LaborHistory, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2000

GeorgeMink, the MarineWorkers Industrial Union,and the Cominternin America

VERNONL. PEDERSEN

In the1949 RKO®lm, TheWoman on Pier 13 ,Brad Collins,who, as an angry young man had brie¯y joinedthe Communist party, is drawnback intoa webof sabotage and intrigue whichthreatens to destroy both his marriage andhis picture-perfectAmerican life. The agent ofCollins ’ downfallis abluntspoken, vaguely EastEuropean Commu- nistnamed Vanning whospecializes in waterfrontwork. Except for theabsence of his trademark black leather jacket(this particular movie Communistblends into the post-warera by wearing aconservative suit)the character ofVanning bears astriking resemblanceto the real CommunistGeorge Mink, the founder of the Marine Workers Industrial Union(MWIU). 1 HowardHughes, who owned RKO, wanted TheWoman on Pier 13 toestablish his anti-Communistcredentials and warn his fellowcitizens of the dangers posed by Soviet spiesand saboteurs. But, Hughes ’ eccentricities,and the need to make apro® t,created insteada dark andbrooding ªBºmovie whichonly caricatured theCommunist threat. Critics dismissedthe ® lm asnothing buta Hollywoodfantasy borrowing equally from gangster ®lms andwar-time Nazi spy movies. The fateof the real Minkmirrors that ofhis ®lm counterpart.At oneextreme heis condemnedas Mink the butcher, the harbor pirate, theNKVD enforcer,and the self-proclaimed representative ofthe Comintern in America. Others dismisshim asan obscuresecond-level ® gure oflittle importance, someclaim henever existed, and he is occasionally defendedas a pro-labor, anti-Fascist,union builder. 2 The controversysurrounding Mink ’scareer ispart ofthe much larger debateover the natureof American Communismand the extent of theparty ’stiesto the Soviet Union. By thelate 1980s thosescholars discounting tales ofCommunist espionage and generally defendingthe party asa positive aspectof American life had cometo dominatethe historical exchange.However, the opening of theCentral Archives ofthe

1The Womanon Pier13 ,originallytitled ª IMarrieda Communist ,ºwas releasedby RKOin 1950.An informative, and entertaining,account of the ®lm ’sproduction and signi®cance as apart ofpost-war anti-Communism canbe found in Daniel J.Leab, ªHowRed was my Valley: Hollywood, the Cold War Film, and IMarrieda Communist ,º Journal ofContemporary History ,19(1984), 59±88. 2Richard Krebs® rstbrought Mink to public attention in 1940in Out ofthe Night ,aclassicof anti-Communist literature,which accusesMink ofbeing little more than awaterfrontthug. Al Richmond, in ALong View fromThe Left ,takesa moremoderate stance and admits that he found Mink, whom he knewpersonally, an attractivebut ambivalent ®gure.Mink ’smost completerehabilitation is in Bruce Nelson’s Workerson the Waterfront which portrays Mink as aminor ®gurewho has becomethe subject ofanti-Communist fantasies. Jan Valtin (aka Richard Krebs), Out ofthe Night (NewYork: AllianceBook Corporation, 1941);Al Richmond, ALong View fromthe Left:Memoirs of an American Revolutionary (Boston: Houghton Mif¯in Company, 1973);Bruce Nelson, Workerson the Waterfront:Seamen, Longshoremen, andUnionism in the 1930s (Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press,1988).

ISSN0023-656X print/ISSN1469-9702 online/00/030307±14 Ó 2000Taylor &Francis Ltd on behalf of The Tamiment Institute 308 V.L.Pedersen

CommunistParty ofthe Soviet Union,now the Russian Center for theStorage and Studyof Documents of Contemporary History (RTZKhIDNI), thegranting oflimited accessto selected KGB ®les,and the declassi® cation oftheCIA ’sVENONA intercepts transformedthe discussion. The ¯oodof books and articles basedon these sources conclusivelydocumented the extent and nature of Communist party tiesto the Soviet Unionand led former party defenderMaurice Isserman to state that it has ªlong since becomeapparent that thoseof us who tended to discount Communist involvement in Soviet espionagewere mistaken.º 3 Asexciting asthe recent revelations have beenthey are only thebeginning ofa completereevaluation ofthis aspectof American history whichmust extend beyond thehigh-pro® le issuesof Soviet in¯uenceand espionage. This studyof Mink ’s American career begins by establishing his statusas a Soviet agent,but continues beyondhis relationship tothe Comintern to shed light ona widerange ofother issuesas well. Two important areas consideredin this studyare thegoals andmethods ofComintern organizers in theUnited States and the relationship betweenthe Comintern,the Pro® ntern,and the CPUSA. Much information isalso revealed aboutthe mundane aspects of union organizing andthe continual dif® culties faced by Communistactivists in theUnited States. A pleasant surpriseis that although Mink’sAmerican career is fully illuminated thecentral ®gure is notdiminished. Minkremains (ashis critics andadmirers have portrayed him, blunt,ambitious, ambiguous) and,although shornof myth, still surroundedby controversy,con ¯ict,and intrigue. Analmost universally heldassumption about Mink is that hewas a native-born American. However,in a1932 autobiography writtenfor theComintern, Mink re- portedthat hewas born GodiMinkowsky, of Jewish parentage, in theRussian village ofZittomir Volyan in 1899. Abandonedby his mother andfather Minkwas sent by his grandparents totheUnited States to live with relatives in Philadelphia. Attheage of14 Minkdecided to shift for himself andmoved to Chicago wherehe worked at avariety ofjobs and perfected his American accent.He wrote in 1932: Ialways lived with native born Americans andI adaptedmyself tothe life of theCountry, and picked up the language in aslang form ¼Irealized very soonthat an American Native Born couldget along better than anemigrant soI decidedto Americanize myself,and in theyear of1916 Ijoinedthe UnitedStates Navy giving my nameas George Martin Mink,born in the USA. Sosuccessfulwas Mink ’sdeceptionthat a1942 FBI report listedhim asborn onApril 23rd, 1899, in Scranton,Pennsylvania. 4

3Themost important recentstudies drawing upon the newlyavailable sourcesare: Harvey Klehr, John EarlHaynes and Fridrikh Firsov, The Secret Worldof American Communism (NewHaven: Yale University Press,1996); Harvey Klehr, John EarlHaynes and KyrillM. Anderson, The Soviet Worldof American Communism (NewHaven: Yale UniversityPress, 1998); the secondedition of Ron Radosh and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File (NewHaven: Yale UniversityPress, 1997); Allen Weinsteinand Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood:Soviet Espionage in AmericaÐThe Stalin Era (NewYork: Random House, 1998).Maurice Isserman, ª GuessWhatÐ They Really WereSpies,º http:/ /www.forward.com/current/ arts.html. 4GeorgeMink Autobiography, April 29,1932, 2± 3, ®le495± 261± 1667, Russian Centerfor the Storage and Study ofDocuments of Contemporary History(RTzKhIDNI) Moscow,Russian Federation;Federal Bureauof Investigation, Custodial DetentionReport, Dec.26, 1942, 1 (Courtesy ofDavid P.Hornstein). GeorgeMink and theComintern 309

Assignedto the Boston naval yards Minkwas serving aboard abattleship whenthe badly damaged Russiancruiser Variag steamedinto theport for repairs. Mink,who modestlyacknowledged that, ashis family had comefrom that country,he spoke ª a little Russian,ºwas assigned as liaison with the Variag’screw.The sailors introduced Minkto radicalism which strucksuch a responsivecord in theyoung seamanthat he later wrote,ª only then[did Irealize] what waswhat in theworld.º Inspired by the RussiansMink took every opportunity during theremainder ofhis career in theNavy topromote socialism andagitate against thewar. Because of these activities Mink receivedan ordinary, rather than an honorable, discharge from theNavy in 1919 and tookup the life ofa merchant seamanand union organizer. 5 In 1921 Minkbecame the International Seamen ’sUnion(ISU) representative tothe AFLCentral Labor Councilin Philadelphia. In May ofthesame year astrike broke out andMink found himself elevatedto the strike committee,an experiencewhich con- vincedhim that theISU did not properly servethe needs of marine workers.Searching for an alternative Minkjoined the Industrial Workers ofthe World (IWW) and,when thestrike failed, led500 sailors outof theAFL andinto the IWW. Expelled from the International Seamen ’sUnionas a Communist(although hewas not) Mink left Philadelphia andsailed tothe west coast where he made contact with theAmerican Communistparty. Helater recalled: While in Portland, Oregon Icame closerto the Communist party there,the (Worker’sParty) andin [month illegible] 1921 Ijoinedthe Worker ’s Party later theCP ofthe USA. Ibecamevery active in theseamen ’sfraction and workedwithin theIWW keeping in touchwith HarrisonGeorge who was in charge ofthe Red International Committee.I keptgoing tosea making trips toJapan, China,etc. Harrison Georgeheaded the Pan Paci® cTrade Union,an organization which fronted for awiderange oflegal andillegal Cominternactivity. The highlighting ofGeorge ’s name in his autobiography indicatesthe importance Minkplaced onthe association andstrongly suggeststhat hebecame involved with theComintern ’sinternational work almost immediately after joining theCommunist party. 6 Mink’sinternational travel andresidence on the west coast insulated him from the factional struggles which sweptover theparty in theearly 1920s. The constant upheavals required regular Cominternintervention and caused considerable member- ship turnover.As a consequencewhen Mink returned to New York in 1925 noone rememberedhis earlier activities (whichhad beenoutside the party in any case)and he seemedto be a freshface. Transferred to District Three Minkwas sent back to Philadelphia andgiven thetask ofbuilding aCommunistfraction within theseamen ’s unionof the IWW. Needinga shore-basedjob to supporthis organizing workhe found employment with ataxi company.Although thebrief jobbecame the basis for the persistentbelief that Minkhad neverbeen a real sailor hedid not stay ashorelong. After

5Mink underlinedthe phrase Ordinarydischarge in his 1932autobiography, givingthe impression that some controversyover his naval servicemay have existed.An Ordinary dischargewas equivalent to today ’s GeneralDischarge which isusually givenwhen normally faithful serviceis marred by negativebehavior (such as anti-war agitation in time ofwar) in regardto performanceof duty orpersonal conduct.George Mink Autobiography, April 29,1932, 4, ®le495± 261± 1667, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 6For afulltreatment of Harrison George ’sworkfor the Comintern, seeHarvey Klehr, John EarlHaynes, and Fridrikh Firsov, The Secret Worldof American Communism (NewHaven: Yale UniversityPress, 1995), 49±60; George Mink Autobiography, April 24,1932, 5± 6, ®le495± 261± 1667, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 310 V.L.Pedersen

organizing ataxicab strike,which failed butbankrupted the company, Mink returned to the sea.7 In thespring of1927 Minksailed for theSoviet Unionaboard the USS Nordico which wastransporting acargo ofsheepto the Black Seaport ofNovorossisk. Mink served as chairman ofthe Communist party fraction aboard ship andsubmitted two reports to theNovorossisk party of®cials. The professionally donereports identi®ed theCommu- nistparty members aboard ship,discussed the behavior ofthe non-party crewmem- bers,and recommended that several ofthe latter besubjectedto ª closequestioningº by local authorities. Minkdid not return to the States on the Nordico,butinstead traveled onto Moscow to attend the Fourth Pro® nternCongress as a delegate from the CPUSA.At the Congress the Pro® nternleadership appointedMink as a representative ofthe Transport Workers International Committeefor Propaganda andAgitation (TWICPA) andcharged him with organizing themaritime workersin theUnited States.8 AsAmerican organizer Minkwas responsible for carrying outgeneral policies for marine workset down in a1923 Pro® nternreport onessential activities among seamen. The report begins with directiveson such basic trade unionactivities asimproving maritime publications, adapting Port Bureauactivities tothe ª speci®c conditionsºof seamen’slives, andcollecting data onwages and working conditions.Less traditional endeavorsincluded instructions to extend Communist in¯ uence on the waterfront through thecapture of ª unorganizedmovements,º and active interventionto settle disputesbetween seamen. The report also recommendedthe aggressive useof unemployedcouncils to end strike breaking andestablish controlof the hiring process. The report’sauthorsurged port organizers toadhere to the Berlin conference decisionsregarding theUnited Front, combat Fascism whereconditions allowed, andform special committeesin thelarge portsto observe and record the movement ofwar materials. Finally, whereverpossible, work among seamenshould be linked toorganizing among other transport workerssuch as longshoremen and railway employees.9 The list oftasks reveals amix ofobjectives behind the Pro® ntern ’sinterestin maritime work.The Pro® nternsought to organize workersaround a variety ofreformist goals designedto improve their daily lives andto simultaneously create a disciplined revolutionary cadre.This group wouldhave themultiple tasksof continuing to build theunions, preparing theground for aproletarian revolution,and performing avariety ofduties,such as monitoring war material or opposing Fascism,of directbene® t tothe Soviet Union.What is notclear from theComintern report ishow organizing onthe basis ofreformism wouldcreate a revolutionary cadre.

7Mink also visitedthe Soviet Unionin 1921but fails to mention this in his Comintern autobiography. Possibly he visitedthe USSR beforejoining the Communist party (which occurredlate in 1921,the exact dateis illegible)and did not considerthe trip signi®cant. ThePro® ntern thought otherwiseand notedon Mink’sregistrationform for the Fifth Pro®ntern Congress that he had visitedthe Soviet Unionas asailor in 1921.Nelson, 91±93; Autobiography ofGeorge Mink, April 29,1932, ® le495± 261± 1667, 1± 6; Questionnairesfrom Delegates to the Fifth Pro®ntern Congress, George Mink, ®le534± 1± 179, 106, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. 8Minutesof Meeting of Fraction of Workers (Communist) party ofthe S.S.Nordico and Letterfrom S.S.Nordico to Communist party, Novorossisk, USSR, Dec.20 and 26,1927, ® le515± 1± 1175; Pro® ntern letteraddressed ª DearFriend,º undated 1929,and Pro®ntern letter, 18 Jan. 1929,® le534± 6± 138, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. 9PortBureaus and ActivitiesAmong Seamen, Pro®ntern report 1923, 100± 101, ® le534± 2± 11, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. GeorgeMink and theComintern 311

Mink,however, had nodoubts about howto proceedÐ he simply sidesteppedthe problem. Heintended to create a revolutionary unionby staf®ng it with menalready radicalized by contactwith theIWW. Assoon as he returned to the United States Mink began contactingold friends and acquaintances within theIWW alerting them tothe plan tolaunch a ªredºseamen ’sunion.He used the most active among these individuals tocreate a maritime af® liate ofthe Communist Party ’slabor umbrella, William Z.Foster ’sTrade UnionEducational League (TUEL). Called theMarine Workers Progressive League(MWPL) the organization had at least apaper existenceby theautumn of 1928. Never intendedas an endin itself Minkplanned to use the Progressive Leagueas a foundationfor thebuilding ofa genuinetrade union,but his activities werealmost cutshort by party factionalism. 10 In late 1928 or early 1929 Jay Lovestoneand Jack Stachel accusedMink of belonging toJames P.Cannon ’sfactionof Trotskyites andsuspended him from all ofhis duties. The action prompted animmediate responsefrom thePro® ntern,which senta sharply wordedletter tothe CPUSA:

Dear Friends,We received a communicationstating that youhave removed Mink,our representative, a member ofthe TWICP&A, withouthaving made any investigation ofthematter. Weare surprisedthat thereshould be suchan attitudetowards our workers, for downto the present time wehave had in all ourorganizations workerswho were appointed and withdrawn with our agreement.We herewith bring toyour noticethat at theFifth Conferenceof Revolutionary Transport Workers,Mink was elected a member ofthe TWICP&A representingthe workers in theMarine Transport Tradesof the U.S.A.and he was charged in accordancewith thedecision of the Fourth RILUCongress and the Fifth Revolutionary Transport Workers ’ Conference with theorganization ofthe American seamen¼ In view ofthe stupendous importance oforganizing theAmerican seamen¼ theTWICP&A requests youto speedup theinvestigation ofthequestion of ComradeMink and until its completion toreinstate him onhis former work.

The letter leaves thedistinct impression that theparty had notbeen previously informedof Mink ’sinternational connections. 11 Minkimmediately returnedto work and sent a letter ofexplanation tothe CPUSA Political Committee.In theletter Minkprotests that hehad always beena supporterof theFoster group andregarded theprinciples ofthe Cannon group ascounter-revol- utionary anda crime against theworking class.He claimed that someonehad forgedhis nameto both asubscriptionreceipt for TheMilitant ,theCannon group paper, anda secondreceipt indicating that hehad donated$50 tothe faction. The defenseis weak andmildly overstated.Mink was certainly involved in thefaction ® ght andmight have, uncertainof the outcome, brie ¯ysupportedthe Cannon group. Minkwas greatly relieved whenthe Comintern ordered Jay Lovestoneand a small group offollowers expelled from theparty in 1929. While in Moscowthe following year hetook pains to commenton the improved atmosphere in theparty andfrequently reminded listeners ofhis loyalty tothe faction surrounding Foster. The incidentshows off Mink ’s

10DearFriend letter, undated, likely early1929, 18, ® le534± 6± 138; Mink Report to the American Commission, 9Sept. 1930,176, ® le495± 37± 67, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 11Pro®ntern to CPUSA, Jan. 18,1929, 6, ®le534± 6± 138, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 312 V.L.Pedersen

somewhatham-handed political skills and,more importantly, reveals thedegree of international protectionhe enjoyed. 12 Freedfrom factional entanglements,Mink organized threeseamen ’sconferencesone eachon the East, West, and Gulf coasts. The conferencesput organizers in the® eld andlaid theground work for anational conventionto establish arevolutionary union. Of 191 delegatesattending theMWIU ’sfoundingconvention in NewYork city in April of1930, only 24 wereparty members.Mink took great pride in this accomplishment andon several occasionspointed out that many ofthe delegates had hitch-hiked or riddenthe rails toreach theconvention. Such enthusiasm indicated a level ofdedi- cation andworking-class consciousness that Minkfelt wasrarely seenin party circles. The vast majority ofthe delegates were former members ofthe IWW, which had certain advantages aswell asdrawbacks. Their past experiencehad given them,in Mink’swords,ª avery goodtraining in theclass struggle,º and made them able organizers. Butat thesame time theformer Wobblies werenotoriously independent andmistrustful of bureaucracy. At the convention the delegates refused to accept a previously writtendraft constitutioninsisting onworking through it line by line until a documentagreeable toall wasproduced. The extra effortresulted in acostover-run forcing Minkto go downtownto CPUSA headquarters for anextra $1000. 13 The moneywas well spentas the constitution produced was un¯ inchingly radical committing theunion to striving for betterwages and working conditionsand to advancing therevolutionary struggle against thecapitalist system.The documentalso denouncedclass collaboration andsought to unite seamen, harbor workers,and longshoremeninto a single militant force.As a tangible demonstrationof their revol- utionary commitment thedelegates requested that theMWIU be directly af® liated with theRed International ofTransport Workers.Mink explained that theTrade Union Unity League(TUUL), Foster ’soldTUEL, of which the MWIU was a part, was already aRedInternational af® liate. Butthe delegates replied that theTUUL was too unstableand they preferredto put their trustin thePro® ntern.Mink agreed andthe MWIUbecame directly af® liated with theInternational Seamenand Harbors Workers Union(ISH) headquarteredin Hamburg. The delegatesleft theconvention armed with stacksof membership cardsand a resolve torapidly build theunion. In August,only fourmonths after thefounding convention, Mink traveled toMoscow and reported to theComintern that therewere now 11 International Seamen ’sclubs(commonly known asInterclubs) in theUnited States and 6000 members in theMWIU. 14

12Apossible sourceof this support may have beenA.S. Lozovsky, head ofthe Pro®ntern, with whom Mink isoften linked. An FBI reportcites [blacked out] sources who believedthat Mink was Lozovsky ’s brother-in-law. FederalBureau of Investigation, Custodial DetentionReport, Dec.26, 1942, 15; George Mink to the Political Committee, undated, 104,® le515± 1± 1640, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow,Russian Federation. 13Mink Report to the AmericanCommission, Sept. 9, 1930,176, ® le495± 37± 67; Interview between Comrade Manuilsky and AmericanComrades, Aug. 31,1930, 1± 4, ®le495± 37± 73, RTzKhIDNI; Richmond, 175±176. 14TheInternational Seamen ’sclubs ®rstappeared in the Soviet Unionas atool fororganizing the domesticshipping industry and then servedas amodel fora worldwidenetwork of clubs. By the late1920s, in the wordsof a distressedBritish union of®cial, the Interclubswere ª springingup everywhere.º Everywherebut the UnitedStates which, until Mink ’sorganizingdrive, had only asingle90-member club in NewYork. J. HavelockWilson, CHCBE Presidentof the National Unionof Seamen, to the Principles ofall the Shipping Companies ofthe UnitedKingdom, 111,® le534± 5± 207; Interview between Comrade Manuilsky and AmericanComrades, 1, ®le495± 37± 73; Preamble and Constitution ofthe MarineWorkers IndustrialUnion, 15±19, Minutes of the National Convention ofthe MarineWorkers League, 6, ®le 515±1± 2179, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. GeorgeMink and theComintern 313

Despitethese impressive statisticsMink admitted that theMWIU had twoserious problems: its relationship with theCPUSA was strained; and it sufferedfrom an extremely unstablemembership. The constant¯ uctuationof membership arosein part from theconditions of maritime work.Unlike European sailors, American sailors were notusually married sothey frequentlymoved from port toport rarely staying with a single ship for more than afewmonths. In addition their lives werepunctuated with regular periodsof unemploymentas they waitedon the beach betweenships. Because ofsuchcircumstances Mink told the Comintern that, ofthe6000 paper members,only 1600 paid dues,and of the dues-paying members only 400 belongedto the Communist party. All ofthe party members,including Minkand his closeassociates, were sailors themselveswhich meant that thegroup whichcould have formeda stable coreof activists also constantlyshifted from place toplace. Mink believed that theproblems createdby seafaring couldbe partly alleviated by recruiting among thelongshoremen to provide areliable, shore-basedmembership. 15 The problems with theCPUSA, Mink reported, stemmed from alack ofunderstand- ing ofmarine workby thebulk ofthe party leadership. This ledto such farcical incidentsas Baltimore Party of®cials, underthe mistaken impression that marine meant Marine Corps,asking sailors at theFells Point Anchorage toput on their uniforms beforecoming toa party meeting.More seriously, it ledto either neglectof marine workby local leadersput off by therough menfrom theships and docks or the overwhelming ofnew party members with bewildering responsibilities. Minkproposed solving theseproblems by strengtheningthe TUUL andeducating party members about thepeculiar needsof seamen. Mink ’sanalysis oftheproblem re¯ectedfavorably onhim butavoided the real problem betweenthe two organizations whichwas an old-fashionedturf war fueledby party resentmentof Mink ’sarrogance andindepen- denceof action and a struggle for controlof chronically shortresources. 16 Cominternof® cials attachedto the American Commissionclosely questionedMink about theclass consciousness of the MWIU membership andthe speci® c goals ofthe unionfor improving theday-to-day life ofthesailors. Minkproudly replied that, asthe bulk ofthemembership had comeout of theold IWW, they werea very class-conscious lot andhad goneª toa goodschoolº of the class struggle. This responsepleased the Cominternreps but they wereunhappy with thelist ofdemands Mink outlined. Chief among them weresame food for of®cers and crew, eight-hour watcheson deck, six hoursbelow deck, abolition of® nesand logging (blacklisting), andthe right topay off in every port. Dmitry Manuilsky,the head of the American Commission,felt that these demandswere too ambitious andjoked that they wouldonly beachieved undera proletarian dictatorship. Aftera pausefor laughter (recordedin thetranscript) heasked Minkwhat hewas doing tomeet small immediate needsto show the workers what the unioncould do for them.Mink had noready answer,pleading that workwould have tobecentered among thelongshoremen in thenear term. Headded that somethings werebeing done,but, as they happenedat sea,the union only heard about theevents after it wastoo late tohave any directin ¯uence. 17

15Interviewbetween Comrade Manuilsky and AmericanComrades, Aug. 31,1930, 1± 2, 11±12, ® le 495±37± 73, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 16Mink Report to the AmericanCommission, Sept. 9, 1930,173, 177± 178, ® le495± 37± 67, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. 17Interviewwith Comrade Manuilsky and the AmericanComrades, Aug. 31,1930, 22, ®le495± 37± 73, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. 314 V.L.Pedersen

Anissue unaddressed by either Minkor his Cominternquestioners was how his organizing workwas being funded.The questionmost likely wasnever posed because everyonepresent knew the answer. Unfortunately their silencecreates problems for historians, especially given thecontroversies over theextent of Soviet fundingfor the American Communistparty. The recordoffers two clues to Mink ’s®nances.Richard Krebs, in Out oftheNight ,recalls escortingMink to Hamburg in 1931 after hehad been given ªseveral thousanddollarsº for waterfrontactivities by Fritz Hecker,the treasurer for theWestern Secretariat ofthe Comintern. An FBI informant recalled thesame occasionand stated that Minkhad received$40,000. Moreevidence can be found in twoaudits that Minkhad conductedof MWIU ® nances.The auditscover theperiod from April 24th, 1930, toAugust 31st, 1931, andreveal that theMWIU operated on abudgetthat neverexceeded $5,000 for asingle year. They also reveal that between80 and90 percentof that amountcame from ªdonations,ºrecorded as a single lump sum, with theremainder ekedout of dues payments andsubscriptions. In all likelihood the donationsrepresent Mink ’sªMoscowgoldº but if soit also indicatesthat the Cominternoperated on a tight budget. 18 Onceback in theUnited States Mink instructed MWIU organizers tobegin intensive workamong longshoremenin thefamiliar territory ofPhiladelphia. Eager todemon- strate resultsMink called for ageneral waterfrontstrike after only amonth ’s prep- aration. The effortfailed miserably andalthough about 50 individuals retainedtheir MWIUbooks the pressures of unemployment quickly forcedall ofthem back insidethe International Longshoremen ’sAssociation(ILA). At theFebruary 1931 national com- mittee meeting Minkreported that over $500 wasowed to the printers andthat the unionitself wasat avirtual standstill.A muchharsher evaluation ofthe situation came from thePro® nternwhich wrote to the International Seamenand Harbor Workers Unionblaming it for theª collapseºof the MWIU. 19 GeorgeHardy, aBritish Communistand newly appointed head of the ISH, re- spondedvigorously tothe Pro® nterncriticism byblaming thecollapse onGeorge Mink. Mink,Hardy wrote,provided weakleadership andemployed mechanical, bureaucratic, methodswhich couldonly lead tothe kind of disasters suffered in Philadelphia. Worse Minkhad beenwarned about employing suchtactics when he passed through Ham- burg andmet with Hardy in thefall of1930. Sincethen repeated letters sent to the UnitedStates requesting information about thesituation of the MWIU had met only silence.Considering that very goodcommunication links, ª both openand con®dential,º existed between the two organizations Hardy wasat alossto explain the American attitude.The bestsolution, Hardy concluded,would be to send an ISH representative toAmerica todirectly overseethe work of theMWIU, but, unfortunately resourcesdid not permit suchan action. 20 The Pro® nternexaggerated theseverity ofthe situation: the MWIU was not in ªcollapse,ºbut neither wasit making great progress.In theearly spring astrike broke

18Thereare two reportsboth submitted on Sept. 30,1931, the ®rstcovers the periodfrom April 24, 1930to Sept. 30, 1930;the secondcovers the periodfrom Oct. 1, 1930to Aug. 31, 1931.Auditing Report ofMax Kitzes, Central Auditing Bureau, Sept. 30, 1931,13± 21, ®le515± 1± 2554, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation;Valtin, 310;Federal Bureau of Investigation, Custodial DetentionReport on George Mink, 26Dec.26, 1942, 4. 19MarineWorkers Industrial Union of USA, Minutes ofNational Bureau Heldin New YorkCity , Feb. 24,1931, 236, ® le515± 1± 2554, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 20Letterto the SecretariatRILU from the SecretariatISH, Mar.9, 1931,96, ® le534± 5± 220, RTZKhIDNI, Moscow,Russian Federation. GeorgeMink and theComintern 315 outamong theblack dockworkers in NewOrleans. Unfortunately,the MWIU failed towinthe con® dence of the strike leadersand instead of shaping tacticswatched from thesidelines as the strike, in thewords of the port organizer, ªdrug onºto its inevitable sadconclusion. In California theMWIU provided leadership for astrike by Stockton rivermen whichprevented a 35% wage cut.However, the two party organizers involved admitted tomaking noattempt topush for radical demandsand criticized themselves for ªhiding theface of the Party.º In October of1931, at theNational Committee meeting, Minkconceded that noneof the goals setfor him by theAmerican Com- missionhad beenachieved. The MWIU,he reported, functioned very well asa propaganda organization, butit had beenunable to create a stable membership or carry through genuineorganizing onthe ships and the docks. Instead, Mink concluded, ª we have spreadout like mushroomstrying tobite offmore than wecan chew. Shifting from port toport, starting workin oneplace andin many casesleaving thejob half ® nished.º 21 Mink’sNational Committeereport gives theimpression that heaccepted the blame for the MWIU’slack ofprogress. But, in factMink placed theonus for theunion ’s problems squarely onthe CPUSA. William McCuistion,one of the MWIU ’s chief organizers recalled many occasionswhen Mink instructed ® eldworkers to make certain that theCPUSA ful® lled its obligations tomaritime work.Mink did not harbor any reluctanceto take his complaints tothe top andfrequently berated Party chiefEarl Browderabout the failure oflocal Party districtsto contribute to waterfront organizing. Of particular concernto Mink was the CPUSA practice ofremoving talentedorganizers from thewaterfront and reassigning them toother duties. 22 In November 1931 Minksubmitted a report tothe Comintern formally accusingthe CPUSAof neglecting theunion. Given that thebasic task ofthe party wasto build revolutionary unionsMink found this conducta ¯agrant violation ofduty, made even more seriousby theheightened danger ofwar against theSoviet Union.The situation couldonly beresolved by thecomplete support of the party for organizing in the maritime industry.Mink suggested that aletter besent from thePolitburo ordering all Districts toconcentrate on marine by assigning full party sectionsto the waterfront (twosections each were needed in NewYork andSan Fransisco), drawing seameninto theDistrict level leadership, andbuilding the MarineWorkers Voice intoa truemass publication. Minkalso recommendedthat aspecial war commissionbe created, comprisedof Earl Browder,William Z.Foster,MWIU organizer Harry Hynes,and Minkhimself. The commissionwould meet regularly tolobby suchbodies as the International Seamenand Harbor Workers Unionfor material support. 23 Mink’ssharply wordedreport had something tooffend everyone and the spring of 1932 foundhim in Hamburg at themercy ofhis enemiesin theISH. ISH organizer Richard Krebsconfronted Mink at thelocal Interclub over apersonal matter and

21MarineWorkers Industrial Union, Report forDec.± Jan.± Feb., 1931,20± 22; Report on Strikeof Stockton Rivermen, Aug. 1931,29± 31; Report on the MarineIndustry in the U.S.A., September 1931, 43, ®le534± 7± 499; National Committee Meeting,Marine Workers Industrial Union, 140Broad St., Oct. 10±11, 1931, 24, ® le515± 1± 2554, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 22McCuistion, afterharrowing experiences in the Spanish Civil War, turnedagainst the Communist party and gavelengthy testimony to the DiesCommittee. U.S. Congress,House of Representatives, Special Committee on Un-AmericanActivities, 76th Congr., 2ndSess. Investigation ofUn-American PropagandaActivities in the United States ,Testimony ofWilliam C.McCuistion, Oct. 30,1939, 6550± 6552. 23Untitledreport of George Mink, Nov. 1931,92± 93, ® le543± 7± 499, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 316 V.L.Pedersen

speculatedthat he[Mink] had beencaught onthe losing sideof a Cominternfaction ® ght. Mink’sdif®culties probably had lessto do with afaction® ght than interagency rivalry. On June30, 1932 Minkappealed tothe Western Bureau of the Comintern complaining that hehad beenabandoned in Hamburg andprotesting his treatment by Pro® nternof® cials. Theseindividuals had questionedhis credentialsin frontof non- party members andattempted to assign him toother work.Mink did accept a temporary reassignment,but only after atelegram from America con®rmed that hewas still MWIUNational Chairman, andonly after theHamburg cadrespromised toreturn him towork in themaritime industrywhen he ª wasthru with theother assignments.º The entireincident greatly angeredMink as he felt it increasedorganizational antago- nismsand detracted attention from suchimportant matters ashis plans for the reorganization ofthe west coast. He also felt personally demoralized andconfessed that ªIam notvery enthusiasticabout going back ashead of our union, especially under suchconditions as exist.º 24 Unfortunatelyfor Minkconditions did not improve. Hisreturn to the United States coincidedwith twoexplosions in theNew York MWIUbranch causedby Mink ’s blunt personality andresolute focus on radicalism. The initial outburstcentered on Commu- nistparty member, andMWIU founder, John Johannessen, who, disgusted with the stateof the party andthe union, submitted a sharply critical article tothe DailyWorker . Johannessencastigated theCommunist party for deluging seamenwith demandsto participate in openair meetingsand signature drives unconnectedwith their daily lives andfor endangering party members ’ jobsby making them distributeCommunist party literature at their place ofemployment. Hereserved particular bile for theparty decisionto subject the seamen to a ªpetticoat governmentºby appointing awomanto representthe maritime workersat aparty convention.He denounced the move asa grossinsult which ª pokedfun at themisery, starvation, andsocial ostracism ofthe American seamen.º 25 Asunhappy asJohannessen was about the party hereserved his sharpestcriticism for theMWIU itself: The Union[he wrote]is ¼ opento Marine workersregardless ofpolitical or religious beliefsand also regardless ofcolor or nationality andyet we®ndthe unionis dominatedby fanatic dogmatic sectarians.When an active member returnsfrom atrip andhas successfullylined up newmembers intothe union andtold them in glowing termsabout therank and® le controlled® ghting MWIUthese workers come in tothe Hall they either swallowwithin afew hoursthe whole revolutionary program hook,line, and sinker or are classedas adumbbell or astoolpigeon. This samesmall faction,Johannessen continued, controlled all themeetings and swept away suggestionsfrom the¯ oor or from returning ships ’ delegates.Open-air meetings wereeven worse: the only distinctionJohannessen could see between an MWIU

24Krebsbelieved that the ªotherassignmentº had beenan NKVD-sponsoredassassination. No evidence existsto corroboratethis accusation. Valtin, 310±312; Letter of George Mink to DearComrades, 136±137, ®le534± 5± 230, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 25LenaDavis appears in an Octoberreport in aposition ofauthority overthe WaterfrontUnit; this and hergeneral position within the Party, make herthe most likely candidatefor Waterfront delegate. Details on Davis taken fromHarvey Klehr, The Heydayof American Communism (NewYork: Basic Books, 1984), 236;Detailed Account of Past Incidentsrelated to MarineWork, 38,File 515±1± 2995, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow,Russian Federation. GeorgeMink and theComintern 317 meeting anda meeting oftheHoly Rollers wasthat theunion speakers shouted, ª tohell with Jerusalem Slim andto hell with everybody,ºwhile themission speakers shouted, ªhurray for Jerusalem Slim andhurray for everybody.º Unionand party chiefs,Johannessen declared, had todrop theidea that good leadership meant ªspitting andcoughing like Leninº; they had tostart listening tothe rank and® le,and establish areal collective leadership. The price for neglecting these changes,he concluded,would be to squanderthe currently ripe conditionsfor creating astrongwaterfront organization. ANational Buro meeting in Augustvoted unani- mously toexpel Johannessenfrom theMWIU National Committeeand ordered him to thewest coast. Johannessen instead resigned from both theparty andthe MWIU and remained in NewYork rejoining theIWW wherehe agitated aggressively against his former colleagues. 26 The secondwave of discontentconcerned a small group ofScandinavian Communist party members whobanded together toorganize unemployedNorwegian seamen.After appealing tothe MWIU for assistancethe Scandinavians discovered, much to their surprise,that theorganization wasmore ofa hinderancethan ahelp. Onone occasion thesailors met with Harry Jackson,a bellicose unionfunctionary from thewest coast, toseek advice about howto approach theNorwegian consulatewith anappeal for unemploymentrelief for beachednationals. Jackson advised the delegates to enter the consulateof® ce, break upthe furniture, and throw the typewriters outof the windows. Nomentionwas made of presenting demands. On another occasionthree members of the seamen’sgroup attemptedto report onthe activities ofa small group ofLove- stonitestrying toorganize onthe docks. Instead of praise all threewere badgered by Jacksonand Mink and accused of disloyalty. OnOctober 29 theScandinavians submitted a lengthy report tothe Communist party entitledª Detailed Accountingof Past IncidentsRelative toMarine Work,ºwhich outlinedthese and other grievances.The authorsdemanded to know what wasgoing on. Why didn’ttheMWIU support fellow Communists in their attempts toorganize theunemployed? What wasthe meaning oftactics like thosesuggested in theNorwe- gian consulateand others at theSeamen ’sChurchInstitute at which ®ve committees wereformed, some to ®ght andsome to shout? Such tactics, the writer declared,ª have beentotally detrimental totheseamen ’scauseand to Marine workº; theonly solution that thereport ’sauthor couldsee was that ªsincethe underlying causesof uneasiness lies with theNational of®ce,º and Comrade Mink is chairman ofthat of®ce, he should beremoved immediately. 27 The NewYork situationgenerated a crisis theresult of which wasthat while Mink remained Chairman ofthe MWIU he became much less visible in theday-to-day operationsof the union. Mink ’ssignature,which previously had appeared onall important uniondocuments, disappeared after thefall of1932, tobe replaced by the signature ofRoy Hudson,the National Secretary. Minkreappears in therecord as a regular participant in thedeliberations ofthenational committee oftheTUUL. Mink had frequentlypointed to the weakness of the TUUL as one of thefactors holding back thedevelopment of revolutionary trade unionsso the change in responsibilities couldbe

26J.Johannessen, ªSeamen and the Revolutionary Movement,º22± 24, File515± 1± 2995, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow,Russian Federation. 27ªDETAILEDACCOUNTING OFPAST INCIDENTS RELATIVETO MARINEWORK,º To: Communist Party ofUnited States, NewYork City, NY, Oct. 29,1932, 36± 38, File 515±1± 2995, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. 318 V.L.Pedersen

seenas an opportunity for Minkto put his advice intopractice by strengtheningthe organization. However,it ismuch more likely that themove wasintended to ª kickº Minkupstairs andwas a form ofpunishment. Mink ’slackluster performance as member ofthe TUUL National Committeebears outthe latter interpretation. Nor- mally loquaciousand argumentative Minkremained silentduring mostof themeetings heattended. In September hegave abrief (oneparagraph) report onthe Boston longshoreman ’sstrike,saying only that ªnothing couldbe doneº because of inadequate CPUSAsupport. 28 The relationship betweenthe ISH andthe MWIU also remained poor.In December 1932 Hudsonforwarded a selectionof correspondence between the two organizations tothePro® nternin thehope of improving thesituation. Most of theletters berated the MWIUin general for notfollowing ISH instructions,but one singled out Mink for individual criticism. The letter respondedto a newspaperarticle theMWIU had forwardedto Hamburg whichdescribed a sailor ’sdelegation that Minkhad ledto the White Housewhich threatened a seamen ’smarch onWashington if relief demands werenot met. What, theISH wantedto know, was the so-called National Chairman doing ªthreateningºwhen it wasthe duty of Communists to act. 29 By late 1933 circumstanceshad combinedto a point that Minkreluctantly accepted reassignmentto Europe. Al Richmond,an MWIU cadre, spoke to Mink shortly before his departureand recalled that hewas very unhappy andbitter about being takenout oftheUnited States. Bruce Nelson, who cites Richmond in Workerson the Waterfront , believed that theAmerican party transferredMink, but this isunlikely. Mink ’s original commissionhad comefrom theinternational apparatus, his unionoperated indepen- dentlyof the CPUSA, and he had survived other attempts by thenational party to remove him. It is muchmore likely that it wasthe continuing friction with theISH and Mink’sapathetic performance asa member ofthe TUUL National Committeewhich prompted his reassignment. 30 This explanation is supportedby thefact that theComintern did not regard Mink ’s failure with theMWIU as serious enough to remove him from international work. Insteadof being either recalled toMoscow or returnedto the rank and® le oftheISH hewas assigned to anti-Fascist propaganda workin Europe.An altercation in a Copenhagenhotel (somesources claim it wasan attempted rape) ledto his arrest and 18-month imprisonment in Denmark. Uponhis releaseMink returned to Moscow, made aneloquent defense of himself beforethe Comintern, and was assigned to work in Spain. Accountsof his activities therevary widely:some accused him ofbeing an enforcerfor theNKVD, onesource even elevated him tohead of NKVD activities in Barcelona, butothers claim hewas only adutifulanti-Fascist volunteer. 31 Mink’swhereaboutsafter 1938 are very shadowy.William McCuistion,a former MWIUorganizer andLincoln Brigade veteran,had contactwith Minkin theUnited Statesin 1939 andthe FBI believed hewas traveling extensively betweenthe USSR and

28TUULNational Buro meeting,Sept. 28,1932, 23, ® le515± 1± 2979, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow,Russian Federation. 29Letterof Roy Hudson to Pro®ntern, Dec. 18, 1932, 131; Letter of the InternationalSeamen and HarborWorkers Union to the MWIU,Nov. 23, 1932,132, ® le534± 5± 231, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow, Russian Federation. 30Nelson, 92±93. 31Nelson, 91±92; Valtin, 312±313; FBI InternalSecurity-Custodial Detentionreport on GeorgeMink, Dec.26, 1942,6, 14±15, 27;Testimony ofWilliam C. McCuistion, Investigationsof Un-American Propaganda Activitiesin the UnitedStates, Oct. 30,1939, 6551. GeorgeMink and theComintern 319

Mexicoin 1940. Pierre Broue,a French Trotskyite, con®rms Mink ’spresencein Mexico,but comments that somebelieve that Minkdied in agun®ght in Barcelona during thesuppression of the anarchists. His identity wasthen assumed by another Cominternagent whoused it while settingup LeonTrotsky ’sassassination.This isnot likely asMcCuistion, who knew Mink well, claimed tohave actually seenhim in 1939. Broueis certain that Minkhad someconnection with theTrotsky murder,a conviction reinforcedby thefact that elementswithin theTrotskyite movementattempted to kill Minkin revenge.No trace ofhim (or his alleged impostor) canbe found after 1942. 32 After Mink’s1933 departure from theUnited States the MWIU, under Roy Hud- son’sdirection,changed tactics to focus on highly speci®c reformist goals. Certain shipping lines,seen as especially vulnerable for onereason or another,were targeted for aseriesof mini-strikes over particular issuessuch as the number of buckets available for washing ondeck. Eager toavoid atie-upin port mostcaptains gave in anda seriesof small victories resulted.In Baltimore theMWIU even brie ¯ytookcontrol of federal relief for beachedsailors andestablished a party-controlled hiring hall. Thesesuccesses werequickly reversed,however, and old problems persisted.In areport madeto the Politburo in 1934 Hudsoncited union membership at 2165; however,he quickly quali® edthat ®gure,noting that only 300 ofthose were ª oldmembers,º the remaining 1865 werethe result a recentrecruiting drive. 33 On May 9, 1934 alongshoremen ’sstrike broke outin SanFransisco which rapidly spreadbeyond the docks to engulf San Fransisco (a general strike) andto brie ¯y paralyze westcoast shipping. Although putdown in amatter daysthe strike greatly excitedCommunists in both theUnited States and the Soviet Unionbecause of the leading rolesplayed by theparty. The author ofa widely circulated report entitled Lessonsof the San FransiscoGeneral Strike tookgreat pride in thefact that the Western Worker,theParty publication onthe coast, was designated the of® cial strike organ. This accomplishment waspossible, he continued, because of the domination ofthe strike committee by secretCommunists seeded over thecourse of three years into theAFL Longshoremen ’sUnionin California. Although careful toinclude the MWIU in his praise ofthe party ’sworkthe report ’sunnamedauthor madeit plain that it wasthe secretfaction in theILA which rackedup accomplishments. Wherever theMWIU workedalone, he noted, the strike failed. Revolutionary unionism,the report implied, wasa deadendÐ the future lay in internal controlof the reformist unions.The Cominternagreed andin lessthan ayear orderedthe MWIU liquidated. Its former members wereinstructed to join the ranks oftheir oldrival theISU. 34 Mink’sAmerican career lays torest any thought that Minkwas no more than an honesttrade unionistand that theMWIU was primarily anindigenous expression of American radicalism. The Pro® nternordered Mink to create the union and the Cominternoversaw its operations, ordering its termination whenit proved unableto serveSoviet needs.Equally discredited,however, is the image ofa well-organized, highly disciplinedinternational Communistmovement. The recordsof the MWIU

32PierreBroue, ªGeorgeMink.º CahiersLeon Trotsky (1979)179. (Courtesy ofDavid Hornstein.) 33Testimony ofWilliam C.McCuistion, Investigation ofUn-American Propaganda ,Special Committee to InvestigateUn-American Activities, Houseof Representatives, 76th Congr., 1stSess. 1939,vol. 11, 6640;Nelson, 96±100; Report ofComrade Hudson on MarineWorkers Conference Made to Politburo April 19,1934, 157, ® le515± 1± 3444; Lessons ofthe San Francisco General Strike ,®le515± 1± 3400, RTzKhIDNI,Moscow, Russian Federation. 34Lessons ofthe San Fransisco General Strike ,Aug. 22,1934, ® le515± 1± 3400, 6± 10, RTzKhIDNI, Moscow,Russian Federation. 320 V.L.Pedersen

reveal disorganization, ®scal disaster,bootstrap techniques,and a striking degreeof tensionand internal rivalry at thehighest levels ofthe Comintern and its subordinate organizations. The discordsprang from several causes,such as bureaucratic empire building, thefrustration ofalways working at thelimit ofavailable resources,and personal animosity. Butperhaps themost important reasonfor theacrimonious atmosphere is that thevarious individuals andgroups involved wereunder constant pressurefrom Moscowto achieve goals which wereimpossible toattain. At thebeginning ofhis Cominternmandate Mink believed that hehad theformula for success:begin with atestedcadre, appeal tothe radicalism inherentin all workers, andmake full useof existing resources.The Cominternfelt Mink ’sgoals weretoo ambitious andcontinually urgedhim toleaven his approach with more reformist techniques,while theCPUSA resented his claims upontheir moneyand personnel. Minkpersisted in his initial courseand believed tothe end that hewould have succeededif notfor lack ofsupport from theCommunist party. However,Roy Hudson cooperatedwith theCommunist party andfollowed the Comintern ’sadvice tothe letter,but enjoyed no bettersuccess and within twoyears presidedover thedissolution of the MWIU. The problem which defeatedboth Minkand Hudson was the impossibility ofmixing reform andrevolution in thesame organization. If revolutionary goals are placed® rst reformism becomesmerely tactical, asituationintolerable toa mass-basedorganiza- tion,as revealed by theNew York crises.But if reformism is put® rstit resultsin a weakeningof the revolutionary toneof the union making it nothing buta duplication ofmainstream organizations andone whose only distinctionis its loyalty toa foreign power.However, a revolutionary factionwithin alarger organization canhave it both waysand, through careful maneuvering, evencontrol the larger organization. By failing wherethe International Longshoremen ’sAssociationsucceeded the MWIU helped convinceComintern leaders to shift from theThird Period policies ofrevolutionary confrontationto the mass-based, but often clandestine practices andpolices of Popular Front Communism.Ironically, in theprocess, George Mink, the advocate of open revolutionary goals, became,at least in thepopular imagination, GeorgeMink the archconspirator.