HydrosolidarityHydrosolidarity andand thethe powerpower ofof beingbeing goodgood

AA comparativecomparative accountaccount ofof hydrohydro--hegemonyhegemony inin thethe OrangeOrange andand OkavangoOkavango riverriver basinsbasins

Prepared for the Third International Workshop on Hydro- Hegemony

London School of Economics, 12 and 13 May 2007

Pål Arne Davidsen University of Bergen [email protected]

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. AA momentmoment ofof reflectionreflection......

Pål Arne Davidsen©2004

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. AimAim andand structurestructure ofof thethe presentationpresentation

• AimAim • ”To develop an understanding of how the securitisation- desecuritisation nexus can provide valuable insights into hydropolitical relations in the Orange and Okavango river basins” • StructureStructure • The river basins – both ”at risk” (Wolf et al. 2003) • Methodology, discourse matters! • A brief theoretical overview • Case studies – hegemon or hegemonized? • Concluding comments

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. TheThe OkavangoOkavango –– JewelJewel ofof thethe KalahariKalahari

• Basin area of approximately 413 550 km² (differs) • Three riparians • Angola – upstream, a “sleeping giant”!? • Namibia – midstream, thirsty • Botswana – downstream, tourist revenues, Ramsar site • Relatively symmetrical power distribution • The basin relatively pristine • How to balance economic development and environmental protection? Pål Arne Davidsen©

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. TheThe OrangeOrange –– thethe ””sourcesource ofof lifelife”” forfor SouthSouth AfricaAfrica ((TurtonTurton 2005)2005)

• BasinBasin areaarea ofof approximatelyapproximately 896896 368368 kmkm²² (Earle(Earle etet al.al. 2005)2005) • FourFour ripariansriparians • Lesotho – upstream, water rich, but power poor. LHWP with SA • South Africa – midstream/downstream. IBT dependency and Apartheid legacy → bilateralism • Botswana – midstream, but contributes no surface runoff. A diplomatic bargaining position (Turton 2001) • Namibia – downstream, in need of a dam for seasonal runoff storage. Table grape industry

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. TheThe OrangeOrange

• AsymmetricalAsymmetrical powerpower distributiondistribution • AA technicallytechnically closedclosed riverriver basinbasin!?!? • Technical innovation, Technical innovation, Source: TCTA howhow toto distributedistribute whatwhat isis ””leftleft””

Pål Arne Davidsen ©2005

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. MethodologicalMethodological frameworkframework

• ””ProblemsProblems andand solutionssolutions areare likelike beautybeauty,, thethe existexist inin thethe eyeeye ofof thethe beholder.beholder. ThatThat whatwhat peoplepeople perceiveperceive,, willwill determinedetermine howhow theythey willwill actact”” ((BrynardBrynard 2003:310)2003:310) • Discourse analysis – search for rhetorical structures • Securitisation – the social construction of enmity, threats and vulnerabilities • Desecuritsation – the social construction of amity, trust and cooperation • Document analysis • Interviews with stakeholders

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. TheoreticalTheoretical frameworkframework

• The Copenhagen School of International Relations (Wæver 1995, Buzan et al. 1998, Buzan and Wæver 2003) • Overcoming the widening-broadening debate • Securitisation (Carl Schmitt 1930/32/34) • Security as a speech act (Austin 1962, Bourdieu 1991) • Security sectors (5) - interconnected • Multifaceted, not only state – legitimacy depends on sector • Desecuritisation • More security not necessarily good or desirable. A trade-off (Jonas 1984) • Desecuritisation a transformative capacity (Aradau 2004), not a-security • From water sharing to benefit sharing (Sadoff and Grey 2002/05, Turton 2004, Phillips et al. 2006). Increasing the pie.

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– OrangeOrange RiverRiver BasinBasin

• SecuritisationSecuritisation • Orange River border dispute, South Africa and Namibia. Northern bank or thalweg? Issues at stake for Namibia: Access to dam/runoff storage (LORMS), grape industry, Kudu Gas Field. South Africa: Private property rights, dangerous precedence • Fuzzy border scenario/colonial overlay (Gleditsch et al. 2004) • South Africa still colonial master and basin hegemon • Hydrohegemony as a layered cake (basin level, profession level). A bilateral, technical discourse; ”not really a problem”→ the issue securitised+depoliticized. No need for SA to securitise because technical discourse maintains status quo • Technical closure→political closure? ”There is nothing left”. Black boxing (Callon and Latour 1984). Participation? Pressure from below?

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– OrangeOrange RiverRiver BasinBasin

• OperationOperation BoleasBoleas, South Africa and Lesotho. Election turmoil, Lesotho 1998. BDF+SANDF intervention. LHWP protection by SA, unilateralism? • SA securitised the LHWP/IBT to Gauteng. Fraught with top-level security rhetoric • ”Echoes of the past”? Total National Strategy during 1980s (Botha), survival of the Apartheid State • Intervention underpinned SA’s position as hydro- hegemon. What about Lesotho? Protection? Further phases of LHWP?

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– OrangeOrange RiverRiver BasinBasin

• DesecuritisationDesecuritisation • The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, South Africa and Lesotho. Water transfer from Maluti Mountains to Gauteng • Benefit sharing. Succesful cooperation; royalties,jobs, infrastructure, electricity (Lesotho); pure White Gold (South Africa) • Water poor, economic rich (SA) + water rich, economic poor (Lesotho) = A ”Win-win” situation (Don Corleone)? • Water scarcity and current allocations? Concealing unequal access and control • Domestic benefits in Lesotho? Compensation? • SA, a goodwill strategy when security(zation) of supply+benefit sharing.

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– OrangeOrange RiverRiver BasinBasin

• The Lower Orange River Management Study (LORMS), joint initiative by Namibia and SA, improve management of common section • Benefit sharing. Water supply, river regulation, dam construction etc. ”Win-win” and common good • But, desecuritisation (BS) together with security of supply • Desecuritisation= technocrats, not securocrats reign supreme (Phillips et al. 2006:20), but → depoliticization→no discursive contestation. Politics THE problem... • Common good conceals inefficient irrigation • Unfavourable flow regime. Namibia a victim? But, ”can kill the goose that lays the golden egg”, bargaining power vs. SA (LHWP)

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– OrangeOrange RiverRiver BasinBasin

• The Orange Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM), established 2000, a multilateral agreement of 4 riparians. • Benefit sharing, ”because of the river” (avert conflict), ”beyond the river” (regional integration) → IWRM and SADC • A technocratic regime. Technical advisor, technical level, technical solutions and hard facts (Angula) →politics aside (depoliticized?) • Why did South Africa join? Does not supersede bilateral regimes (LHWP)+depoliticization→hegemony of SA not threatened. Question of unequal access remains (Beekman et al. 2003:39) • IWRM a depoliticizing effect (Wester and Warner 2002). Border demarcation a POLITICAL choice (Botswana) → SA access to Zambezi and Congo → a Southern African Hydropolitical Complex (Turton 2003, Davidsen 2006)

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– thethe OkavangoOkavango RiverRiver BasinBasin

• SecuritisationSecuritisation • TheThe RunduRundu--GrootfonteinGrootfontein pipelinepipeline andand thethe ENWCENWC,, 19971997 waterwater crisiscrisis Namibia,Namibia, OkavangoOkavango lastlast optionoption • Namibia, economic securitisation (mercantilist)→ Botswana, environmental (wildlife), societal (tribes) and economic (tourism) counter-securitisation→ security dilemma • Cumulative threat perceptions • Enemy constructions, Namibia ”the bad neighbour”

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– thethe OkavangoOkavango RiverRiver BasinBasin

• The Popa Falls Hydropower Station, 50 km upstream of Delta in Namibia. Namibian need for power supply • Wide ranging securitisation in Botswana through economic, environmental and societal sectors. Discourse coalition of Government+safari operators+environmental groupings: A threat the the Okavango Delta (Ngami Times, ”Death of Delta if project goes ahead”) • Delta a Ramsar site 1997. A discourse of goodness + hydrosolidarity (Davidsen 2006). Botswana: national security (tourist GDP) + environmental protection(wildlife)= the ”common good”. A hydro hegemon (Lukes 2005)?

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. CasesCases –– thethe OkavangoOkavango RiverRiver BasinBasin

• DesecuritisationDesecuritisation • The Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission (OKACOM), established 1994 (Angola, Namibia, Botswana) • Cooperation, coordinated development and benefit sharing • But, securitisation of effects (important that not die an early death, Heyns 2005) • Botswana protect Delta through global environmental activism (also Ramsar). ”The Hidden Menace” →desecuritisation+securitisation • Benefits equally distributed? Who is eating? (Angola compensation)

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. ConcludingConcluding commentscomments

”The features of agents that make them powerful include those that render activity unnecessary. If I can achieve the appropriate outcomes without having to act, because of the attitudes of others towards me or because of a favourable alignment...my power is surely all the greater (Lukes 2005:480) • Botswana and Okavango – ”Brigitte Bardot effect” + hydrosolidarity= environmental protection+national security= moral highground (discourse of goodness). Botswana a hegemon • South Africa and Orange – ”African Renaissance” (Mbeki) → SA leader role, but ”old wine in new casks”? Depoliticization and unequal access • Namibia and Orange – downstream, always the victim? ”Benefit sharing is not for everyone, and not always applicable. Some countries might do it to help their neighbours, but how many good Samaritans are out there? (Namibian MAWF)” The hegemonized? Bargaining power vs. SA (LHWP)

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission. Thank you! [email protected]

Third International Workshop on Hydro-Hegemony, LSE, May 2007 Do not cite without author’s permission.