Faculty of Social Sciences MSc Political Science, European Politics and External Relations

Everything is a Matter of Perception: Israeli Perceptions of the European Union and Normative Power Europe

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris Second Reader: Dr. Rocco Bellanova Author: Shirel Levi, 11741813 Date of Submission: 22/06/18 Academic Year: 2017/2018 Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deep gratitude to all the people who made this thesis possible through their contribution. Firstly, to my supervisor Dr. Dimitris Bouris, for his patience, encouragement, enthusiastic guidance, useful critique, and most of all for inspiring me from the very first moment to follow my passion. Secondly, I want to thank Dr. Bellanova, for being the second reader of this thesis and giving his much appreciated feedback. Thirdly, I would like to thank all my interviewees, especially in the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the EU officials, for their time and effort. Last but not least, I wish to thank my parents and my partner for their support, advice, encouragement and patience. Without you this thesis would not have been completed. Special thanks to my mom who always has faith in me, encourages me to be the best that I can be, and always understands.

“All that I am or ever hope to be, I owe to my angel mother.” -Abraham Lincoln

2 Abstract

European Union-Israel relations are one of the most interesting examples of the European Union’s (EU) external relations. Israel is connected to Europe through historical, cultural and economic ties. The relations are characterized by rich economic and research cooperation but yet are over- shadowed in the political sphere by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the context of the conflict and EU foreign relations in general, the EU attempts to present itself as a normative power, emphasizing the importance of norms and values in its external relations. However, third countries do not necessarily view the EU as a normative power nor perceive its actions positively. This thesis identifies what are the main Israeli perceptions of the EU, how they affect EU-Israel relations and whether Israelis perceive the EU as a normative power to begin with, regardless if the EU is considered to be one. The conceptual framework of the thesis emphasizes the importance of examining normative power Europe and external perceptions of the EU, since the EU cannot be perceived as a power if that power is not recognized, and therefore the EU is not able to exert it. This thesis uses the method of content analysis to identify the perceptions of the Israeli political elite, as can be observed in Israeli parliamentary debates, political statements and interviews, and also the perceptions of the Israeli public, through examining online comments of Israelis on the Facebook page of the EU delegation to Israel. Negative perceptions of the EU began to develop since the 1970s after the European Community began to support the Palestinians and criticize Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Furthermore, Israeli perceptions have been very much influenced by the events of the Holocaust and the subsequent mistrust towards Europe. As concluded in this thesis, these perceptions should be addressed if the relations are to be improved and the EU’s role in the Middle East strengthened.

Keywords: EU-Israel relations, EU foreign policy, normative power Europe, external perceptions of the EU, Israeli perceptions, content analysis

3 Abbreviations

AA Association Agreement ACAA Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products AP Action Plan EC European Community EEC European Economic Community ENP European Neighbourhood Policy EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EPE Ethical Power Europe EEAS European External Action Service ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union FP EU Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development MEPP Middle East Peace Process MFA Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs MPE Market Power Europe MS European Union Member State NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPE Normative Power Europe OT Occupied Territories PA Palestinian Authority PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization PM Prime Minister UfM Union for the Mediterranean ROO Rules of Origin UN United Nations US United States

4 Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 6 2. Methodology ...... 8 2.1 Type of data and data collection ...... 8 2.2 Method of analysis and sampling ...... 11 2.3 Limitations and advantages ...... 12 3. Literature Review ...... 15 3.1 The EU as a Global Power ...... 15 3.1.1 Normative Power Europe ...... 16 3.1.2 Alternative Roles of the EU as a Global Power ...... 19 3.1.3 Criticism of Normative Power Europe ...... 23 3.2 Perception and Misperception in International Relations ...... 25 3.2.1 External Perceptions of the European Union ...... 26 3.3 Conceptual Framework: NPE and External Perceptions of the European Union ...... 29 4. EU-Israel Relations: Historical overview and challenges ...... 33 4.1 High Hopes and the Fog of War: 1957-1979 ...... 33 4.2 Long and Winding Road: 1980-2000 ...... 34 4.3 Increased European Involvement: 2001-2012 ...... 38 4.4 Trade and Politics ...... 40 5. Israeli Perceptions of the EU ...... 45 5.1 Perceptions of the Israeli Political Elite ...... 49 5.2 Perceptions of the Israeli Public in Social Media ...... 57 5.3 Understanding the findings and comparing the results ...... 63 6. Israeli Perceptions of the EU and Normative Power Europe –‘mind the gap’ ...... 69 7. Conclusions ...... 77 Bibliography ...... 79 Annex 1: Codebook - Israeli perceptions of the European Union ...... 96

5 1. Introduction

Despite not being geographically located in Europe, Israel is connected to Europe in many ways, such as the historical roots of the Jewish people, the horrific events of the Holocaust, hundreds of thousands of Israelis that uphold a European citizenship, the establishment of Israel after the British Mandate, the European founding fathers of Israel with Europe being the birthplace of Zionism, and the valuable economic and research cooperation between Israel and the European Union (EU) (Pardo and Peters, 2010:112; Harpaz, 2013:170). The EU is the most important trading partner of Israel and the second largest funder of Israeli research (Pardo and Peters, 2010:50). Alongside the prosperous economic and research relations, the EU has been highly critical of Israel regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ibid:5). It has criticized Israeli policies, especially the building of Israeli settlements in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (OT) (Ibid:20). The criticizing of Israel on the political level goes hand in hand with the EU’s attempts to present itself in international relations as a normative power, emphasizing the importance of norms and values, such as human rights and democracy, in its external relations (Sjursen, 2006:248). The EU has been increasing its involvement in the Middle East peace process (MEPP), and has become a meaningful political and economic actor in the international arena (Pardo and Peters, 2010:65). The EU is becoming more involved in the Mediterranean region, and specifically in issues vital to Israeli security, such as the Iranian nuclear program and the Syrian civil war (Chaban and Holland, 2014:189). Therefore, it seems natural that Israel should strive towards enhancing its relations with the EU. This view however is not shared by all in Israel (Harpaz, 2004:1057). Many Israelis do not see the importance of the relations with the EU, as they have obtained negative perceptions of the EU, perceiving it as pro-Palestinian, anti-Israeli and possibly anti-Semitic, ultimately preferring that the EU did not intervene in Israeli affairs (Pardo and Peters, 2010:7). This thesis will aim to answer the questions what are the external Israeli perceptions of the EU, and how do they affect EU-Israel relations and the understanding of the EU as a normative power. The hypothesis of this thesis is that if negative perceptions of the EU indeed prevail in Israel, Israelis will not perceive the EU as a normative power despite the EU’s attempts to present itself as such (Tocci, 2009:338), which will have implications on our understanding of the concept of normative power Europe (NPE). Hence, this thesis will aim to contribute to the academic literature on EU-Israel relations as well as to the academic debate on NPE and external perceptions of the EU, by presenting a particular conceptual framework and new qualitative and quantitative

6 data gathered through content analysis. Whereas the concept of NPE has been widely discussed, more research is required in respect to how it relates to external perceptions of the EU. The Israeli case-study is unparalleled in terms of its historical context, the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and complex, yet close, relationship between the EU and Israel. It has important implications on the future of Israel in terms of its economic prosperity, the role of the EU in the MEPP and thus, developments in the Middle East as a whole. It is especially interesting due to the existing gap between the economic and political relations, the prevailing negative perceptions of the EU in Israel since the 1970s, and the EU’s persistent representation of itself as a normative power in its relations with Israel. The conclusions of this thesis will bring another perspective to EU-Israel relations and EU external relations, as well as provide insights regarding the concept of NPE. The thesis will begin with introducing the methodology of the thesis and a literature review, which will include literature on the conceptualization of the EU as a global actor, especially as a normative power, as well as literature on perceptions in international relations, and particularly external perceptions of the EU. The literature review is concluded with an introduction of the conceptual framework of this thesis. Next, a historical overview of EU-Israel relations will be presented as a background for a deeper understanding of the relations and the development of Israeli perceptions of the EU. The following chapter will present relevant quantitative and qualitative data collected of the perceptions of the Israeli political elite and the Israeli public, followed by an analysis of the results using the conceptual framework of NPE and external perceptions of the EU. The thesis will end with thoughts and conclusions of the analysis results and their implications on the concept of NPE and EU-Israel relations.

7 2. Methodology

The research questions of this thesis are as follows: What are Israeli perceptions of the EU? How do they affect EU-Israel relations and the understanding of the EU as a normative power? Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a dominant aspect of EU-Israel relations, this research will focus mostly on the bilateral aspect of the relations and understanding the significance of Israeli perceptions of the EU and the concept of NPE. The thesis begins from the presumption that even if the EU is in practice a normative power (which is a debatable argument), it will not suffice for assuming a normative role if other actors do not perceive it as such. Hence, the hypothesis of this thesis is that if negative perceptions of the EU indeed prevail in Israel, Israelis will not perceive the EU as a normative power despite the EU’s attempts to present itself as such. Thus, the main purpose of this research is to obtain data regarding Israeli perceptions of the EU and analyse it through the conceptual framework of NPE and external perceptions of the EU.

2.1 Type of data and data collection

For the purpose of this thesis two units have been chosen for analysis in order to achieve a more exhaustive representation of Israeli society: The Israeli political elite and the Israeli public. The units have been chosen firstly because the political elite is the one to set the tone of EU-Israel relations, and secondly because the Israeli public is the one to vote for politicians, and thus indirectly determine the future of EU-Israel relations. Therefore, there is to some extent connection between the two units and their perceptions. However, they may also be cohort specific, and thus indicate a variation in perceptions (Chaban and Holland, 2014:2). The data used for the analysis of the Israeli political elite is extracted from Knesset (Israeli Parliament) debates relating to the EU, public statements of Israeli politicians regarding the EU, and semi-structured, face-to-face, in-depth interviews of officials from the Foreign Ministry of Israel (MFA), EU officials familiar with Israel-EU relations, a governmental office of public diplomacy in Israel and a phone interview with the spokesman of the political party Yisrael Beytenu. The purpose of the interviews was to gain insight about the personal opinions of Israeli officials regarding the EU and how they perceive EU-Israel relations, as well as the experiences of EU officials who engage with the Israeli political elite. Structured questions were presented in order to direct the interviews, and were related to EU-Israel relations, past events and future prospects. Additionally, some questions related to the idea of NPE were presented. Otherwise,

8 interviewees were able to speak freely, emphasizing what are their perceptions of the EU. Interviewees were chosen based on their affiliation and level of professionality in EU-Israel relations. The interview with Yisrael Beytenu was chosen in order to examine past statements of the party regarding the EU. All Knesset debates related to the EU since July 2013 until today were chosen for analysis, since they can provide insights regarding the issues that concern the Israeli parliament about the EU, and they raise different political stances and opinions of politicians from the entire political spectrum. Public political statements were chosen for analysis for they provide insights on the personal opinions of politicians and their reactions to EU policies towards Israel. They also indicate of political trends towards the EU, and they possibly affect the Israeli public’s perception of the EU through their appearance in the media. Conducting an extensive survey would have been a challenging task due to the limited scope of this thesis, and therefore social media was chosen as a source of data of the public’s perceptions. It enables the observation of online comments of a large Israeli crowd which convey their perceptions of the EU. Choosing social media as a source of data is an uncommon academic choice, yet it is a source that should not be over-looked, as it is a good platform to easily reach the public and conduct content analysis of freely shared thoughts (Schwartz and Ungar,2015:78). Using social media as a source of information incorporates new participants in academic research, namely the users of social media, who are increasingly using the platform to express their thoughts and opinions. The content on social media is dynamic and reflects the sentimental fluctuations and societal views of the author, which often relate to particular topics or events, and can be useful to identify trends (Maynard et al., 2017:75). Furthermore, social media enables looking back at critical events in the past, and enables the researcher to access information as it was at that time, rather than relying on retrospective reflections (Schwartz and Ungar, 2015:90). For the purpose of this thesis Facebook was considered to be the most relevant social media platform since it provides accessible, large amount of data regarding the perceptions of Israelis from all backgrounds. Twitter was not used in this thesis for it is mostly used in Israel by politicians and journalists rather than the general public. Due to the high volume of data available on Facebook, the scope of data collection was limited to the most relevant page: ‘European Union in Israel’1. The page includes posts on different aspects of EU-Israel relations posted by the EU

1 Can be accessed in the following link: https://www.facebook.com/Europe.in.Israel/

9 delegation to Israel, which inspire commenting that reflects the Israeli public’s perceptions of the EU and its policies. The data collected was limited to the period of July 2013 until March 2018. This time scope was chosen foremost in order to narrow-down the amount of data available, especially online comments, but also because July 2013 marked an important time in EU-Israel relations. Then the EU published Guidelines prohibiting funding of Israeli companies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and public bodies based in Israeli settlements in the OT, followed by a decision in November 2015 to label clearly the origin of products from Israeli settlements in the OT (European Commission, 2013, 2015). These policies brought on extreme reactions in Israel (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:422). March 2018 was the latest point to gather up-to-date data within the framework of this thesis. Political statements were collected by using the search engines of the newspapers Haaretz, representing the left-wing, Israel Hayom, representing the right-wing, and Yediot Aharonot, representing the centre. These newspapers were chosen for they are the most read in Israel, represent the entire political spectrum, and therefore suffice for the purpose of obtaining public political statements. The keywords ‘Europe’ and the ‘EU’ were searched in Hebrew and then limited to the above mentioned time scope. Political statements were collected only from articles which included the keywords and a matter related to Israel in the headlines. All the articles used will not be quoted in the thesis due to space limits, but can be found in the bibliography. Only quotes of politicians were addressed, and not the articles themselves. Haaretz published more EU- related papers, and therefore has been used more than the other newspapers. Parliamentary debates on their part were collected from the official Knesset website, limiting the search to the same time scope and keywords. Collection of data from social media focuses on the individual comments of users (Schwartz and Ungar, 2015: 90). Therefore, EU related online comments of Israelis have been collected from the Facebook page of the EU in Israel, by systematically collecting all comments made on different posts during the above mentioned time scope. However, only relevant comments indicating the perceptions of the commentators of the EU were analysed.

10 2.2 Method of analysis and sampling

The collected data was analysed using the method of content analysis, which can be defined as “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretations of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings” (Berg, 2006:338). It can be used on various forms of communication for it is primarily “a coding operation and data interpreting process” (Ibid:339). In this thesis, directed content analysis was conducted using themes derived from existing literature (Ibid:339-340) on Israeli perceptions as well as the conceptual framework of NPE and external perceptions of the EU. In cases which did not fit predetermined schemes new categorization was applied (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1282). Although it could be argued that directed content analysis has a predetermined, ‘non-pure’ approach, it will be naïve to ignore already existing research in the field as well as the author’s initial findings from the preliminary research (Ibid:1283). Content analysis was conducted using the qualitative data analysis program Atlas.ti, which is a code-base theory builder program that enables coding, classifying and retrieving, assists in developing connections between codes and concepts, and enables creating graphic networks (Berg, 2006:367). The analysis has been conducted in Hebrew (with the exception of some Facebook comments in English), and the quotations presented in the thesis have been translated by the author. Most of the data collected was already in a written form suitable for content analysis, but interviews had to be transformed into transcripts. The codes have been developed both inductively and deductively, and divided into main themes, based on identified patterns and previous literature (Ibid:341). The analysis mostly focused on manifest content, that is the elements that are physically present in the texts (Ibid:343), but not only. For the purpose of a deeper understanding of Israeli perceptions of the EU, content analysis is more suitable than discourse analysis, for it examines not only the patterns of language used, but also the social and cultural context of the text (Ibid:353). Thus, each text was carefully read, analysed and coded not only based on the presence of certain words, but also the context and deeper meanings behind each manifestation. Each category of codes was defined, as can be observed in the Annex Codebook, and reflects a particular theme of perception (Ibid:361). Based on preliminary research, a few codes indicating themes of Israeli perceptions of the EU were identified in advance: Holocaust, double- standards, biased and economic relations. Additionally, open-coding was conducted based on qualitative analysis of the collected data, which was especially necessary in the analysis of the

11 diverse social media comments. The units of measurement were paragraphs or sentences that contained reference to the EU and EU-Israel related issues, with every such quote linked to an appropriate code. By the end of the analysis 28 codes were identified, to which 1280 quotes were linked. Many of the quotes included several codes, and hence the large amount of quotes linked to codes. Of all comments collected from Facebook, eventually 1023 quotes were linked to codes. Seven interviews were conducted and analysed with 123 quotes linked to codes, alongside four relevant Knesset debates with 35 quotes linked to codes and 38 articles containing political statements with 99 quotes linked to codes. In addition to the qualitative analysis identifying themes of perceptions, quantitative data will be introduced in order to present the results in visual and clear charts. A quantitative analysis presents the prominence of certain perceptions, while a qualitative analysis identifies the perceptions while taking into account the context and nuances of the language (Ibid:343). Thus, quantitative data contributes further to identifying perceptions by demonstrating how prominent they are, and if variation exists between the perceptions of the political elite and Israeli public. In the final chapter of the thesis the acquired results are analysed using the conceptual framework of this thesis.

2.3 Limitations and advantages

The methodology used in this thesis is descriptive, and provides insights on what are the prevailing perceptions. It does not delve into where the perceptions stem from or what could have affected them. The aim of this thesis is to gain understanding of what are the Israeli perceptions of the EU, and possibly form a basis for new hypotheses and further research. Additionally, this thesis has a relatively limited scope of data considering its attempt to identify the general Israeli perceptions of the EU. Nevertheless, the analysis units addressed are different and encompass varied types of data, which can give an idea of the most prominent Israeli perceptions of the EU. Each analysis unit has its own limitations, and therefore the combination of the two ensures more comprehensive, yet complicated, results. Possible variation in the results in each unit can make it difficult to conclude what are the perceptions of all Israelis of the EU, but nevertheless can indicate what are the common trends. When analysing the Israeli political elite a few limitations need to be taken into consideration. Political expressions may be populistic, politicized or constrained. They can vary

12 according to time of elections and current position, as the same politician may have entirely contrasting views in different years. When it comes to the research of social media, there are limitations of reliability, and therefore the information it contains cannot be taken as empirically true and should be analysed in terms of its indication of opinions and perceptions only. It should also be taken into consideration that people may be more impulsive when writing behind the screen in comparison to a face-to-face interaction. On the other hand, people may feel more free to express themselves on social media rather than in an interview, or in in a survey. Interviewees may feel the need to impress and survey takers may find it hard to describe their opinions in a conventional scale of 1 to 5. Furthermore, the Facebook comments analysed cannot be held to reflect the standpoint of all Israelis, as for example older people are under-represented in social media. Nevertheless, the use of the platform is increasing in all segments of the population (Schwartz and Ungar, 2015: 78,89). It is also important to note that researching perceptions, unless done on a large-scale throughout many years, will indicate results that are time and context specific. Moreover, the specific time period chosen for this thesis does not necessarily reflect Israeli perceptions of the EU in other times. Further limitations concern the actual process of coding the data. Conducting direct content analysis has limitations in terms of possibly creating a bias and looking for results that could support the theories the coding is partially based on (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005:1283). However, the purpose of using this approach is merely to give direction to the analysis rather than reinforce pre-existing research. In this thesis there is no inter-coder reliability due to its limited scope, and therefore it is subjected to the author’s interpretation and operationalization only. This should be taken into account, as some quotes were difficult to code and some codes were overlapping. An advantage of this thesis is the ‘native ethnography’ of the author as a European-Israeli and native Hebrew-speaker, which has a key role in conducting content analysis. It enabled easy access to information, the understanding of the Hebrew-language and its nuances, and ensured knowledge and inside understanding of the local Israeli population. Although this is an advantage for content analysis, there may exist certain bias and pre-determined understandings that could have affected the results. Another advantage of the methodology used is that most of the data analysed is already available, and therefore there was no need to worry about response rates and memory bias.

13 Finally, as suggested by Rooduijn and Pauwels (2011), the most reliable and valid results can be achieved through combining the method of classical content analysis and a computer based method, which they call an ‘integrated man-machine’ approach, which is implemented in this thesis. This integrated method eliminates some of the disadvantages of both methods and can be applied to any text. This approach is faster and more systematic than the classical content analysis, yet it produces more valid results than computerised analysis alone, as results are interpreted in their contextual meaning and double-checked by a human coder.

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3. Literature Review

This literature review will present the orienting literature of the conceptual framework of this thesis. It will begin with introducing the idea of the EU as a global power, and continue with the concept of NPE as a way of conceptualizing the EU’s role as a global power. After that an introduction of other prominent alternative concepts will follow, alongside criticism of NPE put forward in academic literature. The review will proceed with introducing academic literature on perceptions in international relations and external perceptions of the EU. Finally, the concept of NPE and external perceptions of the EU will be merged into one conceptual framework, which emphasizes the importance of perceptions in understanding the EU’s role as a normative power.

3.1 The EU as a Global Power

The EU has been seen as a novel and a different type of actor, in comparison to the United States (US) or at the time the Soviet Union (Howse and Nicolaïdis, 2002:770), representing a new power in international politics, and therefore requiring further understanding (Diez, 2005:613-614). The EU has been established in a post-war environment with a European commitment to preserve peace and liberty. Through this, the EU evolved into “a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance which transcends Westphalian norms” (Manners, 2002:240). According to Manners, the EU represents “a new and different political form” (Ibid, ibid). Sjursen adds that there is some empirical evidence in terms of democracy promotion, human rights, encouraging regional cooperation and strengthening international institutions (Sjursen, 2006:235-236), that could indicate that “there is something distinctive about the EU’s foreign policy…that requires attention.” (Ibid:236). The EU has expressed its aspiration to fulfil its potential as a unique actor in the European Security Strategy (ESS) from 2003: “The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.” There have been many efforts to conceptualize, operationalize and empirically study the EU as a unique political being that requires beyond state-like understandings with a particular global role. For decades, EU scholars sought to define the EU’s international role. The attempts to

15 conceptualize the EU as a specific type of power began already in the 1970s by Farnçois Duchêne with the concept of ‘civilian power Europe’ (Duchêne, 1972, Del Sarto, 2016:217). Since, many concepts have been introduced by academics, each one with its own definition of what is the EU, what power is and how does the EU exert power in international relations. The different concepts of the EU as a global power are ultimately efforts to explain the nature of the EU and what kind of power it projects in its external relations.

3.1.1 Normative Power Europe

The debate around NPE runs alongside the initial idea of ‘civilian power Europe’ envisaged by Duchêne in 1972. Writing at the time of the Cold War, Duchêne discussed what could be the future role of Europe in world politics (Duchêne, 1972:33). He concluded that the European Community (EC) is not a considerable military power (Ibid:37), and emphasized its special role in the world being a civilian power that could use civilian means, such as its economic leverage, and thus acquire a constructive role in a world moving towards fewer security issues. “In such context, Western Europe could in a sense be the first of the world’s civilian centres of power.” (Ibid:43). According to Manners, the definition of ‘civilian power’ can be problematic: Eurocentric, neo- colonial, too ontological, and does not suffice to describe what the EU does and what it should do (Manners, 2006:184). The concept of NPE was first introduced by Manners in 2002. Manners’ starting point is that the EU is a “new and different political form” that needs to be studied from a different perspective than states (Manners, 2002:240). He argues that being a different political form, prompts the EU to act in a normative way (Ibid:242). Manners describes normative power as the “ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Ibid:236), which is “ultimately, the greatest power of all.” (Ibid:253) This power works through ideas and opinions and their ability to shape others’ ideas, moving beyond the traditional powers of the Westphalian state by not relying on military means (Ibid:238-239). Manners identified three distinctive features of the EU: its historical context, it being a hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution. The EU has been created as a ‘different political form’ with a distinctive international identity after the Second World War, with a European commitment to promote peace and liberty above all (Ibid:240). The EU was constituted as a political entity based on treaties and legalities. This foundation of the EU can be found in the five

16 core norms identified by Manners, and which the EU implements in its external relations: the centrality of peace, the idea of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Ibid:241-242). Manners identified additional four ‘minor norms’ which are not conclusive: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and the principle of good governance (Ibid:242-243). Having a normative basis is not sufficient to claim that the EU is a normative power; an actual diffusion of norms is required. Manners proposes six factors that shape the diffusion of norms in international relations: contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and the cultural filter (Ibid:244-245). Contagion describes a case in which ideas and norms of the EU are diffused unintentionally to other political actors. Informational diffusion is the outcome of strategic and declaratory communications of the EU. Procedural diffusion occurs through institutionalization of the relationship between the EU and third parties (Ibid:244). Transference occurs when the EU exchanges either goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties. This could be done either using the ‘carrot and stick’ of financial rewards or sanctions, or through exportation of community norms and standards. Overt diffusion is the outcome of a physical presence of the EU in a third country and international organizations. “The cultural filter is based on the interplay between the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion.” (Ibid:245). It shapes the diffusion of norms through the impact of EU norms in third countries, resulting in learning, adapting or rejecting them (Ibid, ibid). The absence of physical force in these mechanisms of diffusion of norms and the significance of cultural diffusion are of particular importance to understanding the EU as a normative power (Manners, 2006:184). Manners argues that different policies pursued by the EU, such as the abolition of the death penalty, alongside different norms and the EU’s existence, are all constitutive norms that shape “what can be ‘normal’ in international relations.” (Manners, 2002:253). The concept of NPE entails an ontological aspect that the EU can be perceived as a norm changer, an empirical aspect of what the EU actually does in order to change norms, and a normative aspect of how the EU should act (Ibid:252). This implies that Manners’ idea of NPE is both prescriptive and descriptive, and the main emphasis deriving from normative theory is that when it comes to the EU, it is not enough to focus on empirical truths and claims, but one should also be critical and analyse what the EU should do (Manners, 2011:228). NPE entails two other

17 meanings, one is the concept of normative power as a form of power, and the other as a characterizations of the actor (Ibid:229). The idea of form of power refers to ideational power, that could be used as a normative justification instead of physical force or material incentives (Ibid:230). According to Manners, normative power may constrain the use of physical force and material incentives, and utilize them in a more justifiable manner. The understanding of NPE as a characterization of the actor refers to its international identity rather than its ability to use normative justifications, heading towards an ideal type of normative power (Ibid:231-232). For a normative justification to be convincing, the norms promoted by the EU should be considered legitimate and promoted coherently and consistently (Ibid:233). Thus, NPE requires certain mechanisms and instruments that will ensure consistency of policies with the principles promoted, that will bind both the EU and other states to legal principles. An example for this is the human rights clause that has been part of all EU trade agreements since 1992 (Sjursen, 2006:248). Actions taken by the EU must involve persuasion, argumentation and the conferral of prestige or shame, such as public declarations and condemnations or symbolic sanctioning (Manners, 2011:235). Additionally, the impact of promotion of principles in international relations must include socialization, that is a process of engagement, partnership, namely institutionalized relationships, and joint or local ownership (Ibid:238). Manners raises the idea of the ‘power of the local’ according to which different economic reforms and democracy, for example, cannot be imposed from the outside, but should stem from within a country, by the local population. Hence, the EU should not impose its norms on its partners, but rather encourage local ownership and empowerment (Manners, 2010:42-43). Manners argues that different international commitments and conventions offer external sources of legitimacy for the promotion of principles by the EU, referred to as ‘shared values’ in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Ibid:38). These external sources of legitimacy also ensure normative coherence and consistency of EU policies, as they are not merely the EU’s own norms, but are entwined in common international commitments (Ibid:38-39). Legitimacy, coherence and consistency are essential to the concept of NPE in terms of the EU’s relations with other actors and the way they perceive the EU, as their absence could undermine the image of the EU in the eyes of its partners (Ibid:39-40).

18 3.1.2 Alternative Roles of the EU as a Global Power Alongside the concept of NPE, scholars have developed various alternative roles to conceptualize the EU as a global power. While this thesis focuses on NPE, it does not take a stance which one of the following concepts best describes the EU or which is better grounded in empirics.

Ethical Power Europe

The concept of ‘ethical power Europe’ (EPE), represents a shift from thinking about what the EU is and what it does, to a proactive role of the EU making the world a better place. For that purpose, the EU should take on more responsibility and improve its capabilities to take on new tasks (Aggestam, 2008:1). EPE focuses on the active exercise of the EU’s power, rather than the passive or indirect power of what the EU ‘is’, as suggested in NPE. EPE focuses on the ethical dilemma behind using certain means in foreign policy, and the justification behind it (Ibid:3). EPE perceives the EU’s role in a broader context, not in terms of its own characteristics, but rather how normative globalization has had a legitimizing and enabling effect on the EU to pursue a more proactive international role (Ibid:3-4). When considering the use of power in ethical terms, there is no such strict division between civilian and military power. Sometimes civilian power could be used coercively, or military power could be used for ethical purposes (Ibid:9). The concept of EPE does not shut out the fact that the EU, and more specifically the different Member States (MS), have interests that can be intertwined with ethical considerations, and suggests that the EU is likely to have mixed motivations (Ibid:4). If the driving force of EU foreign policy would be the need to do good for others it would be an ‘ethical power’. It could also be considered an ‘ethical power’ if it does not pursue its interests at any cost for others and if its promoted interests are linked to ethical considerations (Ibid:8-9).

Empire Power Europe

Zielonka introduces the concept of ‘empire power Europe’ arguing that the EU’s efforts to spread its norms and influence the world are ultimately imperialistic, as “the EU tries to impose domestic constraints on other actors through various forms of economic and political domination, or even formal annexations.” (Zielonka, 2008:471). According to Zielonka, these efforts have been mostly successful in the EU’s neighbourhood and not so much in the global arena (Ibid, ibid). Nevertheless, the EU is a powerful international actor with meaningful economic, legal, military

19 and diplomatic means, which give it significant leverage and influence (Ibid:474). It not only uses ‘soft power’ to achieve its objectives, but also sanctions, bribes and even coercion (Ibid:475). In ‘empire power Europe’, power can be understood as economic or political domination and the imposition of norms and regulations on a weaker party (Ibid:476). The EU is using its economic leverage in order to shape other actors’ policies, to spread its norms globally, and increasingly engage in peacekeeping operations. These actions can be considered imperial for the EU aims at “imposing constraints on the domestic conditions and operations of sovereign states” (Ibid:479). EU mechanisms and policies may benefit other actors, but they are primarily designed to “protect and promote EU interests” (Ibid:480). Furthermore, even the promotion of human rights and democracy can benefit the EU’s own interests, since it can reduce the risks of external shocks and threats to the EU (Ibid:481). The EU might be in a position to influence and shape policies of marginal actors through an accession process of enlargement, but it hasn’t been successful in imposing its norms on powerful actors (Ibid:482). Del Sarto demonstrates through the EU’s response to the Arab Spring that the EU indeed acts as an ‘empire’ in its foreign policy toward the neighbourhood through the use of ‘normative’ policies. The response of the EU to the Arab uprisings has been driven by the interest to secure its economic and security interests. The EU promoted policies framed in normative terms, while the continuing cooperating with authoritarian regimes (Del Sarto, 2016:26). The empire-like behaviour of the EU can be observed for example in the expansion of the EU to new countries and towards its external borders, in an attempt to achieve stability, in the unequal power relations between the EU and its bordering countries, and in the exporting of its practices to these countries whilst cultivating their local elites to maintain European interests (Ibid:222). The imperial approach can explain why the EU has not made the promotion of human rights and democracy in the Middle East and North Africa a top priority. This reconfirms that when normative goals conflict with key European interests, such as security, interests will prevail (Ibid:222-223). Thus, Del Sarto posits that the EU can be ‘normative’ in exporting certain rules and practices, but it is merely a means to serve the empire’s interests (Ibid:223).

Market Power Europe

Being an experiment of market integration, the basis of the existence of the EU and its identity is primarily economic, with institutional features and regulatory capacity. The concept of ‘market

20 power Europe’ (MPE) proposed by Damro, suggests that the EU uses its market and regulatory strength in order to externalize its policies (Damro, 2012:683-684). The concept of MPE emphasizes market intervention through the use of economic and social regulation (Ibid:685). It entails three identity characteristics which are material existence, institutional features, and interest contestation. The material existence of the EU is linked to the European single market, the EU being “the largest advanced industrialized market in the world” and the biggest trading bloc (Ibid:686). The EU can exercise power in the international system, due to its large market size, by affecting material incentives, using economic coercion and affecting others’ perceptions about potential consequences (Ibid:687). In light of European economic power, others are coerced to agree to EU terms, simply because they have no other alternative (Ibid:695). The EU does not usually use physical force as means of exercising power, yet being a market power it is “likely to exercise its power via persuasive and often coercive means” (Ibid:691), which can be generally addressed as positive and negative conditionality, such as the promise of benefits or their suspending (Ibid:691). Damro examines different official EU documents and concludes that there is clear evidence of the EU’s ambition to be a market power and in fact it already operates as such (Ibid:694-695). Damro argues that the concept of MPE is more realistic than NPE, and suggests that the question to be asked is in which way the EU is more likely to influence others: through the externalization of norms or through economic policies and regulations.

Liberal Power Europe

Wagner argues that the EU can be best understood as a liberal power, which is comprised of liberal democracies whose policy is constrained and motivated by their interests, identity and institutions. Therefore, the concept emphasizes the notion that also material interests influence policies, and not only ideas (Wagner, 2017:1401). This will result in outcomes which embody the core political values of liberalism, such as the promotion of institutions, free trade and pacifism (Ibid:1402- 1403). He emphasizes the idea that norms are not only a driving force of foreign policy, but they also constrain it (Ibid:1403). Furthermore, it addresses the ambiguity of norms and conflicts between norms by emphasizing that EU policies are political, and hence, in each case norms should be applied and balanced specifically, rather than assuming a fixed set of norms as in NPE (Ibid:1406,1410).

21

Ideal Power Europe

In her article, Cebeci criticizes the discourse on the conceptualisation of the EU as a global actor, and argues that through this discourse European foreign policy researchers construct a narrative of ‘ideal power Europe’, with the term ‘ideal’ encompassing the notion of ‘normative’ and ‘civilian’. The narrative is constructed through the use of post-sovereign/postmodern EU, EU-as-a-model and NPE discourses (Cebeci, 2012:564). According to Cebeci, researchers in this field engage inevitably in the identity construction of the EU, by linking between EU foreign policy and its identity in an attempt to make them appear consistent. This process, however, mostly focuses on the positive features of the EU, presenting it virtually as an ‘ideal power’, even if this description is not based in reality (Ibid:566). In the post-sovereign/postmodern discourse the EU is represented as different and superior to others who are stuck in the ‘modern-time’ and still suffer from territorial disputes (Ibid:567). The post-sovereign discourse on its part draws a division between what could be incorporated into European norms and practices, and what could be considered as external and dangerous (Ibid:569). In the discourse of the EU-as-a-model, the EU is portrayed as leading by example, a model of regional integration and a promoter of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Ibid:570). Through asserting that it represents the best practices, the EU imposes its own model on third countries in an asymmetrical approach, posing conditionality and demanding compliance, without taking into consideration the specific characteristics of other countries (Ibid:572, 579). The image of the EU as a promoter of norms and a model does not prevail in many countries outside of Europe, despite the EU’s efforts to communicate that image (Ibid:573). NPE discourse emphasizes the EU’s normative difference, which enables it to define what is normal (Ibid:574). This however, according to Cebeci, is merely a tool for the EU to pursue its interests. In this discourse, the EU could still be considered a normative power even if it does not comply with its own norms, for it suffices for it to simply have an aspiration to promote them. The ‘ideal power Europe’ narrative is constructed exactly on the basis of the assumption that “the EU is an ‘ideal power’ even if it does not act in ideal ways.” (Ibid:576). This emphasizes the EU’s double standards, inconsistencies, mismatch between the constructed EU identity and the policies it pursues (Ibid:578).

22 3.1.3 Criticism of Normative Power Europe

The concept of NPE has generated much criticism and an extensive scholarly debate of the EU’s global role. In this section only prominent and relevant criticism for the purpose of this thesis will be addressed. One of the most notable characteristics of NPE is the absence of military power and the use of civilian means in foreign policy. However, the two are not necessarily incompatible (Diez, 2005:615). The concept of NPE does not shed enough light on the use of military means in a normative context, and does not explain the increasingly militarizing EU defence policy (Ibid:624). Furthermore, in cases where norms are continuously violated it could be necessary to threaten to use force in order to appear more credible to other parties and promote norms. In such cases, the incapacity to act could be problematic (Sjursen, 2006:239), and NPE may ultimately be inefficient if not backed up by effective means of coercion (Diez, 2005:615). Additionally, cases where military means could be used to promote civilian norms (Ibid:620) or to protect human rights (Aggestam, 2008:10) are not addressed in NPE. Furthermore, NPE calls for the use of civilian, ‘soft’, non-coercive means in international relations, but as Sjursen argues, this does not mean that these actions are not coercive or causing harm. Economic sanctions for example can cause serious damage to a large civilian population (Sjursen, 2006:239). Manners argues that the EU is committed to “placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with Member States…and the world” (Manners, 2002:241). This assumption leads to another criticism of NPE, that EU norms are ‘worth spreading’ as they promote universal values. This presumption can be seen as imperialistic and Eurocentric, implying that EU norms are better than others’ (Sjursen, 2006:241-242; Manners, 2002:240). Furthermore, the use of the word ‘normative’ with ‘power’ legitimizes the imposition of EU power on others (Cebeci, 2012:577), and the use of the word ‘universal’ justifies the imposition of EU norms even on countries that are fundamentally different than the EU. It is important to note that values and conceptions of what is good are culture and society dependent, and therefore may not be considered ‘universal’ (Sjursen, 2006:247-248). In the EU’s case, its norms have been established through the unique process of its constitution and particular historical developments, and therefore it is difficult to conclude that they are ‘universal’ (Lucarelli, 2007:254). Moreover, the norms promoted by the EU are chosen, and so is the area where they are attempted to be normalized (Diez, 2005:624). The concept of NPE does not address the inconsistency in which certain norms are applied and pursued nor the EU’s double standards (Sjursen, 2006:244).

23 This inconsistency could derive from the criticism that NPE norms may be a mask to disguise EU interests. Although interests and norms could go hand in hand, it remains difficult to unravel which one of them is the genuine driving force of an action (Diez, 2005:622). “[T]he EU’s self-image is characterized by a curious blindness to own interests. Instead, the Union tends to present itself as a force for goodness in international society” (Sjursen, 2006:239-240). Youngs argues that the way in which certain norms have been promoted by the EU could be the result of rational utility calculations of interests rather than a whole-hearted care for others (Youngs, 2004:421). The concept of NPE does not provide a clear answer on how to avoid hypocrisy and how to recognize when interests are disguised as norms. Bicchi suggests that NPE should be defined more clearly, specifically in terms of what it is not (Bicchi, 2006:299). She posits that the EU promotes norms in a manner of ‘our size fits all’, based on the specific successful experience of the EU as a regional organization (Ibid:293). This implies that the EU may not be ‘a force for good’ but rather is motivated by power, internal characteristics and the promotion of the European model, rather than universal norms (Ibid:299). The promotion of regionalism in the Mediterranean is a good example of this, as regionalism represents a European and not a universal norm, and the process of foreign policy towards the region has not been reflexive nor inclusive of others (Bicchi, 2006:288, 291). Nicolaïdis and Howse argue that the concept of the EU as a civilian/normative power can be seen as the EU’s projection of itself in the global arena. This projection may lack self-awareness and may not reflect what the EU actually is, but rather a EU-topia. This idea is usually disregarded in the NPE debate (Nicolaïdis and Howse, 2002:769). Nicolaïdis and Howse argue that the key to the EU’s international influence lies in the credibility of EU narratives and the accuracy of its projections. Therefore, the EU should have consistency in its external and internal goals and policies, and thus become “the utopia that it seeks to project on to the rest of the world.” (Ibid:788). In a later article, Onar and Nicolaïdis turn the attention to the marginalization of Europe’s colonial past in NPE discourse (Onar and Nicolaïdis, 2013:284), despite the fact it still affects some actors’ perceptions of the EU and diminishes its influence (Ibid:285, 296). They argue that by acknowledging the EU’s colonial past, neo-colonial tendencies and Eurocentrism, the EU could reinvent its normative power and increase its influence in the world (Ibid:285). Diez argues that NPE is a practice of discursive representation, a narrative that constructs the EU’s identity against others, which allows “EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings”

24 (Diez, 2005:626-627). NPE discourse presents the EU as a ‘force for good’ and third parties as ‘others’. This has implications on the way policies set by the EU affect other actors, and the extent to which the EU is living up to its own ideals (Ibid:613-614). Through normative power the EU can on one hand exert influence, and on the other to construct its difference in comparison to others (Ibid:633). Manners argues that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.”(Manners, 2002:252). However, if the EU will not practice self-reflexivity in regards to its own deficiencies concerning norms and values, it will diminish its normative power (Diez, 2005:627). Pace argues that the debate over NPE evolves around the notion that NPE is a good form of power to have, and therefore it has disregarded its own limitations, and how they have diminished the EU’s role as a global actor in conflict resolution (Pace, 2007:1043). Pace posits that NPE’s limited capabilities may lead to a gap between EU rhetoric and the situation on the ground, in a cynical attempt to portray itself as a ‘force for good’, yet not taking action when norms are violated (Ibid:1056). Pace and Diez raise the question whether the construction of NPE enables the EU to play a positive role in conflict transformation, and to what extent the EU is “seen as setting standard and leading by example.” (Diez and Pace, 2011:213). By raising these questions, they bring to light the importance of external perceptions of the EU as a meaningful aspect of the EU’s ability to actually obtain the role of a normative power (Ibid:214).

3.2 Perception and Misperception in International Relations

The rationale behind the study of perceptions in international relations is that the images decision- makers have of other international actors will affect their responses to foreign policy problems (Chaban et al., 2006:249). The concept of perceptions and misperceptions in international relations was introduced by Robert Jervis in his book from 1976, using a multidisciplinary approach by applying cognitive psychology to political decision-making. Jervis aims at understanding international politics through the process of the creation of perceptions of political actors and how it may lead to misperceptions (Jervis, 1976:14). Thus, an objective situation will not determine the decision-makers’ responses, but rather his perceptions of that situation. Therefore, the process of decision-making should be scrutinized (Ibid:28). Jervis points out that decision-makers’ perceptions of other actors may be unrealistic, and can be understood through patterns indicating how decision-makers process information and maintain or change their perceptions (Ibid:7).

25 Having some perceptions and expectations already predisposes to noticing particular things and to neglecting others, and thus makes the consideration of options cognitively difficult (Ibid:145). In general, it could be claimed that once a person has developed an image of the other he/she will always see their behaviour as similar to that image (Ibid:68). In decision-making, analogies based on previous events and experiences are often used as a rational shortcut, which can obscure the interpretation of the situation (Ibid:220). Key events in history are powerful determinants of perceptions and interpretation of information (Ibid:219-220). Four variables will determine whether a certain event will affect a person’s perceptions: whether or not he experienced the event first-hand; if the event occurred in his early-adult life or career; if it had important consequences for him personally or to his nation; and finally if he is familiar with alternative events that could promote other perceptions (Ibid:239). According to Jervis, it is imperative that decision-makers be aware of the fact that their perceptions may not be accurate and thus lead to mistakes in international relations (Ibid:423). Perceptions and misperceptions are important not only to decision-makers, but also in regard to the general public who votes for the politicians to lead the country based on their perceptions (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010:304). The information we receive is usually based on our personal experience, advice, national discourse, education and the media, and forms a knowledge database which is the basis of our perceptions (Chaban and Holland, 2014:68-69). The policy preferences of the people are in many cases based on false information, often related to the person’s political preference, and reinforces pre-existing views (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010:307). This is especially true in cases in which politicians have an interest in misrepresenting information and presenting complex issues as black or white (Ibid:306). Therefore, it is valuable to examine the perceptions of the political elite as well as the general public, in order to have an in-depth understanding of a country’s perceptions of other actors.

3.2.1 External Perceptions of the European Union

Researching external perceptions of the EU can contribute to understanding the EU as a global actor, its behaviour, its identity and its influence on other actors in the international arena (Chaban and Holland, 2014:1; Lucarelli, 2014:2). The field of external perceptions of the EU is relatively new and under developed (Chaban et al., 2013:435; Lucarelli, 2014:1-2). It became all the more relevant with the new phase of EU international diplomacy including the implementation of the

26 Lisbon Treaty, the appointment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which enabled the EU to become a more meaningful actor in global affairs (Chaban and Holland, 2014:3-4). Chaban and Holland suggest that perceptions are the “result of the subjective or psychological cognition of the observer rather than the objective reflection of the object that is being observed” (Ibid:8). Perceptions are shaped by actor-related factors as well as developments taking place both within the system of the actor as well as outside of it, especially in the location of the ‘observer’ (Ibid, ibid). Hence, external actors to the EU perceive it through their own identity, location and perspectives unique to them (Ibid:11). The book of Chaban and Holland encompasses multiple researches on external perceptions of the EU, conducted by different researchers in different countries (Ibid:16). Sonia Lucarelli has also addressed the gap of external images in EU literature, emphasizing their importance to the idea of EU distinctiveness as an allegedly normative actor, and its implications on the EU’s political identity and foreign policy (Lucarelli, 2007:258). External perceptions of the EU are diverse, and they vary across regions and issues. Some may perceive the Union as a strong political power, and others may perceive it as weak and lacking internal unity (Chaban et al., 2013:435). Literature on the EU has not evaluated the extent to which others view the EU as a leader. This however is an imperative task, since “in order to lead, an international actor needs to be recognized by the others as powerful, credible, capable and legitimate.” (Chaban and Holland, 2014:46). Others’ views on the EU and their expectations of it shape the EU’s identity and role (Elgström, 2007:952). Elgström argues that the actual impact of a EU policy will depend on how other parties evaluate it. In order for the EU to be a power and lead in multilateral settings it needs followers. In other words, “to actually exert leadership, it is not enough for the EU to say that it is a leader.” (Ibid, ibid). Others will follow the EU if its policies are seen as coherent, consistent and legitimate, with legitimacy being determined only by the perceptions of others (Ibid, ibid). Chaban et al. argue that exogenous and endogenous sources explain differentiation in perceptions of the EU. The former refers to the EU’s actions such as its role in the region, and the latter to sources unrelated to the EU’s actions, usually domestic factors in third countries. The interaction between the two will finally determine what will be the perception of the EU in each case (Chaban et al., 2013:447). For example, perceptions of the EU in each country are also influenced by their historical relations and their evolvement over time (Ibid:436). EU public

27 diplomacy efforts in a particular region form a meaningful exogenous determinant. The EU has experienced challenges in its multilateral activities, which has affected the EU’s ability to communicate itself to others and thus influenced the external perceptions of itself (Ibid:447). Criticism that undermines the EU’s credibility and legitimacy can be summed up to accusing the EU of double standards, inconsistency and having a remissive attitude in respect to the US. Double standards imply that the EU operates differently or adopts a different attitude in similar circumstances. An example of this could be promoting human rights in one country while over-looking violations in another (Chaban and Holland, 2014:54-55). The EU has been accused by several countries of condemning countries selectively, only when the price is not too high (Larsen, 2014:905; Lucarelli, 2014:10). The EU has been also criticized for having the potential to acquire a larger role in the MEPP and failing to do so due to internal division between MS and the inability to take an independent role of the US (Chaban and Holland, 2014:56). Endogenous sources that are particularly relevant to the formation of perceptions of the EU are the specific political, social and security culture in a certain country, cultural sensitivities, differences in normative understandings and the type of regime in the country (Chaban et al., 2013:447). In some cases, also close relations of the third country with the US may undermine perceptions of the EU as a meaningful power and leader, as a way of showing loyalty to the US (Ibid:448). Predominantly, the EU is considered across regions to be a leader in the economic field (Chaban et al., 2013:443; Lucarelli, 2014:7). EU leadership has been seen in some parts of the world as providing an alternative to hegemonic US (Lucarelli, 2007:261) and leading by example due to its own successful regional integration, as well as a ‘force for good’ in terms of international morality (Chaban et al., 2006:259). Although the EU’s role in conflict resolution and peace processes is recognized to some extent (Lucarelli, 2007:265), there is not much evidence of a wide- spread perception of the EU as a normative actor (Chaban et al., 2013:436), with some geographical exceptions amongst EU neighbouring countries (Larsen, 2014:904). External perceptions of the EU also examine whether the EU is perceived as a normative power. From multiple researchers three main perceptions of the EU as a normative power emerge. The first is that the EU does not have a special normative role nor is it normatively different or superior to other countries (Ibid:904-905). The second perception is that the EU may promote norms, but it does so only to cover up for its exercise of neo-colonial political control, advancing

28 its economic interests (Ibid:905). The third perception is that the EU is not promoting universal values but rather its own Eurocentric values, that could clash with norms and values of non- Europeans. The EU has been accused of expecting the rest of the world to accept its’ norms even if they are different, and of interfering in internal political affairs of other countries (Ibid, ibid). The EU has been claimed by some countries to have a patronizing attitude, accompanied by Eurocentric values, that may not necessarily suite others. This is especially noticeable in countries with a colonial past. Furthermore, the EU has been claimed to have no sympathy nor a genuine understanding of others (Chaban and Holland, 2014:54). In light of the above mentioned negative perceptions, the EU may need to exercise some self-reflection in regards to its ambitions, policies and place in the world (Ibid:252). Negative perceptions of the EU will eventually lead to deficiencies in the EU’s ability to lead by example and be considered a leader in the global arena (Lucarelli, 2014:8).

3.3 Conceptual Framework: NPE and External Perceptions of the European Union

The reasoning behind choosing NPE to be part of the conceptual framework of this thesis lies both in its dominancy in EU discourse as well as in the EU’s own communication of itself as a normative actor in the global arena (Cebeci, 2012:570; ESS 2003). As a result, the EU has been criticized both in the academic debate as well as by other countries. In that sense, perceptions come to play an important role in conceptualising the EU as a normative power. The debate over NPE has not engaged with empirical studies on external perceptions of the EU (Larsen, 2014:897) and has been usually examined separately from them. This appears rather odd, for how can the EU be characterized as a normative power if it is not perceived as such by others? Drawing on literature of NPE and external perceptions of the EU, the conceptual framework of this thesis aims at pointing out a significant deficiency in the concept of NPE, namely overlooking the importance of external perceptions of the EU. Manners argues that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is.” (Manners, 2002:252). This claim is especially problematic when not taking external perceptions into account, for external actors may not necessarily agree with the EU on what it is. A normative role cannot be fully achieved if normative power is not recognized. As Manners argues, normative power is the “ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Ibid:236). However, if the EU is not perceived as a normative

29 power it is not likely to be able to exert that power in terms of influencing conceptions of the normal. The discussion over NPE only is too conceptual and not based in empirics (Larsen, 2014:901). It is also very Eurocentric, assuming that EU norms are universal and worth spreading. The image of the EU as a normative power prevails mainly in the EU’s neighbouring countries, which aspire to achieve closer relations with the EU or even a membership, but does not prevail world-wide (Larsen, 2014:906; Lucarelli, 2014:7). There is no doubt that the EU is engaging in a normative discourse and actions constructing itself as a normative power, but this does not mean that the EU is a normative power always and in all of its bilateral relations (Larsen, 2014:900, 902). Even in cases in which the EU is clearly taking normative actions, countries with a colonial past may deem new ’civilizing’ and ‘normative’ actions as illegitimate and neo-colonialist (Ibid:906-907). These countries are particularly aware of the EU’s patronizing style, reinforcing perceptions of the EU as a neo-colonial power (Lucarelli, 2014:10). Despite all of the above, EU discourse disregards the importance of external perceptions (Cebeci, 2012:582) both in regards to NPE as well as EU foreign policy. Merging the concepts of NPE and external perceptions of the EU can enhance our understanding of the EU’s identity and its construction, the EU’s actual global role, the EU’s bilateral relations with third countries, and foreign policy in general. As Lucarelli points out, it could also indicate what are the conditions under which EU policies will be effective (Lucarelli, 2014:2). Furthermore, perceptions could provide an explanation to why certain countries reject or accept NPE (Chaban and Holland, 2014:177). Lastly, there is a gap between the self-perception of the EU as a normative power and external perceptions of the EU, that needs to be addressed (Lucarelli, 2014:10). The Israeli case-study is unparalleled in terms of its historical context, the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, and complex, yet close, relationship between the EU and Israel. Many studies have been conducted in regards to the performance of the EU as a normative power in its relations with Israel, and to what extent it has managed to have a normative influence in Israel (Harpaz, 2008, 2010; Diez and Pace, 2011; Pardo, 2014, 2015; Gordon and Pardo 2015; Persson, 2017). However, the question raised in this thesis is whether Israelis perceive the EU as a normative power to begin with, regardless if the EU is considered by itself or others to be one, or if it promotes norms in its policies towards Israel.

30 The purpose of the analysis conducted in this thesis is to identify whether the same patterns emerging in EU external perceptions literature correlate with Israeli perceptions of the EU in terms of identifying it as a normative power. Therefore, within this merged conceptual framework specific aspects from each concept will be operationalized for analysing Israeli perceptions. Firstly, the EU’s ability to define what passes as normal (Manners, 2002:236) will be examined, and more specifically referrals to agreeing with EU policies in Israel and accepting them as normal. In this sense, the focus will be on the ontological aspect of NPE, of whether the EU can be perceived as a norm changer. Secondly, looking into what are Israeli perceptions of the EU, special attention will be given to referrals regarding legitimacy, coherency and consistency which are necessary for a normative justification to be convincing (Manners, 2011:233), as their absence could undermine the image of the EU in the eyes of partners (Manners, 2010:40). An example for this could be referrals to double standards (Sjursen, 2006:244), illegitimacy and hypocrisy. This is essential taking into consideration the criticism posed by Diez, who claims that the EU does not always see its own shortcomings (Diez, 2005:626-627). Furthermore, as mentioned before, in order to obtain the role of NPE, the EU should be perceived to some extent as setting a standard and leading by example (Diez and Pace, 2011:213). In order to be a leader the EU needs followers, that will recognize it as credible, capable and legitimate. Legitimacy especially is an important factor to examine, for it is determined by others. Criticism of NPE also raises aspects that will be examined, such as lack of credibility originating in the incapacity to act (Sjursen, 2006:239; Diez, 2005:615). The norms and six diffusion mechanisms identified by Manners will not be examined, for they relate better to examining whether the EU is acting as a normative power in its relations with others, and less to whether others perceive the EU as a normative power. Additionally, identifying the norms posed by Manners as normative to begin with is problematic, for not all actors will agree that democracy for example is necessarily a universal value. Furthermore, the conditions for diffusion mechanisms may be present in the EU relations with third countries, but that does not guarantee that diffusion will take place. Especially in regards to negative perceptions of the EU, it seems doubtful that a diffusion will occur despite the existence of diffusion mechanisms when the other party does not trust the EU to begin with. From the literature on external perceptions of the EU emerges that not many countries outside of Europe recognize the EU as a normative power (Chaban et al., 2013:436). For that

31 reason, the three main external perceptions of the EU as a normative power will be examined in the context of Israeli perceptions (Larsen, 2014:904-905). Special attention will also be given to examining the findings of previous research on external perceptions of the EU, such as identifying the EU as an economic power (Chaban et al., 2013:443; Lucarelli, 2014:7), having double standards, being inconsistent, interfering in internal affairs, having a patronizing attitude, not genuinely understanding others and not having sympathy for others (Chaban and Holland, 2014:54). The analysis of the results will include remarks on the specific characteristics that affect Israeli perceptions of the EU, namely the exogenous and endogenous sources of EU-Israel relations (Chaban et al., 2013:447).

32 4. EU-Israel Relations: Historical overview and challenges The EU has maintained a close relationship with Israel regardless of it not having a prospect for accession, that is becoming a EU MS, nor being geographically located in Europe (Yacobi and Newman, 2005:173; Tocci, 2005:126). Israel has many links to Europe being a member European frameworks and policies, attending European cultural events, and most importantly having cultural and historical ties to Europe through Israeli Jews who originate in Europe, with hundreds of thousands of Israelis obtaining a European citizenship (Pardo and Peters, 2010:112; Harpaz, 2013:170). EU-Israel relations take place under an association agreement, and can be generally seen as encompassing good economic relations that are over-shadowed on the political level by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Pardo and Peters, 2010:5; Harpaz, 2007:98-99).

4.1 High Hopes and the Fog of War: 1957-1979

In 1957, when the treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC), the Israeli government not only understood the economic and political importance of the EEC to Israel, but also explored the idea of joining it (Pardo, 2015:21-22). This idea was later ruled out by the Israeli government, which still strived toward close relations with the EEC (Pardo and Peters, 2012:2). In 1959 diplomatic relations were first established between Israel and the EEC, later to become the EC and then the EU, with Israeli leadership emphasizing the importance of establishing close relations (Pardo and Peters, 2012:3; Harpaz, 2005:166). In 1964 the parties signed a limited non-preferential commercial agreement, which despite being the most comprehensive agreement the EC signed at the time with a third country, had little economic importance and did not satisfy Israel, which pushed towards the establishment of an association agreement (Pardo and Peters, 2012:5; Bouris, 2014:49). EC-Israel relations took a dramatic turn after the 1967 Six Day war, in which Israel seized control over territories designated to the Palestinians (Pardo and Peters, 2012:73; Altunişik, 2008:106; Bouris, 2014:48). In 1971 in the aftermath of the war and the Community’s failure to speak with one voice, the EC adopted the secret ‘Schuman document’ on the Middle East, which later leaked, in its first attempt to adopt a common position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict (Pardo and Peters, 2012:74; Müller, 2012:29). After October 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab states, an oil embargo was imposed on Europe by the Gulf states, leading the EC to an energy crisis that required a collective response. In November the EC released a declaration calling

33 for a just peace, taking into consideration the legitimate rights of Palestinians (Pardo and Peters, 2012:75-76; Müller, 2012:30-31), stopping the construction of settlements, and opposing any unilateral initiative to change the status of Jerusalem. This declaration was strongly criticized by Israel, who condemned the EC of betrayal, and merely ensuring its own oil interests. The Israeli sharp and bitter response to the declaration paved the path for future Israeli responses to European involvement in the conflict (Pardo and Peters, 2010:7; Müller, 2012:31). Despite the gloomy state of EC-Israel relations, in May 1975 the two signed their first free trade agreement, eventually making the EU today the most important trading partner of Israel (Pardo, 2011:48; Musu, 2010:134). The agreement was signed for an unlimited period, with the objective to establish a free trade area and promote cooperation between the Community and Israel under the framework of the global policy towards the Mediterranean (Kapeliuk-Klinger, 1993:419; Bouris, 2014:49). The EC expressed its position towards the conflict again in the 1977 London Declaration (The European Council, 1977) when it called for the inclusion of Palestinian representatives in future negotiations (Müller, 2012:33-34; Musu, 2010:38). During the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, the EC continued to stress that a lasting and just peace could only be achieved by establishing a Palestinian homeland. When this was no longer a priority of the Camp David process, the EC decided to launch its own initiative on the matter (Pardo and Peters, 2010:7; Musu, 2010:39).

4.2 Long and Winding Road: 1980-2000

Tensions culminated in the 1980 Venice declaration in which the European Council supported the right of Palestinians to self-determination, urged to find a just solution to the Palestinian problem, and declared that there will be no acceptance of any unilateral initiative regarding Jerusalem (The European Council, 1980). The Venice Declaration is considered to be the basis for the European standpoint towards the conflict (Altunişik, 2008:106; Müller, 2012:34). Furthermore, the EC criticized Israel for its settlement building policy being “deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East” and violates international law (Bouris, 2014:50; Pardo, 2015:5; Gordon and Pardo, 2015:268; Müller, 2013:25). Additionally, the EC recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), considered in Israel to be a terrorist organization (Yacobi and Newman, 2005:181), as the legitimate political

34 representative of Palestinians, that should be included in future negotiations (Pardo and Peters, 2010:8; Musu, 2010:40). These developments were strongly criticized by Israel, who believed the EC is sacrificing Israel in order to protect its oil supplies and relations with the Arab world. Israel denounced the declaration as a “bitter memory”, making references to the Second World War and adopting a position according to which “Israel does not seek a guarantee for its security from any European nation” (Pardo and Peters, 2010:8; Touval and Pardo, 2013). This turning point led to Israeli public distrust in the role of Europe as a mediator in the MEPP, created negative Israeli perceptions of the EC, and brought about a deterioration in the relations, which never fully recovered (Yacobi and Newman, 2005:182; Pardo and Peters, 2010:9; Persson, 2017:1420).

Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the 1987 first Palestinian ‘Intifada’ (Palestinian uprising), the EC increasingly criticized Israel and endorsed the PLO and the rights of Palestinians. Israelis viewed Europe as impartial, not concerned with Israeli security and demanding concessions only from Israel. Thus, Israel continued to oppose any European attempt to play a meaningful role in the MEPP. After the 1991 Gulf War the US turned its attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict, becoming its most prominent international mediator. Due to Israeli encouragement the US prevented Europe from acquiring a meaningful role in the MEPP, as can be seen in the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference (Pardo and Peters, 2010:9), where Europe had a largely economic and less political role (Yacobi and Newman, 2005:182; Musu, 2010:48-49). The US led framework of Madrid was not sufficient to bring Israel and the PLO to the negotiation table, eventually achieving the cause through a secret back channel supported by Norway. This led to the signing of the long hoped Oslo Accords in September 1993 (Bouris, 2014:51; Pardo and Peters, 2010:10). In 1994 Essen European Council Conclusions, following the excitement of Oslo and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, the Council suggested that Israel should enjoy a special status in its relations with the EU (Müller, 2012:63; Pardo and Peters, 2010:65). The EU deepened its relationship with Israel through the multilateral framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) established in the 1995 Barcelona Process as a platform to strengthen political, economic, technological and science relations (Pardo, 2011:50; Pace, 2007:659; Panebianco, 2010:160). The EU aimed at creating a new framework of cooperation in the Mediterranean that will promote peace, cooperation, political dialogue, stability and economic development (Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995). The rationale behind the initiative was the belief that instability in the region is the result of economic underdevelopment and social

35 inequality, and therefore issues of security should be approached not only by military means (Pardo and Peters, 2010:34; Musu, 2010:57). The EU decided to include Israel in the EMP as it seemed that a meaningful change has taken place in the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict with the Arab states willing to accept Israel as a legitimate partner in the region (Pardo and Peters, 2010:35; Musu, 2010:56). In Israel the EMP was viewed as undermining its economic relations and previous bilateral agreements with the EU, degrading Israel to have the same economic status as the countries of the southern Mediterranean. Israel also feared that the EMP is a European attempt to gain more influence in the MEPP, in a relatively pro-Arab framework in which Israel would be outnumbered (Pardo and Peters, 2010:36). The EMP was intended to be separate from the MEPP, but soon events related to the Arab-Israeli conflict became intertwined with the EMP limiting its process (Pardo and Peters, 2010:39; Musu, 2010:57). The meetings of the EMP became a political platform in which the Arab states attacked Israel with the hope of getting support from Europe, and eventually alongside European efforts to obtain a larger political role in the MEPP led to a deterioration in EU-Israel relations and increased Israeli mistrust towards Europe (Pardo and Peters, 2010:41). These developments led to an improvement in EU-Israel relations upon the signing of a new and upgraded trade agreement in November 1995, namely the EU-Israel Association Agreement (AA) (Harpaz, 2005:167; Martins, 2016:157). After a long process of ratification, the AA entered into force in June 2000 (Martins, 2016:158; Bicchi and Voltolini, 2018:133), and became the legal and political framework of EU-Israel relations (Pardo, 2011:50). The agreement encompasses economic provisions as well as elements for the institutionalization of political dialogue between the EU and Israel. The AA enables a preferential status in terms of economic, commercial, technological and research relations (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 2000). It includes free trade arrangements and overall simplifies trade conditions. Essentially, the agreement exempts import and export between the two from monetary custom duties (Harpaz, 2005:167; Pardo and Peters, 2010:49). The AA marked an important breakthrough in EU-Israel relations, having meaningful political and economic benefits for Israel and making it a close economic partner of the EU (Pardo and Peters, 2010: 48; Harpaz, 2005:167; Martins, 2016:164; Tocci, 2005:133). The EU-Israel Association Council was established to meet annually in order to create and oversee the political dialogue and economic cooperation between the two parties (Martins, 2016:157; Pardo and Peters, 2010:11). Additionally, the AA established an Association Committee

36 comprising of Israeli officials and EU officials of the EU Council and European Commission, as well as 11 expert-level sub-committees to deal with professional matters (Pardo and Peters, 2010:51). It is important to note that the AA does not explicitly mention the MEPP, nor is it conditioned by progress in that area, or in any other issues critical to the EU, such as Israeli settlement building in the OT (Persson, 2018:3-4; Pardo and Peters, 2010:52). As part of the AA, Israeli exports to the EU are not subject to custom duties. This has generated a dispute between the EU and Israel, regarding the legal treatment of Israeli goods originating from Israeli settlements in the OT. Israel argues that these goods should be subjected to the preferential status of the AA as they are produced in its customs territory. The EU on its part argues that these territories have been illegally occupied and are not part of Israel, and therefore are not entitled to a preferential status (Harpaz, 2005:182; Bicchi and Voltolini, 2018:133). This dispute is an important matter in EU-Israel relations, and will be discussed in more depth in the final section of this chapter. Israel has sought to intensify scientific and technological cooperation with Europe even before signing the AA, and in October 1995, Israel signed a Research and Development Agreement with the EU, and was accepted as the first non-European country to the EU’s Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development (FP). Through this development and Israeli innovations, the EU has become Israel’s second largest funder of research (Pardo and Peters, 2010:50). Following these events Israel began to seek EU involvement in the MEPP as a financial supporter of the Palestinian economy and institutions. Hence, the EU swiftly became the main donor of Palestinians, and thus became critical of Israeli security and economic restrictions on Palestinians during the Oslo Process (Pardo and Peters, 2010:11; Tocci, 2005:135). After the Oslo Accords faded with no meaningful progress, and the election of the right- wing Likud party’s leader Benjamin Netanyahu as the Israeli Prime Minister (PM), the EU issued the 1999 Berlin Declaration (Bouris, 2014:53; Bouris and Brown, 2014; Müller, 2012:43). In the declaration the EU expressed its readiness to recognize a Palestinian state when the time is right, and thus presented the two-state solution (Müller, 2012:27). The declaration was seen in Israel as a European attempt to determine the outcomes of future negotiations (Pardo and Peters, 2010:17). An effort to revive the peace-talks was made in July 2000 at Camp David, where the EU had no meaningful role (Pardo and Peters, 2010:13; Müller, 2012:45). The talks eventually collapsed with the eruption of the second ‘Intifada’ in September 2000 (Müller, 2012:27; Tocci, 2005:128).

37 4.3 Increased European Involvement: 2001-2012

In the 2002 Seville declaration the EU clearly defined its position calling for an end to Israeli occupation and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the basis of 1967 borders (Müller, 2012:29). It also condemned the Israeli Military Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank (Bouris, 2014:53). At the same time, the EU also became a member of the Middle East Quartet and contributed to the formation of the Roadmap peace initiative for the two-state solution (Müller, 2012:29). Ever since the EU has been clear about its idea of resolving the conflict, focusing on the establishment of a Palestinian state in 1967 borders (Yacobi and Newman, 2005:183-184; Tocci, 2005:127; Tocci, 2007:9). Israel agreed under the 2003 Roadmap initiative to stop settlement construction and to dismantle settlements built since March 2001, but failed to deliver (Pardo and Peters, 2010:20; Bouris, 2014:54). Furthermore, due to continuous violence, the Israeli government decided in the summer of 2002 to construct a security barrier between Israel and the OT, partly made out of concrete wall, therefore referred to as the ‘Wall’, in order to defend Israeli citizens (Marom, 2003). The construction of the ‘Wall’ has been highly criticized by the EU as causing suffering for Palestinians and attempting to change circumstances on the ground, thus affecting future negotiations (Harpaz, 2010:601-602). In 2004, the International Court of Justice ruled that the ‘Wall’ violates international law and human rights (Tocci, 2005:129). Israel received an opportunity to improve its relation with the EU with the launching of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP is a framework for cooperation between the EU and 16 neighbouring countries, including Israel (Bouris and Schumacher, 2017:2, 10; Müller, 2012:30), which “aims for the stabilisation of the EU's Neighbourhood through building resilience of partners.” (EEAS 2004). The policy was part of the enlargement process the EU was undergoing, and aimed at creating around Europe a ring of countries sharing the same values and objectives (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005:20; Harpaz, 2005:296-297). The adoption of the ENP ended up side-lining the EMP and the Barcelona Process. It abandoned the idea of ‘regionality’ and adopted a differentiated, bilateral approach, offering each neighbouring country to develop its relations with the EU to the extent it is willing to undertake political and economic reforms required by the EU (Pace, 2007:661; Pardo and Peters, 2010:58). For Israel, the ENP was a great opportunity to become a closer partner of the EU (Pardo and Peters, 2010:59). The ENP was accompanied by a tailor-made EU-Israel Bilateral Action Plan (AP) aiming at addressing political dialogue as well as increasing economic cooperation (EEAS, 2004). The

38 AP was adopted in December 2004 after difficult negotiations, and was an important milestone in EU-Israel relations, bringing the two closer together. The EU chose to focus on the political achievements of the AP, while Israel chose to emphasize the economic aspects and opportunity to work more closely with Europe on a variety of issues, such as the fight against terrorism (Pace, 2007:663; Pardo and Peters, 2010:60; Tocci, 2005:142). The AP identified six priority areas: enhancing political dialogue and cooperation, economic dialogue, strengthening cooperation on migration, organized crime, and police and judicial cooperation, promoting cooperation in transport, energy science and technology, strengthening environmental policies; and strengthening links on ‘people-to-people’ basis (EEAS, 2004; Del Sarto, 2007:63). Israel has been benefitting from the ENP to the fullest, and the Action Plan has indeed brought the parties closer together with relative success in promoting cooperation in many areas (Pardo and Peters, 2010:61). The AP touches upon some political issues, but discusses them in a vague language, while disregarding major differences between Israel and the EU and lacking a meaningful political commitment from Israel (Pace, 2007:663; Del Sarto, 2007:72). After the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the EU began to take a more active role in facilitating the conditions for the MEPP (Pardo and Peters, 2010:22-23). The EU was asked by both sides to monitor the Rafah border crossing point on the Gaza-Egypt border, establishing the EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah in November 2005 (Bouris, 2012:262; Del Sarto, 2015:33; Bouris, 2014:114; Asseburg, 2010:80). Following the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, after winning the Palestinian elections in January 2006, the mission was suspended. Despite not being very successful, the mission improved EU-Israel relations as Israel was willing to put its trust in the EU in a security matter (Pardo and Peters, 2010:23; Bouris, 2012:262). The EU has also been active in terms of rebuilding the security capacity of the Palestinian Authority (PA) through the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, by improving law enforcement, civil police capacity and training of police officers and officials of the judicial system (Bouris, 2014:109; Bouris, 2012:260; Asseburg, 2010:78). Although Hamas won in fair and democratic elections encouraged by the EU discourse on the importance of democratization, the EU decided to freeze its direct aid to the PA in order to bypass Hamas, which was included in the EU and US terrorist lists (Bouris, 2014:52-53; Musu, 2010:76; Tocci, 2009:391). In July 2008, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched by the Euro- Mediterranean heads of state with the aim of providing a new political framework with greater co-

39 ownership than the EMP in the southern Mediterranean (Bicchi, 2011:3; Del Sarto, 2011:118). The UfM became the platform to implement EMP initiatives and the official EU policy toward the Euro-Mediterranean region. The UfM is an inter-governmental international organization comprising of all EU MS as well as Mediterranean partner countries, including Israel and the PA (Pardo and Peters, 2010:43). Israel benefitted from the approach of the UfM focusing on cooperation in fields in which Israel had experience and could contribute to a dialogue with the Arab states in areas of mutual concern (Bicchi, 2011:4). Unfortunately, this initiative also became dependent on the developments of the conflict, especially after the 2008 Gaza War, when the Arab states refused to engage with Israel in any UfM initiative. Since both of the EU multilateral efforts, the EMP and the UfM, have failed, Israel continuous to develop its relations with the EU on the bilateral level (Del Sarto, 2011:118-119; Pardo and Peters, 2010:45). Acknowledging the growing importance of the EU for the future economic development of Israel, and the EU’s potential to become a meaningful player in the MEPP, Israel began to seek closer ties with the EU. In 2008, the EU-Israel Association Council was preparing for an upgrade in the relations (Council of the European Union, 2008) based on the findings of the Israeli-EU ‘Reflection Group’, whose task had been to find areas of cooperation to be enhanced (Pardo and Peters, 2010:65-66). The upgrade was to be carried out in diplomatic cooperation, Israeli participation in European agencies, working groups and programs and integration of Israel to the European Single Market. These plans suffered a severe setback and were put on hold after the Gaza War of 2008 and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as PM in March 2009 (Pardo, 2011:50). The situation aggravated after the refusal of the Netanyahu-led government to support the establishment of a Palestinian state. By the following meeting of the Association Council in 2009, there was no more discussion of an upgrade of the relations (Pardo and Peters, 2010:5). European disappointed was also expressed in the EU Council Conclusion on the MEPP in December 2009, calling for “urgent resumption of the negotiations” and the advancement of the two-state solution as the best way to guarantee Israeli security and stability in the region (Council of the European Union, 2009).

4.4 Trade and Politics

In order to understand EU-Israel relations, it is important to pay attention to their economic aspect. Even at times when the relations take a hit on the political level, business still goes on as usual.

40 Israel is an important trading partner of the EU in the Mediterranean, and the EU is Israel’s biggest trading partner, with total trade reaching 36,2€ billion in 2017 (European Commission, Trade Statistics, 2018). Nevertheless, economic cooperation between the EU and Israel does not take place in isolation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the MEPP. As mentioned before, the AA raised a meaningful dispute regarding the principle of ‘Rules of Origin’ (ROO) of goods produced in Israeli settlements in the OT. According to the ROO, the country of origin of products needs to be declared in order to determine if the product is entitled to custom benefits (Del Sarto, 2015:86; Voltolini, 2016:1508-1509; Harpaz, 2004:1051). The issue was raised for the first time in 1997, pondering whether products originating in Israeli settlements in the OT are violating the principle of ROO as the territories are not agreed to be part of Israel (Pardo and Peters, 2010:52). Article 83 of the AA refers to the “territory of the State of Israel” (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, 2000) without further specifying what is considered to be that territory. In 1998, the European Commission concluded that based on the relevant United Nations (UN) resolutions, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East- Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are not considered Israeli territory, and that the application of the AA should be limited to Israeli borders before 1967. Thus products originating in the OT are not entitled for preferential status (Harpaz, 2005:182). The Commission argued that Israel is violating the ROO, while Israel on its part claimed that East-Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are under Israeli law a part of Israel, and although the West Bank and Gaza are not officially annexed, Israeli jurisdiction applies in all Israeli settlements located there (Pardo and Peters, 2010:55). From a technical and legal issue, the dispute became highly politicized, with Israel blaming the EU of imposing sanctions on Israel, and the EU responding that the implementing of the ROO is a mere technicality. Nevertheless, this can also be interpreted as a form of conditionality used to advance EU foreign policy (Del Sarto, 2015:90-91; Harpaz, 2005:186; Bicchi and Voltolini, 2018:134; Persson, 2018:5). Finally, in December 2004 Israel surrendered to European pressures and a technical arrangement was adopted, according to which goods produced in the OT will be labelled as ‘made in Israel’, but the specific location of production will be indicated in the origin certificates (Pardo and Peters, 2010:56; Tocci, 2005:141). In February 2005, the agreement entered into force as a compromise allowing Israel to name the location of the settlements as ‘Israel’ and the EU on its part not recognize the legality of Israeli settlements by imposing a charging tariff on these products.

41 This agreement symbolizes an important moment in EU-Israel relations since Israel recognized the EU’s political and economic importance, and the EU became more assertive and critical of Israeli policies (Ibid:57). The Council Conclusions of May and December 2012 can be seen as the highlight of this long process, since the EU finally specified what it means when referring to ‘Israeli territory’ in all of its agreements with Israel (Müller and Slominski, 2017:883). In December 2012 Conclusions the EU committed to ensure that “all agreements between the State of Israel and the European Union must unequivocally and explicitly indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, namely the Golan Heights, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip…the European Union and its Member States reiterate their commitment to ensure continued, full and effective implementation of existing European Union legislation and bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products.”(Art.4). In October 2012, after a few years of intense debate, the EU ratified the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA). The ACAA focused on pharmaceuticals that will be easier to export from Israel to EU countries (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Additionally, in 2013 the EU upgraded its aviation agreement with Israel (The Council of the European Union, August, 2013) and proposed in the December Council Conclusions that “In the event of a final peace agreement the European Union will offer Israel and the future state of Palestine a Special Privileged Partnership” (The Council of the European Union, December, 2013). This upgrade in the relations, especially the ratification of the ACAA, as well as the inclusion of Israel in the EU’s research program Horizon 2020, caused turbulent diplomatic disputes within the EU. Following pressure from the European Parliament and NGOs regarding deficiencies in terms of the ROO in the bilateral agreements with Israel, the EU adopted in July 2013 the Guidelines on eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards (the Guidelines) (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:419; Müller and Slominski, 2017:880). According to the Guidelines, EU bodies will no longer be able to fund or allocate grants and awards to Israeli companies, NGOs and public bodies based in Israeli settlements in the OT (2013 Guidelines, Art.5- 8). The Guidelines reinforce the fact that the EU does not recognize Israeli presence and sovereignty over the OT (Ibid, Art.2-3). Taking into consideration the extensive cooperation

42 between Israel and the EU in the seventh FP programme, the filtering out of the share of Israeli research operating in the OT financed by the FP programmes (which is only a fraction) is an administrative burden that could have possibly outweighed the financial and political benefits (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:418). Despite not setting a new precedent, the Guidelines brought about extreme reactions from the Israeli government. These reactions seem to be a result of two kinds of pressure: the broader context of increasing external criticism and international ‘de-legitimization’ efforts, alongside domestic political power struggles (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:422). Eventually, Israeli reactions to the Guidelines made them highly visible, and empowered their normative stance. In spite of the strong reactions, Israel had to accept the Guidelines, but disapproved the clauses stating that the OT are not a part of Israel (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:422; Persson, 2017:1424). In November 2015, the European Commission proclaimed the issue of ROO and released an Interpretative Notice according to which products originating in Israeli settlements in the OT should be labelled appropriately. The Commission reaffirmed its non-recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the OT by asking Israel to indicate clearly the origin of products. The Commission requested Israel to label the products not as originating in Israel, but distinctly as originating from a particular place, as well as clarifying that this place is an Israeli settlement (European Commission, 2015, point 10). Thus, the labelling and Guidelines are a form of bordering by re- asserting the 1949 Green Line and taking a stance about a disputed border, carried out through technical custom rules (Del Sarto, 2015:89-90; Bicchi and Voltolini, 2018:134). Since issuing the 2013 Guidelines and enforcing the labelling of products in 2015, the EU has adopted a ‘differentiation strategy’ towards the conflict, separating the internationally recognized Israel from the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 (Persson, 2017:1423; Müller and Slominski, 2017:871; Bouris, 2014). This included the issuing of business advisories warning companies of doing business with Israeli entities connected to the occupation, and non-recognition of Israeli veterinary supervision beyond the Green Line. While this strategy has not brought about the stop of settlement expansion, it has contributed to non-recognition and illegality of the settlements (Persson, 2017:1424; Bouris, 2014; Bouris and Schumacher, 2013). The EU has set an example for the US and human rights organizations, which have endorsed the labelling of products adopting the ‘strategy of differentiation’ towards Israel, thus recognizing the power of the EU to shape what is perceived as normal (Persson, 2017:1425). In December 2016 the UN adopted

43 Resolution 2334, which called “to distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since 1967” (UN, Security Council, 2016). The acceptance of the Guidelines and ROO demonstrates Israel’s acknowledgment of the EU’s economic might and potential to acquire a leading role in the MEPP (Harpaz, 2004:1054- 1055). Israel could not afford to disregard the EU anymore, and had to accept the limits of its own power as a small country (Harpaz, 2004:1058). The Guidelines and the labelling of products have an unintended effect of legitimizing and justifying doing ‘business as usual’ with Israel despite the settlement project, while not having a significant financial effect on Israeli entities in the OT nor Israeli export industry (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:422-423; Del Sarto, 2015:87). It seems that the main effect of the Guidelines is pointing out the existence of the Green Line and the illegality of the occupation (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:424; Del Sarto, 2015:86). The eventual implementation of the ROO has on the one hand served to legitimize trade with Israel, and on the other hand to reinforce the EU’s identity as a normative power (Del Sarto, 2015:98-99). To conclude, the EU is highly critical of any changes on the ground that could impinge on the two-state solution. Amongst these changes are the ‘Wall’ Israel has built between Israel and the OT and the building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. According to the EU, these changes are illegal under international law and undermine the prospects for peace (Pardo and Peters, 2010:20). The EU’s position regarding the status of Jerusalem, especially deeming Israeli building in East-Jerusalem as settlements in the OT, have been seen in Israel as a direct challenge to the claim of Jerusalem being its undivided capital and a demonstration of the EU’s bias (Ibid:13- 14). The EU is also continually criticizing Israel regarding the blockade in Gaza and Israeli military actions in the OT (Tocci, 2009:389). The political statements and declarations the EU has made in the past decades are seen in Israel as one-sided, pro-Arab and anti-Israeli. The EU’s harsh criticism has caused Israelis to over-see the continuous European commitment to the existence and survival of Israel, eventually shaping Israeli perceptions of the EU, especially in terms of the EU’s involvement in the MEPP (Pardo and Peters, 2010:71-72).

44 5. Israeli Perceptions of the EU

Perceptions change as time goes by and circumstances change. However, there are cases in which some perceptions never change, and may even grow with time. Therefore, it is valuable to research Israeli perceptions of the EU regularly, especially after major events in EU-Israel relations (for example the above mentioned product labelling). Such research could also provide insights on the evolution of the perceptions, and may aid in predicting what kind of developments could affect the perceptions of Israelis of the EU. It is important to note that Israeli society is not coherent nor unified, and thus different sectors may hold different views of the EU. However, some perceptions are widely shared and can be identified in Israeli society as a whole. Europe is usually not viewed in a positive light in Israel, despite the close trade and research relations and the potential benefits that closer relations could bring (Pardo and Peters, 2010:69). Furthermore, the negative image of the EU in the eyes of Israelis affects the legitimacy of the EU as a normative power (Harpaz, 2007:89). As earlier explained in the methodology chapter, in this thesis the data of perceptions of the political elite of the EU was collected since July 2013 until March 2018 from Knesset debates, Israeli newspapers, and conducting interviews. The data used for the analysis of perceptions of the Israeli public were collected from the Facebook page of the EU delegation to Israel. It is important to remark that there is a notable difference between decision-makers and ordinary commentators in social media. Decision-makers must take responsibility on their actions which might have major implications on many lives, whereas a private person’s comments on social media will probably have only a minor effect, if any. Furthermore, the content analysis was conducted with the purpose of identifying the main perceptions of the Israeli political elite and public, and quantifying their presence in the gathered data. Based on preliminary research a few codes indicating themes of Israeli perceptions of the EU were chosen: Holocaust, double-standards, biased and economic relations. When analysing the texts, open-coding was conducted based on a qualitative analysis. The units of measurement were paragraphs or sentences that contained references to the EU and EU-Israel related issues, with every quote linked to an appropriate code.

45 Word Cloud: Frequency of words Israelis link to the EU. Source: Author’s construction.

As indicated in the methodology, by the end of the analysis 28 codes were identified, to which 1280 quotes were linked. Many of the quotes included several codes in one sentence or comment, and hence the large amount of quotes linked to codes. Examples of the quotes will be provided in the results of the thesis. Additional comments and explanations regarding the classification of each code can be found in the annex Code Book. Of all comments collected from Facebook, eventually 1023 quotes were linked to codes. Seven interviews were conducted and analysed with 123 quotes linked to codes, alongside four relevant parliamentary debates with 35 quotes linked to codes and 38 articles containing political statements with 99 quotes linked to codes. All 28 codes are important in order to understand the bigger picture and the different nuances of the perceptions of the EU amongst Israelis. The most common codes associations together with the different linkages they create, as well as a chart of all 28 codes and their frequency are presented below.

46

Network view of most common code-associations. Source: Author’s construction.

47

Chart 1: All 28 codes identified of Israeli perceptions of the EU and their frequency. Source: Author’s construction.

It should be noted that there is a significant difference in the amount of data gathered from the political elite and the amount of social media comments, the latter being much higher. Therefore, large variation between some codes exists, for example, lack of credibility was mentioned in almost all interviews but was rarely mentioned by the Israeli public. In the following sections the ten most prominent perceptions within each analysis unit, the Israeli political elite and the Israeli public, will be introduced, and then followed by an analysis of the results, variation between the units, and an analysis of the ten most prominent perceptions of the two units combined together.

48 5.1 Perceptions of the Israeli Political Elite

In this section, the results of the content analysis conducted within the Israeli political elite will be introduced. The data gathered includes interviews, four Knesset political debates related to the EU, and public statements of a variety of Israeli politicians representing the entire political spectrum (as appeared in Israeli media during the limited time scope of the thesis). The data was analysed as a text, linking relevant quotes to codes and merging them into one chart. Although the data gathered is varied, the perceptions presented do not reflect the political elite as a whole, especially taking into consideration that the elite examined since July 2013 until March 2018 is presumably influenced by the right-wing ruling government (Pardo and Peters, 2010:115), which is open about its orientation towards the US and alienation from the EU. As indicated by an EU official, it is no secret that the current Netanyahu-led government is not very fond of the EU (Interview 3). Furthermore, published political statements and parliamentary debates might be affected by domestic political interests and could therefore be more populistic or dramatic. The following chart indicates the ten most prominent perceptions of the EU held by the Israeli political elite.

Chart 2: The 10 most prominent perceptions of the EU held by the Israeli political elite. Source: Author’s construction.

49 The most common perception among the Israeli political elite is that the EU is anti- Semitic/anti-Israeli. The two perceptions are presented together for they were often overlapping and used in the same context and even as synonyms. Perceptions of anti-Semitism are rooted among the political elite. Nearly all parliamentary debates related to the EU in the time scope of the thesis discuss the subject of anti-Semitism in Europe: ‘The rising anti-Semitism in Europe’ (25/01/2016), ‘The situation of the Jewish communities in Europe and the prognosis of their immigration’ (03/02/2016), ‘European Union Activities to Combat Antisemitism in Europe’ (12/07/2016). In all these debates the idea that Europe is to some extent anti-Semitic appeared clearly. Robert Ilatov from Yisrael Beytenu presented statistics claiming that 40% of European residents are anti-Semitic by definition, and argued that today in Europe the old anti-Semitism meets the new modern anti-Semitism, which is manifested through the hate towards the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people (Knesset, 25/01/2016). In the debate on the situation of the Jewish communities of Europe it was suggested that Aliyah, the immigration of Jews from the diaspora (in this case Europe) to Israel, should be encouraged, as Europe is no longer a good place for Jews to be in (Knesset, 03/02/2016). In the debate held in the Knesset committee regarding the EU’s activities to combat anti- Semitism, it was suggested that new forms of anti-Semitism exist in Europe. According to the debate, there are organizations and countries that call the existence of Israel racist, and deprive Jews of the right for self-determination. In this context, it was claimed in the Knesset that Israel is being discriminated against, and that the EU is applying double standards demanding things which are not required of any other democratic state. Furthermore, it was claimed that the EU funds organizations that compare Israeli policies to those of the Nazis, which is a form of Holocaust- denial (Knesset, 12/07/2016). One of the statistics presented in the committee implied that every third European holds anti-Semitic views (Ibid, ibid). In the context of the EU’s decision to label products, the Minister of Justice Ayelet Shaked commented that the decision to label products is anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish, and that the European hypocrisy and hatred towards Israel have gone too far (Ravid, November, 2015). The Minister of Energy Yuval Steinitz told foreign media that the labelling of products is perceived in Israel as an expression of latent anti-Semitism because Europe leads double standards against the Jewish state and refrains from similar actions in other disputed areas, such as Northern-Cyprus, Kashmir and Tibet. He added that Europe should take extreme caution regarding the discrimination of the

50 Jewish state and the labelling of products after 2000 years of anti-Semitism and discrimination of Jews in Europe (Tochfeld, 2015). Based on the interviews, common values and shared culture are important features of the relations, but they are overshadowed by the shared history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. The Israeli perspective towards Europe is very specific due to the events of the Holocaust and the feeling that Europe betrayed the Jews. The Holocaust marked a significant turning point both for the Jewish people as well as the Europeans, but the lessons learned on both sides are quite the opposite. The Holocaust is in the ideological base of the EU, and its focus is on avoiding racism, accepting everyone, having the freedom of religion, peace and de-militarization, respect of human rights, and so forth. The lessons Israel learned from the Holocaust are deeply rooted. They evolve around the idea of ‘never again’ leading Israel to do anything necessary to secure the future of the Jewish people, and thus choosing militarization and ethno-nationalism. These differences create a dissonance in the discourse with Europe. Everything is seen through the prism of the Holocaust, being a deep psychological process creating a large gap between the two (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 6; Harpaz, 2011:1865-1866). The memory of the Holocaust is very present in the Israeli society and can be seen not only in memorial days but also in the daily Israeli discourse (Interview 2). Due to the experience of the Holocaust, decisions such as the labelling of products, are automatically interpreted as anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli (Ibid, ibid), which only increases the reluctance to have a dialogue with Europe. According to the results of the thesis, it is evident that the EU is perceived by the Israeli political elite as having double standards and being hypocrite. As an MFA official said, “the camel does not see its own hump”, explaining that in France there is no such thing as minorities, everyone is French, and France is not even signatory to the treaty of protection of minorities. According to the same official, Jews in France are persecuted, and hence the EU is just preaching morals and being hypocrite (Interview 6). He continued stating that the EU presents itself as being supposedly better than Israel and knowing best what is good for Israel. Furthermore, the EU pretends to be a normative power, but this is hypocrite and wishful thinking, merely a creature that has nothing to do with reality, created by Brussels and intellectuals (Ibid, ibid). The Defense Minister at the time, Moshe Ya’alon, commented on the decision to label products stating that it is peculiar that the EU chooses to harm the only democracy in the Middle East, while at the same time it is combatting a wave of terrorism. He continued saying that at the same time in countries and continents around

51 us there is death, destruction, and hundreds of thousands of people are slaughtered, and nobody says a word (Ravid, November, 2015). Many references amongst the political elite also manifested the perception of the EU being biased. Commenting on the initiative to label products PM Netanyahu said that “it makes Israelis lose trust in the neutrality of Europe in terms of the peace process”, asserting that the future borders of Israel will only be determined by negotiations and not external economic pressure (Ravid, 2013). After the speech held in the Israeli Knesset (12/02/14) by Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, many Members of the Knesset were outraged. According to them, Schulz demonstrated bias by claiming that a Palestinian uses 17 liters of water a day while an Israeli uses 70 liters. As a response, some Members of the Knesset left during the speech, called for Schulz not to blindly take always the Palestinians side, and check his facts before accusing Israel of such lies (Lis, 2014). Yet again linking the EU to the Holocaust, Member of the Knesset Moti Yogev from the Jewish Home-party, shouted during Schulz’s speech: “How come a German is not ashamed to tell lies about how much water is being used? Israel has not been in Gaza for a long time, and your support of the Palestinians, who incite for the destruction of Israel in the Israeli Parliament, 70 years after the Holocaust, is an audacity.” (Eydar, 2014). PM Netanyahu commented after the speech that the European Parliament is biased and busy accusing Israel, while they shut their ears to all the attacks against Israel (Ibid, ibid). The 2013 Guidelines caused a political storm in Israel, leading politicians to suggest the EU is boycotting and discriminating Israel. Uri Ariel, then Minister of Construction, argued that the decision to label products is an expression of “racism, anti-Semitism and discrimination against the Jewish people, a reminiscent of boycotts of the Jews in Europe over 66 years ago” (Azulay, 2013). Naftali Bennett, Minister of Economy at the time, called for the Israeli government “to end all cooperation with the EU” regardless of the implications for Israeli economy (Lis, August, 2013). In the Knesset debate ‘The EU's decision to mark products from Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights’ (07/12/2015), both members of the coalition and opposition referred to the EU’s decision as discriminating and unjust (Knesset, 07/12/2015). Anat Berko from the Likud party argued that the European initiative to label products cannot be disconnected from the Boycott Divestment Sanction movement, as both manifest anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and the will to determine the finish line of conflict resolution coercively (Ibid, ibid). According to Berko, anti-

52 Semitism has many colors, and the Guidelines have not been applied anywhere else except in Israel (Ibid, ibid). Oded Forer, from Yisrael Beytenu, argued that Europe and others allow themselves to boycott areas and manufacturers from Israel against international law. David Bitan from the Likud asserted that the EU is the main force leading activities against Israel in all international forums (Ibid, ibid). Others reminded of the importance of the economic relations with the EU, and that Israel cannot protest against the labelling of products and look for other markets (Ibid, ibid). In a meeting with the Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, Netanyahu stressed that if Europe will boycott Israel, Israel will turn to other markets in the world that are interested in Israeli technology. He argued that it is fine to criticize Israel, but those who call for its boycott, do not apply the same logic with other countries (Ravid, 2014). Referring to the Holocaust, PM Netanyahu commented that “we already have a historical memory of what happened the last time when Jewish products were labelled in Europe.” (Ravid, September, 2015). In the interviews conducted in the MFA all the officials conveyed that the EU is undergoing many challenges such as a certain level of disintegration, enlargement which has caused differences between the MS, increasing Euroscepticism, Brexit, financial crisis, migration and terrorism, which result in alienation of MS from the EU and make the EU appear weak (Interviews 1, 5, 6). All of the above pose questions regarding the essence of the EU and its ability to deliver its promises and be a meaningful actor in the international arena (Interview 5). Another reason why the EU is perceived as weak and irrelevant amongst the political elite is the failing EU foreign policy, especially in the Middle East, due to the EU’s inability to implement its policies because of a lack of power. Therefore, the EU is unable to become a meaningful actor in the neighbourhood (Interviews 1, 5, 6). The EU’s inability to implement its policies is demonstrated in the labelling of products, which has been mostly rhetoric and less about actual actions (Interview 1). The ninth most prominent perceptions of the EU are interfering in Israeli affairs and the importance of economic and scientific relations with the EU. The perception of interference can be observed in the words of Avigdor Lieberman, the Chair of Yisrael Beytenu, who attacked the excessive involvement of the international community in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his words, “we do not need a babysitter, let us deal with the problem on our own” (Lis, September, 2013). Furthermore, the EU has been accused by Israel in the past few years of funding anti-Israeli NGOs within Israel, which is interpreted by Israel as a crude interference in Israeli internal affairs

53 and as undermining Israeli policies and democratic principles. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tzipi Hotovely, raised the issue in a forum of European ambassadors, and called upon the EU to stop funding leftist NGOs and organizations that support boycotting Israel, the right of return of Palestinians and slander Israeli soldiers or promote lawsuits against them. Hotovely argued that these NGOs operate under the disguise of promoting human rights, but in fact act to harm Israel’s right to exist (Ravid, July, 2015). In July 2016, the Israeli Knesset passed the ‘NGO law’, according to which Israeli NGOs receiving foreign funding will have to report the amounts and origin to the Association Register, which will publicize the information. Additionally, representatives of the NGOs will be obliged to answer questions of Members of Knesset in regards to their funding (Lis, 2016). Minister of Justice, Ayelet Shaked, who promoted the adoption of the law, replied to the concerns of the EU Ambassador to Israel regarding the law, stating that the law does not harm the freedom of speech and in fact, the interference of foreign countries in the policies and the rule of another country is the real threat to democracy. She continued and added that it is not acceptable that the EU is funding NGOs who act in the name of the State of Israel while de facto they are a tool in the hands of foreign countries to implement their policies (Lis, 2015). In the Knesset debate over the labelling of products (07/12/2015), Michal Rozin from Metretz-party commented on the calls heard in the debate to cut off relations with the EU, and emphasized the importance of economic relations with the EU: “Let’s talk about facts…Our trade agreement with the EU stands at 200 billion a year…Only a few countries in the world…have such an extensive agreement as such with the EU…I want to see you tell the Europeans that we don’t need them.” Yair Lapid, then Minister of Finance, commented that Europe is the main trading partner of Israel with 33% of Israeli trade taking place with the EU. He warned that if a political arrangement will not be achieved in terms of the labelling of products, Israel would suffer immense economic damage. Lapid predicted that other countries might follow the footsteps of Europe and impose sanctions on Israel, if only just to guarantee the continuing of their own trade with Europe (Basok, 2014). Both from interviews with the MFA and EU officials emerged that the two partners recognize that they have many mutual interests and that cooperation in those fields is beneficial for both (Interviews 1-6). It was noted that Israel is not so geographically far from the EU anymore, with Cyprus becoming a MS, and that any instability in the Middle East now more than ever affects

54 the EU (Interviews 1,5). As claimed by a MFA official, Israelis share many similarities with Europe, which create mutual interests and cultural connections, but these take place under the shadow of politics (Interview 6). If this challenge could be tackled, a prosperous cooperation might occur between the EU and Israel (Interviews 2, 3, 4). These mutual interests were recognized in 2009 in one of the main goals of the political party Yisrael Beytenu, which promoted the joining of Israel to the EU: “To date, most of Israel’s trade is with the European Union, and hundreds of thousands of Israelis hold dual European citizenships. Additionally, there is a strong cultural bond between Israel and Europe; it is hard to imagine modern Europe without the influence of Jewish intellectuals, from Spinoza to Kafka and Freud. Membership in the European Union would gain Israel greater political influence in an ever-strengthening Europe and contribute much to the economy. We can achieve this goal in the near future and should make every effort to make it come about.” (Pardo and Peters, 2010:74). Much has changed in the past nine years, and today the position of the party towards the EU has completely changed. When enquired about the current position of Yisrael Beytenu, the spokesman of the party conveyed that the position of the party has changed since the EU became biased against Israel. Not only is becoming a part of the EU no longer an aspiration, but now the EU is also not seen by the party as someone who could lead a meaningful role in the MEPP. Because the EU already chose to side with the Palestinians, it is no longer considered a legitimate player in the eyes of Israel. The EU’s bias is led by interests and not by a genuine concern for human rights. Unfortunately, although the EU is a partner, it is not as close as the party wished it to be in previous years. It has become less relevant with the changing reality (Phone interview, Yisrael Beytenu Spokesman, 27/05/18). Thus, a quite radical negative trend in the perceptions of the EU can be observed, since a party that promoted joining the EU is now dismissing it and viewing it negatively. Views of the EU being irrelevant emerged mostly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Middle East as the main challenge to EU-Israel relations. During the interviews, it became apparent that Israelis believe the EU over-focuses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Interviews 1, 2, 5, 6). According to MFA officials, the EU has agreed that the only solution to the conflict is the two-state solution. This limits the EU’s ability to become a meaningful actor because it does not have flexibility in terms of changing its solutions in light of changes on the ground. The EU is fixed on one solution, and does not understand that a solution to the conflict will have to be

55 reached by the conflict parties, not an external actor (Interviews 1, 5, 6). This limitation affects Israeli political elite perceptions of the EU, and they simply view it as irrelevant in terms of foreign policy and security in the Middle East. As one of the MFA senior official explained, in the Middle East military ‘hard’ power is still the dominant factor, and economic incentives are simply insufficient. The EU is stuck in the past, and its inability to change foreign policy in the dynamic reality of the Middle East makes it irrelevant (Interviews 1,2). Today more than ever, a nuclear Iran makes an existential threat to Israel, and while this is the case, the EU and Mogherini are fighting to preserve the deal with Iran despite recent findings and the US retreat. According to MFA officials, this proves that the EU is not committed to Israel’s security and would rather promote its own interests. This implies that Israel cannot rely on the EU in security issues and therefore the EU is irrelevant (Interviews 1,5). Additionally, the political elite made a strong differentiation between the EU as an institution and the MS. The MFA for example focuses more on the bilateral relations of Israel with individual countries. It appears that for them the EU is bureaucratic and irrelevant, and MS have to pay lip service to Brussels in particular issues (Interviews 1,5). The tenth most prominent perception is a shared spot of the EU preaching and the EU misunderstanding Israel or the situation. According to a MFA official, in each Foreign Affairs Council of the EU, there is ‘Israel bashing’, and the EU criticizes Israel on a regular basis, which creates antagonism on the Israeli side (Interview 1). As a result, Israel does not see any purpose in investing much political energy in the EU only to hear the same preaching and mantras. If the EU had the ability to be flexible and change its policies, then there would be something to discuss, but today the interaction is a monologue of the two sides, and it is pointless to keep hearing yet another preaching on morals and values (Interview 5). As mentioned by a MFA official, the EU has a patronizing and preaching attitude towards everyone, and today there is less tolerance to hearing it (Interview 1). As argued by a MFA official, the chances of Europe improving its image are limited as long as it keeps presenting itself as the superior continent with historical experience, which allegedly taught them what is best. Europe sees itself as a lighthouse, a beacon of light in the middle of the ocean, directing others to come to them. Instead, they are privileged and spoiled, protected in their light house by the US, not having to deal with serious threats, and therefore cannot understand the Israeli perspective (Interview 6). The EU claims the threat to Israel is not

56 real, but it cannot understand that Israelis are strangers in their own neighbourhood, and are not welcomed nor accepted in the region. This is how Israelis feel, and it does not correspond with the European views. A change in the perceptions cannot be expected any time soon for they are deeply rooted within both societies (Ibid, ibid). The official added that the EU does not understand what is the key to the hearts of Israelis. They do not understand the Holocaust post-trauma, facing an existential threat all the time, a feeling that you cannot trust anyone and you are walking on the edge of a cliff. Europe does not make any effort to consider these feelings (Ibid, ibid).

5.2 Perceptions of the Israeli Public in Social Media

The perceptions of Israeli public on social media can be summed up to be negative and sceptical. The comments were in general far less refined compared to the discourse of the political elite, and were in most cases very emotional. Some of the comments were personal comments, including swearing at the EU Ambassador to Israel and the High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini. An example of this is the following comment addressed to the new EU Ambassador to Israel: “I hope that you as a person and your family as individuals enjoy your stay. But the EU as an organization is not welcome due to its inherent anti-Semitism as proven by their representatives, especially Federica Mogherini.” Furthermore, the commentators often referred to the EU as "the anti-Semitic Union", "the Hypocrite Union", "the Arab Union" and "the Union of Evil and Stupidity". Essentially, the EU is not perceived by the Israeli public to be a friend, and is even referred to as ‘an enemy’. In the analysis, only comments that could indicate something of the person’s perceptions of the EU were taken into account. Hence, comments that tagged someone, only included images, or had nothing to do with the EU itself, were excluded. Although Facebook comments are usually brief, most of the comments contained several perceptions, and therefore they were coded multiple times. Some comments were very explicit, containing the specific word of the code, whereas other comments required in depth knowledge of the Hebrew language and its nuances. Not all posts by the EU were commented on, especially not the neutral or positive posts. The posts that drew the most attention were the ones with an opportunity to discuss directly with the EU Ambassador or send him questions, and posts that had to do with ‘advice-giving’ from the EU to Israel, for example that Israel should not adopt a death penalty to terrorists. Furthermore, attention was paid

57 to posts that included references to the MEPP, different EU declarations such as a declaration on anti-Semitic events in Europe, condemnation of terror attacks and Israeli army operations by the EU, and finally the 2013 Guidelines to label products, which draw comments even in unrelated posts until today. It is important to take into account that the amount of people following the European Union in Israel Facebook page is approximately 14,000, and the amount of people commenting on the posts is even smaller. Thus, there are many unheard voices in this discourse. Therefore, although the results of the analysis provide an indication of the Israeli public perceptions of the EU, they cannot be taken as absolutely accurate or as representing Israeli society as a whole. Furthermore, those who follow the page, and especially those who choose to comment on posts, may be more knowledgeable or familiar with the EU, or perhaps care more about EU-related issues than an average person does. For instance, people commenting on the EU posts appear familiar with political issues and take the time to comment on the posts in the hope that someone in the EU delegation will see them. The average Israeli on the other hand may not be as familiar with political issues, especially international ones, and his/her views of the EU may be more neutral and moderate, and possibly be tourism related. The following chart shows the ten most prominent perceptions of the EU held by the Israeli public active on the Facebook page of the EU delegation to Israel.

58 Chart 3: The 10 most prominent perceptions of the EU held by the Israeli public as expressed by the comments on the Facebook page of the EU Delegation to Israel. Source: Author’s construction.

Referrals to the EU being anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli represent the most prominent Israeli public’s perception of the EU. The two perceptions are presented together for they were often overlapping and used in the same context and as synonyms, at times referring to anti-Israeli attitude being just the new form of the old anti-Semitism. The terms were mainly used to describe EU policies in Israel, and in association with ‘Holocaust’, ‘hypocrisy’ and ‘mistrust’, as can be seen in the following comments: “The EU has played a very destructive role as far as the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is concerned: one of pro-Palestinian bias. Double standards and anti- Semitism in anti-Israeli disguise” and “Europe will never overcome its inherent anti-Semitism”. The following comments present the idea that the anti-Semitism of the EU is not in the past: “European anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli instincts are alive and kicking”, “When a Jew manages to stand up in front of your face you feel deep inside the need to be hostile towards him, to abuse him, to rob him and murder him. This was the case in the 20th century and in the past 2000 years, now it is the Jewish state that bothers you.”

59 Perceptions of the EU being biased and one-sided were common, and mostly had to do with the idea that the EU funds and supports the Palestinians more than Israelis, as can be observed in the following comments: “Keep hugging your Muslim friends…Bias against Israel and the Jews is much more deeply rooted and natural for you than really caring about this problem” and “If the EU will only pressure Palestinians 5% from the pressure the EU puts on Israel – peace would have been achieved a long time ago!”. In the context of the labelling of products and conclusions regarding the MEPP one of the commentators wrote the following: “You have just eliminated yourself as an honest broker. You have shown your true face. You have clearly demonstrated on whose side you stand. Finally you have dropped your claim of impartiality.” One of the strongest perceptions among the Israeli public is the idea that Europe is undergoing a process of Muslim invasion, that will bring about many terror attacks and eventually the destruction of Europe as we know it. These references were frequently made in the context that only when this will happen, the EU would eventually understand Israel and its struggles. This can be observed in the following comments: “What happened yesterday in Paris is only the beginning of the end of Europe, and as long as it stays obsessed with Israel instead of finally understanding that there is a global Jihad to fight in Europe…this will become a familiar sight in European streets” and “My son had to decide which language he wants to study in school – French or Arabic. I told him: ‘If you want to go to France, choose Arabic!’”. Accusations of the EU being hypocrite often related to the idea of the EU having double standards and the events of the Holocaust, but also to the fact that the EU has many statements in the support for Israel. In practice, according to the commentators, the EU positions itself against Israel, and therefore is being hypocrite when pretending to be Israel’s friend: “All this talk is supposedly in the favour of Israel, but the actions are against it – supporting terrorists by transferring money to the PA finding its way to salaries, funding the construction of illegal buildings of Palestinians in the territories which are under the Oslo Accords under Israeli control, funding organizations that are promoting the de-legitimization of Israel in the world (a crude interference in the internal affairs of another country), complete silence in terms of the incitement in the media and schools of the PA, and other “gems” from the producers ‘our friends in the EU’… It doesn’t matter what they will say, what matters is what they’ll do – that is the real test.” The Israeli public referred frequently to the Holocaust as a reason why Israel will not accept any preaching regarding human rights from the EU, as they, in the eyes of Israelis, used to be

60 Nazis. The following comment is an example of this: “Who are you that you think you can tell us what is good and what is not?? Who are you to speak of human dignity?? It is time that someone will silence you, continent drenched with the blood of Jews murdered all over throughout the Jewish history in Europe. As for the Nazis, everybody knew and everybody cooperated with the oppressor, there is no doubt. You should shut up and lower your head when it when it comes to Jews and their state.” The perception that the EU does not understand Israel comes across in the continuous assertions of Israelis to the EU that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and how come the EU does not understand that or know anything about Jewish history. Many remarks had to do with the idea of ‘occupation’, with Israelis not agreeing such thing even exists, as the lands of the OT, which they refer to as Judea and Samaria, are ancient Jewish land. Furthermore, it was conveyed that the EU does not understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This perception can be observed in the following comment: “The EU tragically continues to display complete ignorance of the historical facts concerning and facts on the ground in the Middle East.” The perception that the EU funds/supports terrorism was rather prominent taking into consideration that this claim is more of a matter of facts rather than perspective. Most of these referrals had to do with unsupervised EU funding to the PA used to pay the salaries of former terrorists, and to claims that Mogherini supported the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat during the Intifada. This can be observed in the following comments: “Why the EU funds the Palestinian Authority with the full knowledge that this money is paid in huge sums to terrorists in jails, such as those who tried to murder me with a machete and succeeded in murdering my American friend?” and “Why does the EU fund the PA with 200 million dollars, when the PA is encouraging the murder of Israeli citizens by paying the murderers and considering them to be national heroes? Don’t you agree that in light of this it could be argued that the EU indirectly supports terrorism?” The perception of interference in Israeli affairs was raised at times in the context of the EU not meaning anything to Israel since Israel is not part of the EU: why should the EU have a say in Israeli affairs when it was not democratically chosen by Israelis. Furthermore, it was frequently claimed by the commentators that the EU is actually making the conflict worse with its interference. Many remarks had to do with the idea that Israelis do not need anyone to help them since Israel is a strong country and does not want any favours, especially not from Europe, who already betrayed them in the past. This can be observed in a comment on an article posted, which

61 suggested the EU Ambassador recommends Israel not to adopt a death penalty to terrorists: “Why are you saying that the death penalty is not going to advance us? Who is us? You do not represent us, none of us voted for you and we are not interested in your opinion, stop interfering in Israeli internal affairs!” Double standards were often referred to when conveying the idea that the EU is applying one standard to Israel and another to other countries, or does not apply it on itself. It was mentioned primarily in the context of the product labelling and connected to the idea that the EU boycotts Israel and discriminates it. The following comment indicates this perception and also complains about the EU’s continuous focus on Israel instead of more acute issues: “Less than 300km from the EU delegation office in Tel Aviv a mass murder takes place by the hand of the Syrian regime and its supporters (Iran) and Europe stutters; some statements made by the heads of states, a few headlines in the newspaper, but the bottom line is Europe is not doing anything to prevent the horrors in Syria…But here [in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict], you are applying double standards with the level of your interest, actions and the amount of money you are investing: strange votes in the UN, boycotts, and using any opportunity you basically have to bash Israel. This raises the question, if you would invest one percent of your failing attempts to bring peace to Israel in preventing the genocide in Syria, how many children would you have saved?” The idea of mistrust appeared inexplicitly in many comments, but the ones coded under this title were explicit containing referrals to the EU being a liar, and not trustworthy: “We don’t believe your anti-Semitic, politically correct declarations…Don’t waste your time” and “The problem is we have lost all trust in the fact the EU could address Israel-related issues appropriately.” Other valuable perception that emerged from the analysis is that the EU was perceived by the public as irrelevant, either because it is in their view falling apart or because it has no credibility, since no actions stand behind its statements. In the words of one commentator: “Europe's opinion is becoming less and less relevant to Israelis.” Although most comments of the EU are categorized as negative, there were also positive comments mostly relating to posts on research cooperation between the EU and Israel. Yet, the analysis portrays an image of Israelis that are fed up with the EU and would prefer it did not interfere in Israeli affairs. Furthermore, a high-level of mistrust can be identified amongst the public hoping to see the EU take actual actions in favour of Israel.

62 As mentioned before, there were many comments that contained several perceptions. The following comments are good examples of the general perceptions of the Israeli public: “You are a bunch of hypocrite, anti-Semitic Israel-haters. You were quiet when millions of Jews were sent to the crematorium, and until today you are supporting the Palestinians in the name of justice and the enlightened morality. Then you shouted at us ‘go to Palestine’, today you are shouting at us ‘go to the sea’. You go to hell, and may the Islamists conquer all your countries!” “The fact that you have taken an additional anti-Semitic resolution that cannot be explained by "defending customers" speaks more about what you are made of than all the bla-bla you release. The EU has become the most hated organization among the Israelis, and no matter how much money you pour into anti-Israeli organizations from within you have become completely irrelevant.” “Europe is busy undermining Israel, it is busy funding and constructing illegal buildings for the Palestinian invaders and funding anti-Israeli NGOs. Hence, they are the last ones to come and say that they are interested in the well-being of Israel. Now it is easy for them to speak, but when Europe will be conquered by the Arabs that are flowing there, then the European demon will come out as we know it of the satanic persecution of Jews during thousand years (and even today they are trying to harm the Jews by helping our haters – the Palestinians who call for our destruction, and those who do not see that are as blind as the Jews before the Holocaust who didn’t want to open their eyes.)”

5.3 Understanding the findings and comparing the results

The results presented above will be further analysed and compared in this section. In chart 4, the ten most prominent perceptions of the Israeli public and the Israeli political elite are combined together. Additionally, a comparison of the two and the variation between them will be analyzed and shown in chart 5.

63 Chart 4: The 10 most prominent perceptions of the Israeli political elite and the Israeli public of the EU. Source: Author’s construction.

64 Chart 5: Comparison of the 10 most prominent perceptions of the Israeli political elite and the Israeli public of the EU. Source: Author’s construction.

The results in chart 5 are presented relatively in an approximate scale of 1:6, since the amount of quotes coded differs between the Israeli political elite and the general public. The perception of the EU being anti-Semitic and/or anti-Israeli was the most prominent on both units, but was not as evident in the interviews conducted. Therefore, it is possible that politicians are using accusations as a tool to achieve domestic political purposes. As suggested by an official from the MFA, the Israeli claim regarding the EU being anti-Semitic is problematic and is being used by politicians in Israel in order to reject criticism. After the claim has been expressed there is no room for discourse, which does not advance any purpose (Interview 5). However, since both the political elite and public are sharing the perception that EU policies are deeply rooted in anti-Semitism, the perception cannot be overlooked. The perception of the EU being biased and one-sided was a bit higher amongst the political elite with emphasis on the EU’s continuous favoring of Palestinians, and therefore their

65 illegitimacy to be a mediator in the MEPP. The perception of the EU having double standards was relatively much higher among the political elite than the general public. This could possibly be explained by the political elite being more knowledgeable of EU standards and their implementation on other countries, and the will to show the EU it is not consistent in its policies. This could also be explained by the 2013 Guidelines included in the frame of this thesis, since most of the mentions regarding double standards were made in the context of the EU demanding from Israel things that it does not require from other countries with territorial disputes. The perception that the EU funds or supports terrorism entered the ten most prominent perceptions although it appeared only amongst the general public, and was not mentioned at all by the political elite. This might be a misperception amongst the public or political correctness of the political elite. It is also important to note that referrals regarding funding or supporting terrorism were mostly related to unsupervised EU funding of the PA, and the EU being naïve and actually paying salaries of terrorists. The Holocaust was brought up many times both by the public and the political elite, although the political elite gave it a deeper meaning. The public used the Holocaust at times to refer to the EU as Nazis, anti-Semites, traitors, unreliable, shameless and cruel. The public made use of the Holocaust to accuse the EU of the wrongs of the past as well as the present, suggesting that Europe never changed. The political elite on the other hand used the Holocaust slightly differently: The Holocaust was referred to in the context of the mutual history Europeans and Israelis share. The emphasis was on the deep psychological importance of the Holocaust for Jews and the implications on the relations with the EU. An important note made in the interviews was that the lessons learned from the Holocaust by Israel and Europe were different, causing possibly the biggest challenge to the relations. In political statements on the other hand, the Holocaust was used in terms of accusing the EU of not learning from the past by discriminating the state of the Jews and acting against them. The perception of the EU being hypocrite was dominant in both groups, but relatively more amongst the political elite. This is probably because by the perception being largely connected to the Holocaust and the EU having double standards. The perception of the EU interfering with Israeli internal affairs is almost equally prominent in both groups, but slightly more amongst the political elite responsible for Israeli internal affairs.

66 The perception of the EU being irrelevant was relatively more prominent amongst the political elite, although this perception emerged clearly only in the conducted interviews. The irrelevancy of the EU was associated with the idea that the EU’s foreign policy is irrelevant to the Middle East, that the EU is not a relevant mediator in the MEPP, and that the EU has no ability to implement its policies. It is interesting that although the Israeli political elite has recognized the importance of the relations with the EU in terms of economy, they still view the EU as irrelevant in many other aspects. The prominence of the perception of the EU having a lack of understanding of Israel or the situation in the Middle East is somewhat similar in both groups, yet, within the political elite, it appeared only in the interviews. The political elite linked the perception to a lack of understanding of how the Middle East works, what are the security concerns of Israel, and how Israelis should be best approached. The general public considered the EU to be naïve and not understanding Jewish history, the ‘real nature’ of Muslims and the root cause of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. The perception that the EU is undergoing a Muslim invasion and/or experiencing Muslim terrorism, although mentioned in some interviews, was much more notable amongst the general public. In the interviews, this perception was linked to a fear for the safety of Jews in Europe and as causing the EU to become more critical towards Israel (Interviews 1, 2, 6). Expressions linked to this perception amongst the public were rather emotional. Comments related for example to fear of the Islamization of Europe, to the EU’s naivety in taking in so many Muslim immigrants changing the Europe we know. Some of the comments were even vengeful: now Europe will finally experience the same struggles as Israel, and even more extreme, that Europe will get what it deserves. The reason behind choosing the two analysis units was to present more extensive results that could better reflect the Israeli society as widely as possible. Despite some variation in the results in terms of specific perceptions, it is clear that overall negative perceptions of the EU prevail in Israeli society, as presented in chart 6 in the next page. Considering this, it is important to note the inseparable connection between the public and the political elite influencing each other’s perceptions. The Israeli public votes for representatives that hold similar views as them, those representatives express their views in the media, which again influences the perceptions of the public (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010:304). Therefore, the changing political atmosphere in the

67 country as well as particular events in EU-Israel relations, might affect Israeli perceptions of the EU either negatively or positively.

Chart 6: Division of Israeli perceptions of the EU. Source: Author’s construction.

Some could argue, as noted by Harpaz, that negative perceptions of the EU are “more widespread amongst those who belong to the right-wing camp, the Orthodox religious community and lower socio-economic layers of the Israeli society, and less amongst those belonging to the left-wing camp, secular community and elitist layers of the Israeli society.” (Harpaz, 2007:106). Yet, based on the results presented in this thesis, such distinction within Israeli society was not be identified. To conclude, from the Israeli perspective, the EU does not fully understand the security context of the Middle East and the conflict, has no credibility, and is virtually irrelevant to Israel in terms of foreign policy and Israeli security interests. One of the most important aspects of Israeli perceptions of the EU is the strong connection made between European issues to anti-Semitism and the Holocaust. Israelis believe that the EU is biased, hypocrite, holds double standards, and excessively interferes in Israeli internal affairs. Amongst the Israeli public prevails a strong feeling of mistrust towards the EU, and in the words of an MFA official, Israel has an attitude of ‘respect and suspect’ towards the EU (Interview 6).

68 6. Israeli Perceptions of the EU and Normative Power Europe –‘mind the gap’

In this chapter, Israeli perceptions of the EU will be analysed using the conceptual framework of external perceptions of the EU and NPE. It should be emphasized again that this thesis does not discuss the idea whether the EU has demonstrated normative power in its relations with Israel, but rather whether the EU is perceived as a normative power to begin with, and why this is relevant to the understanding of NPE and EU-Israel relations. According to Manners, normative power is the “ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics” (Manners, 2002:236). Perceptions of the EU are important when it comes to the adoption of EU norms and values in third countries (Persson, 2017:1418). Therefore, if Israelis perceive the EU as a normative power and recognize its role as such, then the EU should be considered in Israel at least to some extent as a norm changer. Manners gives the abolition of the death penalty in many parts of the world as an example of constitutive norms that shape “what can be ‘normal’ in international relations.” (Manners, 2002:253). This specific subject of death penalties has been discussed by Israelis on the EU delegation Facebook page. Useful insights on Israeli perceptions of the EU as a norm changer was found in one of the stormiest discussions on the Facebook page. The discussion began after the EU Ambassador to Israel posted an article in Hebrew titled “Death penalty will not advance us”. What emerges clearly of the comments is that most Israelis do not agree with the Ambassador regarding the death penalty, and consider his opinion as irrelevant, interfering in Israeli affairs, and even ridiculous, being a result of not understanding the situation in Israel. Thus, based on that discussion amongst other things, the EU is not perceived as a norm changer or as setting a standard in Israel. In terms of the 2013 Guidelines, despite not setting a new precedent, they brought about extreme reactions from the Israeli government which made them highly visible and empowered their normative stance, since eventually, Israel had to accept them (Pardo and Gordon, 2015:422; Persson, 2017:1424) Manners argues that legitimacy, coherency and consistenc are necessary for a normative justification to be convincing (Manners, 2011:233). Difficulties in consistency and coherency can undermine the image of the EU in the eyes of partners (Manners, 2010:40), with legitimacy only being determined by others (Elgström, 2007:952). The EU can be seen as coherent in terms of its vocal normative position in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU has made numerous statements in regards to its normative position toward the conflict, and has largely expressed its

69 position on paper in its agreements with Israel (Tocci, 2009:338). However, it is one thing to say, and another thing to do. The EU is not very united, with different MS advancing their own interests. For instance, economic relations with Israel are mostly led by individual MS, and are very much disconnected from the EU’s normative position. Thus in practice, although the EU speaks in one voice in terms of its normative message, it weakens its perception as a normative power, and does not seem coherent (Chaban and Holland, 2014:179-180; interviews 1, 5, 6). In terms of consistency, the EU appears to Israelis as inconsistent and having double standards, operating differently or adopting a different attitude in similar circumstances towards different countries (Chaban and Holland, 2014:54-55). This perception is one of the most dominant ones, both among the Israeli public as well as the political elite. This can be observed in one of the comments made on Facebook regarding the 2013 Guidelines: “Europe chooses to single out Israel (Double standards have always been key to Anti-Semitism…) Where is your marking when it comes to the Moroccan Occupations in Western Sahara, Turkish Occupation in Cyprus, or Chinese Occupation of Tibet?”. This enforces the Israeli perception of the EU being hypocrite, namely saying one thing and doing something else, pretending to be Israel’s friend but then acting against it. Furthermore, it can be observed that the EU is seen as hypocrite, preaching morals to Jews after the Holocaust, or for example claiming to care for human rights and therefore criticizing Israel, while overlooking violations in Arab countries. This is observed in the following comments: “The same countries which brutally murdered us and burned us are those who want to teach us about morality and respect of minorities. You should be ashamed!!” and “Why does the EU impose sanctions on Israel, but at the same time cannot wait to do business with Iran, where women and gays are burned and stoned to death?”. When it comes to legitimacy, there are many features indicating that the EU is perceived by Israelis to be an illegitimate actor. Firstly, the EU is considered being biased, not objective and discriminating against Israel, and therefore not being a legitimate mediator in the MEPP. The following comment is an example of this perception: “How do you expect Israel to give you a place at the negotiation table when you support outright anti-Semitic resolutions at UNESCO and abstain instead of opposing them? The bottom line is that you should pursue a more balanced policy towards Israel”. Secondly, since the EU is linked to anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, there is a high-level of mistrust, which impinges on the EU’s legitimacy. As the following comments state: “We don’t believe your anti-Semitic, politically correct declarations…Don’t waste your

70 time” and “You are a bunch of professional anti-Semitic liars.” Thirdly, Israelis have a perception that the EU does not understand them or the situation in the Middle East, and does not have sympathy for Israel, as can be seen in these exemplary comments: “Gee thanks for your fake sympathy. Now that you feel better you can keep picking on Israel. Thank God that the Jews today don’t need European sympathy. We will fight our own battles, thank you.”; “It is time EU learn history of state of Israel, both ancient and current.”; “Denying the truth makes as much sense at an ostrich sticking it head in the sand.”; “The EU is disconnected from reality.”;” If you really want to help, take into account the reality of the past 3000 years and try to change the delusional view of your countries.” This inability to analyse the conflict and the Israeli society, has also led eventually to a weak European role in the conflict (Harpaz, 2007:102, interviews 5,6). Fourthly, perceiving the EU as irrelevant also affects its legitimacy in the eyes of Israelis. The EU is perceived to be fixed on the two-state solution, and therefore inflexible despite of changes on the ground, which limits it in terms of becoming a meaningful actor (Interviews 5,6). Also, the fact that Israel cannot rely on the EU in terms of security issues, makes the EU irrelevant for Israel (Interview 5). Fifthly, perceptions of the lack of credibility affect the legitimacy of the EU. For example, EU policies are perceived by many Israelis to be merely declaratory, due to the EU’s inability to speak in one voice and be effective, because of the differences between the MS (Harpaz, 2007:104; interviews 1, 5, 6). According to a MFA official, the credibility of the EU is very low. The EMP failed, there is no ideology, there is no ability to act, and all that is left is EU money (Interview 1). As expressed by many Israelis on Facebook: “We are waiting for you to prove yourselves in actions and not only words.” Sixthly, views of the EU being neo-colonial, patronizing, preaching and interfering in internal affairs also undermine the legitimacy of the EU. As mentioned in an interview with a MFA official, the EU believes it is the centre of the world, it has a patronizing and preaching attitude towards everyone, and today there is less tolerance to hear it (Interview 1). The same attitude can be observed in these online comments: “Go and preach your morals somewhere else. The Europeans think that they are morally better than us. Arrogant and despicable Europeans.”; “We are not interested in EU interference in our political system. We vote in the ballot and this is what we want, the voting in Berlin should not determine the policy of the Israeli government.” As suggested by Tocci, the credibility of the EU also determines the EU’s impact on

71 conflict resolution. She posits that credibility will depend on “the recipient’s perception of the donor’s capacity and willingness to carry out declared commitments.” (Tocci, 2007:23). According to Harpaz, the EU should improve its credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of Israelis if it wants to have a more meaningful role in the Middle East and to be perceived as a normative power (Harpaz, 2007:89,96). This legitimacy is based on the compatibility between the external pressures applied by the EU on an external player, to its fundamental principles, as well as a consistency between pressures exerted on different external players (Ibid:97). Legitimacy will be hampered if “the EU’s normative aspirations are high on rhetoric but low on delivery.” (Ibid:98). Similarly to the findings of previous research on external perceptions of the EU identifying the EU as an economic power (Chaban et al., 2013:443; Lucarelli, 2014:7), Israelis have also noted the EU’s economic power in terms of its importance to Israeli economy, mostly due to its market size (Knesset 07/12/2015; interviews 1,5; Basok, 2014). Regarding the three perceptions of the EU as NPE recognized in external perceptions research (Larsen, 2014:904-905), although there were some references to the EU being a promoter of human rights and attempting to appear as promoting a normative agenda in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, overall, Israelis do not perceive the EU as having the power to shape conceptions of what is normal. From the Israeli perspective, the EU is seen as motivated more out of interests rather than the promotion of human rights, as can be concluded in the following comment: “We are sick of the European hypocrisy and its war of extermination against Israel and its citizens that the EU has taken upon itself. The Union and its MS have no morals, only interests, and they keep committing the sins of lying and arrogance.” In terms of clashing of norms there was no much evidence in the data, expect in the debate mentioned earlier regarding a death penalty to terrorists. The EU’s emphasis on normative power is not perceived as a good thing in Israel. For example, in the results of the content analysis the EU was perceived by Israelis as weak or failing, owing lip service to ideas coming from Brussels, not being able to speak in one voice and implement its policies. For the same reason the EU is also perceived as irrelevant and lacking credibility. Israelis also made a connection between the promotion of human rights to the large immigration waves to Europe in recent years, suggesting that Europeans have been naïve, and are doomed to be under Muslim invasion and suffer from terrorism. It appears that Israelis view the EU as possibly ignoring the realities of life, not understanding what are the challenges facing

72 Israel, nor understanding the Middle East. The continuous promotion of human rights was sometimes seen as hypocritical, as the EU does not miss a chance to criticize Israel, while doing nothing to help Syrians. The EU is perceived to have double standards, imposing the 2013 Guidelines on Israel but not in other territorial disputes, as well as criticizing Israel for human right violations, while doing business with oppressive regimes such as Iran. This creates the perception among Israelis that the EU is not focusing on the real problem of the region. Additionally, Israel does not view positively any kind of interference in its internal affairs by the EU. In general, Israel perceives the EU as preaching, arrogant, biased, one-sided, funding different Palestinian and anti- Israeli activities, and therefore not trustworthy. Yet, the most prominent and influential perceptions Israelis have are that the EU is connected to the Holocaust and is anti-Semitic/anti-Israeli. In order to be considered a normative power and lead by example, the EU needs followers. For that, the EU should be perceived by others to be credible, capable and legitimate (Elgström, 2007:952; Chaban and Holland, 2014:46). Although the EU could be considered as capable in terms of resources, according to Israelis the EU still demonstrates an incapacity to act, and also lacks credibility and legitimacy. This implies that in the eyes of Israelis the EU is not a leader nor a normative power. The question why certain perceptions prevail in Israel is an interesting subject and should be studied further, although some suggestions can be identified in the literature on external perceptions of the EU. The starting point for the research of perceptions of the EU is that “perceptions are issue-location-, time-, and cohort specific” (Chaban and Holland, 2014:2). They are the exogenous and endogenous sources that interact and determine what will be the perception of the EU (Chaban et al., 2013:447). The exogenous sources that can be identified as affecting Israeli perceptions of the EU are the historical relations between the EU and Israel and their evolvement over-time (Ibid:436), and the EU’s public diplomacy efforts in the region (Ibid:447). What can affect the negative perspectives is the memory of the Holocaust, the betrayal of Israel by France in 1967, and increasingly opposing stands of many European countries against Israeli policies (Harpaz, 2007:99; interviews 1,2,6). European criticism of Israel has affected Israeli attitudes towards the EU and its inclusion in the MEPP (Chaban and Holland, 2014:180). It is partly seen as a result of European energy interests in the oil of the Arab countries, as well as increasing Muslim electoral pressures within European countries (Harpaz, 2007:99; interviews 1,6). Another explanation that prevails in Israel is that that the EU is criticizing Israel as part of an

73 attempt to clear the ‘European conscience’ of the guilt of the Holocaust (Harpaz, 2007:100-101; interview 1). The dispute over the labelling of products originating in the OT, according to the conducted content analysis, has significantly contributed to the negative perceptions, mistrust and prejudice of Israelis towards the EU (Interviews 1,2). This dispute reflects the large gap in understanding of one another, as Europe is in a process of taking down its borders, while Israel is in the process of establishing them (Harpaz, 2004:1053). The political statements and declarations the EU has made in the past decades further contributed to negative Israeli perceptions of the EU. The EU is perceived in Israel as one-sided, pro-Arab and anti-Israeli. The EU’s criticism has caused Israelis to overlook the continuous European commitment to the existence and survival of Israel (Tocci, 2007:9), eventually shaping Israeli perceptions of the EU, especially in terms of the limiting the EU’s involvement in the MEPP (Pardo and Peters, 2010:71-72; Harpaz, 2007:106-107). The endogenous sources identified as affecting Israeli perceptions of the EU are the Holocaust as a national-trauma, Israeli culture, the political atmosphere and the security situation. Europe and Israel are connected through culture, roots, economy, tourism, research and more, but also through the negativity of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism. In this sense, and due to the British Mandate and the abandonment of France in the 1967 War, Europe is seen as responsible for the suffering of Jews and Israel. This implies that there are pre-existing old feelings of resentment that affect the Israeli perceptions of Europe and contribute to perceiving it as dangerous to Israel. As mentioned in an interview with a MFA official, the EU is perceived as an actor that is willing to endanger Israel in the face of its own interests, and as an actor that has failed all tests and cannot be trusted. Israelis do not believe Europe has a real empathy towards Israel, as it never stood up to defend Israel unconditionally, although it was expected to do so due to their shared history (Interview 6). It takes time to change perceptions mostly shaped by dramatic events, both positively and negatively (Chaban and Holland, 2014:92). The events of the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel are relatively recent in the scale of forming perceptions, and still very much discussed and relevant in Israel. The Holocaust is a large-scale dramatic event that has affected the consciousness of Jews all around the world, especially in Israel (Interviews 1,2,6). The experience of the holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel have created an atmosphere that Israel needs to be able to guarantee its own security in the very hostile neighbourhood of the Middle East. As argued by a MFA official, Europe does not understand that

74 Israelis experience post-trauma and deal with an existential threat all the time. There is a general feeling that Israel cannot trust anyone (Interview 6). This can be also observed in one of the comments on Facebook: “You are anti-Semites just like your ancestors, the same thing in a different costume – only this time you will not be able to annihilate us like you did before, today we have a strong country that will not let you realize your plot.” This culture and the security situation of Israel have possibly created the conditions for a political setting that emphasizes security-issues and the strengthening of Israel. In recent years, there has been a rise in right-wing ideologies (Pardo and Peters, 2010: 115) and the impact of religious parties in Israel, which decreases universal orientations and strengthens nationalism. This process was further exacerbated due to the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the growing dominance of Iran. In light of these and the painful memory of the Holocaust, Israeli politicians are representing the Israeli fears of annihilation and appearing as weak, portraying the ‘never again’-narrative (Yair and Odom-Weiss, 2014:23). Additionally, in various researches conducted on external perceptions of the EU, it was found that there is not much knowledge regarding the EU amongst the general public. This could be a result of a limited media coverage of the EU outside of Europe and interest in the EU only at times when it relates to national interests (Lucarelli, 2014:7). This might apply in Israel, since education on the EU is limited, and Israeli academia is increasingly getting closer to the US (Harpaz, 2011:1869-1870). Also, most perceptions of the EU are formed in response to EU policies regarding EU-Israel relations and the MEPP, as presented in the media. Unfortunately, the Israeli media only reinforces negative perceptions of the EU by largely covering issues of anti-Semitism, portraying Europe as anti-Israeli, and judging European affairs and leaders based on their approach towards Israel, thus reminding Israelis of the painful Jewish experience in Europe (Ibid:1871- 1872). The domestic context, country-specific characteristics and history are important for understanding perceptions. In the Israeli case, the European criticism, and the events of the Holocaust and European anti-Semitism in particular, have a central role in shaping perceptions of the EU, and ultimately undermine the ability to perceive the EU as a normative power (Chaban and Holland, 2014:193). Thus, Israeli perceptions of the EU provide a good example of why external perceptions of the EU should be studied together with the concept of NPE. One of the comments posted on the EU delegation Facebook page summarizes the importance of external

75 perceptions of the EU to the understanding of NPE: “According to your response, it is us who are supposed to "better understand" the EU. But what about you "better understand" the Israeli people's perception of the EU’s one-sided approach to the conflict, and your continuous demonization of Israel? Nothing to learn here? I think your comment represents your arrogant approach to Israelis in general and to the State of Israel in particular. We, the indigenous people, are those who have to "better understand". And you? You only have to be a better teacher for us.”

76 7. Conclusions The content analysis of the thesis provided useful insights regarding Israeli perceptions of the EU. Although some variation between the Israeli political elite and the general public were observed, the main themes and trends emerged clearly. Nevertheless, the results must be interpreted with caution, for they are time and context specific, and cannot be generalized to all segments of Israeli society, nor to other countries’ relations with the EU. The process of coding conducted with Atlas.ti was challenging, as the data collected was extensive and diverse. Therefore, during the process some codes and quotes linked to codes were overlapping or could have been coded in more than one way, which might have marginally affected the results. EU-Israel relations have been everything but dull. On the one hand, economic and research cooperation flourishes, while on the other hand, the political relations are bitter, full of mistrust and disappointments. Overall, Israelis hold negative perceptions of the EU, mainly characterized by mistrust and scepticism, particularly at times when the EU is perceived to be interfering in Israel’s internal affairs. In Israel, the EU is largely perceived as having an anti-Israel, biased and unbalanced approach when it comes to Middle East affairs, and therefore the EU is perceived as an illegitimate mediator (Harpaz, 2007:99). Although some Israeli perceptions of the EU may seem unrealistic and distorted, they have important implications on EU-Israel relations (Pardo and Peters, 2010: 91), for example on the economic relations and future prosperity of Israel (Pardo and Peters, 2010:65; Tocci, 2005:135). They also have implications on the future role of the EU in the MEPP. If Israelis will view the EU as more legitimate and have trust in it, the EU could acquire a larger role in the Middle East (Pardo and Peters, 2010:71-72; Harpaz, 2007:106-107; Chaban and Holland, 2014:180). If the EU will not address Israeli perceptions, it could eventually impinge on the effectiveness of its policies in Israel (Chaban and Holland, 2014:177). If Israelis wish to strengthen the relations with the EU, they should address the negative perceptions, for example through a more positive representation of the EU in the media and open political support for the EU by Israeli politicians. The EU on its part should become familiar with the Israeli perceptions, and address them in an adequate manner, or at least show that Israeli concerns have been taken into consideration. Ultimately, perceptions will be those to define the direction that the relations will take on both sides. As suggested above, the main challenges are linked to the emotionally charged history, cultural sensitivities and a high-level of mistrust. These results are worrisome and should be addressed by Israel as well as the EU. It is time for the EU

77 and Israel to move beyond political statements and technicalities, and address their differences that challenge their relationship. The insight gained in this thesis can form a basis for new hypotheses and further research, for example regarding the reasons behind the formation of Israeli perceptions of the EU. Additionally, it would be interesting to research perceptions Europeans have of Israel, which could provide both parties invaluable knowledge possibly narrowing the gap between the two. Furthermore, the tendency to connect the EU to the Holocaust and perceiving it as anti-Semitic should be given further attention, for it appears to be the biggest challenge from the Israeli perspective. Finally, further research should be conducted using social media platforms on a larger scale, making use of the vast amount of data valuable for monitoring human behaviour. Hopefully this thesis can demonstrate the importance of external perceptions of the EU in its relations with other actors, especially in terms of its normative power. The field of external perceptions of the EU should not be underestimated, and it requires further research and theorization. It can help explain the international identity of the EU as well as defining its’ foreign policy, for it takes into consideration the actors with relation to whom the EU exerts its power. Perceptions of the EU are meaningful also in terms of the EU’s ability to influence others. It is not enough to say that the EU is a normative power, for “to actually exert leadership, it is not enough for the EU to say that it is a leader.” (Elgström, 2007:952). Thus, despite the EU’s attempts to present itself as a normative power, Israelis refuse to see it as such.

One thing is certain, perceptions matter.

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85

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Graphs and Charts

Levi, S. 2018, Word Cloud, Frequency of words Israelis link to the EU. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Network view of most common code-associations. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Chart 1, All 28 codes identified of Israeli perceptions of the EU and their frequency. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Chart 2, The 10 most prominent perceptions of the EU held by the Israeli political elite. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Chart 3, The 10 most prominent perceptions of the EU held by the Israeli public as expressed by the comments on the Facebook page of the EU Delegation to Israel. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Chart 4, The 10 most prominent perceptions of the Israeli public and the Israeli political elite of the EU. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Chart 5, Comparison of the 10 most prominent perceptions of the Israeli public and the Israeli political elite of the EU. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

Levi, S. 2018, Chart 6, Division of Israeli perceptions of the EU. Constructed using Atlas.ti.

95 Annex 1: Codebook - Israeli perceptions of the European Union

Code Code content Example of quote linked to code Keywords of the code in Hebrew אנטישמי, אנטי- Anti-Semitic/ Any referrals to the Federica Mogherini, a true reflection ישראלי Anti-Israeli EU being anti- of the antisemitism that runs rampant in Semitic or anti-Israeli the EU, believes that the Jews are the towards Israel and mother of all problems and if she Jews. Often could implement the "Final Solution" overlapping, present then cosmic peace will rain upon the together, or used whole world interchangeably. Mostly written This explains the latest EU decision to explicitly but can also further promote the BDS agenda while refer to a certain paying lip service about being "against action by the EU. boycott". Yeah, right. If it looks like an antisemitic duck and walks like an antisemitic duck, then it is an antisemitic EU duck.

the truth about the EU's antisemitism is too ugly so you try to hide behind this b- s. No chance we, the Israelis, will buy it.

התנשאות, Arrogant/ Referrals to the EU The chances of Europe of improving its יהירות, Patronizing being arrogant, image are limited as long as it keeps קולוניאליזם, patronizing, knowing presenting itself as the superior פטרוניזם, better than everyone continent, that has the historical אימפריאליזם else, believing it has experience which allegedly taught them a special role in the what its best. world. Also links to referrals to the EU’s The Europeans used to be colonialists colonialism. who have seen the light and now they want to enlighten everyone else. They need to understand that this is our country.

I think your comment represents your arrogant approach to Israelis in general and to the State of Israel in particular. We, the indigenous people, are those who have to "better understand". And you? You only have to be a better teacher for us.

96 Stop patronizing with typical European arrogance

מוטה, חד-צדדי, Biased Referrals to the EU The EU is too biased against Israel to לא ניטרלי, לא being biased, one- have any saying whatsoever - You better אובייקטיבי, לא sided, not neutral, not go prepare the yellow badges for לגיטימי objective, illegitimate products made by Jews (as opposed to as a broker, and only Muslims) in Judea & Samaria. Any supports the plans to mark Chinese products made in Palestinians. Tibet too?

You have clearly demonstrated on whose side you stand. Finally you have dropped your claim of impartiality.

What a joke... EU has played a very destructive role in as far as the #Israeli - #Palestinian conflict is concerned: one of pro-Palestinian bias, double standards, and antisemitism in anti-Israeli disguise.

Keep hugging your Muslim friends when they are doing just that. Bias against Israel and the Jews is much deep-rooted and natural for you than really caring about this problem.

חרם ,Boycotts Israel A claim that the EU The EU has no mandate boycotts Israel. Used nor a credible image after promoting mostly in the context racial and ethical boycott to comment of the product on that issue. labelling, referring to it as a boycott of The regulations are meant to promote a Israel. de-facto boycott of Israel.

Stop boycotting Israel!

ערכים משותפים, Common Referrals to the Europe is the place of origin of many תרבות, אזרחות values and common values and Israelis and the continent on which אירופאית, culture culture shared by formed the basis for the values on which היסטוריה Israelis and Israel is established, which are until this משותפת .Europeans in terms of day common values of the two history.

97 להחרים, להפסיק Cut off Referrals that Israel We need to cut off all cooperation with קשרים, לנתק relations with should cut off the them in all fields. We always knew how מגע, לא צריך את .the EU relations with the EU, to manage without them האיחוד, אין מה does not want to לדבר איתם discuss anything with We should cut off all diplomatic the EU or does not interaction with you. need the EU.

אפליה, מפלה ,Discrimination Referrals to any kind The policies of the EU, Glick argued of Israel of discrimination of are designed “to discriminate against Israel in comparison the Jewish state, in order to weaken to other countries, and harm it.” singling out of Israel, mostly in the context …creating de-facto discrimination and of the product backing labelling, hence up the BDS movement discrimination of Israeli settlement products.

סטנדרט כפול, Double Referrals to the EU If you think we are stupid and do not see מוסר כפול, אמות standards having double your antisemitism, your double מידה כפולות standards, telling standards, your bias, your prejudice and others what to do but your "selective concern for occupied not doing it yourself, lands" then think again. ignoring other wrongs and focusing Europe cannot help when it chooses to only on Israel, thus single out Israel (Double Standards having one standard have always been key to for Israel and another Anti-Semitism)... Where is your marking for themselves and when it comes to the Moroccan others. Occupation in Western Sahara, Turkish Occupation in Cyprus, or Chinese Occupation of Tibet?

Show your restraint in Iraq. 5-10 English/Americans were executed and you went on bombing the shit out of them, then you preach Israel to keep calm.

Europe should tell its member Sweden to take care of human rights of their native Kven and Sami people, before sticking their anti-semitic nose to our business.

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נעולים, מנטרה Fixation, lack Referrals to the EU I am talking about the fixation on this חוזרת, מוגבלות of creative being fixed in its two- "solution" despite all evidence, and thinking state solution and complete lack of creative thinking being unable to think regarding these problems, and trying to creatively and change come up with different approaches. its stance according to the fast-changing How long until you will wake up from reality of the Middle the unrealistic, repetitive mantras about East. the "two states solution"?

The Europeans are stuck in the past and their inability to change their foreign policy faster in the dynamic reality of the Middle East makes the EU irrelevant.

מימון ארגוני Funds anti- Claims that the EU is Stop meddling in our internal affairs שמאל/אנטי- Israeli NGOs funding anti-Israeli and stop funding anti-Israel NGOs and ישראליים, NGOs within Israel we may (not will but may) reconsider חתרניים, בצלם, .in an attempt to our position towards the EU שוברים שתיקה, interfere in internal דה-לגיטימציה affairs and harm The EU has become the most hated של ישראל Israel. organization among the Israelis, and no matter how much money you pour into anti-Israeli organizations from within you have become completely irrelevant.

Congratulations to the Israeli Cabinet for moving to force NGOs to declare foreign government funding. Israelis need to know who is behind interference in Israeli domestic matters and who is pushing foreign interests in the guise of human rights advocacy.

בנייה בלתי Funds illegal Claims that the EU is Building illegal EU funded structures in חוקית, הפרה של buildings funding the Judea & Samaria also isn't advancing החוק הישראלי, .construction of peace התערבות חד- buildings in the OT Who gave you the right to build in Israel צדדית, הפרת illegally, against on state land or private land without ריבונות Israeli laws and the planning permits and Oslo Accords. in fact, confiscating land that is not yours???

99 מימון משכורות Funds/supports Claims that the EU is If you want to promote peace it is very למחבלים, תמיכה !terrorism indirectly funding or simple, just stop to fund terrorists בארגוני טרור, supporting תמיכה לא Palestinian terrorism, What guarantees does EU have in place מפוקחת ברש"פ, for example through that not one Euro of its funding to the תמיכה בחמאס unsupervised funding PA goes toward payment of salaries and of the PA. benefits to terrorists who have murdered Israelis or their families?

You should also be held responsible for the Palestinian terrorism because you are actively supporting and funding it so more Israelis are murdered and more terrorists rewarded.

Keep on funding them. Maybe you should see this video to understand that what is happening in Gaza is due to your lack of understanding and you continuous funding of terrorism - you are the real criminals behind Hamas.

שואה, היסטוריה, !Holocaust/ Referrals to the Europe has forgotten 6 מיליון, רצח, !History Holocaust and anti- Europe hasn't learned כוכב צהוב, סימון ... Semitic history of Europe began today to mark Jews יהודים !Europe in the context again of the EU, mostly Europe - Shame on you!!! claiming that the EU is the last one who We have heard of Europe and how it can criticize Israel murdered six million Jews just for being and that the labelling Jews. I don’t believe anything you say of products is nor your sorrow. equivalent to the marking of Jews with We already have a historical memory of a yellow star. what happened when Jewish products were labelled in Europe.

I will not accept a false preaching against Israel in the Israeli Parliament, certainly not in German. How come a German is not ashamed to tell lies about how much water is being used? Israel has not been in Gaza for a long time, and your support of the Palestinians, who incite for the destruction of Israel in the Israeli

100 Parliament, 70 years after the Holocaust, is an audacity.

The EU is comprised of countries that were either actively aiding the Nazis during the Holocaust (the Lithuanians taught the SS how to kill Jews in Ponary forest) or did nothing to resist it. And these people will teach us about "human dignity”?

צביעות, שקרנים, Hypocrite Referrals to the EU You can only envy people or institutions רצח בסוריה, being hypocrite, who can dance in two weddings at the זכויות אדם either saying one same time [equivalent to eat the cake באירן, דו- thing and doing and live it whole]: also be nice and פרצופיות something else, contribute to the Jewish state and its pretending to be citizens and also do anything they can to Israel’s friend but incite the hate against them, to harass then acting against it, them and aid in their boycott and or for example exclusion, etc. claiming to care for human rights and Europe acts toward Israel with therefor are sanctimonious hypocrisy. criticizing Israel, but then do not act to aid You are sooooooooo hypocrite. After Syrians. years criticizing Israel now you want to learn from it.

Shame on EU... you should look in your own backyard first. H Y P O C R I T E

Why are you silent about what happens in Syria and Iran? They are murdering children and you just stand and watch.

לא מוסרי, לא - Immoral/ Referrals to the EU We protest against this invalid move צודק, פסול, Unjust being immoral or unacceptable morally, unacceptable מגונה unjust. Mostly practically and unacceptable appeared in the historically. context of product It appears today that Europe hasn’t labelling. learned anything from history. I expect you not to support this immoral decision.

101 כלכלה, מדע ,Importance of Referrals to the There are almost no scientific מחקר, מימון economic and importance of the commercial or industrial projects that אירופאי, מסחר scientific economic and are not promoted by the EU or aimed at relations scientific relations the European market. between the EU and Israel. The extensive economic system between Israel and the EU can serve as a tool for advancing relations between us and the countries of the region and the Palestinian Authority.

Our trade agreement with the EU stands at 200 billion a year…I want to see you tell the Europeans that we don’t need them.

התערבות, הפרת Interfering Referrals to the EU as How would you explain the EU ריבונות, עניינים interfering in Israeli trampling over another democracy’s פנימיים, אל internal affairs. sovereignty, through an intensive תדחפו את האף ?Includes calls for the interference of its domestic affairs שלכם, כפייה, EU to mind its own תתעסקו בעניינים business and not be EU is pure evil! Don't meddle in Israel's שלכם coercive. internal affairs!! It's none of your business!!

The EU should mind its own business and not interfere anymore in Israeli internal affairs.

לא רלוונטי, לא Irrelevant Referrals to the EU EU foreign policy in Israel sucks. Most מעניין, לא קשור being irrelevant to Israelis don’t trust you. You are far less למזרח התיכון Israel and the MEPP. meaningful than what you would like to Mostly in the context believe. that MS are more important or that the Europe is irrelevant when it comes to EU has no Iran, and the US is much stronger and meaningful role and has more influence. is not being taken seriously by Israelis. They are not relevant in terms of foreign policy and security in the Middle East. In our region military hard power is the dominant factor, economic incentives are not sufficient.

לא אמינים, לא Lack of Referrals to the EU The fact that the EU gives so much מסוגלים לגבות credibility not being credible, attention to the Palestinian issue and

102 את המדיניות mostly in terms of not ignores Syria leads to a meaningful lack שלהם having the ability to of credibility in the eyes of deliver on their Israelis. promises, and their continuously failing There is no foreign policy without policies towards the blood, directives and resolutions are not Middle East. enough.

לא מבינים, לא Lack of Referrals linked to Europe claims our threat is not real, but יודעים understanding the lack of they cannot understand that we are היסטוריה, לא of Israel/the understanding of the strangers in our neighborhood, we are מחוברים situation EU of Israel or the not welcomed nor accepted as part of למציאות, לא .situation in the our region יודעים מה זה Middle East, and not מוסלמים knowing what is best The EU does not fully understand the for Israel. security context of the Middle East and the conflict.

The EU fails to understand the true nature of things.

An agreement really??! With who? with the devil?! Don't you understand they want our destruction?! Do you care at all?? Can't take it anymore! You EU are our worst enemy!

How ignorant of the historical facts and facts on the ground and unethical could you be, suggesting to share Jerusalem, Israel's eternal and indivisible capital, with the "Palestinian…Islamo-Nazi terrorist thugs that plot Israel's destruction, complete takeover and the annihilation of the Jewish people?

חוסר אמון, לא ,Mistrust Referrals to Israeli We don't believe your antisemitic ניתן לסמוך, mistrust in the EU, politically correct declarations...Don't כבדהו וחשדהו, .not believing what waste your time שקרנים, רק the EU says or not מילים .counting on them to Empty words from no-friends be by Israel’s side. Israel has an attitude of ‘respect and suspect’ towards the EU.

103 מהגרים, Muslim Referrals to the EU Increasing Muslim migration to Europe מוסלמים, טרור, invasion of facing an invasion of endangers the future of Jews in Europe השתלטות, Europe/Muslim Muslims that will and the de-legitimization of the שעריה .terrorism lead to increased State of Israel terrorism in Europe and may affect EU It won’t take long time for Muslim policies towards terror to strike in your cities from Israel. inside, then we’ll see your self- righteousness hypocrite nature.

The middle east is burning, the Arab spring became a nightmare, Europe is practically under an Islamic attack and the EU does not miss a chance to condemn Israel for minor things instead of fighting the radical Islam and supporting Israel. When will Europe wake up?

נאיבי, מתי Naïve Referrals to the EU Do they really believe that if they will יתעוררו being naïve or stupid, have their own state, it will be much especially in regard better than the state in Gaza that being to its attitude towards ruled by the terror regime of the Muslims and the Hamas? conflict. "re-launch the Palestinian/Israeli peace negotiations as soon as possible"? Seriously? Ha.

"Securing a just and lasting peace remains crucial for Israelis and Palestinians, as well as for the region and beyond". REALLY??? Crucial for the region and beyond??? Do you mean that if tomorrow there would be peace between Israel and the Palestinians, then a cosmic peace and harmony would fall upon the Middle East and the Sunnis and the Shi'ia would fall in love with each other, hugs and kisses??? And they would both stop murdering Yazidis and Christians and Druze and gays and other minorities?? And also Russia and Ukraine would suddenly stop their war?? COME ON!!! GET REAL!!!

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Positive Referrals to all types There is much more positive aspects [of No specific remarks on the of positive remarks EU-Israel relations] the public ought to words can EU on the EU that know about. describe this indicate a positive coding. perception (at least Europe is an important friend of Israel partially) of the EU. and we share many commune values.

הטפת מוסר, Preaching Referrals to the EU as The Israeli-Palestinian conflict makes it נותנים עצות preaching morals to possible for Europe to criticize Israel Israel telling how and preach morals. Israel should act in its own internal affairs. Israel does not see any purpose in investing so much political energy in the EU only to hear the same preaching and mantras.

סוריה, הרוגים, Should focus on Referrals to the Oy Vey Oy Vey - crisis crisis. Why don’t הגרעין האירני, the real perception that the you discuss the tens of thousands of הגירה problems EU is only dealing people butchered in Syria and in with the Israeli- Kurdistan, and the millions of Palestinian conflict immigrants. instead of the more meaningful problems In many Middle-Eastern countries, such as the situation homosexuality is a criminal act - many in Syria. times punishable by death. How about addressing THAT, and seriously?

We are on the verge of a war in the region, there are so many other problems that need to be solved and require our attention, and still the EU keeps holding onto what is familiar to it.

לא רק פוליטיקה, Should Referrals to the idea It good to hear that you also focus on חיזוק שיתוף !promote non- that the EU should other things other than the conflict פעולה בתחומים political issues promote non-political מגוונים issues in its relations Israel is well aware of the European with Israel, and not criticism of it, but the conflict is not in always focus on the the center of the relations and is political aspect. not a top priority promoting mutual interests as the basis of the relations, that will not be always associated and linked to the conflict.

105 חלש, מתפרק, Weak/Failure Referrals to the EU From the Israeli perspective the EU is נכשל, דיס- being weak, failing or non-existent, it’s inability to be a אינטגרציה, לא about to fall apart meaningful actor in its neighborhood יכול לממש .completely. makes the EU appear weak מדיניות בפועל You are a collapsing organization that ruins Europe. You will be remembered as the ones who brought destruction upon the continent, just like Hitler did.

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