EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION , ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY, AND THE Luke Burton

“We have been too often disappointed by the optimism of the American leaders, both in Vietnam and in Washington, to have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds . . . To say that we are mired in a stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory, conclusion . . . It seems increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out will be to negotiate.” -Walter Cronkite, 1968

On February 27, 1968, veteran Offensive, the American military CBS news anchor Walter Cronkite— presence, contradicting claims of and the “most trusted man in seeking “no wider war,” peaked America”—addressed the nation with 536,000 U.S. soldiers active just days after the now infamous in 1968.1 To this point, American Tet Offensive. Uncharacteristically, leaders had consistently assured in this broadcast he integrated his the public of progress, with victory own opinion regarding the North close at hand. But now, Vietnam had Vietnamese’s demoralizing surprise grown into a fully-fledged war to attack on the South’s capital of prevent the spread of communism Saigon during Tet, the Vietnamese into Southeast Asia and to defend New Year. The substantial the liberties of American democracy American presence in Vietnam with abroad – the instrumentalization an initial influx of military advisors of Domino Theory diplomacy. began under John F. Kennedy and According to many scholars, after continued to grow through Lyndon Johnson’s extensive expansion 1. “Learn About the Vietnam War,” Digital of the war following the Gulf of History, accessed November 5, 2011, http:// www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/modules/vietnam/ Tonkin incident in 1964. By the Tet index.cfm. 45

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Tet the nation’s optimistic outlook I argue that the Vietnam War was suffered a crushing blow, sending simply one of many pawns in the public support spiraling down complex political game that was towards dissent and marking a Nixon’s administration. It was definitive turning point in the a tool of domestic politics used Vietnam conflict.2 These claims to shore up Nixon’s legitimacy seemed to be supported by responses and to insure the stability of his from December 1967 to March 1968 presidency. With the correlation to Gallup Poll’s survey question: between the rise and tragic fall of “In view of the developments since the Executive branch during this we entered the fighting in Vietnam, period and America’s slow exit from do you think the United States Vietnam, the symbiotic relationship made a mistake in sending troops between the two emerges and to fight in Vietnam?” Answers depicts a true abuse of power. of ‘yes’ rose from 45 – 49%, while The 1968 Presidential election ‘no’ responses fell from 46 – 41%, was a watershed in American marking the largest drop in support politics. It marked the end of the prior to Tet.3 However, this turning New Deal Coalition. Republican point did not lead to a swift end to candidate Richard Nixon American involvement. Instead, the successfully challenged this war would be revamped once again Democratic Party dynasty and with the inauguration of President assumed control of managing the Richard Nixon in January of 1969. It numerous crises, domestic and continued until Congress finally cut international, including the struggle war funding indefinitely in July 1973. for American civil rights and the This essay seeks to explain how deteriorating situation in Vietnam. and why American involvement in Part of his campaign’s strength the Vietnam conflict persisted for so was his willingness to make often long, even after the events of the Tet vague promises to end the war in Offensive. The actions of Nixon’s Vietnam. This was something his executive administration from his Democratic opponents could not first term election until the war’s do, despite Johnson’s celebrated conclusion suggest that the end of “bombing halt” that October. The American intervention in Vietnam Paris Peace talks, undertaken shortly was neither solely due to inadequate before the election, demonstrated military strategy and execution nor promise; however, they were faltering public support, as scholars partially sabotaged by Nixon’s have previously argued.4 Instead, campaign because the Republicans 2. Steven Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The promised the South Vietnamese Fall of the Liberal Order, 1964-1980, (Roseville: government an offer superior to Prima, 2007), 188. Democrats’ plans for negotiations.5 3. Alec M. Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll Before he resigned, Lyndon Cumulative Index: Public Opinion, 1937-1997: Volume 3 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Johnson’s Secretary of Defense 1999), 2109. 4. Ben Kiernan, “Review: The Vietnam War: 5. Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Alternative Endings,” American Historical Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Review 97 (1992): 1118-1137. The Free Press, 2001). 46 BURTON

Robert McNamara characterized leading democratic nation to defend the Democratic view of the war Southeast Asia for the greater good. effort as: “We’re in Vietnam 10% to This aspect of his agenda (which help the South Vietnamese, 20% to would continue throughout his hold back the Chinese, and 70% to presidency) was exemplified by his save American face.”6 By contrast, first Presidential inaugural address, Nixon sought to reach a different in which he claimed: “The greatest end, one of victory not surrender, in honor history can bestow is the order to preserve American honor title of peacemaker…If we succeed, and reputation, as well as his own. generations to come will say of us Allowing peace talks to conclude now living that we mastered our would not only have prevented moment, that we helped make the him from rescuing America from world safe for mankind.”7 Alexander international embarrassment, it Butterfield, aide to Nixon’s Chief of would also have greatly threatened Staff Bob Haldeman, also described his entire election campaign. this bittersweet hubris, stating that: However, peace negotiations “The president is very history- soon disintegrated, as the South oriented and history-conscious Vietnamese government proved about the role he is going to play, unsatisfied with the Democrats’ and is not at all subtle about it.”8 terms. The Republicans solidified The President’s colossal need for their control of the Vietnam conflict commendation would grow to be with a dominating victory in the fueled by his depraved ventures, from 1968 Presidential election. Nixon selfishly manipulating the Vietnam was now the United States’ Supreme conflict to his involvement in the Commander in Chief, and he would . By assuring wield this power with a strong the legitimacy of his quest for hand throughout his time in office. remembrance with an “ends justify From the infancy of his the means” mentality, Nixon would presidency, Richard Nixon yearned gradually lose sight of the boundaries for individual greatness as well as between personal gain, national national triumph, to be remembered prosperity, and moral rationale. and respected. America was the vessel that would grant him his THE WAR place in history, and he believed Outwardly, Nixon sought that the prosperity and reputation peace. Behind the scenes, he of the nation were directly linked to retrenched further into war. He his own. The Vietnam War offered began his first term in office with a unique opportunity: it gave him the slogan: “.” the chance to change the war’s Yet Nixon immediately initiated trajectory from a growing mistake 7. Richard Nixon: “Inaugural Address,” January to an honorable effort by the world’s 20, 1969, Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http:// 6. Judith Ehrlich and Rick Goldsmith, The most www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941. dangerous man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and 8. Stanley Kutler, ed., Abuse of Power: The New the Pentagon Papers, (Kovno Communications Nixon Tapes, (New York: The Free Press, 1997), and InSight Productions, 2009), DVD. xiv. 47 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION

a series of secretive operations in with his famous “” Vietnam including the bombing speech on November 3, 1969, just of Cambodia beginning in March a couple weeks after the October 1969. With this “Operation Menu” Moratorium. His address utilized kept hidden from public knowledge, an animated call to patriotism to support for Nixon’s handling of the criticize rash demands for a swift war gradually rose throughout 1969 end to American involvement. to 54% in August. This popularity Instead, the President advocated was brief. Nixon’s approval rating a gradual process to transition dropped sharply to 45% in mid- the war effort from American September after the U.S. Army to South Vietnamese hands. He brought murder charges against Lt. consistently emphasized how William Calley for the horrific My America must not choose “the easy Lai Massacre over a year before.9 way… [But] the right way” in order This event sparked a massive surge to obtain a beneficial outcome in in anti-war protests, including the Vietnam. Nixon also subtly blamed famous October Moratorium in Democrats for prolonging the war, which millions of people around all the while presenting himself as the nation participated. Still, from the honorable shepherd of victory.12 late September to mid-November, With the promise of massive troop the President’s war approval rating reductions and a valiant call to swelled once again, jumping from 52 arms of the public, Nixon had – 64%.10 Nixon’s maneuvers created solidified his position on Vietnam. an unexpected paradox: support The war would continue for “Peace for the President’s management of with Honor,” while holding fast Vietnam grew to unprecedented to Nixon’s policy of diminishing levels, while open opposition to the American involvement. This created war simultaneously grew. For Nixon, a dilemma for the President that this indicated that in contrast to would linger throughout his time the loud, radical, left-wing anti-war in office as he would progressively protesters, much of Middle America need more bombing campaigns sat quiet, mutely supporting the in order to replace the thinning war effort in opposition to its presence and use of ground forces condemnation.11 This “Silent required by his new approach.13 Majority” feared communist and By 1970, public support anti-American influences and fluctuated erratically in the context reacted defensively against protests of constant protesting, troop denouncing the war effort. President withdrawals, and multiple bombing Nixon mobilized this wariness campaigns in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Yet it is clear that the 9. Joseph Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison, (Graph: ‘Richard Nixon’s Approval Rating 12. President Nixon’s Speech on “Vietnamization,” handling the Vietnam War, 1969-73’), Gallup. November 3, 1969, Public Papers of the com, 15 June 2004. http://www.gallup.com/ Presidents of the United States: Richard poll/11998/iraqvietnam-comparison.aspx. Nixon, 1969, pp. 901-909. http://vietnam.vassar. 10. Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison. edu/overview/doc14.html. 11. Matthew Motten, Between War and Peace 13. Alan Axelrod, Political History of America’s (Free Press: New York, 2011). Wars (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006). 48 BURTON timing of these troop reductions Nixon’s “Decent-Interval Strategy,” and military offensives strongly which proposed the continuation of correlated. Nixon carefully tried to military force until negotiation terms balance appeasing the public with were agreed upon that would allow maintaining martial pressure on enough delay between an American Hanoi. On April 20th, in a televised exit and a North Vietnamese address, Nixon announced the victory. If this period was too small, withdrawal of 150,000 soldiers the United States risked looking over the next year; he claimed it weak and cowardly, having simply as a consequence “based entirely abandoned their allies after so much off the progress” in Vietnam.14 bloodshed. This was something Complementing this effort, the Nixon was not willing to tolerate.16 President ten days later publicized Protests, troop reductions, and the plan to invade Cambodia, bombings continued into 1971, legitimizing this move by declaring, while Nixon’s Vietnam approval “I would rather be a one-term slid from 64% in January 1970 to 41% President and do what is right than by February 1971.1716 This significant to be a two-term President at the cost decline occurred in the context of of seeing America become a second- calamitous events: the Kent State rate power and to see this Nation protest shootings in May 1970 and accept the first defeat in its proud the proposal of the Democrats’ 190-year history.”15 Therein lay the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, dichotomy of Nixon’s intentions; providing for the withdrawal of all he demonstrated his dedication U.S. troops by 31 Dec 1971 (which was to the “American Way” and his rejected by the Senate). Additionally, policy of Vietnamization, while also Nixon’s plan for an offensive on foreshadowing the war’s importance the Laotian Ho Chi Minh Trail in regarding his developing reelection February of 1971 further catalyzed campaign. Even early in his first the dwindling public opinion. It term, Nixon realized the significance came just one month after Congress of conciliating the public while succeeded in repealing the Tonkin simultaneously maintaining a Gulf Resolution, rendering the strong hand in Vietnam to prevent war’s origins illegitimate. Nixon the loss of face, for the nation and responded characteristically, for himself. An undesirable end to ignoring the significance of the Vietnam, he believed, would prove resolution and holding fast to his disastrous to his political ambitions, self-authorized and ultimately illicit so its longevity was ultimately a rights as Commander in Chief.18 necessity. This was at the root of Still, the President was adhering 14. “April 20, 1970: Nixon announces more to his promises of Vietnamization; troop withdrawals.” This Day in History, the Laos incursion was designed accessed 11 November 2011, http://www.history. com/this-day-in-history/nixon-announces- 16. Alan Axelrod, Political History of America’s more-troop-withdrawals. Wars, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006). 15. Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation 17. Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison. on the Situation in Southeast Asia,” April 18. Robert Longley, “How Congress Ends 30, 1970. http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/ Wars,” http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/ nixon430.htm. uscongress/a/congendswar.htm. 49 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION

to be a South Vietnamese ground within the chronological context effort only, the first chance to prove of only the Kennedy and Johnson their own capabilities. Although administrations but held wider initially a success with the South ramifications for Nixon’s presidency Vietnam forces capturing important as well. During the first few weeks territory, within months the North after their publication, the President Vietnamese quickly staged a and his confidants regularly debated counter-offensive, reclaiming lost the merits of the leak. On the one ground. This caused great concern hand, it depicted the dishonest inside the Nixon administration as it and dishonorable maneuvers of threatened their “Decent-Interval” prior Democratic Presidents; yet, and demanded revamped military on the other, it represented both efforts to prolong the conflict and “a devastating security breach of coincide with the 1972 elections. the greatest magnitude of anything [Security advisor A. Haig had] ever THE PENTAGON PAPERS seen,” and the misconduct of the June 1971 marked a significant entire governmental institution.19 turning point in the mentality The day after the story broke, Bob of Nixon’s administration, when Haldeman warned the President the New York Times released a of these possibly profound momentous story regarding the and enduring consequences: Pentagon Papers. This 7,000-page collection of documents detailed [The Papers] don’t hurt us an elaborate internal history of politically so much. They American involvement in Vietnam. hurt the others. But what Former military analyst and member they really hurt, and this is of the prestigious RAND think- what the intellectuals – and tank Daniel Ellsberg, who had one of the motivations of the gradually realized the terrible nature Times must be – is it hurts the of the war, leaked the documents government. What it says is… to the Times. After hearing of the to the ordinary guy, all this is articles pertaining to the Pentagon a bunch of gobbledygook. But Papers, Nixon drastically altered out of the gobbledygook comes much of his administration’s focus a very clear thing, which is: You and strategy regarding Vietnam can’t trust the government, and other issues, trivializing each as you can’t believe what they mere matters affecting his prospect say and you can’t rely on their of reelection. Correspondingly, judgment. And that the implicit the Pentagon Papers would bring infallibility of presidents, which out paranoia, secrecy, and an illicit has been an accepted thing in atmosphere within Washington America, is badly hurt by this, as the war itself became less of because it shows that people do a prominent issue in the wake 19. David Coleman, Ken Hughes, and of developing internal crises. Erin Mahan, The Nixon Tapes: Transcripts, The Pentagon Papers’ release Presidential Recording Program, 2011, described the Vietnam War Meeting tape, June 13, 1971 - 12:18pm, http:// whitehousetapes.net/transcript/Nixon. 50 BURTON

things the president wants to soldiers must die, how many do even though it’s wrong. And innocent Vietnamese civilians the president can be wrong.20 must be killed, so that the final end to the war may be announced Popular doubts in how the in 1972 instead of 1971?21 government functioned and upheld “democracy” had been mounting Given the fragile scenario in as a result of the Vietnam War and Washington after June of 1971, other internal issues. With Nixon Nixon initiated a complex political furthering the gradual expansion strategy in order to save his place of Executive power, he was forced in history, punish his enemies, and to fall deeper into concealment to guarantee his reelection in 1972. This preserve his governing authority multi-faceted procedure involved a at the cost of public liberty. To the mass declassification of documents President, “success” depended from prior administrations, legal on the effectiveness of his actions actions regarding the release alone, not on how strictly he of the Pentagon Papers, and upheld democratic principles. investigations into everyone From the beginning, Nixon involved. Additionally, Nixon had to carefully choose how ordered undercover operations to to handle the Pentagon Paper be carried out to not only discredit situation. His guarded personality Ellsberg, but also to destroy or and aggressive attitude managed prevent any injurious documents to trounce ethical reservations from getting out in the future. and eventually to publicize exactly Nixon’s plans to handle the what he would try so hard to security breach began chaotically, conceal. Possibly supplementing because Ellsberg had gone these growing fears, the story in underground, his identity as the the Times came not even one week culprit still unknown. Nearly after Teddy Kennedy’s speech about immediately, the White House ending the war in which he stated: initiated printing halts on the New York Times and the Washington The only possible excuse for Post, and it filed suits against the continuing the discredited newspapers for illegally publishing policy of Vietnamizing the war, classified documents. The President now and in the months ahead, also desperately searched for those seems to be the President’s accountable. In his conversation intention to play his last great with National Security Advisor card for peace at a time close , Nixon seemingly to November 1972, when the ruled out civilians completely as chances will be greater that the suspects for the leaking of the action will benefit the coming Pentagon Papers; he was sure it presidential election campaign... was the Democrats and proposed How many more American plans to put the suspects under

20. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting 21. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Telephone tape, June 14, 1971 - 8:49 am. tape 005-002. 51 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION

oath to prosecute them for treason, that, “if you allow something like or for perjury if they lied.22 Nixon [the leak] to go unchallenged then had always been party-oriented, you are encouraging it; an unending yet after the Papers’ leak, he flow of it…but if you nail it hard it seemed to barricade himself helps to keep people in line and within his administration. He discourage others.”26 Nixon was became constantly suspicious and determined to prevent anything talked to Kissinger about “really of the sort from happening again cleaning house when we have the with the formidable powers of the opportunity” and firing people Executive branch at his disposal. to insure loyalty and security.23 Eventually Daniel Ellsberg revealed himself as the “leaker” THE BEGINNING OF THE END and even held a televised interview Throughout the week following with Walter Cronkite. However, the story in the Times, Nixon and the effect of the Pentagon Papers his trusted advisors discussed a seemed to be waning. Ellsberg strategy to break into the Brookings described this reality, saying that the Institute (another think-tank American public “hear it, they learn like RAND) to steal documents from it, they understand it, and then detrimental to Lyndon Johnson, proceed to ignore it.”27 But Nixon along with any damaging to his own could never believe that Ellsberg presidency. He voiced his concern had carried out such a large-scale to Kissinger saying, “they’ll have security breach alone. Instead, he the whole story of the Menu Series,” imagined a massive conspiracy referring to the secret bombings of against his administration. The Cambodia and Laos throughout President, Kissinger, and Haldeman 24 1969 and 1970. He ordered the discussed polygraphing a massive break-in to be “implemented on a number of government employees thievery basis. Goddamn it, get in to find who leaked the papers. Nixon and get those files. Blow the safe and demanded that even “if they’re 25 get it.” For Nixon, the Pentagon on the golf course, on the tennis Papers represented a threat to the courts, going to New York or to order of American politics, and he Boston or someplace or to Nassau, could not afford to overlook the get those fuckers back here and leak if he hoped to maintain control polygraph them. Is that clear? Every of not only sensitive information goddamn one that had access to it. but the fate of his administration. Now I mean it. Everyone.”28 Nixon His aides agreed, Presidential aide matched his efforts to prevent leaks Roger Colson bluntly explained regarding his administration by

22. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting 26. Rmm413c, “NIXON TAPES: “Fight All Out” tape, June 13, 1971 - 3:09pm. over Pentagon Papers (Chuck Colson),” http:// 23. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9DhsmHGYzI&fe tape, June 13, 1971 - 3:09pm. ature=related. 24. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting 27. Ehrlich and Goldsmith. Tape, June 15, 1971 - 10:39am. 28. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting 25. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, Meeting Tape, July 24, 1971 - 9:43am. http:// Tape, June 17, 1971 - 5:15pm. whitehousetapes.net/transcript/nixon. 52 BURTON continuing discussions of releasing Hunt and FBI official Gordon Liddy damaging information about his as its supervisors. The Plumbers enemies. They discussed linking would ultimately grow to be a part Ellsberg to communist groups of a larger organization identified and planned to provide stories of as CREEP, or the Committee for him killing innocent Vietnamese the Re-Election of the President. civilians from the back of a Jeep as On top of this illegal organization, well, regardless of their validity.29 President Nixon continued to push Ultimately, they also devised plans for leaks regarding documents of breaking into his psychiatrist’s injurious to anyone he viewed as office to find documents damaging threatening. He described leaking as to his credibility and mental “a game,” legitimizing his actions by stability. Nixon’s dirty tricks saying “We’re up against an enemy, would continue to proliferate a conspiracy, their using any means, as he fell further into secrecy. we are going to use any means as Nixon’s attempts to quiet the necessary.“32 For the President, the media failed. On June 30, 1971, the Pentagon Papers threatened the United States Supreme Court ruled stability of his campaign. Vietnam that, in the case of New York Times was supposed to boost his chances; Co. vs. the United States, there was no now there was a risk of it destroying act of treason and that the media was him, directly and indirectly. The permitted to resume printing the administration’s illicit approach contents of the Pentagon Papers. In was now in full tilt and would not response to this, efforts to discredit slow down as ethical judgment the “conspiracy” intensified as Nixon increasingly fell to the wayside. advised Kissinger and Attorney The leak had created a lasting General John Mitchell to not “worry foundation for the Administration’s about [Ellsberg’s] trial…try him in growing misconduct. It began as the press…we want to destroy him in efforts to prevent future security the press.”30 He didn’t want Ellsberg breaches, but as the story of the leak “to be brought up until after the progressed, the public gradually election” and wanted to utilize the overlooked its significance. Nixon media to separate himself from the grew to see the Pentagon Papers as leak, trial, and issues they brought a useful tool instead of a threat to up.31 Nixon continued to organize his political position in Washington his infamous break-in team, known or Vietnam. The national as the “Plumbers,” who would majority’s seemingly apathetic later carry out the plan to break attitude regarding their release was into Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office, disheartening. He planned to re- delegating CIA officer Howard release the Papers to the media, along with the accumulated documents 29. Stanley Kutler, ed., Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes, (New York: The Free Press, damaging to any and all Democrats: 1997), 6; Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, “Get the eyes off of Vietnam Meeting Tape, July 24, 1971 - 9:43am. http:// [leading up to the 1972 election]. It whitehousetapes.net/transcript/nixon 30. Kutler, 6. 32. Coleman, Hughes, and Mahan, 2011, Meeting 31. Kutler, 11. Tape, July 24, 1971 - 9:43; Kutler, 8. 53 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION

gets them thinking about the past improvement in Vietnam. As part rather than our present problems.”33 of Nixon’s “Mad Man Theory,” he He reiterated this important agenda intended to use sporadic bombings explaining how the media was the as a way to keep Hanoi guessing only option; bringing them to the in order to push North Vietnam Senate floor or the Supreme Court toward beneficial negotiations. His would be worthless. “If it goes to “Decent-Interval” plan relied on Congress…John [Erlichman] feels the success of these negotiations, that we couldn’t control them. In still in the works, because only terms of leaking it into the court, favorable terms could provide any it won’t come out until after the hopes of saving face in Vietnam. election, which is too late to do In 1972, Nixon continued us any good.”34 Nixon needed down the path towards his eventual the Vietnam War and the fallout resignation as he arranged a from the Pentagon Papers leak diverse array of actions to promote to survive, as his administration his campaign while damaging was beginning to dissolve. This the Democrats. This included quandary became all the more influencing Democratic Senator clear as the election drew nearer Eugene McCarthy to run as an and the Watergate scandal would independent in order to steal votes grow out of the activities of CREEP in the election, leaking documents and the Plumbers, all with Nixon’s about the Bay of Pigs, and releasing knowledge and even direction. tax returns from contributors to candidates Hubert Humphrey THE CONCEALED CAMPAIGN and Ed Muskie.35 Additionally, Throughout 1971, domestic Nixon ordered wiretaps on the issues involving Vietnam dominated Democratic nominee for President discussion within the White House, George McGovern because he was but the war abroad remained an “affecting the peace negotiations.”36 important issue for the public as On this note, the administration bombings and protests continued. also sought to release photographs Nixon seemed to be making little of anti-war protestors supporting progress in Vietnam, good or bad, McGovern holding signs saying, still holding true to promises of “Communism must win in troop reductions while continuing Southeast Asia.” Nixon planned to initiate military campaigns. This to gain support for his handling was exemplified by the bombings of of the negotiations by portraying Haiphong beginning in late March the protestors and McGovern as and with the mining of many North un-patriotic.37 Furthermore and Vietnamese harbors. Similarly, most notoriously, Nixon ordered a peace talks with Hanoi continued to break-in at the Democratic National begin and end abruptly, something Committee Headquarters. These quite important to Nixon in order occurred on two separate occasions to maintain the impression of 35. Kutler, 27, 28-89. 33. Kutler, 8. 36. Kutler, 92. 34. Kutler, 34. 37. Kutler, 155-56. 54 BURTON in May and June of 1972. Both were I should have done it long ago. I failed efforts, but the misconduct of just didn’t follow my instincts. I’ll these illegal entries was discovered, see that the United States does not and seven of Nixon’s “Plumbers” lose. I’m putting it quite bluntly. I’ll were indicted for the break-in. be quite precise. South Vietnam They remained unassociated with may lose. But the United States the administration as a whole, and cannot lose . . . For once, we’ve they would not go to court until got to use the maximum power of the next year. Nixon and his aides this country . . . against this shit- rejoiced greatly over this as they ass little country: to win the war.40 assumed they were out of harm’s Nixon’s war policy was now way.38 The cover up began as Nixon completely defined by the Decent- fell further into secrecy plagued Interval Strategy; all hopes for by doubts regarding the loyalty legitimate military triumph had of his personnel. Once again, the vanished. Incursions by the South election took primary importance Vietnamese supported by American as Haldeman optimistically bombing campaigns would continue planned ahead for their next term throughout the year as peace saying, “I would think that we talks, particularly between Henry could get some people with guts Kissinger and North Vietnamese in the second term, when we don’t diplomat Le Duc Tho, seemed care about the repercussions.”39 to be progressing. The election Concurrently, the war once approached, and on October 26, again grew in importance. With 1972, Kissinger announced at a press the Watergate indictments delayed conference: “We believe peace is until after the election, Nixon at hand.”41 This was exactly the once again focused on utilizing pre-election boost that Nixon had the Vietnam situation to benefit planned on; his Presidential approval his campaign. His “Mad-Man” ratings reached a height of 62% after tactics were epitomized during a Kissinger’s declaration.42 Nixon meeting in May of 1972, where he won the 1972 election by a landslide, raged about how America must fulfilling his ambition for a second intensify the bombing offensive term. For Kissinger, the war in to draw a favorable scenario Vietnam was the linchpin of Nixon’s for that November’s election: campaign against McGovern; Here’s what we’re gonna do. Nixon had “made Vietnam your We’re gonna get through it. We’re issue and his weakness.”43 Still, going to cream them. This is not 40. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam anger. This is all business. This is and The Pentagon Papers, (New York: Penguin, not “petulance.” That’s all bullshit. 2002), 419. 41. “Transcript: Peace is at Hand, 1968-1973,” 38. “7 indictments close US Probe into American Experience, 29 March, 2005, http:// Watergate Bugging Case,” Kentucky New Era, www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/series/ September 16, 1972, 144..http://news.google. pt_09.html. com/newspapers?nid=266&dat=19720901&id 42. Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison. =ovArAAAAIBAJ&sjid=EGkFAAAAIBAJ& 43. Rmm413d, “Richard Nixon Tapes: Election pg=827,1616375. Night 1972 (Henry Kissinger),” http://www. 39. Kutler, 114. youtube.com/watch?v=MBLR8OeqimQ. 55 EXECUTIVE EXPLOITATION

the situation in Vietnam lingered. this would once again be affected by the developing Watergate scandal, INEVITABLE ENDS which ultimately prevented the Peace talks dissolved. President administration from carrying out Nguyen Van Thieu proved plans to resume the fighting. Henry unwilling to sign a treaty that Kissinger accurately portrayed this allowed Northern troops to remain concept explaining how the “tragedy in South Vietnam. Kissinger then was a domestic situation…In April refused to go back to Vietnam after [1973], Watergate blew up, and we the negotiations failed frustratingly. were castrated…the second tragedy So Nixon, with renewed plans to was that we were not permitted to push Hanoi toward favorable terms, enforce the agreement [Paris peace sent the more assertive National treaty]…I think it’s reasonable to Security advisor Alexander Haig as assume [Nixon] would have bombed his new ambassador. Increasingly the hell out of them during April.”46 aggressive policy led to the initiation Instead, Nixon sat helplessly on of Operation Linebacker II, April 30th when Watergate was linked bombing campaigns that devastated to high-ups in his administration, North Vietnam and became known and he was forced to announce as the “Christmas Bombings.” the resignations of his beloved and This caused a sharp drop in public trusted associates Bob Haldeman opinion as Nixon’s approval rating and Domestic Counsel Chair John dropped to 51% at the beginning of Erlichman. With this, along with 44 1973. The President still pushed the unfolding cover up and Nixon’s for acceptable terms, something involvement (supplemented by that seemed increasingly detached the release of the “Smoking Gun” from reality. With the Watergate Nixon Tapes in July), the executive scandal growing, Nixon needed branch crumbled and became an another boost in support and example of corruption, deceit, decided to push negotiations. On and immoral self-interest. In order January 27, 1973, all parties signed to permanently dismantle this the , marking Executive misconduct, Congress an official end to direct military passed the War Powers Act in May, involvement by the United States. giving the legislature sole authority This monumental event for the to order military intervention. American people led to an explosion Additionally, with the realization of in Nixon’s approval rating to an Nixon’s manipulative government, 45 unprecedented level of 67%. Congress passed House Joint However, unknown to the public, Resolution 636 on July 1, which stated Nixon still had plans to expand that, “no funds herein or heretofore the conflict as he undoubtedly appropriated may be obligated expected North Vietnam to violate or expended to finance directly the treaty agreements allowing for or indirectly combat activities by military action to be resumed. But 46. Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, 44. Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison. Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, (New York: 45. Carroll, The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison. The Free Press, 2001), 7-8. 56 BURTON

United States military forces in or from honor and praise to shame and over or from off the shores of North disdain. “The Pentagon Papers affair Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or ... led directly to the unraveling Cambodia.”47 Finally, Congress and final disintegration of the reached a lasting conclusion of the Nixon presidency,” which would Vietnam conflict as it carried out then give Congress unopposed actions to prevent the abuse of the authority to end American separation of powers; after lengthy involvement in Vietnam. 48 This trials, Richard Nixon became the would later be tested by Gerald first and only American President Ford, Nixon’s successor, when he to resign from office August asked Congress for an enormous aid 9, 1974, the foreseen outcome package for South Vietnam during since the events of mid-1972. the North’s resumed offensive; Richard Nixon came into office however, Congress rejected Ford’s in 1969 with dreams of victory in request, setting a precedence of Vietnam, politics, and popular Congressional authority. Without history. Instead of the war’s this enduring result, one can conclusion bringing him admiration only wonder how long America and respect, it was actually linked would have remained involved in to Nixon’s own destruction. the military conflict in Southeast Throughout his presidency, Asia. Ultimately, the progression Nixon and his administration of Nixon’s administration and the continuously overstepped their Vietnam War from 1969 – 1973 would legitimate power in order to secure provide an potent example of some longevity in office. Along with of the issues at the heart of the Cold many political transgressions, this War. It was not only in Southeast involved manipulating the situation Asia that America battled to fend in Vietnam to provide a needed off communism while preserving public support boost leading up to its own prosperity and influence the 1972 election. Vietnamization around the globe. But to what was a policy introduced in order in degree aspirations of democratic delay the conflict by appeasing the safeguarding outweighed selfish American population while also geopolitical ambition during this allowing for continued military period may forever remain a mystery. involvement. The evolution of the “Decent-Interval” and “Mad-Man” strategies were part of Nixon’s plan to utilize Vietnam for political success. However, all of his secrecy and illegal activity backfired and provided an unsatisfactory exit from Vietnam while taking an administration 48. Michael Belknap, review of The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon Papers 47. “Bill Summary & Status 93rd Congress Case by David Rudenstine, American Historical (1973 - 1974) H.J.RES.636,” Library of Congress, Review 102 (1997): 1263-1264. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ z?d093:HJ00636:@@@L&summ2=m&. 57