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A C T A K O R ANA VOL. 16, NO. 1, JUNE 2013: 177–197 A RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR KOREAN NEO-CONFUCIANISM1 By WEON-KI YOO This article suggests a new research methodology for Korean Neo-Confucianism. In order to do this, we need first to be clear about the nature of Korean Neo- Confucianism in relation to the question of whether it can be legitimately called philosophy in the Western sense of the term. In this article, I shall focus on the following questions: (1) Is there such a thing as world or universal philosophy? (2) Can Korean Neo-Confucianism be considered to be world philosophy? (3) What is the reason for the Western rejection of non-Western thought as philosophy? And (4) what conditions are required for Korean Neo-Confucianism to remain as a science which is understandable to the ordinary man of reason? I offer a negative answer to (1) for the reason that there is no consensus on the definition of philosophy itself. And if there is no such philosophy, we do not have to be concerned with (2). In relation to (3), I examine Defoort who blames the rejection of the existence or legitimacy of Chinese philosophy on Western chauvinism or ethnocentrism. Unlike Defoort, I consider that the rejection is rather due to Western indifference to, or ignorance of, East Asian traditions of thought. The main contention here is that, although there is no such thing as world philosophy, contemporary Korean Neo-Confucian scholars still need to satisfy a number of basic conditions to make Korean Neo-Confucianism a science worthy of discussion in the future. In answer to (4), I here suggest consistency, validity, and conceptual clarity as such conditions. They are in general called logical elements since they are most commonly found in Western books on logic, but they are in effect “commonsensical” in that they are basic elements required in everyday conversation. It is hoped that the conditions should not be taken as a repetition of a controversy over the definition of philosophy, but simply as a “commonsensical” suggestion to write various traditions of thought in a “commonsensical” way. 1 This article was originally presented as a paper at the 2012 International Conference of Confucian Cultural Sphere organized by the College of Confucian Studies & Eastern Philosophy at Sungkyunkwan University between November 16th and 17th, 2012. 178 Acta Koreana Vol. 16, No.1, 2013 Keywords: Korean Neo-Confucianism, World Philosophy, Research Methodology, Consistency, Validity, Conceptual Clarity I. INTRODUCTION Korean scholars seem to accept without any contention that “Korean Neo- Confucianism” is part of Korean philosophy, which is composed of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc. That is, they regard it as a particular or regional philosophy among many different types of philosophies in Korea. Indeed, although none of the universities in Korea have a department specifically named as a Korean philosophy department, most philosophy departments teach Korean thought under the name of Korean philosophy along with other regional philosophies such as Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, etc. and, also, with many branches of Western philosophy, e.g. epistemology, ethics, metaphysics etc. Nonetheless, there arises a problem to consider, when one wants Korean thought to be counted as so-called universal or world philosophy and, also, to be taught in philosophy departments, not in Korean/East Asian Studies departments or Religion departments in Western universities. The fact is that Korean thought has “never” been taught as a single subject in any philosophy departments in Western universities. Of course, this does not apply only to Korean thought, but also to various kinds of thought such as Chinese, Indian, Islamic, Slavic, or African thought. They may be partially taught in regional studies programs, but not in philosophy departments in Western universities.2 One interesting fact is that non-Western scholars hold the view that many different types of thought including their own can be called philosophy, whereas Western philosophers hold the view that only their own thought should be and can be legitimately called philosophy. In reaction to such a tendency, a number of scholars such as Solomon and Defoort ascribe this biased view to Western ethnocentrism or ethnocentric chauvinism for the reason that the criterion or conception of philosophy by which non-Western thought is excluded from philosophy is basically Western. 3 It appears that, according to such a criterion, not only Korean thought but also all the other non-Western traditions of thought are not to be counted as philosophy. This suggests that they lack some characteristics which the Western conception of philosophy includes. In what follows, I shall focus on Korean Neo-Confucianism and examine its current status and methodology of research in relation to the Western conception 2 Cf. Kim Yŏng-min (2005), pp. 209–210. 3 Solomon (2001), pp. 100–101; Defoort (2001), p. 393; Defoort (2006), p. 629 and p. 633. Yoo: A Research Methodology for Korean Neo-Confucianism 179 of philosophy. For this, I shall deal with the following questions: Is there such a thing as world philosophy? What is the reason for the Western rejection of non- Western thought as philosophy? Can Korean Neo-Confucianism be considered philosophy, and if so in what sense? And what conditions are required for Korean Neo-Confucianism to remain as a science worthy of successive discussion in the future? The main contention made here will be that Korean Neo-Confucianism need not attempt to be world philosophy since there is no such thing, but that it nonetheless needs to satisfy a number of basic conditions such as consistency, validity, and conceptual clarification, to be a science in its proper sense. II. A SIMPLIFIED REQUIREMENT OF PHILOSOPHY It is indeed both a provocative and a sensitive matter to raise the question of whether it is legitimate to call a system of thought “philosophy.” This question is provocative because a refusal to apply the term “philosophy” to the intellectual traditions of some countries will be taken as a deep insult and shock to its people; it is a sensitive issue for the very reason that no one would wish to discuss the matter explicitly in public. The question has something to do with national pride or, rather, with basic human pride. Although the exact definition of philosophy is still controversial, it is clear that philosophy is an activity involving reasoning which is regarded as the most basic and significant characteristic of human beings. Therefore, to claim that a person lacks philosophy is tantamount to saying that he/she lacks reason, which even implies that he/she is non-human or bestial. However, Defoort explicitly takes up the question about the existence of philosophy in China. In answer to this question, she claims that it is not legitimate to call Chinese thought philosophy because it does not fit the term ‘philosophy’ which is “a Western matter” and “is, and remains, a primarily Western cultural product.”4 In consequence, she concludes that there is no such thing as Chinese philosophy at all. In any case, this is not the first time that a Western philosopher has denied Chinese thought to be philosophy. Defoort says as follows: Indeed, various eminent European philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and, more recently, Jacques Derrida on his visit to Shanghai in 2001, have proclaimed that ancient Chinese thought is not really philosophy. Kant, for example, stated that “Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient.”5 4 Defoort (2001), p. 393 and p. 404, respectively. 5 Defoort (2006), p. 626. 180 Acta Koreana Vol. 16, No.1, 2013 In relation to this evaluation of Chinese thought, Chinese scholars have endeavored to show that it is philosophy proper. Among them is a prominent Chinese scholar, Hu Shi (胡適, 1891–1962), who cherished the hope that ancient Chinese thought would be regarded as world philosophy. Defoort tells us that his hope still remains unaccomplished even more than fifty years after his death. Now, almost a century after Hu first expressed his hope for Chinese thought, we can respond to his speculation with relative certainty: world philosophy has not arisen and is not on the rise. In fact, the situation is much worse: Chinese ancient thought is not even considered “philosophy” by most Western specialists in the field.6 What is the reason for Defoort’s claim that ancient Chinese thought will never be considered as world philosophy? This question calls for an examination of the criterion of world philosophy or, rather, the conditions of the Western conception of philosophy. Chinese masters do not in general—and certainly not entirely—satisfy the conditions of philosophy. Western academics may, of course, differ regarding the definition of this term, but there is nevertheless a vague consensus that allows for a variety of writings to fall under the label of philosophy, but not just anything. (a) Philosophy must give the appearance of systematicity, reflection, and rationality; (b) it must differ from science and religion; and (c) it must be divisible into various subdisciplines such as metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. A great deal of the teachings of the old Chinese masters from the so-called Golden Age of Chinese philosophy (the fifth to third centuries B.C.) rarely meet these demands. Thinkers like Laozi and Confucius, who are traditionally branded as the founders of Taoism and Confucianism, respectively, expressed themselves in short proverbs, aphorisms, or conversations without concerning themselves too much with systematicity, logic, or any other philosophical criterion.7 ((a)– (c) are my emphasis.) As Defoort says, it is true that there is no general consensus on the definition of philosophy, where she derives them from, and why we should agree with her on those conditions.8 It is also undeniable that in many cases ancient Chinese 6 Defoort (2006, p.