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RICHARD NIXON, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, and the VIETNAM WAR Luke Burton EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION RICHARD NIXON, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, AND THE VIETNAM WAR Luke Burton “We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and in Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds . To say that we are mired in a stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion . It seems increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out will be to negotiate.” -Walter Cronkite, 1968 On February 27, 1968, veteran Offensive, the American military CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite— presence, contradicting claims of and the “most trusted man in seeking “no wider war,” peaked America”—addressed the nation with 536,000 U.S. soldiers active just days after the now infamous in 1968.1 To this point, American Tet Offensive. Uncharacteristically, leaders had consistently assured in this broadcast he integrated his the public of progress, with victory own opinion regarding the North close at hand. But now, Vietnam had Vietnamese’s demoralizing surprise grown into a fully-fledged war to attack on the South’s capital of prevent the spread of communism Saigon during Tet, the Vietnamese into Southeast Asia and to defend New Year. The substantial the liberties of American democracy American presence in Vietnam with abroad – the instrumentalization an initial influx of military advisors of Domino Theory diplomacy. began under John F. Kennedy and According to many scholars, after continued to grow through Lyndon Johnson’s extensive expansion 1. “Learn About the Vietnam War,” Digital of the war following the Gulf of History, accessed November 5, 2011, http:// www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/modules/vietnam/ Tonkin incident in 1964. By the Tet index.cfm. 45 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION Tet the nation’s optimistic outlook I argue that the Vietnam War was suffered a crushing blow, sending simply one of many pawns in the public support spiraling down complex political game that was towards dissent and marking a Nixon’s administration. It was definitive turning point in the a tool of domestic politics used Vietnam conflict.2 These claims to shore up Nixon’s legitimacy seemed to be supported by responses and to insure the stability of his from December 1967 to March 1968 presidency. With the correlation to Gallup Poll’s survey question: between the rise and tragic fall of “In view of the developments since the Executive branch during this we entered the fighting in Vietnam, period and America’s slow exit from do you think the United States Vietnam, the symbiotic relationship made a mistake in sending troops between the two emerges and to fight in Vietnam?” Answers depicts a true abuse of power. of ‘yes’ rose from 45 – 49%, while The 1968 Presidential election ‘no’ responses fell from 46 – 41%, was a watershed in American marking the largest drop in support politics. It marked the end of the prior to Tet.3 However, this turning New Deal Coalition. Republican point did not lead to a swift end to candidate Richard Nixon American involvement. Instead, the successfully challenged this war would be revamped once again Democratic Party dynasty and with the inauguration of President assumed control of managing the Richard Nixon in January of 1969. It numerous crises, domestic and continued until Congress finally cut international, including the struggle war funding indefinitely in July 1973. for American civil rights and the This essay seeks to explain how deteriorating situation in Vietnam. and why American involvement in Part of his campaign’s strength the Vietnam conflict persisted for so was his willingness to make often long, even after the events of the Tet vague promises to end the war in Offensive. The actions of Nixon’s Vietnam. This was something his executive administration from his Democratic opponents could not first term election until the war’s do, despite Johnson’s celebrated conclusion suggest that the end of “bombing halt” that October. The American intervention in Vietnam Paris Peace talks, undertaken shortly was neither solely due to inadequate before the election, demonstrated military strategy and execution nor promise; however, they were faltering public support, as scholars partially sabotaged by Nixon’s have previously argued.4 Instead, campaign because the Republicans 2. Steven Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The promised the South Vietnamese Fall of the Liberal Order, 1964-1980, (Roseville: government an offer superior to Prima, 2007), 188. Democrats’ plans for negotiations.5 3. Alec M. Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll Before he resigned, Lyndon Cumulative Index: Public Opinion, 1937-1997: Volume 3 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Johnson’s Secretary of Defense 1999), 2109. 4. Ben Kiernan, “Review: The Vietnam War: 5. Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Alternative Endings,” American Historical Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Review 97 (1992): 1118-1137. The Free Press, 2001). 46 BURTON Robert McNamara characterized leading democratic nation to defend the Democratic view of the war Southeast Asia for the greater good. effort as: “We’re in Vietnam 10% to This aspect of his agenda (which help the South Vietnamese, 20% to would continue throughout his hold back the Chinese, and 70% to presidency) was exemplified by his save American face.”6 By contrast, first Presidential inaugural address, Nixon sought to reach a different in which he claimed: “The greatest end, one of victory not surrender, in honor history can bestow is the order to preserve American honor title of peacemaker…If we succeed, and reputation, as well as his own. generations to come will say of us Allowing peace talks to conclude now living that we mastered our would not only have prevented moment, that we helped make the him from rescuing America from world safe for mankind.”7 Alexander international embarrassment, it Butterfield, aide to Nixon’s Chief of would also have greatly threatened Staff Bob Haldeman, also described his entire election campaign. this bittersweet hubris, stating that: However, peace negotiations “The president is very history- soon disintegrated, as the South oriented and history-conscious Vietnamese government proved about the role he is going to play, unsatisfied with the Democrats’ and is not at all subtle about it.”8 terms. The Republicans solidified The President’s colossal need for their control of the Vietnam conflict commendation would grow to be with a dominating victory in the fueled by his depraved ventures, from 1968 Presidential election. Nixon selfishly manipulating the Vietnam was now the United States’ Supreme conflict to his involvement in the Commander in Chief, and he would Watergate Scandal. By assuring wield this power with a strong the legitimacy of his quest for hand throughout his time in office. remembrance with an “ends justify From the infancy of his the means” mentality, Nixon would presidency, Richard Nixon yearned gradually lose sight of the boundaries for individual greatness as well as between personal gain, national national triumph, to be remembered prosperity, and moral rationale. and respected. America was the vessel that would grant him his THE WAR place in history, and he believed Outwardly, Nixon sought that the prosperity and reputation peace. Behind the scenes, he of the nation were directly linked to retrenched further into war. He his own. The Vietnam War offered began his first term in office with a unique opportunity: it gave him the slogan: “Peace with Honor.” the chance to change the war’s Yet Nixon immediately initiated trajectory from a growing mistake 7. Richard Nixon: “Inaugural Address,” January to an honorable effort by the world’s 20, 1969, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http:// 6. Judith Ehrlich and Rick Goldsmith, The most www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941. dangerous man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and 8. Stanley Kutler, ed., Abuse of Power: The New the Pentagon Papers, (Kovno Communications Nixon Tapes, (New York: The Free Press, 1997), and InSight Productions, 2009), DVD. xiv. 47 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION a series of secretive operations in with his famous “Vietnamization” Vietnam including the bombing speech on November 3, 1969, just of Cambodia beginning in March a couple weeks after the October 1969. With this “Operation Menu” Moratorium. His address utilized kept hidden from public knowledge, an animated call to patriotism to support for Nixon’s handling of the criticize rash demands for a swift war gradually rose throughout 1969 end to American involvement. to 54% in August. This popularity Instead, the President advocated was brief. Nixon’s approval rating a gradual process to transition dropped sharply to 45% in mid- the war effort from American September after the U.S. Army to South Vietnamese hands. He brought murder charges against Lt. consistently emphasized how William Calley for the horrific My America must not choose “the easy Lai Massacre over a year before.9 way… [But] the right way” in order This event sparked a massive surge to obtain a beneficial outcome in in anti-war protests, including the Vietnam. Nixon also subtly blamed famous October Moratorium in Democrats for prolonging the war, which millions of people around all the while presenting himself as the nation participated. Still, from the honorable shepherd of victory.12 late September to mid-November, With the promise of massive troop the President’s war approval rating reductions and a valiant call to swelled once again, jumping from 52 arms of the public, Nixon had – 64%.10 Nixon’s maneuvers created solidified his position on Vietnam. an unexpected paradox: support The war would continue for “Peace for the President’s management of with Honor,” while holding fast Vietnam grew to unprecedented to Nixon’s policy of diminishing levels, while open opposition to the American involvement. This created war simultaneously grew.
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