). India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan.

Journal of International Affairs. 63(1).

Ganguly, Sumit, Scobell, Andrew. (2005). India and the United States: Forging a

Security Partnership. World Policy Journal. 22(2).

GCA. (March 24, 2013). India Plans Shipping Afghan Goods Via Iran. Gazette of

Central Asia.

GCR. (September, 20, 2016). Afghanistan Starts Railway that Will Like it to the World.

GCR.

Ghausi, Sabihuddin. (April 21, 2008). Banks Eying Business on Rising Trade..Dawn.

Global Bearings. (November 2, 2011). Indian Influence in Afghanistan: 2011 and

Beyond.

Global Security. (2005). Al Khalid MBT-2000/Type 2000 Main Battle Tank.

Gogwitt, Christopher. (2014). The Fiction of Geopolitics. Stanford: Stanford University

Press. 251

Goswami, N. (1971). Pakistan and China: A Study of Relations. Mumbai: Allied

Publishers.

Gulshan, M. (2014). Genesis of Indian Ambition in Afghanistan: Implications for

Pakistan. Islamabad: IPRI.

Guruswamy, Mohan. (2010). Pakistan-China Relations: Higher than the Mountains,

Deeper than the Oceans. CLAWS Journal. 9(2).

Haenle, Paul. Saalman, Lora. (2011). Partners in Peril. US-India-China-Pakistan.

Washington DC: Carnegir Endowment for International Peace.

Haideri, Ashraf. (2017). Afghanistan in 2017: Achievements and Challenges. The

Diplomat.

Haider, Ziad. (2013). Could Pakistan Bridge the U.S.-China Divide? Foreign Policy

Hali, S. M., Shukui, T., & Iqbal, S. (2015). One Belt and One Road: Impact on China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor. Strategic Studies, 34(4).

Hali, Shafie. Tan, Shukui, Iqbal. Sumera. (2016). One Belt, One Road: Impact on China

Pakistan Economic Corridor. Strategic Studies.

Haroon, Iqrar. (November, 5, 2017). Politics of Trade Corridors. DND.

Hassan, Ahmad. (2005). Pakistan's Gwadar Port: Prospects of Economic Revival.

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive.

Haq, Khawaja. (2014). Economic Relations between China and Pakistan. Academia.edu.

Hindustan Times. (July 7, 2008). Militants Attacked Indian Embassy in Kabul. 252

Hepple, L.W. (1986) The Revival of Geopolitics. Political Geography Quarterly,

supplement to 5 (4).

Hindustan Times. (December 25, 2015). Modi Inaugurates New Afghan Parliament Built

by India in Kabul.

Holmes, James. Yoshihara, Toshi. (2008). China and the United States in the Indian

Ocean. New Port: US Naval War College.

Hongmei, Li. (2018). What Trump's Pakistan Policy Means for China. The Diplomat.

Hornby, Lucy. (2010). China Air Force Woos Allies with J-10 Fighter Jet. Reuters.

Houreld, Kenneth. (April 20th, 2015). China and Pakistan Launch Economic Plan worth

$46 Billion. Reuters

Hussain, Riffat. (2002). Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan Continuity and Change.

Strategic Studies. 22(4).

Hussain, Tom (April 19, 2015). China's Xi in Pakistan to cement huge infrastructure

projects, submarine sales. McClatchy News.

Hyder, Danish. (January 11, 2017). CPEC: The Devil in Not in the Details: Herald.

IBN. (July 7, 2008). IFS Officer, Brig Among Indians Killed in Blast.

IBP USA (2008). Global Logistics Assessments Reports Handbook: Strategic

Transportation and Customs Information for Selected Countries. Int'l Business

Publications.

Iftikhar, Omar. (October 17, 2009). Geography: The Border of Pakistan. Dawn. 253

IISS. (2011). India's Role in Afghanistan.

Ikenberry, John. (2014). From Hegemony to Balance of Power: The Rise of China and

American Grand Strategy in East Asia. International Journal of Korean

Unification Studies. 23(2).

Iranian Diplomacy. (August 28, 2012). Chahbahar Port: India, Iran, Afghanistan to Set up

Group.

India Gazette. (May 24, 2014). Indian Consulate in Afghanistan Attacked by Gunmen.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs. (September 11, 2017) Joint Statement on the 2nd

Strategic Partnership Council Meeting between India and Afghanistan, New

Delhi. New Delhi: IMEA.

IRNA. (2010). Pakistan Enjoys Strong Ties with China.

Izuyama, Mari. Kurita, Masahiro. (2017). Security in the Indian Ocean Region: Regional

Responses to China's Growing Influence. NIDS.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. (2011). A tale of two ports. Yale Global Online.

Jahangir, Asifa. (2012). Changing Dynamics in Pakistan-China Strategic Partnership:

Challenges and Prosects. Mphil Thesis: National Defence University.

Jahangir, Asifa. (2013). Changing Dyamics of South Asia Balance of Power. Journal of

South Asian Studies. 1(1).

Jain, K. (1981) (Ed.) China South Asia Relations 1947-1980. New Delhi: Radiant

Publishers. 254

Jain, LC. (February 7, 2010). The Lost Heart of Asia. The Hindu

Jaishankar, Dhruva (2012). India‟s Ocean. Foreign Policy.

Jamal, Afridi. (2009). China-Pakistan Relations. Council on Foreign Relations.

Jane. (2008). India Joins Anti-Taliban-Coalition.

Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. (2013). The Indo-US Strategic Relationship and Pakistan's Security.

South Asian Strategic Stability Institute Research Report. 9.

Javaid, Umbreen. (2015). Pakistan-China Strategic Relations: A Glorious Journey of 55

Years. JRSP. 52(1).

Javaid, Umbreen. (2016). Indian Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan.

Journal for Political Science. 3(2).

Javaid, U. (2016). Assessing CPEC: Potential Threats and Prospects. Journal of the

Research Society of Pakistan, 53(2).

Jervis, Robert. (2003). The Compulsive Empire. Foreign Policy.

Jia, Chen. (April 4, 2015). Silk Road Fund Makes First Investment. China Daily.

Jianmin, W. (2015).One Belt and One Road, Far-reaching Initiative. China-US Focus

Digest

Jichen, Tian. (2016). One Belt One Road: Connecting China and the World. Voices

Jingjing, M. (2017). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Aims to Boost Trade Between

Two Countries. The Global Times. 255

JOC. (May 9, 2016). India, Iran Moving Forward on Redeveloping Chahbahar.

JOC. Com. (May 24, 2016). Easing Sanctions Allows Iran to Develop Key Port Project.

Jorisch, Avi. (2016). Port Of Damaged Goods: India's Dangerous Investment In Iran's

Chahabar. Forbes.

Kabalaan, Marwan (2013). China‟s Interests are Regional not Global. Gulf News.

Kakar, Javed Hamim. (2011). Singh Given Ceremonial Reception. Pajhwok News.

Kang, Wang. (2012). Managing Regional Hegemony in Historical Asia: The Case of

Early Ming China. Chinese Journal of International Politics. 5.

Kaplan, Robert (2013). China‟s String of Pearls? 15 Feb, Real clear World. Retrieved

from:

http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/02/15/chinas_string_of_pearls_1005

58.html

Kapila, Subhash. (2009). Afghanistan: India Has Legitimate Strategic Interests in Its

Stability. New Delhi: South Asian Analysis Group.

Kapur, Ashok. (2011). Indian and the South Asian Strategic Triangle. New York:

Routledge.

Karthikeya, Gundu. Schaffer, Teresita. (2011). India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile

Sports. South Asia Monitor. 117.

Kasi, Mirwais. Khan, Majeed. (2017). Pakistan-Economic Relations: Developments in

Economic and Security Areas in 21st Century. Islamabad: ISSI. 256

Kataria, Jafar. Naveed, Anum. (2014). Pakistan-China Social and Economic Relations.

South Asian Studies.29(2).

Kaufman, M. Lizner. (January 19, 2007). China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test.

Washington Post.

KCCI. (2017). China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Is Pakistan Ready to Surf the Tide?

Karachi: KCCI Research Development Cell

Kearns, G.(2004).The political pivot of geography. The Geographical Journal,179(4).

Kennan, G.F.(1991).Measures Short of War. Washington, D.C.: National Defense

University Press.

Khalid, Iram. (2011). The New Great Game in Afghanistan: Role of India (A Pakistani

Perspective). Journal of South Asian Studies. 26(2).

Khalid, Iram. Khan, Manzoor. (2016). The Politics of Interdependence: A Case of China

Pakistan Economic Corridor. South Asian Studies Research Journal. 31(2). 659-

671

Khan, Ali Zahid. (2012) China‟s Gwadar and India‟s Chahbahar. Islamabad: Institute of

Strategic Studies.

Khan, Azam. Baloch, Farooq. (April 23, 2014). Next Generation License: Govt Raises

Over $1.1 billion in Spectrum Auction. Express Tribune.

Khan, Masood Khalid. (June 29, 2016). Gwadar Vs Chahbahar. The Nation. 257

Khan, Raja. (2013). Pakistan-China Strategic Relations: Regional and Global Impacts.

Regional Studies. 31(1).

Khan, Riaz (2011). Pakistan-China Relations: An Overview. Pakistan Horizon. 64(4).

Khan, Sarwar. (2006). Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changing International Scenario.

The Muslim World. 96(2).

Khan, Shabbir. (2013). Geo-Economic Imperatives of Gwadar Sea Port and Kashgar

Economic Zone for Pakistan and China. IPRI. 13(2).

Khan, Usman Ali. (2015). India, Pakistan Relations: Ending Terrorism, Myths and Blame

Game. Foreign Policy.

Khan, Zahid. Ahmad, Shabir. (2015). New Trends in Sino-Pak Defence and Strategic

Relations Since 9/11: Indian Concerns.

Khetran, Mir Sherbaz. (2015). The Potentials and Prospects of Gwadar Port. Strategic

Studies. 34(35).

Khurana, Gurpeet. (2008). China's 'String of Pearls' in Indian Ocean and Its Security

Implication. New Delhi: IDSA.

Kiani, Khaleeq (September 30, 2016). With a new Chinese loan, CPEC is now worth

$62bn. Dawn

Kjellén, R.(1917).The State as a Living Form. Leipzig: University Press.

Knox, P.L., & Marston, S.A.(2001).Places and Regions in Global Context. Upper Saddle

River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 258

Knox, P.L.,& Marston, S. A.(2001).Places and Regions in Global Context. Upper Saddle

River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kugelman, Michael (July 9, 2015). Pakistan's Other National Struggle: Its Energy

Crisis. The Wall Street Journal.

Kulacki, Gergory. (2014). An Authoritative Source on China's Military Space Strategy.

Cambridge: UCS.

Kulacki G. Lewis (2008). Understanding China's Anti-Satellite Test. Nonproliferation

Review. 15(2).

Kumar, Atul. (2006). China-Pakistan Economic Relations. New Delhi: IPSC.

Kumar, Ravi (2010). Relations Between China and Pakistan. China Centre, Calcutta

University.

Kuus, Merje. (2009). Critical Geopolitics. British Columbia: University of British

Columbia.

Kyani, Farukh. (2013). China-Pakistan Economic Relations: Lessons for Pakistan.

Pakistan Journal of Commerce and Social Science. 7(3).

Lakshman, Kanchan. (2008). Fault Lines. Mumbai: ICMA.

Lancha, Shi. (June 5, 2016). In Iran's Chahbahar, India Seeks Leverage Point Over

Pakistan. Global Times.

Latif, Aamir. (June 1, 2016). Iran's Chahbahar Won't Vie with Pakistan's Gwadar: Exprts.

Andalou Agency. 259

Lee, Raymond. (2016). The Strategic Importance of Chinese Pakistan Relations. Muscat:

Aljazeera Centre for Studies.

Lees, SC. etal. (1993). The Friend of my Enemy is my Enemy: Modeling Triadic

International Relationships. Synthese. 100(3).

Lele, Ajey (2013). China‟s „String of Pearls‟ in Space. New Delhi: IDSA

Li, Xin. Worm, Verner. (2009). Bulding China's Soft Power for Peaceful Rise.

Islamabad: Asia Research Centre.

Litner, Bertil. (2017). A New Cold War in the Indian Ocean? National Interest.

Live Mint. (January 27, 2010). Clueless in Afghanistan.

Live Mint. (March 1, 2018). India Welcomes Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's Initiative

for Direct Talks with Taliban.

Louise, Merrignton. (2012). The India-US-China-Pakistan Strategic Quadrilateral. Asia

Pacific.

Lynch, Colum. (2011). India Threatens to Pull Plug on Peacekeeping. Foreign Policy.

Mahmood. T. (2000). Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Quarterly Survey. 53(2).

Majid, Munir (2012). South East Asia between China and the United States.

Makhdoom, Waqas etal. (2014). A Study of Pakistan-China Defence Relations (2000-

2012). ISSN. 4(22). 260

Malik, Hasan Yaser (2012). Strategic Importance of Gwadar Port. Journal of Political

Studies. Retrieved from: http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-

files/gwadar%20article-winter2012.pdf

Malik, Rashid. (2016). The Growing Pakistan-China Defense Cooperation. Islamabad:

ISSI.

Malik, Rashid Ahmad. (July 26th, 2016). An Introduction to CPEC. Pakistan Today

Mantraya (2016) One belt One Road, one Singapore Analysis. The Eurasia Review.

Marantidhu, V. (2014). Revisiting China's 'String of Pearls' Strategy Places with 'Chinese

Characteristics' and their Security Implications: Issues and Insights.

Markey, Daniel .(2016). Behind China;s Gambit in pakistan. Council on Foreign

Relations.

Martantidou, Virginia. (2014). Revisiting China's 'String of Pearls' Strategy. Washington

DC: CSIS.

Marty, Franz. (2018). Afghan-Pakistani Cross-Border Terrorism Cuts Both Ways. The

Diplomat.

Masood, Salman. (October 13, 2008). Pakistan President to Visit China, A Valued Ally.

New York Times.

McBride, James. (2015). Building New Silk Road. Council on Foreign Relations

MEHR News Agency. (July 20, 2017). Khaf-Herat Railway to Open Within Weeks. 261

Memon, Noor Ahmed. (2014). Pak-China Economic and Trade Relations. Chinese

Review.

Menon, Shivshankar. (2016). As China's Pakistan Ties Deepen, India Needs a Strategy to

Mitigate the Fallout. The Wire.

Meng, Angela. Cheng, Minnie. (2015). Beijing Eyes Bigger Arms Exports After Pakistan

Deal, Experts Say. South China Morning Post.

Miani, Tridivesh. (2015). China and India: Competing for Influence in Afghanistan. The

Diplomat.

Michael Tanchum (May 1, 2014). "Iran's Chabahar port transforms its position". The

Jerusalem Post.

Mirza, Zahid. (2016). Chinese Vision of One Belt One Road and Strategic Dimensions of

China Pakistan Economic Corridor. Islamabad: ISSRA.

Moaz, Zeev (1997). Regional Security in Middle East: pat Trends, Present Realities and

Future Challenges. JCSS.

Mohan, Archis. (2011). Deal for Larger Role In Kabul. The Telegraph.

Mollazehi, Pir-Mohammad. (2016). The Coast of Makran: An Arena for Rivalry among

Powers, Iran Review.

Monnoo, D. (2017). The Geo-economics of CPEC. CPEC: Macro and Micro Economic

Dividends for Pakistan and the Region, Islamabad: IRPI. 17-36.

Mukherjee, Anit. (2017). Indian Ocean Strategic Outlook. Brooking. edu. 262

Mukherjee, Krittiwas (2010). China‟s Growing focus on Indian Ocean irks India.

Mukhopadhaya, Gautam. (2009) (Ed.). India. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace.

Nadkarni, Vidya. (2010). Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances.

New York: Routledge.

Nasar, Rahim. (February 4, 2018). US-Pakistan Relations: A Troubling Scenario for

South Asia. Asia Times.

Naseer, Rizwan. Amin, Musarat. (2011). Balance of Power: A Theoretical Explanation

and Its Relevance in Contemporary Era. Berkley Journal of Social Sciences.

1(10).

Naseer, Rizwan. Amin, Musarat. (2011). Sino-Pakistan Relations: A Natural Alliance

against Common Threats. Berkely Jounral of Social Sciences. 1(2).

NDTV. (December 3, 2008). India, Afghanistan United Against Terrorism.

Newsround. (2013). What Is Bollywood?

News Week. (June 3, 2008). Afghanistan's Troubled Border.

Niazi, Tarique. (2005). Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the India Ocean. AFAR.

Noor, Elina et al (2012). Impact of Rise of China on Regional Security. East- West

Centre.

Noorzai, Najibullah. (2016). Afghanistan, between India and Pakistan. The Diplomat. 263

Okur, Mehmet. (2014). Classical Tests of Geopolitics and the "Heart of Eurasia". Journal

of Turkish World Series. 76(90).

Nye, Joseph. (September25, 2006). Springing Tiger. India Today.

Out Look India. (March 9, 2012). India Condemns Rabbani Assassination. Padukone,

Neil (2014), Beyond South Asia: India's Strategic Evolution and the Reintegration of the

Subcontinent, Bloomsbury Publishing.

Painter, Joe; Jeffrey, Alex (2009), Geopolitics and anti-geopolitics", in Painter, Joe;

Jeffrey, Alex, Political geography: an introduction to space and power (2nd ed.).

Los Angeles.

Pakistan Today. (May 15, 2016).

Pande, Savita. (2015).. Sino-Pak Strategic Relationship: Implications for India. CLAWS

Journal.

Pandya, Dhwani. (March 30, 2017). Indian Billionaires are Interested Managing Delayed

Iran Port: Sources. Bloomberg Markets.

Pant, Harsh. (2010). India's Challenges in Afghanistan: With Power Comes

Responsibility. New Delhi: CASI.

Pant, Harsh. (2010). India's Challenge in Afghanistan: With Power Comes Responsibility.

Philadelphia: Centre for Advanced Study of India.

Pant, Harsh. (2011). India's Changing Role: The Afghanistan Conflict. Middle East

Quarterly. 18(2). 264

Pant, Harsh V. (2012). India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?. New

Delhi: Centre for International Peace and Security Studies CIPSS.

Pakistan Today. (April 24, 2014). China Mobile to Invest $1b in Pakistan.

Panda, Ankit. (2017). Sri Lanka Formally Hands Hambantota Port to Chinese Firms on

99-Year Lease. The Diplomat.

Parera, Sampath (2013). Pakistan transfer Strategic port to China. 26 Feb, World

Socialist Website. Retrieved from:

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/02/26/gwad-f26.htmlhe

Pattanaik, Smruti. (2010). India in Afghanistan: Engagement without Strategy. IDSA

Comment.

Paul, T.V. (2013). Chinese-Pakistan Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power. The

Nonproliferation Review.

PCII. (2013). Pakistan-China Institute Islamabad, interview.

Pejic, Igor. (2015). China's 'String of Pearls' Project. South Front.

Perper, Rosie. (2018). China may be Looking to Exploit a US Move to Cut Aid to

Pakistan. Business Insider.

PEW. (2012). Pakistan Public Opinion Ever More Critical of U.S. Islamabad: Pew

Research Centre.

PEW. (2012). Growing Concerns in China About Inequality. Islamabad: Pew Research

Centre. 265

PEW. (2012), What Pakistanis Think About China. Islamabad: PEW

Ploch, Lauren. etal. (2011). Piracy off the Horn of Africa. Washington DC:

Congressional Research Service.

Popham, Peter (10 March 2001). Taliban vandalism stirs India's oldest hatreds. The

Independent.

Pressler, Larry. (1993). Historycommons.org

Pugh, Jonathan, (2017). Is China New Hegemon in East Asia? IRE

Qamar, Waheed. (February 6, 2017). One Belt One Road-CPEC-Pakistan. China Daily.

Raghavan, RV. (2001). Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia. The

Nonproliferation Review.

Rahman, Saif. Shurong, Zhao. (2017). Analysis of Chinese Economic and National

Security Interests in ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the

Framework of One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative/ Arts and Social Sciences

Journal. 8(4).

Rahim, Shoaib. (2018). Why Pakistan is TAPI's Biggest Hurdle. The Diplomat.

Ranasinghe, Desilva Sergie (2011), why Indian Ocean Matters. The diplomat.

Ranasinghe, Segei. (2011). Why the Indian Ocean Matters. The Diplomat.

Rahman, Fazal. (2010). Pakistan-China Trade and Investment Relations. Strategic

Studies. 30(4). 266

Rahman, Fazal. (2010). Pakistan-China Trade and Investment Relations. Strategic

Studies. 30(4).

Rahman, Hasib. (April 9, 2013). Deepening Banking Cooperation of Pakistan and China.

Youlin Magazine.

Rajghattai, Chdanand. (July 31, 2007). US Bails Out India from Balochistan Wrangle.

Times of India.

Rajghatta, Chidanand. (2012). America Persuades India to Expand Afghan Footprint.

Times of India.

Rakisits, Claude (Fall 2015). A Path to the Sea: China's Pakistan Plan. World Affairs

Journal.

Ramachandran, Sudha (16 November 2016). CPEC takes a step forward as violence

surges in Balochistan. Asia Times.

Ramay, SA. (2016). CPEC: A Chinese Dream Being Materialized through Pakistan.

Islamabad: SDPI

Rashid, Ahmed. (2013) What Nawaz Sharif‟s Win Means for Pakistan‟s Neighbours.

BBC

Raza, Rahib. (January 24, 2011). Commemoration: Pakistan-China Friendship to be

Celebrated. Express Tribune.

Reinold, Therisa, Dembinski, Methias (2009). The Culture of Regional Securitize and

AU Approaches to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 267

Report (2010). Relations Between China and Pakistan. China Centre, Calcutta University

Report Brookings. (2013). Economic Corridors. Washington DC: Brookings Institute.

Reuters. (July 4, 2011). Ties Binding China and Pakistan.

Reuters. (November 22, 2017). Indian Navy the odd man out in Asia's 'Quad' Alliance.

Review of Maritime Transport. (2015). Maritime Transport in Indian Ocean.

Rifaat, Hamzah. Miani, Tridivesh. (2015). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Washington DC: Stimson Centre.

Riley, James Whitcomb. (2013). How Realistic is Realism?

Robin, Lee. (2017. No Deeper than the Indian Ocean? An Analysis of Pakistan-China

Relations. SISA

Roy, Meena Singh (2012), "Iran: India's Gateway to Central Asia", Strategic

Analysis, 36 (6).

Roy, Sumit (2005-06). China and India “The Emerging- Giants” and Africa: A Note.

Roy, Shubhajit. (September 12, 2017). India Steps up Development Partnership with

Afghanistan. Indian Express.

RRTD. (2008). India. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

SAAG. (2011). The Indian Ocean: The Strategic Situation- Analysis. Eurasia Review

June 02. Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiareview.com/02062011-the-indian-

ocean-the-strategic-situation-analysis/ 268

Sahgal, Arun. (2011) (Ed.). US Af-Pak Strategy and Afghanistan's Alternative Futures:

Options for India. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

Salman, Rafi (October 23, 2016). A new 'East India Company' in the making? .Asia

Times.

Sarwar, Ghulam. (1996). Sino-Pakistan Efforts to Maintain Peace and Promote

Development. National Development and Security. 5(1).

Saeed, Amir. (2017). Pakistan-China Trade Volume Reaches $ 13.77 billion in 2016-17.

Business Recorder.

Sattar, A. (2010). Pakistan's Foreign Policy 19470-2009. Oxford: Oxford University

Press.

Salehi, Zarghona. (November 28, 2016). Afghan-Turkmenistan Railroad Inaugurated.

Pajwok Afghan News.

Saul, Cohen. (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. New York: Rowman and

Littlefield.

Sawhney, R.K. (2011) (Eds.). Afghanistan Today. New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare.

Seas, Ark. (2018). Chahbahar Port.

Sengupta, Pallavi. (2015). What China sees in Pakistan, But not in India. One India.

Shah, Saeed (April 9, 2015). China to Build Pipeline From Iran to Pakistan. The Wall

Street Journal. 269

Shah, Saeed (April 20, 2015). China's Xi Jinping Launches Investment Deal in

Pakistan. The Wall Street Journal.

Shah, Saeed. (2016). Big Chinese-Pakistani Project Tries to Overcome Jihadists,

Droughts and Doubts. The Wall Street Journal.

Shamshad, Ahmad. (November 25, 2006). A Special Friend Comes Calling. The Nation.

Sharma, Smita. (December 17, 2017). Kabul to Mumbai: Second India-Afghan

Corridor Opens. Tribune India.

Shear, Andrew. Green J, Michael (2012). Defining US Indian Ocean Strategy. CSIS.

Retrieved from: http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12springgreenshearer.pdf

Shi, Zhiqin LY (2016). The Benefits and Risks of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Beijing: The Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy.

Shira, Deza. (2017). Understanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Silk Road

Briefing.

Shrivastava, Sanskar. (March 30, 2013). India, Russia and China in Race to Expand

Influence Over Afghanistan: Preventing Re-Talibanization After 2014. The World

Reporter.

Siddique, Qandeel. (2014). Deeper than the Indian Ocean?: An Analysis of Pakistan-

China Relations. Oslo: SISA

Singh, Abhijet (2012). The Indian Navy‟s New Expeditionary Outlook. Observer

Research. 270

Singh, Sushant. (2008). Indian Presence in Afghanistan is Essential. New Delhi: ISN.

Sputnik News. (May, 5, 2016). Iran Will Need Russia's Help to Build Its Caspian Sea-

Persian Gulf Canal.

Sridharan, Vasudevan. (December 24, 2015). India Delivers Attack Helicopters to

Afghanistan to Counter Taliban Offensive. IBT.

Statfor. (2018) I.ndian and US find Common Ground in Indo-Pacific. Worldview.

Strasser, F. (2016). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Road to Peace. New York:

USIP.

Sufyan A. Khan (2011). Greater Indian Ocean- A Peaceful geo political pivot.

Pakpotpourri2‟sblog. Retrieved from:

http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/2011/06/24/greater-indian-ocean-

%E2%80%93-a-peaceful-geo-political-pivot/

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty. (2016). India Cements Role in Iran with Chabahar Deal.

Foreign Policy.

Swami, Praveen. (May 27, 2016). Why Chahbahar Deal is a Rebellion Against History.

The Indian Express.

Tagotra, Niahrika. (2017). How India Can Counter China's Growing Influence in Asia.

WION.

Talukar, Sreemoy. (2017). Donald Trump's Afghanistan Policy Presents India a Chance

to Increase Sphere of Influence in South Asia. First Post. 271

Tao, JR. (2012). 60 years of Pakistan-China Relations Landmarks, Trends and

Approaches. Islamabad: IPS.

Tarzi, Amin. (2006). Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worries Pakistan. Radio Liberty.

Tasleem, Sadia. (2008). Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation: Altering Strategic Positioning and

Shifting Balance of Power in South Asia. RCSS Policy Studies. 99.

Tellis, Ashley. (2010). (Ed.) Implementing a Regional Approach to Afghanistan: Multiple

Alternatives, Moddest Possibilites. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace.

The Economist. (April 2, 2017). China's Battler for Regional Hegemony.

The Hindu. (May 25, 2017). Watching India-Iran Ties 'Very Closely': US.

The Hindustan Times. (May 24, 2016). India, Iran and Afghanistan Sign Chahbahar Port

Agreement.

The Nation. (May 8, 2012). President Asks Chinese Group to Set up Oil Refinery in

Pakistan.

The Washington Times. (January 17, 2005).

The Washington Times. (January 17, 2005). China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes.

Tharoor, Shashi. (Janaury 7, 2008). Hooray for Bollywood: India's 'Soft Power'. Taipei

Times.

Toncea, Vladimir. (2006). Geopolitical Evolution of Borders in Danube Basin. 272

Toal, Gerard. (2006). Critical Geopolitcs. London: Routledge.

TOI. (September, 2011). Former Afghanistan President Burhannuddin Rabbani

Assassinated.

UK Essays. (2015). Strategic Importance of Indian Ocean Region. UK Essays.

Umer. M. (2013). Pakistan-China Relations: Problems and Prospects. Lahore: PU.

UNECE. (2010). Iran Railway Transportation.

UNESCO. (2008). The Silk Roads Project-Integral study of the Silk Route: Roads of

Dialogue

US Energy Information Administration. (2010). India: Country Brief. Washington DC:

US EIA.

Vatanaka, Alex (2015). Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American

Influence..B. Taurus & Co. Limited.

Verma, Arjun. Schaffer, Teresita. (2008). A Difficult Road Ahead: India's Policy on

Afghanistan. South Asian Monitor. 114.

Vohra, Anchal. (May 17, 2016). Narendra Modi to Visit Afghanistan in June to

Inaugurate Salma Dan. News 18.

W. H. Parker. (2000). Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft. Oxford: Clarendon

Press .

Watts, Jake Maxwell. (2013). The Great Game: China and India are Battling Over Two

Strategically Important Middle East Ports. QZ. 273

Weija, Hu. (May 27, 2016). Indian Deal with Iran Shows Commitment to Infrastructure

that will Benefit China Too. Global Times.

Weinbaum, Marvin. (1991). Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship. Asian

Survey. 31(1).

WNO. (2018). Nuclear Power in Pakistan.

Wong, Catherine. (2018). China-Pakistan Ties to set to Get Even Close as 'Iron Brothers"

Eye New Alliance. South Asian Morning Post.

World Factbook. (2011). India. Washington DC: CIA.

Xuetong, Y. (2014). Silk Road Economic Belt Shows China's New Strategic Direction:

Promoting Integration with Its Neighbors. Beijing: Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for

Global Policy.

Yousaf, Kamran. (2016). Iran Offers Pakistan to Join Chahbahar Port Deal. Express

Tribune.

Yousaf, Mohammad (2005). Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy in Changing World. ISMICA.

Retrieved from: http://ismica.com/2007/03/pakistans-foreign-policy-in-a-

changing-world/

Yuan, Jing-Dong. (2007). The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in 21st

Century. The Washington Quarterly. 30(3).

Yusuf, Moeed. (2007). The Indo-US Nuclear Deal: An Impact Analysis. ISYP Journal

and World Affairs. 3(2). 274

Zaki, Akram. (2010). China of Today and Tomorrow: Dynamics of Relations with

Pakistan. Islamabad: IPP.

Zambelis, Chris. (January 14, 2011). Back With Vengeance: The Baloch Insurgents in

Iran. Terrorism Monitor.

Zeb, Rizwan. (2012). Pakistan-China Relations: Where They Go from Here? UNISCI

Discussion Paper 29(56).

Zheng, Christoph, Zhihua (2012). Raising important Support for China in Indian Ocean.

28 April. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2200038

Zhang, J. (2016). What's Driving China's One Belt, One Road Initiative?.Beijing: East

Asia Forum of Economic and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific.

Zhendong, Pu. (2013). Pakistan Ambassador Urges Much More Trade. China Daily.

Zweig, David. Jainhai. (2015). China's Global Hunt for Energy. Foreign Affairs. 48(5).