sign in sign up
<<
Home , 1740s, Andrew Montour, Braddock expedition, Christopher Gist, Colony of Virginia, Covenant Chain

COMPANY, , AND CROWN: THE COMPANY OF , EMPIRE

BUILDING, AND THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR, 1747-1763

A dissertation submitted to the

Kent State University College

of Arts and Sciences

in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Emily Hager Kasecamp

December 2019

©Copyright

All right reserved

Except for previously published materials

A dissertation written by

Emily Hager Kasecamp

B.A., Frostburg State University, 2009

M.A., University, 2011

Ph.D., Kent State University, 2019

Approved by

Dr. Kim Gruenwald , Chair. Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Dr. Kevin Adams , Members, Doctoral Dissertation Committee

Dr. Kevin Kern

Dr. Richard Feinberg

Accepted by

Dr. Kevin Adams , Chair, Department of History

Dr. James Blank , Dean College of Arts and Sciences

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... IV

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER ONE: POLITICKING FOR THE BORDERLAND ...... 27

CHAPTER TWO: MAPPING THE OHIO VALLEY: CRESAP, GIST, AND CELERON (1748-1752) ...... 73

CHAPTER THREE: BUILDING THE EMPIRE: STRUCTURES AND ALLIANCES, 1750-1753 ...... 128

CHAPTER FOUR: NEGOTIATING FOR THE BORDERLAND: DINWIDDIE, , AND TRENT .. 173

CHAPTER FIVE: THE : MILITARIZING THE OHIO VALLEY...... 224

CONCLUSION: CRUMBLING THE COLONIAL COALITION ...... 265

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 282

APPENDIX A: ’S ROUTE 1750 ...... 291

APPENDIX B: CHRISTOPHER GIST’S ROUTE 1751 ...... 292

APPENDIX C: WASHINGTON AND GIST ROUTE IN 1753 ...... 293

APPENDIX D: WASHINGTON IN THE OHIO VALLEY 1754-1759 ...... 294

APPENDIX E: BRADDOCK’S ROUTE 1755 ...... 295

APPENDIX F: FATHER BONNECAMPS MAP OF CELERON’S ROUTE ...... 296

iii

Acknowledgements

This dissertation and its argument have grown organically over many years, and many individuals have aided and influenced this project. I am indebted to several people, whom I cannot possibly thank enough. My father, Dr. Charles Hager, introduced me to old books on the history of our home, western , and through these readings on

Thomas Cresap, Christopher Gist, and Fort Cumberland, it became evident to me that the

Ohio Company drove westward expansion. I wrote my first and second papers on these subjects in 2007 and 2009 at Frostburg State University, and I am especially thankful to those faculty, Dr. David Dean, Dr. John Wisemen, Dr. Alum Abbay, and Dr. Sally Boniece, who fostered my academic development and confidence. I am also indebted to Dr. Tyler

Boulware and Dr. Joseph Hodge at West Virginia University for expanding my knowledge of

British colonial America and guided me through my Masters’ Thesis.

I am immensely grateful for the input of my dissertation committee. Dr. Kevin Kern encouraged my research and let me know that academic history was allowed to be enjoyable. Dr. Richard Feinberg, as an anthropologist, pushed me past my assumptions, and the assumptions of the field, to reveal both problems and insights into my work. Dr.

Kevin Adams, as well as providing a comprehensive reading list, questioned my arguments, and pushed my conclusions to the betterment of this dissertation. To my advisor, Dr. Kim

Gruenwald, I am enormously indebted. Interested in my subject from the beginning, she fostered my academic creativity and reassured me of the importance of my project. As a mentor, she simultaneously supported and pushed me as I coped with the ups and downs of life outside academia, and for that I thank her more than I can say.

iv

This dissertation was fostered, financially and logistically by a few key institutions. I am thankful to the Museum, Jilla Smith, Bob Bantz and, Ranger Rita Knox at the C & O Canal National Historical Park for showing me the local history behind the road signs. I want to thank the staff at the Historical Society of , and the Swem and

Carnegie Libraries at William and Mary for their help. A special thanks to the staff at the

University of archives for their help in navigating the many different collections with similar-sounding names.

I could not have finished this dissertation without my family and dear friends. I want to thank Michelle Curran Cornell for being with me each step of the way, her friendship and love means the world to me, and I am richer for having her in my life. Thank you to my mother-in-law, Dr. Terry Kasecamp, who provided childcare and compassion throughout this process. My parents have supported me financially, emotionally, and physically thought out this project. My mother, Pamella Weir Hager, has loved and supported me and my children throughout this entire project, and for her unconditional love and constant understanding, I will be eternally grateful. My father, Dr. Charles T.

Hager, provided historical knowledge and in my subject and never doubted that I could complete this project. He provided motivation and endless proofreading, and I cannot thank him enough. To Ella and Brice, you were both born alongside the project, and you both bring infinite joy and love into my life. Lastly, I must thank my husband, Brian

Kasecamp, Esq. although thanks do not seem enough. He read drafts, went on “vacations” to archives, and gave his support to me and this project in every way. His love and faith in me are humbling, and I am forever thankful that he stood with me through this process.

v

Introduction

“Fathers, Both you and the English are white, we live in a Country between; therefore the

Land belongs to neither one nor t’other: But the Great Being above allow’d it to be a place of Residence for us so Fathers, I desire you to withdraw, as I have done our Brothers the

English; for I will keep you at Arms length: I lay this down as a Trial for both, to see which will have the greatest Regard to it, and that side we will stand by, and make equal Sharers with us.”

-Half-King Tanaghrisson1

This speech made to the French Captain Marin speaks volumes about the situation in the in the mid-. As Tanaghrisson, the Iroquoian Half-King, so eloquently phrased, the “Country between” was highly contested, and no one involved, neither the , the French, nor the British, felt inclined to let it go without a fight. Due to the diversity and number of people interested in the Ohio Country, empire-building

1 , “Journey to the French Commandant: Narrative,” Founders Online, National Archives. Accessed 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-01-02-0003-0002. [Original source: The Diaries of George Washington, vol. 1, 11 1748 – 13 November 1765, ed. Donald Jackson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976, pp. 130–161.] The Iroquois at Onondaga would appoint a “Half-King” to be their representative for the Ohio Valley peoples living under the “control” of the Iroquois. The Iroquois council intended for the Half-King to speak for local bands, negotiate with outsiders, and accept diplomatic gifts, but the Half-King could not enter into binding treaties without the consent of the Onondaga Council. This was the arrangement the Iroquois wanted, as this dissertation explores in later chapters. The on-the-ground reality was that the Iroquois relationship with the Ohio Indians and Tanaghrisson’s role of Half-King were much more complicated and constantly changing.

1

there was neither monolithic nor consistent; each empire and colony had its own method and reason for pushing into the Valley. Although the British government was interested in the region in the late , colonization efforts remained decentralized until the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War.2 Each British colony acted individually, often in competition with all the others. So, who did Tanaghrisson mean when he says “English” in the above quotation?

He may have meant those “English,” or rather British individuals, who had pushed west into the Ohio Valley without permission from or plan for permanent settlement. Rogue imperialists spread the influence and reach of British trade networks but conducted their work outside the purview of the British government.3 Most traders and trappers ventured into the Ohio Valley without threating to take Native American land or establish permanent settlements. Ohio Indians and Iroquois did not fear traders; on the contrary, they welcomed them and their trade goods; it is doubtful that Tanaghrisson would feature Pennsylvania traders with disparate and no organization in his speech.4

Tanaghrisson meant the Ohio Company of Virginia, a land-speculation company that methodically planned its empire by building roads, forts, and settlements, and working with the and British Board of Trade to spearhead the -

2 The term “Seven Years’ War” here is used to refer to what is commonly known in the as the “.” 3 The term “rogue imperialists” and its definition in this dissertation come from Shannon Lee Dawdy, Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 4-5. 4 The term Ohio Indians refers to the refugee polyglot communities who lived in the Ohio Valley under the unwelcome oversight of the Iroquois. This definition is explored later in the introduction; Chapter Two of this work further unpacks the complicated relationship between the Ohio Indians and Iroquois.

2

building process in the Ohio Valley.5 Some company members in Virginia and , worked to gain permission and legitimacy from the Crown, while other shareholders and employees worked “on the ground” in the disputed territory to map the land, trade and negotiate with the Ohio Indians and Iroquois, and erect the infrastructure of an empire. In the end, Company, Colony, and Crown coordinated their efforts to defend the British

Empire’s claim to the Ohio Valley.

This dissertation asserts that the Ohio Company of Virginia negotiated with the

Colony of Virginia and the British Crown so the Company could gain permission to build the

British Empire in the Ohio Valley. Further, this dissertation shows how the Ohio

Company’s endeavors created conflict with the French, Iroquois, and various bands of Ohio

Indians and eventually resulted in the Seven Years’ War. This dissertation argues that the blood spilled, lives destroyed, and monies spent on this cataclysmic international clash originated in the Ohio Company of Virginia’s board meetings. The British government, realizing that land speculators could build an empire, allowed the company to construct the

British Empire in the Ohio Valley. This dissertation asserts that the Ohio Company built the

British Empire in the Ohio Valley, provoking the French, the Ohio Indians, and the Iroquois

Confederacy in the process. Nowhere in the historiography of the Seven Years’ War or

British empire-building is this point made, that a commercial, private venture started

British Ohio Valley empire-building and sparked a worldwide war. Exploring this enterprise’s history in the American colonial context, alongside British and international developments of the mid-1700s, proves that the Ohio Company’s actions, politicking,

5 The subject of this dissertation is the Ohio Company of Virginia founded in 1747, not the -based Ohio Company formed after the .

3

mapping, building, negotiating, and fortifying, spread the British Empire into the Ohio

Valley and led to the Seven Years’ War.

Historiography

The Ohio Company of Virginia is not unknown in colonial American historiography, but it has never received the attention or analysis needed to demonstrate its role in British empire-building. Some older works specifically focus on the Ohio Company, but these provide either biographical information on members and agents or rely on a scant narrative. Kenneth Bailey outlines the Ohio Company’s history and argues that it promoted colonial westward expansion, but he does not examine the Company’s relationship to

Colony, Crown, or the Seven Years’ War.6 Alfred P. James’ The Ohio Company: Its Inner

History, recounts the Ohio Company’s formation and legal endeavors but lacks analysis of the Company’s borderland activities or how those activities served the British Empire and started the Seven Years’ War. In a section called “Limited Narrative,” James admits he excluded relations with Native Americans, diplomacy between and , and the military struggle between Britain and France. He concludes, “Little or no effort is made in this inner history to discuss the history of the period or state the broad milieu of the Ohio

Company.”7 The analysis of both Bailey and James lack nuance and fail to examine the role

6 Kenneth Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement, (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000, org. pub. 1939), 17-267; Kenneth Bailey, : Maryland Frontiersman (: Christopher Publishing House, 1944), 78-111; Kenneth Bailey, Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer and Indian Agent (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976), 25-83. All three books explain the nature of the Ohio Company and its role in westward expansion. 7 Alfred Proctor James, The Ohio Company, Its Inner History (Pittsburgh: Press, 1959), xi.

4

of the Ohio Company in the larger narrative of British empire-building formation or the

Company’s role in the beginning of the war for empire. This dissertation resurrects the subject of the Ohio Company and connects it with the larger narrative of British empire- building.

Analyzing the Ohio Company’s collaborative empire-building in the Ohio Valley, and the Company’s early conflicts with the French and Native Americans furthers the scholarship of British empire-building, borderlands, and the Seven Years’ War. Revealing the Ohio Company’s influence on British expansionary policies and their physical manifestations of empire adds to the historiographical understanding of empire-building as a collaborative, negotiated process. The trans-Appalachian and trans-Atlantic nature of the

Ohio Company’s actions, and this study’s Ohio Valley focus answers the calls for borderland centered studies that show international ramifications of events occurring in the disputed territory. Because the Ohio Company’s borderland activities began in the 1740s and immediately sparked controversy with the French and some Native American groups, this dissertation argues that the origins of the Seven Years’ War are earlier than previously believed. This dissertation builds and adds to three key historiographies, empire-building, borderlands, and the Seven Years’ War.

Any discussion of the empire-building process must include Frederick Jackson

Turner, and while this dissertation agrees with Turner that trappers and explorers were among the first to go "west," there are key distinctions. Turner’s mythical trappers and traders are individualistic, freedom-seeking adventures, who traversed into a wild and primitive west to escape social, economic, and political confines. The Ohio Company’s trappers and traders, in comparison, tied themselves to the power dynamics of the eastern

5

colonial centers; they ventured west not to escape the political and economic realities of

Anglo-American life, but to perpetuate them. They collaborated with Virginia elites, colonial and imperial officials, and eventually the to bring landed gentry, quit- rents, and surveying parties into the Ohio Valley, which contrary to Turner’s simplistic and fictional wilderness, was a highly developed political and economic environment of both

Native Americans and Europeans.8 Finally, this dissertation views imperial armies, not settlers or farmers, as Turner suggests, to be the second “wave of civilization” crashing into the contentious borderland.9

Like Turner, this dissertation studies British expansion into the Ohio Valley as a process and utilizes the works of Eric Hinderaker, Jack Greene, and Amy Turner Bushnell to conceptualize British empire-building. Hinderaker argues that the processes of empire

8 Quit-rents can best be understood as a type of real estate tax British colonists paid to the King. Strictly interpreted, the British King owned all the land in the , and the colonist were granted use of it as long as they paid a “feudal due,” known as a quit-rent. Those paying the quit-rent were the de-facto owners of the land and could do with it as they wanted, as long as they paid 2 for every hundred acres. For more information see, Peter V. Bergstrom, “Nothing so Certain: Taxes in Colonial Virginia,” Digital Library (Williamsburg, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Department of Historical Research, 1984), 8-9. Accessed 26, 2019, https://research.history.org/digitallibrary/view/index.cfm?doc=ResearchReports%5CRR0 127.xml&highlight= 9 For scholars of empire-building, it is essential to remember that there were times and places when Native Americans did not want to, nor did they have to accommodate Europeans, a point emphatically made in Kathleen DuVal, Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 1-12. DuVal demonstrates how Native Americans held control and power in the Arkansas Valley, forcing Europeans to follow their norms and rules. Cynthia Van Zandt, Brothers Among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early American, 1580-1660 (Oxford: , 2008), 8-16, 65-85, observes a similar phenomenon on the eastern seaboard of America, and while her book focuses on inter-racial cooperation, the first half studies times and places when Native Americans had the upper hand and accommodated Europeans only on their terms. While powerful Native American groups lived, worked, and hunted in the Ohio Valley in the mid-1700s, the region can be more accurately described as a borderland than a native ground.

6

were controlled more by those working on-the-ground than by those discussing and writing colonization policy in the imperial capitals.10 Greene sees the process shaped by negotiation between the metropolitan cores and the dominant settlers living in the colonies.11 In her work on Latin American frontiers, Bushnell asserts that empires are built in the context of negotiation and that the negotiation dynamic changed with the physical location, “for all else being equal: the more remote the periphery, the weaker the grasp of the central authority.”12 This idea asserted in the Latin American context is also true of the

British American empire-building process, governmental control weakened the further the location from the colonial metropole. This dissertation combines the ideas of Hinderaker and Greene about the distinct players in empire-building and views the process as one with negotiation between imperial capitals, established colonial centers in the British colonies, and on-the-ground agents, and uses Bushnell’s argument that governmental authority waned the more removed it was from the colonial or imperial capitals. The Ohio

Company’s empire-building process demonstrates that negotiations that took place between the Company’s investors and agents, the Colony of Virginia, and the British government extended British control and claims over the Ohio Valley.13

10 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673- 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi. 11 Jack P. Greene, “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World,” in Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, ed. Jack P. Greene (Charlottesville: Press, 1994), 1-24. 12 Amy Turner Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries,” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (: Routledge, 2002), 15-28. 13 Within the empire-building context, discussions of center and periphery are inevitable, and while this dissertation occasionally uses these words, it invokes them without the idea that the “periphery” is of lesser importance than the core. This study centers on the imperial peripheries: borderlands.

7

This dissertation integrates the legwork of empire with the deskwork of empire, to show how multilayered negotiation shaped empire-building; an approach which reveals how government officials in London, colonists in Williamsburg, and agents in the borderland negotiated to create the land policies of the British Empire. Scholarship of Ohio

Valley land policies and land speculation does not address this mediated process partially because they all focus on the policies created with the advent of the Seven Years’ War as if armies spearheaded empire-building in the Ohio Valley.14 From classics like Clarence

Alvord’s The Mississippi Valley in British Politics to Rob Harper’s 2018 Unsettling the West, an analysis of land policy and speculation begins in the mid- (1768 and 1765 respectively). This late “beginning” means that these scholars focus on top-down, governmental studies, ignoring the early years of the conflict, and the role of both private companies and individuals in the colonization of the Ohio Valley. Alvord readily divulged that he focused on the British ministry’s development of western policy, not on-the-ground movements.15 Similarly, Beer’s British Colonial Policy and Pease’s Anglo-French Boundary

Disputes in the West, both focus on politics and paperwork at high governmental levels.16

14 Histories of Ohio Valley land speculation and land policy that begin after the Forbes campaign retook the Ohio Valley for the British include: Barbara Rasmussen, “Anarchy and Enterprise on the Imperial Frontier: Washington, Dunmore, , and Land in the Eighteenth-Century Ohio Valley,” Ohio Valley History 6, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 1-26; Hanno Scheerer, “’For Ten Years Past I have Constantly Wished to Turn My Western Lands into Money’: Speculator Frustration and Settlers’ Bargaining in Ohio’s Virginia Military District, 1795-1810,” Ohio Valley History 14, no.1 (Spring 2014): 3-27; Strang, Cameron B., “Michael Cresap and the Promulgation of Settler Land-Claiming Methods in the Backcountry, 1765-1774,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 118, no. 2 (2010): 106-135; Gregory H. Nobles, "Straight lines and stability: Mapping the Political Order of the Anglo-," Journal of American History 80, no.1 (June 1993): 9-35. 15 Clarence Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics (Cleveland: The Arthur H Clark Co., 1917), 14. 16 Even those histories of land speculation that deal with Native American rights and lands, such as Sosin’s “York-Camden Decision,” do not deal with the on-the-ground reality,

8

Paul Mapp’s The Elusive West follows that same vein, arguing that maps and information, or the lack thereof, influenced how officials in the colonial and imperial centers perceived and reacted to the imperial contest for the American interior. However, they overlook the actions and agency of those who worked and lived in the Ohio Valley.17

The Elusive West describes the political power of maps, but it does little to explain who mapped and gathered intelligence on the Ohio Valley, or how attempts to survey and mark the land ignited tensions between the British, French, and Native Americans. Mapp’s

Eurocentric view ignores the joint venture that was policymaking, mapping, and intelligence gathering in the 1740s and ; it only looks at paperwork, not fieldwork.

Imperial policy studies must extend beyond the government officials of the 1760s to understand the role of private enterprise in British empire-building process in the Ohio

Valley and gain a more nuanced and complete view of empire-building.

This dissertation demonstrates how Ohio Company agents gathered information in the Ohio Valley and communicated it to the colonial and British governmental officials

Mapp discusses. Studying the information-gathering process and those who carried it out elucidates the multifaceted nature of the British Empire and focuses on the Ohio Valley itself, which, as explained below, is one of this study’s aims. Land speculators and traders opened the Ohio Valley for colonization in the 1740s and gained the permission and

but rather how the British legal and political system treated said rights and lands. Jack M. Sosin, “The York-Camden Opinion and American Land Speculators,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 85 (1961), 38-49; George Lewis Beer, British Colonial Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 6-51; Theodore Calvin Pease, eds. Anglo- French Boundary Disputes in the West, 1749-1763 (Springfield: State Historical Library, 1936), xi-clxxi. 17 Paul Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of Press, 2011), 147-259, especially focus on the Ohio Valley.

9

parameters from the Crown. It was these entrepreneurs who spearheaded the empire’s expansion, carried out the necessary tasks, and reported back to government officials in

Williamsburg and London.18

To study the activities of the Ohio Company agents in the Ohio Valley, mapping, trading, politicking, and building infrastructure, requires paying attention to the borderland that was the Ohio Valley in the mid-1700s.19 While borderland scholarship reaches back to Bolton’s 1921 work, The Spanish Borderlands, it merits continued investigation to gain a more nuanced understanding of the nature of empire-building in the

18 The works of Grant and Williams are the only land speculation histories that look at the on-the-ground activities of land speculation and division, but Grants does not focus on the Ohio Valley, nor large scale land-speculation activities, and Williams focuses solely on the state of Ohio post-1785. Charles S Grant, “Land Speculation and the Settlement of Kent, 1738-1760,” Quarterly 28, (March 1955):51-71; James L. Williams, Blazes, Posts & Stones: A ’s Original Land Subdivisions (Columbus: Compass and Chain Publishing, 2015), Introduction, Chap 1-5. Kindle. 19 The Ohio Company does not quite fit into the field of settler colonialism. Scholars of settler colonialism state that while it is related to colonialism, it is distinct. As Veracini said, “Settlers, by definition, stay, in specific contradistinction, colonial sojourners, administrators, missionaries, military personnel, entrepreneurs, and adventures, return.” The Ohio Company agents held most of the positions in Veracini’s lists of people who were not settlers. Ohio Company agents did not stay in the Ohio Valley. While settler colonialism studies claim to have a fixed beginning, oddly many historians of American settler colonialism, such as Walter Hixon, Patrick Bottiger, and Rob Harper claim settler colonialism studies push forth longue durée histories, which challenge “the historian’s penchant for tidy periodizations.” Bottiger also proclaims the benefits of longue durée history in his study of settler colonialism and the Miami in The Borderland of Fear. These books are informative, fascinating studies, laudably expounding on the long-lasting consequences of colonization and challenging historian’s ideas about colonialism, ethnohistory, and American expansion. However, a longue durée study of settler colonialism, Native American displacement, or empire-building in the Ohio Valley, cannot begin after the creation of permanent settlements. Lorenso Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 6: Walter Hixon, American Settler Colonialism: A History (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). 2-60; Patrick Bottiger, Borderland of Fear: Vincennes, Prophetstown, and the Invasion of the Miami Homeland (Lincoln: University of Press, 2016), Preface, Kindle. Longue Durée history of borderlands was also mentioned in Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, "On Borderlands," The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 365.

10

disputed Ohio Valley.20 Council Fires on the Upper Ohio, initially published in 1940, first investigated how the Native Americans of the Ohio Valley played one set of Europeans or colonists off the other to maintain their precarious hold on .

Adelman and Aron, in “From Borderlands to Borders,” explain that competition between the British and French gave importance and influence to the Native Americans who lived or held power in the Ohio River Valley. This dissertation builds on the ideas espoused in those works. Understanding the borderland dynamic is crucial for a study centered around the on-the-ground empire-building that occurred in the Ohio Valley.21

A recent “state of the field” publication, “On Borderlands” by Hämäläinen and Truett, challenges historians to put borderlands at the center of the study while demonstrating how borderlands connect with international events around the world. Focusing on borderlands while simultaneously recognizing the power and influence of empires and nations, they admit, is a tall order. This dissertation answers their challenge, investigating the empire-building process from inside the borderland while acknowledging the negotiations between agents on-the-ground and officials in colonial capitals and imperial centers.22 Additionally, this dissertation illustrates how the events and actors in

20 Herbert Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old and the Southwest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921); Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” The American Historical Review 104 (1999): 814-841., and Hämäläinen and Truett. "On Borderlands" 356. Both works offer timelines and commentary on the historiography of borderlands, as well as a rundown of the issues and problems with the field. 21 Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 814-841. 22 This challenge is put forth by Hämäläinen and Truett, "On Borderlands," 358-361. A borderland focused approach is beneficial to ethnohistory, as pointed out in Amy Turner Bushnell, “Indigenous American and the Limits of the Atlantic World, 1493-1825,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Approach, eds. Jack P Greene and Philip D Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 191-222.

11

borderlands influenced colonial and imperial capitals, more so than the reverse.23 This dissertation’s focus on the Ohio Company’s organization, communication networks, and on-the-ground agents reveals the international ramifications of the Company’s movements in the Ohio Valley in the 1740s and 1750s.

A study centered on the ramifications of the Ohio Company’s agents in the Ohio

Valley necessitates understanding the on-the-ground agents in the borderlands and the nature of their work. McConnell’s, A Country Between, Merrell’s Into the American Woods, and Merritt’s At the Crossroads, all deal with negotiators in the Ohio Valley and detail the intricacies of intercultural interactions, “Indian Politics,” and transnational relations that made the region a borderland.24 This dissertation adds to that body of scholarship, investigating the go-betweens in the borderlands as peace bringing agents for an individual colony, as Merrill does, it looks at the way the agents of the Company worked to gain trade, land, and alliances and subsequently informed the British of the Ohio Valley’s conditions.

As is explained in all of the aforementioned works, the dynamics of the borderland forced government officials to rely on the abilities of their on-the-ground diplomats, and this dissertation continues that work, showing how agents of the Ohio Company built Virginia’s

23 Furstenberg’s article stresses how the periphery of the Ohio Valley influenced the Atlantic World. François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 647–677. 24 Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 41-151; Michael McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992),5-113; James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 157-253; Jane Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 1-87. This work also subscribes to Merritt’s theory that interracial cooperation between British colonists and the Native Americans of the Appalachians and Ohio Valley disintegrated during the Seven Years’ War, resulting in violent racism that dominated the backcountry in the late 1750s and 1760s.

12

and the Crown’s claim to the Ohio River Valley.25 Even as the conflict grew and the British government became militarily involved, the British military and governmental officials acted in conjunction with Ohio Company intelligence, agents, and infrastructure.26

Because this dissertation explores how Ohio Company agents sparked tensions with

France and some Native Americans in the 1740s, it gives the Seven Years’ War an earlier beginning. Investigating beyond the well-known events of the mid-1750s that caught the attention of governmental officials, such as the expeditions and assassinations of other governmental officials, reveals the earlier origins of the war as it evolved in the Ohio Valley.

Current scholarship needs to recognize that from the perspective of the Ohio Valley, the

Seven Years’ War began much earlier and spread to become an international conflict.

Standard treatments of the Seven Years’ War begin with Céleron’s expedition before skipping to Washington’s 1754 trip or forgo Céleron altogether as if these events sprang,

25 Scholars have seen the Ohio Valley as more than a borderland. Richard White saw the Ohio Valley as a Middle Ground, where Native Americans, Europeans, and Americans formed a “Middle Ground,” where cultural mediation between two or more groups created something entirely new. This middle ground, or cultural mediation process, has been used by countless scholars so frequently that even White himself has lamented the term’s distortion to mean any place where two cultures interact. For the Native American politics and power dynamics encountered by the Ohio Company agents, the term borderland is more accurate. This dissertation reserves the term middle ground for the circumstances, a situation where something new is created as a result of cultural mixing, misunderstandings, and mistakes, in which White intended and made clear in his preface to the 20th-Century edition. Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xxi-xxiv. 26 This work agrees with Jane Merritt’s conclusion while racial, cultural, and physical differences were acknowledged in the first half of the , violent racism between whites and Native Americans increased in the 1760s. While tensions and conflict existed between the Native Americans as seen in the later chapters of this work, empire-building in the Ohio Valley was not yet dominated by the violence or hate-filled rhetoric explored in Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008), 39-160.

13

Athena-like fully formed without cause or pretext. Paul Mapp says, “Histories of the Seven

Years’ War...often begin with George Washington’s blunderings in the Ohio Valley in 1754.”

This is true, but the same cannot be said of his claim that it is a good place to start.27

Washington’s, or even Céleron’s, trip into the Ohio Valley are too late a starting point.

Beginning with the European armies’ incursions into the Ohio Valley inherently argues that governments alone built and fought in the Ohio Valley, or that those fights are the only ones of consequence.28 The field as a whole benefits from a study that investigates who and what motivated the first tensions, clashes, and massacres in the Ohio Valley.29

To show how the early clashes of the Seven Years’ War took place in the borderland, not in the Board of Trade, and to show the international ramifications of those clashes, this work draws on Fred Anderson’s and Francis Jennings’ trans-Atlantic and trans-Appalachian histories of the Seven Years’ War. Anderson’s Crucible of War eloquently brings the

American and European sides of the Seven Years’ War together and acknowledges the role of the Ohio Valley and the individuals who operated within it, on international events.

27 Mapp, The Elusive West, 1. 28 Walter R. Borneman, The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of (New York: Harper Collins: 2006), xiii, 3-11; Charles Morse Stotz, Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and England in Western Pennsylvania: The Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2005), 3-20. In Outposts, the first chapter, “French Visitors from the North,” begins with Céleron’s expedition as the first dig of either empire into the Ohio Valley and looks towards empire as a government entity. Stotz moves right from Céleron to Washington’s expedition to as if the two events occurred in rapid succession, ignoring the intervening actions committed by British private interests, the French military, and the Ohio Indians, erasing non-governmental, commercial actors, from the story. 29 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 11-76; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 8-168. Both Anderson and Jennings spend a few paragraphs acknowledging the Ohio Company but do not explore the Company’s actions or its ramifications.

14

Jennings’ Empire of Fortune also writes about both sides of the Atlantic as well as the borderland, but focuses on New York’s and Pennsylvania’s ties to London, leaving Virginia and the Ohio Company unexplored. This dissertation uses those studies as a model for showcasing the intersection of local and international military conflicts but twists the model to keep the focus on the Ohio Valley.

As this dissertation points out, a private corporation sparked those activities, and by connecting British empire-building efforts to the Seven Years’ War, enriching the scholarship of the Seven Years’ War. It not only acknowledges the first conflicts over the

Ohio Valley, but it explains who and what motivated the French, British, and Native

Americans to battle over the American interior. Extending the narrative timeline back into the late 1740s and early 1750s highlights how this early Ohio Valley centered conflict, as well as the role of non-governmental actors, such as private enterprises and independent individuals, had on starting the Seven Years’ War. This dissertation reveals that the Ohio

Company began the battle for the borderland before the French and British governments sent Céleron and Washington into the Ohio Valley and that the Company spurred the

British and French governments into taking action and influenced the subsequent military movements of both the British and French Empires.

The existing historiography of empire-building, borderlands, and the Seven Years’

War have set the stage for a study of the Ohio Company’s activities in the Ohio Valley and the international repercussions of those activities. Previous studies have left a void in exploring how and why British colonists pushed west to claim and operate in the Ohio

Valley in the years immediately preceding the Seven Years’ War. This dissertation shows how and why the Ohio Company engaged a multilayered, borderland focused, approach to

15

empire-building, and then discusses the ramifications of said activities. Highlighting the role of private and personal interests in Ohio Valley empire-building reveals the origins of the Seven Years’ War.30

Methodology:

As indicated in the historiographical section, this dissertation utilizes a three- pronged approach to understand the British empire-building process in the Ohio Valley.

The first prong investigates the agents of empire who acted on the ground in the Ohio

Valley surveying, mapping, trading, and interacting with the local Native Americans. The second prong analyzes the actions of governmental officials in Williamsburg, and a third prong investigates the repercussions in London. This multilayered approach proves that people not typically viewed as power holders—traders, trappers, and explorers— participated in the negotiation for the course of the empire. Ohio Company employee reports, member journals, and Virginia and imperial governmental documents together provide a more nuanced view of the empire and its American expansion process. The

Board of Trade’s reactions to the Ohio Company’s maps, surveys, and Native American treaties reveal the government’s intentions regarding the Ohio Valley. This dissertation shows how those individuals providing different functions of empire, politicking, mapping, and fortifying, influenced one another. For instance, this dissertation shows how the actions of those in the Ohio Valley shaped the policies of the British Empire and

30 This dissertation does not argue that the Ohio Company was the only entity acting for their own interests, nor that all colonial American private interests benefited the empire. For example, in 1680, traders at Albany smuggled goods and food to the French in Montreal. Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York: Viking Books, 2001), 247-248.

16

governmental officials in Williamsburg and London by supplying the surveys and maps of the disputed territory.

On the other hand, the Ohio Company and its employee records allow a view into how the Company worked with the government and managed to maintain relative freedom from royal intervention. This freedom enabled the Ohio Company to dictate the process of empire-building in the Ohio Valley. Additionally, the letters of Ohio Company members make it possible to understand how the Ohio Company members’ fortunes became married to the fortunes of the British Empire. These sources reveal how the personal financial interests of the company’s members and agents bound them to the empire in the mid-

1700s.

Understanding the Ohio Valley situation requires comprehending the aims and interests of the Native Americans living in the Ohio Valley, as well as those of the Iroquois

Confederacy who, although based in Onondaga, New York, claimed over the Ohio

Valley. How did those agents on the ground create Indian relationships and engage in

Indian diplomacy? By focusing on the diplomacy and trade between Europeans and Native

Americans, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of Indian politics on the development of the Ohio Valley. An analysis of traders’ and diplomats’ documents teases out the many different Indian viewpoints, and this dissertation employs Richter’s method of reading documents from a different perspective, as he espouses in Facing East from

Indian Country.31 The histories of various Indian groups allowed an understanding of the motivations and interests of each community. This knowledge, combined with primary sources that detail cross-cultural negotiations, allows for an analysis of how whites and

31 Richter, Facing East, 8-10.

17

Native Americans forged relationships in the Ohio Valley.

This dissertation puts the three sides of British empire-building within the same analytical framework. By exploring the actions of the British government and that of

British Empire builders together, it creates a complete picture of the Empire as a whole.

Employee documents, Ohio Company minutes, and Virginia and British governmental records, show that by appealing to the Board of Trade’s agenda, selling shares to the colony of Virginia’s officeholders, and recruiting talented diplomats, the Ohio Company became a formative structure of the British Empire. Overall, this study highlights the two-way flow of influence and information between the Ohio Valley and London through the conduit that was the Ohio Company of Virginia.

Sources:

The main primary sources consulted and analyzed are the 1) Ohio Company Papers and the reports of their agents in the Ohio Valley, such as Christopher Gist and William

Trent, 2) the Board of Trade’s minutes, summaries, and correspondence, and 3) the governmental papers from the colony of Virginia, especially the correspondence of

Governor Dinwiddie. Focusing on these sources increases understanding about the empire on both sides of the Atlantic and illuminates how the political movements in Williamsburg and London interacted with on-the-ground actions of a private enterprise, the Ohio

Company of Virginia, to significantly expand the colony of Virginia and the British Empire.

The papers of the Board of Trade, Virginia government, and the Ohio Company of

Virginia demonstrate the relationship between the Ohio Company and the official imperial structure. The George Mercer Papers, also known as The Suffering Trader Papers, and the

18

personal papers of and Thomas Lee, both Virginia Councilmen and leaders of the Ohio Company, provided insight into the interrelationships between Ohio Company members and the governmental officials. The published papers of Virginia and

Company members, especially, demonstrate where and how the line between the Virginia government and the Ohio Company blurred and sometimes disappeared. Among the governmental papers employed are the Virginia Council Records and the Board of Trade Records.

This dissertation also uses the papers of the other on-the-ground agents to determine how their activities translated into empire-building, and also to gain an understanding of how these colonial ground agents viewed themselves and their work.

Additionally, this study employs these papers to understand the dynamic relationship of the Ohio Indians and the traders as the borderland situation grew more tense. Earlier scholars have edited and published the journals of Christopher Gist, the Ohio Company’s primary agent, and the journals of George Washington, whose finances and family were closely associated with the Ohio Company in the early days of his military career.

Previously, these traders’ papers have established the narrative of the Ohio Valley in the mid-1700s or to understand the economic relationship between Ohio Indians and traders.

This dissertation uses them to demonstrate that the agents’ work built the empire and underlines the ties between their personal interests and those of the British Empire.

The final two chapters use the aforementioned primary sources, but also include the papers of those officers and men under the command of at the Ohio River headwaters, George Washington at Jumonville and Fort Necessity, and and his men on his fateful march to . These papers allow for an analysis of

19

how the first military campaigns of the Seven Years’ War utilized the Ohio Company’s infrastructure, knowledge, and agents.

Definitions:

This dissertation references many different Native Americans and Native American

Groups. For clarity and accuracy, it endeavors to use the most descriptive terms available.

As a rule, specificity is preferred over generality, but sometimes non-specific terms, such as

Native American or “Ohio Indian,” are used when primary sources give no specific information. Complicating the terminology situation is the fluid nature of Native American allegiances. Some groups or bands often referred to in the primary documents have scant information available; groups frequently merged, were annihilated, or only existed as a short-term community. Often the name in primary documents was not the name of a band or settlement at all, but in reality, a colonist’s mistake. In instances of little-known or unknown Native American groups, the best geographic information available is given.

The term Ohio Indians is reserved to mean Native American groups who lived in in the Ohio Valley. Many of these groups were refugee, polyglot communities who moved into the Ohio Valley after British settlements pushed them west. The term is not used as an ethnic description, but merely an indicator of where a group of Native Americans lived.

While “Ohio Indians” is more general than desired, it is sometimes all that can be determined due to the highly mobile and temporary nature of Native American borderland communities. Although the Native American residents of the Ohio Valley, which encompasses parts of fourteen modern-day states, are not the center of this study, it is crucial to understand their diversity. Each band or group had its own distinct customs,

20

lifestyles, and governance. The , , Miami, Wyandot, , Wea,

Piankashaw, Ottawa, and Ojibwa are just a few of the many linguistic groups who had political or commercial allegiances in the Ohio Valley.

For many of the above groups, the “Forks of the Ohio” was a popular meeting place, and while this term is commonly found in the historiography, it requires some explanation.

The Allegheny and Monongahela rivers meet to form the Ohio River in present-day

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During the colonial period, explorers sought the headwaters of the Ohio, and they called the location the “Forks of the Ohio” in their letters, journals, and maps, and historians have followed their example and continued using the phrase to describe the land surrounding the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers.

The terms “Seven Years’ War” and “French and Indian War” require clarification.

Some scholars see these terms as interchangeable, and others view them as two separate and distinct conflicts, the European and American conflicts, respectively. Beyond geographic distinctions, some use the term “Seven Years’ War” as the scholarly equivalent to the “French and Indian War.” This dissertation employs the term Seven Years’ War because it argues that the events in the Ohio Valley are central to the broader international conflict, and the American and European sides of the war cannot be and should not be separated so neatly.

Finally, a clarification on “agent,” is required. An agent of empire, for this dissertation’s purposes, is anyone engaged in empire-building activities, regardless of their intentions. The term “agent of the Ohio Company” refers to those people working with or for the Ohio Company of Virginia, most of those people who worked for the Ohio Company owned no stock in the land-speculation company. The status of an individual as an agent or

21

member, can sometimes be difficult to determine, sometimes they were one or the other, or sometimes both. Company stockholders frequently bought and sold shares, meaning that membership could change day-to-day. It is also important to remember that even if an agent did not hold shares in the Ohio Company, the agent still stood to gain from its success. If successful in the Seven Years’ War, the agent’s employment, as well as trapping and land ownership possibilities, remained safe and “their” empire’s continued growth would be assured.

Chapter Overview

The first chapter, “Politicking for the Borderland,” discusses how the Ohio Company allied itself with the governments in Virginia and London by using politically placed members and exploiting their common interest with the Crown, and how this strategy caused friction with Pennsylvania officials and traders. The Ohio Company members crafted a politically connected group with an imperial mission able to succeed in both

Virginia and London. This dissertation uses Board of Trade records, Virginia colonial documents, and Ohio Company records to demonstrate how the Ohio Company used imperial rhetoric and shared interests to shape colonial policies and forge a partnership with the Board of Trade. The Ohio Company changed the nature of colonial expansion which hurt the Pennsylvanians, and they, in turn, attempted to stymie the Ohio Company, while trying to mimic the Virginians’ plans, as seen in the letters between the Pennsylvania government, the Penn family, and the colony of Virginia. These letters emphasize that the

Ohio Valley was not only a borderland between European empires, but it was also a source of intercolonial rivalry between Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland that led to hostilities

22

between both the residents of the various colonies.

The next chapters focus on the movements of the Ohio Company in the Ohio Valley in the 1740s and 1750s and explain the Company’s empire-building activities as well as the repercussions of their on-the-ground activities. Chapters two, three and four mainly use records of on-the-ground agents and government records to highlight the role of the Ohio

Company in building the British empire in the Ohio Valley and the importance of the agents’ reports on the Crown’s perceptions of the Ohio region. Doing so reveals how and if the members’ and employees’ activities simultaneously tied the Empire’s expansion to their own futures and fortunes in the Indian trade, , and land speculation endeavors.

Chapter two, entitled “Mapping the Borderland” investigates the agents’ initial forays into the Ohio Valley, mainly by trading, surveying and engaging in diplomatic relations with the various groups of Native Americans in the region. It begins by showing how the Ohio Company needed agents with mapping skills to lay the imperial groundwork for an empire. The next section shows how the Ohio Company agents mapped the borderland, gathered information, and made alliances for Virginia and the British. The final section of this chapter investigates how the information the Company’s agents gathered was used to inform British colonists and officials about the Ohio Valley situation, and in the process of controlling information, influenced the actions of the government.

The third chapter, “Building the Empire,” argues that the Ohio Company built the empire by erecting infrastructure in the disputed territory to fatten both the British Empire and their own pocketbooks. By detailing how Ohio Company agents built physical structures and Native American alliances, this chapter argues that the Ohio Company built the British Empire in the Ohio Valley, and consequently increased French activity in the

23

borderlands. The Ohio Company took the next steps for the British Empire, prompting the

French to up the ante in the race for the Ohio Valley.

Chapter Four, “Negotiating for the Borderland,” details how the Ohio Company negotiated with the Virginia Assembly, Native Americans, the French, and British officials in London in attempts to save the empire the Company had built while furthering the

Company’s claim on the Ohio Valley. The results of the Ohio Company’s negotiations increased the Company’s and Virginia’s military endeavors in the Ohio Valley and brought the British military into the fray that was the Ohio Valley in the mid-1750s.

“Fortifying the Alleghenies,” the fifth and final chapter, details the role of the Ohio

Company members, agents, and infrastructure in the early years of the Seven Years’ War. It explores how Virginia and the Crown used the Ohio Company information, expertise, and infrastructure in their fortifying endeavors and argues that the Ohio Company, in London and the Ohio Valley, influenced military efforts in the earliest days of the Seven Years’ War.

This chapter relies on the personal papers of the military officials to show how the Ohio

Company caused the first confrontation on the Forks of the Ohio River, dictated George

Washington’s course at Jumonville and Fort Necessity, and finally influenced Edward

Braddock’s route. Demonstrating how the Ohio Company remained linked to the financial and imperial goals of the British Empire through the beginning of the war, reiterates the

Ohio Company’s role and influence in the early days of the Seven Years’ War.

To carry the Ohio Company’s narrative to its end, the conclusion details the actions and motivations of the Ohio Company and the Crown in the period before the American

Revolution and their diverging interests. The actions of the agents of Company, Colony, and

Crown in the period following the Seven Years’ War emphasize how empire-building

24

changed in the 1760s and explain how negotiation and cooperation crumbled as the interests of Company and Crown diverged. A brief comparison of the 1760s with the 1740s and 1750s underlines how colonist-driven empire-building efforts had been a negotiation.

The conclusion points out that in the earlier period, the Ohio Company shaped British expansionary policies, built the British Empire in the Ohio Valley, and served as an information conduit to connect the Ohio Valley to London. It reiterates the role

Williamsburg-based colonists and on-the-ground agents in the Ohio Valley played in both building and defending the empire, and it emphasizes how independent interests paired with imperial intentions built the British Empire in the Ohio Valley.

Conclusion

The Ohio Company of Virginia worked with Virginia and the British Crown to politick, map, build, negotiate, and fortify the Ohio Valley for the British, and subsequently started the Seven Years’ War. A study of the Ohio Company and its previously undervalued and underused sources illustrates how this company, the Colony of Virginia, and the Board of Trade worked together as their goals and interests coincided and adds to historians’ understanding of the nature of the British empire-building, private enterprise, and the

Seven Years’ War.

Expanding the empire was a gamble; it simultaneously created an expense and a possible revenue-generating project. As the first chapter shows, the Ohio Company of

Virginia lobbied the Crown and gained governmental approval and a valuable ally in its efforts to increase the size of its pocketbooks. The British Crown overcame the cost of expansion by using the Ohio Company who took on the cost and planning of empire-

25

building and provided the on-the-ground information and agents needed to expand the empire. This investigation provides insight into British empire-building in the Ohio Valley in the mid-1700s and exposes the earlier origins of the Seven Years’ War.

26

Chapter One: Politicking for the Borderland

“Your Petitioners who are the first Adventurers in this beneficial Undertaking which will be so advantageous to the Crown in point of Revenue, to the Nation in point of Trade and to the British Colonys in point of Strength and Security most humbly pray that Your Majesty will be graciously pleased to encourage this their said undertaking…”1

- Ohio Company of Virginia’s Petition to the Board of Trade

The above petition, written for the Ohio Company by their London agent, John

Hanbury, set the tone for British exploration and expansion into the North American interior in the late 1740s and 1750s. In 1747, when the Ohio Company formed to expand into the Ohio Valley, the British only controlled the eastern seaboard region of their and bits of present-day . The Ohio Company’s politicking intertwined Company, Colony, and Crown in the empire-building process. This chapter explores the formation of those connections and argues that the Ohio Company shaped

British expansionary policies and renewed the empire-building process in Virginia,

London, and, to the Ohio Company’s dismay, Pennsylvania.

The Ohio Company politicked in Virginia and London and consequently gained the support and legitimacy needed to become an official agent of empire, prompting British

1 John Hanbury, “Petition of John Hanbury to the King on behalf of the Ohio Company, 1748,” in Kenneth Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000, org. pub. 1939), 298- 301.

27

expansionary policy in the process. The chapter’s first section, “Politicking in Virginia,” reveals the Ohio Company’s political connections, and additionally, shows how the Colony and Company interests coincided. Then, “Politicking in London,” argues that Ohio

Company’s communications with the Board of Trade shaped British colonial policy, setting the pace and nature of British expansion into the Ohio Valley. The Company’s imperial connections and successful petitions distinguished them from the rogue imperialists who worked in the Ohio Valley without plan or permission. The third section of this chapter,

“Politicking with Pennsylvania” furthers the distinction between Ohio Company agents and rogue traders, asserting that negociations with Pennsylvania protected the Ohio Company claims, and unintentionally spurred Pennsylvania’s empire-building activities. As a whole, the chapter illustrates how the Ohio Company’s politicking in Virginia, London, and

Pennsylvania gave them legitimacy and imperial support, and simultaneously prompted expansionary policies in Williamsburg, London, and Philadelphia.

Historiography

The British Crown acquiesced to the Ohio Company’s request to expand into the

Ohio Valley during a time of political and governmental change in Virginia and London.

These policy shifts, their causes, as well as their repercussions, are unaddressed in the historiography. Illuminating the political influence of the Ohio Company on both sides of the Atlantic adds to the historiography of negotiated British empire-building, colonial politicking, and agents of empire. This chapter argues that through the actions of influential colonists, the Ohio Company achieved its imperial aims in London, which shifted British policy, augmenting Jack Greene’s argument that colonial elites negotiated with London

28

officials to craft colonial policy. This trans-Atlantic collaboration went beyond colonial legal systems, as Greene points out in his study of America’s constitutional origins. This chapter argues that colonial elites shaped British empire-building in the Ohio Valley. In the

1600s, English independent enterprises created the British Empire, but in the 1700s, a

Virginia-based Company negotiated with the Crown to extend that empire. The Ohio

Company’s successful lobbying proves that colonists pushed expansion and persuaded the

Crown to create new expansionary policies.2

The Ohio Company politicking demonstrates how colonial elites wielded power when they tackled the tasks of colonial and imperial governments, all the while profiting financially. Private persons taking on the tasks of colonial governments is stated rather than argued in the first third of Gordon Wood’s The Radicalism of the American Revolution.

Wood explains how colonial elites pursued their own interests alongside those of the colony, asserting that “all government was regarded essentially as the enlisting and mobilizing of the power of private persons to carry out public ends.”3 He echoes Hendrick

Hartog’s conclusions about private and public cooperation to take on small internal projects, stating “governments did not act so much as they ensured and sanctioned the

2 Jack P. Greene, “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World,” in Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, ed. Jack P. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24. British companies had expanded the American empire in the , but no British Trade or joint-stock companies had been chartered in the Americas in the eighteenth century. The Greenland Company was the last to be granted land or a charter in the western hemisphere in 1693. No companies had been chartered at all since the South Seas Company 1711 and only two more British companies, focused on Africa, were created at the end of the eighteenth century. 3 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 70-76.

29

actions of others.”4 This chapter demonstrates how the Ohio Company took on smaller works, such as creating maps, roads, and ferries, but also took on larger external projects: ones that built the British Empire.

“Politicking in London” argues that the Ohio Company influenced the Board of

Trade’s expansionary policies, which adds to the limited scholarship on British Colonial

Policy. T.R. Clayton laments this dearth in his study of the Duke of Newcastle, stating, “The only serious study of the formulation of policy in London with regard to the American situation is confined to the period after September 1754.” Clarence Alvord claims that the

British lacked a colonial policy until 1748, but does not explain why, but Dickerson does.

He asserts that in 1714, George I appointed ignorant, inactive Whigs to the Board of Trade, leaving the British without colonial policy until the Duke of Halifax became President of the

Board of Trade in 1748. Andrew Beaumont echoes this sentiment and credits Halifax with creating a patronage-based expansionary system. This chapter agrees with Beaumont but argues that the Ohio Company influenced Halifax’s system.5 The Ohio Company’s influence came from their agents, and this study of their lobbying adds to the historiography of colonial agents. Michael Kammen’s A Rope of Sand, claims that before 1760, lobbying efforts by Anglo-American colonies achieved success and maintained peaceable relations across the Atlantic. This chapter argues that American companies and colonies successfully lobbied the Crown. Andrew O’Shaughnessy concludes in his study of the British East

4 Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the of New York in American Law, 1730–1870 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1983),62–68. 5 T.R. Clayton, “The Duke of Newcastle, The Earl of Halifax, and the American Origins of the Seven Years; War,” The Historical Journal 24, no. 3 (1981): 57; Clarence Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics (Cleveland: The Arthur H Clark Co., 1917), 105; Andrew D.M. Beaumont, Colonial American and the Earl of Halifax, 1748-1761 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015), 31-109.

30

Company that when a private company’s interests aligned with the Crown’s, the Company could wield considerably more influence on British policies. By using the Ohio Company’s letters and petitions, as well as the Board of Trade responses, this chapter shows that pre-

1760 colonial American companies lobbied just as effectively as London-based companies and reveals how the Ohio Company ensured that the interests of the Company, Colony, and

Crown coincided.6

The final section of the chapter focuses on the Ohio Company’s politicking with

Pennsylvania and identifies the benefits of being an “official” agent of empire. The Board of

Trade’s approval helped the Virginians in their “battle” with the Pennsylvanians over the

Ohio Country. This dissertation asserts that the Pennsylvania traders were what Shannon

Lee Dawdy termed “rogue imperialists;” they expanded the control of an empire outside of governmental controls, and without extending governmental claims. In contrast, the Ohio

Company agents acted with the Crown’s permission, which the chapters show, was crucial to Ohio Valley success because it came with royal support, which forced other colonies to accept the Ohio Company.7 This section also gives context to the much-explored

6 Michael Kammen, A Rope of Sand” The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), 3-38; Andrew O’Shaughnessy, “The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West Indian Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution,” The Historical Journal 40, no.1 (1997): 71–95; Patrice Higonnet, “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” The Journal of Modern History 40, No. 1, (Mar., 1968): 57-90. Because she is not focused on agents or shared interests, Higgonet mischaracterizes Ohio Company influence on London regarding the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. Because she only investigates the Ohio Company’s 1753 and 1754 letters, not the earlier petitions and letters of 1747 and 1748, she mischaracterized the relationship between Company, Colony and Crown as corrupt and negligent. Higonnet correctly asserts that the Ohio Company influenced the British government, however her characterization of the influence, and the time frame in which is occurred is incorrect. 7 Shannon Lee Dawdy, Buildings the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2008), xv. Dawdy uses this term to describe the French in New Orleans, and Robert Michael Morressy further explains the unofficial

31

Pennsylvania expansion into the Ohio Valley. This dissertation points out that

Pennsylvanians did not operate alone in the Ohio Valley. Pennsylvania traders and governmental officials responded to external push-pull factors. The Ohio Company’s on- the-ground actions and their diplomatic (or not so diplomatic) relations influenced

Pennsylvania’s Ohio Valley activities.8

Politicking in Virginia

In October of 1747, Thomas Cresap, a Maryland trader and land speculator, met with Lawrence Washington and Thomas Lee, two Virginia planters active in Virginia politics, to lay the plans for a land-speculation company to push into the Appalachian

Mountains and the Ohio Country beyond.9 Cresap needed the political clout of these

Virginia families to succeed in obtaining a grant of land in the Ohio Valley. Cresap, a

Marylander who already had obtained grants from the Calvert Family for land in Western

expansion of French influence in Illinois in his work, Empire by Collaboration: Indians, Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 2015),10, 245. Traders and colonists were not the only people who unintentionally expanded the influence of their empire, or did so outside the boundaries of the state, to see how the people of helped extend the influence of the British see, Bernard Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1-24; Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 70-76. 8 James Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 157-253; Jane Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 1-87; Kevin Kenney, Peaceable Kingdom Lost, the Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn’s Holy Experiment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11-64; Patrick Spero, Frontier Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 2016), 49-196. 9 “Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, 1748,” Lois Mulkern, eds., George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 2.

32

Maryland, needed a grant from a different colony, as Maryland’s charter specified its western boundary at the headwaters of the “Pattowmack” River. Since the is on the eastern side of the continental divide and flows into the Atlantic, rather than the

Gulf of like the Ohio River, Maryland was incapable of extending into the Ohio

Valley. In contrast, Virginia and Pennsylvania lacked a fixed western boundary, other than the Pacific Ocean, which legally allowed them to expand west of the Appalachians. If

Cresap wanted to benefit from the empire-building process, he had to look outside the borders of his colony. Most likely previous run-ins and bad blood with the Pennsylvanians over Maryland’s northern boundary, caused Cresap to look to Virginia.10 Financial motivations prompted the Virginia gentry to try to obtain a large grant of land to survey, partition, and ultimately sell to make a profit. The Ohio Company members saw land speculation as a means to simultaneously build the Virginia colony, the British Empire, and their personal fortunes. To put the wheels in motion, the Ohio Company had Thomas

Cresap file for a grant of land with the .11

While the exact circumstances surrounding the Ohio Company origins are unknown, the actions of Thomas Cresap, Lawrence Washington, and Thomas Lee stand out. Some

Pennsylvanians credit Thomas Cresap, the Marylander, with initiating correspondence with

Lee and Washington that discussed a plan to secure the Ohio Valley for Virginia. While

Cresap’s contemporaries recognized his influence in the formation of the Ohio Company, it

10 More information on Cresap’s background can be found in Chapter Two of this work, but the details of his violent interactions with Pennsylvania’s citizens and governments can be found in Thomas Cresap: Maryland Frontiersman (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1944), 24-38. 11 “Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, October 20 1748,” George Mercer Papers, 2.

33

was in unflattering terms. In of 1748, Pennsylvanian Richard Peters commented, “It was that vile fellow Cresap who had suggested the scheme to Colonel Lee and other great men in Virginia, to make trading houses at Alleghenny.”12 While this assessment of the

Ohio Company falls short of its real intentions, the Pennsylvanians clearly blamed Cresap for Virginia’s actions. Land speculation in the British Empire depended heavily on personal contacts, which is probably why Cresap contacted Washington and Lee. With wealthy and politically influential backers, he undoubtedly believed a company could successfully build a large settler community in the Ohio Country.

The Ohio Company’s founders believed that the 1744 Treaty of Lancaster between

Virginia, Maryland, and the Iroquois , gave Virginia the right to speculate in the Ohio Valley. Before the treaty, the British proved unable to keep their subjects east of the Blue Ridge, the previously agreed-upon boundary, which sparked conflict with the

Iroquois. At a conference in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the Virginians gave the Iroquois two hundred pounds of to give up their claim to the .

Misunderstandings prevented this treaty from keeping the peace. The Iroquois believed they had given up their claim to the Shenandoah Valley, but the Virginian representative

Thomas Lee, thought that Virginia had bought the rights to their entire charter which extended to the Pacific Ocean. Lee held fast to this belief, and shortly after the Ohio

Company had begun moving in the Ohio Valley, he declared, “Virginia is bounded by the

Great Atlantic Ocean to the East, by North Caroline to the South, by Maryland and

12 Richard Peters, “Letter book 1737-1750, vol. 13,” Richard Peters Papers (Collection 0498) Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

34

Pennsylvania to the North, and by the South Sea [Pacific Ocean] to the West.”13 Following the mindset of one of their founders and de facto leader, the Ohio Company members believed they had the right to claim and settle the Ohio Valley, regardless of the French or

Pennsylvanians. The Company members planned to erect settlements in the Ohio Valley, which they perceived as the colony of Virginia.

While the founding members of the Ohio Company believed they had the right to expand, they needed to recruit others with both political and financial capital, and they succeeded. Ohio Company members were well-known in Virginia politics and governmental administration. Virginia had a bicameral ; the upper house was called the Council and the members were appointed by the King or the Governor. The lower house, known as the or the Assembly, were elected by .

Twenty of Twenty-five members sat in the House of Burgesses from 1747 until the end of the Seven Years’ War. Nine eventually served on the Virginia Council, and two of those nine became head of the Council.14 The Council members did not shy away from making their prejudices in favor of the Ohio Company known. Soon after the Ohio Company’s inception the Council “Ordered, That an Advertisement be inserted in the next Virginia Gazette, signifying that Surveyors are now at Liberty to proceed in surveying any Lands beyond the great Mountains, so that they don't interfere with the Grant to the Ohio Company.”15

Obviously, the Ohio Company members on the Council protected their investment in the

13 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 10. 14 Kenneth Bailey, Ohio Company, 36-37. Bailey discusses the council positions of the Ohio Company, but he gives no information or examples on how the members used their positions to further the Ohio Company’s cause. 15 “At a Council held November the sixth 1749,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia V. 5, ed, Wilmer L. Hall, (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1945), 306.

35

Ohio Company.

The Council was not the pinnacle of the Ohio Company’s governmental involvement; two members held the position of Governor.16 Thomas Lee, the head of the

Virginia Council and interim Governor, sat as the informal head of the Ohio Company of

Virginia during its early years. Lee lifted the enterprise off the ground and supported it from within the Virginia colonial government. Born in England, Lee had inherited land in

Virginia, became the agent of the Culpepper-Fairfax estate in the region of

Virginia, and then a member of the Virginia Council in 1732. Lee moved up the political ranks, first serving as the senior Councilor as well as the Council President in 1747, and then a year later serving as Virginia’s interim Governor, between the administrations of

Gooch and Dinwiddie. During his reign as Governor, Lee used his political office for the

Ohio Company’s gain, supporting expansion, negotiating with the Board of Trade, and promoting Ohio Company activities. He issued instructions to Ohio Company agents to explore and survey for the Company, making these men de facto Virginia officials. When

Lee passed away in 1750, the Ohio Company suffered a significant loss. He had served as the leader of both the Colony and the Company; however, another Ohio Company member quickly took up residence in the Governor’s mansion.17

Robert Dinwiddie, Ohio Company member and proponent of Virginia’s westward expansion, became Virginia’s in 1751, thanks to his experience in colonial matters. As an important merchant between and mainland America,

Dinwiddie had gained wealth, friends, and public office. He sat on the Council of Bermuda,

16 Bailey, Ohio Company, 44-53. 17 Paul C. Nagel, The Lees of Virginia: Seven Generations of an American Family (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1990), 121-123.

36

served as Surveyor-General of the southern part of the Continent of North America, and became the Inspector General of Customs to and the Leeward Islands.

Parliament often sought him out for advice and testimony on commercial and colonial matters. As part of his position as Surveyor-General, Dinwiddie requested admittance to the Council of Virginia in June of 1741 and became a full member in April of 1743. This position familiarized him with future Ohio Company members and the nature of Virginia’s politics. Soon after his acceptance on the Virginia Council, he temporarily retired from public life, but he put those years to good use.18

During Dinwiddie’s (temporary) retirement, he forged friendships with powerful

Londoners. One such friend, John Hanbury, mentioned earlier, held power, wealth and connections. Hanbury traded in the Chesapeake and may have introduced Dinwiddie to the

Ohio Company.19 Dinwiddie also forged relationships with Henry Pelam, the prime minister, Horace Walpole, the prime minister’s son and prominent politician, and the Earl of Granville, John Carteret, who became President of the Privy Council in 1751. Most importantly, Dinwiddie became friends with George Dunk, Earl of Halifax, the new

President of the Board of Trade and one of the chief architects of British policy in North

America.20 His retirement was time well spent, for his new contacts may have helped him obtain a prime position.

Dinwiddie jumped back into the thick of things when William Gooch vacated the

18 John Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie: Servant of the Crown (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1973), 1-8, 13-14. 19 The connections of the Hanbury family are mentioned in Michael Kamman, A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution (Cornell University Press: 1968), 19, 76-78, 122. 20 Alden, Robert Dinwiddie, 14.

37

Virginia Governor’s office, Dinwiddie successfully pursued the office and joined the Ohio

Company. Historians have long debated the timing of Dinwiddie’s membership. According to Fred Anderson’s book, The War That Made America, the Ohio Company “gifted” a large number of shares to Dinwiddie soon after he became the Lieutenant Governor.21 By doing so, the Ohio Company would have ensured that Dinwiddie would represent their interest from the Governor’s Mansion. While this move would have been a clever one for the

Company, earlier historians disagree. Francis Jennings asserts that John Hanbury, the Ohio

Company’s London agent, confident in the Ohio Company success, encouraged Robert

Dinwiddie, to invest in the Ohio Company before the Crown appointed him Governor.22

Kenneth Bailey argued that Dinwiddie received the position as Lieutenant Governor because of his membership in the Ohio Company, which the Crown saw as a way to support the Ohio Company and ensure the empire’s expansion.23 According to his biographer. John

Richard Alden, the Crown delayed in confirming Dinwiddie’s position until July of 1751, and Ohio Company records state that Robert Dinwiddie became a member in March of

1750.24 Official records show Dinwiddie as an Ohio Company member before his official start date as Governor; however, it is unknown when the selection process began and even more challenging to discern when rumors of Dinwiddie’s posting became available.

Regardless of timing, the Ohio Company papers show that Dinwiddie became a member of the Ohio Company before his appointment as Governor.

21 Fred Anderson, The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War (New York: Penguin, 2005), 29-31. 22 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, fn30, 17-18. 23 Bailey, Ohio Company, 31. 24 “Resume of the Ohio Company proceedings,” , 1750. George Mercer Papers, 5.

38

Both Lee and Dinwiddie’s administrations demonstrate how private and public spheres blurred as the Ohio Company expanded the dominion of Virginia with support from within the government. The Governor’s duties, which included expanding and protecting Virginia’s claims, meshed with the Ohio Company’s imperial affairs. Lee and

Dinwiddie privately and politically supported Virginia’s westward expansion, which muddied the lines between their commercial and governmental actions. Both risked their personal funds in the outcome of the Crown’s and Virginia’s actions.

Dinwiddie’s motivations are clear from his correspondence with Thomas Cresap in 1752 regarding the French “invasion” into Virginia territory: “I have the success of the Ohio

Company at heart.”25

As later chapters will show, Lee and Dinwiddie’s positions as Governor made it challenging to determine which agents worked for what entity, or if any difference existed.

Officials readily used political maneuvering and governmental resources to further the

Ohio Company’s cause and due to this politicking, Ohio Company agents often worked directly for the British Empire as clear distinctions between the British Empire and the private company eroded. The actions of these agents are the topic of chapters one, two, and three, so it is imperative to keep the interactions of this web of individuals binding

Virginia’s public and private spheres in mind when considering the actions of Company agents in the disputed territory.

Dinwiddie’s actions, including sending George Washington west, commissioning troops, and purchasing supplies for the Ohio Company forts, blurred the lines separating

25 “Robert, Dinwiddie to Col. Thomas Cresap,” The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant- Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, ed. R. Brock. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883), 17-18.

39

Company and Colony. Dinwiddie constantly wrote letters to the other colonial governors pleading for action regarding the situation in the Ohio Valley. Then after violence broke out, he renewed his letter campaign in attempts to obtain more funding, supplies, and soldiers for the war effort. Dinwiddie undoubtedly used his office to advance the Ohio

Company’s cause. Even after Dinwiddie voluntarily left office and returned to England, he remained invested and active in Ohio Company affairs. Dinwiddie’s biographer claims

Dinwiddie devotedly did his duty, obeyed his orders from London, and kept up his contacts with influential men in England for his personal interests as well as those of Virginia.26

Dinwiddie upheld his duty to Crown, Colony, and Company because their goals coincided.27

As Company members issued orders which supported their private interests from public positions, the difference between the imperial intentions of the government and independent interest of the Ohio Company often became impossible to discern. This tangled situation meant those employed by the Ohio Company often worked directly for

Virginia. Empire-building was a joint effort between the Company and the Colony. As the

French threat grew, and members of the Virginia government and the Ohio Company became increasingly desperate to hang on to their land and investments, distinctions between the two eroded. The goals of the Ohio Company and Virginia complemented one another. Without their shared interests, the Company and its agents would not have

26 Alden, Robert Dinwiddie, 14. 27 The Ohio Company and Virginia’s partnership to expand Virginia into the Ohio Country was common knowledge, but not frowned upon or seen as a negative until 1754 when Dinwiddie and the Council began pushing the Assembly to provide money for the defense of the Ohio Valley, which as is explained in chapters three and four, was filled with infrastructure built by the Ohio Company. This tug of war between the Crown, the Governor and the Council against the Assembly for funding for defense is explored in chapters four and five.

40

worked for the empire; they would have worked outside of the government structure, without support. The Company would have acted independently in the Ohio Valley and in

London and Company agents would have been rogue imperialists rather than part of the official empire-building process.

Politicking in London

To illustrate how the Ohio Company became intertwined with the Crown, an understanding of the organization and history of the Board of Trade is useful. At first the

King oversaw the executive functions of the government with the aid of the Privy Council.

As the number of colonies grew, the King created the Board of Trade in 1696 as a subcommittee of the Privy Council to ensure that the Crown, not parliament, controlled the

Empire’s commercial and colonial affairs. Sixteen officials made up the Board of Trade: eight Privy Council members, and eight salaried positions who carried the majority of the committee’s responsibilities. The Board of Trade oversaw colonial trade and administration, and advised the King and Secretaries of State, both those of the northern and southern departments, but lacked the formal authority to grant land or decide on colonial policy. 28

28 The British had two secretaries or state, The Secretary of State for the Southern Department was in charge of the American colonies and relations with the Roman Catholic and Muslim states of , while the Secretary of State for the Northern Department was in charge of relations with Protestant European countries. For more information on the make-up of the British administration of the colonies, see Anderson’s extensive footnote which details more of the British administration’s organization, Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 752. Anderson points out that the Secretaries of state held little knowledge of the colonies or trade, which made for a disorderly and chaotic administration. The Board of Trade handled colonial administrative and commercial concerns due to the Empire’s commercial nature, it did not intervene often, as such

41

The Board of Trade’s role in British politics declined in 1714 when King George I appointed Whigs with little or no colonial experience to the Board of Trade, and the Board entered a period of dormancy. Colonial Governors found that if they wanted action, they should appeal directly to the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary of State for the Southern

Department. A 1748 letter from the newly appointed President of the Board of Trade, the

Duke of Halifax, to Newcastle claiming that the Board had not exercised its powers for many years, supports this argument.29 However, Halifax’s reign, beginning in 1748, changed all that.30

One of the reasons Halifax came to power was due to the actions of Newcastle and his new system. Newcastle moved up to become the Secretary to the Northern Department in 1747 to oversee the implementation of the treaty of Aix-la- Chapelle and secure Britain's alliance with . Newcastle’s political rival, the Duke of Bedford, became Secretary of

State for the Southern Department, and while the two secretaries rarely agreed, they both knew the lackadaisical nature of the Board of Trade needed to change.31

Newcastle and Bedford agreed upon the appointment of George Dunk, the Earl of

Halifax, to be the President of the Board of Trade in 1748 because he was both energetic

intervention in local affairs could hinder business endeavors. Unlike the French and Spanish colonial empires, the British empire lacked a bureaucratic administration. The empire, as Anderson puts it, “was a structure for the control of trade,” not a territorial empire. 29 This assertion is first made in Oliver Dickerson, American Colonial Government 1696-1865 (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1912), 34-53. This assertion is echoed in Andrew D.M. Beaumont, Colonial America and the Earl of Halifax, 1748-1761 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-40. 30Alvord asserts that the British had no policy before this; however, he provides no explanation for their lack of policy or the reasons behind the creation of one. He does not discuss the appointment of Halifax or the ramifications of his appointment. Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, 105. 31 Dickerson, American Colonial Government, 20-40.

42

and capable. Both Bedford and Newcastle agreed the colonial situation, as it stood in the late 1740s, “required the attention of an able man,” and under Halifax, colonial affairs received more attention than ever before, as Halifax managed to obtain for himself the powers, but not the title or salary, of a secretary of state. Under Halifax, the Board of Trade became active in colonial politics. He flexed the Crown’s atrophied muscles, extended

American commerce, and subsequently became known as the “father of the colonies.”32

The only real policy held by the Board of Trade was that they should hinder French success. Newcastle, Bedford, and Halifax viewed the Treaty of Aix-De-Chapelle as a pause in their war with France, and this Francophobia shaped all British foreign policy in the

1740s and 1750s.33 The Board’s policy towards the American interior had been inherited from the Privy Council prior to the Board’s inception. It involved two main components: preserving alliances with the Six Nations of the Iroquois and the Catawba and so they would continue to serve as buffers to the French and Spanish; and pitting one group of

Indians against another. In 1717, the Board suggested that settlements were the surest way to keep the French, or Spanish for that matter, out of the Mississippi Valley; however, no one in government promoted this policy.34

In the late 1740s, Newcastle, Bedford, and Halifax all favored anti-French policies.

Newcastle hoped to stymie French growth by resisting them on both sides of the Atlantic.

He strengthened alliances in both Europe and America that aimed to keep the French influence and holdings from growing. Bedford, for all of his dislike of Newcastle, shared his

32 Dickerson, American Colonial Government, 39. Notes that it was Halifax’s mind and energy which qualified him for the job, for he lacked experience and knowledge of the colonial situation. Beaumont, Colonial American and the Earl of Halifax, 48-49. 33 Alden, Servant of the Crown, 14-15 34 Dickerson, American Colonial Government, 326-327.

43

anti-French attitude, and he supported the new Board of Trade president, Halifax, who proved eager to revive Britain’s strong anti-French policies of the . While the Ohio

Company plans would undoubtedly hinder French influence in the Ohio Valley, until this point, the British had not actively tried to stop the French and the line between stopping the French expansion and provoking French officials into declaring war was thin. If the

Ohio Company pursued its goals, it would turn the British Francophobic talk into

Francophobic action. 35

Because the Ohio Company’s plans would mean official action in the Ohio Valley, the

Governor of Virginia, William Gooch refused to sign the Ohio Company’s petition, fearing that a grant in the Ohio Valley, would cause conflict with France.36 Gooch referred the decision to the Board of Trade, making it necessary for the Ohio Company members to have a London agent, and they had an excellent one, the influential and well-connected merchant and lobbyist, John Hanbury.37 The Virginia planters knew Hanbury through

British trade networks. He was the largest trader in London, Parliament’s agent to

35 Alden, Servant of the Crown, 43. Anderson, Crucible, 35, 752. The historiography of the Seven Years’ War indicates that British did not began pursuing anti-French policies until the mid-1750s. Anderson asserts that the Crown’s anti-French policy began in 1753, when things became more heated and the Board called for the governors to repel the French and build forts to counter those built by the French (which is studied in chapter four of this dissertation). In Olsen’s book she presents Halifax as an energetic reformer, who tried to bring the colonies firmly under the crown control and was so rigorous that Newcastle and others in Whitehall had to restrain him. Allison G Olsen, Anglo-American Politics, 1660-1775 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1973), 147-150. 36 The Board of Trade’s attitude makes Gooch’s actions incredibly ironic. If Gooch had simply granted the petition, as protocol mandated, the grant never would have reached the Board of Trade. The Crown never would have been involved with the Ohio Company’s plans, and their policy towards expansion may have remained uncertain and erratic. 37 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 11, fn 9. Jennings includes a brief biography of Hanbury. As he points out, no monograph detailing Hanbury’s life exists despite his importance and influence on British politics and policy, indicating the glaring blank of the colonial American and British Empire historiography regarding commerce.

44

Virginia, and the Colonial agent to the College of William and Mary. Trans-Atlantic empire- building mandated a well-connected London agent, so Hanbury’s involvement proved crucial to the Ohio Company’s success.38

The stockholders believed power in London would lie in political and administrative connections. In the Company’s ’s Council, they placed a great deal of importance on the members’ governmental and leadership roles. The Company listed well- connected members first, “The humble petition of John Hanbury of London, Merchant, on behalf of himself and Thomas Lee Esq. Member of Your Majesty’s Council and one of the

Judges of the Supreme Court of Judication in Your Majesty’s Colony of Virginia, Thomas

Nelson Esq. also a member of Your Majesty’s Council.”39 The Company carefully planned and arranged member names, listing Lee and Nelson first, mostly likely due to their positions in the Virginia administration. When John Hanbury became involved, he changed the next two names on the Ohio Company’s petitions, and he added “Colo” to the names of

Thomas Cresap and William Thornton.40 Hanbury, familiar with the imperial administration in London, apparently thought that the Company should include military titles in the list of petitioners, illustrating that the members’ positions held some sway within the British government. While this does not reflect that the Board of Trade thought their membership influential, it shows that the members in Virginia and London believed the governmental and military involvement of the petitioners to be relevant to their success. The only evidence of what the Crown and other involved committees thought

38 Bailey, Ohio Company, 41-42. Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 11. 39 “Petition of John Hanbury to the King on behalf of the Ohio Company 1748,” in Bailey, Ohio Company, 300. 40 “Resume of the Ohio Company proceedings, 1747,” George Mercer Papers, 2.

45

regarding the Ohio Company is that they continued to use the titles of the individuals as they debated their petition.41

Once the Crown became involved, the Ohio Company of Virginia served as a transatlantic conduit through which the on-the-ground agents in the Ohio Valley could

“talk” to the men in London. The Ohio Company sent agents into the borderland and reported the agents’ findings back to the Board of Trade in London, making their agents the eyes and ears of the Crown in the Ohio Valley. The Company eventually sent letters, maps, and surveys of the lush nature of the Ohio Valley, informing the Crown of lucrative trade possibilities and threatening French movements. Renewed information gathering and increased communication with the colonies were hallmarks of Halifax’s reign over the

Board of Trade, and Halifax was probably thrilled to have someone reporting the Ohio

Valley situation directly to the Crown.42

The Crown’s involvement in the Ohio Company lay outside their regular American interaction. Gooch, instead of granting the petition, referred it to the Board of Trade. He asked for their advice even as he knew the Ohio Company’s endeavor would be “productive to many National advantages,” white raising money thought quit-rents.43 After the Board of

Trade received Gooch’s letter, the Board forwarded it to the Duke of Newcastle to present before the King and his Council, and to the Committee of Council for Plantation Affairs

41Bailey, Ohio Company, 25-30, gives some information on Hanbury’s appeals to the Crown or the Ohio Company. 42Beaumont, Colonial American and the Earl of Halifax, 49-50 43 “William Gooch to the Board of Trade, 1747,” Manuscript Copies of Papers Relating to the Ohio land Company of Virginia, 1747-1749, Box 4, Folder 88, Page 3, Ohio Company Papers, 1736-1813, DAR.1925.02, Darlington Collections, Special Collections Department University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Hereafter referred to as Papers Relating to the Ohio land Company of Virginia.

46

(hereafter just referred to as the Council for Plantation Affairs). Due to Gooch’s reluctance the British administration became involved in the Ohio Company’s proceedings.44

The Council for Plantation Affairs asked Gooch why he had not granted the Ohio

Company’s petition, and while Gooch had pointed out that the Ohio Company’s grant would cut off the French communication from Canada to , he failed to articulate his concern and hesitation. The Council for Plantation Affairs seemed unconcerned over the disruption of French communication, or at least the Council did not see it as a reason to prohibit Virginia’s westward settlements. Gooch responded that he “was apprehensive such grants may possibly give umbrage to the French, especially when we were in hopes of entering into a treaty for the general peace.” Gooch feared threatening the peace; however, the Council for Plantation Affairs did not share his concern. While Gooch’s apprehension is understandable, the Board of Trade ignored his initial comment about France’s communication as a problem and asked him to articulate his apprehensions. However, interestingly enough, the Board parroted Gooch’s words regarding French lines of communication back to him in a list of the Ohio Company’s positive aspects. 45

This confusion regarding the Ohio Company, the empire-building process, and especially the attitudes towards the French, indicates that no established policy regarding expansion or empire-building existed in the 1740s. The Virginia administration hesitated on the subject of Virginia expansion. When faced with a decision, the result of which would have expanded the empire, Gooch, head of one of the largest British colonies in America,

44 “Order of the Board of Trade 23 1747,” Papers Relating to the Ohio land Company of Virginia, 5. 45 “William Gooch to the Board of Trade, Nov. 6 1747,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 5.

47

and an essential part of the British colonial bureaucracy, struggled with how to proceed.46

The Governor and the Board of Trade talked past one another regarding the French, indicating that the two halves of the British Empire, divided by the Atlantic Ocean, were not on the same page regarding policies which promoted expansion or French aggravation.

The Ohio Company’s petition opened the trans-Atlantic lines of communication concerning the empire-building process.

The Ohio Company petition left a paper trail of indecision. Officials on both sides of the Atlantic hesitated, uncertain how to handle the expansion of the colony and subsequently the empire, perhaps afraid to heat up relations with France so soon after the end of the War of Austrian Succession which had just ended in 1748.47 The aforementioned interdepartmental correspondence of those in London regarding the Ohio Company’s grant indicates some level of indecision within the bureaucracy in London. When the Council questioned Gooch’s hesitation, it did not immediately enclose orders to grant the Ohio

Company’s petition. The Council, following Gooch’s example perhaps, forwarded his letter to the King and awaited further instruction. While the Councilors puzzled over Gooch’s inaction, they too hesitated to act without permission. This indecision indicates the Ohio

Company petition awakened a dormant subject. It sparked debate for there was no

46 Bailey, Ohio Company, 25-26. 47 The War of Austrian Succession was a European war that involved most of Europe from 1740-1748, and it was mostly concerned with the balance of power among the European countries both in Europe and in the Americas. The conflict ended with the treaty of Aix la Chapelle in 1748, however the treaty failed to resolve the issues of the conflict, which explains the continued tension and hostilities between Britain and France, as well as the hesitant attitudes and policies of the British administrators and officials. For more information on this conflict, including its many causes and lack of definitive ending, see M.S. Anderson, The War of Austrian Succession, 1740-1748 (New York: Pearson Education, 1995).

48

obvious answer to the question the Ohio Company posed: Should the British expand into the Ohio Valley and confront the French? The Company’s insistence on building the British

Empire caused those in charge to consider the policies regarding empire-building. The

Ohio Company of Virginia opened the topic for discussion.

Eventually, in September of 1748, the Crown and the Board of Trade gave the

Council for Plantation Affairs their recommendation endorsing the Ohio Company’s grant and setting the tone for British expansionary policies.48 The Board stated that the Ohio

Company’s proposed actions served the Crown’s interest and advantage and would secure

Virginia and the neighboring colonies.49 The Board of Trade foresaw the Ohio Company increasing the security of not just Virginia, but all of the mid-Atlantic colonies from hostile

Native Americans and the “evil” French Catholics.

The Crown avoided the cost of empire-building by passing it on those colonists who hoped to engage in land speculation. As Hinderaker theorizes, “the British and French empires in America shared in common a fundamental strain on their ability to exploit the

Ohio Valley: the need to justify imperial development by the benefits it conferred on the

European metropolis.”50 The Ohio Company’s willingness to pay the expenses of the empire-building process removed the cost, and therefore, the need for justification. The

Board pointed out that the Company planned to secure the area at its own expense, which

48 Bailey, Ohio Company, 18-20. Bailey does not assert that the Ohio Company forced the issue, he only asserts that after 1748 British policy was almost synonymous with ambitions of the Ohio Company. However, he gives no evidence or explanation of how this occurred. 49 “J. Pitt and J Grenville to the Privy Council, September 2 1748,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 17-23. 50 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi-xiii.

49

became a “further reason…they may deserve His Majesty’s countenance and encouragement.”51 The Board hoped the Company would become the model for British empire-building in America, for the members not only paid the cost of planning and building a settlement, but their actions promised to fill the King’s coffers with quit-rents if their plan succeeded. If the Company failed; the Board of Trade was no worse off than before.

Land speculation required money, manpower, and management. As Hinderaker pointed out, land development depended on harnessing the energies of thousands of settlers into imperial plans. Proprietors needed to manage expansion, define boundaries, conduct diplomacy with Native Americans, purchase and survey land, pay quit-rents, and organize communities. Hinderaker also asserted that land speculation and expansion consistently eluded officials in London and , as well as those in colonial capitals.52

London administrators avoided these obstacles instantaneously with the Ohio Company’s petition. The Company essentially offered to serve as the Crown’s bureaucracy in settling the Ohio Valley, the Virginia investors took on the cost of the tasks related to exploration, purchasing the land from Native Americans, surveying, and then filling the land with the

“foreign Protestants” and managing their quit-rents. The Crown had everything to gain without committing men or money.

The Board of Trade also mentioned that Virginia’s position as the center of the

British colonies “enabled [them] to cultivate a friendship and carry on a more extensive

51 “J. Pitt and J Grenville to the Privy Council, September 2 1748,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 17-23. 52 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, xiii.

50

commerce with the Nations of Indians inhabiting those parts.”53 The Board of Trade perceived the Ohio Company as a means of improving their relationship with the local

Indians and capturing the fur trade from the French. The recommendation also mentioned that the Ohio Company’s proposed settlement would stymie the friendship of the Native

Americans in that region who leaned towards the French. Friendship with the Native

Americans, certainly a step towards empire-building in the Ohio Valley in the mid-1700s, suddenly appeared on the Board of Trade’s wish list. While improving the alliances with the Ohio Indians was necessary, the Board had another benefit in mind.

After much deliberation, the Board concluded, “we cannot therefore but be of the

Opinion that all due encouragement ought to be given to extending the British settlements beyond the great Mountains.”54 The Board thought a private enterprise willing to foot the bill to build the empire should be encouraged. In addition to the Ohio Company paying for the expenses of these activities, in ten years, the Crown would collect quit-rents on the lands the Ohio Company sold. At the heart of the Board of Trade’s approval of the Ohio

Company’s grant was its hindrance to the French as the “settlement may likewise be a proper step towards disappointing the views and checking the Encroachments of the

French.” They paraphrased Governor Gooch, claiming that the Ohio Company would hinder the French communication from to Louisiana, but the Board listed it not as a negative, but as a positive. The Ohio Company’s presence would make Franco

53 “J. Pitt and J Grenville to the Privy Council, September 2 1748,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 17-23. 54 “Order of the Lords of the Committee for Plantation Affairs, Feb 23 1747,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 5.

51

communication difficult, which was always a positive for the British Government.55 The proposed plan was a win-win situation for the Board; it carried out British wishes at no expense to the British government.

While those in the chambers of Whitehall debated the Ohio Company’s plan, the members back in Virginia pressed on with their goals. After the Company discovered that

Gooch sent their petition to London for the Crown’s consideration, the Company actively promoted its interest in the Empire’s capital and bypassed the governor's office. Thomas

Lee wrote to the Board of Trade explaining the benefits of the Ohio Company to the empire.

He wrote about the increasing French threat and the dangers of delaying action. Lee did not mention how much he stood to gain, but instead emphasized his intense desire to

“extend the British Empire.” Throughout the Ohio Company’s history, the members successfully mimicked Lee’s imperial rhetoric. 56

While Lee wrote to the Board of Trade, the Ohio Company obtained representation in London. On October 24th, 1747, a Company committee met at Mount Vernon and wrote to Thomas Lee in Williamsburg, “We desire you to offer John Hanbury Esqr. Merchant in

London to be a Partner with us and to engage him to Sollicit our Petition to his Majesty.”57

Lee wrote to Hanbury, who agreed to join the enterprise. He became a member as well as a supplier of trade goods. However, most relevant for this section, he represented and lobbied on the Ohio Company’s behalf in London. Soon, Hanbury sent a petition that joined

Gooch’s letter in Whitehall.

55 “William Gooch to the Privy Council, September 2 1748,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 17-23. 56 “Thomas Lee to the Board of Trade, September 29 1750,” in Bailey, Ohio Company, 303. 57 “The Ohio Company to John Hanbury, Oct. 24 1747,” in George Mercer Papers, 2.

52

Hanbury and the Ohio Company embellished their petition to the Board of Trade with the language of empire. Their petition to “extend Your Majesty’s Empire in America,” took special care to appeal to the Crown’s self-interest.58 John Hanbury presented the Ohio

Company case in person and stressed the shared interest of the Company and the British

Empire. Hanbury stressed that the private enterprise promoted British interests in the land west of the , which the Company claimed, the French threatened to overrun. Appealing to the British rivalry with the French, the Ohio Company reminded the Crown of the imperial race for the American interior. The Ohio Company displayed the benefits to the empire as a whole, pointing out that its efforts would bring quality land into the British Empire, saying that the Ohio Valley was “extremely fertile” and “the climate very fine and healthy.” The petition also stressed Company plans to secure the backcountry by erecting a to, “protect the infant settlements” and give the British “the best and strongest frontier in America.”59

The Company also promised to promote and expand trade with the Native

Americans. They repeated the arguments that Gooch and the Board of Trade had already made in their favor and expanded upon them. The Ohio Company wrote that with its proposed trade links and friendship, the Indians in question would be committed to the

British interests and the prosperity and safety of British colonies. The petitions additionally claimed that the Ohio Company’s Indian trade, would promote British manufacturing and enlarge British commerce, as well as the Shipping and Navigation

58 Bailey, ed., The “William Trent to Robert Dinwiddie,” 11, 1753. Ohio Company Papers: Being Primarily Papers of the “Suffering Traders” of Pennsylvania, ed. Kenneth Bailey (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc.) 47. 59 “Petition of John Hanbury to the King of the Behalf of the Ohio Company, 1748,” in Bailey, Ohio Company, 298.

53

industries. The Company’s earlier petitions lacked appeals regarding manufacturing and shipping. Hanbury may have promoted this inclusion or added it himself to stress how the

Ohio Company’s endeavor mutually benefited Virginia and the Empire, London merchants included.60

Having the “upper crust” of Virginia society and government, as well as influential merchants in London (such as Hanbury) invested in the Company promoted its success.

These members understood that although Parliament demanded that the colonies existed to serve the imperial center, and those at Whitehall wanted to control and direct colonial empire-building endeavors, the empire could not expand without the aid and initiative of the colonists.61 Even though the administration had already debated the Ohio Company’s first petition, their second petition was not a wasted effort. It kept the debate alive and pointed out new ways the project aided the British Empire. This second appeal stressed the mutual benefits of this operation. Further, this follow-up underlined the urgency of the borderland situation, the threat of losing the imperial race, which may have spurred quicker action.

In retrospect, the Ohio Company need not have worried because the British administration seemed anxious to pursue an expansionary policy aimed towards thwarting the French.62 London officials saw the Ohio Company as an opportunity to cement the

British claim on the Ohio Country while negating the efforts of the French and on February

24th of 1749, the Board of Trade endorsed the Ohio Company petition. The next day, the

60 “Petition of John Hanbury to the King of the Behalf of the Ohio Company, 1748,” in Bailey, Ohio Company, 298. 61 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, xiii. 62 Bailey, Ohio Company, 30-31.

54

Board reported their approval of the said petition to the King in Council and finally, on

March 16th, the King’s Council wrote that the King, pleased with the Privy Council’s advice to grant the petition, ordered instructions drafted for the King’s royal signature. Following the King’s approval, the Board of Trade instructed Governor Gooch to give the Ohio

Company of Virginia its grant as the Company’s plans were to the “advantage and security of our said colony as well as the neighboring colonies inasmuch as our loving subjects will be thereby enabled to cultivate a Friendship and carry on a more extensive commerce with the nations of Indians.”63

Once the King gave the Privy Council authorization, the Council required Gooch to grant 200,000 acres of the Ohio Valley to the Ohio Company. The Board of Trade and the

Crown stood firmly on the Company’s side. The Council for Plantation Affairs wrote to

Gooch, restated benefits of the Ohio Company, instructed him to encourage the enterprise, and instructed him to make sure he carried out his instructions immediately. A not so subtle message to the Governor that the Ohio Company’s mission should be a top priority.

The Council also enlisted the support of the other branch of government, writing that “we hope the Legislature there will give all fitting conference thereto and we recommend to you to promote the same on your part as far as lies within your power.” The Board’s instructions to the Virginia legislature and the executive branches demonstrates its commitment to the Ohio Company.64

Despite these endorsements, the Ohio Company petition had not left London

63 “Order of the Lords of the Committee for Plantation Affairs, Feb 23 1747,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 1747-1749, 5. 64 “Additional Instructions to our William Gooch from the Board of Trade,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 1747-1749, 43-47.

55

unchanged. The Ohio Company’s already imperially loaded request became even more so at the hands of the Board. Those committees in London had discussed and agreed upon some changes, including expanding Ohio Company’s role in empire-building activities and the Crown’s role in the Company’s activities. Perhaps due to the Ohio Company’s willingness to pay for the other aspects of empire-building, the Board instructed the

Company to garrison the proposed fort, stating that it was unlikely that “inhabitants will be induced to settle beyond the great mountains unless they are sure of protection there, it is our further will and pleasure that the building fort and placed a sufficient garrison are made at the expense of the grantees.” The Board of Trade saw an opportunity to secure the

British backcountry at the expense of a private company and took advantage of that situation. Some of the addition to the Ohio Company’s responsibilities, such as the defense of the settlement and the other colonies’ backcountry settlements, were massive undertakings. The Ohio Company, who previously had no intentions of staffing their proposed fort now had the safety of the region on their shoulders. Maintaining a fort and garrison led to friction between the Company and the Crown. 65

The Crown’s last addition to the petition changed the Ohio Company’s future. It stated that “in case anything further shall occur to them as proper and necessary to be inserted therein, that they do add the same to the said draughts of Instructions and lay the same before this committee for their consideration.”66 With these instructions, the Board of Trade attempted to control the Ohio Company, supporting Hinderaker’s conclusion in

65 “Additional Instructions to our William Gooch from the Board of Trade,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 1747-1749, 43-47. 66 “Order of the Board of Trade, 1748,” Manuscript Copies of Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 35.

56

Elusive Empires, that officials who decided colonial policy tried to restrain and channel imperial growth so the benefits of empire would flow across the Atlantic, and so its costs would not outweigh them.”67 Even though the Company footed the expense of the endeavor, the Crown wanted to keep an eye on them and ensure that their actions would not result in costly governmental action.

While this shows the Crown’s desire to control the Company, it also shows British uncertainty regarding empire-building. The process of empire-building proved so unfamiliar that the Crown was unsure of the requirements and best ways to maintain control of those making the efforts in the Ohio Valley. Because of their uncertainty, the

Council for Plantation Affairs put a check on the Ohio Company and required them to ask permission to alter their plans. The Crown continued to control empire-building, on paper at least, without managing or paying for the on-the-ground activities. As the Company’s activities grew, so did the tension between the British and the French, and the Crown’s became more involved in Ohio Valley empire building.

The responses of the King, the Privy Council, and Board of Trade to the Ohio

Company’s petition show that those running the empire in London agreed with the

Company. The Ohio Company’s petition made the Crown’s attitudes towards both expansionary empire-building endeavors and the threat of French retaliation quite clear.

The Ohio Company petitions, those of a private enterprise, changed the British policy towards the Ohio Valley and the French, and allowed the Ohio Company to set the pace and nature of British expansion into the Ohio Valley.

67 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, xiii.

57

Politicking with the Pennsylvanians

While the Ohio Company worked with Virginia and the British Crown, the Company lacked support from neighboring colonies. The British lacked a plan or policy regarding expansion until 1748, and if colonies made expansionary strides themselves, they failed

(sometimes purposely) to consider their impact upon other colonies or include them in their plans. At this time, no American identity existed. Other than the religious revivals of the Great Awakening, none of those events historians typically charged with unifying the colonies, for instance, the Seven Years’ War or the protests that followed, had occurred. Despite the French threat, intra-colonial competition, especially regarding expansion, land claims, and the fur trade, thrived between the British-American colonies.

The competition and political struggles between the governments of Virginia and

Pennsylvania reveal two things: how intercolonial rivalry initiated new expansionary policies, and the differences between the Ohio Company’s systematic, organized political efforts and Pennsylvania’s scattered, unorganized, unsanctioned actions.68 The Crown’s approval gave the Ohio Company power in their interactions with other colonies, and this section demonstrates how the Virginians wielded that power in political showdowns with

Pennsylvania for Ohio Valley trade and land.

The competition between both government officials and fur traders in the backcountry led to resentment toward the Ohio Company and attempts by Pennsylvania to stymie the Ohio Company’s scheme. The creation of the Company and the general interest

68 Jennings, Empire, 15, Jennings asserts that the Ohio Company “stirred up competition and accelerated Pennsylvania's rate of expansion,” but he does not offer much evidence or analysis to support this claim, which this section aims to do.

58

of Virginia regarding expansion put the two colonies at odds with one another.69 While the

Pennsylvanians had no immediate plans to settle the backcountry, they worried about protecting the Ohio Valley, which they considered part of their colony. As early as 1748, immediately after the Company’s formation, the Pennsylvanians became wary of British and French ambitions in the Ohio Valley as is seen in Pennsylvania agent Richard Peters’ letters to the Penn Family. Peters conveyed ’s enthusiasm about the quality of the land, soil, and water west of the Appalachians and his hope that the Penn Family would prohibit Virginians or Marylanders from selling lands that he believed to be within

Pennsylvania.70

Further, showing their distress over rights to the Ohio Country in 1748, Peters wrote to the most prominent trader in Pennsylvania, , to substantiate rumors regarding the French gearing up for action in the Ohio Valley and inquire about the impetus of the French plans. Croghan responded that the French hoped to thwart English settlements in the Ohio River Valley, and stated his belief that the French were reacting to the Ohio Company’s agents, Thomas Cresap and Hugh Parker, who spread news among the

Ohio Indians that the Ohio Company aimed to build a settlement in the Ohio Valley on the

Youghiogheny River, which runs into the Monongahela, one of the Ohio River tributaries.

Probably of more interest to Croghan, he also reported that Parker had informed Ohio

Indians that the Ohio Company would provide them with goods at rates cheaper than those of the Pennsylvanians.71 According to Croghan, The Ohio Company’s forays failed to gain

69 This was not a unique situation; chapter two discusses further boundary disputes. 70 “Peters to Penn, October 24 1748,” in Paul A.W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser: Friend of Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 1945), 269-270. 71 Cresap and Parker’s actions are further explained and investigated in Chapter Two of this work.

59

interest among the Indians, but rather it gave the Ohio Indians an aversion to the Ohio

Company as “the Indians does nott like to hear of there Lands being Setled… in particular by ye Virginians.” However, despite the Ohio Company’s initially poor reception, Croghan claimed the Company remained a threat, and hypothesized that the Virginians would not stay in the southeastern corner of the Ohio Valley as reported in Philadelphia. Croghan relayed his suspicions that the Ohio Company hoped to settle near Lake Erie to secure the profitable trade at .72 Croghan’s reports alarmed and angered Pennsylvanian officials and traders, for the Ohio Company had invaded lands Pennsylvanians believed theirs, undercut their trade prices, and incited the French in the Ohio Valley. Peters agreed with Croghan’s assessment: the Ohio Company threatened Pennsylvania’s claims and trade in the Ohio Valley, and he planned to both mimic and counter their efforts.

Peters must have thought that the Ohio Company’s membership provided a recipe for success, because he soon suggested to Thomas Penn that Pennsylvania copy the

Virginians’ idea and bring men of means and authority into the fur trade on Pennsylvania’s behalf.73 Thomas Penn agreed and advanced 500 pounds to “give the greatest as well as the most speedy encouragement to Trade you can, that we may be not be long after the

Ohio Company, ” demonstrating the provocation of the Ohio Company’s actions.74

However, the Ohio Company also prompted Penn to reach beyond trade. In May of 1750,

Thomas Penn instructed Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton to secure the Ohio Valley trade so Pennsylvania could “make Settlement there before the Virginians,” illustrating

72 “George Croghan to Richard Peters, 1749,” in Samuel Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co, 1853), 31. Pickawillany was located at the current day sight of Piqua, Ohio. 73 Jennings, Empire, 14. 74 “Penn to Hamilton, 1749,” George Mercer Papers, 531.

60

how the Ohio Company fed into Pennsylvanian’s fear of losing the Ohio Valley.75

Pennsylvania officials and proprietors did not worry alone; the Ohio Company also took action to secure the Ohio Valley for Virginia. Thomas Lee, President of the Virginia

Council and interim , used the Ohio Company’s political connections to the Board of Trade as demonstrated in the last section, to press the issue. Lee complained,

“The Pennsylvanians claim as I am told the 39 degree this will take from Virginia a considerable quantity of land, and prevent the Ohio Compy setling with any certainty.”76

Lee appealed to the Board of Trade, pleading for both Virginia and the Ohio Company. At this point, Lee knew the Ohio Company had the Crown’s favor, and he used that approval, imploring that Pennsylvania’s claims hurt and hindered their endeavors, and, if the Crown drew the boundary line in Pennsylvania’s favor, it might prevent the Ohio Company from fulfilling the Crown’s wishes, claiming the Ohio Valley for the British. Lee asked the Board of Trade to appoint to run a boundary between the two colonies in the disputed territory so that the Ohio Company could survey and settle with certainty.77 Lee, uncertain that his letter would have the desired effect in London, followed up with another plea to the Board of Trade and a letter to John Hanbury, asking him to lobby for a survey of the boundary between Virginia and Pennsylvania, pointing out that such a survey

75 Lee Quoted in Lawrence H. Gibson, British Empire Before the American Revolution: Zones of International Friction, vol. 4 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), 236. Jennings briefly introduces the intra-colonial competition between the Pennsylvania traders and the Ohio Company in Empire of Fortune, 15. However, he does not fully analyze the competition and halfway through, he takes the Ohio Company out of the equation and acts as if only governments battled for the borderland. 76 “Lee to the Board of Trade, 1749,” Papers Relating to the Ohio Land Company of Virginia, 75-76. 77 Ibid. There is no evidence that the Board of Trade ever appointed or even discussed boundary commissioners.

61

commission would both settle the on-going land disputes and give validity to the Ohio

Company’s grant.78 Ohio Company members, Lee and Hanbury included, did not want to claim, survey, and settle land whose ownership was in question.

As boundary disputes arose between Virginia and Pennsylvania, Maryland’s administration began to voice their concerns. Governor Samuel Ogle wrote to Governor

Hamilton regarding the border situation in the disputed territory, which included some of the Appalachians east of the Ohio Valley. Ogle asserted that he wished the matter resolved to everyone's satisfaction but wished that Pennsylvania’s proposed latitude line extended into the Ohio Valley. He followed this saying, “I cant well see how the gentlemen of the

Ohio Company can proceed to settle the lands in their intended grant before this is done.”79

Ogle’s reassurance suggests that Hamilton worried about the Ohio Company obtaining land and influence in Pennsylvania. Ogle’s comment indicates the Company grant and subsequent actions caused the Boundary discussion and the intra-colonial land grab. Ogle advised Hamilton that Pennsylvania should not undertake the cost of appointing commissioners to run the line between Virginia and Pennsylvania, for he believed the

Crown would appoint commissioners, as Virginia requested.80 Regarding the “5 degrees of longitude,” Hamilton previously mentioned, Ogle plainly stated, “the Gentlemen of Virginia have very different sentiments upon the Subject.”81 As the letters between Maryland and

Pennsylvania officials show, both colonies had issues with the Virginians’ plans for the boundary location.

78 “Orders of the Ohio Company June 1st 1749,”George Mercer Papers, 141. 79 “Gov. Ogle to Gov. Hamilton, Feb 3rd, 1749-50,” Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, 40. 80 Gov. Ogle to Gov. Hamilton, , 1750,” Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, 46. 81 Ibid.

62

After Hamilton received Lee’s letters, he did not sit back as the Maryland Governor advised, but rather Lee’s letter goaded Hamilton into increasing Pennsylvania’s empire- building activities. Hamilton sent Lewis Evans, a Welsh immigrant to Philadelphia interested in cartography, into the disputed territory in 1750, with the express intention of spying on the Ohio Company of Virginia.82 Lewis’s travels aimed to explore, survey, and make maps of the southern and western portions of Pennsylvania to gain intelligence on the region. Hamilton instructed Lewis to observe where the temporary southern boundary line came close to the Potomac River, and determine if it should touch the Potomac if extended far enough. Hamilton instructed Lewis to look for streams and roads along the

Susquehanna and Potomac that Pennsylvania could use. These orders proved that the land in question extended beyond the Ohio Valley. The regions specified in the orders, the land surrounding the Potomac River, lay in the watershed, and is, therefore, on the Atlantic side of the Eastern Continental Divide. The “west” referred to land east of the

Ohio River Valley. Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia quarreled over territory as far as the headwaters of the Potomac.83

While Hamilton instructed Pennsylvania’s agent, Lewis, to look for anything that could “affect the Proprietary interest,” he actually wanted an investigation of the Ohio

Company. Hamilton ordered him to note “the settlements that would interfere with the

Proprietary Claim, as Cresop’s store.”84 Thomas Cresap, Ohio Company agent and member, as previously discussed, owned a store on the northern banks of the Potomac in Maryland

82 Evans made a map of his travels during 1749, for more information see Henry N. Stevens, Lewis Evans: His Map of the Middle British Colonies in America (London: Henry Stevens, Son and Stiles, 1920), 1-4. 83 “To Lewis Evans, Respecting a Map, 1750,” Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, 47. 84 Ibid.

63

on land granted by the King to Cresap. Cresap’s store served as a western base of the Ohio

Company. They stowed their furs and trade goods, replenished their supplies, and if necessary, took refuge from violence. This point on the Potomac was not the only thing

Lewis looked for; he searched for Lord Fairfax’s dividing line, further indicating

Pennsylvania’s concern over the land holdings and influence of Virginia.

Lewis’ instructions to “Get Informed of the Stock and Scheme of the Virginia Co. trading to Ohio, and what Disadvantages they Labour Under, or advantages they now or hereafter may enjoy more than we from their Situation,” show that keeping up with the

Ohio Company was the real purpose of his mission. For the clandestine mission, Hamilton advised Lewis to “prevent suspicion of your being employed by us,” and to employ

“discretions in contriving the best Rout you can for gaining the necessary intellegence.”

Wary of other colonies, Hamilton devised a cover story, ordering Lewis to employ any traders or trappers as Lewis thought needed to maintain his facade.85 In addition to masking the mission’s real purpose, the traders would increase the quantity and quality of information. Acknowledging this, Pennsylvania agreed to pay the trader whatever losses sustained due to the necessary detours of this covert project. Hamilton’s instructions confirm that Pennsylvanians feared losing considerable acreage and trade with the Ohio

Indians to the Ohio Company, which created genuine enmity between the two colonies.

Evan’s orders show how the Ohio Company prompted Hamilton to modify Pennsylvania’s empire-building practices and policies.

Trader losses concerned Pennsylvanians, especially those engaged in the Ohio fur trade. In George Croghan’s aforementioned letter, he complained that the Indian trade the

85 Ibid., 48.

64

Ohio Company attempted to tap into was of “Considerable advantage to this .” He followed this statement with a plea for Pennsylvania to regulate and control the Indian trade and the traders themselves. This plea, along with assurances that the Ohio Company provided better prices and goods, put the Ohio Company on the radar of Pennsylvanian officials and traders.86

Of course, the Ohio Company underpriced its goods with an ulterior motive: settlement. The Ohio Company’s intentions and permission to settle the land are essential to the difference between Pennsylvania traders and employees of the Ohio Company.

Thomas Cresap, George Mercer, Christopher Gist, and others on the Ohio Company payroll, sought to extend British settlement into the Ohio Valley. While the Pennsylvania traders spread British influence, it was unintentional and lacked any further cause. The

Pennsylvanians were rogue imperialists, spreading the empire without the approval or involvement of the Crown. They did not survey or map or expand the British Empire.

Their concern lay solely with their private interests, which failed to coincide with the

British Crown. The Pennsylvanian traders merely followed the westward migration of their Shawnee trading partners. They showed no sign of wanting to claim land in the Ohio

Valley.87

86 “George Croghan Letter, July 3 1749,” Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, 31. 87 The best idea of the history and goals of the Pennsylvania traders can be found in the activities of George Croghan, Alfred A. Cave, “George Croghan and the Emergence of British Influence on the Ohio Frontier,” in Builders of Ohio: A Biographical History, ed. Warren Van Tine and Michael Pierce, (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State Press, 2003), 1-12; Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: 1959,) 3-47. For a broader history of the Pennsylvania involvement and trade with the Indians of the Alleghenies can be found in Michael McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 13-90: Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 22-39;

65

The Ohio Company sought land speculation, but that endeavor was tied to the

Native American fur trade. The Ohio Company’s multiple motivations allowed them to engage in the fur trade with the Ohio Indians at lower costs. If the Company experienced some loss in the fur trade, it was not as relevant as it was to the Pennsylvanians because the Virginian’s ultimate goal went beyond the fur trade. The Ohio Company engaged the

Ohio Indians in trade to create alliances in the region. Additionally, the Ohio Company paid those who carried out their fur trade, so that their trader’s financial interest lay not only in the outcome of their barters, they profited in the short term as well. For the Ohio Company and its agents, the fur trade was a preliminary, albeit necessary step for settling the Ohio

Country.

The Ohio Company sought out other means to obtain Indian friendships besides trade. Early in their history, the Ohio Company sought out the power to deal with the

Indians as the New Yorkers could do at Albany. They asked their London agent, Hanbury, to lobby for Virginia to have the same rights as New York, to give Native American’s gifts as diplomacy required.88 The Company asked for permission for the entire colony, privately lobbying for the public good, but in their company’s interest.

As the Pennsylvanian traders and Ohio Company agents vied for Ohio Indian furs and friendship, hostilities grew between the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania. This antagonism led to hostility, especially in the Ohio Company’s early years. This intercolonial struggle for dominance in the region transformed the Ohio Country into a borderland between colonies as well as empires, and this competition impeded the Ohio Company’s

88 “Orders of the Ohio Company June 1st 1749,” George Mercer Papers, 141.

66

efforts.89 Considering Hamilton’s position, as well as Lewis Evans’ secret mission, the

Pennsylvanians’ attitude is unsurprising. In 1752, the Ohio Company, in partnership with

Virginia planned a conference at to gain permission from the Iroquois and Ohio

Indians to erect a settlement at the Three Rivers (modern-day Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania).

Dinwiddie petitioned Governor Hamilton to partake in the conference, but he declined. In a lackluster effort, he sent George Croghan to serve as the colony’s single representative.90

While Hamilton’s response was lukewarm at best, the Pennsylvania traders were outright hostile. The Pennsylvanians, furious over the Ohio Company’s trade practices, mounted a propaganda war in the borderlands. Although Hamilton assured Dinwiddie that he would stop the Pennsylvania traders’ inflammatory remarks to Native Americans in the borderland, they continued, and not only in the Ohio Valley. The Pennsylvanians alerted

Virginia and Pennsylvania’s backcountry settlements of the dangers of the Ohio Company’s policies and practices, and asserted that the Company’s proposed infrastructure would help the French, and the Ohio Indians allied with them, to destroy their settlements.91 Ohio

Company leaders could not stop the Pennsylvania traders’ antagonistic rhetoric.

If the Ohio Indians had not already realized it, Croghan indicates that the

Pennsylvania traders made sure the Ohio Indians knew the difference between them and the Virginians. Native Americans welcomed Pennsylvania traders, who carted coveted bolts of fabric, mirrors, and guns into the Ohio region, and then left to return with more trade goods. The Pennsylvania traders lacked surveying equipment and showed no signs

89 Fred Anderson, The War that Made America, 27. 90 George Mercer, “Case of the Ohio Company, 1754, Enclosure 2,” The George Mercer Papers, 243; For the Virginia-Pennsylvania rivalry see, Bailey, Ohio Company, 103-122. 91 Bailey, Ohio Company, 113.

67

of staying. However, as Croghan reported, when the Virginians showed up laden with surveying equipment and messages from the King, the Ohio Indians became wary.

Successfully acting as an Ohio Company agent in the disputed territory required skilled diplomacy. To carry out their ambitions to claim, settle, and distribute the land, the Ohio

Company agents had to work and ally themselves with both the Iroquois Confederacy and the local Ohio Indian groups.

The Pennsylvania traders’ rhetoric almost ruined the Ohio Company’s Logstown

Conference; they badmouthed the Ohio Company and spread (most likely correct) rumors about the Company’s intentions for the conference. The Pennsylvanian disruption and the consequent hesitation by the Ohio Indians to attend delayed the conference for several months. The Pennsylvania traders temporarily halted the Ohio Company’s activities, including this conference, which aimed to expand the British land claims and build structures of empire. The intentions of the Pennsylvania traders failed to coincide with the

Board of Trade’s interests.

The Pennsylvania traders brought the Virginia-Pennsylvania rivalry back to intra- colonial politicking. Virginia’s governors, Thomas Lee and his successor Robert Dinwiddie began an ink and parchment war with Pennsylvania’s governor, James Hamilton. Both Lee and Dinwiddie, highly invested in the situation as Ohio Company stockholders, blamed the

Pennsylvanians for the disputes. While Hamilton supported the colonists from his region, his position proved difficult to defend as the Ohio Company had royal instructions to trade with the Native Americans and expand the British Empire. Hamilton, however, failed to rein in the traders from his colony. When Lee protested and suggested that Hamilton jail the offenders, Hamilton replied that the traders were not in Philadelphia; most likely

68

finding them and throwing them in jail was not on Hamilton’s priority list.92 Even if

Hamilton had looked, he would not have easily found the offenders, for, as Hamilton said, the traders did not frequent Philadelphia. Eventually, the Ohio Company wanted “Legal

Endeavours be used to prevent the Pensilvania and other traders from Trading on the

Branches of the River Mississipi without a lycense from the Government.”93 While this request would have been unenforceable if it had been made into law, this request illustrates the hostility between the Virginians and Pennsylvanians. Despite their shared pride in the Empire, British colonies competed with one another. Governors frequently complained about one colony’s infringement on another, and the colonies rarely cooperated or acted in unison. Only a few years prior, Maryland and Pennsylvania had fought the Conjacular War over their boundary, which only ended when the King intervened.94 British colonies were distinct, separate and often in competition with one another.

While the Pennsylvania government continued to disagree with Virginia, many

Pennsylvanian traders switched allegiances over time. As the Ohio Company of Virginia became more established, their incentives drew away some of Pennsylvania’s traders, which strengthened the Ohio Company’s ability to operate in the borderland. Native

American alliances were built on personal relationships, which Pennsylvanians like

Croghan and Trent had established, making individual Pennsylvanians some of the Ohio

Company’s best operators in the Ohio Country. George Croghan aided the Ohio Company

92 Bailey, Ohio Company, 112. 93 “Orders and Resolutions of the Ohio Company and of the Committee of the Company, October 20, 1748- , 1763,” George Mercer Papers, 169. 94 Bailey, Thomas Cresap, 31-55.

69

because the Company was a reliable trading partner and supplier of goods, and most enticingly, Croghan obtained a 200,000-acre claim adjacent to the Ohio Company’s grant.95

Croghan negotiated for the Ohio Company on many occasions and introduced the Ohio

Company to many traders who eventually became Ohio Company agents, such as Andrew

Montour, the best interpreter and cultural mediator of the era, and William Trent, who had previously reported on the Ohio Company to the Pennsylvania Council. When traders, regardless of their colonial allegiance, stood to gain personally from Ohio Company’s activities, their colonial loyalties became open for negotiation.

While Croghan and other native Pennsylvanians aided the Ohio Company, the two colonies still competed. Intercolonial cooperation remained elusive even as France threatened to take the Ohio Valley. In 1754, George Croghan, perhaps motivated by his interest in the Ohio Company, suggested that rather than hauling trade goods into the Ohio

Valley, Pennsylvania should purchase the needed trade goods from the Ohio Company. As the Company already had the goods west of the mountains, this arrangement would save

Pennsylvania the cost of hauling the goods over the Appalachians. However, even the possibility of evading the cost of hauling trade goods could not tempt the Pennsylvanians into cooperation with their southern neighbors. 96

95 Alfred A. Cave, “George Croghan and the Emergence of British Influence on the Ohio Frontier,” in Builders of Ohio: A Biographical History, ed. Warren Van Tine and Michael Pierce, (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State Press, 2003), 1-12 96 “George Croghan to Gov. H., February 3, 1754,” Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, 119. Even as Trent and Croghan remained involved in other trade schemes in Pennsylvania financial circles, they still dedicated their considerable talents to the Ohio Company and the colony of Virginia whenever need be. Jennings holds that the Pennsylvania traders (he picks on Croghan in particular) betrayed Pennsylvania by selling out to the Ohio Company; he does not see their work with multiple colonies as a demonstration of the independent nature of the traders and necessary loosening of colonial allegiance required by the realities of the borderland. Jennings, Empire, 39.

70

The as personal and monetary interests of Virginians and Pennsylvanians caused both British colonies to take action in the Ohio Valley, which in turn spurred on the French who in turn threatened both Virginia and Pennsylvania. Anderson points out that the

Virginia/Pennsylvania two-pronged attack that the French saw as organized was not a single invasion, but rather a rivalry.97 While unplanned, the two-headed nature of the

British movements instilled fear in the hearts of the French and furthermore drove imperial contention and empire-building on each side to new heights. Each empire hustled to beat the other in the competition for the Ohio Valley.

Conclusion

The Ohio Company members’ plans to expand their wallets necessitated politicking within Virginian and in London governmental and social circles. A land-speculation company aimed at settling the Ohio Valley needed the support of both provincial and imperial governments, and through the members’ positions, political connections and lobbying efforts, the Ohio Company gained validation and distinguished themselves from other colonists in the borderland. The Ohio Company’s political pursuits spurred on expansionary policies at the imperial and colonial levels, as seen from the changes in imperial policies in London and those actions taken by the administration in Pennsylvania.

When the Ohio Company triumphantly politicked and gained permission to build the

British Empire, the members completed the first stage of the empire-building process. The next stages required the Company to find different type of agent. Their Ohio Valley agents were not officeholders or wealthy merchants as in Williamsburg and London; they were

97 Anderson, Crucible of War, 30.

71

traders and explorers with Borderland experience. The Ohio Company’s success in mapping, surveying, and negotiating in the Ohio Valley required an entirely different style of politicking

72

Chapter Two: Mapping the Ohio Valley: Cresap, Gist, and Celeron (1748-1752)

“Discover the Lands upon the River Ohio, & other adjoining Branches of the Mississippi down as low as the great Falls thereof: You are particularly to observe the Ways & Passes thro all the Mountains you cross, & take an exact Account of the Soil, Quality, & Product of the Land, and the Wideness and Deepness of the Rivers, & the several Falls belonging to them, together with the Courses & Bearings of the Rivers & Mountains: You are also to observe what Nations of Indians inhabit there, their Strength & Numbers, who they trade with, & in what Comodities they deal.”

-Ohio Company Instructions to Christopher Gist, 17501

While the Ohio Company members waited to hear on the status of their petition, they began sending agents into Ohio Valley. As instructions to their agent Christopher Gist indicate, the Ohio Company members, knew little about the and the

Ohio Valley beyond. Empire-building required knowledge; therefore, it required agents capable of obtaining that information. From 1748 to 1752, Ohio Company agents in the borderland engaged in the earliest stages of empire-building, by exploring, surveying, mapmaking, as well as trading and building alliances with Native Americans. The ripple

1 “Instructions Given Mr. Christopher Gist By the Committee of the Ohio Company The 11th Day of September 1750,” in Christopher Gist’s Journal with Historical, Geographical, and Ethnological Notes and Biographies of his Contemporaries, ed. William Darlington, (New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 31-32. Also, the “great falls” or the “falls of the Ohio,” located between present day Clarksville, Illinois across from Louisville, , were known by the Company as an end to the contiguous navigable Ohio River. They did not know where these falls were located, but they knew they existed.

73

effect of the Ohio Company agents’ activities influenced the policies and actions of

Company, Colony, and Crown, and shifted the political and economic currents of the Ohio

River Valley. While Native American reaction to the Ohio Company’s intrusion varied, the

French as a whole increased their own mapping of the Ohio River Valley.

This chapter argues that both British and French mapping constituted the first stage of empire-building in the Ohio Valley and that the Ohio Company required specialized agents capable of carrying out this process and reporting their findings to Virginia and

London. To this end, the first section of this chapter investigates the credentials and characteristics of the Ohio Company agents needed to map the Ohio Valley successfully.

The second section, “Mapping the Ohio Valley” explores the Ohio Company’s initial forays into the disputed territory and argues that the French launched Céleron’s military expedition in reaction to the movement of Ohio Company’s agents. The third section,

“Filling in Maps,” analyzes how the Ohio Company relayed borderland intelligence along the trans-Appalachian and trans-Atlantic communication networks to fill in Ohio Valley

“maps.” Without the Ohio Company agents, neither the British nor the French knew what lay in the Ohio Valley. These sections illustrate that Ohio Company agents and their mapping activities were necessary for empire-building, and that they agents sparked

British and French interests and movements in the Ohio Valley.

74

Historiography

As stated previously, this chapter investigates the Ohio Company’s exploratory activities in the Ohio Valley and furthers the scholarship of mapping, negotiated empire- building, and the trans-Atlantic and Trans-Appalachian communication networks. This dissertation employs Cynthia Van Zandt’s definition of mapping in the Ohio Valley context:

Any information-gathering, including exploration of landscapes and inhabitants, is considered “mapping.” The Ohio Company members knew little about the Ohio Valley or its politics. This chapter demonstrates that the Company had to map the region before attempting to construct structures or settlements, without knowing the location of rivers,

Villages, or swamps, how could the Ohio Company members know what land they wanted to claim, or how they could access and protect it. Without showing the agents’ mapping and the intricate day-to-day diplomatic processes, the existing historiography shows an incomplete picture of empire-building, one that focuses on soldiers and settlers, and not on the shareholders and surveyors.2 By arguing that “mapping” the borderland required specific skills, and those with those skills shaped the empire, this chapter adds to historiographical understandings of the mid-1700s Ohio Valley and the origins of the

British and French conflict.3

This analysis of the Ohio Company agents furthers mapping scholarship by demonstrating that successful mapping required the participation of specialized

2 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673- 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi. Amy Turner Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries,” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002),15- 28. 3 Cynthia Van Zandt, Brothers Among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early American, 1580-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008), 6-10.

75

individuals. Standard treatments fail to recognize the mappers, their skills, and the repercussions of their actions. Historians should not summarily dismiss the Ohio Company agents, because their endeavors illuminate early British borderland activities, and provide context and cause for the famous events of 1755, which most historians view as the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. This chapter highlights the role private colonists played in the British empire-building and demonstrate that the events of 155 were not sudden movements by either empire, but instead were the result of a decade of growing tension that was in no small part caused by the Ohio Company’s actions.

In Empire of Fortune, Francis Jennings briefly mentions Christopher Gist but neglects other Ohio Company agents. Fred Anderson follows Jennings’ example, failing to mention the Ohio Company employees who mapped and ruffled French feathers in the process.4 Bailey’s statement, that the Company “contained within its membership every element needed to make it a great success,” ignores the fact that most members lacked the qualifications necessary to map the Ohio Valley.5 Paul Mapp’s study on maps and knowledge on British politics also ignores the individuals gathered the intelligence to fill in those charts.6 The Ohio Company agents, who survived extreme temperatures, wild animals, perturbed Native Americans and coureurs de bois, sickness, hunger, and thirst, had

4 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 8-20. Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 7-30. 5 Kenneth Bailey, Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer and Indian Agent (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976), 26. 6 Paul Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 147-259.

76

to possess particular motivations and skills.7 The Ohio Company required skilled employees to map the borderland.

This chapter reveals the agency of the Ohio Company’s employees, and the influence of their reports on the colonial centers, which illuminates the negotiated nature of empire- building. This chapter gives a play by play of how those working in the borderland shaped the empire. The Ohio Company agents interpreted the orders of the Company and Crown and were somewhat bound to them, but once they moved into the Appalachians, and certainly into the Ohio Valley, the agents gained a degree of freedom; they had the agency to shape the empire.8 The Company members relied on reports from their agents, which gave the agents the chance to influence the course and nature of the British Empire. This dissertation illuminates how Ohio Company agents, Ohio Company members, and governmental officials of both Colony and Crown all negotiated to shape the British invasion into the Ohio River Valley.

The third section of the chapter focuses on how the Ohio Company’s on-the-ground information traveled across the Appalachian Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean to the colonial and imperial centers.9 A lot of scholarship regarding British commercial networks focuses on London-based mercantile communication. However, very little scholarship has been completed on anything involving the American interior or the benefits of colonial

7 Coureur De Bois were Independent Frenchmen who trapped animals with pelts and traded with Native Americans for additional furs. 8 Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries,” 15-18. 9 This is focused on the international ramifications of borderland activities as is called for Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, "On Borderlands." The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 365.

77

enterprises to empire building.10 McCusker and Morgan, in their introduction to The Early

Modern Atlantic Economy, discuss how trans-Atlantic enterprise was an important conduit which also led to the establishment of settlements on the American littoral, while other

British commercial network studies have focused on how British merchants intentionally benefited society. However, none of these works penetrate past the American coastline.

This dissertation adds to the scholarship of commercial networks by illuminating how

American companies served as information conduits and established communities beyond the Atlantic World.11

Choosing the Right On-The-Ground Agents

Just as critical as Dinwiddie, the Lees, and the Hanburys were to the Ohio Company’s success were the Ohio Company agents who had the knowledge, skills, contacts, and motivation to act on the Company’s behalf in the disputed territory. While the Ohio

Company members risked their money to realize their company’s ambitions, they were neither capable nor disposed to travel into the dangerous and largely unknown lands to further their mission. Even after being in Virginia for six years, Dinwiddie admitted his ignorance of the Ohio Valley in 1757 stating, “As I am a stranger to that part of the Country

10 For more information on how the expanding British economy helped spur on colonization and expansion of the empire see, Patrick K. O’Brien, “Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal States, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: vol. 2, The Eighteenth Century, eds. P.J. Marshall and Alaine Low, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001), 53-76. 11 John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds. The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001) 1. Sheryllynne Haggerty, 'Merely for Money?’: Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750–1815 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012), 1-8.

78

I must refer to Colo. Washington.”12 The leader of the Ohio Company and the colony of

Virginia lacked this essential knowledge, forcing him to rely on an agent of the Company and the Colony to make decisions in the disputed territory.

Even those with general knowledge about the Ohio Valley, such as Thomas Lee, had no desire to journey into the rugged forest to camp, trade, trap, and combat the elements.

The Ohio Company needed agents not only capable of survival in the borderland but motivated to take on such risky work. In fact, because the Ohio Company’s agents were constantly involved with the Company’s activities, they often seem more concerned than the members regarding the success of the Company in the Ohio Valley. For instance, when planning the Logstown conference, Governor Dinwiddie commented to Thomas Cresap, that they were the only members of the Ohio Company concerned about the Company’s fate or their Indian relations.13 Most members, while financially involved, remained unaware or unconcerned with the day-to-day activities of the Company’s employees. Ohio Company investors risked a bit of their money on Ohio land speculation, but their agents often risked their time and their lives. Many of the Ohio Company agents had experience working for colonial governments, and they knew the potential rewards outweighed the risks.

These on-the-ground agents revealed that many of the geographic details in the

Ohio Company’s petitions were incorrect. The did not lay not just beyond the Appalachians, as the Ohio Company petition claimed, revealing how little intelligence

Ohio Company members and the rest of the Colonial and European worlds had regarding

12 “Dinwiddie, 9, 1757,” The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, Brock, R.A. ed. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883), 720. Hereafter referred to as Dinwiddie Papers. 13 “Dinwiddie to Thomas Cresap, 23, 1752,” Dinwiddie Papers, 17-19.

79

the American interior. The details in the Ohio Company’s petitions and the Board of

Trade’s responses reveal the Board’s unfamiliarity with the geography of the American interior. The ignorance of members and royal officials necessitated the involvement of agents like Thomas Cresap (who was also a member), Christopher Gist, and Hugh Parker.

Just as important as accurate geographic surveys, and land descriptions were to the

Ohio Company’s success, were the relations and knowledge of the Ohio Indians. Such information was paramount, and understanding the on-the-ground situation relays how specialized and detailed the agent's knowledge had to be. Knowing the languages, cultures, habits of the Native Americans was essential to successful information-gathering in the

Ohio Valley. Native Americans and Europeans built and maintained beneficial relationships through trade. While trade brought alliances with Native American alliances, it was not profitable for the British or the French.14 In regard to the Ohio Company’s fur trade,

Jennings argues that the Ohio Company never had much success in trading with the Native

Americans despite the preparations of the members. However, the Ohio Company members aimed not to profit from the fur trade; they employed agents to create alliances and the acquire land.15 Success in Native American trade and alliances required an understanding of the power dynamics of the Ohio Valley for which the Ohio Company relied on its on-the-ground agents in the Ohio Valley.

The Iroquois were intricately tied to Ohio Valley politics. The Confederacy held a

14 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 33. 15 Jennings, Empire, 15. Many British colonies and individuals engaged in the fur trade even though it was dangerous and financially unpredictable because monopolies did not control their fur trade. Jennings explains that Native American trade only a minorly contributed to national wealth, but because it led British control over the Ohio Valley, the British Empire invested time, energy, and resources into the Indian trade.

80

great deal of power in the region despite the considerable distance from New York, the area that was the Iroquoian base, to the Ohio Valley. As over-trapping depleted the beaver population in the 1600s, furs became difficult to obtain, and the trade imbalance between

Native Americans and Europeans became obvious. The beaver population decline forced all Native Americans in the northeast, especially the Hudson Valley sought new trapping grounds.16 The Iroquois, in particular, suffered. The Iroquois lands were depleted of beaver, and competitors to the north, the Neutral and Huron peoples had easy access to

French forts and thicker pelts, became powerful, partially due to their European trade partners. As the fur trade grew out of the Iroquois reach, and disease and warfare ravaged their population, the Iroquois, armed with Dutch guns aggressively campaigned to cement and expand their power and influence.17

To compensate for their losses and regain access to beaver, the Iroquois targeted the Ohio Valley for its furs and access to French markets. They consolidated their political power, strategically attacking the Native Americans in the Ohio Valley in a long string of battles known as the . The Beaver Wars are among the bloodiest in North

American History. While casualties are difficult to calculate, the Iroquois obliterated large

16 This chapters specifically uses the term “trapping grounds” to describe the Iroquois conception of the Ohio Valley. “Hunting grounds” indicates that the Iroquois used the land to obtain food when in reality the Ohio Valley furs were destined for sale to Europeans. The commodification of the Ohio Valley furs makes “trapping ground” most appropriate. 17 The Dutch willingness to trade firearms did not extend to all Native Americans. The Dutch were unwilling, for a variety of reasons to trade firearms to the Delaware Indians who lived around their more in present-day and Delaware. Alan Taylor, American Colonies: The Settling of North America (New York: Viking Books, 2001), 105-107.

81

confederacies including the Huron, Neutral, Erie, , and Shawnee.18 The

Iroquois captured and colonized the land surrounding their holdings, effectively expanding their empire. Iroquoian attacks destroyed or captured some groups, and others disbanded or fled west beyond the Mississippi or south to the . This constant war (and disease) led to a declining number of Iroquois, which required them to adopt foreign individuals to replace lost kin, a practice called “mourning war.”19 The Iroquois depopulated the Ohio Valley, secured their power in the region, and trapped the now sparsely populated Belle Riviere.20

Even as the Iroquois claimed the region, other Native Americans moved in, filling the void and resentfully accepting the Iroquois “dominion.” Often, these inhabitants migrated from the eastern side of the Appalachian Mountains when British settlement pushed them west. These refugee communities chafed under the control of the Iroquois, and this relationship became sorely strained as time went on. To avoid outright rebellion among the Ohio Indians, the Iroquois hold on the Ohio Country was much looser than the

Confederacy asserted. The Iroquois extended their claims by right of conquest, but the

“conquered” contested the Iroquoian claims. The Iroquois used a half-king system, where they appointed a headman to maintain control over Ohio Indian bands, but he had to keep the community's allegiance to maintain his power. This already difficult task was made even more onerous as settlements often moved, dissolved, and reformed under new

18 Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chair Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984), 84-112. 19 Daniel Richter, “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience,” The William and Mary Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1983): 529-537. 20 Belle Riviere is the French term for the Ohio River Valley.

82

leadership, meaning the Iroquois had a negotiated relationship with the Ohio Indians, not the absolute rule they claimed.21 Iroquois strength depended on fluid alliances. When the

Dutch deserted their trading outposts, the Iroquois forged a trading relationship with the

French but soon found new trading partners and allies in the British. The Dutch vacancy allowed the Ohio Company to tap into previously French-dominated fur markets and extend its claim on the Ohio Valley.

In Article Fifteen of the Treaty of Utrecht, the French accepted the dubious proposition that the Iroquois were under the control of the British Empire. The treaty, combined with Iroquoian claims of dominance in the Ohio Valley, led the British to believe that their own claim on the Ohio Country was strong and valid. 22 It is important to note that while the British claimed dominance over the Iroquois, in reality, they did not and could not control them. The Iroquois would have laughed at the British assertion that they were vassals of the Crown. From the mid-1600s until 1763, both the French and British courted the Six Nations in hopes of winning their favor.23 The British claim was tenuous because, in reality, they held no claim over the Iroquois, and the Iroquois claim over the

Ohio Indians was less than desired. The French claim on the Ohio Valley was based on the right of and was equally tenuous because the French had no real presence in the

21 More information on Iroquoian control is found in this dissertation’s later chapters. 22 Jennings, Empire, 120. 23 After 1722, the Tuscarora joined the Iroquois as the sixth nation, after they migrated North due to the pressures from the British settlement in the western Carolinas. Hereafter they were known as the six nations rather than the five. This addition highlights two things: first, the Iroquois were willing to add a new member, and second, it shows the constant flux of Native American life due to European expansion. This is not to suggest that the Indian’s lives were static before European colonization, but rather to point out the disruption caused by the arrival of Europeans. Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 289- 290.

83

lower portion of Ohio Valley. Despite each group’s confidence, the British ignored French assertions, the French scoffed at the British-Iroquoian claims, and many Ohio Indians disregarded Iroquoian rule.

Many groups claimed the Ohio Valley, but very few real examples of French, British, or Iroquoian power existed there in 1748 when the Ohio Company began foraying into the disputed territory. When the Ohio Company began moving into the Ohio Valley, both empires hurried to shore up alliances, prove rights of conquest, and erect structures to protect their claim. To achieve these goals, the British and French empires had to understand the tenuous hold the Iroquois had over the rebellious Ohio Indians and understand Native American economics, politics, and culture. The Ohio Company needed agents such as Thomas Cresap, Christopher Gist, and William Trent to navigate the Ohio

Valley political currents.

Thomas Cresap’s history, a thrilling tale in its own right, allows an understanding of his actions, why he took them, and how he gained the knowledge that was crucial to his successful ventures in the Ohio Country. Thomas Cresap, an Ohio Company founder, lacked the wealth and familial connections of the other stockholders. This deficiency, accordingly, motivated him to work in the Ohio Valley. Luckily, Cresap possessed the survival skills to go into the Ohio River Valley and claim unknown lands for the Ohio Company and British

Empire. Cresap, who “had so much courage that it seemed to seep out of his very pores,” possessed a few tracts of land in western Maryland by the time the Ohio Company formed, but he had meager origins.24 Around 1715, Thomas Cresap, then a young teenage

24 Allan Eckhart, The Wilderness Empire: A Narrative (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 160.

84

immigrated to America from Skipton, England. In 1727 he married Hannah Johnson, a member of a merchant family, who would serve as Cresap’s partner in all of his

“frontier” endeavors.25 After their marriage, Cresap fled from Maryland into Virginia to escape debt collectors, and perhaps met Lee and Washington. When he returned to

Maryland, Hannah proved unwilling to migrate south. Instead, the Cresap family relocated to Wright’s Ferry, a location both Maryland and Pennsylvania claimed. Cresap threw himself into this dispute called the Conojocular War, or Cresap’s War, on the side of

Maryland’s proprietors.26 Vicious fighting and a combative character gained Cresap the infamous nickname, “the Maryland Monster.” Cresap served time in a Philadelphia jail, where he stayed until Maryland arranged for his release. The Pennsylvanians eventually drove Thomas Cresap and his family out of Wright’s Ferry when they burned his house with the Cresap family still inside. They escaped and fled into western Maryland.

Working for the Maryland government demonstrated to Cresap that land speculation and loyalty to a colony could pay off. After leaving Wright’s Ferry, Cresap’s moved to present-day Frederick, Maryland, where the Calverts rewarded his loyalty with land, which he sold. Then, the Calverts granted Cresap another large in western

Maryland, in present-day Allegany County, and his new location proved paramount. Cresap

25 Allen Powell, Forgotten Heroes of the Maryland Frontier: Christopher Gist, Evan Shelby, Jr. Thomas Cresap (Baltimore: Gateway Press: 2001), 119. 26 For details of Thomas and Hannah Cresap’s involvement in the Maryland- Pennsylvania dispute, and on the Conojocular War in general, see Thomas Cresap: Maryland Frontiersman (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1944), 48. It is during this intercolonial war that Hannah Cresap, Thomas’ wife, gained her fame among the Pennsylvanians as a fierce enemy and combatant; she fought alongside Thomas and often acted as a lookout and a scout for her husband’s raiding parties. When the Pennsylvanians attacked the Cresap home, Hannah alone and seven months pregnant, fought them off. Hannah’s tough demeanor and ability with a rifle later enabled Cresap to maintain a fortified home on the edge of the British Empire.

85

built a fortified home and attempted to christen it “Skipton,” after his birthplace in England, but the name never stuck, and it was referred to as “Cresap’s” or “Oldtown.” Oldtown was on the intersection of the Warrior Path, a major north-south Iroquoian path, and the

Potomac River, a natural conduit from the mountains to the Chesapeake Bay, and he made the most of that location. Cresap’s move into the region transformed the Native American crossroads into a British crossroads. By operating a trading post on the junction of the

Potomac River and Warrior’s Path, Cresap benefited from and influenced the region’s fur trade, provided trade necessities for Native Americans and colonists, and guaranteed that he would have hands in all the pies baking in the Allegheny Mountains and Ohio Valley.27

Cresap’s location made him a specialist in Indian affairs and the fur trade and Cresap continued to aid Maryland, Virginia, and the British Empire until the Revolution, personally profiting all the while.

Cognizant of his vulnerable position, especially in his early years on the edge of empire, Cresap liberally hosted and fed various Indian groups, causing the Iroquois to call him “Big Spoon.” Cresap welcomed and fed Native American travelers, something Young

George Washington noted in his journals, proclaiming that while at Cresap’s he saw his first

War Dance and scalp.28 Through his location and activities, Cresap had observed the culture and language of various bands of Native Americans and served as the Ohio

Company’s Native American expert.

27 Bailey, Thomas Cresap, 57. 28 George Washington, “Diary entry: 23 March 1748,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed , 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-01-02-0001-0002-0013, The Diaries of George Washington vol. 1, ed. Donald Jackson, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 13.

86

Cresap was unique as both an Ohio Company member and as an agent. No other members journeyed into the disputed Ohio Valley. While Cresap had enough money to help finance the Ohio Company, his finances still motivated him to work in the disputed territory, despite the dangerous drawbacks. The rugged mountains lacked roads or inns, and the weather provided enough hazards without the French bounty for English scalps.

Because of his skills and knowledge, Cresap played a significant role in the formation of the

Ohio Company, causing Kenneth Bailey to assert that he was, “the most important member of the Company after the death of Thomas Lee.”29 While Bailey’s assertion remains debatable, Cresap held first-hand information about the area the Ohio Company wanted to settle and he advised other Company leaders in most situations regarding Indian diplomacy. Cresap’s previous endeavors on the edge of the British Empire made him a valuable resource, especially when it came time for the Company to hire other agents.

Cresap’s first recommendation was that the Ohio Company hire Christopher Gist, who became the Ohio Company’s most well-known agent. Gist’s meticulous journals are an excellent resource detailing his activities and surroundings as he traveled in the Ohio

Valley. Gist was an outstanding agent partially due to his formal education, and the Ohio

Company’s activities required a man with his talents. Unusual for a 1750s trader, Gist had formal training in surveying and mathematics, which he needed to carry out the Ohio

Company’s missions. His education was especially valuable when Virginia began requiring formal licensing from the College of William and Mary to survey for the colony. Gist’s survey training and experiences made him a highly desirable borderland agent.30

29 Kenneth Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000, org. pub. 1939), 47. 30 Bailey, Gist, 15-17.

87

A native of Baltimore, Gist began his career serving in Maryland’s Rangers, a special unit of the Maryland , chosen for their knowledge of the surrounding area and the

“frontier.” For the Rangers, Gist built and maintained the “Ranger Road,” a wagon road from Baltimore to present-day Frederick, Maryland, through , unsettled by

Whites. This task required him to repeatedly travel up and down the road in areas still very much untouched by English settlement. Gist later worked as a merchant and owned at least one ship that transported trade goods to and from England before he ran into personal financial trouble that left him heavily indebted. Gist served as the agent for the

British Fur Company for eight years, but in 1732, disaster struck when a warehouse filled with furs burned. The British Fur Company held Gist responsible for the damage and charged him with a claim of 10,000 pounds sterling, which Gist paid for the rest of his life.

Perhaps trying to get a fresh start, Gist relocated his family to the Yadkin River Valley in the

Carolina backcountry. Despite the grief he found in the fur trade, the experiences later benefited him, the Ohio Company, and the British Empire. Through his trappings and trading, he came to know the country between Williamsburg and present-day Pittsburgh exceptionally well. Gist’s biographer asserts that Gist knew that stretch of land better than his contemporaries. His contemporaries agreed, for not long after Gist relocated to the

Yadkin River Valley, Thomas Cresap advised the Ohio Company to hire Gist to explore, map and survey the Ohio Valley.31

Gist’s financial strains explain why he risked building the British Empire in a highly contested area. The Ohio Company paid well compared to homesteading the Yadkin River

Valley and provided adequate motivation for Gist to take on-the-ground action.

31 Bailey, Gist, 20-23.

88

Additionally, Gist also may have seen this opportunity as a way to work his way back up the financial ladder and reclaim his position as a trans-Atlantic trader. It proved to be a good match: Gist needed the Ohio Company, and the Company needed him.

The Ohio Company needed more than two agents, and with Cresap’s help, and added

Hugh Parker to the payroll. Parker’s backcountry acumen made him useful and influential.

He actively attended and participated in the Company’s committee meetings, however

Parker’s membership is unclear, and so was his past. He was a Maryland trader and an expert in both the fur trade and Native American politics, but other than that, his past is unknown.32 Regardless, the Ohio Company was lucky to have Parker. An experienced trader and trapper, Parker knew the disputed territory and its conditions. As time went on,

Parker became the Company’s workhorse, packing and hauling goods and new furs in and out of the Ohio Valley. In the initial stages of his employment, the members seemed not to trust Parker, they laid out strict rules for Parker’s activities, especially regarding appropriate trade prices and partners. Parker must have proven himself, because as time went on, he took on many of the Ohio Company projects in the borderland.33

Parker obviously held an interest in the fur trade, and most likely would have been motivated to join an organization looking to expand that enterprise. This Marylander may have hitched his horse to the Ohio Company’s wagon due to the border disputes between

Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. Marylanders would have known at this point that their charter prohibited them from reaching into the Ohio Valley. Considering this possibility, Parker, maybe because of an association with Cresap, or maybe because of the

32 Bailey, Ohio Company, 71. 33 Parker’s activities for the Ohio Company are briefly outlined in, “A Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, June 21, 1749,” The George Mercer Papers, 1-7.

89

multitude of competing traders in Pennsylvania, joined up with the Virginians. Parker, as a trader, knew the erratic nature of the fur trade. A warm winter, poor relations with the

Native Americans, or poor international markets could quickly bring a trader to his knees.

While it is unknown if Parker experienced financial strain, he likely preferred the reliable and steady pay of the Ohio Company to the fickle fur trade. Like Cresap and Gist, Parker may have believed working with the Virginia gentry worth the risk of empire-building in the climatically difficult and potentially dangerous Ohio Valley. As the accounts of the Ohio

Company agents show, there were many narrow escapes for them, and many British traders did not make it out of the Ohio Valley. Additionally, Parker may have joined the

Ohio Company after the King granted its petition, his name is not on the Company’s original petitions, but he could have bought stock after the company sent the petitions to London.34

While these three agents would serve the Ohio Company in its infancy, when the

Company’s activities in the borderland began to grow, the Company looked for new employees who would be well suited for the job. To find men with the skills and motivations to be on-the-ground agents, the Ohio Company hired Pennsylvania traders.

These Pennsylvanians, anxious to expand their fur trade and possibly their landholdings, may have become involved with the Ohio Company and the colony of Virginia because the pacifist Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania Assembly proved unwilling to expand westward in the 1740s and early 1750s due to their fears that it would create conflict with the Native

Americans. The Crown’s support of the Ohio Company also may have critically influenced the traders. The traders understood the structure of the Empire, and how to best use it to

34 Ibid., In the Ohio Company’s Resume, Parker is listed as one of the attendees of the Ohio Company’s meetings, but it is unclear if he is there as a member or as an agent.

90

their advantage, showing the further intersection of private and public interest regarding imperial actions in the borderland. Experienced and ambitious traders such as George

Croghan, , and William Trent proved willing to work with a Crown- approved Virginia-based Company, especially when the Company’s aims and interests mirrored their own. The interests of those British colonists in the borderland became even more firmly tied together after the governor of Canada declared it “open season” on British traders in the Ohio Country in the early 1750s. In fact, it was in the early 1750s when

William Trent, one of the more active Pennsylvanians, took on the Company’s cause.35

William Trent had the experience required to be a successful Ohio Company agent.

In June of 1746, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas appointed Trent to captain of one of the four Pennsylvanian companies intended to go against Canada in King George’s War (the

American segment of the War of Austrian Succession). Pennsylvania stationed Trent in

Saratoga, New York for over a year where his command garrisoned and completed scouting duties. He had military experience and had served the British Crown previously. In

December of 1747, Trent’s commission expired, and he returned to Pennsylvania, was honorably discharged, and publicly thanked by the Pennsylvania Assembly. In March of

1749, he became a county judge. In that same year, the Pennsylvania Assembly also employed him as a messenger to the Ohio Indians. Shortly after his jaunt to the Ohio

Indians, Trent and George Croghan, Trent’s brother-in-law, formed a trading firm that

35 Sewell E. Slick, William Trent and the West (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1947), 14-27, 28-41. William Trent’s activities for the Ohio Company, as well as the deteriorating, and dangerous situation in the Ohio Company are documented in the second and third chapters of Sewell’s biography. Additionally, the activities of Croghan and Montour can be found in Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: 1959).

91

lasted until 1756. Croghan and his associates held significant sway with the Ohio Indians.

After the Ohio Company began working with Croghan, Trent became involved in the Ohio

Company and the colony of Virginia. He was most likely a much-appreciated addition, for he had experience in dealing with the Ohio Indians on a diplomatic and trading level, and unlike most of the Company’s other employees, he had military command experience.36

The careers of Cresap, Gist, Parker, and Trent demonstrate the background required for survival in the disputed territory, but it also shows the agents’ monetary distress.

These men ventured into the Ohio Valley for the Ohio Company of Virginia as a road to financial stability, a way to pay back debts, and possibly to increase their lot in life. While they acted on the Crown’s behalf, as well as Virginia’s, their personal fortunes trumped any other loyalties. Empire-building was a means of gaining both wealth and status.37 The

Company needed motivated and ambitious men willing to take the risks necessary for empire-building in order to augment their own fortunes, and they found them. The dangers of the backcountry required invested agents. Since the agents endured brutal weather and perilous missions, they had to have something substantial to gain. These men’s circumstances motivated them to undertake the unpleasant tasks empire-building required of on-the-ground agents. Traders and trappers, like the Virginia gentry, tied their fortunes to the Ohio Company and the British Empire.

An interest or participation in the fur trade is another commonality of the men the

36 William Trent, Journal of Captain William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany, ed. Alfred Goodman, (Charlestown: Nabu Press, 2014), 56-58; Slick, William Trent, 5-13. 37 As is further explained in the conclusion, this changed in the years between Braddock’s Expedition and the American Revolution, when the Crown attempted to restrict the westward expansion of the colonies in order to maintain peace with the Native Americans. This would include the Ohio Company’s grant.

92

Ohio Company employed. The Ohio Company aimed to expand the British fur trade.

Cresap, Gist, Parker, and Trent all had trapped fur independently and had traded with the

Native Americans of the eastern woodlands. The Ohio Company needed successful trade relationships with the Native Americans because Native American relationships were built and maintained through trade. The trade drew the Virginians in because they needed to acquire land from the Ohio Indians, which necessitated alliances.38 In regard to the Ohio

Company’s fur trade, Jennings argues that the Ohio Company never had much success in the Indian trade despite its preparations. However, the Ohio Company never aimed to profit from the fur trade alone; the trade was a means to an and. They sought alliances and the subsequent acquisition of land.39 The knowledge of Native Americans with whom the

Company’s agents traded made men, such as Gist and Cresap, indispensable. Virginia elites lacked knowledge of Indian culture and would have failed as go-betweens. Governor

Dinwiddie acknowledges this in a letter to Trent, “You know how to frame a speech to the

Indians in their style better than I.”40 If the Ohio Company hired men ignorant of Indian culture, the Company’s forays into the disputed territory would have ended immediately.

The Ohio Company needed men with the ability to travel the backcountry safely, as well as negotiate and communicate with the Native Americans to expand the British fur trade, as the company had promised the Crown, and obtain Native American friendship and land.

Without competent agents, the Ohio Company would have failed to extend the British

38 Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, 33, also points out that the Ohio Valley Fur trade relations pulled the British into the complex system of Native American alliances. 39 Jennings, Empire, 15, also espouses the view that British colonies engaged in dangerous and unprofitable trade because it led to control of the Ohio Valley. 40 “Governor Dinwiddies letter to Capt Trent, ,1753,” Lois Mulkern, eds., George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 284.

93

Empire into the Ohio Valley.41

Racing to Map the Ohio Valley: The Excursions of Cresap, Celeron, and Gist

Since the Ohio Company members sent a petition across the Atlantic over the head of their governor, it is unsurprising that they began the push westward before receiving official permission from the Board of Trade. Governor Gooch’s refusal forced the Ohio

Company to slow its movements into the Ohio Valley, but it failed to stop them. Because the Company had not yet heard from the Board of Trade, the members took conservative measures. They hired agents to engage in the Indian trade, fur trapping, and preliminary explorations. As early as February of 1748, months before the Board of Trade indicated its decision, the Ohio Company arranged for the purchase of one hundred pounds sterling in

Indian trade goods.”42 In the same meeting where the members advocated an association with Mr. Hanbury, they engaged Cresap and Parker to take action in the Ohio Valley. The

Ohio Company regardless of unanswered petitions pursued mapping the borderland.

The Ohio Company did not wait to hear back from the Board of Trade due to fear of competition. They members ordered that Cresap and Parker complete this mission “as soon as possible, or we may be complained of for keeping others from taking up the Kings land.”43 Already bogged down in the imperial bureaucratic system with their petition and boundary dispute with the Pennsylvanians, the members took pains to avoid any more

41 “Petition of John Hanbury to the King on behalf of the Ohio Company, 1748,” Bailey, Ohio Company, 300. 42 “Orders and Resolutions of the Ohio Company and the Committee of the Company,” , 1748, The George Mercer Papers, 167. 43 “A Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, June 21, 1749,” The George Mercer Papers, 4.

94

issues. At this point, the Ohio Company, unaware that the Crown would ultimately support its plans, quickly began their mapping activities.

The Ohio Company assigned Parker to duties pertaining to the Indian trade. He was hired to ship goods and furs between Williamsburg and the Ohio Valley and was appointed the Company’s factor, or agent, in the Ohio Valley.44 Because he was not of their rank, many in the Company, especially the Mercer family, who held a lot of stock in the Ohio Company and partook in committee and secretarial duties, had their doubts about Parker. The Ohio

Company initially limited Parker’s term of service for one year. The Company instructed

Parker to “dispose of the Goods to the Indians on the Best Terms he can, and not to dispose of any of them to Traders but at such prices as the Company shall fixt on them.” While the members allowed Parker to take on this weighty position, they must have felt the need to ensure that he would stick to the Company’s mission, to butter up the Ohio Indians, and not just trade his goods away to other traders. Maybe members worried that the formerly independent trader would let profit, not empire-building, dictate his sales. The members’ mistrust of William Parker is again evident in their instructions, which specified that

Parker needed to “give such Credits as appears to be Absolutely necessary for the Benefit of the Trade and not in General.” While highlighting the mistrust of Parker, these passages underline the Company’s purpose in the Ohio Valley. The Ohio Company instructed the traders to extend credit only when beneficial to the Indian trade, and thus relationships with the Ohio Indians.45

If trade and negotiations with the Ohio Indians went well, the Company wanted to

44 “Orders of the Ohio Co. June 21st, 1749,” The George Mercer Papers, 141. 45 “Orders of the Ohio Co. June 21st, 1749,” The George Mercer Papers, 169.

95

be able to pursue the land grant, and they needed agents to do so. Choosing the settlement location required information about the features and geography of the Ohio Valley; since the Company’s petition claimed that the Mississippi lay just west of the Appalachians, it is clear they knew very little. To correct this error, in June of 1749, the Company decided that

Cresap and Trent should “be employed to discover the parts beyond the Mountains, so that we may know where to Survey our Land.”46 The location, “beyond the mountains,” was extremely vague; and the Company’s knowledge remained far from correct or complete.

Sending out explorers to map the borderland and find the best and most accessible land was a significant step towards land speculation. To fulfill the Ohio Company’s orders,

Cresap and Parker traveled into the backcountry, explored and made it known that the

Ohio Company of Virginia intended to expand into the Ohio Valley. As indicated in Chapter

One, the Pennsylvanians cited Cresap and Parker’s mission as alarming the Ohio Indians and the French. However, the exact details of their journey are unknown; no records from

Cresap’s and Parker’s trip exist.

Historians do not often cite this initial foray of Cresap and Parker into the disputed territory, and those who do write it off as inconsequential or as a failure.47 It is easy to see

46 “A Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, June 21, 1749,” The George Mercer Papers, 4. 47 Kenneth Bailey, Ohio Company, 70; Alfred Proctor James, The Ohio Company, Its Inner History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), 15. Both Bailey and Proctor cite Cresap and Parker’s work in the Ohio Valley during this time as inconsequential. Jennings, in Empire of Fortune, 14, 22, does not list their explorations in his chronology at all and only cites the explorations and reports of Pennsylvania agent, Conrad Weiser, who discusses the activities of the Virginians, but does not go into who went into the Ohio Valley or their success in the Ohio Valley. This is a problem, for as Croghan and other Pennsylvania officials pointed out, the Ohio Company stirred things up in the Ohio Valley for the Native Americans and the Pennsylvanians albeit in very different ways, and without the inclusion of these events, the borderland narrative does not make sense.

96

why. Cresap and Parker returned from their Ohio expeditions without surveys, maps, or a chosen location for the Ohio Company’s grant, and their excursions caused panic in the borderland. However, while all this is true, this dissertation argues that Cresap and

Parker’s jaunts into the Ohio territory were informative. They gave reports on the Ohio

Valley size and the unfriendly political climate of the region. Considering the vast region these two men explored, it cannot be surprising that initial explorations were inconclusive.

Merely informing the ignorant Ohio Company members of how much land lay “beyond the great mountains” was in itself an achievement. The Company members continued employing both Cresap and Parker, indicating their faith in the pair. While Cresap and

Parker’s explorations might appear as flops compared with Christopher Gist’s jaunts, this comparison is unfair. Cresap and Parker received vague instructions and additional responsibilities beyond exploration, while Gist’s assignment instructions were explicitly exploratory and informational.

Cresap and Parker’s early missions illuminated the members’ ignorance of the vastness of their chosen task. The negotiations with the Native Americans were more complicated and problematic than anticipated, and the Company had vastly underestimated the size of the Ohio Valley. The expeditions of Cresap and Parker indicated to the Ohio Company that mapping the (189,442 square mile) Ohio Valley would be more difficult and contentious than the Company, Colony, and Crown previously imagined.

Cresap and Parker’s trips also tripped French alarms and spurred them into action in the Ohio Valley. George Croghan reported that the French were unwilling to let the Ohio

Company achieve its goals for “itt [sic] is well known ye French will Spare no Trouble to

97

advance thire Trade.”48 Croghan believed that Ohio Company’s actions would increase

French movements in the Ohio Valley.49 The , Roland-Michel

Barrin de La Galissoniére, proved Croghan correct. Although Canada had “always been a burden to France,” the governor intended to protect the French claim to the Ohio Valley.50

While a series of sporadically placed lead plates was probably not what Galissoniére wished for in a barrier, it was all New France could muster. In 1749, Galissonnière sent

Pierre Joseph Céloron de Blainville on an expedition into the Ohio Valley to reassert the

French claim on the region, most likely in an attempt to draw Native American goods and friendship away from the British, and to Mark the French claims to the Ohio Valley with lead plates which restated the French claimed to the Ohio River and all of the land in its drainage. However, Céleron’s was a difficult task compared to the Ohio Company’s. He led a military mission which offered very little cover and generated very little good will, while the Ohio Company had the cover and benefit of trade. All British excursions had been independent enterprises, aimed at trade, while the French pushed forward with their military.51

48 “George Croghan to unknown, July 3, 1749,” in Samuel Hazard, Pennsylvania Archives, vol. 2, (Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co, 1853), 31. 49 For more on Croghan’s transition from trader to land speculator see, William J. Campbell, “An Adverse patron: land, Trade and George Croghan,” Pennsylvania History: A Journal o Mid-Atlantic Studies 76, no.2 (Spring 2009), 117-140. 50Galissoniére, “Memoire, Dec. 1750,” Documents for the Study of American History, accessed , 2015, http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/galissonierre.html 51 “Céleron Plate,” Virginia Museum of History and Culture, accessed , 2019, https://www.virginiahistory.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history- explorer/céloron-plate The engraving on the lead plate states, “In the year of 1749, of the reign of Louis the 15th, King of France, we Céloron, commander of a detachment sent by Monsieur the Marquis de la Gallissonieré, Governor General of New France, to reestablish tranquility in some Indian villages in these , have buried this plate at the mouth of the River Chinodahichiltha on the 18th of August near the River Ohio, otherwise Beautiful River, as a monument of the renewal of the possession we have taken of the said River

98

Céleron concluded in 1749 that British private enterprise, mostly the Ohio Company of Virginia, seriously undermined the French empire-building effort in the Ohio Valley.

While he tried to persuade the Native Americans to only barter with the French, his records indicate that he knew this was impossible. He reported that the British provided goods at such reduced costs that he suspected that the King of England subsidized the costs.52 While correct about the subsidized goods, Céleron was wrong about the source. The Ohio

Company, not the Crown, subsidized the goods. Considering the differences in the English and French administration policies, Céleron’s error is unsurprising and highlights the role of private enterprise in building the British Empire.

Céleron resorted to threats and warnings in his efforts to expel the British from the

Ohio Country. He “summoned the English … to withdraw into their own country with their effects and baggage, under penalty of being treated as smugglers.” Céleron issued warnings because he lacked the strength to comply with all of Governor Glassionier’s orders. He noted that he was instructed to “plunder the English, but I was not strong enough for that.”53 Céleron’s report indicates that the British presence was far superior to what he, and his bosses, expected. During his mission, Céleron wrote to the Governors of

Pennsylvania and North Carolina notifying them of the illegal behavior of their traders. In his letter to Governor Hamilton, Céleron complained that the traders had no right to be in that territory per the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle. He expressed his hope that the governor

Ohio, and of all those which empty into it, and of all the lands on both sides as far as the sources of said rivers, as enjoyed or ought to have been enjoyed by the kings of France preceding, and as they have there maintained themselves by arms and by treaties, especially those of Ryswick, Utrecht, and Aix la Chapelle.” 52 Céleron, “The 9th of August,” Expedition of Celeron to the Ohio Country in 1749, Ed. C.B. Galbreaeth, (Columbus, Ohio: The F.J. Heer Printing Co., 1920), 32. 53 Céleron, “The 25th,,” Expedition of Celeron, 49.

99

would “be so good as to prohibit that trade in the future,” and threatened future violence if the traders continued to trade in lands Céleron deemed “a country to which England never had any pretentions.”54

Céleron brought back news regarding the progress made by the British in the Ohio

Country. He informed those at Montreal in November of 1749 that the Native Americans of the middle portion of the Ohio Valley were more inclined to trade the British, “who give them their merchandise at one-fourth the price” of the French traders. He speculated that the Ohio Indians could be won back “by furnishing them merchandise at the same price as the English,” but he acknowledged that it would be “difficult to find the means” for the

French to finance such an endeavor. The Ohio Company was able to offer the already cheaper British goods at an even further discount, the Company regarded the goods more as gifts than as fair-trade items. Céleron had to be talking about the Ohio Company of

Virginia’s goods, as even the Pennsylvanians complained about the Company’s low prices, as was demonstrated at the end of Chapter One. Céleron concluded his report of the Ohio

Valley stating, “the nations of these localities are very badly disposed towards the French, and are entirely devoted to the English. I do not know in what way they could be brought back.”55 Faced with the reality that the French could not compete commercially with the

English, Galissoniére concluded that government-sponsored military action was the only course of action.

The British and the Ohio Indians, especially those who resided around Logstown

54 Céleron “Céleron to Governor Hamilton, From our Camp on Le Belle Riviere,” ed. Samuel Hazard, Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania vol. 4. (Philadelphia: W.F. Geddes, 1829) 221-222. 55 Céleron, “10th of November,” Expedition of Celeron, 57.

100

and the Forks, viewed the French claim invalid. The Ohio Company continued to send agents to mark the Ohio River Valley as British. It was in the Company’s best financial interests to claim the borderland for the British. In order to do this, and keep pace with the

French, the Ohio Company members responded to Céleron’s excursion with one of their own, headed by their agent, Christopher Gist. Gist’s dangerous mission for the Company,

Colony, and Crown further hindered French interests in the Ohio Valley.

Christopher Gist led the Company’s 1750 explorations into the Ohio Valley. The

Ohio Company specifically instructed Gist to “search out and discover the Lands upon the

River Ohio, & other adjoining Branches of the Mississippi down as low as the great Falls.”56

On October 31st, Gist set out from Thomas Cresap’s fortified home and began his six-month excursion into the Ohio Country. On this mission, Gist reported the politics, populations and geographic positions of various bands of Ohio Indians to the Ohio Company. Fred

Anderson points out that, “Gist’s surveys gave the Virginia investors a remarkable view of the Ohio Valley’s potential,” and this is true; however, this chapter shows that Gist’s words were valuable to those other than the Ohio Company. His reports were passed on up the imperial chain to Virginia’s government and the Board of Trade. Gist’s explorations benefited the British government as well as the Ohio Company. When Dinwiddie staunchly refused to allow the French to move into the Ohio Valley less than two years later, he did so knowing the rich composition of the Ohio Valley due to Gist’s reports. Gist’s information gathering was necessary to build the British Empire in the Ohio Valley. 57

The Ohio Company instructed Gist to “observe what Nations of Indians inhabit

56 “Instructions Given Mr. Christopher Gist By the Committee of the Ohio Company The 11th Day of September 1750,” Christopher Gist’s Journal, 31-32. 57 Anderson, Crucible, 27.

101

there, their Strength and Numbers, who they trade with, & in what comodities they deal.”

Gist gathered information and conveyed it to the Company, Colony, and Crown, all the while acting as a British ambassador to the Ohio Indians, giving gifts and relaying British messages. He represented the British, cemented relationships with bands already inclined towards the British, and attempted to sway those French leaning bands towards British interests. Gist stressed his role as the King’s messenger to maintain his safety and gain the respect of the local Native Americans. Gist’s ambassadorial role highlights the connections between the Company and Crown, as Gist sometimes, due to fear of death, neglected to mention the Company and Colony when describing his mission.58

Gist did not always mention the Ohio Company to the Native Americans he encountered, if the situation seemed dangerous or unlikely to achieve favorable results,

Gist did not mention the Ohio Company. When the situation seemed favorable, Gist mentioned them frequently. In order to settle the Ohio Country, the Company needed to create and maintain Native American relationships. Towards the goal of settlement, Gist forged essential agreements with the Ohio Indians. Gist invited almost every Indian he encountered to the Logstown Conference that the Company had planned for the following spring. Gist’s invitation to the Native Americans provided a good cover for his trip, and the promise of presents at the conference most likely eased Gist’s negotiations with the Ohio

Indians. 59

Gist’s mission for the Ohio Company required him to map the land as well as people.

He was “particularly to observe the Ways & Passes thro all the mountains you cross, &, and

58 “Instructions Given Mr. Christopher Gist,” Christopher Gist’s Journal, 31-32. 59 Ibid.

102

take an exact Account of the Soil, Quantity, & Product of the Land, and the Wideness and

Deepness of the Rivers, & the several Falls belonging to them, together with the Courses and Bearing of the Rivers and Mountains.” The Company instructed Gist to find land for the

Ohio Company’s settlement and make detailed surveys and notes regarding its location and attributes. Initially, the Ohio Company was concerned about the quality of the land rather than its location when choosing the acreage for the grant. The committee told Gist, “The nearer in the Land Lies, the better, provided it be good & level, but we had rather go quite down the Mississippi than take mean broken Land.” The company dictated that even after

Gist had found a tract to recommend, he should continue to note and survey both large and small tracts of superior land. 60 For instance, Gist reported that South of Licking Creek there was “fine rich level Land, with large Meadows, fine Clover Bottoms & spacious Plains covered with wild Rye: the Wood chiefly large Walnuts and Hickories, here and there mixed with Poplars Cherry Trees and Sugar Trees.”61

The Company also instructed Gist to “draw as good as a Plan as you can of the

Country.”62 Empire-building required maps, and the Ohio Company took full advantage of

Gist’s employment to acquire them. Gist took this order very seriously and kept careful records of his path. For instance, “Saturday 6. We went along the Warrior’s Road S 1 M, SE

3 M, S 2 M, SE 3 M, E 3 M,” or “Sunday 7. Set out E 2 M, NE 1 M, SE I M, S 1 M, W 1 M, SW 1

M, S 1 M, SE 2 M, S 1 M.”63 Gist found mapping and surveying, already an onerous task,

60 Ibid. 61 Gist, “Monday Jan 28,” Gist’s Journals, 43. 62 “Instructions Given Mr. Christopher Gist,” Gist’s Journals, 31-32. 63 These numbers and letters signify distance and direction, for instance, the letters S, SE, SW, mean south, south-east, and south-west respectively. The letter M stands for miles, and the number that proceeds it indicates the number of miles.

103

even more challenging since the location’s population, worried about British expansion, dictated that he be covert.64

The Ohio Indians, some of whom opposed British expansion into lands they considered their own, more than likely would take offense to an outsider meandering about with a compass and sextant, after all many of these Native Americans were refugees, who had already lost their land to settlers carrying surveying equipment. Gist wanted to forge Native American alliances, dictating that he conceal the Ohio Company’s plan to colonize the Ohio Valley. Gist noted, “I took an Opportunity to set my Compass privately… it was dangerous to let a Compass be seen among these Indians.”65 Gist kept his mapping quiet, which helped his relations with the Native Americans he encountered, as he concealed what would be unpopular plans from the Native Americans and the French.

While Gist had so far updated his journals with information regarding rivers, streams, and mountains, as well as Indian Camps, when he reached the Ohio River, he commented for the first time on the lack of quality land. He reported “the land from

Potomack to this Place is mean stony and Broken, here and there good Spots upon the

Creeks and Branches but no Body of it,” implying that he had not found an appropriate place for the Ohio Company’s settlement.66

When Gist reached Logstown, the Headmen was absent and those left behind informed Gist that Pennsylvania traders George Croghan and Andrew Montour, were about a week ahead of him (Croghan and Montour had not yet become allied or associated with the Ohio Company). Gist welcomed this news, but his pleasure was short-lived because the

64 Gist, “Sunday 7,” Gist’s Journal, 62. 65 Gist, “Monday, 19,” Gist’s Journal, 33-34. 66 Ibid.

104

inhabitants of Logstown, “began to enquire my Business, and because I did not readily inform them, they began to suspect me, and said, I was come to settle the Indian’s Lands.”

The Logstown inhabitants speculated that if Gist had come to settle their lands, he had a slim chance of returning home. Logstown’s assertion reveals that the Ohio Indians distinguished between Gist and the Pennsylvanians and that Cresap and Trent’s missions made the Native Americans of the Alleghenies suspicions about the Ohio Company.67

Identifying the danger of his situation, Gist “pretended to speak very slightingly of what they had said to me, and enquired for Croghan.” When this ploy failed, Gist announced that he carried messages from the king and governor of Virginia, which obtained him ”Quiet and Respect among them, otherwise I doubt not they would have contrived some Evil against me…Tho I was unwell, I peferred the Woods to such Company.”

Gist’s initial visit to Logstown was not long or successful. However, while there, he messaged Croghan regarding his situation. Gist likely hoped to obtain the “Prince of

Pennsylvania’s” friendship and secure his party’s safety.68

After he left Logstown, Gist traveled along Beaver Creek and joined an Ohio

Company trader, Barney Curran. Their party, now made up of about 20 men, traveled towards . En route, they passed a town of French-leaning Ottawa. Gist reported that an old French man and his Indian wife lived among them and was initially kind to Gist. However, he later called him “a big knife,” an unfavorable term used to describe Virginians. Despite this somewhat derogatory term, Gist and his party stayed a

67 Ibid. 68 Gist, “Monday 26,” Gist’s Journals , 35. Although throughout Gist’s employment for both the Ohio Company and later the British military he was well-known for his ability to cover great tracks of ground in a short amount of time, some chronic illness plagued him and often left him weak and feverish for several days at a time.

105

few days, indicating that relations between the Ohio Company agents and the Ottawa were, at the very least, cordial.69

The Company party pressed on to Muskingum, a town of one hundred Wyandot and

Mingo families, whose loyalties were divided evenly between the French and British. Gist probably felt more optimistic about this village for the inhabitants of Muskingum saw the

British flag on the home of the headman, and on the camp of George Croghan. Gist’s relief was short-lived. Upon entering Muskingum, Croghan relayed that the French had captured several English Traders, and in response, he had ordered all British traders into town and sent word of Gist’s arrival to traders downstream and to the Miami village of Pickawillany

(located at present-day Piqua, Ohio). The Wyandot and informed Gist that they planned a war council to discuss the situation. Shortly after the Ohio Company’s arrival, two of Croghan’s traders returned from an expedition and reported that forty French men and twenty French-allied Native Americans traveling to a new French Fort on Lake Erie had captured two British traders from their party, indicating that the French displeasure at the

British actions. The disputed territory was primed and ready to explode.70

In light of the reports coming out of Muskingum, Gist acquainted Croghan and

Montour with his purpose and his intended negotiations with the Ohio Indians. Following this, the trio discussed the regulation, or lack thereof, of the fur trade. Croghan, who had pled with Pennsylvania for stricter trade regulations, including, but not limited to prohibiting the sale or gifting of alcohol, was pleased with his discussion with the Ohio

Company’s agent, who was also against plying the Native Americans with rum before

69 Gist, “Friday 14,” Gist’s Journals, 37-38. 70 Ibid.

106

trades and treaties. He and Gist joined forces and traveled together for the next few months.71

The information in the preceding chapter regarding the Pennsylvania and Virginia rivalry makes this partnership initially difficult to believe. However, both Croghan and

Montour would work with the Ohio Company in the next few years. Pennsylvania’s lackluster attempts to regulate the Indian trade irritated Croghan, and he probably realized how he could gain from the Ohio Company’s plan. In light of the attacks from the French and their Indian allies, Croghan also probably viewed the Virginian party as a reliable ally for the immediate future, as they had twenty men, and his long-term future, as they were invested in keeping the Ohio Valley in British hands. Cross-colony cooperation made sense in a dangerous borderland where colonists from different colonies and diverging interests banded together. When faced with the French, the Pennsylvanians and Virginians in the borderland rallied together.

Amidst all the bad news came Christmas. While seemingly insignificant, the holiday reveals Muskingum’s diplomatic and political climate. Gist intended to read prayers but initially lacked an audience. However, Thomas Barney, a well-respected blacksmith who was well established at Muskingum, and Andrew Montour, a well-known and respected interpreter, invited many of the Wyandot to hear Gist’s prayers and they accepted. A surprised Gist went through prayers, a short sermon, and the homilies of the Church of

England. Montour translated Gist’s words and added Gist spread “the true Faith which the great King and His Church recommended to his Children.”72

71 Gist, “Tuesday 25,” Gist’s Journals, 37-39. 72 Ibid.

107

Following his sermon, Gist reported that the Muskingum Indians seemed well pleased with the Anglican service and thanked him for his efforts. Not only did they express gratitude for Gist’s impromptu mission work, but they also invited him to settle at

Muskingum, and adopted him, and gave him a name Annosanah, the name of a good and respected man who had once lived in their village. While all 100 families had not attended

Gist’s service or invited him to dwell among them, the headman attended the service and

Gist’s adoption and declared that Annosanah, meaning The Interpreter, must always be

Gist’s name. Gist, while thankful for the honor, declined the invitation, saying, “the French woud come and carry me away as they had done the English Traders.” To this assertion, the Muskingum Indians suggested that Gist should “bring great Guns and make a Fort,” and that “they woud never desire to return to the French, or suffer Them or their Priests to come near them more, for they loved the English.” The town also wanted Gist, whom they had mistaken for a minister, to perform weddings and baptisms. To these pleas, Gist replied that in the King’s religion, no one could baptize any children not instructed in the

Faith. Gist, spinning the situation in favor of British colonization, told them that the King

“woud send Them proper Ministers to exercise that Office among them,” which pleased them. Gist’s pseudo-missionary work laid the groundwork for further British colonization.73

While the Muskingum Indians seemed more concerned with the principles and ceremonies of Christianity than about politics or economics, their reactions may indicate more than just religious enthusiasm. While not to suggest that their religious fervor was disingenuous, the politically and militarily charged atmosphere may have contributed to

73 Ibid.

108

their reaction. The French presence and the activities of the French allies may have caused the residents of Muskingum to reach out to the British and encourage the British to build a fort for Muskingum’s protection. Accepting the British religion might have been the

Wyandot and Mingo method of encouraging British friendship as they attempted to shore up allies against the French.

Of course, the Wyandot and Mingo conversion did not stop the chaos in the Ohio

Valley. On January 4th, news came from another Wyandot, advising them to avoid the

Ottawa, that France had claimed dominion over all the branches of the Great Lakes. Gist reported that the French claim might have caused some Wyandot to “come over to the

English Interest, & join their Brethren on the Elk's Eye Creek, & build a strong Fort and

Town there.” Gist may have been mistaken, or the Wyandot may have deceived him; however, it appears that the French attempts to shore up their claims by capturing British traders and asserting their control over the Great Lakes angered the Wyandot instead of bringing them into the French zone of influence.74

A few days later, two traders from Pickawillany announced that the French had taken yet another English trader prisoner. However, these traders also announced that three French Soldiers had surrendered themselves to the English traders at Pickawillany, and the Miami who lived at Pickawillany sent them to George Croghan.75 By allying himself with Croghan who had contacts among all of the British traders and significant influence with Native Americans, Gist shored up his personal safety and the interests of the Ohio

74 Gist, “Jan 4,” Gist’s Journals, 40. 75 Apparently, the guard not only ensured the Frenchman's captivity, but also to protect them from the Pickawillany residents who wanted to kill them as restitution for the captured British traders.

109

Company. In response to Pickawillany’s message, Gist, Croghan, and Montour sent their cohorts to the “lower Town,” intending to follow the next morning. However, that evening’s council was delayed, first due to the other headmen’s lateness, and then due to the “King's Council being a little disordered with Liquor.” Eventually, Croghan and

Montour, presenting four strings of wampum to show the weight of their words, announced that the “under the Care of the Governor of Virginia, their Brother,” the British

King had sent a large number of presents, which they were invited to receive at a council in

Logstown. The Wyandots expressed thanks but said they could not respond until after the full Council in the spring, which may have been their method of putting off British advances.76

From the Wyandot village, the British party passed through many small Delaware towns, stopping at Chief Windaughalah’s town of about twenty families. This chief, in favor of the English interest, called for a council. After Montour informed the Delaware of the messages of the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Ohio Company, as well the increased

French activities, the Delaware toting four strings of wampum thanked them, agreed to come to the Logstown council and said, "We will not hear the Voice of any other Nation for

We are to be directed by You our Brothers the English, & by none else.”77

Gist reported this town to be the most westward of the Delaware and estimated that they had about 500 warriors firmly allied with the British. He then explained the Delaware

76 Gist, “Sunday 27,” Gist’s Journals, 43. 77 Ibid. Wampum is used by Native American groups in the eastern woodland region in a variety of ways, in this dissertation wampum is referenced as a diplomatic tool, which was used to denote the sincerity and weight of a particular decision or partnership. For more information, see Marshall Joseph Becker, “Small Wampum Bands Used by Native Americans in the Northeast: Functions and Recycling,” Material Culture 40, no. 1 (2008): 1- 17.

110

relationship with the six Nations, and how the Delaware lived scattered among most of the

Ohio Indians. This is a perfect example of how the Ohio Company employees informed the

Company members in Williamsburg and also those in governmental positions in

Williamsburg or London about Native American politics and the borderland situation.78

Gist continued to Shannoah Town, which he informed the Ohio Company spanned both sides of the Ohio River and contained around 300 men and around 150 houses. Gist explained to the Ohio Company members relations between the Iroquois and Shawnee were rocky. He concluded his observations stating, “they are great Friends to the English who once protected them from the Fury of the six Nations, which they gratefully remember.” At Shannoah, Croghan delivered the messages from both Pennsylvania and

Virginia and informed the Shawnee of the increasingly tense situation regarding the

French. However, the Shawnee were already aware of the situation, and informed Gist’s party of the price on the heads of Croghan and Montour and the new French war threats to

Shawnee and Wyandot. The Shawnee then explained that ten French Canoes supplied their new fort on Lake Erie. Following this revelation, Croghan advised the Shawnee to keep their warriors at home until the spring. Then Gist, through Montour, invited them to the council in the Spring and informed them of the “large Present of Goods, in Company with the six Nations, which was under the Care of the Governor of Virginia.” The Shawnee leader, Big Hannaona, thanked them and said they would attend the Logstown council, and concluded by saying “We hope that the Friendship now subsisting between Us & our

Brothers, will last as long as the Sun shines, or the Moon gives Light."79

78 Gist, “Sunday 27,” Gist’s Journals, 43. 79 Gist, “Wednesday 30,” Gist’s Journals, 44-46.

111

Even though continuing westward would be treacherous, Gist, had been specifically instructed to observe Native Americans west of the Ohio River, so he pressed on. However,

Gist believed the danger to be genuine, for he made his son who was traveling with him stay with the friendly . Despite the risk, Gist hoped to gain allies from the excursion for rumors had spread that the “western Indians” had left the French and Gist hoped to persuade them to join the British camp. Gist’s suspicions proved correct, for after a lavish welcoming ceremony, the Miami invited him into town sporting English colors.80

The headman invited them to his own House where he erected their British flag. This friendship was crucial to holding the Ohio Valley. Gist reported that Pickawillany was among “the strongest Indian Towns upon this Part of the Continent,” as their power reached beyond the Mississippi River. Considering Miami influence, Gist must have been pleased to find them ready form an alliance.81

Gist’s journal explained how their new allies functioned politically with many different bands living in the same settlement. They were all represented and taking part in governance. Gist explained that while these tribes had traded with the British, they had not had many opportunities. According to Gist, those living at Pickawillany would welcome

British traders among them. The Miami living at Pickawillany had recently relocated from the Wabash region to escape French traders, who Gist claimed supplied them with few cheap goods at exorbitant prices and pressures. Gist substantiated the rumor that the

80 The people living a Pickawillany were a subset of the Miami Indians, it is this specific group that the British called Twightwee. 81 Gist, “Tuesday 12,” Gist’s Journals, 47-48; Kathleen DuVal, Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 1-12. The Miami, for all their power, did not operate in a Native Ground situation, their proximity to the French and reliance on the British fur trade made it difficult for them to operate completely on their own terms.

112

Miami had rejected French and moved to their new location “for the Sake of trading with the English.”82

The Miami had awaited the British arrival. Montour apologized for their tardiness before presenting “two Strings of Wampum to remove all the Trouble of your Hearts, & clear your Eyes…We have a great Deal to say to You.” Following this announcement, which showcases the nuance of Native American diplomacy and the value of go-betweens,

Montour asked if they could send a Mohican interpreter to ease the language barrier as the

Miami language, was unfamiliar to even the famous Montour. Eventually, Montour delivered the oft-repeated speeches from Pennsylvania and Virginia, but this time he also delivered a message from the Wyandot and Delaware. The Wyandot and Delaware prevailed upon their “brothers” to care for their British “brothers.” They also pled with them to “be strong like Men…and make the Road clear, that our Brothers the English may have free Course and Recourse between You and Us.” To this point, Gist and his cohort had been tested, but nothing they experienced prepared them for Pickawillany’s test. Following the council, the town raised the alarm. To Gist, Montour, and Croghan, it appeared that confusion and panic ensued. Reports came in that four hundred French stood just outside the town; however, the Miami at Pickawillany soon revealed that the reports were a ruse to gauge the reaction of the British who, the Miami decided, had “behaved themselves like

Men.”83

This test foreshadowed the events of the next morning when four Ottawa came into

Pickawillany under the French colors to a pleasant reception. The headman set both the

82 Gist, “Sunday 17,” Gist’s Journals, 47-49. 83 Gist, “Sunday 22,” Gist’s Journals, 50.

113

English and French flags in the council chamber, and still testing the British, asked them their opinion of the flags. Gist’s party, careful of their position, responded that the headman should do as he deemed fit. The French ambassadors gifted fourteen quarts of brandy and a ten-pound roll of tobacco to the Miami. They conveyed the French message offering French friendship to Pickawillany again despite their previous refusals. This time proved no different; the headman announced that the French had made the road “foul & bloody” and announced that his people had formed a new alliance with the English. After this council-ending announcement, the French Ambassador went into private houses to prevail on some of those at Pickawillany to come to the French side to no avail. Over the next few days, deliberations between the British, French, and Miami ensued. In the end, the

Miami at Pickawillany announced their intention to attend the Logstown conference the following spring with the British, and publicly announced that they had turned their back on the French. Pickawillany’s leaders tore down their French flag, and claimed that they would die before they rejoined the French. According to Gist, the Miami-French alliance was over.84

Following the council, Gist returned to Shannoah Town, the Shawnee village. Gist suspected an Ottawa ambush, so he left the path and after hearing several gunshots the next day, pursued a forest course. When Gist arrived back in Shannoah Town, he reported that the Shawnee welcomed him, and celebrated the Miami’s positive reception by firing more than 150 guns in the air. The excursion to Pickawillany proved a diplomatic success for the British, Virginians, and Pennsylvanians, as well as the Delaware, Wyandot, and

84 Gist, “Sunday 24,” Gist’s Journals, 50-53.

114

Mingo.85

To obtain more information about the topography of the Ohio Valley, the Ohio

Company had instructed Gist to continue to the falls of the Ohio River to acquire information regarding navigational potential. However, the French presence prohibited

Gist from completing this task, though not for lack of trying. Gist headed towards the falls, heard gunshots, saw newly set traps and day-old footprints, and deemed the Falls inaccessible. In substitution, Gist did obtain a second-hand report that the Falls were “not very steep,” but that the river was swift and burdened with deadly rocks and rapids and could only be navigated by canoe with great care. His informants reported that the Ohio

River flowed about 400 miles before it emptied into the Mississippi.86

After six months in the field for the Ohio Company, Gist made his way to

Williamsburg to debrief the Ohio Company and made his settlement recommendation.

Gist’s description of the land from Shannoah to Pickawillany suggests that he recommended the Company claim land in that region. He described the land as rich, well timbered, with excellent waterways, and plentiful with game, saying, “it wants Nothing but

Cultivation to make it a most delightful Country.” Another indicator that this was the land he recommended to the Ohio Company is the fact the leaders back in Virginia believed it to be too far away from Virginia current settlements to defend and supply.87 Because of this issue, the Ohio Company sent Gist on another exploratory expedition seeking a settlement location a bit closer to home.

Another difference between Gist’s first and second expeditions was that the

85 Gist, “Tuesday 26,” Gist’s Journals, 54. 86 Gist, “Monday, 18,” Gist’s Journals, 58. 87 Gist, “Sunday 17,” Gist’s Journals, 47.

115

Company instructed him to keep his eyes open for areas fitting for the Ohio Company’s other empire-building projects, such as roads and trading houses. He was instructed to

“look out & observe the nearest & most convenient Road You can find from the Company's

Store at Will's Creek to a Landing at Mohongeyela,” and look for a place “convenient for our building Store Houses & other Houses for the better carrying on a Trade and

Correspondence down that River.”88

Gist again set out late in the season, leaving the Company’s storehouse at Will’s

Creek, on November 4th, 1751, and almost immediately discovered a pass through the mountains near present-day Cumberland, Maryland, called the Narrows. Gist asserted that

“This Gap is the nearest to Potomack River of any in the Allegany Mountains, and is accounted one of the best, tho the Mountain is very high, The Ascent is no where very steep but rises gradually near 6 M.” Gist commented that the trail was obstructed with Trees and stones, but optimistically stated that it would make a good wagon road. This discovery was significant because the “Gap is directly in the Way to Mohongaly, & several Miles nearer than that the Traders commonly pass thro, and a much better Way.” Gist found an easier, shorter way through the Allegheny Mountains, which gave the Virginians an edge in bringing their cheap trade goods and offers of friendship into the Ohio Valley.89

Because Gist’s second excursion stayed further east than his first, Gist mainly met

88 “Instructions Given to Mr Christopher Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company, 1751,” Gist’s Journals. The Ohio Company’s headquarters, otherwise known as “Wills Creek,” were eventually built in present-day Cumberland, Maryland. The construction of the headquarters, and the road mentioned in the quote above, which was to end near present-day Pittsburgh (roughly 150 miles away from Cumberland), are explored in chapter three of this work. 89 Gist, “Monday Nov 4,” Gist’s Journals, 68.

116

Delaware.90 On November 24th, he bought some corn from a group of Delaware and invited them to the Treaty at Logstown on “the full Moon in May,” as the Ohio Company instructed.

While Gist reported that the Delaware had been civil, he notes in his journal that he later learned that they threatened to take away his guns and prohibit his group from continuing.

This tense moment with the Delaware is another example of the lengths and risks these agents took to further the Ohio Company’s interests in the Ohio Valley.

For the next week, Gist’s party explored and made notes on the land, but soon ran into another tense situation. When they went into the Delaware camp, which Gist had visited on his last journey, to invite the inhabitants to Logstown, he found them to be disgruntled and hostile. The headman complained that his voice was not heard in

Williamsburg and asked that Gist pass on the message that William Penn had granted him land near the Forks of Brandywine Creek, but had not protected his claims. Gist noted that he was obliged to insert the Headman’s message into his journal to appease the Delaware.

This incident makes it clear that the Delaware understood the trans-Atlantic communication network and the methods which the whites used to communicate.91

Soon after this, December 17th, 1751, Gist ran into a friend of Oppaymolleah, whom

Gist called an “Indian captain.” This friend, a Native American whom the British called

Joshua, inquired about Gist’s reason for being in the borderland and upon learning about the Logstown conference, recommended that Gist inform the chief of the Delaware, Beaver, about his mission. Therefore, Gist wrote to him, and Joshua promised to deliver the

90 This dissertation uses the term Delaware because it is the term employed in the Primary Sources, and from what can be ascertained from Gist’s Journals, it is how the Delaware referred to themselves. 91 Gist, “Saturday 7,” Gist’s Journals, 70.

117

message. This entry demonstrates that Gist sought to teach Company members about

Native American culture and politics. While he informed them of various attributes in other journal entries, this one is particularly telling, Gist explained the significance of the name “Beaver,” explaining that Chiefs often named themselves for “any Beast or Bird they fancy, the Picture of which they always sign instead of their Name or Arms.” The fact that the Company agent had to explain Ohio Indian culture, demonstrates just how much the members relied on their employees for information.92

Both British colonists and imperial officials in London needed Gist’s mapping and surveying skills. From Gist’s journals, it is evident that the Pennsylvania traders were more familiar with some of the Ohio Valley than Gist. However, they had not measured or mapped the land. The difference between Gist and the Pennsylvania traders is apparent from Gist’s journal from Shannoah to Pickawillany, “The Traders had always reckoned it

200 M, from the Shannoah Town to the Twightwee Town, but by my Computation I could make it no more than 150.”93 The Pennsylvania traders lacked survey skills and equipment, as well as the motivation and cause to methodically map and measure the land, which was a potentially dangerous and time-consuming process.94

On March 14th, Gist’s party was able to mark the land for the Ohio Company. Gist reported, “We found a large Stone about 3 Feet Square on the Top, and about 6 or 7 Feet high…SE Side which was smooth and white as if plaistered with Lime. On this Side I cut with a cold Chizzel in large Letters.” Gist carved, “THE OHIO COMPANY, FEB. 1751, BY

CHRISTOPHER GIST.” Perhaps Gist felt a physical marking of the land, such as Céleron’s

92 Gist, “Tuesday 17,” Gist’s Journals, 71-72. 93 The British called the Miami Indians, by a different name, the Twightwee. 94 Gist, “Wednesday 30,” Gist’s Journals, 44-46.

118

lead plates, strengthened the Ohio Company’s claim to the land. Here Gist also noted that he found a better route home and that he was “of Opinion the Company may have a tolerable good Road from Wills Creek to the upper Fork of Monhongaly.” The road would be about 70 miles from Wills Creek to a spot on the Monongahela where “the River is navigable all the Way to the Ohio for large, flat bottomed Boats.”95

In his last substantial journal entry, Gist noted the protests of those he encountered, including the Delaware leaders Oppamylucah and Beaver. Gist reported that they “desired to know where the Indian's Land lay, for that the French claimed all the Land on one side the River Ohio & the English on the other Side.” Gist eventually answered that the British and the Native Americans were all the Kings people with the same rights and privileges.

After he gave this answer, Beaver instructed Gist to stay camped there for two days and wait for his return. At the end of two days, he returned and said that as Gist said they were all the King’s people, Gist was safe to travel and live in the area, and announced that he,

Beaver, and his people would be attending the conference at Logstown. This incident indicates that the Ohio Company had been correct to hire Gist, for this encounter with

Beaver highlighted Gist’s diplomatic skills. Gist, as an agent of the Ohio Company, was at the Delaware’s mercy. He had to obey them to protect his body and mission, and his obedience demonstrates Native American power in the Ohio River Valley. The Delaware, far from being the most powerful Indian group in the region, still influenced events in the territory, and actively played the British and French off one another in order to maintain their way of life and agency in the Ohio Valley.96

95 Gist, “Thursday 12,” Gist’s Journals, 77-78. 96 Gist, “Thursday 12,” Gist’s Journals, 77-78.

119

If the initial forays of Cresap and Parker frightened the French, the extended journeys of Christopher Gist in 1750 increased their alarm. Gist’s very presence, let alone the Ohio Company’s intended settlement, was “trespassing” in the eyes of other Europeans.

The French knew that Gist had interacted, traded, and negotiated with the Ohio Indians in lands the French claimed as their own. Gist’s 1750 journal revealed how the Ohio Valley was fraught with tension. Upon his second journey, the situation had become so sticky that the rightfully anxiety-ridden Delaware had become increasingly prickly over land rights.

They wanted compensation for their lost land. The Ohio Company’s activities deep in the

Ohio Country acted as a catalyst for everyone, including the Ohio Indians and the French, to increase their efforts to claim the Ohio Valley. In essence, when Lee sent Gist deep into the disputed territory, he accelerated the borderland “arms race” between France and Britain that escalated until war erupted in 1754.

Filling in Maps: The Spread of the Ohio Company Intelligence

The Ohio Company agents were a part of a complex and polycentric communication network that spanned the Atlantic Ocean and half of North America. While France and

Britain constantly watched, spied, and engaged in direct conversation with one another in

Europe, this was not possible in the borderland. Cresap, Parker, Gist, Céleron, as well as various Ohio Indians became the eyes and ears of Europe in North America. The Ohio

Company agents gathered information to pass on to London, all the while giving the Native

Americans information to pass on to the French.97

97 While this section focuses on the role of the Ohio Company agents as transmitters of intelligence, the Ohio Indians are possibly the most important link in this information

120

Fred Anderson notes “Gist’s surveys, conducted over the next two years, gave the

Virginia investors a remarkable view of the Ohio Valley’s potential.”98 Anderson’s statement is true, but due to the intertwined nature of the Company and colony, Gist’s reports also gave the British government, from the Virginia Administration to the Board of

Trade, that same information. Gist’s surveys and explorations benefited the British government as well as the Ohio Company. When Dinwiddie staunchly refused to allow the

French to move into the Ohio Valley less than two years later, he did so knowing the rich composition of the Ohio Valley due to Gist’s reports. Gist’s information gathering was necessary for the empire-building process employed by the British Empire.

Ohio Company agents other than Gist also kept the Virginia and British governments aware of activities or encroachment into the Ohio Country. Without such scouting expeditions, the French could have done as they wished without British competition. The

British men who worked and spied in the Ohio Country were necessary for trans-Atlantic and trans-Appalachian communication. In many instances, it was more challenging to transmit information across the Appalachians than it was across the Atlantic. The Ohio

Company agents linked the trans-Appalachian networks to the trans-Atlantic networks and communicated the backwoods situation to members of the Ohio Company.

The Company’s agents cured the ignorance of the Company and the Colony of

Virginia. In 1753, Governor Dinwiddie, based on information from the Ohio Company’s agents’ excursions, worked to bring the Iroquois into closer alliance with Virginia and wrote a letter chastising Cresap and Trent for not informing him of the Iroquois

pathway, they communicated with each other, including the Iroquois, as well as the Europeans, all the while manipulating and using the information for their purposes. 98 Anderson, Crucible, 27.

121

movements: “I did not know that the Warriors of the Six Nations were gone to the so,wd. I wish you c’d have informed me of their Design, for I Sh’d be very glad to have them and the so.w’d Ind’s in a comfirm’d state of Peace.”99 Even though this is an instance of the Ohio

Company’ agents failing to transmit messages, it highlights the reliance the shareholders had on their employees. Dinwiddie ended his letter begging them to keep him apprised of the Indian affairs.100 In another letter to Thomas Cresap, Dinwiddie asked Cresap to furnish him with a list of Indian nations, their names, and their numbers, as well Cresap’s advice in how to engage them. He follows this up with a confession of his ignorance regarding Indian affairs and diplomacy and concludes his letter by repeating his request that Cresap frequently update him on the Ohio Indians and their activities.101 Cresap answered the call and often wrote not only to Dinwiddie but also to the Virginia Council informing them about the frontier situation and how the Company and Colony’s agents could successfully negotiate in the Ohio Valley. In this same letter, Cresap recommended

Andrew Montour as Virginia’s agent, a boon for both the Ohio Company and Virginia.102

Cresap’s interest in the Ohio Company aided the colony of Virginia’s empire-building efforts.

The British government strove to obtain information on North American interior.

When George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax, became president of the Board of Trade in

1748, he requested information on the edges of British settlements, and specifically asked

99 “Governor to Captains Cresap and Trent, Fed 10 1753,” Dinwiddie Papers, 22-23. 100 Ibid. 101 Governor Dinwiddie to Col. Thomas Cresap, Jan 23 1752. Dinwiddie Papers, 17-19 102 “At a council held 1752,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia V. 5, ed, Wilmer L. Hall, (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1945), 375.

122

about the possibility of French encroachment.103 As specified in Chapter One, the Ohio

Company had specific directions from Halifax and others on the Board of Trade to recount information from the borderland. To comply with these orders, the Ohio Company turned the journals of Christopher Gist over to the Crown. The Virginia government must have known that Gist provided a service to them in his “mapping” the Ohio region. The Virginia council paid 20 pounds to Gist for his journey to the Miami and 20 pounds to Thomas

Cresap for Gist’s expenses.104

The mapmakers Fry and Jefferson, commissioned by the Colony of Virginia to prepare a map of the colony, also used Gist’s journals and interviewed Gist in 1752 when the pair traveled to Southeast Ohio to negotiate a treaty with the Iroquois. Gist had been

“the first white American to explore Southern Ohio and Northeast Kentucky thoroughly.”105

Gist’s surveys and descriptions of the region helped mapmakers, and his first-hand experiences made him a tremendous resource for Fry and Jefferson. The legend of Fry and

Jefferson’s map notes Gist’s contribution, “the Course of the Ohio or Alliganey River and its

Branches are Laid down from Surveys and Draughts made on the spot by Mr Gist.”106

Gist provided so much new and corrected information that Jefferson and Fry had to extensively revise two of the map’s plates. Fry and Jefferson had previously drawn Lake

Erie too far south, and it was relocated and replaced based on Gist’s information about the correct course of the Ohio, Kanawha, and New Rivers, as well as the French settlements on

103 Margaret Beck Prichard and Henry G. Taliaferro, Degrees of Latitude: Mapping Colonial America (Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 2002), 165. 104 “ 1752,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 414. 105 Ibid, 157. 106 Ibid.

123

the edge of Pennsylvania.107 Gist’s surveys again informed London about the Ohio Valley situation.

In 1750, the Board of Trade requested a new map of the colonies regarding exact boundaries and any encroachments of any foreign powers. Dr. John Mitchell worked on a general map of North America to fulfill the Board of Trade’s wishes. His maps illustrated the British point of view. Mitchell relied heavily on Gist’s records, as well as on Fry and

Jefferson’s maps, which as indicated, also depended on Gist’s accounts. Gist’s inclusion into

Mitchell’s publication shows the groundbreaking nature of his excursion and simultaneous journal entries. Without Gist’s records, large portions of what is today Virginia, West

Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky would have remained unknown to mapmakers before the American Revolution. According to Prichard and Taliaferro, Mitchell’s 1775 Map of the British and French in North American with the Roads, Distances, Limits and

Extent of the Settlements, is among the most popular and reliable cartographic publications of the eighteenth century.108 Mitchell extensively researched each colony’s charter and argued that British claims overrode those of the French. Gist’s forays proved invaluable for those maps even though circumstances forced him to measure the territory surreptitiously.

Mitchell’s assertions for the British Empire quickly gained notoriety, especially when he published his pamphlet, The Contest in America Between Great Britain and France, with its Consequences and Importance, with the map in 1757.109 Dinwiddie saw the map as supporting the King’s, Virginia’s, and the Ohio Company’s claims all at once, and wrote to

107 Ibid, 159. 108 Ibid, 21. Mitchell’s map was held in such regard that the British and Americans used it in the Peace of Paris following the America Revolution for the treaty negotiations. 109 Ibid, 171.

124

Mitchell expressing his hope that everyone would support British rights to the American interior, as it was agreeable to so many land grants and patents.”110 Gist’s work was being used via trans-Atlantic communiqué to make the argument for his own employer and the empire simultaneously. Using Gist’s information, Mitchell’s map showed the British claims to be larger than those of the French.

The Ohio Company was not alone in transporting information regarding the state of the borderland across the Atlantic. The adroit Governor of New France, Galissoniére, personally promoted French expansion and warned against that of the British in Paris.

Soon after Galissoniére sent Celeron into the Ohio Valley, he was recalled to France and gave testimony regarding the borderland situation. The governor hoping to prompt the

French government to take military action to secure the Ohio Valley for the French. The

Governor knew that New France was a financial hole for the European power but knew the enormous potential as well as the power play that the Ohio Country portended.

Galissoniére insisted that although Canada was a financial burden to France, it was the

“strongest barrier...to the ambitions to the British.” He maintained that Canada’s unique position allowed it to wage war against all possessions and warned that if the French failed to hinder the British in the Ohio Valley, they would overtake all

French American colonies, including those in the which were incapable of heading Britain off alone. Galissoniére even questioned what would stop the British from overtaking Europe once they controlled the Americas. The Ohio Company’s exploratory missions turned the Ohio Valley into a powder keg, one that could explode with one

110 “Robert Dinwiddie to John Mitchell, Feb 23 1756,” Dinwiddie Papers, 338.

125

spark.111

In order to keep the British from taking over, the Canadian governor asserted that the French should make “a more energetic and generous effort to increase and strengthen

Canada and Louisiana than the English are making in their colonies.” He explained that

Canada and Louisiana, even in their destitute position, had always waged war with the

British colonies and received some success due to their Native American allies. However, he pointed out that these attributes were almost accidental, and that if the French neglected to maintain those alliances while the English made every effort to undo them, they would lose the Ohio Valley. Galissoniére tried to explain “Indian Politics” to the

Parisians, saying that while the Ohio Indians both loved and feared the French, ultimately, they were self-interested. He summed up the Ohio Valley stating that the Ohio Indians knew “that the Strength of the English and French remain nearly equal, so that through the jealousy of these two nations those tribes may live independent of, and draw presents from, both.”112

To combat the British, Galissoniére advocated for the French to strengthen Canada and Louisiana and establish permanent settlements around Fort St. Frederic, and the posts at Niagara, Detroit, and the Illinois.113 Galissoniére’s message sparked the French court into action; however, to implement these changes the French brought in Marquis de la

Jonquiére as Governor-General of New France, which delayed any immediate changes. All the while, the British traded, treated, and constructed in the Ohio Valley.

111Galissoniére, “Memoire, Dec. 1750,” Documents for the Study of American History, accessed May 25, 2015, http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/galissonierre.html 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid.

126

Conclusion

The Ohio Company relied on Cresap, Parker, or Gist to head all of the Ohio

Company’s initial trades, treaties, and constructions in the disputed territory. Each of these individuals possessed attributes and abilities such as fortitude and ambition that enabled a turning of the tables in the Ohio Valley to Virginia’s advantage. The Ohio Company members had to have agents like these in the Ohio Valley just as much as it had to have members like Robert Dinwiddie and Thomas Lee in Williamsburg and John Hanbury in

London. Without agents like Cresap, Parker, and Gist, neither the Company nor the British would have made any headway in the Ohio Valley, something ignored by historians until now. This chapter proves that mapping the Ohio Valley in the 1750s required the involvement of men of lower social and political status who were unafraid of the dangers of

“the county in between,” and that the actions of these men provoked French activity in the

Ohio Valley.

The next stage in empire-building: constructing infrastructure and creating alliances with the Ohio Indians, also required the Ohio Company to rely on skilled agents. The missions of the Company’s on-the-ground agents continued building the British Empire and aggravating the French. Chapter Three, “Building the British Empire: The Ohio Company’s

Structures and Alliances” reveals that Cresap, Gist, Trent, and others like them, continued to construct and protect the Ohio Company’s Ohio Valley empire.

127

Chapter Three: Building the Empire: Structures and Alliances, 1750-1753

“Whereas you have obtained a Commission from the College for Surveying our Lands, You are to…measure the Road clear’d by the Company from their Store at Wills Creek to the

Fort of Mongongaly.”1

-Ohio Company Instructions to Christopher Gist (1753)

Until the 1750s, the British and French had mainly limited themselves to exploratory excursions and trading activities in the disputed territory. However, as the

Ohio Company’s instructions to Christopher Gist in 1753 indicate, with their mention of roads, storehouses, and forts, the Company moved on to the next phase in the process of empire-building: infrastructure. The British and French knew they needed both infrastructure and Native American alliances to strengthen their claim and military position. The Ohio Company funded, and its agents built, storehouses, roads, and settlements in the Ohio Valley. By investigating the Ohio Company’s construction of both buildings and alliances, this chapter continues this dissertation’s argument by showing that the Ohio Company’s infrastructure increased British empire-building in the Ohio Valley, increased imperial tensions, and by doing so served as a precursor to the Seven Years’ War.

This chapter investigates the back and forth race between the British and French

Empires for control over the Ohio Valley, and argues that the construction of buildings and

1 “Instructions given to Mr. Christopher Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company,” July 27th 1753, Lois Mulkern, eds., George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 149.

128

alliances triggered imperial action on both sides. The first section of this chapter, “Building the Empire: Ohio Company Storehouses, Headquarters, and Roads” demonstrates how the

Ohio Company agents built the physical structures of the British Empire in the Ohio Valley, and then recounts the French backlash against the Company’s activities. The second section discusses how the Company and Colony formed alliances with Native Americans as a means to construct forts and settlements. This infrastructure prompted a French military response in the Ohio Valley, and this chapter also explores how Virginia’s failure to react hindered the Company’s efforts and allowed the French to gain significant footholds in the disputed territory. The final section, “(Finally) Striking Back,” details how the Ohio

Company agents and their Native American allies opposed the French by reconfirming Virginia's alliances and finally building the Ohio Company’s settlement.

Historiography

This chapter includes the history of the financing, building, and maintaining of

British infrastructure and Native American alliances and argues that the Ohio Company launched the British empire-building in the Ohio Valley, triggering a French military response. Showing the Ohio Company’s on-the-ground construction projects and conferences with Native Americans furthers this dissertation’s argument that commercial entities and skilled on-the-ground agents took part in the British negotiations over the nature of empire-building and adds to the scholarship showing the complexity of empire- building in the Ohio Valley. This chapter adds to the historiography of the negotiated empire-building process, the borderland nature of Ohio Valley politics, and the Seven

Years’ War.

129

The Ohio Company’s erection of infrastructure and the Virginia Assembly’s refusal to support the Company reveals additional layers of negotiation to the empire-building process. The Ohio Company members and the Virginia Assembly, also called the House of

Burgesses, fought with one another to determine the nature of Virginia’s borderland activities. The Assembly’s refusal to follow the Crown’s wishes shaped the British Empire and the nature of the British presence. Asserting that colonial elites influenced the course of the Empire builds on Jack Greene’s argument about the negotiated nature of the

Empire’s legal structure. It also adds to the scholarship regarding the nature of colonial politics by augmenting Bernard Bailyn’s argument in Origins of American Politics about the struggle between Governors and Assemblies. This chapter demonstrates that empire- building was part of this Governor-Assembly negotiation, but it also demonstrates that this was not just a fight between the assemblies and the governors.2 This struggle within

Virginia over actions in the Ohio Valley shows the diversity of colonial elites in Virginia and demonstrates how even within one colony, various cliques of elites competed to shape

Virginia’s response to the French militarization of the Ohio Valley.3 The negotiation over financing these ventures took place between the colonial and imperial centers, and it took place within colonial centers.

This chapter, which brings in governmental officials and militaries, best

2 This disintegration and its relations to empire-building is further explored in the conclusion of this dissertation. 3 Jack P. Greene, Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the Unites States 607-1788 (Athens, : University of Georgia Press, 1986), 7-54; Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 7-10; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 71. Jennings mentions the power struggle of assemblies with the core, however he does it within a military context in 1755, this is further explored later in this chapter.

130

demonstrates that the Ohio Valley was a “borderland” more than a “Native Ground” or

“Middle Ground.”4 The Iroquois, Delaware, Shawnee, Miami and other groups living in the

Ohio Valley were stuck between the French and British Empires. As seen throughout this chapter, the Native Americans played the British and French off one another in attempts to maintain their own power. The Ohio Indians and Iroquois influenced the colonists, and the colonists influenced them. As the Ohio Valley became a problem in international politics, international politics became a problem in the Ohio Valley.5 The Ohio Valley inhabitants responded to external push-pull factors. While those in the Ohio Valley influenced events internationally, this chapter shows they could not entirely dictate events or accept

Europeans only on their terms. The Ohio Indians could not stop the French or the Ohio

Company from building infrastructure, even if they were able to exercise agency within the arrangements. This chapter demonstrates the difficult situation between the Ohio Indians and Iroquois during the 1750s, and it proves that the 1750s Ohio Valley was, indeed, a borderland.6

One of this dissertation’s claims is that it illuminates the origins of the Seven Years’

4 The differences between a Native Ground, a Middle Ground, and a borderland are outlined on pages 12-13, in introduction of this work, as well as in footnote 26 of the introduction. 5 Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, "On Borderlands," The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 365. This article calls for the international repercussions of the events of the borderland to be included in his scholarship. 6 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xxi-xxiv; Kathleen DuVal, Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006),1-12. ); Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” The American Historical Review 104 (1999): 814-841; François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 647–677.

131

War. It shows that the animosity over the Ohio Valley began far sooner than historians recognize. Historians have acknowledged that in reality, the Seven Years’ War began earlier than the official declarations of war made by the British and French governments made in 1756. Some count George Washington’s loss at Fort Necessity in 1754 or Edward

Braddock’s March in 1755 as the beginning of the War. This dissertation argues that the on-the-ground events in the Ohio Valley from 1750 until 1753 need to be included in the

Seven Years’ War scholarship, as these events significantly contribute to the build-up towards war. This chapter explores how the Ohio Company motivated the 1753 French fort-building surge and demonstrates that the French hold on the Ohio Valley was more tenuous than histories, beginning with George Washington’s 1754 trip, indicate. By illuminating the Ohio Company’s empire-building in 1750-1754, this chapter reveals how

Company, Colony, and Crown negotiated to set the stage for the British, French, and Native

Americans conflicts in 1754 and 1755.7

Building the Empire: The Ohio Company Infrastructure

The Ohio Company built some infrastructure before 1750, such as trading posts and

7 Paul Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 127-259; William Fowler, Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763 (New York: Walker & Company, 2005), 11-27; Walter R. Borneman, The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America (New York: Harper Collins, 2006) 12-24; Charles Morse Stotz, Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and England in Western Pennsylvania: The Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 3-20; Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 11-76; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 8-168; Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years’ War 1754-1763 (New York: Pearson, 2011) 44-65.

132

stores houses to promote their Native American trade. To this end, the Ohio Company turned to agents Thomas Cresap and Hugh Parker to “build convenient houses & Stores for the Reception of the goods,” which the Company’s London agent, John Hanbury, shipped across the Atlantic.8 Since the Indian fur trade was the first step in empire-building, the first “houses” the Ohio Company agents built aided that enterprise. However, the storehouses also served as a meeting place for the British and their Native Americans trading partners.

None of the storehouses served as an adequate base for the Ohio Company’s operations, and as early as 1748, the Ohio Company planned a permanent fortified borderland headquarters, but after multiple excursions into the Ohio Valley, the members realized that constructing a headquarters required more time and effort than originally conceived. However, the distance, terrain, and French activity in the borderland made securing a location further west than Williamsburg necessary.

Due to the cost and difficulty of construction, the Ohio Company took advantage of

Cresap’s fortified home at Oldtown, which served as the Ohio Company’s western headquarters as it had since the Company’s inception. While the stockade and outpost at

Cresap’s granted the Company protection, the Company built additional structures at

Cresap’s to serve its purposes. In March of 1750, the Ohio Company arranged for room and board for Parker and two other agents at Cresap’s, at the Ohio Company’s expense, while they built the Company’s storehouse at Oldtown. The committee concluded, “it appears to us that a Store house of Loggs built at Colo Cresaps will both secure the Goods better and

8 “At a Committee of the Ohio Company, Jan 29th 1750,” George Mercer Papers, 171; “Orders and Resolutions of the Ohio Company, 1749-1761,” George Mercer Papers, 141.

133

give leisure for building proper houses at Wills Creek the cheaper.” Even when the Ohio

Company built new headquarters at Wills Creek, the Oldtown location saw heavy use during the exploration and trading era. Gist stopped there on each of his excursions into the Ohio Country, to obtain supplies including horses, and it remained a vital supply depot for the Company.9

The Company eventually outgrew the storehouses at Cresap’s and built a base about twenty miles up the Potomac from Cresap’s Oldtown location, where the Wills Creek joined the Potomac River (modern-day Cumberland, Maryland). Their chosen location lay along the shortened route west through the Narrows, a natural cut in the Appalachians discovered by Gist on his second excursion west.10 This location eased the burden of the agents but was far enough east to avoid conflict with the French or French-allied Native

Americans. The Wills Creek intersection with the Potomac River lay beyond the backcountry settlements, but east of the eastern continental divide, not in the Ohio River drainage, technically outside of the French claims. Wills Creek lay far enough east to rule out most attacks by the French, Native Americans, or even disgruntled Pennsylvanian traders, but far enough west to offer refuge to those acting in the borderland. Cresap had previously explored and surveyed this location while working for Maryland’s Governor

Thomas Bladen, and probably recommended it to the Ohio Company. In January of 1750, the Ohio Company purchased the Wills Creek location and instructed Parker to begin

9 “Orders of the Committee of the Ohio Company, March 29th, 1750,” George Mercer Papers, 172. 10 Eventually the , the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, Route 40, Interstate 68, as well as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Western Maryland Railroad and the Chesapeake and Pennsylvania Railroad (all eventually part of CSX transportation) all passed through the Narrows, and by Wills Creek, on their way to the Ohio Valley.

134

immediate construction on the new Company headquarters, hereafter referred to as Wills

Creek.11

Hugh Parker and his team built a two-story log trading post that stood on the southern side of the Potomac River. At the time of its construction, this log edifice was the largest Ohio Company building. The size of this structure alone indicates the Company’s dedication to the fur trade (and obtaining the Native American friendships that accompanied such trade) and the goal of settling the Ohio River Valley and enlarging the empire. However, the trading post was not the end of the members’ plans for the Wills

Creek location. In May of 1751, the Company bought an additional five hundred acres adjacent to the Company buildings at Wills Creek. In 1752, the Company continued to build, this time another, more extensive structure close to the first two-story building. 12

The Company’s headquarters grew and eventually became a multi-building, fortified complex. The Ohio Company built these structures to hold trade goods and furs but also the traders themselves.

The Company needed to house more people over time because the headquarters’ defenses and location attracted them. Subsequently, the number of traders and agents working for the Ohio Company increased during the 1750s. Keeping them well supplied and defended spurred the headquarters’ growth. As time went on, and interactions between the French, British, and the Native Americans spread and grew more violent, the

Wills Creek location became a defensive refuge. The Ohio Company’s list of enemies goes

11 “A Committee of the Ohio Company January 29th 1750,” George Mercer Papers, 171. Eventually they purchased another 500 acres of land from Thomas Bladen in Maryland. 12 “Of the Company, , 1751.” George Mercer Papers, 142.

135

beyond disgruntled Frenchmen. Invaded Native Americans, jealous Pennsylvanians, or even rival Virginians were among the Ohio Company’s enemies. Despite existing outside the Ohio River drainage, Wills Creek remained unsafe. No one knew for sure where the

Ohio drainage began. The headquarters served as a jumping-off point for the traders and agents of the Company, Colony, and Crown into the Ohio territory. All future moves the

Ohio Company and Virginia made to secure the borderland for the British originated from the Company’s headquarters. From Wills Creek, the Company erected forts, built roads, and sent settlers west.

The Ohio Company members planned to construct roads as part of their empire- building endeavor since its inception. In 1749, the committee ordered Parker and Cresap to immediately “employ such persons as they thought fit to clear all Roads between those places as should be most for the Companys advantage.”13 The Ohio Company believed this task, as many shareholders discussed in their initial meetings, would be easy. In reality, the road was unattended for two years because of the difficulty of road building, the administrative red tape in Virginia and London, and finally because diplomatic problems with the Ohio Indians, caused by the jealous Pennsylvanians, kept the Ohio Company from sending agents with blatant imperial missions into the Ohio territory. All this occurred early on in its history, as was seen in Chapter One. Despite these delays, plans for the road were not forgotten. In May of 1751, the Ohio Company decided to build a road from Wills

Creek to the forks of and instructed Thomas Cresap to hire men to help blaze and construct the road, as long as his expenses did not exceed twenty-five

13 “Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, June 21, 1749,” George Mercer Papers, 3.

136

British pounds. Despite these orders, Cresap failed to begin construction of the Ohio

Company’s ambitious thoroughfare probably because he knew the cost would exceed twenty-five pounds.14

It was not Cresap, but Gist who took the first step toward actual road construction.

The Company directed him to “look out & observe the nearest & most convenient Road you can find from the Company’s Store at Wills Creek to a Landing at Monhongeyela.”15 The

Company’s instructions to Gist’s reaffirmed the plans to build major infrastructure in the

Ohio Valley. Gist noted a path that followed the , and that despite some stones, trees, and mountains, he thought might make a fine wagon road for the Company, that was several miles shorter than the path currently used by traders.16 Gist’s route quickly became the preferred route not only for the Ohio Company agents but other traders and trappers as well.

Building on Gist’s optimistic report, the Company quickly put Gist back to work. In

April of 1752, the Ohio Company told Gist that if Cresap had not already cleared the road, he was to complete the job. The Company instructed Gist to confer with Cresap to hire

Native American guides and then cut a road from the Ohio Company’s Wills Creek headquarters to the forks of the Monongahela.17 Cresap had not yet cut the road, so the pair plotted and then constructed the thoroughfare. The Ohio Company’s long-coveted

14 “Orders of the Committee of the Ohio Co, May 22 1751,” George Mercer Papers, 143. 15 “Instructions given to Mr. Christopher Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company, July, 16th 1751,” in Christopher Gist’s Journal with Historical, Geographical, and Ethnological Notes and Biographies of his Contemporaries, ed. William Darlington, (New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 67. 16 Gist, “Monday Novr. 4th,” Gist’s Journals, 68. 17 “One of the Instructions given by the Company to Mr. Gist, , 1752, George Mercer Papers, 147.

137

road finally reached fruition. This road was far more than a trace but not a wagon road.

In addition to Christopher Gist, Thomas Cresap may have chosen another companion, , a Delaware and a close friend, familiar with the landscape. Legend has it that Gist and Cresap named the trail for this Delaware in exchange for his help. His contribution has evoked much speculation, and records of his involvement are scarce.

According to Bailey and James, historians of the Ohio Company, when Cresap asked for his assistance in building the road, Nemacolin agreed to help as long as Cresap named the trail after him. However, neither scholar provides footnotes that confirm this information.18

Due to this omission, some scholars, doubt Nemacolin’s involvement, and credit

Nemacolin’s inclusion in histories of this endeavor as “romantic embellishment and folklore,” as neither Ohio Company records, nor any records of Cresap or Gist mention his involvement.19

However, Nemacolin’s involvement seems more likely than not. It would make sense for Cresap and Gist to consult someone who had lived there all his life and knew the land. Furthermore, a neighbor and friend of Cresap’s, John Jacob, who married Thomas

Cresap’s widowed daughter-in-law, noted in his publication that Cresap hired Nemacolin to aid him in the blazing and building the trail.20 Why would John Jacob include a Delaware in

18 Kenneth Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000, org. pub. 1939), 52; Alfred Proctor James, The Ohio Company, Its Inner History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), 58. 19 Norman Baker, Braddock’s Road: Mapping the British Expedition from Alexandria to the Monongahela (Charleston: The History Press, 2013), 18. 20 John Jacob, A Biographical Sketch of the Late Captain Michael Cresap (Cumberland, Maryland: J.J. Miller, 1826), 33. The era after the Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution fraught with Anti-Indian sentiment, especially in backcountry settlements such as Oldtown, Maryland, where Jacob lived.

138

his history, written during an era fraught with White-Native American tension and racism, if Nemacolin was not involved? Jacob knew Cresap personally, and his account would have come from Cresap himself.

While the Ohio Company’s records do not mention Nemacolin, neither do they mention many of the laborers or traders who worked in the borderland on the Ohio

Company’s behalf. The enormity of the road construction project required Cresap and Gist to have help. Gist’s companions on his previous excursions often were unmentioned. Gist’s son, who traveled with him during his excursions into the Ohio Country, for reasons unknown is mentioned only rarely in his father’s journals. However, this lack of mention does not mean that such laborers did not exist to help construct the Ohio Company’s road.

The Ohio Company’s orders said that Gist should find Indians to assist in building the road.

It would stand to reason then, that Gist, who according to his journals, had so far followed his orders to the letter or provided an explanation for his actions, would not have ignored the order to obtain an Indian guide. Taking all this into consideration, it seems likely that

Nemacolin partook in building the infrastructure that now bears his name.21

Regardless of whom Cresap and Gist hired to aid them in their project, they built a wagon road from Wills Creek to the “Monongahela,” or more specifically to McKee’s Rocks.

This road crossed Wills, Savage, and Meadow Mountains then descended into Great

Meadows before climbing and Laurel Hill to the Monongahela. The Ohio

Company intended this road to give the agents, as well as Virginia and the Crown, easier

21 The chronology is slippery. The oral history and folklore Western Maryland is full of stories about Nemacolin. The naming of Wills Creek, Wills Mountain, Dan’s Mountain, and Negro Mountain all have something to do with the Cresap family and their Delaware friend.

139

and quicker access into the Ohio River Valley. Cresap, Gist, and the other men who worked for the Company, did more than blaze a trail, they cleared the road, cutting the trees and moving the rocks. While we are unsure of Cresap’s compensation for this arduous project,

Gist received at least 44 pounds for his labor as well as any expenses while completing the project.22 As it was over a hundred miles between Wills Creek and the Monongahela, help was necessary.

Gist’s involvement went beyond blazing and constructing the trail. After he received his commission as the Surveyor of the Ohio Company from the College of William and Mary the Company later called upon him to measure and plot the road’s course on a map, sometime in 1752 or 1753.23 The Ohio Company instructed Gist to obtain a measuring wheel at the Company’s expense to “measure the Road Clear’s by the Company from their

Store at Wills Creek to the Fork of the Mohongaly.”24

Like the trading and mapping discussed in Chapter Two, the building of borderland infrastructure personally benefited the Ohio Company’s agents. When someone

(unspecified in the Ohio Company papers) attacked the Company’s headquarters, the Ohio

Company instructed the Treasurer to write to Cresap for supplies from his sawmill to achieve the repairs.”25 These orders are revealing in multiple ways. First, the Ohio

Company continued to rely on agents and their expertise to build its borderland

22 “At a Meeting of the Committee of the Ohio Company at Stratford in Westmorland County the 25th of July & Continued the 26 & 27th of the same Month,” George Mercer Papers, 178. 23 “Instructions given Mr. Christopher Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company July 27th 1753,” George Mercer Papers, 149 24 “Instructions given Mr. Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company, , 1753,” The George Mercer Papers, 149. 25 “At a Meeting of the Committee of the Ohio Company.” October 17th, 1760, George Mercer Papers, 180.

140

infrastructure. Second, the agents, this time Cresap, via his sawmill, personally benefiting financially from involvement in the Ohio Company. Cresap, like other Ohio Company agents, monetarily benefitted when the Company purchased construction supplies or paid him for his construction services. It is easy to see why men such as Cresap, or the unknown laborers, supported empire-building; the expansion fattened their pocketbooks. While the

Virginia elites had a chance to make money from the land speculation scheme, circumstances, explained in the Conclusion of this work, eventually prevented them from collecting on their investment. Taking this into consideration, the agents who provided goods or services to the Ohio Company of Virginia, gained more than its members did from their construction efforts in the Ohio territory.26

On a broader level, the Ohio Company’s infrastructure helped the British and hindered the French. The Ohio Company infrastructure made it easier for information, goods, and people to flow from Williamsburg, Winchester, Baltimore, and Philadelphia into the Ohio Valley. Putting permanent physical structures on the land to claim it for the

British was an important feat. These constructions allowed the British to trade, trap, and move in the Ohio Valley, and they did far more to claim the empire for the British than

Céleron’s lead plates ever did for France. These early constructions (such as the storehouses, trading posts and the improvements to Cresap’s location) built the Company’s and the Crown’s physical empire in the borderland.

26 By including this instance of British infrastructure building, the French forts built in 1753, which are explored later in this chapter, are not seen as the first to build imperial structures in the Ohio Valley. This observation goes against the grain of the historiography of the Seven Years’ War that focuses on the French construction in the Ohio Valley.

141

The Ohio Company’s trading, mapping, and building had angered the French.

Despite Celeron’s conclusions that the French could not keep the British out of the Ohio

Valley, Jonquiere, Governor-General of New France, took drastic measures in May of 1750 to counter these British moves. Before 1747, two things allowed the French to influence the Ohio Indians. One, their strategic military position on the transportation waterways between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi, and two, their close ties with the Ottawa,

Potawatomi, and Chippewa of the Detroit region. The French relied on the Detroit Indians in “keeping other Indians loyal to New France and in repulsing the Growing British trade offensive the Ohio Valley.” However, British trade hindered the French influence, as was seen in Gist’s visit to Pickawillany. The Miami refused French requests that they abandon

Pickawillany and the British, to return to their previous town, Maumee, which lay within the French sphere of influence.27

Because the British presence in the borderland made it difficult for the French to effectively influence the Miami and other Native American groups, Jonquiere changed his strategy. In May of 1750 he ordered French commanders to turn the Indians against the

British and take “all the possible measures to induce them to trade solely with the French,” without spending any of the French Crown’s money. When Jonquiere’s orders proved

27 R. David Edmunds, “Pickawillany: French Military Power Versus British Economics,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 58, no. 2 (1975): 169-84. Edmunds even asserts that Céloron’s expedition in 1749 had been ordered and carried out with the intention of drawing those Huron and Miami back into French influenced territory. Which would make sense considering the amount of time and number of pages Celeron spent detailing the situation at Pickawillany. He reported that he found them devoted to the English.

142

ineffective, ministers and governors concluded that they would have to take serious military and violent action to gain control over the Ohio Valley.28

The French departed from their diplomatically paternalistic relationship with the

Native Americans and sought to exert their influence by force, requiring a change in French colonial leadership.29 Despite the action of Galissoniére, the Canadian Governor, to promote French interest in America such as Celeron’s expedition and the arrests of British traders, his actions were not very effective. Marquis Duquesne took over the governorship of Canada in 1752 under the direction “to make every possible effort to drive off the

English from our lands…and to prevent their coming there to trade.”30 In April of 1752, the

French informed the Ohio Indians that they could go to the English to exchange goods, but that French would not allow the English into the Ohio Valley to trade.31 The French attempted to keep British traders out by expelling, capturing, or killing those in the Ohio

Country.32

This practice, of course, harmed the British traders and interrupted the flow of borderland information to the colonial capitals. The Ohio Company, Dinwiddie, and the

Crown all relied on those on the ground for information. Alarmed, Dinwiddie wrote to the

Board of Trade regarding the French bounty on the British traders. Luckily for the British

28 M de la Jonquiere, “Aux abus qui s’etoient glisses dans les postes,” May 29, 1750, quoted in Bailey, Ohio Company, 172. 29 From more information on the French struggle to maintain their relationship as “father” to the Indians in the area surrounding the Great Lakes, see Richard White’s Middle Ground, 82-222. White also agrees that the French could not combat the financial incentive the British traders provided the Indians. White, 75. 30 Quoted in Anderson, Crucible, 32. 31 “Minutes of Instruction to be given to M.Duquesne” April 1752, quoted in F.G. George Stanley, New France: The Last Phase, 1744-1760 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1968), 45. 32 “Letter from Capt. William Trent, May 3rd 1753,” George Mercer Papers, 71.

143

traders, Dinwiddie’s letter fell into the right hands, and the Earl of Albemarle in London was able to parley with the French to free several traders from French custody.

As the French threat continued to grow, the Ohio Company needed strong allies.

Christopher Gist’s mapping expeditions told the Ohio Company and Virginia that a treaty with the Ohio Indians and the Iroquois was necessary for a fort and a settlement in the Ohio

Valley to become a reality. The proposed fortifications and the Company’s ultimate goal, settlement in the Ohio Valley, lay outside the Company’s reach. To achieve their aims, the

Ohio Company members needed to build something requiring a little more finesse than a storehouse; the Company needed to build Native American alliances.

Building Alliances: Success at the Forks and failure in Williamsburg

Christopher Gist laid the groundwork for the Ohio Company’s successful pursuit of

Native American alliances during his expeditions. During his first and second expeditions,

Gist countered some of the rumors the Pennsylvania traders had spread about the Ohio

Company. These rumors, which had more than a bit of truth to them, had initially made it difficult for Cresap and Parker to pursue Native American trade agreements. Gist also had established ties with the diplomatically skilled George Croghan and Andrew Montour, both of whom the Native Americans liked and respected. On Gist’s second expedition into the

Ohio Valley, the Ohio Company instructed him to find land closer to Virginia and to invite any Native Americans he met to a conference at Logstown, a point just north of the Forks of the Ohio. Gist issued invitations and promises of presents to the Delaware, Shawnee,

Miami, and other Ohio Indian bands if they would come to Logstown to treat with the

British in the Spring.

144

The Virginians hoped the Logstown Conference would allow them to construct forts and settlements in the Allegheny Mountains in the Ohio River drainage. It was a land grab opportunity. The Colony and Company hoped it would confirm their interpretation of their previous Treaty with the Iroquois at Lancaster in 1744, which from Virginia's perspective, opened up the Ohio Valley for Virginia. The Logstown Conference also needed to “purchase the compliance” of the Ohio Indians.33 Even if they reached an agreement with the

Iroquois, the local Ohio Indians could decide to raid and destroy the Ohio Company’s settlements. Onondaga, the capital of the Iroquois situated hundreds of miles away, would but hard put to stop them. The Virginians needed to work with both groups, something that required careful diplomacy considering the tense political climate of the Ohio Valley.34

The Ohio Company agents tried to keep multiple Ohio Indian tribes and the Iroquois happy with them, and happy with each other.

While there would be multiple Native American interests at play, the Virginia

Council, with seats full of Ohio Company members, did their best to present a united

Virginian front. Both Virginia and the Ohio Company’s preparation and execution of the

33 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673- 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 137. 34 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 118-145. Jennings writes as if Pennsylvania carried out the Logstown conference, but it was the Ohio Company and Virginia. The Ohio Company sent Gist back into the Ohio Valley to find land closer to Virginia and to invite native Americans to the Logstown Conference, and the Ohio Company led the conference. When Jennings downplays this aspect, it undercuts the significance of the economic interests in building the British Empire in the Ohio Country. In Crucible, 28, Anderson says that Tanaghrisson played a huge role when the Ohio Company persuaded him with gifts. While Anderson recognizes the Ohio Company’s importance to the conference, he does not state how the Ohio Company and Virginia were in cahoots for these particular treaty negotiations and certainly does not point out the Virginia Council’s blatancy in its protection and promotion of the Ohio Company’s interests.

145

Logstown conference demonstrates the relationship between the Colony and the Company in the early 1750s. A private, governmentally approved enterprise spearheaded Virginia’s expansion and then decided a conference was needed to better relations with the Iroquois and Ohio Indians. They needed to obtain their permission to erect a fort and settlement.

The Company then sent out agents to deliver invitations in the name of Virginia and the

Crown. Virginia then took up the planning and orchestrating of a conference to confirm that the Ohio Company would be able to attain its goals. As difficult as it was for the British colonists to understand the Indian organization, all of the Anglo-American hierarchy and relationships must have seemed confusing to the Native Americans at the conference as well. Gist and Montour acted as Ohio Company agents, and Ohio Company members acted as Virginia’s agents.

As the Ohio Company and the Colony of Virginia prepared for the conference at

Logstown, the colonial Council demonstrated support for the Ohio Company by appointing

John Blair, William Nelson, and Richard Corbin to draw up commissions and instructions for the Logstown commissioners who would represent Virginia and negotiate on the colony’s behalf. The Virginia Council instructed the commissioners to “signify to and satisfy the Indians that the present from his Majesty is in consequence for the Treaty of

Lancaster…and an inducement for them to protect and secure a peaceable Possession to the Ohio Company.”35 In other words, the presents were from both Company and Colony, in hopes of securing the Ohio Company’s land grant in the Ohio Valley. Even with these specific instructions, Dinwiddie and the Council choose commissioners who mirrored the

35 “At A Council Held March 3rd 1752,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia vol. 5, ed, Wilmer L. Hall, (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1945), 376-377.

146

Ohio Company’s interests. , Lunsford Lomax, and James Patton served as the official delegates from Virginia.36 Shortly after this conference, Lomax bought Ohio

Company stock. James Patton was famous for his expansionary, pro-British maps, and

Joshua Fry was involved with another Virginia-based land speculation company.37 Worried about this competing land company, Cresap expressed his concern that Patton would not support the Ohio Company’s interest, even with the Council’s implicit instructions.

Dinwiddie was surprised that anyone should oppose an Ohio Company settlement and assured Cresap that he would instruct the commissioners to strongly encourage settlement.38

Cresap need not have worried, the members and commissioners relied on him and some of the Ohio Company’s on-the-ground agents to carry out the diplomatic work for both Colony and Crown. Virginia paid Cresap to transport the presents and wampum for the entire Logstown Conference.39 Cresap, as the only member with Ohio Valley experience, suggested the Council obtain Andrew Montour’s services as an interpreter, and Dinwiddie followed his advice and told Cresap to “prevail with him to be at your House when the

Commissioners come.”40 As this was Virginia’s and the Ohio Company’s first real

36 “Dinwiddie to Joshua Fry” undated, assumed Dinwiddie wrote it around the 12th- 13th of December, when he wrote Patton’s very similar instructions, The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant- Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, ed. R. Brock. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883), 7-9. 37 Jennings, Empire, 18-21. Jennings points out that Dinwiddie’s commissioning men with holdings in other land speculation companies was odd. However, Dinwiddie wanted to reaffirm the land sales of the Treaty of Lancaster, which would benefit all those who had interests in the “west.” 38 “Governor Dinwiddie to Col. Thomas Cresap. Jan 23rd 1752,” Dinwiddie Papers, 17- 18. 39 “Instructions to Coll. James Patton,” Dec 13th 1751,” Dinwiddie Papers 9-10. 40 “Governor Dinwiddie to Col. Thomas Cresap. Jan 23rd 1752,” Dinwiddie Papers, 17-18.

147

employment of Montour, they rewarded him with fifty pounds, and a “handsome settlement of land” on the Ohio Company’s grant, without the expense of quit-rents.41

Cresap and Dinwiddie, both of whom knew Gist’s value, probably impressed upon the Virginia Council the importance of having Gist at Logstown. Gist, who had been ceremoniously adopted there, had a strong relationship with many groups of Ohio Indians and was familiar with the culture and diplomatic procedures. The Council then instructed the commissioners to “employ if they can Mr Christopher Gest as a joint interpreter with

Mr Montour and assure him he will be handsomely rewarded.” The Ohio Company even arranged for Gist to serve as an “imperial representative” if a Virginia could not attend, and even though they all attended, Gist carried out the majority of the legwork and represented the Company’s interests. Virginia employed Gist and Montour to negotiate a treaty to benefit the Ohio Company, but the Ohio Company, even with all of this shared interest, still wanted to ensure that the Company had adequate representation, and paid

Gist to be the Company’s representative and privately instructed Gist to directly purchase land from the Ohio Indians behind the back of the Iroquois, if the Logstown Conference failed to achieve the desired results.42

41 George Mason, “Additional instructions to Christopher Gist Sent on a Separate Paper,” April 28, 1752, George Mercer Papers, 177. Despite the fact that the Ohio Company agents did most of the legwork at the conference, the council paid 120£ to the commissioners 70£ more than the interpreters received for their work. “At a Council Nov 4,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 411. 42 “At a council, 1752,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 384. In Empire of Fortune, Jennings writes as if Conrad Weiser created the idea for the Logstown conference, in reality Dinwiddie wrote to Conrad Weiser and informed him of the council at Logstown and asked him to interpret for the Ohio Company and Virginia. “Dinwiddie to Conrad Weiser, Dec 12th 1751,” The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant- Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, ed. R. Brock. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883), 6-7. Weiser originally agreed but later backed out and the council chose Gist and Montour. Cresap’s recommendation can be found in “At a council held

148

In May of 1752, the Logstown Conference, one of the long-desired goals of Gist’s many voyages into the Ohio Valley, finally commenced. Tanaghrisson, the Iroquois Half-

King, along with the “little Brothers,” leaders of the Mingo, Delaware, Shawnee, and

Wyandot constituted the Native American delegation.43 After the opening ceremonies, one problem immediately arose due to the Virginia Commissioners' ignorance. Gist and

Montour delivered strings of wampum with the Ohio Company’s opening statements. The commissioners did not have wampum, and without it no official business with the Ohio

Indians could be conducted and the talks had to be suspended until later that afternoon.44

The Virginia commissioners’ lack of knowledge about Native American diplomacy and ceremony interrupted the proceedings and underlined the need for the Ohio Company’s agents and representatives. Just like mapping, certain skills were required to treat with

Native American interests in the Ohio Valley successfully. Gist and Montour had to play prominent roles if the Company wanted to settle the Ohio Valley.

Gist acted as the primary diplomat for Virginia and the Ohio Company. Gist, standing before a large pile of presents, tried to persuade the Native Americans to allow

January 23 1752,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 411. One of Dinwiddie’s first intra-colonial actions was writing to Maryland Governor Ogle and Pennsylvania Governor Hamilton regarding the Logstown Conference. He hoped for intra- colonial cooperation and asked to have frequent correspondence, and informed them of Virginia’s intended conference at Logstown, and invited them to attend, and asked if they had any messages for the Ohio Indians. Neither of the two governors attended the conference (neither did Dinwiddie) however, Pennsylvania sent George Croghan as an unofficial delegate, and Governor Hamilton requested that Montour stress that the Pennsylvania government agreed with the Virginians 43 Two men who represented the Delaware, Beaver and , were both invited to the conference by Gist as described in Chapter Two, and both of them were featured in Gist’s activities in 1753, which are outlined in Chapter Four, demonstrating the benefit of consistently employing agents with personal relationships among Ohio Indians. 44 “The Treaty of Logg's Town, 1752,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 13, (June 1906): 154–174.

149

Ohio Company constructions in the area. First, he explained that the Ohio Company fort, like the one at Wills Creek, would hold well-priced (subsidized) trade goods. Gist also needed to get the Native Americans to agree to the Ohio Company’s settlement, which would bring about 200 families into the Allegheny Mountains.45

The Ohio Indians wanted a strong house to supply them with powder and lead but were concerned about the settlement. Christopher Gist and George Croghan worked together and tried to rationalize the settlement. They explained that the fort needed the settlement for men and provisions, but the Native Americans responded, “we will take care that there shall be no scarcity.” The council looked like it had reached an impasse.

However, the tension between the Ohio Indians and the Iroquois allowed the Ohio

Company an opening.46

Onondaga had denied for years that the Ohio Indians could conduct diplomacy without them, as they (quite ridiculously) claimed that the Ohio Indians were only hunters.

However, in about 1747, the Ohio Indians developed an independent streak, and had worked with both Virginia and Pennsylvania outside of the Iroquois Confederacy’s control.

The Ohio Indians infuriated the Iroquois, who knew they needed to act swiftly to take back control of the Ohio Indians diplomacy with the British. The Iroquois needed to maintain their power in the Ohio Valley, and appointed Tanaghrisson, a Seneca chief, to be the “Half-

45 Gist’s role at the Logstown Conference is outlined in two of Bailey’s books, Kenneth Bailey, Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer and Indian Agent (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976), 113. Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia, 129-138. Jennings also recounts the role of Gist and the Ohio Company at Logstown, Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 37-45. 46 “The Treaty of Logg's Town,” Virginia Magazine, 154–174. An extended and detail account of the Ohio Indian Politics and power dynamics with the Iroquois empire can be found in White, Middle Ground, 186-240.

150

King” over the Ohio Indians. Tanahgrisson’s power and status were ambiguous. He was to remain subordinate to the Council at Onondaga, but powerful among the Ohio Indians, whose recognition of Iroquois power was great enough that they still took Tanaghrisson seriously.47

Gist and Croghan worked privately with Tanaghrisson to cut a deal, which resulted in the Half-King’s agreeing to the Ohio Company’s fort and settlement.48 Tanaghrisson initially agreed to a fort and trading post at the Forks of the Ohio River because these would allow the Indians protection from the increasing French threat and access to cheaper European goods, but objected to a settlement in the Ohio Valley. However, after receiving 2000 pounds of British trade goods, and hearing that the Virginians would negotiate with the Ohio Indians directly, Tanaghrisson agreed to allow the Ohio Company’s settlement at “the Forks.” How the Virginians obtained these results is still historically hazy, but Gist’s and Montour’s knowledge of the diverse political landscape of the borderlands greatly aided the Ohio Company and Virginia.49

The Iroquois claim of domination over the region, weaker in the 1750s than it was in 1700, caused unhappy Delaware and Shawnee to use either the French or the British to weaken the Iroquoian hold on the Ohio Valley even further. Gist and Montour freed the

Ohio Company to build additional and larger physical structures of empire, such as storehouses, trading posts, and forts, in the Ohio Country.50

47 Information specifically on the role of the Logstown conference can be found, White, Middle Ground, 236-239. Jennings, Empire, 43. 48 Jennings, Empire, 43-44. 49 “The Treaty of Logg's Town,” Virginia Magazine, 154–174. White, The Middle Ground, 236. The pounds here refers to weight, not monetary value. 50 The Treaty of Logg's Town, 1752,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 13, (June 1906): 154–174.

151

The only issue, which was substantial, was that Tanaghrisson, as a representative of the Iroquois, lacked the authority to make such an agreement; only the Council at

Onondaga could “sell” lands, much to the anger of the Ohio Indians. Tanaghrisson, aware of

Céleron’s lead plates and the potential French power that accompanied them, understood the British hunger for land. Tanaghrisson, his power already in jeopardy amongst the irritated Ohio Indians of the Alleghenies, could not let the Ohio Country slip through the fingers of the Iroquois Confederation. His influence among the Ohio Indians was already tenuous due to the nature of his position. Due to the everchanging nature of Ohio Valley politics, the powers of Native American leaders remained uncertain. The political culture of the borderland forced leaders to work continuously to maintain their power. If the people did not agree with the Half-King’s decisions, such as selling tribal lands or engaging in risky and harmful warfare, he lost power. Leaders maintained power via gift-giving, with many “gifts” coming from traders. Tanaghrisson accepted the Ohio Company gifts and used them as patronage to his “constituents.” Tanghrisson’s acceptance of the gifts symbolized his intention to support the Virginians, but it also gave him the ability to redistribute the gifts to the Ohio Indians and secure his position among them.51

While the Logstown Conference allowed the Ohio Company to make inroads in the

Alleghenies, the Company also wanted to secure the friendship of the Miami at

Pickawillany. However, the Miami had not come to the conference despite agreeing to in

May of 1751, so the Logstown Commissioners and Ohio Company sent agent William Trent,

51 Jennings, Empire, 43-44. White, Middle Ground, 236-239. For details on the gift- giving and the “generosity” of Tanaghrisson at the Logstown Conference, see Michael McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 82.

152

the one-time Pennsylvania trader, to Pickawillany to deliver presents and convey Virginia’s message of friendship. This plan would not reach fruition because when Trent neared

Pickawillany, he found the Miami bleeding and dazed. The French, unhappy with the new

Pickawillany-British alliance, had abandoned diplomacy and taken up the hatchet against the Miami.52

When the newly instated French Governor Duquesne arrived in Canada in 1752, he was alarmed by the British progress in the Ohio Valley, and his concern was justified. The

Ohio Company had spread British influence quickly. The Native Americans at Pickawillany had promised to travel 300 miles to the Forks of the Ohio River to attend the Ohio

Company of Virginia’s Conference. A pro-British Indian village so far into the “upper country,” threatened the French alliance system. When those at Pickawillany refused to move back into the French sphere of influence and end relations with the British, Jonquiere said, “The French officials were well aware that their position was deteriorating.”53

To counter this deterioration and warn other Ohio Indians against deserting the

French, the French ravaged Pickawillany. On June 21st, 1752, Charles Langlade, a half-

French and half-Ottawa war chief, took 240 Ottawa and Chippewa and destroyed the village.54 They burned the town, killed many of the inhabitants and British traders, and seized 3000 pounds of British goods. The Ottawa and Chippewa boiled and ate the

52 Jennings, Empire, 45. White, Middle Ground, 230-231. 53 M de la Jonquiere, “Aux abus qui s’etoient glisses dans les postes,” May 29, 1750, quoted in Bailey, Ohio Company, 172. 54 R. David Edmunds, “Pickawillany: French Military Power Versus British Economics,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 58, no. 2 (1975): 174. Edmunds asserts that originally, the force was a more sizable attack led by Celeron, but he held back when the Indians at Detroit failed to join them. Regardless, the smaller expedition destroyed the town and its threat to the French.

153

headman, Old Briton, symbolizing their domination over him.55 This attack devastated the

Miami. Their largest town, an influential and valued headman, and many of their population were lost. After the attack, the Miami split into pro-British and pro-French groups, with the French group relocating to live near Fort Detroit. The massacre smashed the Miami and left them politically weakened and geographically dispersed.

This violent attack significantly altered Ohio Valley politics. A devastating blow to the Miami, this was also a loss to the Ohio Company’s strategy in the Ohio Valley; one of the

Company’s most important allies, hard-earned by subsidized trade and the diplomacy of

Christopher Gist and those at Logstown, had been obliterated. Dinwiddie expressed his regret at the loss of the Miami later in 1754. The Ohio Company and the colony of Virginia lost friends and gained enemies.56 However, word of this massacre quickly traveled around the Ohio River Valley, and many Indians felt outraged at the actions of the French and their Native American allies. Immediately after the Pickawillany attack, many Ohio

Indians began harboring hostile feelings towards the French. The situation was ripe for the

Ohio Company to take further action in the Ohio River Valley.57

The Ohio Company found out about the new Ohio Valley political situation when

William Trent, returned from his diplomatic trip to Pickawillany and reported the terrible news. The Miami, an influential and powerful British ally, were scattered. Trent returned with a lengthy report of the French attack Pickawillany and recounted the Miami pleas to

55 “Twightwee Speech to Thomas Burney,” in Journal of Captain William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany with Biographical Sketch, Edited by Alfred Goodman. Charlestown: Nabu Press, 2014), 48. 56 “Governor Dinwiddie to Colo. WM. Fairfax, 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 108-109. 57 Edmunds, “Pickawillany,”174. White, Middle Ground, 233-234.

154

Virginia for aid. As anti-French sentiment ran high in the Ohio Valley, it was time to move, and the Ohio Company knew it. In October 1752, The Virginia Gazette asserted that “the six nations in alliance with the Miami a people much more powerful than themselves have declared War and against the French and French Indians.”58 The article cited the massacre at Pickawillany as the impetus for this alliance and Iroquoian-Miami plans for retaliation.

The Ohio Company papers point out that this anti-French feeling was a “favorable opportunity” to secure settlement locations in the Ohio River Valley.59

Trent explained the anti-French sentiment by recounting a conference he witnessed near Pickawillany between the Iroquois, Cherokee, Shawnees, and the Miami. At this meeting, they expressed their anger with the French and confirmed their British friendship.

The Iroquois had ceremoniously ravaged the French colors and gave speeches condemning the French. The Cherokee and the Iroquois presented the Miami with wampum to express their condolences. Then the Iroquois gave a speech on the Delaware’s behalf, and reminded them of the between the Iroquois and the English. The Iroquois told the Miami of the British presents they received at Logstown and said, “Brothers: We desire you to be strong, and to hold fast the chain of friendship concluded between us, you and the English, and we desire you not to mind that the french and their indians say to our disadvantage.” Trent, as the Ohio Company representative, also consoled the Miami and then returned to Virginia to pass on the word about the French attack. 60

58 “Virginia Gazette, October 6th, 1752,” found in “The Case of the Ohio Company,” 8. In George Mercer Papers, 338. 59 “Petition of the Ohio Company to Governor Dinwiddie and the Council,” George Mercer Papers, 68. 60 Trent, William. Journal of Captain William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany with Biographical Sketch, Ed. Alfred Goodman. Charlestown: Nabu Press, 2014), 97.

155

Trent’s report demonstrates the crucial role the Ohio Company played in transmitting crucial Ohio Valley information to Williamsburg. His lengthy report detailed the situation deep in the Ohio Valley and gave Dinwiddie the information he used in attempts to protect the Ohio Valley from French encroachment.61 After the massacre at

Pickawillany, Dinwiddie acknowledged in a letter to Ohio Company agents Thomas Cresap and William Trent that they needed to give the Ohio Indians powder and lead. He believed that promises of ammunition would keep other bands of Ohio Indians from following their example and switching their trade and alliances from British to French. Dinwiddie prophetically stated, “the French are come to Loggs Town, and are building houses, &c. and that it is to be feared they will take Possession of the River Ohio, oppress our trade and take our traders Prisoners.” However, it was not, as Dinwiddie concedes, the worst-case scenario, “we would fain hope these people are only French Traders, and they have not other View by Trade. I hope there is no great army of French among the Lakes.”62 French militarization of the Ohio Valley could utterly foil the Company’s plans.

The French and Ottawa attack on Pickawillany was a significant turning point for the British in the international borderland struggle. As White claimed in The Middle

Ground, “The attack on Pickawillany created the first significant demand for a united

British-republican-Iroquois response to the French.”63 Even those Miami, Delaware, and

Shawnee who had been against the British renewed the chain of friendship with the British and then released British prisoners and asked for assistance in thwarting the French.64

61 “At a Council Nov 4,” Legislative records of the Council of Colonial Virginia. 411. 62 “Dinwiddie to Captains Cresap and Trent February 10, 1753,” Dinwiddie Papers, 22. 63 White, Middle Ground, 234 64 White, Middle Ground, 231-234

156

Following the Pickawillany massacre, Dinwiddie knew that Virginia’s and the Ohio

Company’s futures were at stake and he pushed the Assembly to act in 1752.65 Dinwiddie knew victory hinged on the approval of the Ohio Indians. He pled with the Assembly to send gifts for the Ohio Indians. “There is one thing I recommend to your particular

Reguard, and that is cultivating the good correspondence with the neighboring nations of

Indians. It is better they shou’d Love than Fear us. And one of the two is absolutely necessary.” Dinwiddie explained that the Virginians should make the Indians love them so that when “our European neighbours settled to the Southw’d and northw’d of us, would never be able to influence the Indians against us.” Although both houses of the legislature agreed, the Assembly only paid lip service, most likely thinking the money was better spent in the settled areas of Virginia, or better yet, not at all. 66

The Assembly refused to take action in the Ohio Valley, arguing over the validity of

Virginia claims and the cost of such an endeavor before the debate became bogged down in quarrels over new land taxes. Dinwiddie even went to the Assembly chambers and showed them a letter from the Board of Trade, “recommending a Strict Friendship and Affection to the Ind’s,” to no avail. The Assembly staunchly refused, and greatly stymied Virginia’s action and alliances in the Ohio Valley. The Assembly’s interests, unlike the Governor and

Councils, were not allied with the Crown’s interest, much to the detriment of British footholds in the Ohio Valley. Governor Dinwiddie reminded the Assembly of “the

Usefulness of giving proper Encourag’m’t to foreign Protestants to settle in the interior

Parts of the Dom’n,” showing how he saw the Ohio Company’s interest as one and the same

65 Jennings, Empire, 72. 66 “Dinwiddie to the Assembly 1752,” [undated] Dinwiddie Papers, 26.

157

as Virginia’s.67 The Assembly refused to join the rest of the Virginia government, the Ohio

Company, and the Crown in an empire-building effort.68

In addition to pushing for Native American diplomacy and settlement, Dinwiddie clamored for Virginia to retaliate against the French for the Pickawillany massacre to no avail. He wanted the Burgesses to execute the existing militia laws, and to allow for the mustering and training of the men. Dinwiddie knew the French were moving, and he reminded the Assembly that Virginia relied upon a nonexistent militia to defend of

Virginia’s open country. The Assembly refused, and Dinwiddie pled with the Assembly, stating that the men needed to be trained and regularly exercised. Still, the Assembly refused, and the session ended. However, a French action soon caused Dinwiddie to reconvene the Burgesses and Council.

When the two branches of the legislature reconvened, he addressed them stating,

“since your last adjournment I have been alarm’d by several Informations from our back

Settlem’ts from the Ind’s and from our neighbouring Gov’ts of a large body of French

67 Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the Council and House of Burgesses 1753 [undated] Dinwiddie Papers, 37- 38. Dinwiddie’s relationship with the Assembly was particularly contentious: they quarreled over the Pistole Fee, and the Assembly sent an agent to London to complain about Dinwiddie’s actions, see Jack P. Greene, " and the Pistole Fee Dispute," The William and Mary Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1957): 66-69. 68 Jennings, Empire, 72. Not only concerned about finances, the Assembly fought against but a political power drain. The assemblies “had become accustomed to make the basic legislative decisions in their provinces, and a good many executive decisions as well.” Jennings claims that the conflict with France in 1754 caused all British colonial governors to increase demands on the Assembly, who “dug in their heels to resist encroachment on their hand-won powers of decisions.” Colonial Assemblies saw the Board of Trade as power-hungry and autocratic. The Virginia Governor-Assembly power struggle outlined in this chapter and the following chapters, compares to those outlined in Empire of Fortune, with the New York and Pennsylvania assemblies readied for Braddock’s march in 1754. Jennings states that the colonial assemblies represented local interests and were not as interested in the imperial interest in the Ohio Valley.

158

regulars and Ind’s…having marched from Canada to the river Ohio in a hostile Mannner, to invade his maj’ty’s Land.” This information could only come from the Ohio Company agents, Trent and Gist who both had been deep in the Ohio Valley delivering presents from the Ohio Company.69

Again, at the Crown’s urging, Dinwiddie tried to form an alliance within the Virginia

Government to take defensive and military action. The Crown had commanded him to call the Assembly into session and stress the need for assistance in combating the French.

Dinwiddie explained to the Assembly that upon hearing his reports, the Crown had

“immediately order’d one of His Ships of War to come to this Dom’n to help thwart the

French.” Perhaps Dinwiddie thought that the Crown’s support would loosen the Assembly’s pocketbooks. He stated, “As this Affair has been so strongly attended to at Home and there judg’d to be of great Conseq’se to His M’y’s Dom’ns... You will think it a Matter that requires

Y’r immediate Consid’n.” Dinwiddie informed the Assembly that the King had sent 30 pieces of cannon and ammunition, which he told them was causation enough for them to take action, and provide money and supplies, but noted that if the Crown’s concern was not enough, then the security of Virginia settlements should be. 70

Dinwiddie did what he could without the Assembly, and while he could not call up the men directly, he divided the colony into four districts and appointed leadership to call general muster in the fall of 1753. The was poorly prepared and trained, and since it was the colony’s “chief Dependence, for the Protection of our Lives and

Fortunes (our country being very extensive and without Fortifications),” Dinwiddie urged

69 “Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the House of Burgesses,” Dinwiddie Papers, 40-41. 70 Ibid.

159

the Assembly to make the necessary alterations and amendments regarding militia laws.

Dinwiddie’s pleas show his worry that both Virginia and the Ohio Company would be in ruins without proper fortification or militia. 71

Duly frustrated that the Assembly thwarted his fortifying plans, Dinwiddie, recognizing his lack of progress, ended the session by scolding, “That Zeal for His M’y’s

Service, that disinterested Love of Your Country…has not been sufficiently attended to.“ He reiterated the Assembly’s neglect to create friendships with the Indians and how imperative it was to the national interests and security of the British Empire.” However, nothing he said moved the Assembly to allocate funds, supplies, or manpower to secure the

Ohio Country or even Virginia’s backcountry settlements, rendering Virginians incapable of taking advantage of this period of anti-French hostility in the borderland.72

With the Virginia Assembly unwilling to act, the Ohio Indians believed that the

Virginians had reneged on their alliances and promises and, therefore, Native American support for the Virginians waned. As Edmunds concludes, the friendship between the

Miami and the British demonstrated that the British trade goods trumped French threats for the Native Americans. However, Edmunds also concluded that French military power succeeded in driving most of the British traders out of the Ohio Valley.73 Military force trumped bribes and treaties. The British nonresponse created a rift in Indian-British relationship that gifts could not bridge.

71 Ibid. 72 “Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the House of Burgesses, Dec 19th 1753,” Dinwiddie Papers, 47-48. 73 R. David Edmunds, “Pickawillany: French Military Power Versus British Economics,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 58, no. 2 (1975): 183.

160

Striking Back: Red Stone Creek, Gist’s Plantation, and the Winchester Conference

As the above section shows, the local significantly affected the broader British situation in the Ohio Valley, for in 1753 after the Pickawillany attack, the

Ohio Company agents were the only British moving in the Ohio Valley.74 The Ohio

Company refused to allow the French to keep them out of the Ohio Valley, even though the members were forced to defend their investment alone, as no other British colonist remained in the Ohio Valley.75 The Ohio Company’s persistence “suggested forcibly to the

French that Langlade’s attack had been only a half-victory over the English invaders.”76

The Ohio Company kept building, and took on the most challenging westernmost construction project yet, a fortified structure where Redstone Creek joins with the

Monongahela, about 37 miles from the headwaters of the Ohio River.77

This location, called hereafter referred to as Redstone, was perfect for a fortified storehouse. Traders and travelers could travel forty of the sixty miles from Conococheague

(present-day Hagerstown, Maryland) to Wills Creek, by road, and then take the Ohio

74 Some of Dinwiddie’s problems with the Assembly surrounded the Governor’s insistence on collecting the Pistole fee, a tax payable to the governor each time he affixed his seal. This fee would not have made Dinwiddie rich on its own, and as Alden pointed out, he did not need the revenue, nor was the fee high enough that the burgesses could not pay it. The problem lay in that Dinwiddie insisted that land grants be patented and have the official seal. This compelled the owners of land to pay quit-rents to the Crown. This upped the cost of owning and obtaining land, which previously been cheap. “Dinwiddie sought a small fee; but his demand that patenting promptly follow surveying was not a trifling matter.” John Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie: Servant of the Crown (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1973), 26-37. 75 Fred Anderson, The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War (New York: Penguin, 2005), 36. 76 Anderson, Crucible, 29 77 Bailey, Ohio Company, 154-155, Anderson, Crucible, 29, asserts that after the attack at Pickawillany the Ohio Company agents were the only British left in the Ohio Valley.

161

Company’s boats up the Potomac River the last twenty miles. After reaching Wills Creek, travelers took the Ohio Company’s road the sixty miles from Wills Creek to Red Stone.

Once travelers got to Red Stone Creek, they could travel on the Monongahela and Ohio

Rivers, which made the transportation of goods into the Allegheny Mountains relatively easy. Additionally, the Redstone location lay near where the Company planned its settlement, and the Ohio Company thought “it absolutely necessary to have some fort or place of security,” to protect future settlers.78

The Ohio Company petitioned Virginia for the land it specifically wanted to settle but did not receive a response. In their petition, the Ohio Company members succinctly summarized their actions, and pointed out that they had undertaken the expense to “search and view the lands of the Ohio alias Alligany river as far Westward as the Twightwee town and to cultivate trade and friendship with the several nations and tribes of Indians,” and clear “a wagon road from their Store house at Wills creek to one of the branches of the

Ohio.” It was at this location near Redstone Creek that the Company asked to erect its settlement.79 The Ohio Company tried to move forward with the colonization plans, but the government’s inaction made it difficult.

While the Company’s plans moved slowly due to the Assembly’s roadblocks, the

French quickly cemented themselves in the Ohio Country so firmly that only war could evict them. The French government pursued a massive military undertaking in the Spring of 1753. The governor planned and orchestrated a chain of forts and a road connecting

78 “Instructions given Mr. Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company,” George Mercer Papers, 149. 79 Petition of the Ohio Company to Governor Dinwiddie and the Council, George Mercer Papers, 66.

162

them with the aid of Engineers.80 In May of 1753, the French executed their carefully laid plans, beginning with (modern-day Erie, Pennsylvania) along the shores of Lake Erie. In July, they continued their string of Forts with the construction of Fort

LeBeouf (modern-day Waterford, Pennsylvania). By August, the French had ousted John

Fraser, a British trader, from the junction of French Creek and the , (called

Venango by contemporaries, and Franklin, Pennsylvania by residents today), and erected

Fort Machault.

This fort-building spree proved expensive. The French had to be seriously concerned about the British to take on such a costly venture, costly enough for Duquesne to forcefully seize food from Canadian farmers to feed his troops, which he claimed allowed him to “oppose the projects of the English.81 This confiscation failed to cover the army’s needs and the French purchased food from New England, underlining the fact that local and independent interests outweighed those of the empire.82 The Canadian scarcity was so great, that an incredulous Governor Dinwiddie, faced with the French army in the Ohio

Valley stated, “Where they get Bread and Corn I cannot imagine, for from many Acc’ts they are in the greatest want at Canada.”83

Dinwiddie and the Ohio Company were not alone in keeping an eye on the status of the Ohio Valley. The Six Nations noted the French inroads and sent a group of women, signifying the peaceful and diplomatic nature of the party, to determine the nature of the

80 William A. Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing,1999 org. pub. 1960), 23. 81 Donald Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Society, 1954), 14-15. 82 Ibid. 83 “Dinwiddie to Captains Cresap and Trent, Feb. 10 1753,” Dinwiddie Papers, 22-23.

163

French intentions. Chevalier Pierre Paul Marin, the commander of the French military in the Ohio Valley told the group that he would only raise the hatchet “in case he encountered opposition,” and that the French were there to “drive away the evil spirits that encompassed them and disturbed the earth.”84 The “evil spirits” referenced can only mean the British. Without a doubt, the French built their forts to dissuade British empire- building in the Ohio Valley.

While many Native Americans were upset by the French activities in the area, only the Indians on the lower Allegheny, led by Tanaghrisson, protested their occupation.

Reliant on the British trade, they had different interests than the Iroquois in Onondaga.

The French at Presque Isle knew Tanaghrisson was en route. Joncaire, a French go-between and interpreter warned Marin that Tanaghrisson was “more English than the English” and

“in a word, he is no good.”85 On September 3rd, 1753, the Half-King voiced his protest to the

French forts, claiming that the land did not belong to them: “I desire you to withdraw, as I have done our Brothers the English, for I will keep you at Arm’s length. I lay this down as a

Tryal for both, to see which will have the greatest regard to it, & that Side we will stand by,

& make equal Sharers with us: Our Brothers the English have heard this, & I come now to tell it to you, for I am not affraid to discharge you off this Land.” Marin rebuffed the Half-

King, and insulted him, saying “I despise all the stupid things you said.” Marin refuted the

84 “M. Dusquesne to M. De Rouillé,” August 20th 1753 in Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York: procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. vol. 10, eds E.B. O’Callaghan, (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, 1858), 33. 85 Tanaghrisson’s speech recorded in George Washington, “Journey to the French Commandant: Narrative,” Founders Online, National Archives. Accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-01-02-0003-0002. [Original source: The Diaries of George Washington, vol. 1, 11 March 1748 – 13 November 1765, ed. Donald Jackson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976, pp. 130–161.]

164

Half-King’s power, comparing Tanaghrisson and his followers to mosquitos, and claiming that he would continue building French forts. Marin claimed that even with British aid,

Tanaghrisson could not stop the French forts.86 Following this exchange, Tanaghrisson offered Marin wampum belts to document the meeting, and Marin disrespectfully refused the belts, essentially saying he would not acknowledge Tanaghrisson’s words. Marin ended the meeting, stating, “Here is your Wampum, I fling it at you. Child, you talk foolish.”87

However, the French could not ignore Tanaghrisson’s threats, especially as starvation and dysentery swept through the French troops, leaving the sick to bury the dead. By October of 1753, the French fort-building force in the Ohio Valley had dwindled from 2000 to 800, work halted, and the French went into winter quarters.88 When Parisian administrators inquired about the delay, the governor replied that the sickness, drought, horrid weather, and Indian threats stymied their progress. Sickness and poor living conditions significantly changed the French status for the worse, and Tanaghrisson and his people, once considered irrelevant, now threatened the French position.

Tanaghrisson left Presque Isle angry and entirely opposed to the French. The

French forts did not guarantee the loyalty or friendship of the Ohio Indians or Iroquois.

While Tanaghrisson failed to prohibit the French fort-building activities, his visit nonetheless factored into the Ohio Country events. Thoroughly turned off by the French, the Half-King became even more tied to Virginia and the Ohio Company as the Seven Years’

War drew closer and closer. As Chapters Four and Five show, Tanaghrisson held

86 “Jonacaire to Marin, undated, Archives du Seminaire de Quebec,” V-V, 5:60:2, translated in Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 12. 87 Quote from George Washington, “Journey to the French Commandant: Narrative,” 130–161. 88 Kent, The French Invasion, 65.

165

significant sway in George Washington’s infamous expedition to Fort Le Boeuf, in building the Ohio Company’s fort at the Forks, and in the initial military encounters between the

British and the French in the Ohio Valley. The French snub strengthened Tanaghrisson’s opposition. He continued to protest and undermine the French foothold, and he did not act alone.

Dinwiddie, when he heard of the French military activity in Ohio Country took further steps to create Native American alliances. He held another conference with the

Iroquois, as well as the Delaware, Shawnee, Wyandot, Miami, and other Ohio Indians.89 The

Virginians had tentatively discussed this conference during the Logstown Conference, but the French advances into the Ohio Country forced the Ohio Company to solidify diplomatic plans. As with the Logstown Conference, Gist invited the Indians to attend the Winchester

Conference, and Andrew Montour again served as the Company’s interpreter.

Virginia held this council on its own. The reasons for this solo approach are unclear, especially in light of Dinwiddie’s previous attempts at intercolonial cooperation.

Dinwiddie’s various letters to and from the governor of Pennsylvania and the Crown regarding the boundary between the two colonies indicate continued strife between the two colonies, so Dinwiddie may have intentionally left out his neighboring colonies in order to cement Virginia’s claim in the Ohio Valley. Alternatively, perhaps Dinwiddie had become discouraged from his failed attempts at intercolonial unity, especially regarding the situation of the French in the Ohio Valley so much that he decided not to put forth the effort. Dinwiddie might have believed that fewer colonial officials would lead to a more direct, clear conference, one where Virginia’s government and the Ohio Company, could

89 Bailey, Gist, 59.

166

obtain the agreements and alliances that the Company needed to secure the coveted Ohio

River Valley.

The gathering at Winchester focused on British and Virginia expansionary policy and the Ohio Company’s interests. William Fairfax led the conference for Virginia, and ten other prominent Virginians attended, six of whom held ties to the Ohio Company. William

Fairfax had several family members in the Ohio Company, and personal investments that relied on British westward expansion, and Ohio company members William Trent and John

Carlyle attended. Ohio Company agents Christopher Gist, Andrew Montour, and George

Croghan were also present, and these three played prominent roles, interpreting and acting as cultural intermediaries between the Virginians and the groups of Ohio Indians. These individuals played crucial roles, their choice of words, actions, and their wheeling and dealing were paramount to bringing the two sides together and facilitating understanding between the groups.90

In September of 1753, around one hundred delegates from the tribes listed above met with the Virginians in Winchester. The meeting opened with a message from Onondaga confirming the Iroquois ambition to drive the French out of the Ohio Valley, and both sides cursed the French. A headman and leader of the people of Lower Allegheny, Monacatoocha,

(also known as Scarroyady) called the Virginians out for not building the fort they pledged at the Logstown Conference. Monacatoocha and the Ohio Indians renewed requests for a

British Fort along the Ohio River and forcefully asked for guns and ammunition to drive out the French. The Indian leaders at Winchester discussed granting the Ohio Company land in

90 Bailey, Gist, 58. Bailey points out that the Ohio Company was well-represented at the conference but ignores the crucial role of their employees and agents.

167

the Ohio River Valley once they expelled the French. This was an enticement to the Ohio

Company and the colony of Virginia to take action. This conference was enormously important to the Ohio Company, as it was a step towards ensuring the cooperation of the

Iroquois and the Indians who lived in the Alleghenies, which dictated the settlement’s success. Many scholars wrongly see it as inconsequential, but the turbulent nature of the borderland in the early 1750s necessitated frequent meetings between the British and their Native American allies. Power dynamics could shift quickly and radically change the nature of Borderland politics. This conference reaffirmed the Ohio Company’s alliances, confirming that many Ohio Indians and also the Iroquois welcomed more Ohio Company infrastructure. 91

One of the new items deliberated at Winchester may not have had much impact, nonetheless the discussion is revealing. While it is crucial to point out that not all of the

Ohio Indians might have held these same opinions, the ones present at the Winchester

Conference did. The Native Americans requested a more tightly regulated trade. They asked that only three traders be allowed to come among them to trade from the British.

The three men they requested, Christopher Gist, William Trent, and Andrew Montour, all worked for the Ohio Company of Virginia, indicating their preference for the Ohio Company agents. The Indians then asked that the British also discontinue trading “fire water” among their people, proclaiming that it was not in their people’s best interest to consume such a beverage. Gist and Trent had already made it known that they disapproved of the sale of liquor in the borderland, and Andrew Montour’s long association with Croghan who had previously advocated against the sale of alcohol suggests his aversion to the practice.

91 Bailey, Ohio Company, 140-144.

168

While the preference for the Ohio Company’s agents over any independent traders reveals the Native American attitudes towards the Company, the Virginians could never enforce such a request.92

This conversation regarding traders and agents was not the Conference’s purpose; the meeting was intended to discuss the activities of the French in the Ohio Valley and how it could be combatted. As much as the Ohio Company members wanted to thwart the

French efforts, the Crown tied their hands. If the Company took action, as some settlers and traders did in the borderland, and fought without the consent of the Crown, the members risked losing favor with the Crown, which risked their land grant. Such a loss would have utterly crippled the Ohio Company and rendered all the agents’ work and members’ investments a waste.

However, by the end of 1753, the Crown authorized the use of force to drive the

French out of the Ohio Valley. In March, Lord Halifax, member of the Board of Trade, with anti-French tendencies and a zeal for empire, urged Lord Holderness, the British secretary of state, to quickly stop the French “proceedings and encroachments.”93 Holderness, in turn, authorized two Ohio Company forts in the Ohio Country and permitted Dinwiddie to employ the Virginia Militia against the French invaders. If the French refused to leave, the

Board commanded Dinwiddie to drive them off by force.94 Considering this order and the tension between empires in the Ohio Valley, it is surprising that full-scale war did not erupt in 1754.

Even with the threat of violence and the French militarization in the Ohio Valley, the

92 Ibid. 93 Alden, Servant of the Crown, 43. 94 “Editorial Note” The Papers of George Washington, 56–60.

169

Ohio Company pursued its ultimate goal: land speculation. The architect for this endeavor, as he was for many of the Company’s projects, was Christopher Gist. Gist plotted the settlement and constructed a few buildings, including his own home as early as 1752. This location, known as Gist’s Plantation or often simply Gist’s, was about 10 miles from the

Ohio Company’s planned strong house at Red Stone Creek, between the Monongahela and

Youghiogheny Rivers. The Logstown Treaty, and then the Winchester Conference, had granted the Ohio Company permission, as well as encouragement to establish a settlement somewhere around this location. Gist lived at this location for approximately two years before the Ohio Company settled “Foreign Protestants” on the land.95 It was 1752 before the Company sent Gist to Baltimore and Philadelphia to recruit settlers to move to the Ohio

Company’s land grant.96

The Ohio Company had finally done it. The Company’s agents brought (or bought) the Ohio Indians living in the Allegheny Mountain to their side and constructed a settlement in the Ohio Valley. In 1754, the Company “dispatched Mr Gist to the Northward to give notice to the persons he had there contracted within the Companies behalf that they might remove as soon as they would to settle pursuant to their Agreement.”97 The Ohio

Company granted a family of four 100 acres, and 50 acres per additional family member.98

95 All Company documents related to settlement always included the words “foreign protestants.” The Crown did not want to move those in the colonies already paying quit- rents, they wanted new sources of income. 96 Gist’s energy was amazing since he also suffered from a disease that may have been malaria or at least had diagnostic symptoms that are consistent with this ailment. Many times, Gist writes of his ailments and of the need to stop and recover. He was actually walking thousands of miles over these years before war would begin. 97 “Untitled document preceding the Ohio Company Petition to Dinwiddie and the Council,” George Mercer Papers, 66. 98 “, 1750” in “Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, October 24 1747-May 24th 1751,” in George Mercer Papers, 5.

170

This agreement required settlers to live on the land for three years, quit-rent free, and then pay four pounds sterling per 100 acres a year. Gist recruited fifty families from

Philadelphia and Baltimore, to move to the Ohio Company’s settlement where Gist had already constructed his own home.99 While the exact dates of Gist’s construction of his home are unknown, by 1754, he had turned his home into a fortified position. When the

French commander de Villiers came through in 1754, he wrote that Gist’s home consisted of three buildings with a barricade. However, this is thought to be Gist’s family dwelling and not the entirety of the Ohio Company families, of which there were eleven, in addition to Gist’s grown children who had resided there for a few years prior. One of three buildings identified by Villiers was a storehouse for the Ohio Company’s trade goods and supplies.

Gist and at least eleven other families settled around the site known as Gist’s Plantation, near modern-day Mount Braddock, above the headwaters of Red Stone Creek. George

Washington places Gist’s Plantation about 70 Miles from Wills Creek, 50 miles for the forks of the Ohio, and 20 miles from Logstown, deeming it “at least 135 or 40 Miles from our back

Settlements.”100 The Ohio Company finally built a settlement in the Ohio Valley and brought the Ohio Valley one step closer to war.

99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. What Washington calls the Ohio Company settlement “Gist’s new settlement” to distinguish it from Gist’s former home, Opeekton, located close to Wills Creek.

171

Conclusion

From 1750 until 1754, the Ohio Company carried out the second phase of empire- building, construction of the empire. With the members footing the bill, Ohio Company agents-built infrastructure and the Native American alliances necessary to complete said infrastructure. The Ohio Company’s infrastructure, storehouses, roads, and fortifications pushed the French beyond their traditional diplomatic and commercial activities. The

French turned to military retaliation and infrastructure to protect their empire. While these French activities initially caused Virginia and the Ohio Company to stumble, eventually the Company members and agents regained their footing and continued construction of both buildings and alliances in the Ohio Country.

The Ohio Company had achieved its goal of erecting a settlement in 1754; however, victory was by no means secure. They had to take the next step in empire-building, militarizing the territory. This phase aimed to protect the infrastructure and claims of the

Ohio Company, Virginia, and Britain, and compete with the French militarily in the Ohio

Valley. Protecting the fledgling empires and imperial infrastructure brought the Colony and the Crown even further into the empire-building process. The Ohio Company’s actions brought the British, French, and Iroquois Empires another step closer towards war.

172

Chapter Four: Negotiating for the Borderland: Dinwiddie, Washington, and Trent

"The Eyes of all Indians are fixed upon you. You now have it now in your power with a small Expense to save the whole Country for his Majesty, but if the opportunity is missed it will never be in the Power of the English to recover it but by a great Expence & the United

Force of al the colonies.”

-William Trent to Robert Dinwiddie, August 11, 17531

As the above quote indicates, the Ohio Company and the Colony of Virginia needed to act swiftly to hold their ground in the Ohio Valley. The French competition was tenser than ever, and Dinwiddie knew the Ohio Company could not hold the Ohio Valley alone, legally or in actuality. They needed allies. The borderland situation and the multiple layers of the British colonial system required the Ohio Company to negotiate with various groups before taking action. While Governor Dinwiddie negotiated with the Virginia Assembly and the Crown, the Company agents negotiated with the Iroquois and the Ohio Indians. Both

Dinwiddie and the agents aimed, with varying degrees of success, to protect the Company’s investments, but their efforts brought the Ohio Valley and the British, French and Iroquois to the brink of war.

An analysis of the Ohio Company’s involvement in and influence on the expedition to Fort Le Boeuf and Virginia’s subsequent political and military actions, highlights the role

1 “William Trent to Robert Dinwiddie,” August 11, 1753. Ohio Company Papers: Being Primarily Papers of the “Suffering Traders” of Pennsylvania, Ed. Kenneth Bailey. (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, Inc.) 22-23.

173

of private enterprise in this phase of British Empire building; These events typically are thought of as the origins of the Seven Years’ War. When Dinwiddie sent diplomats to Fort

Le Boeuf, called men to arms, and militarily pushed into the borderland, the Ohio Company remained active. The events of 1753 and 1754 were the Ohio Company’s last-ditch efforts to rally allies and secure the Ohio Valley.

The first section of this chapter, “Negotiating British Response,” analyzes how

Dinwiddie negotiated with the Crown and the Virginia Council to design a response that would protect the Ohio Company’s endeavors while operating within the bounds of the imperial and colonial structures. “Ensuring Washington’s success,” portrays how the Ohio

Company’s agents and allies acted to ensure that Virginia's emissary successfully gathered intelligence and delivered Dinwiddie’s eviction notice to Fort Le Boeuf. The chapter’s final section displays Dinwiddie’s negotiations with the Crown, the Virginia Assembly, and the

Ohio Indians to gather allies, men, and as many Ohio Company agents and members as possible, to protect the Ohio Company’s Ohio Valley empire.

Historiography

By investigating the way Ohio Company’s members and agents negotiated to shape

Virginia’s borderland expedition, internal politics, and military activities, this chapter continues this dissertation’s argument that the Ohio Company took part in the empire- building processes of 1753 and 1754. In making that argument, this chapter adds to the broader historiographical arguments of this dissertation regarding the negotiated nature of

British empire-building, and the commercial origins of the Seven Years’ War.

174

Because agents and officials in London, Williamsburg, and the Ohio Valley frequently interacted and negotiated to shape the events of 1753-1754, this chapter reveals the multi-layered nature of British empire-building. The works of Hinderaker, Greene, and

Bushnell which all focus on different aspects of negotiated empire building, intersect in this chapter. The colonial centers influenced the on-the-ground agents, and the agents’ interests shaped their response to the Colony and Crown. The struggle between colonial elites, uncovered in Chapter Three, is continued in this chapter, adding to the scholarship of

Greene and Bailyn, but the chapter also showcases how colonial elites pushed their own vision and interest into the process. The Ohio Company negotiated with its agents in

Virginia, the Ohio Valley, and London, and all of them negotiated with the Company and one another.2

The Ohio Company was able to have such a prominent role in the negotiations surrounding the origins of the war because Robert Dinwiddie negotiated with many different levels of the colonial structure. Dinwiddie’s letters to London Officials and the

Board of Trade are one of the main sources used in this chapter, and they are also the main sources of Patrice Higonnet, whose article focused on Dinwiddie’s letters from 1754 and

1755 mischaracterizes the relationship between Company, Colony and Crown as corrupt and negligent. Higonnet correctly asserts that the Ohio Company influenced the British

2 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673- 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi; Jack P. Greene, “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World,” in Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, ed. Jack P. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24; Amy Turner Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries,” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002),15-28; Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 7-10.

175

government. However, her characterization of the influence as corrupt is incorrect.3 This dissertation investigates the Ohio Company from 1747 onward, it and demonstrates that this influence was neither corrupt, nor new in 1755. The Ohio Company had been influencing the Board of Trade since 1749. Because this chapter looks at Dinwiddie’s letters to London while focusing on the borderland, it reveals that Dinwiddie’s support of the Ohio Company went beyond letter writing. Dinwiddie appointed Ohio Company agents to governmental positions and sent the Virginia militia into the Ohio Valley to defend the

Ohio Company’s claims and investment.

This chapter demonstrates the role of private companies and individuals in the events occurring in the borderland from 1753-1754, which are typically seen by historians as the origins of the Seven Years’ War. The second and third sections of this chapter demonstrate that even as the government became more involved than it had in the mapping or building phases, the Ohio Company members and agents continued to play a significant role. While the actions of George Washington are noted in the historiography of this period, those of Gist, Trent, and other Ohio Company members and agents are not.

This chapter argues that the Ohio Company spurred the government to take action and then actively influenced and participated in the borderland clashes. This dissertation takes exception to the government-focused view held by prior historians, and shows the agency and activities of a private enterprise during this time period.

3 Patrice Higonnet, “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” The Journal of Modern History 40, No. 1, (Mar., 1968): 57-90.

176

Negotiating the British Response: Dinwiddie, the Crown, and the Virginia Council.

When word of the French military activities reached Governor Dinwiddie, he promptly advocated for the mobilization and militarization of Virginia. For Dinwiddie, a conflict with the French now seemed unavoidable. For either the Company or Crown to fulfill its imperial goals or, at the very least, hang on to the territory and structures already in their grasp, they needed military action. After the French fort-building spree, Governor

Dinwiddie sought a forceful response, something he had previously failed to provoke in the dilatory Virginia Assembly, so he sought aid from another entity, the Board of Trade.

On June 16th, 1753, Dinwiddie informed the Board of Trade of the French encroachments in the Ohio Country and pled for permission to act: “I hope you will think it necessary to prevent the French taking Possession of the Lands on the Ohio, so Contiguous to Our Settlements.” Dinwiddie hoped the Crown would allow him to unleash the full strength of the Ohio Company and Virginia to secure the Ohio Valley, and London did not disappoint him. The Board of Trade received Dinwiddie’s letter on the 11th of August 1753, and immediately took action, informing the King on August 18th. By the 28th of August,

Lord Holderness, the British Secretary of State, conveyed the Crown’s instructions to

Dinwiddie to verify the rumors of the French invasion, and if he found the rumors to be true, he should “require of Them peaceably to depart, and not to persist in such unlawfull

Proceedings.” Dinwiddie received the Crown’s instructions in mid-November and quickly sent a young George Washington to treat with the French, immediately informed the Crown he had done so, and promised to transmit Washington's information and the French commander's reply upon Washington’s return. In order to operate within the imperial

177

system and keep the Ohio Company in imperial favor, Dinwiddie acted within the bounds the Crown set forth; his response was negotiated. 4

Before Dinwiddie received the Crown’s response to his letter informing them of the

French forts, the Ohio Company agents brought even more troubling news of the dire and desperate borderland situation in the summer of 1753. William Trent wrote, “The French have already built a Fort on Lake Erie, and another is partly finished. . . . By the last account

I can get the French Army consists of about fifteen hundred Souldiers besides Battoe Men.”5

Trent reported that the French planned to build two more Forts down the Ohio River. He urged Dinwiddie and the Ohio Company to take action: "Now is our Time, if we manage well all the Indians may be brought to join against the French. Otherwise they will join the

French against the English." Trent knew the time was ripe for Dinwiddie to act. "The Eyes of all Indians are fixed upon you. You now have it now in your power with a small Expense to save the whole Country for his Majesty, but if the opportunity is missed it will never be in the Power of the English to recover it but by a great Expence & the United Force of al the colonies.” Trent’s (rather prophetic statement) prompted Dinwiddie to act. On October 27,

4 “Robert Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade,”; “Lord Holderness to Robert Dinwiddie,”; “Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, 17 Nov. 1753,”; “Robert Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade,” from all from the “Editorial Note, ”The Diaries of George Washington, vol. 1, 11 March 1748 – 13 November 1765,” ed. Donald Jackson, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 118–129. For more on Dinwiddie’s fight with the Assembly prior to Washington’s expedition, See Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 40-41. 5 “Battoe,” “bateau,” or “Batteaux,” are flat bottomed boats with pointed ends at both the bow and stern. These boats were mainly used for river navigation, mainly in America. The men who were skilled in operating these vessels were separate from the main body of soldiers.

178

1753, Dinwiddie presented Trent’s letters to his only ally in Williamsburg, the Virginia

Council.6

Trent’s pleas for action fell on ears already inclined to hear them. The Virginia

Council members were heavily invested in the Ohio Country. Dinwiddie, and two Council members, Thomas Nelson and Philip Ludwell, held significant stock in the Ohio Company, whose interests in the Ohio Valley have already been made plain. John Blair was engaged in land speculation with William Russell. Richard Corbin and John Lewis held unfilled grants of 190,000 and 800,000 acres in the Ohio Valley respectively. The remaining pair of

Council members William Nelson and William Fairfax both had immediate familial connections to the Ohio Company and interest in western land speculation.7

All of these men had a financial incentive to protect the Ohio Valley and ensure that it stayed in British, preferably Virginian, hands. Unsurprisingly, the five Council members advised Dinwiddie to take action against the French. Trent’s most recent letter explained that the British traders “were preparing to remove from Yougyougane by Advice of the Half

King.” In this letter, Trent reaffirmed his confidence in Tanaghrisson but conveyed his fears that some of the Iroquois now leaned towards the French due to British inaction following the massacre at Pickawillany. No military response had been mounted and the

Ohio Company’s promised fort was still unrealized. Trent speculated that this put the Ohio

Company lands and settlers in danger and claimed: “all the Setlers on the Ohio Company's

Lands will be obliged to move off if the Governor don't fall on some Method speedily to stop

6 “William Trent to Robert Dinwiddie, August 11, 1753,” “William Trent to Robert Dinwiddie,” August 11, 1753. Ohio Company Papers, 22-23. 7 “Resume of the Proceedings of the Ohio Company, October 24th 1747,” Lois Mulkern, eds., George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 2.

179

the progress of the French.” The mention of the Ohio Company's land and settlers demonstrates the Council's concern for the Ohio Company's success and explains why, after receiving permission from the Crown, the Council acted so quickly.8

To keep the French militarization of the Ohio Valley from negating its financial gains and ensure imperial obedience, the Council needed to act. However, all previous efforts to spur the Assembly to action failed. Dinwiddie and the Council, alarmed by Trent’s letters, knew time was of the essence, so they bypassed the Assembly altogether. Even the

Assembly's inaction or reputation for inaction influenced the nature of the Company and

Council’s response. The Council’s access to funds was limited due to the nature of colonial governance, which granted the power of the purse to the Assembly, if the Council wanted to protect the Ohio Company’s investment and land claims, they had to act small.9

The Council and Dinwiddie agreed to send a messenger to the French, which instructed the French to stop their progress. At the same meeting when Dinwiddie stressed the Ohio Company’s perils, Dinwiddie proposed that the Council draft instructions, passport and a commission for an emissary to deliver a letter to the French Commandant.10

The Council members jumped at the chance to have Virginia pay for this excursion; after all, private companies had funded many previous missions into the borderland. On October

31, 1753, the Council produced the passport, commission, and a letter to the French

Commandant, and delivered them to the chosen emissary.11

8 "At a Council held October 27th, 1753” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia V. 5, ed, Wilmer L. Hall, (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1945), 443-444. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., The Virginia House of Burgesses paid Washington 50 pounds for his journey, 11 “At an Council held October 31st, 1753,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 445.

180

The emissary, young George Washington, was the much-younger brother and ward of Ohio Company member, Lawrence Washington. The Council members knew this volunteer through his brother, Lawrence, and other family connections. George

Washington also came with William Fairfax’s recommendation, which carried tremendous weight in Virginia politics. Fairfax (Lawrence Washington’s father-in-law), had familial and financial connections to the Ohio Company, and probably wanted an agent with Ohio

Company connections.12 Again, colonial politics negotiated Dinwiddie’s choices. He chose

Washington not because of his military prowess, famed leadership, or reputation, but rather for his familial and financial connections. In fact, as Dinwiddie’s biographer articulates, William Fairfax had previously influenced Dinwiddie’s decision to appoint

Washington as one of the adjutants of the Virginia militia.13 This dissertation argues that the Fairfax factor, as well as Washington's connection to the Ohio Company, influenced

Dinwiddie again when selecting a candidate to send to Fort Le Boeuf.

Washington needed ambition; he needed a plan of action, a path to wealth. The much younger son of a planter, he only would inherit half of his brother’s estate. Like many second sons, Washington turned to the military to help him climb the socioeconomic ladder. Going into the Ohio Country, as was pointed out in previous chapters and is again articulated below was a perilous and often deadly business. Washington, like so many of the other agents in the borderland, willingly took the risk.14

12 “Governor Dinwiddie to Colo. William Fairfax,” Jan. 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 61-62, 13 John Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie: Servant of the Crown (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1973), 90-91. 14 Anderson, Crucible, 74-75.

181

Anderson suggests that Washington’s experience in the "West," influenced

Dinwiddie’s selection of the youth to go west. However, Washington’s knowledge and expertise in “the west” were severely limited. Washington had traveled with Lord Fairfax's

1748 surveying party as a teenager. However, Lord Fairfax’s expedition only went to the other side of the , and not into the Ohio Country.15 Only 21 years old,

Washington needed a guide to aid him as the succeeding sections of this chapter demonstrate.16

To chaperon Washington, Dinwiddie chose none other than the Ohio Company’s most trusted agent, Christopher Gist. Gist, as outlined in Chapters Two and Three, had been on multiple extended trips into the Ohio Country for the Ohio Company, and he knew the area and its Indian inhabitants well. By sending Gist on the mission, Dinwiddie appeased the Ohio Company members, as well as the Ohio Indians, as both knew and respected Gist. Gist had visited Logstown several times. Even Gist’s current home, Gist’s

Plantation, the beginning of the Ohio Company settlement, lay further into the borderland than Washington had ever traveled. Dinwiddie chose wisely, for Washington and Gist’s journals show that the Ohio Company agent acted as guide, diplomat, and protector of

Washington on this journey. Gist, armed with knowledge and skill from his previous missions for the Ohio Company, kept Washington protected from the harsh elements and

15 Robert D. Mitchell, “’Over the Hills and Far Away’: George Washington and the Changing Virginia Backcountry,” in George Washington and the Virginia Backcountry, ed. Warren R. Hofstra (Madison, : Madison House, 1998), 63-86. 16 On Washington’s western experience playing into his being selected as emissary see, Fred Anderson, The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War (New York: Penguin, 2005), 39. “Editorial Note” The Diaries of George Washington, 6.

182

hostile Indians. This was not a mere stroll but an arduous 505-mile trek from

Williamsburg to Fort LeBeouf in the dead of winter.17

Ensuring Washington’s Success: Agents and Allies on the trip to Fort LeBeouf

Finding the French forts and delivering Dinwiddie’s demand for the French to withdraw was a rather dangerous mission. Also Dinwiddie asked Washington and Gist to

“map” the borderland once again. Gist and Washington were to obtain information about the landscape and inhabitants, French and Indian alike. In fact, this may have been the real reason for Washington’s trip. Dinwiddie spent much more time instructing Washington on intelligence gathering than he did telling him what to say to the French commander. “You are diligently to enquire into the Numbers & Force of the French on the Ohio, & the adjacent Country; how they are like to be assisted from Canada; & what are the Difficulties

& Conveniencies of that Comunication, & the Time requir’d for it.” This trip more than hinted at espionage, and Dinwiddie continued, “You are to take Care to be truly inform’d what Forts the French have erected, & where; How they are Garrison’d & appointed, & what is their Distance from each other, & from Logstown.” Dinwiddie also commanded the expedition to determine, as the Crown had asked, what caused the French to take on this project, and why the French thought they had the right to build forts in the Ohio Country.

This information gathering is not surprising. Dinwiddie probably (correctly) suspected that

17 Walter R. Borneman, The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America (New York: Harper Collins: 2006), 20.

183

this expedition would get a last look at the French defenses before the British encountered them under far more militant conditions.18

Francis Jennings wrongly asserted that for this trip to Fort Le Boeuf, “Little finesse was required.” Jennings may have meant that the actual delivery of Dinwiddie’s letter required little finesse; however, this excursion exceeded a mere delivery. Carrying the message through the dangerous frigid environment of the Ohio Valley while navigating the complex borderland politics proved quite a challenge. This trip through the Ohio Country passed through the territories and settlements various groups of Native Americans and

Washington and Gist’s party had to navigate the different languages, cultures, and politics.

The Virginia party worked with these Native Americans and further cemented their alliance, a feat that absolutely required finesse. The Ohio Valley situation probably prompted Dinwiddie to assign his most reliable Indian diplomat, Christopher “Annosanah”

Gist to serve as Washington’s guide. Additionally, the expedition necessitated careful negotiation, with which Gist had experience.

The espionage aspect of this trip, further explained below, especially at Fort Le

Boeuf and at Venango, proved especially delicate. Jennings’s assertion about finesse, or lack thereof, supposedly explained why Dinwiddie chose Washington, as “Diplomats are not normally so young.”19 However, this dissertation chapter argues that because of Gist’s qualifications, Dinwiddie could afford to send someone young, ignorant of the geography,

18 Robert Dinwiddie, “Instructions from Robert Dinwiddie, 30 October 1753, The Papers of George Washington, 60–61. 19 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 60-61.

184

and inexperienced in Indian diplomacy, as long as he carried the class and social connections that Gist lacked.

George Washington’s journal of the expedition to Fort Le Boeuf has been published in many forms, with many editors, and have been the subject of many publications. This chapter’s analysis highlights Gist’s role in ensuring the mission's success. No one has put

Washington’s expedition into context with the Ohio Company’s movements at the time, or critically examined the contributions of the Ohio Company agents, Christopher Gist and

Barney Curran. Jennings merely states that Washington picked up a “guide” at Wills Creek, and wrongly writes as if Washington were on solo mission, not one where a well- experienced Gist ensured his life and success.20 While Anderson does not talk about Gist’s role in his detailed account of the Seven Years’ War, The Crucible of War, he does name him as one of Washington’s companions.21 In The War that Made America, Anderson calls

Washington “lucky” to have had Gist as a guide, negotiator, and translator, as no one else in

Virginia knew the Ohio region as well as Gist.22

Kenneth Bailey goes into some detail on the expedition to Fort Le Boeuf, but even he glosses over Gist’s contributions and downplays Gist’s role in ensuring Washington’s success. The focus on Washington may be due to the hero-worship of the founders, especially of Washington, present in the historiography at the time of Bailey's publication.23

In some instances, Bailey even called Gist “Washington’s protégé,” which would have been

20 Jennings, Empire, 60. 21 Anderson, Crucible, 45. 22 Anderson, The War that Made America, 39. 23 For a historiographical account of the scholarship of the founders and their hero- worship, see Gordon Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different (New York: Penguin, 1993)1-28, for information on the hero worship of Washington Specifically, see 31-47.

185

a very odd relationship for Gist, a man in his late fifties at the beginning of the war and early sixties at the end of the war, to have with a man in his twenties.24 Washington and

Gist eventually developed a solid relationship based on mutual respect, and Washington later used his military and social position to secure Gist positions he thought appropriate.

That hardly means Washington was Gist's mentor; the reverse was more likely, especially in the Ohio Valley. Any deference Gist granted Washington was due to Washington’s social standing.25

This section does not seek to devalue Washington or his accomplishments but, rather, displays the roles that others, mainly Gist, played in this expedition. To ignore those who influenced Washington's journey only allows god-like worship of Washington to continue and allows others to fall into undeserved obscurity. However, although some more modern historians portray this journey as requiring little skill, intelligence or stamina, nothing could be further from the truth as this section shows. Most importantly, for this dissertation’s purposes, to ignore the other actors pushes or supports the narrative

24 Kenneth Bailey, Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer and Indian Agent (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976), 113. 25 Bailey is not alone in his thoughts about Gist’s role. Brady Crytzer, Major Washington’s Pittsburgh and the Mission to Fort Le Boeuf (The History Press: Charleston, 2001), 61. This account of the trip to Le Boeuf appreciating the role Gist played on this venture. He acknowledges Gist’s skill in surviving the Ohio Country and noting that “without the efforts of Christopher Gist, John Davidson, and Barnaby Currin, he [Washington] would have been lost in the tangled web of antiquated rituals” of Indian diplomacy and speaks about Gist as a major player in the expedition. However, some of what Crytzer states is speculation and some of his work takes on an air of storytelling. Crytzer has Gist and Washington sharing glances, raised eyebrows, and subtle shakes of the head of which there is no record. While this dissertation agrees with the credit given to Gist, it seeks to engage in a more scholarly analysis of the existing source material to show Gist’s contribution.

186

that the Virginia administration acted alone in the Ohio Valley, and ignores the reality that private enterprise, not the colonial government, pushed the Virginia boundary west.

To find Christopher Gist, Washington took the Ohio Company’s route west to the

Company’s headquarters at Wills Creek, and then onto the settlement known Gist’s

Plantation. That the envoy needed Gist’s skills is evident from the fact that Gist was persuaded to remain with Washington’s party even when he had adequate reasons to depart. Just a few days after they departed from Gist’s, Gist received word that his son,

Nathanial, who was returning from a mission to see the on behalf of Virginia, fell ill at the backcountry fortification of Conegocheague (present day Hagerstown, Maryland).

Christopher Gist wanted to return to his son, but noted, “As I found myself entered again on public business, and Major Washington and all the company unwilling I should return I wrote and sent medicines to my son, and so continued my journey.” Washington and his party correctly believed that they would need Gist and his skills to achieve their goals.26

Unaware of the severe climate of the Ohio Valley, Governor Dinwiddie sent the

Virginia party on this expedition in early winter. Dinwiddie’s ignorance of these conditions exemplified the dearth of knowledge about the Ohio Region in general and made the jobs of the agents of Virginia much more challenging. The bitter weather rendered some rivers impassable for rafts, which frequently forced Barney Curran, the Ohio Company trader, to bring their baggage by land, while Washington and Gist went by canoe.27 Dinwiddie,

26 Christopher Gist, “Thursday 15,” Christopher Gist’s Journal with Historical, Geographical, and Ethnological Notes and Biographies of his Contemporaries, ed. William Darlington, (New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 80. 27 George Washington, “22nd” in “Journey to the French Commandant: Narrative,” Founders Online, National Archives. Accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-01-02-0003-0002. Original source: The Diaries of George Washington, vol. 1, 11 March 1748 – 13 November 1765, ed.

187

accustomed to the milder Williamsburg, was probably unaware of the harsh winters of the

Allegheny and Ohio Valley regions.

When the group reunited at the Forks of the Ohio, Washington followed orders and wrote the location “extremely well situated for a fort.” Washington further noted that he believed this place to be superior, defensively, and geographically, to the Ohio Company’s proposed location two miles upstream.28 This observation proved useful, for in 1754 the

Ohio Company built its fort at the location Washington suggested.

The group stopped next at the Ohio Company’s proposed fort site, the home of

Shingas, the Delaware Headman. Here, Washington engaged Native Americans diplomatically for the first time with help from the Ohio Company agent. Both Gist and

Washington use the term “we" in regard to their negotiation with the headmen, indicating that they worked together.29 Gist most likely led the way, as his journal shows, the Ohio

Indians knew and trusted him. If the relationship between Gist and the Indians at

Logstown was a strong as Gist suggested, Gist’s presence may have eased the minds of the

Ohio Indians and may have influenced many of them to meet with the Virginia party in the first place.

From his village, Shingas escorted Washington, Gist, and company to Logstown where George Croghan and other traders, including those of the Ohio Company, camped alongside their Ohio Indian Allies. The half-king Tanaghrisson, lived in Logstown.

However, he missed the Virginian's arrival, and Shingas sent a runner to retrieve him from

Donald Jackson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976, pp. 130–161; Gist, “Saturday 24,” Gist’s Journal, 81. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. Gist, Gist’s Journal, 81.

188

his hunting cabin at Little Beaver Creek.30 Neither Croghan nor Montour was "home," for neither Gist nor Washington name them in their reports, and Gist most likely would have mentioned his colleagues. Had the famous duo been there, they would have taken part in the proceedings, both of them throwing their considerable “weight” around, and Montour specifically would have acted as an interpreter.

Per Dinwiddie and the Council’s instructions, the expedition needed to gather information about the location of the French fortifications.31 Dinwiddie lacked up-to-date regional information. Dinwiddie’s most current intelligence on the Ohio Valley came from the previously mentioned letters from William Trent. British intelligence about the location of the French forts was nonexistent; a lot of the information from the Ohio Valley came through the Ohio Company agents and was transmitted by Dinwiddie and then on to the Crown in London.32 Dinwiddie’s correspondence does not indicate that any information regarding the backcountry situation came London. Regarding intelligence of the borderland, the trans-Atlantic line remained one-way, the colonist found out very little about French plans from England. While this displays the value of the Ohio Company’s

30 Ibid. Washington employed a man named Davidson as the Virginian party's interpreter. However, as Montour was one of the most sought out interpreters and cultural mediators for the British, he would have partaken if present. 31 “Instructions from Robert Dinwiddie, 30 October 1753,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-01-02-0029. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 1, 7 July 1748 – 14 August 1755, ed. W. W. Abbot. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983, 60–61.] 32 Andrew D.M. Beaumont, Colonial American and the Earl of Halifax, 1748-1761 (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015), 112-114. Beaumont explains that information came mainly from New York’s Indian Commissioner, William Johnson, and Robert Dinwiddie, and Johnson’s information from the Iroquois would have been different than that of Dinwiddie’s information coming from the Alleghany Mountains.

189

correspondence and left the colony of Virginia and the Crown reliant upon it, also would have placed pressure on Washington and Gist to deliver new information.

Fortunately for the British, the intelligence-gathering portion of Virginia’s expedition succeeded. By some stroke of luck, on November 25th, a British trader named

Brown, who was escorting some deserters from the French Army to Philadelphia, stopped at Logstown.33 The former French soldiers proved quite useful. When Washington questioned them regarding the French fortifications, they informed him that the French had built four small forts between New Orleans and the “Black Islands,” each with a few pieces of cannon and a garrison of about 30 or 40 men. Washington reported the number of men and arms at each fort. but he also (incorrectly) noted the location of “New Orlians, which is near the Mouth of the Mississippi,” and, “The Black Islands is about 130 Leagues above the Mouth of the Ohio, which is 150 above New Orlians.”34

The way Washington described the location of New Orleans speaks volumes about the dearth of information the British had regarding the American interior and how the

French had situated themselves there. Furthermore, the “Black islands” were not islands at all, but a mistranslation of Illinois to “Isles Noires.” Not only did the British not know where the Illinois country lay, the term proved so unfamiliar that the Virginia party’s translation failed.35 This error demonstrates the lack of British knowledge about the interior of

America, which rendered the Ohio Company’s surveys and intelligence reports incredibly

33 These men had probably deserted due to the quickly deteriorating conditions of the French Army, discussed later in this chapter. 34 Washington, “25th,“ and fn 34, in “Journey to the French Commandant,” 130-161. 35 Ibid. Not all of British were unaware of the Illinois country or its name, Gist and others mention it in their papers. However, this translation stood even after Washington and others edited his journals for publication.

190

useful, a great deal of the British’s information came from them. Dinwiddie who claimed to govern those lands, and who had a financial and political interest in the West, required detailed directions and descriptions on the locations of the French Forts, even for sites as large and important such as New Orleans and Illinois.

The day after the Virginia expedition questioned the French deserters, Tanaghrisson arrived in Logstown and on November 26th, the Half-King and the Virginia party discussed the French presence in the Ohio Country. Their meeting began with Tanaghrisson recounting his previous trip to Presque Isle to protest the French invasion of the Ohio.

Tanaghrisson’s meeting, as we know from the preceding chapter, did not go well for him or his followers. Washington, per Dinwiddie’s instructions, informed Shingas and

Tanaghrisson of Virginia's plans to evict the French from the borderland. Virginia needed to assure its Indian allies that they planned to take action and make good on the

Winchester Conference promises. Of course, this meeting was not purely informational,

Dinwiddie specifically instructed Washington to ask Tanaghrisson to assign warriors to serve as a guard for the Virginia expedition. Dinwiddie’s confidence in making this request, and the Half-King’s objections to French fortification efforts, is a testament to the close relationship and strong alliance between the Half-King and the Virginians. Their mutual interests tied them together; each believed that they would benefit from the Ohio

Company’s incursions into the Ohio territory. 36

Luckily for Virginia and the British Crown, the Ohio Company had already been engaging in Indian diplomacy for the past five years. The fact that this Virginia party had

36 “Instructions from Robert Dinwiddie, 30 October 1753,” in “Journey to the French Commandant,” 130-161.

191

any friends in the Ohio Country was due to the expenditures of the Ohio Company members and the efforts of the Ohio Company agents. In the end, Dinwiddie’s confidence in the Ohio Company’s friendship with the Half-King proved well founded, for when it came time to go west, Tanaghrisson escorted Washington to Le Boeuf.37

While Tanaghrisson and his followers accompanied the Virginia expedition, others declined. Jennings writes that Shingas, the Delaware headman, used his wife’s sickness as an excuse not to accompany Washington. Jennings continues to say that the Delaware and

Shawnee had only recently returned from the conferences at Winchester and Carlisle and that “their enthusiasm for doing British chores has distinctly cooled.”38 While this may have been true, other possibilities exist. The Shawnee and Delaware, as discussed in

Chapter Three, came to Winchester and then to Carlisle, searching for help to evict the

French. While the conferences may not have gained the result the Indians wanted (arms and ammunition to take on the French), they did receive gifts from the Virginians, and the conference was certainly not, as Jennings claimed, simply “British errand.” The conference was an important part of the Ohio Company and Virginia trying to assure the Native

Americans in the Alleghanies of their friendship and good intentions. The other problematic aspect of Jennings’ statement is that he writes as if Shingas was migrating towards a French alliance. Washington indicated that he believed Shingas was fearful of the French, not leaning toward an allied with them.39 Shingas’ supposed fear, paired with the fact that Shingas had recently asked for help to expel the French, suggests animosity

37 Washington, “26th” in “Journey to the French Commandant,” 130-161. 38 Jennings, Empire, 60. 39 Washington, “29th” in “Journey to the French Commandant,”130-161.

192

towards the French. This dissertation maintains that the Indians of the Lower Allegheny

Mountains regarded the French with fear, not friendship.

For Virginians and their Native American allies to make it to Fort Le Boeuf in the extreme temperatures of the winter of 1753, they had to detour to Venango (modern-day

Franklin, Pennsylvania).40 Before the massacre of Pickawillany and the French fort- building spree that would effectively run all the British traders out of the Ohio Country, this location had been the residence of the British trader, John Frazier. Although they knew the

French had garrisoned Venango with a small group under the leadership of Joncaire, the

French go-between and interpreter, the cold weather forced the Virginia party to stop.

Washington and Gist wrote of Joncaire’s hospitality, but focused on the French attempts to sway the Half-King and his party of warriors to stay at Venango and abandon the

Virginians.41 Washington wrote that he had done all in his power to keep the Half-King and

Joncaire apart, but in the end, he failed and the French quickly plied the Tanaghrisson with gifts and alcohol, rendering them incapable of completing their business.

The next day, a sober Tanaghrisson prevailed upon Washington to come to his meeting with the French where Tanaghrisson planned to renounce the French and return the wampum belts the French had given to the Mingo, Shawnee, and Delaware.

Washington refused because he wanted Tanaghrisson to wait until after they arrived at

Fort LeBeouf to carry out his diplomatic business. The Half-King refused, he wanted to do his business at Venango (or Frasier’s), which was an area approved for Iroquois business to

40 Both Washington and Gist note the extreme temperatures in their journals and note that the Allegheny River frozen over. 41 Washington, “30th” in “Journey to the French Commandant,”130-161.

193

take place.42 Tanaghrisson saw an opportunity and attempted to take it. However, Joncaire refused to receive Tanaghrisson’s wampum and wanted him to carry it to the fort commander. The French, now with the upper hand militarily, changed the rules regarding

Indian diplomacy and no longer respected the Iroquois traditions.43

Tanaghrisson’s diplomatic business was unfinished at Venango. When the

Virginians prepared to depart, some of their native American friends from the Allegheny

Mountains were unwilling to accompany them. Gist and Washington both reported that the

French persuaded Tanaghrisson’s group to stay with them for at least one night. In an attempt to avoid further problems, Washington left Davidson, the party’s interpreter, to stay the night with them, and planned to regroup all of their companions the next morning.

It may have been rum and warmth that kept some of the Indians of their party there, but

Washington says they delayed their departure because Tanaghrisson and his group had,

“some Business with [a Delaware], to know the reason why he did not deliver up the French Belt, which he had in his keeping.” Washington fails to comment further on this incident, perhaps because he did not understand its significance. Tanaghrisson, as Half-

King, should have had the ability to recall the wampum belts given to the Delaware by the

French. The fact that Custaloga refused to comply shows the weakened Iroquoian hold on the Ohio Indians, which rendered Tanaghrisson's position more precarious than ever.44

Gist took more extensive notes than Washington and commented on how the divisions among Delaware grew with the British and French rivalry. The Delaware were divided

42 Donald Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Society, 1954), 56-57. 43 Ibid. 44 Jennings, Empire, 60-62.

194

between the British and French to be sure, however they also were divided about the role of the Iroquois in the internal politics. While the Delaware tried to break their bond with the Iroquois, this break strained their internal relationships as well. On this subject, Gist's notes are more detailed than Washington's, probably because Gist better understood the importance of the Indian council and the entire borderland picture. Washington, anxious to prove himself, focused on his current mission for Dinwiddie. Gist knew Tanaghrisson might have the ability to persuade all of the Delaware to side with the British, greatly benefiting the Ohio Company and Virginia in the Ohio region.45

Even after the Native Americans had finished their business (Tanaghrisson unsuccessfully), the French still prevailed upon the Indians to stay at Venango, and

Washington’s and Gist’s journals demonstrate how Washington had to rely on Gist. Both

Washington and Gist noted that although Davidson stayed with the Indians, Washington

"was oblig’d to send Mr. Gist over to Day [sic] to fetch them, which he did with great

Perswasion.” Gist noted that “Joncaire did every thing he could to prevail on our Indians to stay behind us, and I took all care to have them along with us.”46 Gist played a crucial role in keeping Tanaghrisson’s party united with Washington’s party, which was vital to any success the British might have in the Ohio Valley. Success in the borderland required

Indian support, and Tanaghrisson’s role as the only headman fully committed to the British rendered his support crucial. Gist’s presence in the Virginia party was necessary for successful Indian relations. Without him, the Indians may have stayed at Venango, which would have made it difficult to travel and survive, as the Indians with the party hunted,

45 Washington, “6th” in “Journey to the French Commandant,” 130-161. 46 Gist, “Wednesday 5,“ Gist’s Journal, 82-83. For more information on Tanaghrisson’s power struggles, see Jennings, Empire, 60-62.

195

made camp, and built rafts when needed. It also would have severely weakened the British position when meeting with the French commander. 47

After Gist had peeled his Native American allies away from the rum at Venango, his party made its way up to Fort Le Boeuf. When they finally arrived, Washington observed the fortifications, the garrison, canoes, and stores. However, as much Washington wanted to snoop, he was being monitored and had to move on to his official business.

Washington first delivered Dinwiddie’s letter to Saint-Pierre and then, because

Dinwiddie had addressed his letter to the French commander, Washington had to wait for

Louis Le Gardeur de Repentigny, to come from Presque Isle. While the French officers proved polite and treated Washington and his party with respect, they declined refused to leave the Ohio Country, or admit to any hostile action. Dinwiddie’s letter asked the French to remove themselves from the Ohio Valley, and the Commander replied, “As to the summons you send me to retire, I do not think myself obliged to obey it… I am here by virtue of the orders of my General, and I entreat you, Sir, not to doubt for a moment that I have a firm resolution to follow them.” To Dinwiddie's accusation that the French acted in a hostile manner by invading the colony of Virginia and violating the Treaty of Aux de la

Chapelle, the French commander further stated, “I do not know that anything…can be construed as an act of hostility, or as contrary to the treaties between the two Crowns.”48

Tanaghrisson again attempted to complete his own business with the French, renouncing and protesting the French by returning their wampum belts. He held the belts from the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo under his command at Logstown, and he may have

47 Washington, “6th,” in “Journey to the French Commandant,” 130-161. 48 “Le Gardeur de Saint-Pierre to Robert Dinwiddie, “From the Fort of the Rivière au journey, , 1753" in Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 75–76.

196

gathered more at Venango. While the French had told the Half-King that he could not return the belts to Joncaire at Venango but only to the Commander at the Forts,

Tanaghrisson met with frustration there as well. The French commandant was also unwilling to accept them. The French effectively refused to engage in diplomacy with the

Half-King. This refusal, along with the epic snub of Marin a few months earlier, was enough for Tanaghrisson. He became further attached to the British cause and played a significant role in fortifying and fighting on behalf of the Virginians.

After Washington completed his diplomatic and military business, his party began the return trip home. While most histories do not recount this leg of the expedition, it is crucial to do so, for Gist continued to guide Washington towards success and safety. A few uneventful days passed as they journeyed back towards Venango, but when they arrived at

Venango, the Half-King and others of his party stayed warm at Venango and left the

Virginians to travel alone for the remainder of their journey.49

Both Anderson and Jennings write that Tanaghrisson and his followers stayed with the French at Fort Le Boeuf for a length of time and did not make the return trip to

Logstown with Washington and Gist; however, a close reading of both Washington and

Gist’s journals proves those statements inaccurate.50 Washington wrote on the 15th that the French had done all they could to keep the Indians at Fort Le Boeuf and that the commander "had promis'd them a Present of Guns, & ca. if they wou'd wait 'till the

Morning. As I was very much press'd by the Indians to wait this Day for them; I consented on a Promise that Nothing shou'd hinder them in the Morning." On the 16th, Washington

49 Washington, “23rd,” in “Journey to the French Commandant, 130–161. 50 Anderson, Crucible, 48; Jennings, Empire, 64.

197

wrote that the French tried to delay Tanaghrisson’s departure again, trying the "Power of

Liquor; which I doubt not wou’d have prevail’d at any other Time than this, but I tax’d the

King so close upon his Word that he refrain’d, & set off with us as he had engaged."

Washington went on about the return trip to Venango, and the distance between Le Boeuf and Venango (Washington approximated 130 miles following the river). When they reached Venango, on the 23rd, the Half-King announced he was staying.51

Washington worried about Tanaghrisson’s stay with the French as he “knew that

Monsieur Joncaire wou’d employ every Scheme to set him against the English.”

Washington told Tanaghrisson to guard against Joncaire’s flattery and “let no fine Speeches

Influence Him in their Favour.” Tanaghrisson replied that “he knew the French too well” to be swayed by their lies.52 Gist also wrote some journal entries about the trip from Le Boeuf to Venango, all of which concern Tanaghrisson’s Indians, their hunting, and encampments.53 From the writings of both Washington and Gist, it is clear that the Indians did not stay indefinitely at Fort Le Boeuf with the French which would indicate their abandonment of their British allies. Tanaghrisson and his warriors instead traveled to

Venango before staying there they stayed at Venango.

This chapter shows the accurate history of the trip from the Fort LeBeouf back to the Ohio Company’s headquarters at Wills Creek and doing so alters the historiographical understandings of the borderland in 1754. By writing that Tanaghrisson stayed at Fort rather than the trading post and party house of Venango, and by indicating that the Indian

51 Washington, “23rd,” in “Journey to the French Commandant, 130–161; Gist, “14th,” 3 52 Anderson, Crucible, 48; Jennings, Empire, 64. 53 Gist, “16,” “17,” “18,”, 83, Gist’s Journal, 83.

198

friendship with the British had cooled, Jennings and Anderson assert that the Indians turned their back on the British. While the Ohio Valley situation favored the French in the winter of 1753, the British were not alone or friendless. Another oft-made error in the historiography of the expedition to Fort Le Boeuf is that historians do not recount, document, or analyze the return trip of the Virginia party to Wills Creek. This dissertation analyzes the return journey, as it highlights the role of Gist as guide and confidant. It also clearly demonstrates the youth of George Washington and explains why he needed an experienced guide to navigate the Ohio Valley safely.

After the Virginians left Venango, the weather turned even colder, so that all the rivers and creeks froze over and left their horses much fatigued. Gist noted, “Here Major

Washington set out in Indian dress. Our horses grew weak, that we were mostly obliged to travel on foot.”54 Not a frontiersman and unaccustomed to the harsh conditions, the journey wore on Washington's physical condition. The next two days, the weather forced them to travel on foot. Finally, on the 26th Washington wanted the unflappable Gist to set out on foot, and to go ahead with some of the supplies to make camp. Gist said “I was unwilling he [Washington] should undertake such a travel, who had never been used to walking before this time. But as he insisted on it, I set out with our packs, like Indians, and travelled eighteen miles.” Even with Gist taking much of the burden, Washington struggled.

Gist said, “That night we lodged at an Indian cabin, and the Major was much fatigued.”

Washington, not used to walking many miles in a day, in what would appear to him to be

54 Gist, “Monday 24,” Gist’s Journal, 84.

199

the "wilderness," in Indian clothes and shoes. The exhausted Washington relied upon the knowledge, skill, and stamina of Gist to get him home successfully.55

The bitter cold and snow were not the only things that concerned the Virginia expedition. The party also worried over enemy Indians, and for a good reason. On the way home, an Indian whom Gist recognized from Venango joined them and wanted to take them to his cabin to rest. Gist immediately became wary of this man, although he called Gist by his Indian name, which indicated friendship. Gist attempted to keep his uneasy feelings hidden from Washington, although why he would keep these misgivings from “the major,” is unknown. Perhaps Gist tried to keep Washington calm and not spooked, because

Washington grew increasingly tired and physically ailed from the grueling trip. After they

“travelled very brisk for eight or ten miles…the Major's feet grew very sore, and he very weary.”56 Washington, however, caught on to the Indian’s attitude when he became

“churlish” after Washington refused to let him carry his gun. The unnamed Native

American became increasingly hostile, and shot at Gist and Washington, even though he pretended it was an accident. Some accounts say that Gist tackled the Indian, knocking the gun askew, then and unarmed him. Again, Gist rectified the situation and showcased his frontier-forged practicality when he suggested that they kill the Indian. Washington would not allow it, so Gist pretended that the gun had gone off by mistake, and told the Indian they could not continue and would meet him at the Indian’s Cabin the following morning.

However, once night had fallen, Gist told Washington, “As you will not have him killed, we must get him away, and then we must travel all night.” Gist must have had to push

55 Gist, “Wednesday, 26,” Gist’s Journal, 84. 56 Gist, "Thursday, 27," Gist’s Journal 84-85.

200

Washington very hard. Washington, already fatigued at this point, had said he could not go on any longer, yet he walked all night to evade the danger because Gist said he must.57

Washington, the senior officer, listened to Gist and continued their march, even though the trip wore Washington almost to the point of collapse. Washington followed the older man's advice and showed his respect for Gist's knowledge of the dangerous political currents of the Ohio Valley.

This attempt on the lives of the British party reveals the subterfuge and mystery that surrounded Ohio Valley politics. The hostile Indian may have acted alone, or he could have cooperated with the French. While the French had respected the Virginia delegation in attempts to avoid a war, they were not weak or pacifists. Both Gist and Washington noted the French attempts to sway the British Indian allies. While Gist recorded that he saw this Indian at Joncaire's, he does not come out and say that the French sent him; however, it is a definite possibility. While the French could not kill the Virginia diplomats outright without causing a major international incident, they could send an Indian agent to take their lives and blame it on the individual or without much risk to themselves or the French empire. Many things could have happened to these two in their wilderness journey. This incident is especially interesting as, if successful, the incident would mirror the 1754 situation in Jumonville Glen, when Washington’s Indian ally, Tanaghrisson, killed

Jumonville.58 That particular later incident might have blown over, as this one did, except that Washington, due to a bad translation, accepted the blame for the assassination in his

57 Gist, “Thursday, 27,” Gist’s Journal, 86. Jennings asserts that Washington’s youthful vigor led Dinwiddie and the Council of Virginia to select him for the job. If this was the case, they were sadly mistaken, as Gist frequently mentions Washington’s exhaustion and fatigue in his journals. Jennings, Empire, 60. 58 This incident will be explored further in Chapter Five.

201

surrender of Fort Necessity. Both of these incidents show three things: just how valuable and powerful Indian allies were with respect to the competing empires; just how precarious and fickle were the balances of power and peace in the Ohio Country; and just how influential individual actions could be in the borderland.

Even once they evaded this hostile Indian, they still had to make it across the

Allegheny River, and that almost proved Washington’s undoing. It is this incident that historians most often point to when discussing Gist’s influence on Washington. Gist pulled

Washington out of the icy waters and most likely saved his life. He notes, “We set out early, got to Allegheny, made a raft, and with much difficulty got over to an island…The Major having fallen in from off the raft, and my fingers frost-bitten, and the sun down, and very cold, we contented ourselves to encamp upon that island.”59

Many points in this passage show the influence of Gist and the other Ohio Company agents. Gist, on the raft with Washington, most likely saved the Major’s life by hauling him out of the icy depths. Washington had to be relieved to know that Gist had the wherewithal to keep a cool head and saved his life at the risk of his own. Until this point, their Indian allies had built the rafts, but as the Indians stayed at Venango, the Ohio Company men, experienced in the harsh Ohio Valley, brought forth the knowledge and skills necessary to build the raft, which allowed them to get across the frigid river. Building rafts, setting up camp, and keeping warm was a challenge as the temperature plummeted. Washington, as a

Virginia planters’ son with little experience in the west, most likely did not possess the skills required to survive.60

59 Gist, “Saturday 29,” Gist’s Journal, 86, Borneman, The French and Indian War, 23- 24. 60 Gist, Gist’s Journal, 84-87.

202

While the cold challenged even the most experienced frontiersmen, the ever- optimistic Gist commented, “the cold did us some service, for in the morning it was frozen hard enough for us to pass over on the ice.” Temperatures must have dropped very low to freeze running river water overnight. Despite the cold, the trip home continued uneventfully; the party traveled together until they reached Will's Creek, where Gist and the other agents remained, and Washington departed for Williamsburg to report to

Dinwiddie. 61 The trip from Wills Creek to Williamsburg, while long and through the backcountry of the colonies, was not nearly as dangerous as the trek from Wills Creek to

Fort Le Boeuf.

Gist must have made a good impression on Washington for later Washington ensured Gist a position in the Virginia militia as a scouting captain, and then as the deputy to the Southern Indian Superintendent. Washington said of Gist, “He has had extensive dealings with the Indians, is in great esteem among them; well acquainted with their manners and customs, is indefatigable, and patient: most excellent qualities indeed, where indians are concerned! And, for his capacity, honesty and zeal, I dare venture to engage,” meaning that Washington trusted Gist and believed him to be an honest man.62 This quote and the fact that Washington later campaigned for Gist as the Assistant Indian

Superintendent, shows that Gist’s demeanor, frontier knowledge, and Indian diplomacy impressed Washington. Gist’s journal indicates that Washington almost collapsed. Gist and

61 Gist, “Saturday 29,” Gist’s Journal, 86. 62 “From George Washington to John Robinson, 30 May 1757,” The Papers of George Washington, 174–175.

203

his other companions kept him going in that last leg of the trip and allowed for a successful journey.63

While the Virginia party failed to achieve their goal of evicting the French from the

Ohio Valley, their actions sparked immediate consequences. On December 22nd,

Legardeur de Saint Pierre, the Canadian commander of the French forts in the Ohio Valley, wrote to Duquesne about the claims made by the Virginians. Duquesne responded, "His

[Dinwiddie’s] claims on the Belle Riviere are sheer imagination, for it belongs to us uncontestably, more over the King wishes it, and that is enough for us to go forward.” The

French, just like the British, Iroquois, and Ohio Indians, believed the Ohio Valley belonged to them and disregarded the others’ claims. As Duquesne pointed out, the French King’s wishes dictated their course of action. Regardless of how solid the French believed their claim, they did not think the British would accept this result. The French issued

Instructions to , the French fort on Lake Ontario near Present-day Niagara

Falls, New York, detailing what action to take if Washington or another British party came to call. The Virginia party’s arrival and message caused the French some anxiety.64

The arrival and continued activity of the Virginians in the Ohio Valley probably concerned the French the most in regard to their Indian Allies. As the French military and trading positions weakened, the British became more attractive to the Ohio Indians. As the

French position declined in the south at an alarming rate due to sickness and want of supplies, they pulled back their men and trade goods in October of 1753. Of the 2000 men

63 Gist, Journal, 84-87. Edward G. Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life (New York: Random House, 2005), 28-29. 64 Le Gardeur de Saint-Pierre to Robert Dinwiddie, “From the Fort of the Rivière au journey, December 15, 1753" in Kent, The French Invasion, 75–76.

204

that had begun the French building spree, only 800 remained alive and able to swing an ax.

The French had to worry that the British would take advantage of their weakness.65

The halt of French fortification could not have come at a worse time for the Ohio

Indians. These groups became desperate for goods and food. Already hindered by the extremely harsh winter of 1753-1754, now the Ohio Indians had no trading partners.

French activity had driven off the British traders, and now the French vacated the region.

The Indians became hungry and poor without trading partners or the traditional hunting skills of their ancestors.66 The French must have feared (correctly in some cases) that the

Ohio Indians would turn to the British or turn on their former French friends.67

Due to the French susceptibility, the Indian attacks the French had once shrugged off, such as the one suggested by Tanaghrisson, now, due to disease and overwork, threatened French progress. Even Indians who could still get work with the French began to desert. Some Delaware agreed to carry goods for the French down to the forts, but they took the supplies and never returned.68 The French knew their impoverished situation threatened their position. Joncaire, the French Indian savant, wrote that the Indians

“recalled all the promises made to them [by the French] last summer, at the same time taking great pains to have it understood that when the English were there, they did not suffer so much.”69

65 Anderson, The War that Made America, 32-36. 66Kent, The French Invasion, 64. Jennings, Empire, 64. 67Kent, The French Invasion, 65-69; Fowler, Empires at War, 36-37. 68 Ibid. 69 Joncaire to Saint-Pierre, 1754, Papiers Contrecoeur, 78,79. Translated in Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 65-66. Jennings, Empire, 64.

205

The French even cited the increased Indian threat as one of the reasons for their lack of progress when the French King asked why they went into winter quarters so early.70

Their lack of money to pay for Indian presents and lack of trade weakened the French position in the Ohio Country so much that the Indians “mutinied and insolently blocked the road,” forcing the French to change their military plans for fall of 1754. The British blundered their chance to secure the Ohio Valley in 1753, and the French blundered theirs in 1754.71

Gathering Allies in London, America, and the Ohio Valley

While all of this went on in the Ohio Country, Dinwiddie prepared to take action in the spring. Unbeknownst to him, the French blunders allowed him a perfect window.

When Washington returned to Williamsburg from Le Boeuf, he gave his report to Governor

Dinwiddie. Dinwiddie, now had the Crown’s permission and Washington’s evidence to help persuade the Assembly to cooperate and join him in defending the Ohio Valley. Lord

Holderness had clearly stated what Dinwiddie should do if he could not evict the French from the borderland. He wrote that if the French “still endeavour to carry on any such unlawfull and unjustifiable Designs, We do herby strictly charge, & command You, to drive them off by Force of Arms.”72 While alarming, Washington’s report did have the desired effect on the previously obstinate Assembly, for Dinwiddie wrote to William Fairfax, “His

70 Kent, French Invasion, 68. 71 “Duquesne to the Minister, , 1754,” Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania, eds. Sylvester Stevens and Donald H. Kent, (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), 62-65. 72 “Holderness to Dinwiddie, 28 Aug. 1753,” in “Editorial Note,” The Diaries of George Washington, 118–129.

206

[Washington’s] report had convinc’d some People of the certainty of the French building

Forts and their further intention to come down the Ohio.”73

Dinwiddie took immediate measures to follow the Crown’s orders to thwart the

French. He did several things simultaneously: he informed the Crown of the current situation in America, courted colonial and Indian allies, fought for funding in the Virginia political arena, and built up the British military presence in the Ohio Valley. In anticipation of Washington’s arrival, Dinwiddie kept a ship bound for London, the Speedwell, in port to immediately notify Lord Holderness and the Board of Trade that Gist and Washington confirmed the earlier reports of French infiltration. Dinwiddie sent George Washington’s oral report, journal, map of the frontier, and his plan of Fort Le Boeuf to the Crown on

January 29th, 1754. The reports to the Crown stated that the French “had begun another

Fort at the Mouth of the Creek, which he thinks will be finish’d by the Month of March.”74

Washington also sent information about the number of men in the fort, "300 regular Forces and that an additional nine hundred were gone to Winter Quarters on Lake Erie but would return by the Month of March.” In the end, Washington deduced that fifteen hundred

French regulars (in addition to their Native American allies), and three hundred canoes, were ready to go down into the Ohio Valley to build additional Forts until they reached

Logstown.75

73 “Robert Dinwiddie to Colo. William Fairfax, Jan. 1754,” The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant- Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758, ed. R. Brock. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883), 49-50. 74 The construction Washington mentioned became the French Fort Machault, it was located in present-day Franklin, Pennsylvania. 75 Robert Dinwiddie, “Letter to the Board of Trade. Jan. 29, 1754,” fn 68 in “Journey to the French Commandant: Narrative,” 130–161.

207

Simultaneously, Dinwiddie wrote to James Abercrombie, complaining about the

House of Burgesses, who had protested to the King about Dinwiddie pushing for a Pistole

Fee.76 Dinwiddie, appalled that the Assembly had acted in such a manner, explained that the Assembly spent money on other expenses, but pled that the colony had no money to raise a force to evict the French from the Ohio Country. Dinwiddie also goes on to say that he hoped the Pistole Fee controversy was resolved so they could focus on the French troubles to the west. The actions of the House embarrassed Dinwiddie. This letter; he hoped, would explain the situation from his point of view and would clarify the reasoning behind his actions.77

Through the coming months, Dinwiddie continued to serve as the trans-Atlantic link to Holderness and the Board of Trade, keeping them apprised of the situation in the

American interior. He kept them updated about the continued problems with the

Assembly, and with obtaining funding, and how the uncertainty of the Pennsylvania and

Virginia boundary line continued to cause problems in sending militia to the backcountry.

The boundary issue must have been frustrating, as the Board had ignored the issue for years. Regardless of any frustration, Dinwiddie did his job and passed on the information about the Indians, Virginia’s prospective allies and their politics, as well as the land agreements between the Indians and the Virginians, most notably the Lancaster Treaty of

1744. Dinwiddie continually mentioned the difficulty and expense of the tasks ahead of them and the inadequacy of the Virginia treasury to manage them. He wrote that he

76 Further information about the Pistole Fee and the controversy surrounding it can be found on page 158, footnote 67. 77 Robert Dinwiddie to James Abercrombie, April 26th, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 137; Bailey, Ohio Company, 206. Andersen, The War that Made America. 43.

208

remained “in hopes of Assistance from Brittain.” He explicitly asked the Board of Trade for a regiment of regular forces and a supply of goods to use as Indian presents and trade goods. Dinwiddie also requested aid in the form of naval protection, writing to the

Secretary of the Admiralty for ships to protect the coast of Virginia and Maryland.78

Dinwiddie, connected with governmental officials on the other side of the Atlantic, and with his fellow Ohio Company member, merchant John Hanbury, who continued to serve as the Company’s eyes and ears in London. Dinwiddie expressed his gratitude to

Hanbury for keeping him informed on the currents of Whitehall. “I duely rec’d and am much oblig’d for the Hints You give me of w’t passed at the Council.” He also wrote that he appreciated Hanbury acting on his behalf, for he “did not care to be too solicitous with the

B’d of Trade ab’t Presents and Independ’t Compa’s.” The Ohio Company provided the troops and provisions, as well as the Indian gifts necessary to bring the Ohio Country into

British control. However, the Company needed an ally in London to push the Company’s agenda and interests. Dinwiddie made this clear when he asked Hanbury to ensure that he

[Hanbury] "he has the L’d Hol. Ear, to make sure the pay of the independent companies and supplies are properly established.”79 While Lord Holderness had promised Dinwiddie these items, the Governor remained concerned about the cost and most likely feared that the Crown would hold Virginia responsible for the cost. With the Assembly refusing to provide funds, Dinwiddie needed Hanbury to ensure the Crown’s responsibility for these new expenses.

78 “Robert Dinwiddie to the Secretary of Admiralty” ,, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 104-105. Patrice Higonnet, “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” The Journal of Modern History 40, No. 1, (Mar., 1968): 57-90. 79 Robert Dinwiddie, "Dinwiddie to John Hanbury," , 1754, Dinwiddie Papers. 153.

209

After sending the intelligence to the Crown, Dinwiddie wrote to the governors of nearby Colonies asking for cooperation in opposing the French. The other colonies’ responses were disappointing.80 While Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania supported

Dinwiddie, Pennsylvania’s Quaker Assembly refused, repeatedly, to vote funds for defense.

Maryland’s Governor Horatio Sharpe wrote Dinwiddie that the Assembly “had come to a resolution that the Exigencies of Affairs was not such as required any Aid or Support from them.”81 This response so irked Dinwiddie that he wrote back to Sharpe, “How any person c’d presume to ascert that we were to raise no Forces, I know not…as it is a Com’d from His

M’y.”82 The only bright spots came when the North Carolina Assembly granted 12,000 pounds for defense, and promised to contribute proportionately to the other colonies. Even faced with lackluster responses, or in many cases, no response at all,

Dinwiddie continued his letter-writing campaign to the other colonial governors, updating them on the situation and Virginia's actions in response. While trying to link the colonies together and create some semblance of unity, Dinwiddie tried to goad them into action. By showing that Virginia was acting and arming, and eventually allocating money Dinwiddie called the other colonies out on their inaction. Dinwiddie received more fodder when he got word of the Crown’s actions as well.

Dinwiddie again reached out to Virginia’s Native American allies for aid. He sent emissaries to Monacatoocha, whom George Washington met near the Forks of the Ohio.

Dinwiddie acknowledged his alliance and "fidelity" to the British, and informed him that

80 For more information on strain between the colonies, see Borneman, The French and Indian War, 38-39 81 “To George Washington from Robert Dinwiddie, January 1754,” The Papers of George Washington, 63–67. 82 “Governor Dinwiddie to Governor Sharpe” , 1754. Dinwiddie Papers, 105.

210

Washington and Trent would soon deliver “sfficient Assistance to enable You to deliver Y’r

Selves from Y’r Enemies.”83 In essence, Dinwiddie armed the Indians on the lower

Allegheny so that they could combat and resist the French. While Dinwiddie phrases this as if he is arming them to keep their sovereignty and resist domination by the French, in reality, he needed these Indians to fight the French to maintain control of the Ohio Country for the Crown and the Ohio Company. With the French removed, the Ohio Country would be wide open for uncontested land grants and settlements, meaning money in the form of land sales to the Ohio Company and in the shape of quit-rents to the King. Dinwiddie also wrote to the Catawba Indians, telling them that the French were moving to "bring all the

Nat's of Ind's to the So'ward into Slavery." The letter asks them to come to the Forks of the

Ohio, and bring their allies, (Dinwiddie mentions the Cherokees and the ) to join the British in the battle over the Ohio Valley. Dinwiddie concludes by inviting them to another conference at Winchester and promises to distribute supplies so that they can,

"take up the hatchet" against the French, their "mutual" enemies.

While southern Native American allies would aid the British cause, the Six Nations would help much more. Even in the 1750s, they remained the biggest and most influential

Indian actor in the Ohio Region and the Great Lakes Region. Dinwiddie reached out to the powerhouse, stating, "the Designs of Y’r Enemies can be no longer doubted of, and it is manifest that they intend to deprive You of Y’r hunting Grounds on the Ohio, and liberties.”

After the French built their forts, Dinwiddie had concrete evidence to use against them when dealing with the powerful Iroquois Confederacy. Another point of interest is that he

83 Robert Dinwiddie, “Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the Indian Chief Monacatootha” Dinwiddie Papers, 57.

211

acknowledges that the Ohio Valley is not the Iroquois home, only their hunting ground. He knows they claim dominion over the land and the Ohio Indians. Dinwiddie played a cautious and careful diplomatic game, for the Virginians dealt with the Ohio Indians both in and outside of the official Iroquois guidelines, and he did want not to irritate either side.

Dinwiddie advocated that the Iroquois attack the French and encourages them by saying,

“You know that I have given com’o and Orders to my Officers to join You with some Forces if You will take the Hatchet into Y’r Hands." Dinwiddie also sent Andrew Montour, now the agent of Virginia and the Ohio Company, to Onondaga, the base of the Iroquois confederacy, to pass on intelligence and confirm their spring Council. At this point, Dinwiddie pushed for war with the French, which would enlarge the both the Company and the Colony. Due to the nature of the Crown’s orders, he had every right to do so.84

Dinwiddie moved with equal speed in informing the Virginia Council of the expedition’s findings January 21st, 1754, to great success as it "Convinc'd some People of the certainty of the French building Forts and their further intention to come down the

Ohio to build more Fortresses."85 The Council members, wanting to protect their investments in either the Ohio Company or other land schemes, advised the recruitment of

100 men from Frederick and Augusta and advocated that Dinwiddie should place

George Washington in chief command. The Council also proposed that Dinwiddie send

Washington and 100 men to the frontier immediately.86 They also advised Dinwiddie to order Trent to raise “what Traders and other Men he can to annoy the Enemy.” The Council

84 “Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the Six Nations,” undated, Dinwiddie Papers, 58. 85 “Governor Dinwiddie to Colo. William Fairfax,” undated, Dinwiddie Papers, 51. 86 “At a Council October 27 1753,” Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 458-460.

212

acknowledged that Virginia, and the British Empire as a whole, needed to take larger and stronger efforts to drive the French out of the borderland. However, to do so would require funds, and that meant appealing to the previously uncooperative House of Burgesses. For quick additional military action, the Council recommended that Dinwiddie call the House of

Burgesses, not due back in Williamsburg until late April 1754, into session.87 Dinwiddie expressed his hope that the Assembly back in session in about a month, would agree and see the “absolute Necessity of making a Push at this Time.” 88 He knew Trent and

Washington’s two hundred men inadequate for the task of protecting the Ohio Valley; he needed four or five hundred troops to protect the fort the Ohio Company's planned to build at the headwaters of the Ohio River.89

On February 14th, 1754, the Virginia House of Burgesses met to consider

Dinwiddie's reports. Governor Dinwiddie addressed the Assembly to impress upon them the urgency of the situation: “nothing less than a very important Concern c’d have induc’d me to call You together again… but the dignity of the Crown of G’t Britain, the Welfare of all the Colonies on this Continent, and more especially of this Dom’n.” He then explained the situation of the French forces on the Ohio River as reported by Washington and Gist, the numerous forts, and the plan to evict or capture of all British subjects in the Ohio Valley.

87 Ibid. 88 “Governor Dinwiddie to the Right Honorable Lord Fairfax” January 1754, The Dinwiddie Papers, 48-49. 89 Ibid. Jennings, Empire, 64. Alden, Servant of the Crown, 44-45. Doug Macgregor, “The Shot Not Heard Around the World: Trent’s Fort and the Opening of the War for Empire,” Pennsylvania History 74, No. 3, (Summer 2007): 354-373.

213

Dinwiddie stressed that the French response violated the treaties between France and

Britain, which would have included the Treaty of Utrecht.90

Dinwiddie told the Assemblymen that they needed to follow the Crown’s instructions, which had directed him and the Assembly to, “prevent any foreign Power settling or building any Fortresses on this M’y’s’ Lands.” In efforts to goad the Assembly into taking action, Dinwiddie informed them “their [the other British colonies] Eyes are fix’d on your Proceedings, and I hope you will engage them, by a laudable Example, to contribute sufficiently for the common Cause.” Dinwiddie also informed the Assembly of the steps already taken to rectify the situation, including planning for fort construction in cooperation with the Ohio Company, and outfitting it with the Crown’s “gracious Presnt of

30 Pieces of Cannon, 80 lbs Powder and the Ordinance Stores suitable.” Dinwiddie employed the same guilt tactic he previously applied to the other colonial governors to goad the Virginia Assembly into loosening its purse strings.91

Dinwiddie needed the Assembly for funding and reorganization of the militia. In a letter to James Patton, Dinwiddie noted that no law allowed him to pay for a militia, and he became increasingly frustrated with the Burgesses and its lack of concern about what he considered a dire situation.92 According to Dinwiddie, he had attempted to rectify the militia’s archaic organization since his appointment as Governor. It sorely needed to be done for Virginia did not have a correct pay scale, no funding or even regulations regarding

90 “Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the Council and Burgesses, Feb’y 14th 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 75. 91 Ibid; Bailey, Ohio Company, 182-184, 201-208. 92 “Governor Dinwiddie to James Patton Jan 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 50-51.

214

a doctor, or even a commissary.93 The Virginia militia lacked the necessities for a military operation. Dinwiddie also advocated paying the militia in money rather than the traditional tobacco. These, as well as many other problems due to the poor management of the militia, would continue to hinder Dinwiddie, the Virginia Council, and the Ohio

Company in carrying out the King's orders and protecting their personal investments.94

That the Virginia Governor and Council acted to protect their private interest was suspected not only in Virginia but other colonies as well. Some individuals saw these proposed military expeditions as designs to further the interests of the Ohio Company, which absolutely held a large degree of truth, but also was in the interest of Virginia and the British Empire.95 Washington wrote that many Virginians believed his initial report of

French military activity on the Ohio “a Fiction; and Scheme to promote the Interest of a private Company (by many Gentlemen that had a share in Government) These unfavourable Surmises caus’d great delays in raiseing the first Men and Money.”96 The individuals who thought the Ohio Company wielded substantial influence were correct, for the documents of the Governor and the Council show the Council’s concern about the Ohio

Company’s success.97 However, neither Dinwiddie nor the Council falsified reports of the

93 A commissary was a person in charge of obtaining and distributing supplies for an armed force. 94 “Message of Governor Dinwiddie to the Council and Burgesses, Feb’y 14th 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 75; Alden, Servant of the Crown, 44-45. 95 Fowler, Empires at War, 37; 96 From George Washington to John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, 10 January 1757,” The Papers of George Washington, 79–93. 97 Bailey, Ohio Company, 203-205. It is in Bailey’s explanation of non-Ohio Company members’ suspicions of Dinwiddie that he argues that the Seven Years’ War was not economically motivated. He makes the flimsy argument that because most of the population did not have an economic stake in the borderland, the war was not motivated by money.

215

French activities in the Ohio Country. As the Ohio Company and the Crown had corresponding interests, the Virginia Council likely believed its support of the venture appropriate and followed the Crown’s orders. The Assembly bucked this belief. The

Assemblymen came from a different tier of society; their goals differed from those of the

Crown, the Governor, the Council, and the Ohio Company (even though some Ohio

Company stockholders sat in the Assembly).98 When the Crown, Dinwiddie and the

Council, and the Ohio Company needed the financial support of the House of Burgess to defend their Empire, the refusal of the Assembly influenced the course of empire-building, showing how the colonial elite had to negotiate with one another as well as the imperial core.99

Even while Dinwiddie prepared to take on the Assembly, he authorized others, men with financial ties to the Ohio Valley, to take on the French. The Council recommended to

Dinwiddie that he commission George Washington and William Trent to raise 100 troops each (Washington from Frederick and Augusta Counties and Trent from the traders), and head into the Ohio Country.100 Beyond Washington and Trent, Dinwiddie made other appointments. He chose men who had a financial interest in the Ohio Company through land grants and speculation. James Patton, the Lieutenant of the Augusta County militia, became involved due to his position as an active member of the Loyal Land Company.

98 Colonial Assemblies, not wanting to pay for the Seven Years War, had seemed treasonous, but as Francis Jennings pointed out, "the assemblies were self-consciously following the examples set by the English House of Commons." Jennings refers to all of the American during the war, but this dissertation extends his argument to the pre- war period. The Virginia House of Burgess protested the cost of defending the colony before the onset of open conflict. 99Alden, Servant of the Crown, 33-35. 100 “Dinwiddie to William Fairfax, Jan 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 50.

216

Patton would probably agree on the need to remove the French from the Ohio Valley.101

Dinwiddie appointed Major , a member of the Ohio Company, and a member of the Company committee, to act as the commissary. Dinwiddie ordered Carlyle to carry supplies to the Ohio Company’s buildings at Wills Creek, and then on to the Ohio Company

Fort.102 At this point, the Ohio Company had built all of the structures the colony of Virginia used. Not only that, but all of the commissioned individuals except Patton held connections to that specific land speculation company.103

When Dinwiddie commissioned Trent, Washington, and others with Ohio Company ties as British officers, they were transformed from private to public agents.104 However, many of the same individuals who served as agents, carriers, and receivers under the Ohio

Company from 1747 until 1754 continued those roles within the new government structure and many of them maintained personal correspondence with one another. The

Ohio Company members and agents in the military remembered their personal interest in the Ohio Valley, and continued to support their monetary interests but used military, not commercial channels. This chapter continues to investigate the Ohio Company’s agenda and its effects within the military and governmental structures. The military began to replace the Ohio Company as the borderland activist, but the Ohio Company’s people and buildings remained crucial until Braddock’s expedition to remove the French from the Ohio

Valley in 1755.105

101“Governor Dinwiddie to James Patton, Jan 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 50. 102 “Commission of Major John Carlyle, Jan 27, 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 54. 103 Alden, Servant of the Crown, 44-45. 104 Alfred Proctor James, The Ohio Company, Its Inner History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), 98. 105 Jennings, Empire, 65.

217

Dinwiddie cited the French "hostile manner" and "having committed divers

Outrages and Violence on the persons and Goods of his Majestys Subjects,” and issued

Trent a captain's commission. Dinwiddie ordered Trent, his men, and their Iroquois allies to aid the Ohio Company in building the Company’s fort at the Forks of the Ohio.106 They built the fort to “keep possession of his Majesty’s land on the Ohio, and waters thereof, and dislodge and drive away and in case of refusal and resistance to kill and destroy or take prisoner all and every persons whatsoever not Subjects of the King of Great Britain.”107

Dinwiddie chose Trent to take on this task due to his experience and knowledge. In his work for the Ohio Company and the colony of Virginia, he had sent dependable reports, had a good relationship with the Indians, and understood the dynamics of the borderland.

In addition to procuring and commanding troops, and aiding in building the fort, Dinwiddie also asked Trent to take on the role of Indian ambassador. He wrote to him, “As you have a good Interest with the Ind’s I doubt not You will prevail with many of them to join You in order to defeat the Designs of the French in taking their Lands from them by force of Arms.”

Dinwiddie goes on to ask for Trent’s expertise in moving the bulky supplies to the Ohio

Company’s fort: “You are acquainted with the Roads, I shall be glad of Y’r Advice therein.”

The governor also wrote that he would communicate this to Major Carlisle, an Ohio

Company member, who would serve as a commissary. Carlisle’s appointment seems like a small detail, but the movement of troops and supplies is crucial to any war or defensive campaign. The Virginia Governor continued to rely on the Ohio Company agents for their

106 Dinwiddie, “Commission of Captain William Trent,” Dinwiddie Papers, 57. 106 James, The Ohio Company, 98. 107 Edward Ward, “Ensign Ward’s Deposition,” Darlington ed., Christopher Gist Journals, 278. James. The Ohio Company, 97-98.

218

knowledge of the area. Dinwiddie concluded, "You see the Confidence and good Opinion I have of Yr’ Capicity and Diligence w’ch I hope You will Exert on this Occasion by keeping a good Comand and strongly engaging our friendly Ind’s to be on the active.”108

While Trent and his men worked on the fort, as further discussed in Chapter Five,

Washington continued to gather troops in Augusta and Frederick counties. Building up the

Virginia Militia proved hard, especially when the Assembly, suspicious of Dinwiddie and the Council’s aims, granted scant funds. While the House of Burgesses eventually agreed to foot the bill, the Assembly’s obstinacy crippled and delayed the Virginia military enough to lose the highly coveted position at the Forks of the Ohio River.109

George Washington took a bit more time to carry out his orders than Trent, although

Washington may have carried out his orders more completely, as Trent never quite had

100 men. Dinwiddie and the Council instructed Washington to raise 100, then go on to

Frederick where he was to train and discipline the troops. Dinwiddie hoped Washington and Trent would quickly raise and train the men and then “proceed to the Fork of Ohio…to finish and compleat in the best Manner and as soon as You possibly can, the Fort, w’ch I expect is there already begun by the Ohio Comp’a.”110 Dinwiddie instructed Washington to

“act on the Defensive, but in Case any attempts are made to obstruct the Works or interrupt our Settlem’ts by any Persons whatsoever You are to restrain all such Offenders, and in

108 “Governor Dinwiddie to Wm. Trent Esqu. Jan 27th 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 55- 56. While Dinwiddie assigned these tasks to Trent, his actual orders read, "keep Possession of His M'y's Lands on the Ohio and the Waters thereof and to dislodge and drive away, and in case of refusal and resistance to kill and destroy of take Prisoners all and every Person and Persons not subjects of the Kings of G.B. who now are or shall hereafter come to settle and take Possess’n of any Lands on the said River Ohio, or on any of the Branches or waters thereof.” Doug Macgregor, “The Shot Not Heard Around the World, 354-373. 109 Fowler, Empires at War, 37. 110 “Governor Dinwiddie’s Instructions to Major Washington,” Dinwiddie Papers, 59.

219

Case of resistance to make Prisoners of or kill and destroy them.”111 These words would be crucial to the future actions of Washington in the Ohio Territory. However, for the time being, Washington was in trouble, for he had trouble recruiting men. Dinwiddie, in a letter to Lord Fairfax, scolded him for allowing his county’s militia to refuse to accompany

Washington. Dinwiddie, most likely panicking due to the quick actions of the French, told

Washington to take the names of the militia members unwilling to serve and to have them court-martialed. Washington’s first command was slow to take shape. 112

In March, things finally began to move forward, with money paving the way. The

Assembly after “great Applicatn: many Argum’ts: & with much difficulty,” authorized

£10,000 for the defense of Virginia.113 The nearness of the French and the arguments set forth by Dinwiddie did manage to propel them to take this limited action. The funds allocated by the Assembly to “support British int’t against the Invasions of the French,” allowed Dinwiddie the funds to raise the . 114 Dinwiddie told Joshua Fry, the Commander of the Virginia Regiment, to head towards the Ohio Company’s fort at the

Forks of the Ohio, find a place to mount the canon and make England’s "undoubt'd" right to that land known.115 At this same time, Holderness reacted to Dinwiddie’s letters and placed two Independent Companies from New York in his command, and one regiment from North Carolina. The British effort was finally gaining steam.

111 Ibid. 112 “Dinwiddie to Lord Fairfax, February 23rd, 1745”, Dinwiddie Papers, 82. Edward G. Lengel, General George Washington, 30-34. 113 “Governor Dinwiddie to , Governor of Bay,” , 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 87-88. 114 “Governor Dinwiddie to Governor DeLancey of New York”, February 3, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 79; Fowler, Empires at War, 36. 115 “Instruc’s to Joshua Fry, Esqr., Colo and Com’d’r in Chief of the Virg’a Regiment.” , 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 88.

220

However, while the Virginia regiment formed, and the independent companies traveled to Virginia, and Trent’s companies traveled west to build the fort, Washington still struggled. Recruitment and supply remained problems even after the Assembly granted the 10,000 pounds. Washington's troops had no tents, nor linen to make them from, and also lacked arms. "We also are much in want of Cutlasses, Halbards, Officer’s half Pikes,

Drum’s… the Artillery being very bad is scarcely worth the trouble of carrying.” The enlisted men became restless for want of uniforms, which Washington speculated might have been the sole enticement to enlist. He also wrote that the soldiers anxiously asked to know who would serve as paymaster and when they would receive payment. George

Washington wrote again on March 9th 1754 that he was experiencing trouble convincing men to enlist because the paymaster and pay dates remained unknown. Washington said that even those already enlisted waited anxiously to receive payment. The military situation was complicated because both Virginia and Pennsylvania claimed the land. In

Virginia, the law implied that militia could not operate outside of Virginia. Due to this statute, Dinwiddie encountered opposition from the Assembly regarding the conscription of troops, thus forcing him, and Washington to rely on enlistment to fill the ranks. 116

In addition to recruiting problems and the trouble of payment, Washington noted that the enlistees clothes “renders them very incapable of the necessary Service," as many enlisted without shoes, stockings, shirts, or coats. The enlisted men were willing to pay for their outfitting but needed to be paid before they could do so. Washington relayed, “they

116 “From George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, “, 1754, The Papers of George Washington, 71–73; “From George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, “, 1754, The Papers of George Washington, 73–75; Editorial Note for “From George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie,” March 7, 1754, The Papers of George Washington, 71–73.

221

are perpetually teasing me to have it done, but I am not able to advance the money.” On

March 15, 1754, Dinwiddie responded to Washington’s pleas for direction and money; he noted that the soldiers should receive pay every two months from the date they enlisted and that Mr. Carlyle, an Ohio Company member, would pay them. He also writes that he was sending sloops with recruits and supplies. In this letter, he also makes arrangements for the payment of the officers and some logistical reorganization that the militia desperately needed to function. While initial money from the Assembly allowed Virginia to make progress, it only went so far. In a letter to William Fairfax, Dinwiddie said he had lent

300 pounds to supply Washington and wondered if Fairfax would provide an additional

300 pounds.117 Part of the problem was that even though the Assembly had agreed to the funds, the assembly had also appointed a committee to approve all spending and the committee still had not obtained the funds. 118

Dinwiddie’s return letter to Washington focused not on troops and supplies but instead emphasized that Washington and his militia needed to make haste to the Ohio

Company’s fort. Citing intelligence from Trent and Cresap regarding the surprising quickness of the French in building their defenses, Dinwiddie advised Washington to march immediately, ahead of Fry, to support the Ohio Company’s fort. Dinwiddie hoped that

Washington’s arrival would reinforce Trent’s position at the Forks, “w’n our Forces are properly collected, we shall be able to keep possession and drive the French from the

117 Alden, Servant of the Crown, 44-45. 118 “Colonel George Washington to Governor Dinwiddie, Alexandria,” March 9, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 92-93; “Dinwiddie to Colo. Geo. Washington, March 15, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 106-107; “Governor Dinwiddie to Colo. William Fairfax,” March 15, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 108-109. Lengel, General George Washington, 30-32.

222

Ohio.”119 Trent, with his few troops and meager defenses, wrote that Washington needed to immediately reinforce them at the Forks of the Ohio, but even as Washington hastened his troops to the Ohio Company’s Fort, the French closed in.120

Conclusion:

This chapter recounted the oft-told story of the beginnings of the Seven Years’ War, but also the oft-excluded history of the economic factors that influenced the key players.

Governor Dinwiddie, motivated by the Ohio Company’s interest, took the actions he saw as best for himself, the colony of Virginia, and the Crown. Luckily for him, those in power in

London agreed with him. Dinwiddie appointed people connected to the Ohio Company of

Virginia into positions of power and influence; they, in turn, took on the Ohio Company’s interests as their own. For Gist, Washington, Trent, and other military administrators,

Virginia's success in the west equaled success for themselves. As they took measures to build their own empire while simultaneously evicting the French, the Company, Colony, and Crown became more intertwined than ever before. In 1753 and 1754, the Ohio

Company, Virginia, and the Board of Trade officially joined efforts to extend the British

Empire into the Ohio Valley.

As the conflict with the French grew more and more likely, the Ohio Company began trying to prepare to defend its empire and claims to the Ohio Valley. As these defense fortifications began to take shape, Dinwiddie used all his political clout in Virginia and

London to protect the empire. The time for diplomacy was done, the next step in the process of empire would bring a military confrontation.

119 “Dinwiddie to Colo. Geo. Washington, March 15, 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 106- 107. 120 Bailey, Ohio Company,197-198.

223

Chapter Five: The Ohio Company: Militarizing the Ohio Valley.

Introduction

“We will endeavor to make the road sufficiently good for the heaviest artillery to pass and when we arrive at Red-stone creek fortify ourselves as strongly as the short time will allow.”

-George Washington, 17541

A young George Washington wrote the above plan regarding the Ohio Company’s road in a letter to Governor Dinwiddie from Wills Creek, the Ohio Company headquarters.

As Washington reached for the Ohio Company fortifications at Red Stone Creek, Ohio

Company supplies filled his wagons, Ohio Company maps charted his course, Ohio

Company allies scouted for him, and Ohio Company agents guided his moves. Washington, and later Braddock, relied on the Ohio Company’s infrastructure, knowledge, and men, demonstrating how crucial the Company was to Virginia and British military movements in the Ohio Valley. Ohio Company roads, buildings, agents, and intelligence played a huge role in the early days of the Seven Years’ War from the French capture of the Ohio Company fort to Braddock’s defeat.

1 “From George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, 25 April 1754,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-01-02-0045. Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 1, 7 July 1748 – 14 August 1755, ed. W. W. Abbot. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983, 87–91.

224

This chapter argues that the Ohio Company carried out the first British militarization of the Ohio Valley and that when Virginia and the Crown took over the region’s defense, both governments heavily relied on Ohio Company infrastructure, information, and agents. While Chapters Two, Three, and Four explore the Ohio Company’s empire-building activities surrounding trade and settlement, Chapter Five investigates the

Ohio Company’s defensive infrastructure. During this militarization period, the Ohio

Company no longer faced the French with minimal colonial and imperial support. In 1754,

Dinwiddie finally coaxed the Colony and Crown into action beyond words. As Colony and

Crown moved to defend the Ohio Valley, they leaned on the Ohio Company’s finances, men, and infrastructure.

This chapter has three parts to demonstrate the Ohio Company’s influence on the defense of the Ohio Valley. The first section, “fortifying the Alleghenies,” focuses on the

Ohio Company’s militarization of the borderland at Red Stone Fort and the Ohio Company

Fort at the Forks of the Ohio. The second section demonstrates how George Washington used Ohio Company agents, alliances, and infrastructure in attempts to secure the Ohio

Valley for Virginia. “Dictating Braddock’s Route,” the chapter’s last section, shows how the

Ohio Company’s agents, intelligence, and infrastructure influenced the Crown’s plan to recapture the Ohio Valley and that plan’s execution under the infamous General Edward

Braddock. These sections demonstrate the intertwined nature of the interests of the Ohio

Company, Virginia, and the British Crown, and detail how the Ohio Company’s locations provided the only infrastructure available to the Virginian and British militaries in the

Allegheny mountains.

225

Historiography

Despite Company personnel and structures often appearing in the primary sources of both the British and French in the borderland, the Ohio Company’s presence is largely absent in the Seven Years’ War historiography. This chapter adds to this dissertation’s assertions that empire-building was a negotiated process by showing how the Ohio

Company influenced the defense of the Ohio Valley. By showing that Virginia and the

Crown planned and executed their campaigns to retake the Forks of the Ohio River based on the Ohio Company’s agents and infrastructure shows how the Company influenced the

British defense of the Ohio Valley.2

The first section of this chapter complicates to the historiography of the Seven

Years’ War by showing that the Ohio Company’s actions were a driving force in the earliest days of the war. Historians sometimes mention the fortifications at Red Stone Creek’s, or the Forks of the Ohio, but they do not mention that the Ohio Company built them. Rather, they write as if these fortifications were part of the natural landscape. MacGregor’s “The

Shot Not Heard around the World,” is the most detailed investigation of the French capture of the Ohio Company’s fort, and while he correctly argues that present-day Pittsburgh saw the first military action between French and British troops on April 17th, 1755, he too omits the fact the Ohio Company paid for the fort, and that Ohio Company agents constructed it. Currently, the historiography downplays the role of shared interest, cooperation, and negotiation in the fortification of the Ohio Valley.3

2 Colin Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2006), 4. 3 Daniel Baugh, The Global Seven Years’ War 1754-1763 (New York: Pearson, 2011), 44-65; William Fowler, Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763 (New York: Walker & Company, 2005), 11-27; Walter R.

226

The current interpretation of the first military interaction between the British and

French ignores the British financial interests at play in securing the Ohio Valley. In Crucible of War Anderson notes that during this time, Dinwiddie attempted to “further his prerogative in the Virginia government while enriching himself and his Ohio Company cronies at public expense.”4 Though Anderson estimates Dinwiddie’s interests, he does not recognize that the Ohio Company members, at the crown’s insistence, funded the fortification, the public expense was very little. Dinwiddie, and the other members are paid for the fort, and at this point. Ohio Company members had yet to receive a significant return on their investments. The interpretations that fail to recognize the Ohio Company’s involvement mischaracterize the first military interactions of the Seven Years’ War, making it appear that Virginia dictated the course of the war in the Ohio Valley when in reality the

Company and Colony influenced each other’s actions and reactions, it was not just the company alone pushing for expansion and defense of the Ohio Valley for the British and it was not the colony alone footing the bill.

The second and third sections of this chapter show how both Washington and

Braddock relied on the Ohio Company in their Ohio Valley campaigns, showing that the

Ohio Company remained part of the negotiated defense of the Ohio Valley. The

Borneman, The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 12-24; Charles Morse Stotz, Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and England in Western Pennsylvania: The Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749- 1764 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh: 2005), 3-20; Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 11-76; Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 8-168; Doug Macgregor, “The Shot Not Heard Around the World: Trent’s Fort and the Opening of the War for Empire,” Pennsylvania History 74, No. 3, (Summer 2007): 354- 373. 4 Anderson, Crucible, 46; Jennings, Empire, 66.

227

historiography of the Seven Years’ War and the individual campaigns either ignores the

Ohio Company constructions used by the military or lumps them in with natural physical landmarks, not acknowledging that they were man-made structures which constituted most of the British empire-building in the Ohio Valley.5 Neither do scholars of the Ohio

Company recognize the influential role the Ohio Company infrastructure played in British expeditions into the Ohio Valley. Even Ohio Company histories omit information regarding its military significance. James recounts the events from Ward’s parley to the surrender at

Fort Necessity in a single paragraph, with no discussion of the Ohio Company’s interests or role in the events.6 Bailey states, “The early campaigns [of the Seven Years’ War] were all fought on company Property, Wills Creek, Redstone old fort, Nemacolin’s road, and Gist’s settlement,” but fails to investigate how the structures and agents of the company influenced the Colony’s and Crown’s expeditions.7

5 Edward G. Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life (New York: Random House, 2005), 35. 6Alfred Proctor James, The Ohio Company, Its Inner History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959), 98. 7 Kenneth Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement, Reprint. (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000, org. pub. 1939), 208. This dissertation uses local histories such as George Albert, The Frontier Forts of Western Pennsylvania (Harrisburg: Clarence M. Busch, 1896), 4-39; William A. Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 1999, org. pub. 1960), 3-60; Charles Morse Stotz’s Outposts of the War for Empire, 3-20. for information on of the Ohio Company structures, their locations, and use during this period. However, while these works mention or give basic information of the Ohio Company’s sites, they lack information about their strategic value after the loss of the Ohio Company’s fort, and they lack any analysis specific to their military use by Virginia and later the British military. These local, specific histories fail to show the broader sway the Ohio Company had on these early days of this war and its global repercussions. This section of the chapter goes beyond these piecemeal reports to show how Ohio Company infrastructure was all that Virginia (Washington) or the Crown (Braddock) had in the borderland, and how the location of Ohio Company assets dictated the course of British action in the borderland in 1754 and 1755.

228

Recounting Braddock’s advances without discussing the infrastructure and intelligence the 1755 expedition relied on forces the conclusion that the military expeditions into the Ohio Valley acted independently, without outside influence, when in reality the Ohio Company infrastructure dictated their course. Even when governmental and military agents of empire, like the Virginia militia or Braddock’s troops, embarked on expeditions into the Ohio Valley, the Ohio Company’s agents, information, and infrastructure determined their strategy and actions to secure the Ohio Valley. This omission is especially noticeable when historians recount Washington’s first military venture into the Ohio Valley. These historians make no mention of how the Company’s buildings provided the only infrastructure in the area or how their presence influenced

Virginia’s military strategy.

Fortifying the Alleghenies: The Ohio Company’s Fort at the Forks of the Ohio

Any discussion of the Ohio Company’s or Virginia’s defense the borderland in 1754 must begin with Robert Dinwiddie. Dinwiddie’s instructions from the Crown effectively left him to decide if the Ohio Valley would be at war or peace, and under his leadership, both the Company and the Colony first undertook military action.8 The Earl of Holderness directed Dinwiddie to erect a fort and if necessary, forcibly drive the French out of the Ohio

Country. Dinwiddie had it in his power to start the British militarization of the Ohio Valley9

Like Holderness, other colonies looked to Dinwiddie to supervise the militarization of the Ohio Valley. Pennsylvania Governor Hamilton wrote to Dinwiddie in May of 1753,

8 Bailey, Ohio Company, 189-190. 9 “Earl of Holderness to Dinwiddie. , 1753,”, in The Ohio Company of Virginia, 190.

229

asked what the Ohio Company and Virginia planned regarding the fortification of the Forks, and informed Dinwiddie that he had orders to aid if possible. Hamilton knew the situation warranted action, but his Assembly, quarreled even more than Virginia’s did, and he lacked an entrenched private enterprise to fall back on. Even as the Assembly rendered him unable to defend “western Pennsylvania,” Hamilton never budged on Pennsylvania’s land claim. In the same letter offering Dinwiddie assistance, Hamilton warned that the 200,000 acres promised to Virginia’s defenders lay within Pennsylvania’s borders. Intracolonial rivalry lived on in the colonial centers even as the situation (and the Crown) dictated their cooperation. Hamilton’s land claims failed to stymie the Ohio Company’s militarization of the borderland as they pressed on and began fortifying the area.10

Even though Dinwiddie had orders from the Crown and a personal predisposition to militarize the Ohio Valley, he needed the Ohio Company’s cooperation and capital. The

Virginia Assembly balked at providing funds for the protection of the Ohio Valley when the

Colony’s claim was questionable.11 Virginia had not launched a military expedition on its own since the end of the , and Dinwiddie lacked the funds to carry out an expedition like the one Holderness’s orders described.12 Circumstances forced him to consider other means. His answer: the Ohio Company of Virginia.

Under Dinwiddie, the Ohio Company financed the Fort at the Forks of the Ohio

River. With his commission to William Trent, Dinwiddie sent a letter in which he explained that Virginia would pay Trent and his men while the Ohio Company footed the bill for the construction of the Fort. By revealing this odd financial situation, this dissertation

10 Bailey, Ohio Company, 121. 11 Bailey, Ohio Company, 204. 12 Anderson, Crucible, 51.

230

highlights the complicated relationship between Virginia and the Ohio Company of Virginia.

It is also one of the first instances of the Ohio Company and the colonial military working hand in hand. Those in government and commercial enterprises put tremendous effort into expelling the French and claiming the Ohio Valley for themselves. When Dinwiddie received authorization from the Crown to use force to expel the French and protect the

British claims, he did not hesitate to pull and combine resources from both Company and

Colony to achieve his aims.13

Because the Ohio Company funded the Fort’s construction, Dinwiddie circumnavigated the quarrelsome Assembly for construction costs, but cost worried the

Company as well. The Ohio Company’s London agent, John Hanbury, asked the Board of

Trade three times between 1749 and 1753 to relieve the Ohio Company of the responsibility and cost of building and arming a fort. The members thought the required fort and the accompanying garrison too expensive and unfair, for it was of “a public nature and therefore will guard other colonies as well as this and no particular advantage to the company.” In their 1751 plea, the Company members stressed that they only wanted “a small fort for the security of their Goods and people and not a regular Fort and Garrison for the protection of the Country.” The Company argued that such a fort would eat up “all the profits they could even suppose to make.”14 In the end, the Ohio Company realized that the

13 “Governor Dinwddie to Wm. Trent Esq.,” “Commission of Captain William Trent,” both documents are undated, but Dinwiddie’s other letters surrounding the Fort at the Forks came out on and around, Around Jan 27, 1754, Dinwiddie Papers, 55-57. 14 Neither Jennings nor Anderson mentions that the Ohio Company paid for this fort, nor do they discuss the implications of the Virginians protecting a privately funded fort. Neither of them emphasizes this loss as a turning point in the Borderland, or as the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. Anderson, Crucible, 46, Jennings, Empire, 65-66. “Orders of the Ohio Company, June 21st, 1749,” “Instructions given to Mr. Christopher Gist by the Committee of the Ohio Company,” July 27th 1753, Lois Mulkern, eds., George Mercer Papers

231

deal required the forts, and attempted to compensate by enlarging their grant and asked to settle 200 additional families to offset the cost of the fort.15

Hoping that extra acreage would offset the cost of the forts, the Ohio Company paid for the fort’s materials, provisions, and ammunition, and paid some of the agents who built the fort. Company member George Mason ordered 20 swivel guns and other ammunition from Hanbury in London. The Ohio Company agreed in November 1753 that each should pay 20 pounds for building costs, and like Virginia, placed Trent in charge of fort construction. 16

Before Trent could begin construction at the Forks of the Ohio, the Company members needed him to complete their Red Stone Creek fortification.17 Acting for the Ohio

Company, Trent built “a strong Square Log House with Loop Holes,” where Red Stone Creek met the Monongahela. At the end of the Fort Le Boeuf expedition, Washington wrote in his journal that he saw Trent on his way to the Forks of the Ohio with fort-building materials, but he was mistaken. Trent aimed not for the Forks, but rather for the Ohio Company’s Red

Stone Creek location. Many historians have taken Washington as his word, but Dinwiddie did not issue the orders to build the Ohio Company fort at the Forks until after

Washington’s return. An examination of Washington’s journals, Governor Dinwiddie’s papers, and the Ohio Company’s papers set the historical record straight. Trent could not

Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 141-142. 15 “Order of the Committee of Council to the Board of Trade, 1754.” George Mercer Papers, 470. 16 Ward, “Ward Deposition,” Christopher Gist’s Journal with Historical, Geographical, and Ethnological Notes and Biographies of his Contemporaries, ed. William Darlington, (New York: Argonaut Press, 1966), 275-278. 17 Ibid; Bailey, Ohio Company, 188. The Ohio Company’s Red Stone location is near present day Brownsville Pennsylvania.

232

have received his commission until after Washington’s return, he was on his way to build the Company’s Red Stone fortification, an Ohio Company location that had already the attention of the French, when he received his commission and order to move onto the

Forks of the Ohio River.

After a Delaware chief, Custaloga returned from a reconnaissance mission to Red

Stone for the French in early February, he identified the Ohio Company as the impetus for the British incursion into the Ohio Valley. Custaloga reported “a thousand men building a fort there.” He continued to say that when Trent and his men finished the fort at Red Stone, the French planned to “build another at the mouth of that same river,” meaning the Ohio

Company Fort at the Forks.18 While Custaloga inaccurately reported the numbers of traders under Trent’s command, his report of Trent’s itinerary was correct. The French correctly blamed the Ohio Company for this excursion stating, “this violation of territory has been made on at the request of a company of traders to favor their commerce with the savages.” While the Ohio Company plans exceeded trading, the French were correct that a private enterprise pushed the British into the Ohio Valley and hurried to counter the

British threat. 19

Before the French could act on the scouting report, Trent had already relocated to the Forks of the Ohio, conferred with Tanaghrisson and began constructing the Ohio

18 “Joncaire to Saint-Pierre, February 20 1754,” Quoted in Kent, Donald Kent, The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Society, 1954), 24-25. The Delaware chief mentioned is presumably Custaloga. 19 JCB, Travels in New France. Eds Sylvester Stevens and Donald H. Kent, and Emma Edith Woods, (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Historical Commission), 56.

233

Company’s fort on , 1754.20 Trent received Dinwiddie’s orders while fortifying

Redstone Creek. To round up the traders as Dinwiddie instructed, Trent “dispatched

Messengers to several parts of the Country where the Indian Traders lived.” When the

Half-King summoned Trent to “come immeadatly and build a Fort at the Forks of the

Monongalhela and Ohio,” he swiftly transported supplies and ammunition to the Ohio River headwaters.21 Trent’s haste to meet the Half-King was justified, for the Ohio Company’s alliance with Tanaghrisson enabled the Ohio Company to build at the fort of the Forks.22

The Ohio Company agents had built alliances with Tanaghrisson, and on February

17, 1754, they built a fort together, which serves as concrete (or wooden) evidence of their relationship. When Trent and Tanaghrisson met, they held a short ceremony which led to

Tanaghrisson symbolically laying the first log and proclaiming that “The Fort belonged to the English and them and who were offered to prevent the building of it, they, the Indians, would make war against them.”23 Tanaghrisson insisted that Trent set his men to work, and with help from his men, and they finished a storehouse, hewed boards and made shingles. The presence of Tanaghrisson’s group is unsurprising as their “requests” for a fort at the Logstown and Winchester Conferences had spurred the Ohio Company’s plans, and Tanaghrisson was counting on the British.

Richard White explains that the Delaware had grown wary of the encroachments of the both the British and French empires and thought that they might come together to

20 Bailey, Ohio Company, 192. Dinwiddie referred to the Fort as ; most secondary sources list it as the Ohio Company Fort or Trent’s Fort, and this dissertation follows suit, calling the fortification, the Ohio Company Fort. 21 Ward, “Ward Deposition,” Christopher Gist’s Journal, 275-278. 22 This assertion is also found in Jennings, Empire. 23. 23 MacGregor, “The Shot Not Heard,” 65.

234

eliminate them. Many Ohio Indians saw the French forts and leaned towards Canada. All of this left Tanaghrisson in a tough spot. He and his followers had a stake in making the Ohio

Company’s plans a reality, they would help them fight the French, and achieve an independent trade relationship with the British. 24 The Half-King’s position remained precarious; he needed to show the Ohio Indians his, formidable British allies. Stuck in the political dynamics of the Ohio Valley, he allied himself with the Ohio Company and hoped to maintain power while treading lightly enough to escape Onondaga's wrath.

Ohio Company Agent George Croghan, armed with a nuanced understanding of Ohio

Valley politics, came to the Forks to smooth relations between the Virginians and

Tanaghrisson. Anderson claims that Croghan was present to “investigate whatever commercial opportunities the situations might afford.”25 However, as an affiliate of the

Ohio Company and someone who was invested in the fur trade, Croghan was already involved in this commercial opportunity. Croghan’s long game benefitted the Ohio

Company. He translated and smoothed Virginia-Indian relations, which went a long way towards ensuring success. Not only financially interested in the Ohio Company’s success,

Croghan knew that Virginia was the only option to protect British interests in the

Alleghenies. Pennsylvania’s Quaker-dominated Assembly was pacifist, and therefore would not counter the French. Without the Ohio Company’s fort to counter the French forts,

Croghan knew his fur trading days were numbered. Croghan worked for the Ohio Company and the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania, and as he explained to Governor Hamilton,

24 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 235- 242. 25 Anderson, Crucible, 46.

235

his linguistic skills were crucial to maintaining the British Indian alliances.26

The French disregarded the Half-King’s endorsement of the Fort and continued to collect intelligence on the British progress. On , French scouts met a deserter from

Trent’s group who reported that six cannons with eight-pound balls had arrived at the Red

Stone fortification and the Ohio Company agents immediately sent these arms to their new fort. The next day, a French spy reported that the British had begun construction at the

Forks of the Ohio.27

While the French watched the British, the British watched the French, and the

French location caused the Virginians to seek reinforcements, supplies, and improved defenses. Tanaghrisson urged Trent to hurry George Washington and his command to the

Fort and bring more supplies from Wills Creek. Following this advice, Trent left to retrieve the much-needed rations and reinforcements on March 17, leaving his brother-in-law,

Ensign Ward, in charge of erecting the rest of the fort. Shortly after Trent’s departure,

Christopher Gist arrived with news of supplies at Redstone and asked Ward for assistance in bringing them to the fort. Ward dispatched men from his already small force to bring up the supplies. On , a French force traveled down the Allegheny River and caused the

British to speed up their defense. Ward, advised by Tanaghrisson, started a stockade and resolved to hold out as long as he could to avoid losing Indian respect.28

A few days later, the French arrived and rightly blamed the Ohio Company for all of the trouble in the Ohio Valley. On , the French soldiers that the British had fretted

26 Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: 1959), 57-60. 27 Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 47. 28 Kenneth Bailey, Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer and Indian Agent (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976), 85-86.

236

over landed upstream of the Ohio Company’s Fort at the Forks. The 600 French soldiers moved closer, a hair out of musket range the following day, just as the Virginians finished their new stockade.29 According to a French soldier, the French force reached the Ohio

Company’s fort, and pointed four cannon at the construction.30 A few days later, the French sent a summons to Ensign Ward in which they blamed the Ohio Company for all of the trouble in the Ohio Valley. The invitation to the council stated, “I am assured that your enterprise has only been planned by a company which had in view commercial interests rather that labouring to maintain union and harmony…between the Crowns of France and

Great Britain.” Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de Contrecoure, the commander of the French troops, stated further that if the British “came for commercial purposes, I am sorry to tell you that I cannot help seizing you, and confiscating your effects for the good of the savages, our children, our allies, and our friends it is forbidden that you do any prohibited commerce.”31 On the other hand, the French stated that even if the British were there with permission from the British King, they still commanded them to vacate the Ohio Valley. A

British commercial venture in the Ohio Valley, even one with the King’s endorsement, was unacceptable to the French.

The French threatened force, and after deliberation with Tanaghrisson, Ward vacated their Ohio Company fortification. As men had gone with both Trent and Gist, the

British had less than half their original force, and Ensign Ward was in an unwinnable position. He estimated the French had 1,000 men to his forty-one, only thirty-three of whom were trained soldiers. Ward, advised by Tanaghrisson, asked for more time, and

29 Ward, “Ensign Ward’s Deposition,” Christopher Gist’s Journal, 277. 30 JCB, Travels in New France. 56. 31 “Mirepoix to the Minister A.E, Angl 438,” Quoted in Bailey, The Ohio Company, 195.

237

predictably, the French refused and demanded an immediate surrender. Ward, unaware of when British reinforcements would appear, knew the French vastly outnumbered him. He obliged the French and led his men out of the fort and back to the Ohio Company’s Red

Stone Fort.32

The capture of the Ohio Company Fort was a military expedition, where Virginia militia faced French troops, and is a turning point in the history of the borderland. For most of the war in America, the British attempted to recapture the Ohio Valley.

Washington and Braddock both aimed to recapture it, and in 1758, the French rebuffed

Major James Grant and his first Highland regiment’s attempt to retake the fort. It was not until John Forbes, and his six thousand troops marched towards Fort Duquesne that the

French burnt their stronghold and withdrew from the Ohio Valley.33

Dinwiddie, whom historians have portrayed as only starting his letter campaign after Washington’s defeat at Fort Necessity, began pleading for aid and condemning the torpid Assembly immediately after Virginia lost the Ohio Company’s fort.34 He wrote letters to the Board of Trade, the Treasury, the Earl of Holderness, the Earl of Halifax, the

Earl of Granville, Horace Walpole, and Virginia’s agent in London, James Abercromby.35 In these supplications, he explained how the Virginia Assembly’s lack of funding prohibited him from carrying out the Crown’s orders to defend the Ohio Country, which resulted in the

32 Fowler, Empires at War, 157; Doug Macgregor, “The Shot,” 354-373; Bailey, Gist, 86. 33 Fowler, Empires at War, 161-165, Doug Macgregor, “The Shot,” 354-373. 34 Patrice Higonnet, “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” The Journal of Modern History 40, No. 1, (Mar., 1968): 57-90. 35 “Governor Dinwiddie to the Earl of Holderness, April 27th, 1754,” Governor Dinwiddie to the Early of Halifax, April 27th, 1754,” “governor Dinwiddie to the Earl of Grenville April 27th, 1754,” “Governor Dinwiddie to J. Abercromby April 26th, 1754,” all from the Dinwiddie Papers, 133-140.

238

loss of the Ohio Company’s fort. To prove his points, Dinwiddie sent the Board of Trade the minutes and actions of the Assembly and Council for 1753 and 1754, which demonstrated the Assembly’s unwillingness to provide for the Virginia’s defenses. Dinwiddie explained the Assembly’s lack of funding for defense and complained that the Assembly’s actions were “inconstutitonal and degroatory to the prerogative of the Crown.” Dinwiddie asserted that the Assembly’s inaction led to the French capture of the Fort at the fork and that he had followed the Crown’s orders as well as he could under the circumstances. Dinwiddie also sent copies of Ensign Ward’s deposition, to underline the gravity and nature of the situation at the Forks of the Ohio.36 He reiterated his fears that if the French went unstopped, it would ruin the British colonies and give America to the French. He followed these letters to government officials with one to Capel Hanbury, John’s brother and another member and agent, of the Ohio Company. The Virginia governor informed Hanbury of the loss of the fort and begged him to aid him in his efforts to provoke action and funds from the government.37

Other colonial leaders besides Dinwiddie, in both the French and British governments, viewed the loss of the Ohio Company Fort as extremely relevant to the status of the Ohio Valley. The French viewed it as a great success, and Governor Duquesne boasted that it was the “most important mission that has ever been assigned in this colony.”38 The French saw this moment as their takeover of the Ohio Valley. The British also saw this as a watershed moment. Thomas Walpole, when discussing Washington’s activities in the Alleghenies in 1754, said: “Major William Trent, one of our associates is ‘the

36 “Dinwiddie to the Board of Trade, May 10, 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 160-161. 37 “Dinwiddie to C Hanbury, May 10, 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 155. 38 Stotz, Outposts, 17.

239

Gentlemen’ who had the honor to command the first raised troops” against the French.39

Walpole’s words are correct, although very few historians take heed of them.

Williamsburg power brokers were not alone in worrying about French advances in the Ohio Valley. Tanaghrisson was agitated, furious, and ready to renew the fight. When the French took the fort, Ward reported that Tanaghrisson “stormed greatly at the

French…and told them it was he Order’d that Fort and laid the first Log of it himself, but the

French paid no Regard to the Half-Kings words.”40 The Half-King had staked his reputation and power on the British and the Ohio Company, and he was not about to go down without a(nother) fight. Tanaghrisson sent a message with Ward to George Washington specifying that his band was “as ready to fight them [the French] as you [the British] are yourselves.”

He asserted, “If you do not come to our aid soon, it is all over with us, and I think that we shall never be able to meet together again.”41

Scrambling from One Ohio Company location to Another: George Washington in 1755

Unaware of the British eviction from the Ohio Company Fort and the Half-King’s ultimatum, quoted in the previous paragraph, Washington and his 1,867 men trekked from

Winchester Virginia to the Ohio Company’s headquarters at Wills Creek.42 Washington planned on using and reinforcing the Ohio Company infrastructure, supplies, and men, and even though the situation had changed completely, Washington’s reliance on the Ohio

39 Thomas Walpole, “Remarks upon George Washington’s memorial of Virginia Militia,” George Mercer Papers, 354. 40 Ward, “Ensign Ward’s Deposition,” Christopher Gist’s Journals, 278, 41 “The Speech of the Half-King,” in Hugh Cleland, George Washington in the Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 1955), 70. 42 Lengel, General George Washington, 19, 32,

240

Company did not. As Washington and the Virginia militia continued the Ohio Company’s militarization of the Ohio Valley and efforts to secure the Forks for the British, their plan consisted exclusively of reinforcing and improving the Ohio Company’s infrastructure, and that same Company infrastructure dictated their military strategy.

This section of the chapter builds on the limited historiography that acknowledges that from Washington’s perspective, the French had already committed an act of war in attacking the Fort. Even those scholars who acknowledge this military action neglect to say that the fort the French attacked was an Ohio Company structure. Both Washington and

Dinwiddie viewed it the “beginning of hostilities on the part of the French; and henceforth both he and Washington acted much as if war had been declared.”43 The capitulation of the fort altered Washington’s mission. MacGregor correctly asserts that Washington could not carry out his orders because the fort he was going to reinforce was now in French hands.44

Most of the historiography on Washington’s 1754 actions and the origins of the

Seven Years’ War underplays the significance of the capture of the Ohio Company’s fort on

Washington’s mission. Because scholars ignore the fact that the French had already initiated the first military conflict in the Ohio Valley, much of the historiography of the

Seven Years’ War presents Washington as the naive aggressor who made error after error in 1754. Anderson mentions that Washington was on the way to the Fort at the Forks but writes as if Dinwiddie promoted Washington after Ward surrendered the Ohio Company

Fort to the French. He does not acknowledge that Washington was already en route to the

43 Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1884), 149-150. While Parkman’s work has its flaws, he does show a nuanced understanding of Washington’s situation, and understands that Washington’s attitude and mission changed with the French capture of the Ohio Company’s Fort at the Forks. 44 Doug Macgregor, “The Shot,” 354-373.

241

Ohio Company’s fort and that the loss of that fort significantly altered Washington’s orders and purpose in the Ohio Valley. Jennings does not mention of that Washington intended to go to the fort. He mentions that Washington was “hotheaded,” which as the above section points out, would seem to be true if the facts about the Ohio Company’s fort were unknown.45

Before Washington even found out that the plans had changed, he sent a messenger ahead of his column to Thomas Cresap, the Ohio Company’s supply agent at Wills Creek, and relayed that despite their struggling with rough roads, he was determined to push on to the Ohio Valley. Washington planned to carry supplies on horseback and asked that

Cresap and Trent procure as many horses as possible and meet them at Wills Creek. Other than horses, Washington relied on the Ohio Company Store for provisions, tools and anything else the Ohio Company agents and seasoned traders thought that Washington might need.46 The Virginia military continued to rely on the Ohio Company as the

Assembly still refused to foot the bill.

Washington received a message from Trent to hurry to the Ohio Company Fort due to the 800 Frenchmen in the proximity. However, by the next day, when Washington finally made it to Cresap’s home at Oldtown on , he learned from Ensign Ward himself that the Ohio Company Fort had fallen to the French, which left Washington unable to carry out his orders. Washington was not entirely without guidance. Dinwiddie had instructed Washington, “in Case any Attempts are made to obstruct the Works [the Ohio

Company’s fort] or interrupt our settlements [Gist’s Plantation] by any Persons

45 Jennings, Empire, 65-70; Lengel, General George Washington, 32-33. 46 “Washington to Cresap, April 2 1754,” The George Mercer Papers, 84-85.

242

whatsoever, You are to restrain all such Offenders, & in Case of resistance to make

Prisoners of or kill & destroy them."47

Washington made his way to Wills Creek on April 23rd to partake in a council to determine how to protect Virginia’s and the Ohio Company’s claim. Their plan, crafted at the Ohio Company headquarters, revolved around Ohio Company infrastructure. The war

Council decided against attacking the French, prudent considering their inferior numbers

(about 180 British to the 1000 French), even though Tanaghrisson urged retaliation. The

Council decided that Washington should head to the Ohio Company’s fortification at Red

Stone Creek, improve the Ohio Company’s road and make it “sufficiently good for the heaviest artillery,” so that when the rest of the British made it into the Ohio Valley, they would have a perfect position to attack the French at Fort Duquesne.48

Washington planned to expand the Ohio Company’s structures at Red Stone, which lay about 37 miles southwest of the Forks of the Ohio.49 Washington’s journal listed the

Council’s reasons for agreeing to this plan, and they all related to the Ohio Company. He first wrote about the geographic advantages, stating that “Red-Stone is the first convenient

Place on the River Monaungahela.” He later asserted that Virginia could send the “Great

Guns” by water whenever they decided to attack the French. Washington either discovered

47 “Governor Dinwiddie’s Instructions to Major Washington,” Dinwiddie Papers, 59. Anderson says that Dinwiddie's instructions to Washington were issued without the knowledge or direction of the British government in London. However, Dinwiddie’s instructions from Holderness, relayed at the beginning of this chapter, gave Dinwiddie all the power he needed to proceed. 48 “From George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, 25 April 1754,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed April 11, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-01-02-0045. Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 1, 7 July 1748 – 14 August 1755, ed. W. W. Abbot. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983, pp. 87–91. 49 Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754: Narrative,” Founders Online.

243

this geographical information while at the Ohio Company’s headquarters, or from Ohio

Company agents, Thomas Cresap and Ensign Edward Ward. Washington listed the Ohio

Company’s structures already built at Red Stone as another advantage of that location, stating that they could easily store the provisions there. Washington wrote that moving to

Red Stone would protect his men and assure the Ohio Indians of the British intention to defend of the Ohio Country.50

While all of those virtues of Red Stone were seemingly true, the Virginians never were able to use them to their advantage due to Washington’s focus on improving the Ohio

Company’s road. Washington spent three weeks widening twenty miles of road in attempts to get to the Ohio Company buildings at Redstone. In 1758, while Washington was stationed at Fort Cumberland, he tried to persuade the British Army to take the Ohio

Company’s road when they moved to retake the Forks of the Ohio. Washington reflected that “the Ohio Company in 1753, at a considerable expense, opened the road, In 1754 the troops whom I had the honor to command, readily repaired it, as far as Gist’s planation; and, in 1755 it was widened and completed by General Braddock to within six miles

(about) of Fort Duquesne.”51 By , Washington and his men had made their way to

Great Meadows, the future site of Fort Necessity, about halfway to their intended destination, Red Stone, from their supply base at Wills Creek. They set up camp and improved the Ohio Company’s road.

50 Ibid. 51 “Washington to Colonel Bouquet, 2 August 1758,” The Writing of Washington; Being His Correspondence, Addresses, Messages, and other Papers, Official and Private. vol. 2, ed. Jared Sparks, (New York: Harper Brothers, 1847), 302.

244

The road and Red Stone location were not the only Ohio Company resources that influenced Washington: there was also Gist’s Plantation. Washington’s efforts to protect

Gist’s Plantation led directly to the infamous events at Jumonville Glen. On ,

Washington sent some men there, hoping to find information on the French. Washington reached out to the Plantation for information, demonstrating that the Ohio Company’s settlement was a beacon to the Virginia military. On May 16, Washington met two British traders, who were retiring from the Ohio Country because there were so many sightings of the French near Gist’s Plantation. The Half-King and George Washington had been in constant contact and had confirmed their alliance with the exchange of wampum belts.

Tanaghrisson warned Washington of a French attack, a message Washington received on

May 24. Tanaghrisson reported that the French were out to meet Washington and attack the first British they met. That same day a trader came in, saying that he had left Gist’s that morning and could confirm the Half-King’s statement of a French force in the area.52

Early on the morning of , Gist came into Washington’s camp at Great

Meadows and brought word that the French had been to his Plantation the day before, threatening their homes, only deciding against leveling them due to the influences of two

Indians. Gist reported that the French had inquired after the Half-King, and Washington informed the Indians in his party that the French intended to kill Tanaghrisson. According to Washington, the Indians offered to accompany the British on their scouting trips, and promised to gather the Mingo if the French killed or even insulted Tanaghrisson.53 After hearing of the French movement near Gist’s Plantation, Washington took action to protect

52 Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754: Narrative,” Founders Online. 53 Why these Native Americans specified that they would rally the is unknown. They may have been Mingos themselves or knew some Mingos nearby.

245

the Ohio Company settlement and track down the French. He sent Captain Hog, Lieutenant

George Mercer, an Ohio Company member, and sixty-five men with Gist to protect the Ohio

Company settlement, again demonstrating that Ohio Company infrastructure influenced military strategy. However, that was not the last of the day’s intelligence. The Half-King, alive and well, sent a message to Washington, relaying that he had found the French camp, and Washington, realizing that the camp lay in the opposite direction of Gist’s, where he had sent Captain Hog, he set off with a large number of men to join Tanaghrisson.54

All of the French movement originated from Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy de

Contrecoeur at the Fort Duquesne construction site. Contrecoeur had sent scouts to follow the Virginian road-building campaign. According to the anonymous soldier who authored

Travels in New France, the French had almost completed Fort Duquesne when Contrecocur sent a group of Indian and French scouts out on reconnaissance. The soldier continued his report saying that the detachment “returned at the end of several days, and reported that the English had settled in Virginia, forty leagues away and were building a storehouse, probably with the intention of attacking Fort Duquesne.” The storehouse mentioned was most likely the Ohio Company’s fortified location at Red Stone Creek. The French commander sent Ensign Jumonville and thirty-five men to intercept the British force, gather intelligence and deliver a summons ordering the British to leave French land.55

After rendezvousing with Tanaghrisson, the two men agreed to commence a dawn attack on the French. The events that occurred at Jumonville Glen are far from certain due

54George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754: Narrative,” fn 51. Fowler, Empires, 37-39. 55 J.C.B Travels in New France, 59. Sources disagree on the exact composition of Jumonville's force, which may have included French troupes de la marine, Canadian militia, and Native Americans allied with the French. Fowler, Empires at War, 41-42.

246

to the conflicting primary sources. This dissertation agrees with Fred Anderson’s analysis and conclusion, which draws from John Shaw’s account to make sense of the events of May

28th.56 Washington’s and Tanaghrisson’s forces came into the French encampment, commenced a surprise dawn attack that ended with the French, led by commander le

Force, surrendering their arms to the British. After the French surrender, Washington lost control over the situation, and Tanaghrisson split the skull of Ensign Jumonville and washed his hands with the Frenchman's brains, a symbolic rejection of French authority over Tanaghrisson, his followers, and the Ohio Country. Following the shattering of

Jumonville’s cranium, Tanaghrisson’s followers killed a number of their French prisoners.

The other prisoners, Le Force and twenty-one of his men, were taken to Williamsburg by

Thomas Cresap.57 Expecting French retaliation, Washington returned to his camp at Great

Meadows and resumed work on the fortifications.58

Histories of the French and Indian War usually focus on Jumonville as the beginning of the Seven Years’ War, but the Jumonville episode only occurred after the French captured the Ohio Company’s Fort, and Washington reinforced and protected other Ohio

Company infrastructure. This chapter clarifies Washington’s actions in the Alleghenies by showing that from Washington’s perspective, the French had already committed an act of war. Believing this, Washington acted quickly. He was convinced that the French had already started the war by capturing the Ohio Company’s fort. He thought Jumonville and

56 Anderson, Crucible, 91. 57 “Dinwiddie to Cresap, 1854,” Dinwiddie Papers, 185 58 What exactly happened at Jumonville Glen is a heavily debated subject, for additional information an interpretation see, Anderson, Crucible of War, 5-5, 57-61; Anderson, The War that Made America, 45-52; Jennings, Empire, 66-70. Fowler, Empires at War,41-43. Lengel, General George Washington, 36-39.

247

his men might have been on route to forcibly remove the British military from Red Stone fort and British settlers from Gist’s Plantation. Knowledge that the French military had already captured one British location prompted Washington to follow Dinwiddie’s orders and protect the other locations, which all had been built by the Ohio Company. The shots at

Jumonville Glen may have been the first shots of the Seven Years’ War, but they were not the first military action. 59

Back in Williamsburg, the Jumonville incident instigated another Dinwiddie letter- writing campaign to update officials about the first shots between the British and French militaries in the borderland. On , 1754, he wrote to the Board of Trade, the Earl of

Albermarle, Sir James Abercromby, and Thomas Robinson, the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department, informing them of the situation. Dinwiddie detailed the erection of Fort Necessity and Virginia’s lack of finances to launch a proper retaliation, and he explained how these events could disrupt negotiations with possible Native American allies. Dinwiddie also wrote to his colonial counterparts, Governor Sharpe of Maryland,

Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania, and Governor DeLancy of New York. Dinwiddie explained that continued military action and bloodshed had occurred in the Alleghenies, he attempted to appeal to their loyalty to the Crown, and he ended by asking for aid or military assistance from his neighboring colonies to thwart the French and secure the

King’s lands.60

Meanwhile, in the Alleghenies, Washington believed that French military action was forthcoming, so he pushed his men to complete a fort, Fort Necessity, along the Ohio

59 Macgregor, “The Shot,” 369. 60 The letters can be found in The Dinwiddie Papers, 201-212.

248

Company’s road, between the two Ohio Company installations he used as endpoints.61

Washington had his men begin “a fort with a little palisade,” on , and on , they finished and held prayers in the fort.62 Washington had his men build a makeshift defense; he did not intend it to be a long-standing fortification. Regardless of Washington’s intentions, Fort Necessity would be the first fort built by the military in the Ohio Valley. Up to this point, all of the buildings, roads, and forts used had belonged to the Ohio Company of Virginia. Had this not been an emergency, Washington would not have built Fort

Necessity. Virginia had planned and would have continued to pursue a strategy based on the Ohio Company’s infrastructure.

When the French attack did not materialize, Washington did not await the French behind Fort Necessity’s minimal palisade; instead, he scurried from one Ohio Company location to another. He attempted to finish improving the Company’s road and planned for an eventual campaign against Fort Duquesne, for Washington knew the British would attempt to retake the Forks. Washington required reinforcements and supplies from

Dinwiddie, and instead of building stronger defenses at Fort Necessity, as might have been prudent, he returned to work on the Ohio Company’s road. Washington had heard rumors that the French had stationed 500 poorly supplied soldiers at Fort Duquesne, so in

Washington’s mind, when Virginian and British reinforcements appeared, they would significantly add to his 300 men and give them the upper hand. The sooner the reinforcements could reach Washington, the sooner they could take on Fort Duquesne. As

Anderson says regarding Washington’s behavior following his ambush of the French, “it

61 George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online. 62 Lengel, General George Washington, 35-36; Fowler, Empires at War, 43-44.

249

was not merely foolish self-confidence that made him unwilling to invest more than minimal efforts and time in construction of Fort … he had no intention of making a stand at

Great Meadows.” Anderson surmises, and this dissertation agrees, that Washington intended to storm the gates of Fort Duquesne. Washington, unaware of the strength of the

French force in the Allegheny Mountains, assumed that a large number of British reinforcements were on the way to his location. Given these assumptions, his intentions of taking on the French at Duquesne were not “deranged.”63

While Washington returned to Great Meadows to build Fort Necessity, the Half-King attempted to rally his allies. When Washington relayed Dinwiddie’s request to meet

Tanaghrisson at Winchester, the Half-King answered that the French presented an imminent danger and said Washington “must send Messengers to all the allied Nations, in order to invite them to take up the Hatchet.” After the Jumonville incident, Tanaghrisson told Washington he would wait for him at Gist’s Plantation. Washington must have told him of his plans to erect a fortification, for the Half-King told him that when the British finished their construction efforts and were ready to renew their fight with the French, they should send men and horses to bring Tanaghrisson and his people to Great

Meadows.64

Though Washington never intended Fort Necessity to be a permanent structure,

Native American families allied with the British against the French regiments gathered there. On June 1, the Half-King and Queen Aliquippa, who was the leader of a band of

Seneca, came to Fort Necessity with about 135 people (according to Washington), came

63 Anderson, Crucible, 60; Fowler, Empires, 39-42; Lengel, General George Washington, 40-42. George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online. 64 George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online.

250

into camp. Tanaghrisson informed Washington that he had sent Monokotoothka to

Logstown with wampum, French scalps, and demands of assistance for the Iroquois,

Wyandot’s, and other groups. Native Americans continued to come to Fort Necessity. A few families of Shawnee, and eight other Native American families (Washington does not say which tribe or band they were from) came from through the 5. Gist appeared on

June 8, and then on , the rest of the Virginia Regiment arrived at Great Meadows, excluding Colonel Joshua Fry, who broke his neck in an equestrian accident and subsequently died at the Ohio Company buildings at Wills Creek.65 Fry’s death left

Washington as the highest-ranking officer in a situation where he unquestionably would have benefited from a more experienced commander. On , Captain Mackay and his

100 men arrived. As historians have noted, this created an awkward question. Mackay had a commission from the King and Washington held a provincial commission. Despite

Washington’s higher rank, Mackay proved reluctant to take orders from a provincial officer.66

A more experienced commander might have taken advantage of the lack of French response and further fortified the position, but Washington renewed the costly efforts to improve the Ohio Company’s road west. Believing that a French attack was improbable after such a delay, and under the impression that more Native American and British reinforcements were close, Washington left Mackay’s regiment to uphold Fort Necessity and took his men to widen the road towards Gist’s Plantation and Red Stone Creek on June

16. It took Washington and his 300 Virginians two-weeks to reach Gist’s Plantation. The

65 Lengel, General George Washington, 40. Bailey, Christopher Gist, 86-87. 66 Ibid; Anderson, Crucible, 92. George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online.

251

road-building effort exhausted Washington’s force as they struggled to move their supplies and the Ohio Company’s nine swivel guns. Wagons broke beyond repair, forcing the already tired men to carry their wares on their backs.67

When the Virginians finally arrived at Gist’s plantation, Washington used the Ohio

Company’s settlement as a meeting ground. Washington, Tanaghrisson, Croghan, and Gist, and other Native American headmen discussed their bleak situation, which only worsened as they spoke. Tanaghrisson’s attempts to convince the other chiefs to assist Washington proved fruitless, and on Monacatootha, relayed that De Villiers had finally set out from Duquesne to avenge Jumonville, who happened to be De Villiers’ brother.68

At the meeting at the Ohio Company Settlement, Tanaghrisson finally left the British cause. He could not convince any of the Ohio Indians to join him, and he finally gave up on what he considered his ineffective and indecisive British allies. In light of Tanaghrisson’s departure, and the French movement towards their position, on June 28, Washington called for Mackay to join him at Gist’s Plantation. Mackay marched his independent company from Great Meadows to unite the British forces at Gist’s Plantation, and hastily palisaded the houses for defense.69

Despite the time and effort spent at Gist’s, on , the war council decided to retreat to Wills Creek; however, the French moved more swiftly than expected and forced the Virginians to defend themselves at Fort Necessity. As the British left Gist’s, dragging the Ohio Company’s nine swivel guns eastward, De Villers arrived at Washington’s original

67 Lengel, General George Washington, 41. 68 George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online. 69 George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online. Bailey, Christopher Gist, 88-89.

252

destination, the Ohio Company’s Redstone location, where he left supplies, sick Indians, twenty soldiers, and a sergeant.70 With the French so near, the Virginians who worked on the road abandoned their supplies in order to make it back to Great Meadows on . De

Villiers and his men followed the Virginians down the Ohio Company’s road to arrive in the early hours of July 3.71

Hauling goods and people around from Ohio Company location to Ohio Company location had taken its toll on the British. Even when sheltered at the pathetic haven that was Fort Necessity, they were miserable, for it began to rain. The British fort, in the open, had no shelter and no dry powder. When the French attacked on July 3, the cover of trees and dry powder gave the French an advantage beyond their superior numbers. By nightfall, Washington’s men were wretched, wet, and wounded. They broke into the rum and drank to excess rendering half of the force incapable of fighting. When the officers called the roll, only 300 soldiers were in fighting condition.72

De Villiers, unaware of when British reinforcements would appear, raised a white flag, and began negotiations. The French requested that Washington surrender the garrison and retreat to Virginia, threatening if they did not surrender immediately.

With the bloodied Jumonville fresh in his mind, Washington agreed to the terms. The

French composed the surrender terms, which said that Washington admitted to

Jumonville’s assassination. However, Washington’s interpreter, Van Braam incorrectly

70 Coulon De Villiers, “The French Commander, Coulon De Villiers Describes the Campaign from the French Points of View,” in Hugh Cleland, George Washington in the Ohio Valley (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 1955), 105. 71 Lengel, General George Washington, 40-42. Anderson, Crucible, 94-96. George Washington, “Expedition to the Ohio, 1754,” Founders Online. 72 Lengel, General George Washington, 43-44; Fowler, Empires at War, 45.

253

interpreted this word; and both Washington and Mackay signed the document and abandoned Fort Necessity on July 4. Washington and MacKay had suffered 30 dead and 70 wounded. Their remaining soldiers limped back to the safety of Wills Creek, the Ohio

Company Headquarters on .73

Even after the British vacated the Alleghenies, the Ohio Company’s infrastructure continued to dictate French military decisions. After their victory at Fort Necessity, the

French destroyed the Fort. They used the Red Stone fortification as a storage facility and hospital before their victory at Fort Necessity, and after July 4, they demolished the Ohio

Company’s buildings at Red Stone.74 On , the French destroyed the Ohio Company’s settlement at Gist’s Plantation along with the palisade Washington’s men had erected only a few days prior.75 De Villiers and his men did all of this by traveling the Ohio Company’s

Road. After Washington’s disastrous trek in the Allegheny Mountains, Tanaghrisson deserted his Virginian allies and ended the relationship that served as a keystone to many of the Ohio Company’s other Native American connections. With the loss of Fort Necessity, the Ohio Company lost five years’ worth of infrastructure and alliances.

While his men camped at Wills Creek, George Washington traveled to Williamsburg and delivered a report on his capitulation to Governor Dinwiddie on July 16, unaware of the far-reaching consequences his words would have in both British and French governmental circles.76 The French government assembled a dossier of documents entitled "A memorial

73 Ibid; Anderson, Crucible, 95-98. 74 De Villiers, “The French Commander,”105. 75 Bailey, Christopher Gist, 89. 76 Washington probably expecting a rebuke, instead received thanks from the House of Burgesses and Dinwiddie, who blamed the defeat on poor supply and lack of aid. Lengel, General George Washington, 47

254

containing a summary view of facts, with their authorities, in answer to observations sent by the English ministry to the courts of Europe." The French used Washington's capitulation statement and Washington's journal to suggest that Washington ordered the assassination of Jumonville.77 Based on Washington's report, the British launched their propaganda campaign which claimed ownership of the Ohio Valley and suggested that

Jumonville had spied on Washington’s expedition.78 After the loss of Fort Necessity and most of the Ohio Company’s infrastructure, Dinwiddie, made a last-ditch letter campaign, contacting everyone with authority in the colonies and London to mount a strike back against the French. Again, he contacted Virginia’s London agent, the Board of Trade, the

Earl of Albermarle, the Lord Halifax and the Earl of Granville, and questioned their dedication to securing and supporting the British rights to the Ohio Valley. This time he added Henry Fox, the British Secretary of War, to his correspondence list to specifically inquire and complain about the tardiness of the two Independent companies from New

York, who arrived too late to aid Washington in the Alleghenies. Dinwiddie also contacted the Ohio Company’s agents in London, Capel and John Hanbury, and begged them to lobby the Board of Trade on his behalf. Governor Dinwiddie was desperate to save the Ohio

Valley for the British Empire and the Ohio Company.79

Despite his letters, Dinwiddie most likely doubted he could to goad the Assembly or any of the other colonies into action, as all of his previous attempts to do so had failed.

After all, Dinwiddie was stunned that no one had aided him thus far to preserve the Ohio

77 Dwight, 84-85, as Dwight points out, not all Frenchmen agreed with the story: the Chevalier de Lévis, who served in second in command under Montcalm cast doubt on the French story when he called the entire incident a "pretended assassination.” 78 Anderson, Crucible, 66. Jennings, Empire, 69. 79 Dinwiddie’s letters can all be found in The Dinwiddie Papers, 234-257.

255

Valley for the British. No one else had followed the Crown’s orders. No one, from his

Assembly to the other governors had defended the Ohio Valley. In his letter to James

Abercrombie written July 24, Dinwiddie proclaimed that those against action in the Ohio

Valley “must give a Holy-day to their Sense,” if they failed to comprehend the magnitude of the events occurring in the Ohio Valley.80 A depressed and frustrated Dinwiddie contemplated resignation, unaware that his London-bound letters were “creating the galvanizing effect that all his other efforts failed to generate.”81

Dictating Braddock’s Route

Dinwiddie’s and Washington’s reports of the events at Fort Necessity alarmed officials in Whitehall and prompted immediate action; the government sent General

Braddock to America. The official reports of the debacle at Fort Necessity reached the Duke of Newcastle, Thomas Pelham-Holles, in August, and he, being the British Secretary of State in charge of the colonies, directed much of British foreign policy, debated the empire’s next move. Newcastle considered the French actions in the Ohio Valley so egregious that he asked the Duke of Cumberland, a man whom he disliked, a known war hawk, to support him. Only two weeks after receiving Dinwiddie’s letter, the pair gained approval to send two regiments of Irish infantry under the command of General Edward Braddock to the

Ohio Country to remove it from French hands.82 Braddock, the new commander-in-chief, held authority over colonial governors and was in charge of the defense of all Anglo-

80 Dinwiddie, “Governor Dinwiddie to James Abercromby, July 24 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 235. 81 Anderson, Crucible, 66. 82 Anderson, Crucible, 66-67. For a short summary of the politics surrounding Braddock’s selection and goals, see Fowler, Empires at War, 49-55.

256

American colonies. The British officials planned for General Edward Braddock take Fort

Duquesne and the Ohio Country in the spring of 1755.83

The Ohio Company, a land-speculation company, held only negligible sway over military decisions in London; however, the Ohio Company’s agents considerably influenced the Crown’s military strategy in the Ohio Valley. The Ohio Company’s agents in London and

America, as well as in the Ohio Company infrastructure in the Ohio Valley, ensured that

Braddock’s campaign route would benefit both Virginia and the Ohio Company.

John Hanbury, the Ohio Company’s London agent and Ohio Company stockholder, used his influence to ensure that Braddock would land in Virginia and use the Ohio

Company’s road and buildings. Military expeditions, a boon to any economy, would financially benefit Virginia and the Ohio Company, and Hanbury negotiated to ensure that

Braddock executed a Virginia-based campaign that would protect and expand the Company and Colony’s interests into the Ohio Valley. Hanbury’s political influence was known.

Englanders knew of Hanbury’s interests in the Ohio Valley, and one gentleman published a series of pamphlets accusing the Ohio Company of causing Braddock’s demise.84

The first pamphlet damned the Crown, Hanbury, and the Ohio Company for the

Company’s influence on Braddock’s campaign. The pamphlet contended that rather than asking colonial representatives for guidance to combat the French usurpation of British land in the Ohio Valley, the British government looked to an agent of a private enterprise.

The pamphlet, written after the British General Edward Braddock was thwarted in his attempt to retake the Forks of the Ohio, in the Battle of the Monongahela, maintained that

83 Anderson, Crucible, 67-68 84 John Shebbeare, A first letter to the People of England on the present situation and conduct of the National Affairs (London: J. Scott, 1755), 22-26.

257

John Hanbury’s private interest pushed the British to retaliate against the French. The author later argued that the British never needed to go into the Ohio Valley to rout out the

French but speculates that the British could have achieved victory by cutting French supply line from Canada at Niagara. The author claimed that the British only sent troops into the

Ohio Valley due to the Ohio Company’s investments in the region. The pamphleteer further argued that Hanbury not only used his influence to push the Crown into taking the fight into the Ohio Valley but that he also ensured that Braddock and his army landed and traveled through Virginia. The author contended that Braddock should have landed in

Pennsylvania for better supplies, troops, and geography, which the author contends the

Crown would done if not for John Hanbury’s interference on the Ohio Company’s behalf. 85

A second pamphlet criticized British traders, merchants, and the Ohio Company, for instigating war with France and maintained that the traders should have left the Ohio

Valley to France.86 The pamphlet targeted the Ohio Company traders, he specifically wrote about permanent structures and the traders’ refusal to vacate the Ohio Country after the

French ultimatum. The pamphleteer points the finger at John Hanbury for starting the war because he refused to relinquish his Ohio land grants and concede the Ohio Valley to the

French, whom the author considered the rightful owners of La Belle Riviera.

These pamphlets, which are the only two remaining in what appears to be a series of at least four, open up a new interpretation of Braddock’s campaign strategy, execution, and subsequent defeat. The only mention of the Ohio Company’s influence on Braddock’s

85 Ibid. 86 John Shebbeare, A fourth Letter to the People of England on the Conduct of the Ministers in Alliances, Fleets and Armies since the first Differences on the Ohio, on the taking of Minorca by the British (London: J Scott, 1756), 2-9.

258

campaign, or either of the aforementioned pamphlets, is in Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolfe, which offers a brief mention of their existence.87 None of the scholarship associated with the Seven Years’ War or the Ohio Company acknowledged the existence of publications that blamed the Ohio Company for not only the outbreak of international war but also the failure of one of the British Empire’s most celebrated Generals. Anderson writes of William

Shirley and William Johnson’s influence on Braddock’s plan but does not acknowledge that a private company, the Ohio Company, could have pushed Braddock’s campaign into the

Ohio Valley.88 The publications analyzed in the preceding pages, combined with the French documents surrounding the surrender of the Ohio Company’s fort, demonstrate that both sides knew a private company was building the British Empire in the Ohio Valley, and individuals on both sides blamed the Ohio Company for the outbreak of hostilities between the British and French in the Ohio Country.

Hanbury was not the only Ohio Company advisor to Braddock’s campaign; the on- the-ground agents also advised Braddock. Most of the historiography ignores the agents’ contributions. Koppermen mentions that Gist and in Croghan served Braddock as Indian advisors but fails to mention how or why the men had experience in the Ohio Valley. He also claims Croghan was the most influential and active agent and only mentions Gist in a one-line footnote. However, chroniclers of Braddock’s March do not support Kopperman’s assertion. Orme refers to Gist as “the General’s guide.” Gist prepared the official maps for the Expedition’s route and encampments, and Braddock’s engineer, Gordon, used Gist’s

87 Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 204 88Anderson, Crucible, 89-91.

259

description and sketches for his maps as well.”89 Gordon also admitted that his map was general, and not as detailed as Gist’s, and stated that he relied on Gist for the location, identification, and mileage between encampment sights.90 Bailey asserts that Gist was

Braddock’s personal guide.91 This reliance on Gist shows his importance to the Braddock campaign. Gist and Croghan’s advice and actions would prove especially crucial as

Braddock refused advice from those who knew the region best, Native Americans. William

Johnson, the superintendent of Indian Affairs, appointed George Croghan his deputy and sent him out to bring in allies. Croghan delivered first bringing about 50 refugee Mingos and then bringing in six chiefs from the Ohio Valley, including Tanaghrisson’s successor,

Scarouady and Shingas, the war chief of the Ohio Delaware. (This achievement would mean more if Braddock had respected or utilized his Native American allies.) Anderson points out that Washington served as Braddock’s aid de camp because he knew the Ohio Country better than any other “gentlemen,” but Anderson does not mention Washington’s service to the Ohio Company, his immediate family connections to the company, or the fact that

Washington was not the most knowledgeable agent in Braddock’s arsenal. Cresap, Trent,

Gist, Croghan, and Montour all participated in Braddock’s campaign and knew much more than Washington about the Ohio Country and its inhabitants.92

Not only have historians not recognized the weight of the lobbying efforts of Ohio

Company agents, but they have also ignored or underplayed the sway of the Ohio Company infrastructure, especially the Ohio Company’s road. Braddock’s army followed the Ohio

89 Robert Orme, Journal, in Braddock Road Chronicles, ed. Andrew J. Wahl, (Westminster, Maryland: Heritage Books, 2006,) 327. 90 Ibid. 91 Bailey, Christopher Gist, 91. 92 Anderson, Crucible, 122-123.

260

Company’s road: the trail blazed by Christopher Gist and Thomas Cresap for the Ohio

Company and then improved by Washington and his men. While the road was far from perfect, it significantly influenced Braddock’s campaign. When Anderson and Lengel discuss the plans made in London for Braddock in their publications, they both consistently call the road “Washington’s road.” Anderson writes, “Braddock would follow Washington’s road toward the forks,” when, as Washington said, he followed the Ohio Company’s road.93

After all, Washington’s men had only cleared a small portion of the road. In Kopperman’s

Braddock at the Monongahela, the words “Ohio Company” appear nowhere, and when he references Will’s Creek and “the old indian road,” he never mentions who built them. He also claimed that Fort Cumberland engineer, St. Claire, had “overseen the planning of the road along which the army marched,” without mentioning the original architects of the road, Cresap, Gist, and Nemacolin. 94

The first official Ohio Company location that Braddock’s company used lay at the jumping-off point into the Ohio Valley, the areas surrounding Wills Creek, including

Thomas Cresap’s home at Oldtown, Maryland. At Cresap’s Braddock and his men camped for two days and received provisions from Cresap and the Company. On May 8, part of

Braddock’s army reached Thomas Cresap’s, and while not officially an Ohio Company location, Oldtown was the property of an influential member and a location that the Ohio

Company had improved and expanded upon as was explained in Chapter Three. The army left Cresap’s and marched approximately ten miles to the Ohio Company headquarters.95

93 Anderson, Crucible, 126-128. Lengel, General George Washington, 54. 94 Paul Kopperman, Braddock at the Monongahela (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 1977), 9-12. Kopperman is heavily biased in Braddock’s favor, best displayed in his quote “Braddock had seldom been too proud to heed advice.” 95 Fowler, Empires at War, 59.

261

After the loss of Fort Necessity and the Ohio Company’s entire infrastructure in the

Ohio Valley, Dinwiddie secured the British position the best he could by transforming Wills

Creek into a military stronghold. Following Fort Necessity, all of the men under

Washington and Mackay stayed at the Company Headquarters, and Virginia requisitioned the Ohio Company buildings to serve as the general meeting point of colonial troops.96

Under Dinwiddie, the Ohio Company headquarters became the cornerstone of the strategy and campaigns of Virginia and the Crown, and Dinwiddie acted as if Virginia publicly owned the Ohio Company’s goods. Dinwiddie instructed his commanders to makes use of the private property, “There are six swivels at Wills’s Creek belonging to the Ohio

Company, which is all we have. You Must make use of them.”97 He reiterated these orders a few weeks later, and told Innes to “take possession of the Ohio company’s warehouse at

Wills’s creek for your possessions; get all your great guns up there.”98 The Ohio Company provided shelter, supplies, fresh horses, and defense. Dinwiddie ordered more troops to

Wills Creek and urged Washington to reassume the offensive. Dinwiddie also mentioned transforming the Company headquarters to Colonel Hunter.99 Dinwiddie ordered Innes and Washington, both stationed at Wills Creek, to outfit the Company’s headquarters as a magazine and build any other works they needed on the land. The damage to the Ohio

Company’s holdings was so great that after the proclamation of 1763, the Company sued for reimbursement and received compensation.100

96 “Dinwiddie to Board of Trade, ,” Dinwiddie Papers, 277. 97 “Dinwiddie to Col Innes, August 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 270. 98 “Dinwiddie to Col Innes, , 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 297. 99 “Dinwiddie to Hunter, 1754,” Dinwiddie Papers, 150. 100 “Petition of the Ohio Company, , 1778,” printed in Bailey, Ohio Company Papers, 320-327.

262

The presence of the Ohio Company’s headquarters not only influenced Washington and Braddock; it also influenced Maryland’s defensive strategy, as evidenced by Maryland building Fort Cumberland right next door to the Ohio Company buildings. Neither John St.

Clair, commissary for Braddock’s army, nor Harry Gordon, the military engineer, saw the military advantage of the location. Maryland used it most likely because it neighbored the

Ohio Company site, had the advantage of the Ohio Company’s roads, and lay on the quickest route to the Ohio Valley. Built in the fall of 1754 by the militia under Captain Dagworthy and James Innes, the commander-in-chief for the colonial forces at the time, the fort was initially named Mount Pleasant, but was renamed Fort Cumberland in 1755.101

Braddock’s army employed the Ohio Company’s infrastructure as the men marched west. The army referenced Wills Creek far more than any other location, man-made or otherwise. The army stayed put at Wills Creek for more than a month, from May 10 until

June 10, and continued to use it as their supply base throughout the campaign. Wills Creek, outside the Ohio Valley watershed, also served as the army’s safe haven after their defeat at the hands of the French. The next Ohio Company’s location Braddock used was Gist’s

Plantation. Gist’s Plantation was a major stopping point and supply depot; the army waited there to receive reinforcements and provisions. Gist’s Plantation, the westernmost outpost of the Ohio Company, had been burned by the French following Fort Necessity’s defeat, so it is unclear how much infrastructure remained to aid Braddock’s army. At Gist’s, the army camped and received reinforcements and supplies. Again, the Ohio Company’s

101 For more information on Fort Cumberland see, William Lowdermilk, History of Cumberland (Washington D.C.; J. Anglim, 1878), 92-98.

263

infrastructure dictated Braddock’s campaign route to Fort Duquesne.102

The Ohio Company did not complain about the government’s use of their property.

If the French successfully defended the Ohio Valley, the Company would have little use for its buildings and supplies, and if the British dislodged the French from the Ohio Valley, it would be to the Company’s advantage. Washington and Braddock’s military ventures were only the latest in a long series of collaborative efforts. Having worked with the Colony and

Crown in colonizing the Ohio Valley since 1747, and after finally coaxing the Colony and

Crown into military action, the Ohio Company willingly placed its entire infrastructure in the hands of the Virginia and British military. 103

Conclusion

The Ohio Company was heavily involved in the militarization of the Ohio Valley from the erection of Company forts to Braddock’s use of the Company guns. The Company funded the first British fortifications in the Ohio Valley, and when the Colony and Crown began to move militaries in the disputed territory, they relied on Company infrastructure, information, and agents. The Ohio Company members gladly lent their resources and men towards the British cause, after all, they had spent years cooperating with the Colony and

Crown in efforts to open up the Ohio Valley. The Company had invested enormous effort, countless hours and thousands of pounds sterling attempting to open the Ohio Valley, all done in collaboration with the Colony and Crown. The Company expected a reward, or at least the land promised in the original grant when the Ohio Valley was back under the

British flag. Empire-building, after all, was a partnership…

102 Lengel, General George Washington, 53-54. Bailey, Christopher Gist, 89. 103 Bailey, Ohio Company, 219.

264

Conclusion: Crumbling the Colonial Coalition

“He has been and still shall be ready on all Occasions to risk his Life, and small fortune in promoting the settlement of that part of his Majesty’s Dominions, so necessary to the

Preservation and Interest of all his American Plantations.”

-Christopher Gist1

This above excerpt from Christopher Gist’s petition to the Virginia Assembly for reimbursement for the damages done to his property on Gist’s Plantation during the early days of the Seven Years’ War reveals the nature of the British Empire in the 1750s. Gist’s proclamation illustrates that as the Ohio Company’s on-the-ground agents actively, and knowingly participated in empire-building. Gist viewed his work as “necessary” for the

British Empire’s preservation and interest. Gist saw himself and the Ohio Company, as an integral part of the empire-building process. Without the context provided in this dissertation, Gist’s claim that he had and would be ready to “risk his Life, and small fortune in promoting the settlement of that part of his Majesty’s Dominions,” seems grandiose and exaggerated. However, this dissertation’s investigation and analysis of the Company’s activities from 1747-1755 explains why the Ohio Company and its agents risked life and

1 “Wednesday, October 30 1754,” Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1752-1755 1756-1758, eds. H.R. McIlwaine, (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1909),332. Gist was not the only Ohio Company agent applying for reimbursement; William Trent applied for compensation for lost trade goods in 1763, Kenneth Bailey, Ohio Company Papers 1753-1817: Being Primarily Papers of the “Suffering Traders” or Pennsylvania (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers Inc., 1947), 225.

265

limb to build the British Empire. The Ohio Company of Virginia and its agents like

Christopher Gist had politicked, mapped, built, negotiated, and fortified the Ohio Valley for themselves, and in the process, they expanded the claims of Virginia and the British

Empire.

This dissertation started out as an investigation of the Ohio Company of Virginia, a little-known company which turned up in the first few pages of books on the Seven Years’

War or was briefly mentioned in the biographies of colonial Americans who served as the

Ohio Company’s agents. A careful study of the Company’s papers has revealed more than just the financial history of one company. This analysis of the Ohio Company’s activities has focused on the international repercussions of borderland events, the multi-layered, negotiated British empire-building process, and the origins of the Seven Years’ War.

This dissertation focused on the borderland that was the Ohio Valley in the mid-

1700s as it relates to British empire-building and a world war. Keeping the borderland at the center of the international story has not been difficult. However, resisting the international, governmental allure has been a struggle. Military orders or official agents of empire somehow seem to carry more weight and seem more important than the agents of a private company. While this dissertation illustrated how the government used the information the Ohio Company brought out of the Ohio Valley to show the broader implications of the Company’s work, that practice has sometimes threatened to pull the focus of this dissertation away from what the Ohio Company did in the Ohio Valley.

However, this study of the Ohio Company, and the scholarship of Virginia, the British

Empire, and the Seven Years’ War have benefited from resisting the pull to value public above private. This has been a careful balancing act, which is what is required to do as

266

Hä mä lä inen and Truett, advised in “On Borderlands”: to focus on the borderland, while showing its ties to the broader history of the region, continental, and global history.2

A detailed study of the Ohio Company illuminates the nuances of the multi-layered negotiated nature of the British empire-building process. The Ohio Company agents, although they gained agency from the distance between London or Williamsburg and the

Ohio Valley, still had to operate within the parameters set for them by the Ohio Company if they wanted to continue working for the Company. The Ohio Company members in turn, had to negotiate with the agents, as they relied on their knowledge and willingness to do the leg work of empire. The Ohio Company also had to work with Virginia, and while

Chapters Three and Four show the failures of the Company to get exactly what it wanted from the Virginia Assembly, this in itself demonstrates the negotiated nature of the empire.

The Company could not just do whatever it wanted whenever it wanted. The Company’s responses to Native Americans, French armies, and even imperial orders were often

2 Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett, "On Borderlands," The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 365; Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History,” The American Historical Review 104 (1999): 814-841; François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 647–677. While this study is focused on the mechanisms and people within the imperial structure that built the British empire, it also does bring some of the history of Native American peoples to light. By bringing out the events like the Logstown Conference, the Massacre at Pickawillany, and by focusing on individuals like Tanaghrisson, it has brought Native Americans into the story of empire-building and the Seven Years War more so than if this study had focused on the layers of imperial negotiation from London’s perspective. Acknowledging and bringing the Native American into borderland studies is also found in Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 41-151; Amy Turner Bushnell, “Indigenous American and the Limits of the Atlantic World, 1493-1825,” in Atlantic History: A Critical Approach, eds. Jack P Greene and Philip D Morgan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 191-222.

267

constrained and shaped by the Colony.3 Perhaps the most interesting negotiation explored in this dissertation is the one within the colony of Virginia itself, as both the Governor and

Council fought with the Assembly to craft Virginia’s response to both the events of the Ohio

Valley and the Crown’s orders.4 The Crown, also influenced by lobbyists, relied on the

Company to build the British Empire, meaning the Crown’s orders and policies were negotiated as well. Each layer of the empire negotiated with each of the others and with itself to help shape its nature.

The Ohio Company’s expansionary process took them into the Ohio Valley and sparked conflict with the French in the years before 1755. Because of the Ohio Company’s membership, politicking, and shared interests, the Company obtained allies on both sides of the Atlantic to support them, and as the Company, Colony, and Crown worked together to expand the British Empire, they sparked conflict with the French that eventually grew into the Seven Years’ War. This study of the Ohio Company shows that it was not just governments and armies who bought guns and built fortifications; it was also private individuals and enterprises. The Seven Years’ War was not just a conflict between various armies. It was a conflict between the peoples living in the Ohio Valley. The Ohio Company and its agents were combatants in the Ohio Valley before war was declared in 1755, and

3 Jack P. Greene, “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World,” in Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, ed. Jack P. Greene (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994), 1-24; Amy Turner Bushnell, “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries,” in Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, ed. Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (New York: Routledge, 2002),15-28; Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires, Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi. 4 Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 8. Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988), 71-108.

268

even when the military dominated the war effort, the Ohio Company’s infrastructure and intelligence continued to influence the course of Braddock’s March.5

Before the Ohio Company members could send agents out into the Ohio Valley and threaten the French, they had to politick within the Governments of Williamsburg and

London. As Chapter One showed, the Ohio Company had to have people like Lee and

Washington, people of a particular socioeconomic status in their membership, and they had to have certain London agents and connections in order for them to gain permission to engage in the process of empire-building. Having people like the well-connected Governor

Robert Dinwiddie and John Hanbury to connect them to the Board of Trade was crucial for the Ohio Company to gain permission to take action in the Ohio Valley. The Ohio

Company’s political movements also came with some unintended by-products, such as the

Crown using them to erect defensive Ohio Valley forts or spurring on of Pennsylvania’s expansionary activities; it was all part of the many moving pieces of the British Empire that negotiated with and influenced one another.

“Mapping the Ohio Valley” brought in many new layers of negotiation. The

Company investors in Williamsburg had to find agents who had the skills to survive and map in the borderland and were motivated to take part in the dangerous process of mapping the Ohio Valley. These on-the-ground agents, Cresap, Gist, Parker, and Trent had their own take on what the British Empire should look like in the Ohio Valley. These agents had to negotiate with both the Ohio Company and the Ohio Indians and Iroquois in order to successfully operate and map in the borderland. The Ohio Company had to have Native

5Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 139-167; Fred Anderson, The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War (New York: Penguin, 2005), 86-108.

269

American allies like Nemacolin and Tanaghrisson to successfully move into the Ohio Valley.

Mapping the borderland was difficult, but so was getting the information about the Ohio

Valley out of the Ohio Valley. The second half of Chapter Two shows how the Ohio

Company’s information became the Empire’s information, as it was used in reports and maps to determine the nature and value of the Ohio Valley.

“Building the Empire,” as explained in Chapter Three, required on-the-ground agents to actually undertake the building, which required them to obtain permission from the Native Americans to build their imperial structures and settlements. The Ohio

Company relied on its agents to use their knowledge of the intricacies of Native American politics to obtain permission to continue building their empire in the Ohio Valley. In

Chapter Three, the violent French reactions towards Native American alliances with the

Ohio Company are revealed. The decimation of Pickawillany, the Miami village, over the

Pickawillany’s new alliance with the British, was the beginning of open hostility in the borderland, about the borderland. In response to their strained relationship with the

Native Americans who moved out of their zone of influence, as well as the increased British activities in the Ohio Valley, the French continued to pursue militarization of the Ohio

Valley by erecting a string of forts. While the Virginia Assembly’s protection of its own interest kept Virginia from launching its own military response, the Ohio Company and

Governor Dinwiddie continued building alliances and structures in the Ohio Valley.

The Ohio Company continued their empire-building activities despite the protests of the Assembly, and Chapter Four, “Negotiating for the Borderland,” shows the ways the Ohio

Company and Dinwiddie operated within their parameters (as negotiated with the Crown and the Assembly) to obtain the Ohio Valley for the Ohio Company. Dinwiddie determined

270

that he could use his position as Governor and as leader of the Ohio Company to confront the French in the Ohio Valley, and by using Ohio Company’s intelligence and agents, he did all he could to ensure that Washington’s 1754 expedition was a success. When Washington returned without evicting the French, the Ohio Company reached out to find allies and were notably unsuccessful in Williamsburg. While Dinwiddie and the Virginia Council were unable to prompt the Assembly into action, it was still a negotiated process. The experience of the Virginians in the Ohio Valley could have been much different if they had the financial and political backing of the colony, but the Ohio Company continued to act and agitate the French in the Ohio Valley. Even without the Assembly’s money, the Ohio

Company continued to wreak havoc in the Ohio Valley.

As the Ohio Company found other allies in the fight against the French takeover of the Ohio Valley, it began its own process of fortifying the Allegheny Mountains. As the Ohio

Company funded fortifications at Redstone Creek and the Forks of the Ohio River, the agents became combatants, and without their activities, the Seven Years’ War would have taken a different course. Without the Ohio Company, George Washington would never have come into the Ohio Valley in the first place, he was only there because the Ohio

Company’s interest lay in the Ohio Valley, and once he was there, he had only the Ohio

Company, not the Colony or Crown, to rely upon for information and infrastructure.

Braddock’s march into the Ohio Valley occurred under different circumstances, but the

Ohio Company was still involved, as London agents lobbied for him to land in Williamsburg, and then take the Ohio Company’s road and use the Ohio Company’s infrastructure. The

Ohio Company continued to be a motivating factor in the fight for the Ohio Valley and continued to be a tool of British empire-building.

271

While Gist’s petition reveals the collaborative and negotiated nature of empire- building in the 1750s, the Crown’s denial of his request also reveals the nature of empire- building. The Crown refused to grant Gist’s compensation request, and Gist was just one of many who had invested and worked for the imperialization of the Ohio Valley and lost everything to receive nothing. The British in London denied these requests, the war had been extremely costly, and almost bankrupted the British Empire.6 The Ohio Company had taken the risk, and the Ohio Company would take the fall.

Not only did the Crown deny the Ohio Company and its agents’ reimbursement, but as time went on, the Crown also issued the Proclamation of 1763, which as stated above, did not allow the colonists to move and settle the Ohio Valley. When the Crown issued the proclamation, it negated any chance for the Ohio Company members to complete their mission and finally make a return on their investment. The Proclamation Line of 1763 disallowed anyone from settling in the Ohio Valley, and in essence, revoked any previously made land grants. Land speculation, previously part of the mutually beneficial process, was no longer a method of British empire-building.7

Until the middle of the Seven Years’ War, empire-building in the Ohio Valley was a collaborative, multilayered, negotiated effort built from the bottom up, with the agents of land speculation companies and traders doing the leg work of expanding into the Ohio

Valley. As time went on, and the seriousness of the war with France grew, the expansionary process eventually included both the colony of Virginia and the British

6 Colin Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4. 7 Kenneth Bailey’s compilation of documents regarding traders’ losses in the Ohio Valley and their attempts to seek compensation from the Crown are aptly named The Suffering Trader Papers.

272

Crown. However, after Braddock’s defeat, the British lost control over the Ohio Valley until

Forbes Expedition passed through Pennsylvania to recapture the Forks of the Ohio River in

1758.

After 1755, Native American attacks on the backcountry of the British settlement increased, and pushed the British back out of the Appalachians. Thomas Cresap, the Ohio

Company’s western-most resident was forced to temporarily vacate Oldtown with the rest of his friends and family, and flee back to Conococheague (present-day Hagerstown,

Maryland) about sixty miles to the east of Oldtown.8 While the British Crown regained control with the Forbes Campaign, neither the Ohio Company nor the colony of Virginia would ever operate in the Ohio Valley with the success they had in the 1740s and 1750s.

In October of 1761, the commander of , Colonel prohibited settlements in the Ohio Valley and a month later; the Earl of Egremont issued a proclamation restraining all land grants in “Indian country.” Even closer to home the Ohio

Company found themselves at odds with the government, as the Virginia Council prohibited surveyors from registering entries for lands west of the Allegheny Mountains in

January of 1762. While the war was going on, the Ohio Company members may have thought their ban from the Ohio Country temporary. They would not find out until after the British and French signed the Treaty of Paris on February 10, 1763, the rules regarding settlement in the Ohio Valley remained unchanged.9 The Crown was overwhelmed by the

8 It was during this period of war and violence that the any real interracial cooperation between the colonists and Native Americans ended, and left behind bitter racism. This is further explored in Jane Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 264-307. Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, 15. Calloway writes about the breakdown in the “middle grounds” between the Indians and whites in the year 1763. 9 Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, 10.

273

challenges of governing a continent, their expansion-obsessed colonists, the French settlers, and the rightfully ruffled Native Americas. Controlling the empire was costly and difficult, and in the end, it drove a wedge between the colonies and the core.10

While the colonists rejoiced with the signing of the treaty, the Ohio Valley continued to have problems. The British colonists poured into the west, even as the British Crown tried to stop them. Due to the expansionary activities of the colonists, the backcountry and borderland became ridden with Native American warfare. Due to increased settlement and

Anglo migration in the Ohio Valley, the Native Americans, led by men like Neolin, a

Delaware profit and , an Ottawa Warrior, rebelled.11

Pontiac’s War was the final straw and the Crown tried to stop the warfare by continuing the military’s idea about separating the Native American and white communities. “Westward expansion would occur the government said but it would follow a measured British pace, not a frantic American one.”12 This was not what the Ohio Company was used to. While the Company had negotiated with the Crown in the 1740s and 1750s, the limits on its activities had been few. The Crown had encouraged the Company to rapidly expand to thwart the French intentions in the Ohio Valley, and now after the Ohio

Company had spent the money to open the Ohio Valley for the British, the King issued a proclamation establishing the Appalachians as the boundary between whites and Native

Americans, which kept the Ohio Company from its land grant and long-awaited returns.

The Proclamation of 1763 separated the colonists from the land for which they had risked

10 Linda Colley, Britons Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press: 1992), 101-103; Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, 13-15. 11See Gregory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven, Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press: 2002), 114-147. 12 Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, 92.

274

life and fortune, and this separation ultimately helped undermine the British Empire in

America.

The Proclamation shocked the Ohio Company members when it cut them off from their land grant after all they had done to achieve success. The Ohio Company, and others like them saw the Ohio Valley essentially turned into what Canada had been under the

French: unattainable land, exactly what they had been fighting against in the Seven Years’

War. The empire-building the Crown had encouraged prior to the Seven Years’ War had abruptly and unexpectedly been deemed illegal. The Crown had treated the Ohio Company as a partner in empire-building, and encouraged them to settle, survey and fight for land that new imperial policy made inaccessible.

Some members of the Ohio Company believed the Proclamation of 1763 to be only temporary, or an obstacle that could be overcome using previously successful methods.

George Washington, who inherited shares in the Ohio Company from his late half- brother,

Lawrence, stated, “I can never look upon that Proclamation in any other light than as a temporary expedient to quiet the Minds of the Indians and must fall of course in a few years.”13 Washington even joined another land speculation company, the Mississippi

Company, with other members of the Ohio Company including Presley Thornton and some of the , and even obtained an agent in London, before they realized they had little chance of success.14 The Pennsylvanians, following Virginia’s example as was argued in

13 “George Washington to William Crawford, ,1767” in Washington Papers, Series 5, Financial Papers: Copy Book of Letters and Invoices, 1775, 1776, Manuscript/Mixed Materials, http://www.loc.gov/item/mgw500004/. 14 Kenneth Bailey, The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement, Reprint. (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000, org. pub. 1939), 229.

275

Chapter One, finally started to organize into land speculation companies to settle the Ohio

Valley.15

Other Ohio Company members, such as George Mercer, stuck to the Ohio Company’s claims, and repeatedly appealed to the Board of Trade and to the King’s Council for permission to take action on their land grant in the Ohio. Mercer pled with the King in hopes that he would “renew the said instructions to the Lieutt. Governor of Virginia.”16

Mercer petitioned three times after the Seven Years’ War and once after the American

Revolution revive the Ohio Company’s grant without success.17

In efforts to use a previously successful strategy, George Mercer and Thomas Cresap even offered powerful men like Colonel Bouquet shares in the Ohio Company. They hoped that he would allow them to continue their land speculation efforts around the Forks of the

Ohio, but Bouquet refused to join “the favorite scheme of Virginia” and reported the Ohio

Company to General Amherst who also failed to sympathize with their situation. The new military control of the Ohio Company left the Company without powerful friends among those officers now controlling the periphery.

15 Among the notable Pennsylvanians involved in this plan in 1756, were Thomas Pownell, the cartographer referenced in Chapter Two, Samuel Hazard and , however their efforts found no success until undertaken by , Bailey, The Ohio Company, 233-239. 16 “Memorial of George Mercer on the Behalf of the Ohio Company, June 21 1765,” Lois Mulkern, eds., George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 375. George Mercer’s efforts to regain the Crown’s favor led to his collection of Ohio Company Papers.16 17 Some members of the Ohio Company joined the Walpole and Companies to form the Grand Ohio Company in December of 1769 in an effort to regain their real estate losses. They were granted land by the Crown in 1772, but the American Revolution prohibited any success from this venture.

276

As time went on, and the Ohio Company’s petitions to the Crown were unsuccessful, and it appeared that the Ohio Company of Virginia was finished. The Virginia Assembly still did not favor the Company, all efforts to involve those leaders who could aid the Ohio

Company turned down the opportunity, and the Ohio Company of Virginia stood stagnant.18 The Mercer family obtained new representation in London and even crossed the Atlantic themselves, but as Kammen pointed out in A Rope of Sand, the great age of colonial agents in London was over, and more and more the Mercers found themselves fighting against squatters, and competing grants.19

Most of the Ohio Company members, seeing the writing on the wall, gave up, and the company no longer had meetings. Finally, in 1770, Mercer, the only member who continued working on the Ohio Company’s hopeless case agreed to join with the Grand

Ohio Company, which united other land speculators and merchants in London and the colonies. While the Ohio Company did not have a grant for the Ohio Valley, it did have the information and Bailey argues that the other speculators did not know the names of the rivers or the lay of the land the petitioned for until the Ohio Company provided a chart of the Ohio Valley. The Ohio Valley was still largely unknown and mapping, it seemed, was still a necessary part of the empire-building, and land speculation.20 The merger that came with the Grand Ohio Company came with a lot of legal trouble, which demonstrated that the competition between colonies which eventually became states was never resolved. The

18 Bailey, The Ohio Company, 253. 19 Michael Kammen, A Rope of Sand” The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell, 1968), 242-276. 20 Bailey, The Ohio Company, 270-272.

277

Ohio Company’s legal issues were never resolved until after the American Revolution when the King’s grants no longer carried any validity in the Ohio Valley.

While this dissertation used the Ohio Company of Virginia to demonstrate the nature of British empire-building in the 1740s and 1750s, to reveal how the British Empire was one of shared interests and negotiated policies and actions, the history of the Company after the Seven Years’ War is equally revealing. It illuminates the way the British policy change affected the Ohio Valley, as well as the Backcountry settlements of Virginia, and

Williamsburg. A study of the Ohio Company’s activities after Braddock’s March illuminates the changes that took place within the imperial structure. It demonstrates that with the removal of the vanquished French, the British no longer saw their colonists as a method of building the Empire, they saw them as something that they needed to control.21

After the Seven Years’ War, the interests of the Company and Colony failed to coincide with those of the Crown, and without common interest binding them together, the

British American empire began to crumble. As Chapter One demonstrated, both the Ohio

Company and the Crown wanted to expand into the Ohio Valley, and the Board of Trade supported the Ohio Company’s efforts to expand. However, the Company and Crown had vastly different reasons to build the British Empire in the Ohio Valley. The Ohio Company of Virginia did so to seek a profit, to sell the lands and make money. As explained in

Chapter One, the Crown was interested in the Ohio Valley because it hindered the French

Empire. The Board of Trade was not interested in the profits of land speculation. After the

21 Calloway, The Scratch of a Pen, 93. Henry Ellis, former Governor of Georgia, was advising the Secretary of State in 1763, and argued that if the population of the colonies were left “unchecked” and allowed to move into the Ohio Valley, the Britons in London would never maintain their control over the colonists.

278

war the British imperial government only cared about holding on to its now-massive empire and controlling those who had once been partners in the empire-building process.

The Proclamation Line and the Ohio Company’s fate demonstrate how the imperial interests of the Company and Crown no longer complemented one another after 1763.

Without French threat the British Crown had no reasons to support colonial expansion into the Ohio Valley, which created a crisis that lead to the disintegration of the British

American Empire. Without cooperation from the colonies, or a military large enough to control their now massive empire, the British found themselves unable to manage their empire or the Native Americans dwelling in the Ohio Valley. The colonists, who suddenly found themselves cut off from the lands they had opened for the British and them helped defend, balked at providing such aid because the Empire’s actions no longer served their interests.

The Proclamation Line slashed the egos and pocketbooks of those who had once been great empire-builders, provoking a revolutionary reaction. The preceding pages have cited the self-interested action of the Ohio Company members. The individuals toiling on the frontier found ways to work that benefited the British Empire and well as themselves.

It should come as no surprise that when the Crown went against the interests of the colonists who had politicked, mapped, built, negotiated, and defended the Ohio Valley, a clash would soon follow. Thomas Cresap, George Washington, George Mercer, the Lee

Family and others who had built the British Empire in America turned their backs on

London and fought for sovereignty, and American control over the Ohio Valley.

Christopher Gist, the Ohio Company’s most active and trusted agent, did not live long enough to turn his back on the British. He never saw diverging interests among the

279

London officials, colonial elites, and Native Americans divide the empire he helped create.

After Braddock’s defeat, Gist continued to do what he had done best: he helped colonial elites understand the Ohio Valley. Gist became Captain of the Virginia scouts under George

Washington, who specifically held that position for Gist. Washington noted that the scouts

“encountered more hardship, danger, and fatigue,” than the average officers. However, perhaps remembering the trip home from Fort LeBeouf, Washington told Gist not to worry about the fatigue “as you are greatly inured to it.”22 As Captain of the Scouts Gist had a home base and an office. He was no longer free to roam, and he apparently tired of sitting still. Through Dinwiddie, he pursued the position of Deputy Agent of the Southern

Department in 1757.23 This was similar to working as an agent of the Ohio Company, involving long treks, living among Native Americans, and ferrying information from the borderland back to Virginia. It was on one of these trips back to Williamsburg that Gist passed away. His death is reported to have been in the end of 1759, before the end of the

Seven Years’ War, and certainly before the Proclamation of 1763 banned him from returning to his ruined home at Gist’s Planation.24 It is impossible to know what Gist, being thoroughly tied to the borderland as well as the well-being of the Native Americans within, would have thought of the Proclamation. However, the reactions of his fellow Ohio

Company agent, Thomas Cresap are known.

Thomas Cresap’s position as both Ohio Company shareholder and agent renders a summary of his revolutionary actions a prime example of both members’ and employees’

22 Bailey, Christopher Gist, 106. 23 Croghan held the position of Deputy Agent of Indian Affairs of the Northern Department, show casing that these men, whose specific skills were required for empire-building, were also required for empire-defending. Bailey, Christopher Gist, 127. 24 Bailey, Christopher Gist, 150-151.

280

feelings regarding the drastic shift in British policy. Cresap represented Frederick County in the Maryland Assembly, where he argued for resolutions against the hated Stamp Act. A leader of the , he protested the “tyranny” of the Crown. Cresap advocated that Maryland send delegates to the First . In 1775, when war was imminent, Cresap was a member of Maryland’s “Committee of Observation,” where he was one of three responsible for raising 1,330 pounds for arms and ammunition from Frederick

County. Cresap pledged a company of riflemen to the Second Continental Congress, and his son, Captain Michael Cresap, led the company north to Boston when George Washington made the call to arms. Thomas Cresap knew his days of earning money through British empire-building were over. After the Seven Years’ war, he watched the Crown dismantle his previous accomplishments and thwart his latest attempts to expand into the Ohio

Valley. The British Empire found its efforts to control the Ohio Valley thwarted by those rebels who had helped establish British control over the area only a few years prior.

The strife that began when the Ohio Company struck out for the lands that lay beyond the summit of the Appalachian Mountains, found one conclusion at the end of the

Revolution. As Fred Anderson asserted, the founding of the United States can be understood as “a consequence of the forty year-long effort to subject the Ohio County, and with it the rest of the Trans-Appalachian west to imperial control.”25 The once-shared goals of the Company, Colony, and Crown to colonize the Ohio Country had bound the three entities together, and when those interests diverged, holding the British empire together became an impossibility.

25Anderson, Crucible, xx.

281

Bibliography

COLLECTIONS CONSULTED

Alfred P. James Papers, 1946-1956, DAR.1956.01, , Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Lois Mulkearn Research Files, 1937-1956, DAR.1981.01, Darlington Collection, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Ohio Company Papers, 1736-1813, DAR.1925.02, Darlington Collection, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Richard Peters papers, (Collection 0498), The Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

PRIMARY PERIODICALS

Maryland Gazette Virginia Gazette Pennsylvania Gazette

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Abbot. W. W. ed. The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series, vol. 1, 7 July 1748 – 14 August 1755, ed. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/02-01-02-0029.

Bailey, Kenneth. Ohio Company Papers 1753-1817: Being Primarily Papers of the “Suffering Traders” or Pennsylvania.” Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers Inc., 1947.

Brock, R.A. ed. The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant- Governor of the Colony of Virginia, 1751-1758. Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1883.

“Céleron Plate.” Virginia Museum of History and Culture. Accessed September 1, 2019. https://www.virginiahistory.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history- explorer/céloron-plate

282

Darlington, William. ed. Christopher Gist’s Journal with Historical, Geographical, and Ethnological Notes and Biographies of his Contemporaries. New York: Argonaut Press, 1966.

Galbreaeth. C.B. ed. Expedition of Celeron to the Ohio Country in 1749. Columbus: The F.J. Heer Printing Co., 1920.

Galissoniére. “Memoire, Dec. 1750.” Documents for the Study of American History. Accessed May 25, 2015. http://www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/galissonierre.html

Hall, Wilmer L. ed. Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia vol.5. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1954.

Hazard, Samuel. Pennsylvania Archives. vol. 2. Philadelphia: Joseph Severns & Co, 1853.

Hazard, Samuel. Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania Vol 4. Philadelphia: W.F. Geddes, 1829.

Hunter, William A. Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758. Reprint. Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 1999.

JCB, Travels in New France. Eds Sylverser Stevens and Donald H. Kent, and Emma Edith Woods. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941.

O’Callaghan, E.B. ed. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York: procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn Brodhead, Esq. vol. 10. Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, 1858.

Orme, Robert. “Journal,” in Braddock Road Chronicles, ed. Andrew J. Wahl. Westminster, Maryland, Heritage Books, 2006.

McIlwaine H.R. eds. Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1752-1755, 1756-1758. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1909.

Mulkearn, Lois, ed. George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954.

Pease, Theodore Calvin, ed. Anglo-French Boundary Disputes in the West, 1749-1763. Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State Historical Library, 1936.

Pownall, Thomas. A Topographical Description of the Dominions of the United States of America, Being a Revised and Enlarged edition of a Topographical Description of Such Parts of North America As Are Contained in the (Annexed) Map of the Middle British Colonies, & in North America. Ed. Lois Mulkearn. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1949.

283

Shebbeare, John. A first letter to the People of England on the Present Situation and Conduct of the National Affairs. London: J. Scott, 1755.

Shebbeare, John. A fourth Letter to the People of England on the Conduct of the Ministers in Alliances, Fleets and Armies since the first Differences on the Ohio, on the taking of Minorca by the British. London: J Scott, 1756.

Sparks, Jared ed. The Writing of Washington; Being His Correspondence, Addresses, Messages, and other Papers, Official and Private, vol. 2. New York: Harper Brothers, 1847.

Stevens, Sylvester and Donald H. Kent. eds. Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941.

Trent, William. Journal of Captain William Trent from Logstown to Pickawillany with Biographical Sketch, Ed. Alfred Goodman. Charlestown: Nabu Press, 2014.

“The Treaty of Logg's Town, 1752.” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 13, (June 1906): 154–174.

Washington, George. The Diaries of George Washington vol. 1, Ed. Donald Jackson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976.

Washington, George. “Journey to the French Commandant: Narrative.” Founders Online, National Archives. Accessed April 11, 2019. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/01-01-02-0003-0002. [Original source: The Diaries of George Washington, vol. 1, 11 March 1748 – 13 November 1765, ed. Donald Jackson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1976, pp. 130–161.]

SECONDARY SOURES

Adelman, Jeremy and Stephen Aron. “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History.” The American Historical Review 104 (1999): 814-841.

Alden, John Richard. Robert Dinwiddie: Servant of the Crown. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1973.

Alvord, Clarence. The Mississippi Valley in British Politics. Cleveland: The Arthur H Clark Co., 1917.

Anderson, Fred, Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North American, 1754-1766. New York: Vintage Books, 2000.

Anderson, Fred. The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War. New York: Penguin, 2005.

284

Anderson, M.S. The War of Austrian Succession, 1740-1748. New York: Pearson, 1995.

Bailey, Kenneth. The Ohio Company of Virginia and the Westward Movement. Reprint. Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, 2000.

Bailey, Kenneth. Thomas Cresap: Maryland Frontiersman. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1944.

Bailey, Kenneth. Christopher Gist: Colonial Frontiersman, Explorer and Indian Agent. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976.

Bailyn, Bernard. Origins of American Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.

Baker, Norman. Braddock’s Road: Mapping the British Expedition from Alexandria to the Monongahela. Charleston: The History Press, 2013.

Baugh, Daniel. The Global Seven Years’ War 1754-1763. New York: Pearson, 2011.

Beaumont, Andrew D.M. Colonial American and the Earl of Halifax, 1748-1761. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015.

Becker, Marshall Joseph. “Small Wampum Bands Used by Native Americans in the Northeast: Functions and Recycling,” Material Culture 40, no. 1 (2008): 1-17.

Beer, George L. British Colonial Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907.

Bergstrom, Peter V. “Nothing so Certain: Taxes in Colonial Virginia,” Colonial Williamsburg Digital Library (Williamsburg, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Department of Historical Research, 1984. Accessed October 26, 2019. https://research.history.org/digitallibrary/view/index.cfm?doc=ResearchReports %5CRR0127.xml&highlight=

Bolton, Herbert. The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.

Bottiger, Patrick. Borderland of Fear: Vincennes, Prophetstown, and the Invasion of the Miami Homeland. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016.

Borneman, Walter R. The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America. New York: Harper Collins, 2006.

Bushnell, Amy Turner. “Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries.” In Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820, edited by Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy. New York: Routledge, (2002), 15-28.

285

Bushnell, Amy Turner. “Indigenous American and the Limits of the Atlantic World, 1493- 1825.” In Atlantic History: A Critical Approach, eds. Jack P Greene and Philip D Morgan, (191-222). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2009).

Calloway, Colin. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Campbell, William J. “An Adverse patron: land, Trade and George Croghan.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 76, no.2 (Spring 2009): 117-140.

Cave, Alfred A. “George Croghan and the Emergence of British Influence on the Ohio Frontier.” In Builders of Ohio: A Biographical History, edited by Warren Van Tine and Michael Pierce, (1-12). Columbus: The Ohio State Press, 2003.

Clayton, T.R. “The Duke of Newcastle, The Earl of Halifax, and the American Origins of the Seven Years; War.” The Historical Journal 24, no. 3 (1981): 571-603.

Cleland, Hugh. George Washington in the Ohio Valley. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 1955.

Colley, Linda. Britons Forging the Nation 1707-1837. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Crytzer, Brady. Major Washington’s Pittsburgh and the Mission to Fort Le Boeuf. Charleston: The History Press, 2001.

Dawdy, Shannon Lee. Building the Devil’s Empire: French Colonial New Orleans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Dickerson, Oliver. American Colonial Government 1696-1865. Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1912.

Dowd, Gregory Evans. War Under Heaven, Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002.

DuVal, Kathleen. Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

Eckhart, Allan. The Wilderness Empire: A Narrative. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.

Edmunds, R. David. “Pickawillany: French Military Power Versus British Economics.” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 58, no. 2 (1975): 169-84.

Fowler, William. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763. New York: Walker & Company, 2005.

286

Furstenberg, François. “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History.” The American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June 2008): 647–677.

Gibson, Lawrence H. British Empire Before the American Revolution: Zones of International Friction. vol. 4, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939.

Grant, Charles S. “Land Speculation and the Settlement of Kent, 1738-1760.” New England Quarterly 28 (March 1955):51-71.

Greene, Jack P., “Negotiated Authorities: The Problem of Governance in the Extended Polities of the Early Modern Atlantic World.” In, Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History, Edited by Jack P. Greene, (1-24). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994.

Green, Jack P. "Landon Carter and the Pistole Fee Dispute." The William and Mary Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1957): 66-69.

Haggerty, Sheryllynne. 'Merely for Money'?: Business Culture in the British Atlantic, 1750– 1815. Liverpool University Press, 2012.

Hämäläinen, Pekka, Samuel Truett. "On Borderlands." The Journal of American History 98, no. 2 (2011): 338-3.

Hendrik Hartog. Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730–1870. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983.

Higonnet, Patrice. “The Origins of the Seven Years’ War,” The Journal of Modern History vol. 40, No. 1, (March 1968): 57-90.

Hinderaker, Eric. Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley 1673-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Hixon, Walter. American Settler Colonialism: A History. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.

Jacob, John. A Biographical Sketch of the Late Captain Michael Cresap. Cumberland, Maryland: J.J. Miller, 1826.

James, Alfred Proctor. The Ohio Company, Its Inner History. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959.

Jennings, Francis. Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years’ War in America. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1988.

287

Jennings, Francis. The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chair Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984.

Kenney, Kevin. Peaceable Kingdom Lost, the Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn’s Holy Experiment, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2009.

Kent, Donald. The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Society, 1954.

Kopperman, Paul, Braddock at the Monongahela. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press: 1977.

Lengel, Edward G. General George Washington: A Military Life. New York: Random House, 2005.

Lowdermilk, William. History of Cumberland. Washington D.C.; J. Anglim, 1878.

Macgregor, Doug. “The Shot Not Heard Around the World: Trent’s Fort and the Opening of the War for Empire.” Pennsylvania History 74, No. 3, (Summer 2007): 354-373.

Mapp, Paul. The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

McConnell, Michael. A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992.

McCusker, John J., and Kenneth Morgan, eds. The Early Modern Atlantic Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2001.

Merrell, James. Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.

Merritt, Jane. At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.

Mitchell, Robert D. “’Over the Hills and Far Away’: George Washington and the Changing Virginia Backcountry,” in George Washington and the Virginia Backcountry, ed. Warren R. Hofstra, (63-86). Madison, Wisconsin: Madison House, (1998).

Morressy, Robert Michael. Empire by Collaboration: Indians, Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 2015.

Nagel, Paul C. The Lees of Virginia: Seven Generations of an American Family. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

288

Nobles, Gregory H. "Straight lines and stability: Mapping the Political Order of the Anglo- American frontier." Journal of American History 80, no.1 (June 1993): 9-35.

O’Brien, Patrick K. “Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal States, and the Expansion of Empire, 1688-1815.” In The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol 2, The Eighteenth Century, ed P.J. Marshall and Alaine Low, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2001, 53-76.

Olsen, Allison G. Anglo-American Politics, 1660-1775. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1973.

O’Shaughnessy, Andrew. “The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West Indian Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution.” The Historical Journal 40, no.1 (1997): 71–95.

Parkman, Francis. Montcalm and Wolfe. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1884.

Porter, Bernard. The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Powell, Allen. Forgotten Heroes of the Maryland Frontier: Christopher Gist, Evan Shelby, Jr., Thomas Cresap. Baltimore: Gateway Press: 2001.

Pritchard, Margaret Beck and Henry G. Taliaferro. Degrees of Latitude: Mapping Colonial America. Williamsburg: The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 2002.

Rasmussen, Barbara. “Anarchy and Enterprise on the Imperial Frontier: Washington, Dunmore, Logan, and Land in the Eighteenth-Century Ohio Valley.” Ohio Valley History 6, no. 4 (Winter 2006): 1-26.

Richter, Daniel. Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Daniel Richter. “War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience.” The William and Mary Quarterly 40, no. 4 (1983): 529-537.

Scheerer, Hanno. “’For Ten Years Past I have Constantly Wished to Turn My Western Lands into Money’: Speculator Frustration and Settlers’ Bargaining in Ohio’s Virginia Military District, 1795-1810.” Ohio Valley History 14, no.1 (Spring 2014): 3-27.

Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2008.

Slick, Sewell E. William Trent and the West, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1947.

289

Sosin, Jack M. “The York-Camden Opinion and American Land Speculators.” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 85 (1961): 3, 8-49.

Spero, Patrick. Frontier Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016.

Stanley, F.G. George. New France: The Last Phase, 1744-1760. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1968.

Stotz, Charles M. Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and England in Western Pennsylvania: The Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005.

Strang, Cameron B., “Michael Cresap and the Promulgation of Settler Land-Claiming Methods in the Backcountry, 1765-1774.” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 118 no. 2 (2010): 106-135.

Taylor, Alan. American Colonies: The Settling of North America. New York: Viking Books, 2001.

Wainwright, Nicholas B. George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press: 1959.

Wallace, Paul A.W. Conrad Weiser: Friend of Colonist and Mohawk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 1945.

White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Williams, James L. Blazes, Posts & Stones: A History of Ohio’s Original Land Subdivisions. Columbus: Compass and Chain Publishing, 2015. Kindle.

Wood, Gordon. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

Van Zandt, Cynthia. Brothers Among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early American, 1580-1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2008.

Veracini, Lorenso. Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010

290

Appendix A: Christopher Gist’s Route 1750

“Approximate Route Taken by Gist 1751-52.” In Allen Powell, Forgotten Heroes of the Maryland Frontier: Christopher Gist, Evan Shelby, Jr., Thomas Cresap. (Baltimore: Gateway Press: 2001), 19.

291

Appendix B: Christopher Gist’s Route 1751

“Approximate Route Taken by Gist 1750-51.” In Allen Powell, Forgotten Heroes of the Maryland Frontier: Christopher Gist, Evan Shelby, Jr., Thomas Cresap. (Baltimore: Gateway Press: 2001), 10.

292

Appendix C: Washington and Gist Route in 1753

Washington’s Trail, 1753. 2015. In Washington’s Trail- 1753 Fact Sheet, Accessed September 1, 2019 http://www.washingtonstrail.org/resources/Washington%27s-Trail_Fact- Sheet_1-13-2015.pdf.

293

Appendix D: Washington in the Ohio Valley 1754-1759

Washington in the French and Indian War, 1754-1759. 2016. In George Washington’s Mount Vernon, Accessed September 1, 2019. https://www.mountvernon.org/preservation/maps/washington-in-the-french- indian-war/

294

Appendix E: Braddock’s Route 1755

Route of the . From American Military History, Center of Military History, 1989. https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/braddock_1755.jpg

295

Appendix F: Father Bonnecamps Map of Celeron’s Route

Pere Bonnecamps, Carte Dun Voyage Fait Dans La Belle Riviere, 1753, In The Pittsburgh History Journal, Accessed September 1, 2019. https://thepittsburghhistoryjournal.com/post/917628968/map-by-father- bonnecamps-1749-via-on-this-day

296