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Empathy, Open-Mindedness and Virtue in Argumentation UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Santa Barbara Empathy, Open-Mindedness and Virtue in Argumentation A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Jonathan Anthony Caravello Committee in charge: Professor Aaron Zimmerman, Chair Professor Kevin Falvey Professor Voula Tsouna June 2018 The dissertation of Jonathan Anthony Caravello is approved. ________________________________________________ Voula Tsouna ________________________________________________ Kevin Falvey ________________________________________________ Aaron Zimmerman Committee Chair June 2018 ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Writing a dissertation took a significant psychological toll on me, but I would be lying if I said that the burden was my own. I would like to thank every person who helped me in developing my thoughts and supporting me throughout this endeavor. Since a young age I have been interested in argument (just ask my Mom), which lead me to pursue what I considered to be the deeper questions about the world. I entered college at ASU with the hope of becoming a theoretical astrophysicist. But there were two factors that turned me off once I began my studies. First, I was not pleased with the culture of the discipline. Too often would professors wave off my questions as irrelevant to learning the techniques being taught. “Once you master these techniques,” they would say, “you will be in a better place and you will better understand why I cannot answer your questions.” Although there is some truth to what they said, I realized later that the reason my questions seemed out of place was because they were philosophical in nature. There were exceptions: Dr. Treacy and Dr. Lebed helped me immensely. Second, my fellow peers suffered from a deep and misguided close-mindedness concerning philosophical concerns. This, for me, was a breaking point. How could I investigate the deepest questions about the world when the space I occupied was full of stubborn interlocutors? Again, there were exceptions: Katie and Lauren, to be specific. Now, don’t get me wrong, there is plenty of stubbornness in philosophy as well. But at the very least, philosophers seemed to be directing their attention toward what really mattered and their practice reflected this. Unlike in my experience in physics, philosophers didn’t stubbornly laugh at my concerns, even if they often stubbornly criticized them. Sometimes that stubborn criticism is exactly what I needed – thanks Thad Botham! – but acceptance and understanding were and continue to be what I need. Thad was not only critical, he was understanding and a huge reason why I was accepted into the PhD program at UCSB. Others that were of immense help at ASU, include professors Cheshire Calhoun, Stephen Reynolds, Brad Armendt, and Angel Pinilos, and my fellow classmate Zach Horne. Thank you also to Travis and Jenni for being model graduate students for me, giving me a taste of what was to come. Thanks to my high school teacher Mr. Schiesser and junior high teacher Ms. Eddy, who shone through the bullshit as beacons of hope. Thank you Aaron Zimmerman for being my mentor and my friend. Thank you Tony Brueckner for showing me how philosophy doesn’t have to be stressful to be impactful. Thank you Kevin Falvey for entertaining some of my wilder ideas. Thank you Voula Tsouna for reminding me that there’s more to life than academic philosophy. Thank you Tony Anderson, Sonny Elizondo, Nathan Salmon, Teresa Robertson, Dan Korman, Michael Rescorla, Chris McMahon, Matthew Hanser, Tom Holden, and any others I’m forgetting for being welcoming and giving me space to grow as a thinker and philosopher. Thank you to my partner, Sarah Aspell, who has been my foundation when the floor beneath me was moving. She has somehow cut through the tangled mess of mind to swing me into a more peaceful side of myself. Thank you to my family and friends who put up with my philosophical tinkering for so long: my mom Dolores, my uncle Pat, my twin brother Pat, my older brother Mike, his kids Mikey and Abby, my older sister Carina and her husband John, their kids John, Cali, Dominick, and Brooklyn. Thank you most of all to my fellow graduate students, who I could not have lived without. Dillon: thank you for opening up and being my partner in philosophy for so long. I learned more through talking to you than I have from anything else in my entire life. Our bond is limitless, even when we disagree. Thank you Jason, Tim, Matt, David, Kyle, Daniel, Sherri, Jenna, Julianna, Jeongyu, Alex, Alex, Josh, Phil, Jenessa, Austin, Matt Peterson, Brian, CC, Jason, Jason, Augi, Damien, Blake, Zach, Dan, Keith, Rick, Rob, David Spewak, and any others I’ve missed. I dedicate this dissertation to anyone and everyone who has ever felt isolated from the world, from others, or from themselves . iii VITA OF JONATHAN ANTHONY CARAVELLO Month 2018 Areas of Specialization Epistemology, Ethics (broadly construed) Areas of Competence: Action Theory, Critical Thinking, Moral Psychology Education University of California Santa Barbara 2010-Present • M.A. 2014 • Ph.D. 2018 Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona: B.A. in Philosophy 2010 Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona: B.A. in Physics 2010 Dissertation Empathy, Open-Mindedness and Virtue in Argumentation How should we respond when someone challenges the very norms we assume when evaluating arguments? I contest a widely-accepted dogmatist answer according to which we can justly assert or rely on foundational norms or principles even when we know our interlocutors reject them. I go on to develop a virtue-theoretic approach to argumentation, highlighting the central role played by open-mindedness and related virtues in distinguishing good from bad arguments. The resulting theory elucidates the pragmatic nature of argumentative circularity, offers normative guidance for those looking to improve their discursive behavior, and makes some progress towards resolving ongoing debates over the proper response to peer disagreement. Committee: Aaron Zimmerman (chair), Kevin Falvey, and Voula Tsouna Awards and Honors UCHRI Multi-Campus Graduate Working Group Award 2016 - 2017 UCSB Dissertation (Diversity) Fellowship 2015 - 2016 Aida and Philip Siff Award for Best Essay 2015 - 2016 UCHRI Multi-Campus Graduate Working Group Award 2015 - 2016 SIOP Grant 2015 Steven L. Humphrey Fellowship, University of California Santa Barbara 2010 - 2011 Teaching Experience Instructorships and Adjunct Faculty Positions: (University of California Santa Barbara): Designed syllabi, exams and assignments for both lower and upper division courses, consisting of approximately 50-240 students; conducted 2-3 lectures per week; held office hours; maintained course website; supervised 1-4 teaching assistants. • THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE • CRITICAL THINKING • INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY • WRITING 2: ACADEMIC WRITING (25 students, no teaching assistants) iv Teaching Assistantships: (University of California Santa Barbara) Conducted two discussion sections per week for 50-70 lower and upper division students; held office hours; led review sessions; graded assignments and exams. • Philosophy of Mind (Winter 2014) • Metaphysics (Spring 2011) • Intro to Philosophy(Winter2013) • Theory of Knowledge (Winter 2011) • Philosophy of Religion (Fall 2012) • Introduction to Ethics (Fall 2010) • Philosophy of Mind (Spring 2012) • Philosophy of Mind (Summer 2010) • Theory of Knowledge (Winter 2012) • Critical Thinking (Spring 2010) • Introduction to Ethics (Fall 2011) • Introduction to Ethics (Winter 2010) • Theory of Knowledge (Summer 2011) • Introduction to Philosophy (Fall 2013) Graduate Courses *Indicates Audited Courses University of California Santa Barbara 2010-Present Topics in Philosophy of Mind | Rescorla Historical Philosophers | Zimmerman Hellenistic Philosophy | Tsouna *Seminar in Epistemology | Brueckner Seminar in Epistemology | Zimmerman *Seminar in Philosophy of Language | Salmon Philosophy of Space and Time | Humphrey *Seminar in Epistemology | Brueckner Intermediate Symbolic Logic | Anderson *Topics in Theory of Knowledge | Rescorla Seminar in Epistemology | Brueckner *Seminar in Philosophy of Language | Salmon Contemporary Philosophy | Salmon *Seminar in History of Philosophy | Tsouna Seminar on Hume | Holden *Seminar in Philosophy of Language | Meta-Ethics | Hanser Rescorla Seminar in Philosophy of Mind | Falvey *Seminar in Philosophy of Mind | Falvey Meaning and Reference | Salmon *Seminar in Philosophy of Mind | Rescorla Seminar in Ethics | Hanser *Seminar in Epistemology | Zimmerman Arizona State University 2006-2010 Seminar in Philosophy of Emotion | Cheshire Calhoun v ABSTRACT Empathy, Open-Mindedness and Virtue in Argumentation by Jonathan Anthony Caravello Disagreements continue over the most basic epistemic questions. Which logic is correct? What makes an argument good? We need a theory that can both explain the prevalence of such disagreements and evaluate the conduct and characters of those who participate in them. I argue that formal theories cannot supply this need. Circular arguments demonstrate the failure of formal approaches. Circular arguments are often impeccable from a formal perspective, but circular argumentation is almost always criticizable. A skilled arguer does not dismiss other viewpoints out of hand. Instead, to reason with those who reject our most basic assumptions about the logic of argumentation itself or the norms we assume when evaluating arguments for cogency or coherence we must break out of
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