A Nation at War.Indd
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A NATION AT WAR IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC CHANGE Williamson Murray Editor September 2004 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Offi ce by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at [email protected] ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http:// www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/ ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-171-7 ii CONTENTS Foreword ................................................................................................... v 1. Introduction Dr. Williamson Murray..........................................................................1 2. “Knowledge Must Become Capability”: Institutional Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation Commander Steven W. Knott, USN.....................................................21 3. Swiftly Defeat the Efforts, Then What? The “New American Way of War” and the Transition from Decisive Combat Operations to Post Confl ict Security Operations Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson ......................................................43 4. Nuclear High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse--Implications for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle ..................................................69 5. Iraq, 2003-04; and Mesopotamia, 1914-18: A Comparative Analysis in Ends and Means Lieutenant Colonel James D. Scudieri ..................................................95 6. Waging Peace: ECLIPSE in Postwar Germany and Iraq Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy.........................................125 7.The Abrams Doctrine: Has It Been Abused in the Global War on Terror? Colonel George A. Brinegar ................................................................173 8. The Abrams Doctrine: Total Force Foundation or Enduring Fallacy? Colonel Brian D. Jones........................................................................201 9. Secure the Victory: Is It Time for a Stabilization and Reconstruction Command? Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth ................................................ 227 iii 10. Nation Building: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come? Lieutenant Colonel Burt K. Thompson...............................................255 11. Seabasing and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and Their Implications for the Joint Force Commander Colonel Stuart L. Dickey, USMC.......................................................277 12. Is the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) Embedded in the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) HQ A Model for Future Confl ict? Lieutenant Colonel Byron H. Risner, USAF .....................................303 13. The National Security Strategy of the United States: Development of Grand Strategy Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly ................................................321 14. The Human Dimension of Transformation Colonel Robert E. Scurlock, Jr. ...........................................................343 About the Authors ................................................................................367 iv FOREWORD The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army’s Chief of Staff have all stated that the United States is a “Nation at War.” This fundamental fact is key to what we do at the U.S. Army War College. Because of our continued emphasis on the Global War on Terrorism, we face signifi cant strategic challenges as we continue to transform the force, improve interagency integration into joint operations, and, all the while, engage in active combat operations. This collection of outstanding essays―three of which won prestigious writing awards―by the students enrolled in the Army War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) highlights some of these strategic challenges and offers thoughtful solutions. The authors provide insights that undoubtedly will prove useful to decisionmakers at the highest levels of our national security establishment. Our ASAP graduates continue to make their mark as outstanding theater strategists in the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and in the Combatant Commands. DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR. Major General, U.S. Army Commandant v CHAPTER 1 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE Dr. Williamson Murray INTRODUCTION It is a pleasure to once again have the opportunity to write an introductory essay for the collection of essays written by the students of the U.S. Army War College’s Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP). This year’s students, as their essays suggest, more than lived up to the standards of their predecessors in the program. Last year, two of the essays won prizes at the U.S. Army War College’s Graduation. This year, three students received writing and research awards at the college’s graduation ceremonies. Commander Steven W. Knott’s essay on the importance of intellectual effort in transformation received the second place award in the Chairman’s essay contest, while Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson’s essay on the problems in transitioning from combat operations to stabilization operations won the AUSA’s Land Warfare Award. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle’s examination of the implications of the Electromagnetic Pulse Threat to Homeland Security won the Armed Forces Communications-Electronics Association award. Not surprisingly, a number of this year’s essays address the problems of transition operations after conventional military victory. This is a problem that will confront the American military for the remainder of the 21st century. The concerns of the students in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program thus refl ect the realities that they and their fellow offi cers in Iraq already confront. There is, and will be, no easy route to political and strategic success in the confl icts that America will confront over coming decades. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAQ WAR There have been a number of observers within and outside the Services who have suggested that the American military has 1 little to learn from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, since the Iraqi military, as in the Gulf War, for the most part put up such a poor showing. Nothing could be more dangerous in the years ahead. Whatever the weaknesses of the Iraqi Army, military operations in this war suggested a number of issues that the services and the joint world need to address. If these weaknesses showed up during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there is every reason to believe that more effective and adaptive enemies will be in a position to take advantage of American mistakes in a fashion that will have a direct and painful impact on the lives and well being of young soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen―the life blood of this nation. What has been particularly encouraging about the reaction of the American military to this confl ict has been willingness not only of the Services, but the Joint world as well, to address the whole business of lessons learned in an honest and forthright fashion.1 The diffi culty now confronting the American military is the reality that no conceivable power is going to challenge its power directly. Instead, throughout the world military organizations and others are thinking about asymmetric challenges that could address American military power indirectly. U.S. forces are already seeing the results of such thinking and adaptation in the streets and along the highways of Iraq. Technology alone will not address the challenges of the 21st century, because man is an inventive and adaptive animal to the ever changing conditions and context of his environment. Above all, the victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces underlined that the fundamental nature of war is not going to change, whatever the technological superiority that American forces bring to the battlefi eld. The technological monism that has molded so much of the debate about transformation and military technological revolutions has quite simply foundered on the realities of the battlefi elds in Iraq. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that those realities have had an impact on the technophiles, since they have so little interest in history, including even the history of the recent past. In fact, the head of the Offi ce of Force Transformation has recently argued that the American military can discard the traditional approach of the inductive method of learning from experience (i.e., history and experience) in favor of the deductive method, where one can derive the future from assumptions. In other words, the 2 Department of Defense (DoD) has supposedly reached a position where it can posit what the future is going