17 / 2015 and Political Crisis in

Guest Editor Catherine Wanner, Pennsylvania State University

A clergyman on Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Kiev, August 2014 © Carmen Scheide

Open Access Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe University of St. Gallen URL: www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch ISSN 2296-0708

Center for Governance and Last Update 18 April 2015 Landis & Gyr Culture in Europe stiftung University of St.Gallen Table of Contents

A Note From the Editorial Team 3

Religion and Political Crisis in Ukraine Editorial by Catherine Wanner 4

Analysis

Orthodoxy and the Future of Secularism After the Maidan by Catherine Wanner 8

Was There an Alternative? Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius and his First Steps by Nikolay Mitrokhin 13

The of Ukraine: Past and Present by Yuliana Smilianskaya 20

Islam and Muslims in Ukraine After the “Revolution of Dignity”: Current Challenges and Perspectives by Oleg Yarosh 35

Protestant Churches After the Maidan by Mikhailo Cherenkov 42

Between ‘Mother Homeland’ and Saint Mary: The Independence Monu- ment on the Maidan in Kiev by Wilfried Jilge 49

Opinions

“Being Church” during Times of crisis by Myroslav Marynovych 55

The Responsibility of the Churches During the by Yuriy Chornomorets 60

Church-State-Relations After the Maidan by Oleksandr Sagan 67

Bibliography 72

Publishing Information/Contact 73

Euxeinos 17/2015 2 A Note From the Editorial Team Euxeinos

Dear reader,

the following collection of articles is the result of the ‘Religion in Ukraine’ Conference that took place in Kiev, Ukraine, at the end of September 2014. Catherine Wanner – Professor of History, An- thropology, Religious Studies, and Barry Director of the Paterno Fellows Program at Pennsylvania State University – organized the Conference to illuminate how events on Maidan Square shaped perceptions of state-faith relations in Ukraine. The collection of articles thus includes a range of opinions and attitudes on how religion shaped events on the Maidan, and vice versa – published in the second section of this edition. A second set of articles – published in the first section – examines these events from a theoretical perspective. The following articles also appeared in collaboration with, and are available in print in Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West (RGOW2/2015 43. Jahrgang). Religion & Gesellschaft is published by G2W, the Ecumenical Forum for Faith, Religion, and Society. We would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to Catherine Wanner, the authors, and the G2W Institute for their collaboration, and hope the articles are as instructive to you, the reader, as they were for us. ------The views, beliefs, and opinions expressed in the following articles are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Euxeinos editorial team. Euxeinos makes no truth-claims as regards the relationship between one’s religious practice, change, and/or affiliation to a particular faith, and subsequent political orientation.

Sandra King-Savic, Carmen Scheide and Maria Tagangaeva

Euxeinos 17/2015 3 Religion and Political Crisis in Ukraine

ince the first internationally-recognized ating effects of clerical meddling in politics. Sstate boundaries were created in 1991 from The import of religion on politics and popular the territories of the former , pop- perceptions of political legitimacy were only ular unrest and vociferous demands for re- heightened in both countries after the Maidan form have spiked during pivotal moments. In protests were sparked. This development pro- Ukraine these protests have taken the form of vided the motivation to dedicate an issue of mass street protests, which coalesced into the Euxeinos to changes in the religious landscape

Editorial 2004 and, more recently, in Ukraine. into the 2013-14 Maidan protests. Although there have been isolated forms of high vis- Maidan as Turning Point ibility, high impact protest in as well, When Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych such as the Pussy Riot punk performance in and his governing circle of oligarchic partners Moscow’s Cathedral of Christ the Savior in decided to privilege maintaining good rela- 2012, the same level of broad mass initiatives tions with Russia by entering into the Eur- to force reform have not occurred in Russia. asian Customs Union over taking the initial Although these two countries share a common steps toward a trade agreement with the Eu- cultural tradition of Orthodoxy, an Eastern ropean Union, popular protests set in motion Christian faith, in Russia Orthodox clergy, re- consequences that continue to test geopolitical ligious institutions and believers by and large alliances. After several hundred years of po- help maintain the status quo by discouraging litical union with Russia and a mere 23 years open unrest even though the popular griev- of independence, as far as the most vocal seg- ances against judicial corruption, income in- ment of the population was concerned, the fu- equality and negligible investment in infra- ture of the country was decidedly European. structure are comparable in both countries. In Protest over Yanukovych’s decision combined contrast, Ukrainian clergy, religious institu- with popular disgust over corrupt and self- tions and, above all, average believers have ac- serving governance that found expression in tively played a key role in fomenting demands massive street protests in , the capital of for change justified by religiously inspired Ukraine, beginning on November 21, 2013. rhetoric and symbolism. This coalesced into a broad social movement The instrumental use of religious sentiment in for reform that has come to be known as the both contexts reflects the emergence of condi- “Maidan,” after the main city square in Kyiv, tions in which religion is capable of playing an Maidan Nezalezhnosti, or Independence expedient role in forging a new governing and Square. The Maidan protests, which at their moral order. It is doing so, however, quite dif- height involved over one million people in a ferently in both countries. Paradoxically, it is city with three million residents, were even- the common faith tradition that Ukraine and tually disbanded on February 20, 2014 when Russia share that has come to separate these President Yanukovych gave the order to clear two countries. Each one is becoming more re- the square of its protesters, resulting in the ligiously committed, thanks to a recognition of death of over one hundred people. the galvanizing potential of shared religious The audibility of the religiously-inspired sentiment, and yet simultaneously more sec- rhetoric and the visibility of religious symbol- ular in orientation as a reaction to the alien- ism and clergy on the Maidan was ubiquitous

Euxeinos 17/2015 4 Editorial

through each of the phases -- hopeful protests, in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, violent struggle and now mass mourning and but in general as these two countries contin- collective commemoration. This pronounced ue to rapidly evolve and forge new forms of religiosity on the public square does not, how- governance. Religious institutions in Ukraine ever, reflect a “postsecular” rediscovery of have altered the dynamics of their subservient religion after Soviet anti-religious campaigns state-allied role in governance, which in many to promote an atheist worldview. Rather, the respects constitutes a departure from tradi- instrumental use of clergy, religious sentiment tional church-state relations within an Eastern and transcendent symbolism on the Maidan Orthodox tradition. The implications in a vari- reflects the emergence of conditions in which ety of faith traditions of a recalibrated balance religion is capable of playing an expedient role of powers among the state, the populace and in the process of forging a new governing and religious leaders is a central theme explored in moral order. During the protests, assertions of the articles that follow. transcendence fed convictions that the mas- Not only did the Maidan protests ultimately sive efforts required of a humiliated and tired lead to a string of unforeseen actions and re- population to radically redirect governing actions with global implications, they also practices were indeed possible (Fylypovych mark a turning point in church-state relations and Horkushi 2014). Religion was effectively in Ukraine that do not find their counterpart used to bolster a sense of Ukrainian nation- in Russia at this time. The implications of hood and has been instrumental in articulat- this pivotal moment are fundamental and far ing and making manifest an embraced sense reaching. Religious organizations have be- of Ukrainian nationality. Indeed, the meaning- gun to reconfigure understandings of cultural ful role played by clergy and religious insti- space, religious boundaries and their relation tutions during this pivotal moment of protest to state borders and issues of sovereignty. and struggle has irreversibly altered the bal- This, in turn, informs assessments of political ance of church-state relations in Ukraine. The legitimacy, moral authority and allegiance. In power of the Ukrainian people to launch and short, religious communities in Ukraine and sustain mass street protests is now undeni- Russia have been invested with new roles, al- able. This power stems from a shared rejection beit different ones. These new roles are ren- of forms of governance predicated on a social dering these societies more secular and more Darwinian moral code of self-enrichment and religiously inclined simultaneously. Most im- the lawlessness and corruption that it bred. portantly, they are also creating cultural and The response of the Ukrainian people was a political differences that separate these two revolution to reclaim their dignity. countries from each other in spite of their long The prolonged protests were tragically fol- shared history. These larger dynamics in- lowed by an armed struggle for territory and creasingly have ramifications for the religious influence that erupted in March 2014, begin- landscape within Ukraine as well. ning with the annexation of and de- veloping into an undeclared war in eastern Region, Nation and Beyond Ukraine. Carl von Clausewitz claimed that war It had become conventional wisdom among is a continuation of politics by other means. scholars, journalists and the informed public The same could be said of religion, not only to speak of the regionally divided nature of

Euxeinos 17/2015 5 Editorial

Ukrainian political life. Little thought, how- policies, social institutions and cultural values ever, went into identifying just what those re- were emerging in the sphere of religion. (Wan- gions were. Did the “regional” split in Ukraine ner 2007) And, now, once again, on the heels go beyond the east-west / pro-nationalist-pro- of the Maidan protests and its aftermath, I find communist / pro-European-pro-Russian bina- myself stressing the importance of religion in ry divides that were so commonly used to de- shaping people’s reactions to the violent con- scribe the divisions in Ukrainian society? If so, flict that continues to rage in how? Is there merit to Vladimir Putin’s insis- as I write. (Wanner 2014) tence on the necessity of federalism in Ukraine To analyze these dramatic developments, the as a ruling mechanism due to the country’s Region, Nation and Beyond project sponsored pronounced regional divisions? a conference organized by myself and Viktor The “Region Nation and Beyond: A Transcul- Yelensky in Kyiv in September 2014. The goal tural and Interdisciplinary Reconceptualiza- of this conference was to consider the myriad tion of Ukraine” research project, funded by roles religion was playing in the acute politi- the Swiss National Science Foundation, was cal crisis facing Ukraine. The articles in this is- conceived as an attempt to rethink regionalism sue concerning Ukraine written by Myroslav in Ukraine to come to a greater understanding Marynovych, Oleksandr Sagan, Nikolai Mi- as to how particular regions are envisioned by trokhin, Mykhailo Cherenkov, Yuri Cherno- those who live in them, and what informs that morets and myself were first presented during vision. What are the dynamics that transform this conference. They offer diverse perspec- a particular space into a cultural and political tives on the sources and ramifications of this place that has a name and to which people at- strife as it has affected religious institutions tach meaning and allegiance? The project pro- and the everyday religious practices of the vides answers to these questions by exploring faithful. These articles pay particular attention the formation and ramifications of regionalism to the shifting obligations of clergy in terms in Ukrainian society from five distinct view- of their understandings as to whom religious points: history, religion, language, literature institutions serve and to the changing nature and economics. The goal is to take a fresh look of what religious institutions can expect from at the dynamics of change that bring regions state authorities. into being and change them over time, and The aforementioned articles are complement- analyze the significance of regions for Ukraine ed by additional articles by Oleg Yarosh, Yuli- and the surrounding countries today. ana Smilianskaya and Wilfried Jilge in this No one could have predicted that this project issue that consider how religious practice is would have become so timely. As head of the changing as a result of the dramatic disrup- research group on religion, I have long recog- tions to everyday life that have ensued since nized the political utility of religious symbol- the Maidan protests. They consider changes ism as well as the role of religion in defining in religious practice and consciousness from spaces as sacred and then forging attachments the perspective of members of non-Eastern to those spaces. Over a decade ago, I began Christian faith groups and from the very large to argue that some of the sharpest differ- segment of the Ukrainian population that con- ences since the collapse of the USSR separat- sider themselves not religious at all. And yet, ing Ukraine from Russia in terms of political the radically different atmosphere that has en-

Euxeinos 17/2015 6 Editorial

gulfed the country since the violence broke out About the Editor in eastern Ukraine continues to provoke evo- Catherine Wanner is a Professor in the Depart- lutions in political and cultural orientations in ment of History and the Department of An- which religious institutions continue to play thropology at The Pennsylvania State Univer- a vital role. Very few other social institutions sity. She has conducted research in Ukraine are capable of generating the moods and moti- for over twenty years on the politics of religion vations necessary to sustain prolonged aggres- and secularization with special attention as to sion and few are in a position to provide com- how they affect the social and cultural prac- fort to those forced to bear witness to senseless tices of every day life. She is the author or edi- destruction of human life. tor of Burden of Dreams: History and Identity As the importance of religion for understand- in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1998); Communities of ing and responding to these convulsive chang- the Converted: and Global Evange- es is unlikely to fade, rather only to accelerate lism (2007), which won four awards; Religion, in this part of the world, the initial conference Morality and Community in Post-Soviet Societies in Kyiv in 2014 has given birth to an ongo- (2008) and State Secularism and Lived Religion in ing research group, “Religion in the Black Sea Soviet Russia and Ukraine (2012). Region.” This new initiative aims to consider e-mail: Cew10 [at] psu.edu religion and religious practices that not only situate Ukrainian regions within Ukraine, but also Ukraine within a greater geopolitical re- gion. This means that readers of Euxeinos can look forward to more articles on this impor- tant theme.

Bibliography Fylypovych, L.O. and Horkushi, O.V. (2014). Maidan i Tserkva. Kyiv: Sammit-Kniha.

Wanner, Catherine 2007 Communities of the Converted: Ukrai- nians and Global Evangelism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2014 “’Fraternal’ Nations and Challenges to Sovereignty in Ukraine: The Politics of Lin- guistic and Religious Ties” American Ethnolo- gist 41(3): 427-439.

Euxeinos 17/2015 7 Orthodoxy and the Future of Secularism After the Maidan

by Catherine Wanner, Pennsylvania State University

n many ways the undeclared war between Rus- positions the spatial boundaries of believers in Isia and Ukraine has triggered seismic shifts in relationship to a particular state. As a result the religious landscape in the two countries. Al- of this prominence of the state, there is com- though united by a common Eastern Christian paratively less tension between categories of faith tradition, Russia and Ukraine are increasing- the religious and the secular as modes of being ly separated by the same. After more than twenty and modes of governing in Eastern Christian years of an independent Ukrainian state that has societies. Scholars who have engaged secular-

Analysis adopted its own legislative policies toward reli- ization theoretically have generally bypassed gious institutions and the means of regulating the consideration of Eastern Christian societies for exchange of peoples, goods and ideas, a growing this reason. (Asad 2003, Casanova 2006, Taylor number of differences in terms of cultural values 2007). and political orientations are now manifest be- A second related difference that is pertinent tween the two countries. to this discussion is that, as a faith tradition, Theses changes contributed to sharp, popular Orthodoxy in Eastern Europe is organized on protests that erupted on 21 November 2013 and a nation-state model. State churches by and became initially known as the “Revolution of Dig- large serve a particular nation as in the case of, nity.” What role did religion play in shaping the for example, the Greek Orthodox Church, Ser- form these protests took? And how are religious bian Orthodox Church, Bulgarian Orthodox institutions themselves likely to be affected by the Church and so on. Aspiring to more closely aftermath of the Maidan protests in which they integrate politically with Europe and the Eu- constituted a formidable presence? The events ropean Union, many Ukrainians, in a parallel on the Maidan led to a long series of unforeseen endeavor, also envision the recognition of an consequences, including the ouster of former independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and the match their independent state. Although the onset of an undeclared war between Russia and boundaries of Ukraine have been redrawn as a Ukraine, which has already cost thousands of result of this crisis, after more than two decades lives and redrawn the borders of both states. of independence, it is clear that the Ukrainian As an overarching framework, here I ask why the state is unlikely to disappear. Therefore, the issue of church-state relations is always so promi- demands of an independent Ukrainian Ortho- nent in discussions of Orthodoxy. I suggest that dox Church, which were continuing unabated rather than religion per se, the domain likely to be before this conflict erupted, have since gained most affected by the Maidan might well be how new impetus and urgency. secularism, as a political principle, will be put into Such an initiative automatically affects the practice in the future. I draw on the experiences of , which in Ukraine other states’ use of secularism to grapple with a goes by the name of the Ukrainian Ortho- diversity of values, views and lifestyles, manifest dox Church-Moscow Patriarchate. It is cur- in regional variation, to rethink issues of religious rently the largest of all Orthodox Churches in authority and political legitimacy. Ukraine in terms of properties. These efforts to create an independent, canonically recog- In two key respects, the Eastern Orthodox tradi- nized Ukrainian Orthodox Church have met tion is distinct from other Christian traditions, with a competing vision. The Russian Ortho- notably Catholicism and . First, it dox Church, positioning Russia as following

Euxeinos 17/2015 8 Catherine Wanner

a “third way,” has articulated its own spatial vision of a Russian World a means to create correlation linking its believers to each other universality, political neutrality and compas- in an alternate configuration. The Russian sion among peoples? The rationale here is that World refers to the canonical jurisdiction of by lifting religion above politics and specific the Russian Orthodox Church that includes state structures, faith is freed from the inevi- Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, echoing the im- tably fallen qualities of political compromise, perial domain that united Great Russians, Lit- thereby allowing an institution and its faith- tle Russians and White Russians, as these three ful to pursue a more pure form of harmonious groups were known, under the tsarist empire. piety. The “Russian World” is not a post-national Importantly, both positions represent an at- understanding of shared cultural space. It tempt to use Orthodoxy to define a particular is a term that claims to take inspiration from space politically, which has ramifications for ancient Rus’ and rests on a specific historical lived religious practices as well as for the re- precedent of an imperial past. The term recog- lationships between religious organizations nizes the legacy of this past, but in doing so and states in this part of the world. In both offers a divine vision of the past that canbe instances, - a nationalized form of Orthodoxy encountered and experienced as sacred in the and “Christian patriotism” or a supranational present. At the same time, the Russian World confessional tradition that sits at the seat of underscores a model of political organization another state’s power- bespeaks reestablish- that spans, overrides and subsumes multiple ing the supremacy of Orthodoxy as a guiding states and nations as naturally conflated and force in social and political life, albeit with dif- preordained by history. ferent spatial and political dimensions. This The Russian World refers to a “civilizational fork in the road existed even prior to the Maid- model” characterized by a unique cultural, so- an protests. The armed conflict that erupted cial and historical landscape that is most vivid- in Eastern Ukraine only intensifies the passion ly characterized by distinctive (and supposed- behind the commitments to one position over ly superior) spiritual and moral values. What the other and exacerbates the ramifications of is more, the choice of the Russian World and each option. its moral order stands opposed to the West. The recourse to religion on the part of both In contrast to the “spirituality” of the Russian the Ukrainian and Russian states bespeaks World, the West offers a shared moral order the need to legitimate political authority with that embraces forms of citizenship and “Eu- a religious aura. Attempts to save a populace ropeanness” hinging on universal discourses from “sin, error and evil” usher forth a politics of human rights as shared values, a means of of redemption that inevitably brings theology belonging and a meaningful common identifi- along. Modern states, and especially ones that cation. (Stoeckl 2014) aspire to govern through means that are not For Ukrainians, the choice is quite stark: should purely authoritarian, need some way to forge they pursue attempts to create a “Ukrainian- consensus and trust so that perceptions of jus- ized “ form of Orthodoxy, which then, in con- tice will be met and some degree of compli- trast, makes the Russian World project and ance with the law will ensue. On what basis its forms of Orthodox leadership and practice should political authority rest? seem “imperial” or “imperializing”? Or is the

Euxeinos 17/2015 9 Catherine Wanner

Accommodating Difference poses trust that individuals and groups rec- In many ways, the discussions of church-state ognize themselves to be part of a political relations and how they should be structured process in which they will be listened to and are really issues of secularism. Secularism as a in which their views matter. Without such a political principle is a means to accommodate mutual commitment, this trust will be eroded. difference all the while shoring up a sense of (Taylor 2011: 43) commonality that makes the exercise of state The commitment between the Ukrainian state power possible. The real challenge as a result authorities and the people they were sup- of the Maidan, I argue, has less to do with the posed to serve was razor thin, leading to an state regulation of religious institutions or evaporation of trust between the citizenry and church-state relations per se and more to do authorities. This loss of trust and widespread with how to democratically integrate and ac- sense of betrayal, which was experienced cept difference. throughout much of Ukraine, translated into The Orthodox Church in Russia derives a good newfound forms of solidarity among large bit of its power and position from the strong sectors of the national population. A plethora state to which it is allied. This strong state has of citizens found themselves on the main city similarly contributed to thwarting the robust square having experienced familiar forms of development of civil society in Russia. There- alienation, dissatisfaction, and even outrage at fore the historic triad of God-Tsar-Nation has the hands of state officials. This humiliation been remade into strong state-weak Church- and anger bubbled over and was emphatically weak civil society. Although this is one model, expressed as a popular will for change in the it has limited application in Ukraine because “Revolution of Dignity.” the dynamics have developed differently. Augustine, among others, asserted that (Wanner 2012) The Ukrainian state has been the Latin ligare, to bind, is the root meaning weak, unable to satisfy and provide for its citi- of the word religion and connotes its essence. zenry. It reached a nadir under Yanukovych. Religion is what embodies the commitments Clergy and religious institutions of all persua- that bind individuals to each other, to faith sions, albeit not to the same degree, came to and to divine powers. The Maidan, like no the Maidan to side with the people against other event, generated popular solidarity be- the state and its inadequate governance. In cause it put in evidence the extent of shared Ukraine the weakness of the state - and the normative understandings of moral order, au- questionable levels of legitimacy it has had - thority and political legitimacy and the popu- gave way to greater respect for and more vig- lar will to act to bring those understandings in orous levels of participation in religious life. alignment with reality. Thus, most recently, the weak Ukrainian state Such solidarity and binding force were has bred comparatively stronger religious in- not universal, however. Orthodox societies, stitutions and a more vocal and active civil including Ukraine, have always been multi- society. confessional, albeit not to the degree that they In order for people to deliberately form a com- are today because virtually every religious mon will to act together to pursue a common group embodies a plethora of transnational purpose, as was done on the Maidan, there contacts, exchanges and influences. When must be commitment. Commitment presup- this confessional diversity combines with a

Euxeinos 17/2015 10 Catherine Wanner

full spectrum of attitudes that run the gamut that fostered a public sphere, which was for from religious, to areligious to nonreligious the most part neutral toward religion. As a the degree of diversity presents challenges in by-product of this shift, confessional identities terms of binding citizens to each other in com- gradually ceased to hold meaning (2013: 38). mon cause and in forging the kind of trust that The ultimate result of processes of seculariza- generates perceptions of political legitimacy. tion in Europe, therefore, involved de-confes- (Wanner 2014: 432-436) sionalizing state structures and dismantling a Ultimately, the Maidan protests have be- system of state churches. queathed a central issue: how to accommo- This process never really occurred in Impe- date the increasing diversity and fragmen- rial Russia, nor even in the USSR, where the tation of the modern age and even of the Russian Orthodox Church maintained a privi- modern nation-state, which often comes in the leged, albeit vastly diminished, position vis- form of a diversity of opinions. For this rea- à-vis the state. In France, another imperial son, an important aspect of church-state rela- country with a similar history of a strong sin- tions is how secularism as a political principle gle church, secularism has been implemented is implemented. This, I expect, more than as- differently. The state has attempted to control suring ecumenical relations, will be the central and manage religion as a means of minimiz- challenge for religious institutions and for the ing the influence of clergy and the interfer- new Ukrainian government. ence of religiously informed understandings Secularism has been mobilized in divergent of morality and legitimacy on political policy. ways in the US and in Europe and these expe- The most recent manifestation of this impulse riences represent two models for implement- has been the policy of laïcité, which essentially ing secularism to accommodate difference. tries to privatize religious expression by tak- In the , secularism was origi- ing out of the public sphere all forms of religi- nally advanced as a political principle that osity, including material objects and symbols could prevent one of the many rival Protes- with religious meaning. tant confessions from gaining the upper hand As John Rawls (1971) has pointed out, the and dominating or otherwise discriminating process of secularizing a state is quite differ- against other denominations. (Finke and Stark ent from attempting to secularize a society 2005) More recently, the principle of secular- and the two processes cannot be confused. A ism has been applied to balance the needs and secular state does not mean a secular society. rights of religious, nonreligious and areligious Whereas a democratic state claims neutrality people in such a way that the rights of all are before all religious institutions and communi- equally guaranteed before the law. This is ties, ostensibly refusing to favor one over oth- in many respects the challenge to be met in ers, religious institutions themselves remain Ukraine. free in a democracy to comment, propagate This is very different from the European ex- and otherwise try to influence the direction of perience. José Casanova has suggested that state policies. Therefore, the longed for “neu- in Europe a series of secularizations have oc- trality” that a separation of church and state curred. This process involved a shift from a promises can appear quite illusive. As long pronounced correlation between territory and as the use of a religious aura to cast the righ- confession, resulting in confessional states teousness of state leaders and state power in

Euxeinos 17/2015 11 Catherine Wanner

a virtuous light continues in Ukraine, by and References large to compensate for a lack of trust and po- Asad, Talal 2003 Formations of the Secular: litical legitimacy, true secularism will remain , , Modernity. Stanford, CA: out of reach. Stanford University Press. In his New Year’s address to the nation, the Casanova, José 2006 “Secularization revisited: new Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, a reply to Talal Asad.” in Powers of the Secular in referring to the armed conflict to defend Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors. Da- the Fatherland in eastern Ukraine, said, “The vid Scott and Charles Hirschkind, eds. Stan- truth is on our side. God is with us.” The ford, CA: Stanford University Press. Maidan protests provided a public forum in Casanova, José 2013 “Exploring the Postsecu- which to express religious sentiment. These lar: Three Meanings of the “Secular” and their events enhanced the perceptions of the ben- Possible Transcendence.” in Habermas and Re- eficial contributions of clergy and religious ligion, Craig Calhoun, Eduardo Mendieta and organizations to Ukrainian society by virtue Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. Malden, MA: of their ability to create and maintain moral Polity Press. order. A new sense of the political is emerg- Finke, Roger and Stark, Rodney 2005 The ing in Ukraine that freely integrates religious Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and conviction with political positions. If the early Losers in our Religious Economy. New Bruns- post-Soviet years focused on articulating a na- wick: Rutgers University Press. tional identity that could hold this regionally Poroshenko, Petro 2014 http://en.censor.net. diverse country together, after the Maidan, ua/video_news/318792/president_poroshen- the task is to articulate a political identity that ko_addresses_the_nation_on_new_year_vid- will spell out the values and norms by which eo. Last accessed: 9 January 2015. a diverse group of Ukrainians agree to be Rawls, John 1971 A Theory of Justice. Cam- governed. One of the key tasks the Maidan bridge: Harvard University Press. has given is how the new Ukrainian state will Stoeckl, Kristina 2014 The Russian forge a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of its Orthodox Church and Human Rights. London: own people that will be grounded in a secular Routledge. neutrality, and not by relying on the religious Taylor, Charles 2007 A Secular Age. Cambridge: aura of righteousness of a particular faith tra- Harvard University Press. dition or confession to do so. Taylor, Charles 2011 “Why we Need a Radi- cal Redefinition of Secularism” in Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere. New York: Columbia University Press. Wanner, Catherine 2012 Lived Religion and State Secularism in Russia and Ukraine. New York and Washington, D.C.: Oxford Univer- sity Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Wanner, Catherine 2014 “’Fraternal’ Nations and Challenges to Sovereignty in Ukraine: The Politics of Linguistic and Religious Ties” American Ethnologist 41(3): 427-439.

Euxeinos 17/2015 12 Was There an Alternative? Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius and His First Steps

by Nikolay Mitrokhin, Research Center for East European Studies, Bremen

Abstract After the death of its long-serving leader, Metropolitan Bishop Volodymyr (Sabodan) of Kiev, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate chose a new leader in August 2014. The election was accompanied by internal church disputes regarding the future orientation of the church, and in particular the degree of independence from Moscow. The new head of church, Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius (Beresovsky) from , is pursuing a balanced approach.

his article is based on interviews which I tocephaly.” Members of these communities Tconducted in early October 2014 with two have ceased praying liturgies to the Moscow dozen high ranking clergymen from the Ukrai- Patriarchate for two decades, and there are no nian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate plaques to be found in these churches to indi- (UOC–MP) and with a few religious experts in cate that they belong to the MP.. Part of the in- Kiev associated with the current church struc- ner circle of the former Metropolitan Bishop, ture. We essentially spoke about the current who himself had undergone a serious evolu- situation of the UOC–MP and about the first tion, having turned from Moscow’s vicar of steps of its new head, Metropolitan Bishop fictitious autonomy into an actual ideologist Onuphrius (Beresovsky), who was elected on advocating a peaceful separation from Mos- the 13th of August. Due to the fact that the in- cow, also supports these views. terviewees are in potential danger of attack, I The majority of the parishes in the central, will not cite their names or any other concrete northern, eastern, and far-western parts of the details which could compromise their ano- country (Transcarpathia) are entirely satisfied nymity. with the UOC’s current autonomous status. The former leader of the UOC–MP, Metropoli- The Church actually has full freedom in deci- tan Bishop Vladimir (Sabodan), who passed sions of internal personnel and administrative away on the 5th of July after nine months in questions; it no longer pays any church taxes a coma, has left behind an ambivalent legacy. to Moscow, and is independently building The UOC–MP is the strongest Ukrainian reli- relationships with secular authorities. In any gious organization with more than 13,000 par- case, when the Eparch of the Orthodox dio- ishes, which, in terms of numbers, dominate cese of Cherkasy (in the center of the country) the competing Orthodox churches in practical- recently emerged as a fervent proponent of ly all regions of Ukraine, to exclude three Gali- autocephaly and carried out a survey among cian regions. However, the Church appears to the priests, only slightly more than half of be divided into three pieces with regard to its them supported his position1. This is to say ideologies. nothing of the dioceses, in which the leaders Many parishes of the west and, partially, are not as strongly in support of the present central regions of Ukraine desire to form an idea. I n light of this question, Metropolitan organizational separation from the Moscow Bishop Vladimir’s position corresponded to Patriarchate composed of these three points 1 http://censor.net.ua/news/300120/upts_ of view and to attain so-called “canonical au- mp_na_cherkasschine_poslushalas_prihojan_i_ne_ pominaet_patriarha_kirilla_na_bogoslujeniyah

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the expectations of those supporting the status particularly at the conflict between the closest quo, who do not refuse autocephaly at some person to the deceased Metropolitan Bishop— indefinite point in the future. the young Metropolitan Bishop Alexander A third group of parishes, priests, and bishops (Drabinko; born in 1977), whose image was remain in categorical opposition of the schism significantly burdened by the various scan- with Moscow and the widening of autonomy. dals—and the greatest authority among those Part of this group ignores the fact that the close to Vladimir—the church administrator, Ukrainian Orthodox Church even exists, be- Metropolitan Bishop Antony (Pakanich; born lieving it to belong exclusively to the Russian in 1967), who is the second person to occupy Church. A large portion of these parishes (or the post of administrator of church affairs. priests and bishops with similar views, which Both of these figures are behind the boundar- by far are not in agreement with the senti- ies of Ukraine and little-known, because their ments of the parishioners) was in the eastern influence on church life in the UOC was only and southern regions of the country, mostly in determined within the last decade, but secular major cities. Nevertheless, ideological propo- Ukrainian journalism has not abandoned its nents of the “Russian World” or the Russian attention towards them. Orthodox Church can be met with among the Besides these personal differences, both fig- clergy in rural areas as much as in the cities. ures were divided in their approach to the The strategy of the Kiev Metropolitan Bishop future of the UOC-MP as well. Alexander had already been laid down two decades be- (Drabinko) was and remains unpopular with- fore. It was based around the binding together in the church but, along with this, he made an of all three parts of the Church in ignorance of influential impact on the few episcopates who their orientation with external political struc- were personally obligated to him. He more or tures. This was and is being achieved through less had declared himself to be a supporter of a considerable decentralization of the church autocephaly (if not now, then in the near fu- and the reconciliation of a complex balance of ture) and tried to form an image of himself at interests. One is initially left with an impres- the hands of the secular press as a Ukrainian sion of total chaos for the living representative patriot. In Moscow, amongst a small circle of of the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, clergy and laity concerned with Ukrainian is- who is accustomed to clear-cut discipline and sues, his name was long associated with the hierarchy, as well as external unanimity of “betrayal of church interests.” Metropolitan church “speakers” and the media. Bishop Antony, taking on a responsible and The situation became more complicated after laborious imperative, preferred to preserve the death of Metropolitan Bishop Vladimir as more normal working relationships, both a result of the fact that he had passed away with Moscow and Yanukovich’s team, saving without having nominated an evident succes- the discussion of the church’s future “for lat- sor. Those who could pretend to have the most er,” which is to say for a time when he would correct interpretation of his ideas and who, become a representative and would gain the earlier on, had held tense relations with one freedom to act. Nevertheless, the people be- another had now “broken away” and estab- longing to his circle did not hide their views, lished a public squabble, attracting state de- goals, and sympathies. They hoped that Met- partments and the secular media. I am looking ropolitan Bishop Antony would begin seri-

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ous and deep reforms in the UOC-MP at the tightly connected with Yanukovich’s people, very minimum, to include the further mod- retracted himself from these games and spent ernization and Ukrainization of the Church. a significant part of the year abroad. In a strug- “Heavyweights” from the old pro-Moscow gle between ideological parties, having begun guard emerged from church leadership as op- long before the death of Metropolitan Bishop ponents of the “Ukrainophiles”. These “heavy- Vladimir, no one seriously recognized the pos- weights” are established members of the Holy sibility that an independent player would ap- : Metropolitan Bishop Illarion (Shu- pear. Yet church history has taught us that a kalo) of , Metropolitan Bishop Aga- mediator possesses the greatest opportunities fangel (Savvin) of , and Metropolitan in an era of crises and heated debate. More- Bishop Pavel (Lebed‘), head of the Kiev Cave over, the death of the old representative and Monastery, where the seat of the Kiev Metro- the choices of the new one have coincided with politan Diocese is located. However, if it had the most aggravated period of political debate been possible to suggest ten or fifteen years in the meagre 25 years that Ukraine has existed ago that Moscow, garnered with the support as an independent state. However, the victory of Yanukovich, would be able to push one of of the Ukrainian revolution has paradoxically these men into the primary position of leader- had a negative impact on the possibilities of ship in the Church, then it has become clear the pro-Ukrainian party taking power in the within the last few years that this proposition UOC-MP. Journalists sympathizing with Met- could not even theoretically come to pass. The ropolitan Bishop Aleksander accused Metro- overwhelming majority of potential electoral politan Bishop Antony of collaborating with delegates were hand-picked in an already in- Yanukovych. The supporters of Metropolitan dependent Ukraine and were considered “old Bishop Antony battled with the followers of ones” (with the exception of the frequently ill, Metropolitan Bishop Aleksander, who had but relatively young Metropolitan Bishop Pav- committed many more sins from the church’s el), surviving relics of the age. This applied all point of view – so many more that Aleksander the more when the three Metropolitan Bishops decided to not run as a successor himself and had to fundamentally reconsider their conduct has decided to form a party of supporters of in the summer of 2014. Under threat of legal autocephaly under the leadership of the expe- persecution for complicity in the organiza- rienced, though provincial Metropolitan Bish- tion of mass unrest in Odessa and the escape op Simeon (Shostatsky). However, this group to Moscow of those of his helpers who had received only nine votes in the first round of been directly involved, Metropolitan Bishop elections for the new church representative. Agafangel decided to refashion himself as a The new Ukrainian authorities did not want Ukrainian patriot. Metropolitan Bishop Illari- to oppress participants of the church. on fled from the city of Donetsk, which had Metropolitan Bishop Antony’s supporters been entrusted to him, abandoning his flock in were confident of their victory long before the a difficult hour. A permanent member of the elections; the managing director has consider- Holy Synod answered my question about his able possibilities to lobby for his candidacy whereabouts as follows: “You are asking ques- in this situation. However, the first round tions that are more dangerous than if they had produced frustrating results—only 24 votes. been godless.” Metropolitan Bishop Pavel, The competitor, Metropolitan Bishop of Cher-

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novitsky, Onuphrius (Berezsky), received 36 ceremony held votes--one and a half times as many votes re- in the Kremlin ceived by the former. In the following round, for the annexa- supporters of Alexander and Simeon almost tion of Crimea, ubiquitously crossed over to his camp and that the Eparchy he gained a devastating victory with 48 to 25 of Crimea has votes. Antony’s supporters, judging conversa- remained a part tions I have had in Kiev, are now in a state of of the UOC, and bewilderment, wondering how this came to that, on the eve pass. of the election of Unexpectedly, Onuphrius became for many the representa- one of the key candidates immediately follow- tive of the UOC, ing the death of Vladimir, at which time they Moscow made an voted him (then the chairman of the ecclesi- effort not to exert Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius astical court) as the new patriarchal locum. direct pressure on Source: pravoslavye.org.ua This necessity does not guarantee permanent the electoral dele- status as head of the Church and, for many gates and the discussion regarding the desired in Ukraine, as well as in the UOC, Onuphrius candidates in church media. The new Ukrai- should not have taken this office. His “pro- nian authorities made no arguments for the Moscow” background was all too apparent, interference of the electoral process, even if regarding his monkhood in the Trinity-Sergi they had wanted to. In this situation, the bish- Monastery, rigid rhetoric, and involvement in ops themselves were deciding on whom they the question of the unification of the UOC-KP required as the head of the church and, in my with Moscow. Also, to put it lightly, he ex- opinion, this was an absolutely natural choice. pressed himself in a less than eloquent fash- There are a few facts about Metropolitan Bishop ion in 2008 on the question of the Holodomor2, Onuphrius which are important for the mod- of which people have not forgotten to remind ern Ukrainian Orthodox Church: firstly, he has him in light of the coming electoral campaign. not been involved in any serious scandals, nei- Given the background of the war that Russia ther of a financial or economic nature, nor of a has unleashed on Donbass, it would appear political or sexual nature. This is a great rarity that the chances of a “pro-Moscow” candidate for the bishops of the UOC. Secondly, neither were down to zero. However, as usual, the has he been, nor is he currently a member of Church has shown that it is a special institu- a particular group; he possesses no apparent tion which lives according to its own laws and following (associates, camps, minions—call that the current political agenda has no deci- them what you will). Third, and in contrast sive meaning for it, at least in the short term. to several other members of the Holy Synod, The Moscow Patriarchate has continued to he does not suffer (at least not publicly) from conduct itself in an unexpectedly wise manner any pro-imperial illusions. As a result, his re- in this situation. I have already written that Pa- lations with the authorities, although distant, triarch Kirill did not take part in the solemn are equal and tolerant. Fourth, and perhaps

2 http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/28395. most importantly, he is known as a strong htm housemaster, who does not relent to anyone.

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The UOC-MP is now faced with the question much more patriotic, independent, and (not of its preservation, which is much more impor- of the least importance) Ukrainian-speaking tant than the question of development. In the service of the UOC-MP. Friends of mine from situation of political disturbances and the war both churches have expressed their surprise with Russia, which houses the administrative that, for those who have gone through the last and spiritual center of the ROC, the UOC-MP half year since the moment of victory for the cannot permit itself any sort of reformation or Ukrainian revolution, this process hasn’t be- modernization being proposed its modernists. come a landslide. Meanwhile, no more than This will most likely provoke an ideological half a dozen parishes (as far as is known in schism; there is a hope that the modernization Kiev) have left the UOC-MP for the UOC-KP. of the UOC-MP will attract some new groups These conditions formed the experience of of believers, but this is a rather illusory hope Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius, who man- given the current situation. The patriotic youth aged to stand up in the oblast on be- will not go in for the “Moscow” church, and half of the UOC-MP during the early 90s for a different group of laymen is nowhere to be the largest monastery complex in Ukraine— found. The Ukrainian missionary field is satu- the Pochaevsky monastery—and afterwards, rated with much more attractive propositions. for more than two decades, successfully led The UOC-MP cannot allow itself at present to the indispensably rich, large, and multiethnic take part in an apparent campaign of “self- Chernovitsky diocese. As a result, this lone Ukrainization,” which to a large degree has al- diocese became the head of the UOC-MP. ready begun to affect many segments of Ukrai- In my eyes, Metropolitan Bishop’s first steps nian society. The specter of the establishment in his post as the new representative (and let of an ethnic Russian exarchate in Ukraine has it be remembered that the 13th of November troubled the church for already more than a makes three months since this date) confirm decade. In spite of the separate mission state- his time-proven style of leadership, which cre- ments of the radicals, none of the reliable rep- ates confusion for other church leaders. Many resentatives of the church whom I am aware expected large-scale public steps in keeping of are in favor of this idea. The creation of this with those of Patriarch Kirill: press conferenc- exarchate will give rise to too many admin- es, broad statements, relations with the public istrative problems and too large a part of the and state authorities, discussion of programs church will be lost. of reform, in short, participation in the cam- On the other side of the coin, the UOC-MP has paign for the uplifting of the UOC’s image, accepted the fact that it is being examined by which had been spoiled as a result of the col- religious competitors and, in part, by political laboration of separate church representatives forces (not necessarily radical ones) as a pie with Yanukovich. Instead, after coming into sitting out on a windowsill, ready for the tak- power and locking himself into his residence, ing, which it is at least possible to have a bite Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius has refused of, if not divide entirely. It is difficult to pro- 99% of all possible interviews and public ac- pose a better moment than now to do so. On tivities (if not all of them) and currently main- the part of those coming to support the idea tains communications with the world through of autocephaly, this has long been an unsus- his former competitor. In the meantime, tainable situation, and the desire to join in the Metropolitan Bishop Antony has not only re-

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mained at his post as executive director, but, only can, but should wait, because, in this in- as before, also holds control over the dealings definite situation, every imprecisely spoken or of the Kiev Metropolitanate. Onuphrius has unfaithfully reproduced word could turn into not begun to beckon anyone from the Cherno- a large problem for the UOC-MP. vitsky diocese and his only confidant, besides What can we expect from Metropolitan Bish- Antony, is Bishop Obukhovsky Iona (Cherep- op Onuphrius in the future? How much lon- anov), whose opinions are very much in ac- ger will his “seclusion” continue and what cordance with the style leadership within the will this lead to? As I see it, there are two pos- church and its ideologies. This lively and en- sibilities: theoretically, Metropolitan Bishop ergetic monk of Russian origin (with whom I Onuphrius can take a page from the tactical had the pleasure of conversing in 1998—much book of Saint Cyrill—namely to wait a couple more vibrant than Onuphrius) successfully of years for reforms, to observe, and to pro- managed to populate a small monastery and mote his people to the necessary posts and, turn it into a famous landmark of religious life afterwards, concisely and immediately com- in Kiev. In light of this, he has come a long way mence to make those or any changes he has from a gloomy and obscure Russian monk- in mind. However, based on the opinion of hood, whose traditions were actively support- my close friends in Kiev as well as my own ed in Odessa and Donetsk3. personal impressions from long conversations In my opinion, this “withdrawal into seclu- with the bishop himself5, he is not the kind of sion” is a standard managerial path in this person who has any long-term plans for the situation. Nothing of a particularly critical na- future. He is exclusively a tactician, although ture is actually taking place within the UOC- very successful in this respect. MP. The new authorities do not have a thirst Therefore it is my opinion Metropolitan for the church’s annihilation and are not call- Bishop Onuphrius will most likely take after ing for any decisive actions from Metropoli- the strategy of Patriarch Pimen (Izvekova), tan Bishop Onuphrius. As a result, he spoke who, at the beginning of this rule, went to the all words necessary in support of the actions Trinity-Sergi Monastery, where he spent eigh- of the authorities and led a funeral proces- teen years of his life. This strategy operates sion over the voluntary centurion battalion through ignorance of political agendas or any “Aidar,” with regard to the Jonah Monastery4. church reforms made on behalf of its leader. None of the dioceses, which it had been pos- But this strategy will not change the possi- sible to influence with the path of negotiations, bilities of innovative experiments in separate plan to separate. Time is needed to understand areas of church life, implemented by church what is to be done in Kiev and with whom it is leaders of the second or third echelon. In the possible to work; this is analogous with Mos- case of obvious failures, these experiments can cow and . And journalists not always end, and those responsible can always be relocated or reduced. In the management 3 http://religions.unian.net/ orthodoxy/577998-episkop-iona-cherepanov- 5 Interview by N. Mitrokhin with ochen-hotelos-byi-chtobyi-veter-ne-unes-moyu- Archbishop Onuphrius (Berezovsky), 05/15/1998, golovu.html in Chernivitsi. Interview With N. Mitrokhin with 4 http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ Archbishop Onufry (Berezovsky) 15.5.1998, in ukrainian_news/26703-glava-upc-mp-sovershil- Chernivtsi. A deciphering. Personal electronic otpevanie-sotnika-batalona-ajdar.html archive of the author.

Euxeinos 17/2015 18 of the church, the Synod, and its departments, About the Author they will be observing the two or three clos- Nikolay Mitrokhin, Dr. phil., Research Center est figures to the patriarch in order and piety. for East European Studies, Bremen. The aforementioned Ion (Cherepanov) and e-mail: mitrokhin [at] gmx.net the long-time assistant of Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius, Archbishop Meletios (Egorenko), who occupied the vacant Chernovitsky office (and who is an anti-imperial Russian who maintains a good reputation both in the UOC and the ROC), may very wind up being these figures. In this situation, administrative affairs will only entrust Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius with giving principal and most likely unoffi- cial blessings to experiments, the deciding of figures who are responsible for the regulation in times of crises, and tough negotiations with leading authorities of the Ukrainian govern- ment and Moscow. What innovations will come about in the future, where will they lead the UOC-MP, how successful will the ideas of the autocephalists prove to be, and to what de- gree will they be prepared to answer for the results of their leadership? Time will show us.

Translated by Charlie Smith

Euxeinos 17/2015 19 The Jews of Ukraine: Past and Present

by Yuliana Smilianskaya, Institute for Jewish Studies, Kiev

Abstract A large number of Jewish communities as well as non-profit and cultural organizations have been established in Ukraine since 1991. Restored and new synagogues serve as religious and cultural cen- ters. The Jewish institutions focus their efforts on the integration of the history of the Ukrainian Jews into the historical memory of Ukraine. Ukrainian Jews also protested on Maidan Square.

I. Historical Review hills of Kiev from the 10th to the first half of he first archeological evidence of the the 12th century. The sacking and destruction Tpresence of a Jewish population in to- of Kiev in 1240 by the Mongol-Tatars practi- day’s Ukraine is related to artifacts from the cally led to the annihilation of life in the city first century, found by archeologists on the altogether, to say nothing of the Jewish com- Crimean peninsula; they present a view of the munities in particular. life of Jewish communities the Greek cities of The following period of active Jewish life Panticapaeum, Chersonese, and Kafe1. The is connected with the Lithuanian Principal- next stage of the dissemination of in ity, the Kingdom of Poland, and, later on, the Ukrainian lands2 is connected to the history of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The role the Khazar Kaganate, which existed as an in- of Jewish communities in these states, which dependent state from the 7th to 10th century, had at this time taken Ukrainian lands into but kept “shards” of the state in view, to in- the fold, was great. Lithuanian princes, Polish clude Jewish communities, right up until the kings, and the Szlachta invited Jews to their middle of the 9th century. lands, understanding that they would be ca- Parallel to the Jewish communities of Khazar pable of regulating trade after a long disrup- are Jewish “merchant-radonites”, appearing tion in the newly revived cities, towns, and towards the 10th century, migrating along the castles. Thanks to this, more than 200 Jewish trade route “from the Vikings to the Greeks.” communities flourished in Ukraine in the 12th The first document to have fixed the presence century and were practically autonomous, of a Jewish community in Kiev is the famous having their own “parliament” (VAAD of the “Kievan Letter,” which narrates the tragic four lands) and education system. This peri- events of the brothers Khanuka, with regard od left behind a wealth of material evidence, to the 10th century3. There are also allusions which can be seen while traveling around to this in ancient Russian chronicles, notes of Ukraine: defensive synagogues in Shargorod the traveler Ptakhia of Regensburg, and oth- and Zhovkva, fragments of fortress walls er testimonies, which allow us to confidently and the Reznitskaya Tower in Kamenets- converse about the entirety of Jewish life in the Podol’sky, Jewish urban development in Shar- 1 Theodoseus gorod, Murovannye Kurilovtsy, and Bershad, 2 The term, “Ukrainian Lands,” in this “matseivy” (headstones) in numerous Jewish article refers to territories that compose the modern cemeteries (Bus’k, Brody, Khotin, Kremenets, state of Ukraine. 3 Golb, Norman and Omeljan Pritsak. Satanov, Medzhibozh, and many others). This Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth was a time of blooming for Jewish culture, Century. — Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1982

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education, and learning. Youths studied in II, the anti-Jewish politics of the state began to world-famous yeshivas, famous rabbis were slacken and a series of privileged groups be- writing their masterworks, and philosophical gan to appear (merchants, persons with higher schools gave birth to new ideas. education, etc.), which were allowed to live From time to time, Jewish life was rent with outside of the “boundary of settlement.” catastrophes. For example, during the Khmel- The gradual process of the “ingrowth” of Jew- nitsky uprising (or Koliyivshchyna), flower- ish community into leadership in the Russian ing communities were annihilated, cut off, Empire (before 1793, this leadership was ab- and razed to the ground. However, after some solutely foreign to Jews, and therefore it took time, they again revived themselves, creating several decades for Jews living in Ukrainian, new material and spiritual values. In the 18th Belorussian, and Polish lands to sort out which century, in the city of Medzhibozh, a direction state they had settled into and how to exist of Judaism was formed by the famous tzad- within it. A large part of the Jewish popula- dick Baal-Shem-Tov, which today is one of the tion, as in the past, remained in the “boundary most the most widespread amongst the Jews of settlement,” but those who overcame the of the world. In the following quarter of the prohibition and found themselves in big cities century, Hassidism was disseminated in hun- began to form a special class of “enlightened” dreds of European communities. Having been or “wealthy” Jews. The money of Jewish phi- formed in the second half of the 18th century, lanthropists funded hospitals and universities, this institute of tzaddicks defined the structure schools and theaters, museums and markets. of the spiritual life of Russian and Polish Jews Their children were successfully graduating up until the 20th century. from universities and academies and becom- At the turn of the 19th century, after the sec- ing doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Max Em- ond and third divisions of Poland, a large part manuel Mandelstam, Semyon An-sky, Arnold of the Ukrainian lands, along with the Polish Margolin). Their grandchildren were journal- Jews inhabiting them, were assimilated into ists, writers, musicians, and artists (Vladimir the . The next stage of the ex- Gorovicz, Avo Pevzner, Isaac Rabinovich, istence of Jewish communities was beginning Abraham Manevich). And it would appear “in the Galut.” Before this point, Jews were not that it was now possible to talk about the new allowed to live in the Russian Empire. There- vector of development for “Galut Jewry,” but fore, the situation of the Jewish population in waves of horrific massacres in 1881-82 and, the country was complicated. A large number later, in 1903-05, the people were repeatedly of limitations, bans on different forms of lead- reminded that they were still regarded as for- ership, and limited places in which they were eign to the lands, on which only a few genera- allowed to live (“boundary of settlement”) tions of their ancestors had lived. demonstrated to the Orthodox population the The revolution changed the situation, for the inferiority and even hostility of the Jews for first time equalizing Jewish rights with those more than a hundred years. Emperor Nikolai of everyone else living in the country. How- I (1825-1855) led especially rigid political mo- ever, a wave of bloody riots during the peri- tions aimed at the assimilation of the Jewish od of the Russian Civil War brought colossal population into the Empire. After his death, losses to the Jewish population, and the Soviet under the rule of the tsar-reformer Alexander authorities utterly destroyed the structure of

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the Jewish community. The struggle with re- cially were shot for “spying,” the Jewish col- ligion, the closing of the synagogue, which for lective farms were abolished, and the colleges centuries had been the core of Jewish spiritu- and institutes were closed. Besides that, under al life, and a ban on the teaching of Hebrew Stalinist repression, a huge number of Jewish (both those who taught as well as those who political and cultural officials fell to the “Fair- sent their children to be taught their mother ness,” though it should be noted that this was tongue were landed in jail) all put an end to not a case of anti-Semitism. During this phase, the next phase of “Galut Life.” equality was maintained. The best representa- However, within the first years of Soviet pow- tives of the Ukrainian, Jewish, Russian, and er, the state declared a course towards “in- Georgian people (as well as others) living in ternationalism” and “root-taking,” which is the USSR were tortured and executed. The gu- to say in support of all peoples living in the lag swallowed millions, and the Jewish people country, to include the “previously oppressed lost famous writers and poets (for example, Jewry.” The first half of the 1920s became the Isaac Babel and Osip Mandelstam), religious beginning of the rapid development of Yid- officials, pedagogues, artists, musicians, sol- dish life and culture. Artists and musicians, diers, engineers… Jewish life in the cities dur- Jewish theaters, studios, and clubs formed the ing this period was fleeing into the deep un- model of the new “Soviet” Jew; Jewish collec- derground. In Jewish towns came an original tive farms in the step region of Crimea and transformation of tradition with new calls for in the South of Ukraine were called forth to the “Soviet man.” The formula, “a boy knows change the stereotype of the humiliated “petty the Torah well,” changed to “a boy reads of- bourgeois trader” into that of the proud So- ten.” Now the founding idea of the Jewish viet farmer—Jewish schools, books, and the- family was no longer to educate one’s children aters were required to teach the “new Jewish in Jewish tradition, but Soviet tradition, which proletariat.” Such politics, from the receiv- was hopefully higher, if not special. ing side, appeared so attractive, that Jewish Before the Second World War, about 2.5 international organizations (especially Joint) million Jews were living in the territory of actively supported them, supplying Jewish Ukraine. About 1.4 of them were murdered collective farms with the newest technology during the Holocaust. and considerable monetary subsidies4. How- Ukraine became a “site,” in which the Nazis ever, in the 1930s, the “course of the Party” were learning to murder hundreds of thou- changed decisively from support of national sands of people; this was the beginning of the culture to the formation of the “Soviet man,” path to the “Final Solution to the Jewish Ques- ideally without any national (nationalistic) tion.” In this occupied territory of the USSR— indications. The head of Joint and the active Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltics—the Nazis officials of the “Ga-khaluts” movement espe- commenced first mass-, and, later, wholesale 4 For a short period in the arid steppe murder. Men were being executed in June zone of Crimea, 163 wells were constructed, 97 1941—men and women by July. By August, villages were established, 2900 homes were built, up to 200 collective households and civil buildings they had begun to execute children. In Sep- were built, 16 cheese factories, 28 stables and cow- tember, in Babiy Yar, the Nazis move onward houses, 8 machinery shed, 94 wheat silos, 8 sheep pens, 52 school buildings, 10 village building to total annihilation. In these lamentably fa- rooms, 8 baths, 6 clinics, and so on… mous declarations, pasted about the streets of

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Kiev on the 28th of Septbember, they had writ- mothers’ breasts until their final moments. ten, “All Jews of Kiev.” Everyone was villainously slaughtered; many From Ukraine it was possible to trace all of the hundreds of thousands—a million Jews in “models” that the Nazis would implement to- Ukraine.”5 wards the annihilation of all of the Jews of Eu- In the first years following the war, a few Jews rope. The “Eastern Model” was a quick, practi- received permission to open the synagogues, cal, and total annihilation of the population by which had been closed in the 1920s6. The Jews firing squad and other methods of murder; the of every city collected money for the restora- “Western Model” was the gradual exclusion of tion of these buildings. This is testified to in in- people from political, economic, and social life terviews taken in Kiev: “My father was a cob- and, afterwards, concentration and deporta- bler. He would regularly lay a small sum of tion to death camps; the “Romanian Method” money aside to take to the synagogue.” “And was the gradual annihilation of prison-camp my father was the secretary of the district com- populations through starvation, exposure, epi- mittee. Therefore, he would transfer the mon- demic, and mockery of the guards. The reac- ey to his mother, and she would secretly take tion of the remaining population in these re- it to her aunt and she would transfer it to the gions varied. Different methods were utilized synagogue through her neighbor.” This was a in the propaganda for the proposal of the path short revival period for Jewish self-awareness to death. The goal of the Nazis was a common in the USSR, a sense of “victory over Nazism,” one—the annihilation of all Eastern European and the understanding that “we have sur- Jews. And it is a bitter necessity to establish vived, and Hitler is no more.” the fact that they practically succeeded in this The next phase of Stalinist anti-Semitic poli- goal. Vasili Grossman summed up this tragic cy—the execution of the Jewish Anti-fascist toll in his essay, “Ukraine without Jews:” Committee and a struggle against “cos- “The People were villainously slaughtered… mopolites” and “saboteurs”—beginning in The old artisans were villainously slaugh- 1948, demonstrated to the Jewish population tered…, lumberjacks, tractor drivers, cab of the country the hopelessness of the very drivers, were villainously slaughtered; water idea of a “resurrection of Jewish life in Rus- carriers, millers, bakers, cooks were villain- sia.” That which belonged to the Jews was ously slaughtered…; bacteriologists and bio- becoming an indication of withered hopes. chemists… grandmothers who didn’t know And, since this policy harkens back to that how to do much besides loving their children of the Nazis in the 1930s, it was forbidden and grandchildren... simpleminded wives to speak about the Holocaust. In all histori- who were true to their husbands… beauti- cal documents, which had been prepared for ful young women… university students and dissemination, the murder of the Jews be- joyful school children… the stupid and the came the murder of “peaceful Soviet citizens.” ugly… the humpbacked… the blind… the deaf-mute… violinists and pianists…. three- 5 V. Grossman. “Ukraine Without Jews.” “Enichait.” 1943. Cited from S. Markish, “Babel and and two-year-olds… seventy-year-old men Others,” Kiev, 1996, v. 54. with cataracts in their turbid eyes, with cold 6 Based on the evaluation of the Israeli professor, M. Alshuler; after the Second World transparent fingers and quiet voices… cry- War, more than 120 synagogues were opened in the ing infants who were eagerly suckling at their USSR.

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For many who had survived the Holocaust, very least, informal relationships. The lega- these events precisely became key for the fu- cies of the vanished Yiddish culture could be ture refusal of Jewish self-identification. If it found in the small cities (formerly “schtetly”) was possible, parents would give their children of Ukraine, where both old and young spoke non-Jewish last names. After Stalin’s death Yiddish, and where Jewish holidays were came the period of the “thaw”—a small his- more or less observed openly and not highly torical span of time during which democratic threatened by the authorities (who were far ideas penetrated the totalitarian state. People, distant). In the large cities, the synagogues having overcome their fears, arose with a (even if they hadn’t been closed) functioned small part of the truth, including the tragedy under undivided attention of the KGB; as a of the Jewish people during the Second World result, the official community, as a rule, in- War, which penetrated into social conscious- cluded a small quantity of elderly people, ness. Literary and musical works—the poems since the appearance of a young person could of Evtushenko, the music of Shostakovich, the spell their end of their careers, an exclusion prose of Solzhenitsyn and Grossman—formed from the Komsomol academy, unpleasantness a public wealth of information, the dissemina- as a result of the party line, and so on. This tion of which followed Stalin’s death in 1953. policy was meant to lead to a swift assimila- A democratic dissident movement was being tion, but, in the usual fashion, the state itself conceived which several Jews took part in. obstructed the initiative. The “fifth box” in However, after a short interval of time, state the Soviet passport, which indicated national- policy began to change, and the term, “the ity, did not allow people to forget about their struggle with world Zionism,” began ap- Jewishness—it was frequently the reason why peared in the state lexicon in connection with people were not accepted into the university the schism of diplomatic relations with the or a “closed” institution. A portion of Soviet young state of Israel. Now, any Jew found ex- Jews, who didn’t want to make peace with the pressing democratic ideas could be prosecut- anti-Semitic policies of the state, attempted ed along these lines. This is what the authori- to emigrate. Only a few managed to do so. ties did with any attempt towards the public During the period between 1948 and 1985, (or even private) manifestation of Jewish life. somewhere around 290,000 people emigrated It became a crime to study Hebrew and Jewish from the Soviet Union. The majority of those traditions, not to speak of leaving for Israel. remaining made an effort to exist through loy- Jewish life disappeared underground. A spe- alty to the state, a small group among them, cific group of people known as the “Refusers,” the so-called “Refusers,” retreating to a life of who waited years for permission to depart for active dissidence. The state dealt with them Israel, came onto the scene. As a result, they using the slogan of “struggle with world Zi- were not given jobs in the USSR, but were also onism,” and, at this time, any manifestation of refused this permission to leave. Jewish life could fall under this idea and result It cannot be said that Jewish life disappeared in unpleasantries. Simply admitting to being a altogether (the Jewish people has a unique Jew was quite a brave act. ability to survive difficult times), but it did Of course, a socialist state could not openly indeed disappear from the “public space” declare such policies. During Brezhnev’s time, into the sphere of personal, familial, or, at the there was one Jewish state-sanctioned theater

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in Chernivtsi; in Kiev there was a commemora- nizations: in 1991, Vaad (the Association of Jew- tive plaque made out to the “Proletarian Jew- ish Organizations and Societies) in Ukraine; in ish Writer Sholom-Aleikhiy.” However, this is 1992, the Jewish Council of Ukraine; in 1997, where the state’s loyalty for the Jews ended. the Pan-Ukrainian Jewish Congress (PJC) and There was a strict “percentage norm” in every the Jewish Fund of Ukraine (JFU). In 1992, the university that had not been publicly declared, social organization, the “Institute of Judaism,” even though it was regularly observed. Legal began work which posed a whole chain of chaos ruled the country. At some point, they tasks in the area of preservation and research began to accept this or any form of higher of Jewish history, culture, and art in Ukraine. education available. And graduates from Kiev This could be defined as the “internal vector” went to Tver’ or Ufa in order to receive their of the development of Jewish life in Ukraine. education. However, it is unlikely that these impressive successes could have been achieved without II. 25 Years of Jewish Life in an Indepen- an “external” vector of development. At this dent Ukraine time in Ukraine, after half a century of inter- At the end of the 1980s, during Perestroika, a ruption, the American Jewish Joint Distribu- new phase of Jewish life was beginning that tion Committee (Joint) made a return, after could be defined as an “escape from the un- which both the Commission for Jewish Ma- derground.” In the USSR and, consequently, terial Searches in Germany (the Claims Con- in Ukraine, the persecution of “Zionist lead- ference) and the Jewish Federation of New ership,” the study of Hebrew, and research of York, the “United Jewish Appeal” (UJA), were the Holocaust was discontinued. As a result, enacted and the offices of a series of founda- there was a revival of Jewish life in Ukraine. tional international Jewish organizations were Already by 1988, the Kiev Association of Jew- opened to include the Jewish Agency of Israel, ish Culture and the Chernivitsy Fund for the “Sokhnut,” and the largest Jewish student Preservation of Jewish Cemeteries (previ- organization, “Gilel’.” The World Jewish Re- ously the Chernivitsi Jewish Socio-Cultural lief (WJR), the Rothschild Fund (Hanadiv) of Fund) were established. From the moment Europe, and the Jewish Humanitarian Fund that Ukraine had achieved its independence (JHF) provided a large amount of aid in the in 1991, a number of Jewish organizations in spheres of philanthropy, Jewish education, various cities and settlements experienced and culture. rapid growth. After twenty years, 288 national And, of course, it is unthinkable to talk about Jewish organizations and 290 Jewish religious the revival of Jewish life without its reli- societies had been registered, not to mention gious components. The arrival of rabbis to around 100 more Jewish philanthropic organi- Ukraine, the appearance of religious schools, zations and funds7. and the opening of synagogues were hailed A few “umbrella” organizations were founded as a miracle. During these twenty-five years in order to coordinate all of these smaller orga- in Ukraine, several pan-Ukrainian religious unions were formed. 123 registered societies 7 “Jewish Life in Ukraine: Achievements, joined the Federation of Jewish Societies of Difficulties, and Priorities from the Fall ofthe Ukraine (FJSU), 84 joined the Union of Judaist Communist Regime to 2013.” Report from the Institute of Jewish Political Research, 2014. Religious Organizations of Ukraine (UJROU),

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and 13 joined the Pan-Ukrainian Congress of synagogue buildings, which in Soviet times Judaist Religious Societies (PCJRS). There is were repurposed for completely different ac- even a particular organization for followers of tivities (from theaters and clubs to sports halls reformist Judaism: the Religious Union of the and warehouse), are today completely recon- Societies of Progressive Judaism of Ukraine structed for the purposes of religious commu- (RUSPJU), which took in upwards of 50 soci- nities. eties. Another twenty-six officially registered In order to describe the particularities of Jew- religious societies are completely independent ish life in Ukraine, it is necessary to answer of these umbrella organizations. The most fa- the question of whom it is possible to call a mous among them are Skvira, Bratslav, and Ukrainian Jew. In 2010, the fund, “Public Ex- other Hassidic movements in Ukraine. A con- amination,” carried out a complex sociological servative movement is actively represented in study of Russian Jews8, the conceptual appa- Chernovitsi and a few other cities. ratus of which can safely be extrapolated to The process of restitution, beginning af- the whole territory of the Commonwealth of ter the dissolution of the totalitarian system Independent States, to include Ukraine. The and returned several synagogues back to the authors proposed a construction based on the communities which had been transferred to concept of Jewish Peoplehood. The criteria are various organizations during Soviet times, as follows: contributed to the revitalization of religious - Liberal criterion—Jews who consider them- life around synagogues in the big cities (usu- selves to be Jews. ally in regional centers) of Ukraine. For the - Halakhic criterion—Jews who inherit their first time ever, all Jewish life in the city was identity from the maternal line and have ac- concentrated. However, this process affected cepted Judaism in the traditional ways. a large portion of building which had at one - Criterion of the law of returns—Jews who point belonged to Jewish communities due have either a parent or a grandparent who is to the fact that the buildings were highly in- Jewish. volved in the infrastructure of modern cities, - Criterion of Jean Paul Sartre—Jews whom and sometimes due to the fact that a small- other people consider to be Jewish. numbered Jewish community simple couldn’t - Formula of the verdict of the High Court balance this or any construction. of Israel concerning Daniel’s brother—Jews New synagogues were built in small cities, whom other Jews consider to be Jewish which became the new universal centers of Jewish life, such as Medzhibozh, connected Now we will attempt to sort out with both with the name of the founder of Hassidism, statistics and entire groups with whom the Vaal Shem Tova. Meanwhile, there is only one aforementioned Jewish organizations have example of a new synagogue built in a big worked. Based on what is known of the final city—the Golden Rose synagogue in Dnepro- census of the population of the USSR in 1989, petrovsk, which is included in the “Minora,” there were 486,000 Jews in Ukraine at this the first complex structure in Ukraine that time. This census was carried out through a houses not only a synagogue, but also a com- 8 A. Osovtsov, I. Yakovenko. “The Jewish munity theater, a museum of the Holocaust, People in Russia: How, Why, and Who Belongs to and a Jewish museum. In many cities, the old It.” Moscow, 2011, v. 21.)

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presentation of one’s pass- port, which is to say that, as a rule, these were peo- ple whose mother and fa- ther were Jews and, in re- ceiving their passport, had no choice but to accept this designation themselves. The census of 2001 was carried out by survey; therefore the figure of 103,591 reflects the exact quantity of people who called themselves Jews, or those who would fall into

the first group of the Jew- Brodsky Synagogue. Kiev. 2014. Photo Carmen Scheide ish Peoplehood criteria. The target group com- posed of Orthodox Jewish communities falls relevant to Israel, and there is not much sense into the second group—the Halakhic Jews. The in examining it with regard to Ukraine. third group, up to the beginning of the current Now we will examine how the “Ukrainian war (up until 2013) was evaluated at approxi- Jew” fits into “Jewish life in Ukraine. In order mately 300,000 people, who make up the ma- to do this, we will distinguish a few positions jority of non-religious Jewish organizations. which unify Jews into a single people and then The fourth group is imaginary, resulting from analyze each one: the stereotypes of a non-Jewish environment. Religious life in today’s Ukraine is one of the Here we should denote extreme points in the greatest miracles for former Soviet citizens. field in which a wide range of opinions are If it were only possible today to carry out an spread out. This consists of two stereotypes. interview of the Ukrainian Jews, for example, The first is a negative one: “all bad people in in 1978, and to ask them whether it would be Ukraine are Jews.” Over periods of time, peo- possible to open a synagogue in the Kiev Bell ple have included Jews such as Yushenko, Ya- Theater (which, by the way, it was originally nukovich, and Timoshenko into this list, who built as in 1898), no one would answer affir- are influential and notorious representatives matively. Not a single analyst, scholar, or even of the political elite. The second stereotype a romantic dreamer would have been able sounds something like this: “All of the smart, then to imagine that there would be six syna- good, and talented residents of Ukraine are gogues operating in Kiev at the beginning of Jewish.” Within the last year, the direction has the 21st century. None of the Jews—the engi- been constantly shifted to the positive stereo- neers, doctors, and students—would even be type, but the danger that the dwindling eco- able to imagine that they would even be able nomic and political situation will revert this to visit this synagogue regularly for prayer or process towards the negative direction has not Jewish holidays. A description of the scene: been ruled out. The fifth criterion is the most the Ukrainian president is lighting a meno-

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rah in one of the central squares of Kiev—it community of Ukraine. And, even though the would sound like a fantasy to the residents of material basis of Jewish reformist communi- the country. However, synagogues are operat- ties is weaker today than that of the Orthodox ing today in Ukraine, along with yeshivas, Tal- Jews, more and more local sponsors in the last mud-torahs, and Jewish religious schools for few years have come to their support, both boys and girls. Young rabbis, shoikhets, and materially and intellectually. The process of melameds have appeared—no longer from restitution has played a huge role in the re- America or Israel, but from Ukrainian cities. vival of religious life in the country. Three There are permanent rabbis in more than thir- wonderful synagogues in Kiev (the Brodsky, ty cities. All over Ukraine, they are building Schekavitsky, and Galitsky synagogues) have mikvahs—pools used for ritual bathing. immediately become centers of Jewish reli- And although only fifteen percent of the Jew- gious life and education. Moreover, in coordi- ish population takes part in religious life, the nation with synagogues in Lvov, Kirovograd, nearby presence of the religious community Ivano-Frankovsk, Vinnitsa, and hundreds of and the rabbi have effectively changed Jew- other cities in Ukraine, they have become an ish life in the country. Today, many Ukrainian object of interested for millions of internation- Jews have a notion of Jewish tradition and al tourists (to include non-Jews). from time to time visit the synagogue. Jewish philanthropy, an integral feature in Statistics are unexpectedly showing us that the leadership of Jewish communities all over Orthodox Judaist communities are more at- the world and in all periods, was completely tractive to local sponsors and older Jews who banished from the life of the Soviet Jews by regularly visit the synagogue than to the com- the 1930s. But, immediately after Perestroika, munity; it would seem more understandable it was precisely this that signaled the return of for the post-atheist society than for reformist Jewish life to the nation. By the middle of the Judaism. However, analysts have turned their 1990s, philanthropic funds and cultural orga- attention to the fact that, as a rule, sponsors are nizations were being founded. The social aid not too personally submerged in religious life, system for those in need was improved. They but looks highly convinc- created pensions for boys and girls from dis- ing for investors. For older people, the appear- advantaged families, opened soup kitchens, ance of black hats and ear-locks serves as a sort organized food rations for pensioners and the of anchor in the historical consciousness, con- disabled, and greatly aided veterans of the necting them with the traditional village Jews Second World War. of bygone centuries, with family traditions or It is important that these philanthropic orga- folkloric history. nizations, in paying such great attention to Reformist communities are more oriented to- material aid, did not forget about the cultural wards youth and the middle-aged. They are demands of the wards Chesed. Lectures, ex- introducing bold innovative methods of work cursions, and a number of creative workshops in an attempt to attract intellectuals—histori- returned a sense of the joy of life and the pos- ans, writers, artists, and those entering into sibility of creative work to the older people. religious life in the 21st century. They are also Cheseds are frequently the main centers of making an effort to attract members of non- Jewish life in a region, where there are usually Jewish families in order to widen the Jewish small, but rich museum exhibits, and where

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many educational and enlightening projects already confused by the words, “Shabbat” and are conducted. As a result, it is here that those “Pesach,” and their Jewishness was character- wishing to understand the inner-workings ized by its clash with the anti-Semitic predilec- of Ukrainian Jewish communities come, as it tions of its neighbors in the courtyard in light serves as a sort of “mirror” of Jewish life. of their unsuccessful attempts to get into insti- Both religious and non-religious Jews agree tutes or to set themselves up with a job. that Jewish tradition has an objective source— Of course, there were exceptions. In a few the Torah. However, in the case of the banning small cities (formerly “schtetly”) in Ukraine, of the Torah in the USSR after the revolution, Ukrainian families spoke Yiddish and buried Jewish tradition was compelled to disappear their dead in Jewish cemeteries; boys recited in its entirety. However, this did not come to the Kaddish (a memorial prayer) and grand- pass. There was something left that was pre- mothers taught their granddaughters how served in Jewish families. In order to under- to make gefilte fish and how to boil kosher stand this, we must turn to Hebrew, in which chicken bouillon. It was still possible in the 50s two terms are used: “masorete Israel,” from to feel the spirit of the schtetl in cities such as the verb, “masar”—“to convey,” and “mo- Balta and Shargorod. The final traces, along reshet Israel,” from the verb, “yarash”—“to with the last older Jews, were discovered inherit.” by research enthusiasts in the middle of the The Jewish inheritance consists of books, one’s 1980s. Alas, the “new time” dictated its own grandfather’s old prayer shawl and yarmul- rhythms; today, there are practically no Jews ke, a chanukkiyah or mezuzah that has been in these villages, but the “village traditions” preserved in an old closet among forgotten are preserved by the elderly Jews who are things—that which can provoke questions living in big cities today. Interviews taken by and, in the process of answering, reveal the the Institute of Judaism and films shot by re- main essence of Jewish tradition: “Tell my son searches from St. Petersburg and Israel allow about this.” “Tell about” and “convey” are two us to catch a glimpse of this all but vanished points of footing which allow the people to sur- world which, while bitter and destitute, gave vive like the people of any environment. Inter- birth to such writers as Sholom-Aleikhem, views taken of people who have experienced Menakhem Moikher Sforim, Shmuel Joseph the “zone of silencing,” which is to say those Agnon, and Simon Vizental, the founders of who lived under Soviet authority, allow us to Hassidism, musicians, artists, sculptors, and distinguish several generations. For those born inventors. in the 1930s, their parents or, at the very least, Emmanuel Levinas9, one of the greatest phi- their grandmother and grandfather, were re- losophers of the 20th century, noted that the ligious, “traditional” Jews; therefore, in spite existence of Jews who want to remain Jews, of the absolute secularity of the period, these even beyond any connection with the state of people remembered something about Jewish holidays, saw their grandfathers praying, and 9 Emmanuel Levinas--December 30th, 1905 (January 12th, 1906); Kovno, 25th of December, sometimes even went to synagogue on Yom- 1995, Paris—was a French philosopher. He was born Kippur and ate matzo. But this no longer kept in Lithuania, studied in an academy in Kharkov, them from eating salo and decorating eggs on and then in Lithuania (Kovno) and Germany (at Freiburg University under the direction of Edmund Easter. The generations born in the 1950s were Husserl and at Martin Heidegger’s seminars).

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Israel, wholly depends on Jewish education: for the Study of the History of the Holocaust, only this can justify and support such an ex- the Center of Jewish Education, and several istence10. Over the last quarter century, a new other organizations are conducting seminars system of Jewish education has been being that shed light on the various aspects of Jew- built absolutely from scratch. Furthermore, ish history and culture. while there is still no singular system, practi- In the early years of the resurgence of Jew- cally every type of Jewish educational institu- ish life in the former Soviet Union, this sort of tion exists and is well known in other nations leadership was extremely relevant, as every- of the diaspora: around forty Jewish schools, thing within the frame of formal and informal more than a dozen kindergarten schools, sixty Jewish education was an absolute novelty for Sunday schools, eight yeshivas, and seventy the majority of students. However, after twen- ulpans for the study of Hebrew, which are ty years, Ukraine came up against the prob- frequented by upwards of 10,000 children and lems that Emmanuel Levinas mentioned back adults in total. in the 50s in relation to Jewish education in Formal education, represented by schools and France. This problem remains today in Germa- lyceums, offers an advanced course of Jewish ny and other European countries: traditions, subjects to students along with the state curric- joint holidays, and classes on Jewish history ulum. Once children graduate these schools, are great, but are apparently insufficient for they receive diplomas of the state standard the preservation of Jewish education, which, and are completely prepared to pass entry in the opinion of Levinas, is inseparable from examinations at higher learning institutions. the research of Judaism and Jewish science. Some of the parents whose children attend At the same time, a small number of youths, Jewish school believe that the quality of edu- even amongst the students of Jewish schools, cation there is higher than in the state schools somehow connect their future with Judaism. based on certain factors such as the combina- There is a catastrophically low number of tion of the state curriculum and Jewish sub- intellectuals capable of sparking ideas of the jects, the quality of education, the instruction necessity of Jewish education in a sufficient of foreign languages (including Hebrew), and amount of parents and children. Centers of a rich extra-curricular program. Jewish education are working on preparing However, a very low percentage of Jew- specialists for the development of Judaist ish children in Ukraine are attending Jewish science. Programs such as “Sambation” for schools. The majority of them attend regular students and international schools such as Ukrainian learning institutions. And, in order “Sefer” have already contributed several in- to attract their attention to Jewish history and teresting researchers and enthusiasts to the traditions and to engage them in Jewish life, a country who have formed a circle of interested strong system of informal education has been youths around them. We hope that the con- developed. Jewish aid organizations are oper- cept of “academic Judaism” will soon cease to ating summer camps for children and families. be exotic in Ukraine, and will take its lawful The Institute of Judaism, the Ukrainian Center place in international academia. Numerous Jewish organizations are con- 10 Emmanuel Lévinas. Reflexions sur l‘education juive : Les Cahiers de l‘Alliance israelite cerned with informal education in a vastly universelle n. 58 (1951) wide spectrum: family camps, excursions,

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“schools on wheels11,” educational seminars, and independent enthusiasts—teachers, en- among which Limud12 occupies a special gineers, journalists, and retired servicemen13. place, and much else. This system envelops a Work is carried out in the search for places of wide circle of Ukrainian Jewry, into which the mass annihilation; the first articles begin to ap- concept of “Jewish education” only reentered pear in newspapers along with small exhibi- the system of identification in the 1990s. The tions in Jewish communities and monuments gladly devote their free time to participation commemorating the names of those who per- in Jewish educational projects and are grateful ished. This is managed mainly thanks to the attendants of lectures, excursions, studios, and efforts of individual enthusiasts, sometimes patrons of theater and music collectives. supported by international funds or separate Three vectors of development can be distin- foreign sponsors. guished within the wide field of “Jewish ed- The breakthrough of a wide awakening of ucation”—religious, culturological, and the interests in this them became the project of research and teaching of the history of the Ho- the “Survivors of the Ha-Shoah,” which is re- locaust. Religious education is carried out by membered in the mass consciousness as the rabbis and concentrated around the resurrect- project of Steven Spielberg. Interviewers were ed synagogues of distinct orders; culturologi- being prepared in Ukraine beginning in 1996. cal demands are satisfied by young Jewish or- More than 3.5 thousand interviews, taken in ganizations whose goal is to return a part of Ukraine, forced people to reflect (possibly for the people’s history and culture back to them. the first time in their lives) on the highly in- complete picture of the events of the Second III. Teaching the History of the Holo- World War which had been stamped into their caust memories. In small towns, the very fact that The history of the Holocaust immediately took an interviewer and a film crew had arrived a unique place in the system of Jewish educa- contributed to the arousal of interest this long- tion, quickly exiting its framework. The history open subject. The term, “Holocaust,” was of the Holocaust is a part of Ukrainian history gradually becoming understandable to resi- and pedagogy, a method of understanding the dents of the country. essence of totalitarianism, and an instrument Towards the end of the 1990s, scientific re- for the understanding of good and evil in soci- search on the history of the Catastrophe in ety and humankind. Ukraine was beginning. A number of efforts The first research conducted on the Holocaust cropped up in relation to the regional particu- in Ukraine began in the 1980s. The theme of larities of the Holocaust in the occupied terri- “Ha-Shoah” became a subject of interest for tory of Ukraine; for the first time, the question Ukrainian Jews—both scholarly historians of righteousness in Ukraine was raised; the fates of individual victims were documented, 11 “Schools on Wheels” were expeditionary trips combining excursive, research, and creative 13 F. Levitas defended the first doctor’s work. They were regularly held in Ukraine for dissertation on the history of the Holocaust… There Jewish youth groups. are works by historians and researchers in various 12 Limmud is a Jewish education conference regions of Ukraine—Y. Honigsmann (Lvov), Z. that has become a tradition in Ukraine, including Kovba, S. Yelisavetsky, Y. Smilianskaya (Kiev), M. lectures, training sessions, workshops, and other Tyagly (Simferopol), L. Solovka (Ivano-Frankovsk), educational activities.) and others.

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the names of the perished were registered, and caust14,” was carried out by the Institute of martyrologies were released. An information- Judaism in collaboration with the Ministry al basis was formed and, gradually, a team of of Health, Welfare, and Sports (Netherlands). historians and pedagogues formed who were A group of pedagogues and students from capable of teaching the subject of the Catastro- Ukraine, the Netherlands, and Belgium con- phe in higher academies on a methodical level. ducted two 6-day seminars in Ukraine and, In 1998, based on an initiative launched by the later, in the Netherlands. Participants of the Institute of Judaism, an organization of the project made a list of fundamental goals relat- first seminars for Ukrainian school teachers, ing to the comprehension, study, and teaching students, and professors of higher learning in- of the Holocaust in the 21st century, on the stitutions and universities began to take shape. basis of a single European pedagogical space. The main difficulty was due to the fact that the The mutual labors of pedagogues from three pedagogues had never studied the history of countries allowed a widening of the spectrum the Holocaust, neither in school, nor in univer- of questions raised about the study of the sity, and had not frequently heard anything Catastrophe, an improvement of the partici- about it. Literature on the subject was pitifully pants’ factual knowledge, and the identifica- little and motivation practically non-existent. tion of vectors of collaborative development, In preliminary interviews, the question of why which could result not only in new methods it was necessary to study the history of the of teaching, but also a path to the formation of Jews was frequently implied and occasionally a tolerant society. voiced. In connection with this, the main task In speaking of the Holocaust, it is impossi- was to include the subject of the Holocaust in ble not to ask the question: “who were these the historical memory of the Ukrainian peda- hundreds of thousands of people killed in gogical elite and to maximize as much as pos- Ukraine?” And this is a very important tran- sible the dissemination of information with re- sition to the next them relating to the Jewish gard to it. Afterwards came a transition to the . Only ten years ago, teach- formulation and solution of key pedagogical ers from smaller cities, as a rule, knew noth- tasks, which allowed the possibility of decid- ing about the Jewish history of their villages, ing how to approach the theme of the Holo- of which the Jews made up anywhere from caust. These tasks were being decided by the thirty to seventy percent. After the seminars, Institute of Judaism, along with the Ukrainian expeditions, and “schools on wheels, conduct- Center of the Study of Holocaust History and ed by Kiev’s Institute of Judaism, these teach- several other Ukrainian and international or- ers returned to their cities and saw the history ganizations. As a result of all of this effort, a of their land with different eyes. Information group of specialized pedagogues came to exist was beginning to be disseminated in waves, who were capable of teaching Holocaust his- sometimes even without our help. Surprising tory in a world context and successfully work- events were taking place. School children and ing on international projects. their teachers were finding witnesses and peo- One such project, known as the “Formation of Pan-European Pedagogical Space in the 14 Marco Otten (Arnkhem), Julia Process of Teaching the History of the Holo- Smilianskaya (Kiev). The Formation of a Single European Pedagogical Space in Teaching the History of the Holocaust.

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ple who had saved Jews during the Holocaust, new Ukrainian historiography, pedagogy of taking interviews, recording unique histories, trust, or an updated civil sense of responsibil- and shooting films. The most important thing ity are impossible. was that they were building up the history of The process of understanding the essence of their own towns. the Holocaust contributes to the creation of Why is this important for Ukraine today? The civil society which is aware of the dangers point is that more than 2000 Jewish graves of totalitarianism, both for the individual were preserved in places where Jews had long and society as a whole. It helps to restore an ceased to live. Whether these graveyards will understanding of the value of human life, to disappear from the face of the earth or be pre- form humanitarian principles in society, and served for future generations depends on the to reduce its level of aggression. The mecha- non-Jewish populations of these cities. Such a nism of the formation of totalitarian thinking, situation arises with synagogues, the unique which we have disclosed to the participants of Jewish structure of the schtetl, and Jewish our projects as a historical study, has become quarters in the cities. Therefore, it is necessary a bloody reality in Ukraine. And, hopefully, to convince not the government (this would be courses on the Holocaust will help someone useless at the moment), but Ukrainian civil so- find the strength to fight for his country, sur- ciety that the Jewish legacy of their cities is the vive in the current war in Ukraine, and pre- very richness, history, and memory of them. serve humanity, without which a peaceful life It will be to the non-Jewish portion of soci- is unthinkable. ety that people come from all over the world to see a synagogue from the 16th century or IV. Maidan and the Jews the unique threads on the matzevahs (Jewish From the first days of resistance against the tombstones. Therefore, in order to look after authorities and “Berkut” at Maidan, Jews have the Jewish legacy of their cities, it will not only stood alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Geor- require Jews (who do not live in these cities), gians, and Tatars. They are engineers and doc- but the non-Jews themselves, because they are tors, culturologists and philologists, students, the ones who are living there. In some places, and pensioners. In January 2014, historian and people already understand this but, in many, politologist Vyacheslav Likhaichev wrote of not many people do. But our current school his Jewish friends who had found themselves children have already begun to grow into spe- at the barricades: cialists of Judaism who fulfill the demand for “It seems to me that there is a special reason a group of “intellectuals.” for Jews to go to Maidan. A representative The theme of the Holocaust, while remaining of one of the American Jewish philanthropic an integral part of Jewish education and self- funds once explained to me why his organi- identification, has ceased to be a subject of in- zation not only gives money to community terest exclusive to the Jewish community and activities: any project working towards the is gradually entering the historical memory of restoration of justice and aid for the people the Ukrainian people as an essential compo- is a Jewish project. The fund was prepared nent of the history of Ukraine. The conversa- to finance programs providing equal access tion of the Catastrophe assists in the formation to wheelchair users to state services, because of new cultures of memory, without which a justice and mercy are Jewish values. Although

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this sounds like pretentious word juggling, it the war will end. This chance, paid for with is actually an approach based on the American blood, will be realized and Ukraine will be- Jewish concept of correcting the world, “Tik- come a normal, civilized state. And then the kun Olam.” There is a shade of eschatological Jewish community of Ukraine will flourish messianism in this type of charity. I would like and Jewish life will continue. undesirable to to think that, among those employed by these make an alternative prognosis… bandit authorities that are attacking protes- tors, there are no Jews. Because, to sell your Translated by Charlie Smith soul for 200 grivny, to beat and intimidate civil activists is not a Jewish value, as the represen- tative of the fund would say. But, among those About the Author rising to meet the day at Maidan, stiffened by Yuliana Smilianskaya, Director of the Institute the cold and a lack of sleep, the Jews can abso- for Jewish Studies in Kiev. lutely be found15. e-mail: kievkon [at] gmail.com Among the killed at Maidan, now known as the “Heavenly 100,” is Joseph Schilling from Drogobych (Lvov region). He had been 61 years old. Two daughters and four grand- daughters survived him. A sniper killed him with a precise shot to the head near the October Palace. Alexander Sherbanyuk was from Cher- novitsi, the cradle of Ukraine’s world-famous poets, writers, and musicians. He was a con- struction worker. They buried him in embroi- dery and laid a gas mask, helmet, and skullcap in his coffin. He was a member of a commu- nity known as “Beit Simcha.” Three children survived him. His son was going to a Jew- ish school. The Eugene Kotlyar was thirty-three years old. He was known among liberal activists and ecologists, who struggled against the annihilation of parks being carried out by the city’s bandit authorities. He worked in the field of industrial alpinism16. Today is a terrifying period of Ukrainian his- tory. But the residents of the country hope that

15 “The Jewish Battalion of the Heavenly Hundred.” 09.03.2014. http://eajc.org/page279/ news43756.htm 16 Vyacheslav Likhachev. “Jews at Maidan: Why and What For?” 01.23.2014. http://booknik.ru/today/all/evrei-na-mayidane- pochemu-i-dlya-chego/

Euxeinos 17/2015 34 Islam and Muslims in Ukraine After the “Revolution of Dignity”: Current Challenges and Perspectives

by Oleg Yarosh, Free University of Berlin

Introduction of Islamic Organizations in Europe1, are tra- ince 1991 Ukraine has been experiencing a ditionally more active in the social and politi- Ssteady growth of Islamic religious activity. cal spheres, especially with regard to Middle The present day “Islamic revival” in Ukraine Eastern politics, the “Arab Spring” and the shares many similarities with developments in “Palestinian issue”. its neighboring countries in Central and South We should consider the Spiritual Admin- Europe especially those with indigenous Mus- istration of the Muslims of Crimea to be the lim populations. In fact Islam in Ukraine is most politicized among Islamic institutions in developing in a “minority situation”, as Mus- Ukraine due to its active role in the process of lim ethnic groups constitute only a very small the Crimean Tatar national revival. This has part of the overall population of the country been permanently contested by the pro-Rus- and despite the presence of a huge indigenous sian organizations and recently by the new se- Muslim ethnic group in Ukraine (Crimean Ta- cessionist authorities in Crimea. tars), we should perceive this process in terms The political crisis in Ukraine caused wide- of “creating from scratch” rather than recon- spread protests in November 2013 –Febru- struction. ary 2014 known as the “Euro-Revolution” or Islam in Ukraine is not developing in a mono- the “Revolution of Dignity”, which first took lithic form. Instead we should regard it as a place in Kyiv and then in some other regions conglomeration of the recently emerged het- before President Victor Yanukovych was ulti- erogeneous Islamic localities based on ethnic mately removed from power. Various Islamic groups and network structures. Meanwhile, institutions responded to these events in their the international networks of Islamic institu- own ways and in turn were differently im- tions are having a huge impact on the emer- pacted by them. gence of transnational Muslim communities in Ukraine. Islam in mainland Ukraine Islamic institutions in Ukraine traditionally The most important Islamic institutions in demonstrate different levels of political en- mainland Ukraine consolidating a vast part gagement: from apparently neutral to active of the Muslim communities are the Spiritual involvement. Some of them, like the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine in (DUMU) in Kiev, the Spiritual Center of Mus- Kyiv (DUMU) headed by Ahmad Ta- lims of Ukraine (DCMU) in Donetsk, the Spiri- mim, actually stay out of political activities tual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine while maintaining strong relations with the “Umma” (DUMU “Umma”) in Kiev. Muftiat of Chechnya. At the same time its sub- In August 1992 the Spiritual Administration sidiary structure in Crimea “Tavrian Muftiat” of European and Siberian Part of the Russian actively supports pro-Russian secessionist Federation (DUMES) approved the establish- forces there. ment of the Main Mukhtasibat Administra- Meanwhile the All-Ukrainian Associations of tion of Ukraine and appointed Lebanon-born Social Organizations “al-Raid” and the Spiri- Ahmad Tamim to the post of -muhtasip tual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine “Unmma”, which are linked to the Federation 1 FIOE is an umbrella organization for the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe.

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of the Muslims of Ukraine2. The process was himself “aide to Shaikh Tamin” several times completed with the establishment of the Spiri- addressed people on Maidan from the stage, tual Administration of the Muslims of Ukraine but DUMU officially denied his affiliation (DUMU) independently of DUMES in April with them5. 1993 headed by Sheikh Ahmad Tamim. In an interview on the 25th of February 2014 DUMU adheres mostly to the Shafi’i madhab Shaikh Tamin reiterated the neutrality of the and brings together Muslims of different na- DUMU: “We have stated our position - we are tionalities, including a significant part of the out of politics and against the fact that some- Dagestan and Chechen diasporas. Moreover, one has used Islam for political purposes”6. DUMU is closely connected ideologically and In November 2014 during a meeting with the organizationally with the transnational Islam- speaker of the Parliament Alexander Turchi- ic network structure al-Ahbash3. DUMU also nov, Sheikh Tamim stated that the Muslims of has strong ties with the Chechen muftiyat due Ukraine by all means try to show that they are to the common Shafi’i school and strong pres- full citizens of this country, which has become ence of the Chechen diaspora in the DUMU their second homeland7. community in Kyiv. Sheikh Ahmed Tamim By contrast, the Spiritual Administration of has visited Chechnya several times and the Muslims of Ukraine “Umma” (DUMU Chechen mufti Sultan Hadzhi Mirzaev has “Umma”) has always played a more active been to Kyiv as well. In 2012 both institutions role in these processes. Founded in 2008, signed a cooperation agreement4. DUMU “Umma” has strong ties with the All- During the “Revolution of Dignity” DUMU Ukrainian Associations of Social Organiza- stayed away from the protests and remained tions “al-Raid” who represents the European neutral in their discourses and actions. The branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of Friday sermons (hutba) in the ar-Rahma its communities are located in the Donetsk mosque in Kiev traditionally addressed issues and Luhansk regions and in Crimea. The muf- of religious morality and upbringing without ti of “Umma” Said Ismagilov himself was a reference to the political situation. During the part of the protest movement participating in protests Alexander Krivonosov who called “Maidan” in Kiev and Donetsk. At the same time he expressed his disapproval of the vio- 2 See: Oleg Yarosh, Denis Brylov, Muslim lent forms of protest8. communities and Islamic network institutions in Said Ismagilov has admitted that since Do- Ukraine: contesting authorities in shaping of Islamic localities// Muslims in Poland and Eastern Europe: netsk was captured by pro-Russian separat- widening the European Discourse on Islam , ed. by ists, some of local Muslims and religious Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska), Warsaw, 2011. – p. 259. leaders left the city. Meanwhile, he noted that there was not significant pressure on the local 3 In 1930 Shaykh Abd al-Rahman al-Ajuz founded Jam‘iyat alMashari‘ al-Khayriyya al- 5 http://umma.ua/ru/news/world/ Islamiyya Kto_vistupaet_na_stsene_Evromaydana_ot_ (the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, musulman_Ukraini/24231. AICP). This institution is known as a strong 6 http://focus.ua/society/297299/. opponent of the fundamentalists and Islamists, 7 http://umma.ua/ru/news/ukraine/ such as Salafis and Muslim Brotherhood. It is often Turchinov_posetil_DUMU_s_ofitsialnim_ named after its spiritual leader Sheikh Abd Allah vizitom/28133. al-Harari known as “Habashi” (Ethiopian). 8 http://risu.org.ua/ru/index/all_news/state/ 4 http://nbnews.com.ua/news/36275/. national_religious_question/55029/.

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Muslim communities from so called “Donetsk of Crimea, the Plenum of the Spiritual Admin- Peoples Republic” (DNR)9, although some at- istration of the Muslims of Crimea, the Coun- tempts were made to create an independent cil of ‘Ulama and Mufti11. The Mufti is elected muftiyat of DNR: “Some persons accompanied by the Kurultay. An officially declared goal of by the armed men visited mosques in the oc- the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of cupied territories and offered to join a Muslim Crimea is “to unite the Crimean Tatar people religious administration in these territories”10. in the study of religion of Islam”12. The Spiritual Center of Muslims of Ukraine DUMK until now has had a strong ties with (DCMU, established in 1994) was also badly the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the su- affected by the military confrontation in the preme national representative body. In 1995 Eastern Ukraine, because major part of its the institution of the special representative of communities are located in the Donetsk and the Mejlis in the Muftiat was established to Luhansk regions and some Muslim families influence religious politics via consultations were forced to leave their houses amid ongo- with the administration of the Mejlis. The cur- ing clashes. rent mufti Emirali Ablaev and his deputies have received religious education in Turkey. Islam in Crimea Until present the local Islamic institutions, first The process of religious revival and the re- of all DUMK, have been receiving significant institutionalization of Islam in Crimea started aid from the international Islamic organizations in the early 1990s. The first Muslim commu- and foundations, in the first place from “Al- nities in Crimea were officially registered in Raid” (FIOE) and the Turkish Presidency of 1988. In 1990-1991 the Kadiyat of the Muslims Religious Affairs (Diyanet) who supported of Crimea (KMC) was established under the projects on religious education, the building jurisdiction of the Spiritual Administration of of the new mosques and reconstruction of the European and Siberian part of the Russian the old cult-related buildings. Aziz Mahmud Federation (DUMES, Ufa) and in 1992 reorga- Hüdayi Vakfı from the famous Turkish nized into an independent Spiritual Adminis- Naqshbandi Shaykh Osman Nuri Topbaş and tration of the Muslims of Crimea (DUMK). foundations from Saudi Arabia (Zam-Zam, DUMK is the largest Islamic institution in SAAR Foundation) were also actively present Ukraine and comprises 80% of the total num- here, but Saudi foundations were forced to ber of Muslim communities in Ukraine. The leave by the Ukrainian authorities in 2003. overwhelming majority of religious organi- The Islamic activities in Crimea also took zations of the Spiritual Administration of the place outside the mainstream Islamic institu- Muslims of Crimea is located in the territory tions in so called “independent communities” of Crimea and brings together Crimean Ta- or inside communities formally affiliated with tars, which indicates its regional character and DUMK, like those in some Black Sea coastline mono-ethnic structure. The main bodies of towns. Some of these communities consoli- DUMK are the Kurultay (convention) of the date local Salafis and Hizb ut-Tahrir followers. delegates of clergy and Muslim communities Therefore, the DUMU claims to represent

9 http://www.svoboda.org/content/ 11 See: Oleg Yarosh, Denis Brylov, Op. cit. – article/25461709.html. p. 252 – 265. 10 http://umma.in.ua/?p=2085. 12 Ibid. – р. 258.

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all Muslims and constantly unknown people”. At the same time, the head pledges to abandon disagreements and differ- of the Mejlis did not recognize the forcibly ap- ences in the name of the national unity. pointed new Crimean government. After that Nowadays though, the authority of the Spiri- and before the so called “Crimean status refer- tual Administration of the Muslims of Crimea endum” the Mejlis held several rallies against over the Crimean Muslim community was ac- it and called for its boycott. tively disputed by other Islamic institutions, After the annexation of Crimea, Crimean Ta- namely the Spiritual Center of the Muslims of tar religious and political organizations who Crimea (DCMK)13. opposed Mejlis and DUMK such as the Milli DUMK and Mejlis successfully opposed the Firka and the DCMK gained the upper hand.. official registration of another Muftiyat in Milli Firka sometimes is critical about local Crimea for several years, but the Spiritual Crimean authorities and seeks support from Center of the Muslims of Crimea was ultimate- the Federal authorities. Meanwhile, the cur- ly officially registered in 2010. The Center has rent vice-speaker of the Crimean Parliament, strong ties with the Spiritual Administration former vice-chair of Mejlis Remzi Ilyasov, of the Muslims of Ukraine in Kyiv (DUMU), founded a new Crimean Tatar social move- headed by Sheikh Ahmed Tamin who itself ment called “Crimea” which is loyal to the connected ideologically and organizationally local authorities and aims to weaken the po- with the Islamic network organization al-Ah- litical influence of Mejlis14. On August 22 the bash. DCMK held a convention of the communities During the “Revolution of Dignity” leaders and proclaimed the creation of the Tavrian and activists of the Mejlis supported protest- muftiat. This initiative was criticized by the ers in Kiev. On February 26, day before the DUMK while Crimean Prime Minister Sergey armed seizure of buildings the Council of Aksyonov expressed support for the creation Ministers and the Supreme Council of the of the parallel muftiat15. Crimean Autonomy (ARC) took place, the The Tavrian Muftiat claimed to have sup- Mejlis held a massive rally in support of na- port from the influential Russian Muslim tional unity and the “Revolution of Dignity” leader Talgat Tajuddin, the mufti of the Cen- in front of the Parliament. The next day, when tral Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the governmental buildings were captured by Russia (CDUM, former DUMES), one of the the Russian paratroopers, the Mejlis leader Re- major Muslim associations in Russia which fat Chubarov called on Crimean Tatars to stay has friendly relations with Sheikh Ahmed Ta- at home, and the Mufti of Muslims of Crimea mim16. However, when the DUMK officially asked them “not to yield to provocations by addressed him about his position in that case, he officially denied that he supports creation 13 The Spiritual Center of the Muslims of Crimea was established in 2010. The Center linked 14 Remzi Ilyasov admits that Mejlis is still with the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of supported by 70%-80% of Crimean Tatars. See: Ukraine, which itself, according to Denis Brylov, is http://www.vz.ru/politics/2014/10/22/711566.print. linked ideologically and organizationally with the html. Islamic network institution Al-Ahbash. See: Oleg 15 http://qha.com.ua/aksenov-tavricheskii- Yarosh, Denis Brylov Muslim communities and muftiyat-ne-vneset-raskol-sredi-musulman- Islamic network institutions in Ukraine: contesting krima-139655.html. authorities in shaping of Islamic localities. – p. 260 – 16 http://www.ng.ru/facts/2014-09-03/1_ 262. muftiat.html.

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of the Tavrian Muftiat. In September security forces, FSB and police At the same time, another influential Russian raided several mosques and Islamic schools in Muslim leader Rawil Ğaynetdin, mufti of the search for “extremist materials”, while tem- Spiritual Administration of the European Part porarily detaining and questioning religious of Russia (DUMER) and head of the collec- teachers and . A particularly intrusive tive Islamic representative body the Council search took place at a religious school in the of Mufties of Russia, criticized the creation of village of Kolchugino in the Simferopol re- the Tavrian Muftiat and the position of Talgat gion, Simferopol and Yalta19. Tajuddin and expressed his support to the In September 2014 mufti Emirali Ablaev DUMK. On September 19th he visited Crimea met with prime-minister Sergey Aksyonov. and held a meeting with leaders of the DUMK Aksyonov acknowledged that law enforce- and local authorities. After the meeting Rawil ment sometimes “went overboard” and de- Ğaynetdin had a briefing with Emirali Ablaev clared that Crimea residents will be given where he reinstated his support for the DUMK three additional months to dispose of all liter- and claimed the creation of a joint commission ature prohibited by Russian law. The DUMK of representatives of DUMK and local officials also made an appeal to Muslims to dispose the for conflict resolution17. prohibited literature in due course. It should The active involvement and positioning of the also be mentioned that about 7000 Crimean two most prominent Muslim Russian leaders Tatars including supposed followers of Hizb in the conflict between Islamic organizations ut-Tahrir have fled Crimea to Ukraine since in Crimea reflects their longstanding rivalry March 2014. for supremacy over the Tatar Muslim commu- nity in Russia. Since the Russian Federation extended its The other dangerous challenge for the Crime- authority over Crimea, aid from the foreign an Tatars comes from the pro-Russian nation- Islamic institutions could become more prob- alist organizations, so called Kazaks, and their lematic because Russian authorities banned armed self-defense units, who recently had activities of the international Islamic donor received an official status. In its recent report organizations in 2000, especially those linked “Rights in Retreat. Abuses in Crimea”, the to Saudi Arabia, but not exclusively Saudi HRW accused security forces and self-defense Arabia. They were accusing them of support- units of unlawful detention, abduction, ill- ing religious extremism in the Russian Federa- treatment including the torture and execution tion. Until now though, some Turkish chari- of Crimean Tatars and pro-Ukraine activists18. table foundations such as the “Foundation There were at least 15 cases in which Crimean for development of Crimea” founded by the Tatars or pro-Ukraine activists disappeared, former Turkish President Suleuman Dimerel,

were abducted, or went missing in Crimea since 19 The Federal List of Extremist Materials March 2014. Six were subsequently released was introduced by Federal Law “On Combating and two missing persons were found dead. Extremist Activities” in July 2002. The list, which was first published in 2007 and has been updated regularly and currently includes about 2,500 17 http://www.ansar.ru/ publications, audio and video materials, and rfsng/2014/09/15/53261. images. Around 25% of those items are widely used 18 See: www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ by the Islamic community and include no extremist reports/crimea1114web.pdf . content. Thus they were inappropriately banned.

Euxeinos 17/2015 39 Oleg Yarosh

still operate there20. At the same time, finan- sia. On the other side, federal authorities don’t cial support from the official Russian Islamic have a clear vision how to deal with Crimean charitable institution “Foundation for support Tatars and their political and religious insti- of the Islamic culture, science and education” tutions. Thus they shift all responsibility to may be problematic for the organizations op- Aksyonov and his associates who are under posed to the current authorities in Crimea. the patronage of the “party of war” in the Recently Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Ca- Kremlin. Therefore, if the DUMK becomes vusoglu accused Russia of not meeting its obli- more loyal to the local authorities, they will gations towards Crimean Tatars regarding the use this as an opportunity to weaken and even official status of the destroy them. and other cultural rights and quota for Crime- Thus, the current situation in Crimea is char- an Tatars in the local government21. acterized, on the one hand, by the diminished Since the annexation of Crimea local Islamic political influence of Mejlis, a reduction of institutions have been subjected to the same activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim political context and legal regulations and Brotherhood. On the other hand, the DUMK share common problems with their counter- has managed to minimize the splitting of the parts in the Russian Federation and contacts Muslim Umma in Crimea so far and could be between them will undoubtedly intensify. I able to strengthen its grip on communities addressed this issue to my Russian colleagues previously controlled by Hizb ut-Tahrir. The who are experts on Islam in North Caucasus future of Islamic institutions in Crimea de- (Dr. Akhmet Yarlykapov) and Tatarstan (asked pends on how successful the DUMK will be in not to be named). Dr. Yarlykapov claimed that its attempts to mediate between the interests the DUMK’s loyalty to the federal authorities of the Crimean Tatar community, Mejlis and cannot guarantee its support in conflict with politics of the local and federal authorities. the local administration, because in the re- gions of the Russian Federation such as Stav- Conclusion ropol where Muslims are in minority, local au- The “Revolution of Dignity” affected Islamic thorities in problematic situations always acts institutions in Ukraine to various extents. in the interests of the Russian majority and the While taking different stances with regard to federal institutions never intervene in these the protests, all of them supported the Ukrai- conflicts. nian people’s move to democracy, national The other colleague expressed an assumption unity and territorial integrity. that closer relations between Crimea and Ta- Meanwhile, Muslim communities in Crimea tarstan in perspective will allow Tatar busi- are most significantly affected by the events nessmen to invest in cultural and religious which followed the “Revolution of Dignity”, project in Crimea, but this is not on the table namely the annexation of Crimea by the Rus- right now due to the economic crisis in Rus- sian Federation and the extension of its repres- sive legislation regarding religious noncon- 20 http://qha.com.ua/turetskii-fond- razvitiya-krima-organizoval-kurbanbairam-v- formity to local Muslim institutions. simferopole-140372.html. Therefore we cannot exclude the growth of 21 http://qha.com.ua/mid-turtsii-rossiya- ne-vipolnila-obeschanie-dannoe-krimskim- religious and inter-ethnic tensions in Crimea. tataram-142418.html. In this case, the position of the DUMK as the

Euxeinos 17/2015 40 Oleg Yarosh

most influential Islamic institution in Crimea About the author will be crucial. In order to achieve its goals Oleg Yarosh, PhD, Institute of Philosophy of which consist in maintaining the national NANU, Visiting scholar at the Berlin Gradu- unity of the Crimean Tatar community and ate School Muslim Cultures and Societies strengthening of their influence inside local (BGSMCS), Free University of Berlin. Muslim community, the DUMK will mediate The present paper is based on a presentation between the interests of the Crimean Tatars , at the BGSMCS in November 2014. Mejlis and politics of the local and federal au- e-mail: o.yarosh [at] gmail.com thorities while trying to secure support from the influential Islamic institutions in Russia.

Euxeinos 17/2015 41 Ukrainian Protestants After Maidan

by Mykhailo Cherenkov, Ukrainian Catholic University,

Abstract Protestant are a small minority in Ukraine, but there are a variety of religious groups (, Pentecostals, Lutherans). In his contribution, the author examines the social status and po- sitioning of Ukrainian Protestants before and after Maidan. It was not until Maidan that Protestants became aware of their social responsibility; however, the events of Maidan simultaneously lead to a separation in the church.

aidan has become not only a social, but Soviet.” Protestants unexpectedly discovered Man ecclesiastical symbol. The church and a practical ecumenism—Christian solidarity Maidan have permeated one another--neither under extreme conditions, namely in a conflict society nor the church have remained as they zone, as opposed to finding unity in a theo- were. I will try to demonstrate these changes logical cabinet or the church. Protestants were by examining the experience of Protestants in not consciously seeking this solidarity, but Ukraine, prior to and after Maidan. found it manifested in their solidarity with Before Maidan, Protestants in Ukraine were the Ukrainian people, as if it were a gift. They precisely what their name implies: alienated felt themselves to be the ‘light and salt’ of so- from society, national traditions, and politi- ciety, a responsible part of the population. cal responsibilities. Before Maidan, Protes- Protestants reestablished the integrity of their tants were considered “post-Soviet,” which particular worldview and missionary respon- is to say that they were no longer Soviet, but sibility: a holistic understanding of salvation also not yet Ukrainian. Protestants were de- as both individual and collective, spiritual and nominationally isolated, kept to themselves, social. They had found themselves politically too concerned about their own exclusivism, engaged, even though their involvement came and scarcely interested in other traditions. The about without an invitation, volens nolens. Protestants were sectarian in their relations Again, it is necessary to underline that not all with society; they lived in an oppositional of the aforementioned changes began liter- subculture, in their own “small world.” They ally, but trends of change became apparent: considered themselves as being “spiritual,” different atmospheres, themes of discussion, ignoring “human” or “earthly” questions and and methods of self-understanding began to focusing on the salvation of the soul. They develop. The Protestant churches of Ukraine were staunchly apolitical, or, as they said of were faced with tough lessons that call for a themselves, “neutral.” socio-theological analysis. These are founding In the wake of Maidan, Protestants became points of reference, which Protestant leaders “Ukrainian Protestants,” having begun to propose to hold onto, in order not to lose their speak about the Ukrainian people as their collective experience, to understand Maidan own, historical churches as “brotherly” insti- as “a particular period in our history, during tutions, social injustice as a plea for Christian which God is galvanizing, cleaning, and pre- solidarity, and politics as a common affair. The paring the Church in Ukraine for a more re- Protestant relationship with the Soviet past is sponsible service in to the world.” better defined as “anti-,” as opposed to “post- First off, the theological points: The gulf be-

Euxeinos 17/2015 42 Mykhailo Cherenkov

tween dogmas and life exists to this day. The resentatives of all Christian denominations, answer Protestants give when faced with the with the exception of the Moscow Patriarchate. question, “what would Jesus do in this situa- The experience of “ecumenism in troubling tion,” is always dogmatic. However, theology times” has become an irrevocable precedent. (concerning incarnation in particular) should It will be difficult to separate those who have serve as a point of orientation for socio-po- found unity in the mortal danger encountered litical participation, as opposed to dismis- while defending the Ukrainian people. It will sive contemplation. We must rely not only on also be difficult to speak about unity with Christology, but also sociology, politicology, those who preferred “peace and security” and and culturology, for a singular model of the fearfully assured, that “we took no part in the interaction between the mortal and the divine. protests on Maidan.” As Protestant Maidan- As a result, it is becoming extremely impor- activist Anatolij Denisenko testifies, “The tant for theologians to show Christological spirituality born on Maidan is unique in its implications for social practice. Unfortunately, ecumenical character. It doesn’t belong to any for the majority of Protestants, incarnation single denomination. I heard a devout man (in reality, socio-political life) will remain an saying that, from this point forward, his de- abstract theological idea. For them, Christ is nomination is not the religious group whose always God and by no means human, while church he visits, but those who stood side-by- earth is a godless and graceless place. Pastor side with him in prayer on Maidan. Hence- Mikola Romanjuk complained about this issue forth, the Catholic and Orthodox people who during his presentation, Theology in the Pres- rescued him from the snipers belong to him”.2 ence of Maidan (January 15, 2014): “I fear that A question then arises concerning how to we, Protestants, are more isolated from the move forward with the ecumenical experience world than Christ.1” And so a new task rises of Maidan—will it remain a strange episode, before Protestant theologians: to recognize or will it serve as a precedent for further rap- God’s presence and plans as they relate to the prochement between churches? In any case, it events of social history, and thereby to justify is becoming apparent that the time has come this history and responsible Christian partici- to speak not only about the “one local Ortho- pation within it. dox Church” as a unified structure, but also Solidarity in difficult times is the first form in about the “one Ukrainian Church” as an as- the development of ecumenism. As the Prot- sociation of independent churches, to include estants erected their prayer tent in Maidan the Protestants. Square at the beginning of December 2013, no Another important point is the question of one imagined that it would become cross-de- leadership: The new spiritual elite, whose nominational, not only in name, but also as a formation was necessitated by churches and result of the multiple aspects of its mutual ser- society, is born out of an atmosphere of social vice. It became the symbol of interfaith unity, extremes. Maidan called upon new leaders; as did the cross-denominational prayer-mar- it became a strict test of leadership qualities athon in Donetsk, initiated by Pastor Sergej among church defenders. A strong demand Kosjak in early March 2014, which unified rep- for lustration and skilled renewal has become

1 http://www.rmikola.com/pohlyad/uroky- 2 http://studgazeta.com.ua/articles/s-nami- majdanu-dlya-ukrajinskyh-protenstantiv.html. byla-vera.

Euxeinos 17/2015 43 Mykhailo Cherenkov

apparent. Consequently, the traditional rela- “non-interference” in politics, devoted Chris- tionship to the church hierarchy, like the rela- tians are flocking to Maidan… Ideally, one of tionship to the holy elite, is not in agreement the results to come out of Maidan would be the with the new requirements of society. Most appearance of a pleiade of new, realistic lead- importantly, this touches on certain odious ers to Ukrainian Protestant Christianity who personalities, such as Sandei Adeladzha and wouldn’t be afraid to go out to Maidan and his protégés (the most well-known among express their civil and Christian position. The them, Alexander Zinchenko, became the “An- Protestant Church in the Post-Soviet space, ti-Maidan Commandant,” and, subsequently, including Ukraine, must embrace spiritual one of the leaders of the separatist movement). reformation and elaborate social guidelines This also touches on those who remained si- to demonstrate that faith on earth is tangible lent and were assured “power from God” in and apparent. If this does not come about, I exchange for full loyalty, but the people de- am afraid that the Protestant movement may nounced the revolt against the “lawful author- well experience its own Maidan.”3 ities.” The question remains as to whether a change in Obviously, without consideration of the afore- generations and types of leadership will come mentioned points, Protestants will fall away about within the existing church or whether from transformational processes in Ukrainian new leaders will create their own structures society. But even moving within the field of and movements. Ultimately, this concerns the perspectival transformations, it will be ex- broader question regarding the capability of tremely difficult for them to change their role church structures to bring change, the neces- in society—to change their socio-theological sity of reformation as an internal renewal, and position—and, as a result of this, maintain the possibility of reformation as a new model unity between churches. The “post-Maidan” of leadership. period has turned into an epoch of differentia- Finally, there are aspects of ecclesiastical re- tion between ecclesiastical theology and civil form: the Maidan should serve as a symbol of Christianity. church renewal, an appeal to socio-political Maidan has divided the country and the responsibility, and a call for change – not only Church. Protestants have themselves experi- within society, but in the church as well. Per- enced both theological division and regional haps strained relationships between Protes- resistance. While some, in light of Maidan, tant leaders and the social Maidan can be ex- have found their lost sense of being Ukrai- plained if we consider the apprehension of the nian, others have maintained an even stron- religious Maidan, which is to say “the revolu- ger grip on their Soviet propensities and their tion in the church.” At the outset of the revolu- anti-Ukrainian sentiments. The Church was tion on 11 December 2013, Protestant publicist scattered. If the Maidan in Kiev was a “revo- Oleg Turlak recognized this possibility: “the lution of dignity” and freedom, then the East exposed the diverging perspec- became a breeding ground for the counterrev- tives held by Christian leaders, and those of olution of “stability and order.” It has come devotees of evangelical discipline. Given this to light that Eastern Ukraine has remained divergence, as denominational leaders retain 3 http://www.christianmegapolis. a diplomatic language and the principle of com/2013/12/4898.

Euxeinos 17/2015 44 Mykhailo Cherenkov

for all twenty-three years of its independence ers and churchgoers—lacking ties to the sys- a haven for Sovietism, an undisturbed and tem and experience of “communal struggle” only slightly embellished oasis of the USSR. It and having nothing to lose—came out in sup- is difficult to call this a discovery—the scale port of a unified and democratic Ukraine. and depth of Soviet influence is astounding. It The majority of Christians in Eastern Ukraine takes its most unexpected form in the fact that genuinely anticipated the end of the revolt, many Protestant churches have chosen the rebellion, and an uprising against “lawful au- side of anti-Maidan, “the powers,” the shovel, thorities.” The citizens of Donbass, unaccus- and the past. tomed to freedom, recoiled from fearlessness Local “theologians” were quick to remind peo- and loyalty, the love of freedom and solidar- ple that “all authority comes from God” (prov. ity. Maidan became a call which strength and 24:21), and that one should not associate with courage alone could not fulfill. It called for an rebels. “Christian” bloggers from Donetsk be- answer, not only for the crimes of Yanukovich gan to defend the memory of Lenin from “na- and the depravity of his system, but also for tionalists” and to complain about the destruc- the corruption and slave consciousness of his tion of the population’s Soviet culture. Church constituents, the servants of this system. As leaders took it upon themselves to reason that they still said in 2004, “Yanukovich is a ban- “the corruption is not as bad; at the very least, dit, but he’s our bandit.” And now Maidan it is well known what we should give to whom has arisen, along with “Ukraine After Maid- and how to decide our questions, but should an.” We will admit, these concepts are great, these Banderivtsi (Ukrainian nationalists) suc- but they are not ours. Maidan does not fit into ceed, it could disturb our usual scheme.” the old system of thinking, values, and world The ‘Euromaidans’ drew dozens, hundreds view. As a result, people have begun to hate it. of well-meaning and fearless people who had Why did people begin to defend the Berkut no connection to the Protestant Church. There men, even though the hate for cops in Donbass were units of activists, and people steeped is unlike anywhere else in the country? Why in silent prayer, though church-functionaries are they still embracing Yanukovych as one of claimed to be “apolitical,” and to preserve their own, despite their firsthand knowledge neutrality. The majority of Christians were not of his crimes? Why were church elders pro- afraid of the “shovel” in the Church; they had fessing their unswerving loyalty to the mayor grown used to it, but Maidan in the church during the last days of the regime’s existence? terrified them. Because a certain awareness has risen: we are Under the initiative of Pastor Sergei Kosyaka, a part of this godless system. We must either soon after the victory of Maidan in Donetsk, change (a terrifying and difficult proposition), the Christian Maidan arose—a prayer mara- or prove our faithfulness to it in the hopes to thon around a tent in Constitution Square. be left undisturbed in our quiet corner. The Pastor Kosyaka, however, only managed to stability of the already established “shovel” gather a few dozen patriotic worshippers, appeared to lead to a better future, for which even during times of relative safety. Thou- it is still necessary to struggle. Added to that sands of Donetsk churchgoers remained on is the insecurity that Maidan might actually the other side. A similar situation transpired change something—that repression from au- in Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk. Young lead- thority will not follow support for democracy.

Euxeinos 17/2015 45 Mykhailo Cherenkov

A relationship to Maidan has revealed an Islam than with Western Christianity. It goes unpleasant truth about the church and its unsaid here that worldwide Orthodoxy is not actual influence. It has truly served the people, identical to Moscow Orthodoxy; but if we fol- but it has not changed them. They have cured low Putin’s logic, one could say that Moscow drug addicts, helped the poor, and adopted Orthodoxy has more in common with Islam orphans. And now, former clients of these than it does with the Orthodoxy of Constanti- centers of rehabilitation are fighting on the nople or the Patriarchate of Antioch; this is to side of the Donetsk People’s Republic. say that Russia presents itself as central to the And now we have reached the point of no true faith, not only setting itself in opposition return. Separatists have captured numerous against Catholicism and Protestantism, but churches, dozens of Protestant leaders have also Orthodox diversity. Again and again, like suffered, and orphanages and charitable or- a mantra, Filofei’s old seductive words to the ganizations have been destroyed. Under con- ruler of Moscow are repeated: “Two Romes ditions of war, fear in the wake of beckoning have fallen, but the third stands, and there changes in the country, and the revolution in will not be a fourth… you alone are tsar to the church, people have retreated to a second the Christians of earth.” Russia, enchanted by plan. Tragic experiences have created the pos- myths of having a “special path,” has chosen sibility for comparison between Maidan and a path of isolation and anti-Westernism, and is the anti-Maidan, European and Eurasian per- now seeking to bring her neighbors onto this spectives, and the faces of the “heavenly one- path in order to create a Eurasian empire. hundred” as they compare to those of DPR fighters. A long and arduous battle lies ahead Most unfortunately, this myth of a special so that the churches can experience their own path and anti-Western resentment has become Maidan and become truly Ukrainian, so that infectious to post-Soviet Protestants. Instead the leaders of the prayer tent can become lead- of choosing a difficult integration into global ers of churches, and so that they can become Christianity, Protestants often opt for the com- an influential minority and lead communities fortable alternative. By emphasizing their ex- and society. But positions are clearly defined, clusivity and converting their insufficiencies and this prevailing clarity will define further into merits, Protestants do away with theol- choices and actions. ogy and Christian Universities—there will be Generally, one could write a postscript about fewer intellectuals and discussions, the church the Soviet epoch. The events on Maidan Square will take no active social positions, but, on the and the ensuing Russian invasion of Ukraine other hand, there will be no problems with the accentuate the long-lasting post-Soviet transi- state. tional period. Eurasia is emerging as the new At the same time, however, it cannot be said project of Russia, Belarus, and mid-Asiatic that this Eurasian path will be the only one. A “camps.” There is no longer a place for athe- differentiation is taking place within the post- ism here, but there is a place for a bizarre mix- Soviet world, within society and the church. ture of militant Orthodoxy, Islam, and Slavic Separate states, Ukraine, Georgia, and the . Republic of Moldova, are choosing the Euro- According to an old assertion by Vladimir pean vector of development. But divisions are Putin, Orthodoxy has more in common with also appearing within every state, nation, and

Euxeinos 17/2015 46 Mykhailo Cherenkov

church. Some are choosing in favor of a post- talking about the unconditional identifica- Soviet transition and, afterwards, the Eurasian tion of Ukrainian Protestants with European path. Others are in favor of a European turn- principles. Instead, a differentiation of vec- ing point, to be followed by a gradual integra- tor has come about: the choice of a referential tion into global society. culture on the basis of which one must exam- The above-mentioned processes have the ine his development. And here, set against a most serious consequences for the Protestant background of civilizational, political, and Church, its mission, and its structure. In the religious processes, the role of education is Eurasian world, Protestants are labeled as greatly strengthening. It is becoming more im- “foreign agents.” “America,” “NATO,” “glo- portant for the Church and its mission. Educa- balism,” “democracy,” “Europe,” “Reforma- tion overcomes social marginalization and re- tion,” and “Protestantism” are placed in one ligious isolation. It serves as a channel for the category. Regardless of all of their attempts to exchange of theological and missionary ideas. show loyalty to Russia and Central Asia, Prot- This is why hope for the future is connected estants are marginalized, both by the state and with the emergence of relationships between society (even more significantly). the Church, its mission, and education. And here once again emerges a familiar his- Maidan intensified demands for the correc- toric fork in the road for local Protestants: ei- tion of theology among Ukraine’s Protestants ther one thinks of oneself and one’s future in regarding mission and social position, ecclesi- the context of Moscow Orthodoxy (and Eur- ology and ecumenism, national and Christian asia), or maintains and cultivates a connection identity, and an understanding of connec- with the heritage of the Reformation (and Eu- tions between dogmatic and social practices. rope). Meanwhile, it is apparent that the first Maidan again presented Protestants with the connection is stronger than the second. A his- familiar question of complex moral, civil, torical memory works in favor of Orthodoxy and theological choices between autonomy (a memory that goes deeper than Protestant- and worldly transfiguration, stability and ism, with roots going back to early Orthodoxy freedom, the willingness to serve the people and even further to Slavic paganism), the cul- and fear of provoking the regime’s wrath—a tural context (language, archetypes, models of choice between loyalty and naiveté, and resis- thought and behavior, values), and political tance and compliance. feasibility (maximum loyalty and minimum In the tumult of Maidan, two old and danger- differentiation). And, in favor of Western tra- ous Christian myths were put to the test—that ditions, there are theological principles (most- of the neutrality of the church in situations ly unconscious), education (which affects only of conflict, and that of “all power coming a few), and relationships with international from God.” Protestants witnessed the birth Protestant networks (mainly of a formal na- of Ukrainian Protestantism coming out of the ture). crisis of post-Soviet Protestantism and a shift The Orthodox-Eurasian path can tentatively of leadership. A yearning has developed for be correlated with Russia, and the Protestant- “open” Christianity, healthy ecumenism, the European path with Ukraine. In the first place, experience of mutual struggle, Christian soli- no one is discussing the return of “Russian darity with the people, and a prophetic voice. Protestants” to Orthodoxy; neither is anyone As it turns out, the Church is not always above

Euxeinos 17/2015 47 Mykhailo Cherenkov

conflict, but may in fact reside within it. It may booting” the entire triad of society, state, and be that the Church is a part of Maidan, and the church, as well as the relationships therein. Maidan a part of the Church. Protests of the society also affected the churches and divided Translated by Charlie Smith them into a passive majority and an influential minority, conformists and radicals, “zealots” About the Author and “spiritual warriors.” The division in the Mykhailo Cherenkov, former dean of the church traversed time and space. In this sense, Christian University in Donetsk, Professor the separation of Ukrainian Protestants from of Social Ethics at the Ukrainian seminar for their Russian brothers is not only the conse- Protestant Theology in Kiev, Assistant Pro- quence of state and political divisions, but also fessor at the Ukrainian Catholic University in a severance from their final connection with Lviv the general Soviet past. e-mail: cherenkoff [at] gmail.com While contemplating the nature and conse- quences of Maidan, one must acknowledge the obvious fact that these events have divid- ed the history of Ukrainian Protestants into “pre-Maidan” and “post-Maidan.” Perhaps for the first time, Protestants have a possibil- ity to participate in the process of national self-identification; to become a significant factor of interdenominational reform, as well as the Church’s relationships with the state and society. Evidently, not everyone is tak- ing advantage of this opportunity. As events following Maidan have shown, those who have preserved “neutrality” remain outside of time, chronologically and kairotically. Those who have chosen the anti-Maidan, “neutral- ity,” and thus full loyalty to the powers that be have remained within the post-Soviet past. Those who have accepted Maidan as a call- ing and a gift, an experience of community and freedom, a chance to strengthen ties with people, and to revitalize their Christian voca- tion have received a place in the future and a chance to fight for one that is Ukrainian and Christian while still European and Protestant. In the post-Soviet Orthodox Ukraine, this final task will not be fulfilled without Protestants. Therefore, they have the right to consider themselves invited into the initiative of “re-

Euxeinos 17/2015 48 Between ‘Mother Homeland’ and Saint Mary: The Indepen- dence Monument on the Maidan in Kiev

by Wilfried Jilge, Leipzig / Vienna

ransnational places of remembrance in the Stalinization phase of Ukrainian national com- TChristian-Orthodox tradition – such as munism (1956 to 1972) nationally connoted the national symbols, images and monuments images of femininity can be found in Soviet- referring to certain images of the mother of Ukrainian graphic and poster art, which link God in the present paper – are particularly motives of pagan Slavic mythology with icon- revealing for understanding national cultures ographic elements of pictures of the mother of remembrance in post-Soviet Ukraine. This of God, in order to symbolize Soviet Ukraine assumption is based on the premise that the and to visualize Ukrainian narratives of origin functions, interpretations and connotations and religious traditions that are still allowed linked to transnational places of remembrance within the Soviet sphere. A typical example (or to the veneration of Mary) indeed always is the poster by Tymofii Liashchuk with the point beyond the boundaries of a nation (and heading “Soviet glorious Ukraine, be praised after 1991 a nation state), but always have ru- from gender to gender!” from 1967. It portrays dimentarily had a national starting point dur- a young woman dressed in the Ukrainian folk ing both the socialist and post-socialist era.1 tradition, who is holding her child on her left This relationship also applies in modified arm. The child casts an adult-like glance to form to the period of the Ukrainian Socialist the beholder and doubtlessly evokes imagina- Soviet Republic, because a specifically Soviet- tions of the mother of God with a child. The Ukrainian identity developed in this period background reflects both stylistic elements of – in particular during more liberal phases of iconic art as well as scripture and ornaments Soviet nationality policy –, which indeed has of Ukrainian graphic design which were ad- national connotations. After 1991 state his- opted from the non-Soviet tradition. The small tory policy was able to draw on this in modi- triangles which, for example, represent the fied form as a link in order to bridge regional blossoms of plants in Liashchuk’s depiction or differences in the culture of remembrance in the form of a sun surround the child’s head and national identity. For instance, in the de- with a halo, refer to motherhood and fertility and hence the significance of the mother as the 1 Here I refer to my considerations on basis of one’s roots and gender. transnational places of remembrance expressed during the preparation of the DFG project based The wide-spread (historical-)political usage at the Leipzig Centre for the History and Culture of elements of Marian devotion, as is also the of East Central Europe “Zwischen religiöser Tradition, kommunistischer Prägung und case with the Independence Monument in kultureller Umwertung: Transnationalität in den Kiev, is not only characteristic for Ukraine, Erinnerungskulturen Ostmitteleuropas seit 1989” but also for other post-Soviet states and can (Between religious tradition, communist legacies and cultural re-interpretation: transnationality in be seen in the context of the nationalization the cultures of remembrance in Eastern Central of religion and sacralization of the nation.2 Europe since 1989), which was coordinated by Agnieszka Gąsior and directed by Stefan Troebst. The particular significance of transnational Regarding the concept of “transnationality” I places of remembrance in Ukraine which refer draw on Kiran Patel’s definition of “transnational to the cult of Mary results from the fact that history”: Kiran Patel: Transnationale Geschichte – ein neues Paradigma? In: geschichte.transnational 2 See Martin Schulze Wessel (ed.): (http://geschichte-transnational.clio-online.net/ Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung forum/2005-02-001.pdf). – I thank the art historian der Nation im östlichen Europa. Stuttgart 2006 Dmytro Horbachov (Kiev) for information on the (=Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des cult of Mary. Östlichen Mitteleuropa, 27).

Euxeinos 17/2015 49 Wilfried Jilge

state history policy must at least rudimentarily consider a wide range of (regionally) different national, Soviet-Ukrainian, Soviet and Russo- phile cultures of remembrance and linguistic cultures when selecting national symbols. This is the only way to ensure that these symbols are widely accepted. If it wishes for its history policy to promote broadly based national inte- gration, the state cannot fall back on a domi- nant national church and interpretation when exploiting Christian traditions related to the sacralization of the nation due the pluralism of the Orthodox churches existing in Ukraine. In the discourse regarding the Independence Monument of Kiev Ukrainian connoted im- ages of the mother of God are used, which are visually indistinct and thus subject to interpre- tation. In the following I will briefly present such images and thereby provide evidence for the arguments above.

The monument on the reconstructed In- dependence Square3 The Independence Square (Maidan nezalezh- nosti) at the main post office of Ukrainian cap- Monument to honor the „Great Socialist October Revo- ital spans to both sides of the Khreshchatyk, lution“. 1986. Source. Ukraina. ed. L. M. Kravchuk. the central promenade of Kiev. Until 1991 the Moskva 1986. entire square was called “Square of the Great Socialist October Revolution”. On the right times the central feature of the square, the side of the street behind the conservatorium monument to honor the “Great Socialist Oc- lies the uneven side (named after the uneven tober Revolution” consisting of a Lenin statue house numbers) of the square. During Soviet and four bronze figures, was supposed to por- tray the deserving heroes of the revolution. Briefly after the failed coup d’état in August 3 In the following chapters on the Independence Monument I partially draw on 1991 the monument was destroyed in order to two of my essays in modified and supplemented symbolically underpin the change in power. form: see Wilfried Jilge: Kulturpolitik als Geschichtspolitik. Der “Platz der Unabhängigkeit” Not until August 2001 was an independence in Kiev. In: Osteuropa 53 (2003), Issue 1, pp. 33-57 monument capped by a female figure erected and Wilfried Jilge: Cultural Policy as the Politics of in this spot. This monument will be briefly History. Independence Square in Kiev. In: Alfrun Kliems/Marina Dmitrieva (eds.): The Post-Socialist analyzed in the following. City. Continuity and Change in Urban Space and One striking element of the independence Imagery. With the Assistance of Louise Bromby and Christian Dietz. Berlin 2010, pp. 140-155. monument is the more than 60 meter high

Euxeinos 17/2015 50 Wilfried Jilge

Corinthian column made of white granite Mother of God (Latin: Orans; in Ukrainian with a golden capital. Of the three types of and Russian texts frequently: “Oranta”) in St. columns (Doric, Ionic, Corinthian) the Corin- Sophia’s Cathedral of Kiev. Already during thian column is based on the Roman tradition. her emergence in the 11th century she was re- It is supposed to embody the glory, power and garded as the patron saint of Kiev, the capital steadfastness of the state. According to the re- of the medieval Kievan Rus’ and venerated in sponsible artist, Anatolii Kushch the indepen- the national tradition as the protector of the dence of Ukraine is supposed to be symboli- Ukrainian people. The nationalization of the cally eternalized by these antique shapes. In praying mother of God is a good example for public discussions Kushch’s antique column the conversion of a symbol of general Eastern was strongly criticized, described as “38 me- Slavic, Orthodox sacral culture into a pro- ters of conformism” and appropriately associ- nounced national symbol. At the same time, ated with the Soviet-imperial design and the it underscores the connection of the indepen- premises of socialist realism. According to the dent Ukrainian state to the Kievan Rus’ and critique, this stands in contrast to the demo- refers to the Christian traditions of Ukraine.5

cratic aspirations of the state. Columns and 5 the references to the images of the mother socialist realist shapes were also frequently of God cannot be discussed in entirety here. An used in other competitive projects. Central el- additional construction element of the monument project which was intended by the artist and already ements of the Independence Monument and decided in a directive by the Ukrainian President the monumental depiction of national history in 2002, but not yet realized, draws on Ukrainian- Cossack motives in the image of the Sheltering- expressed in the ensemble of monuments as cloak Madonna (Pokrova). In semi-circle in the well as the non-transparency of the decisive back of the figure “Oranta-Ukraine” a “pantheon competition for the final design of the Inde- of national glory” consisting of twelve sculptures is planned, which is supposed to symbolize pendence Square in 2000 doubtlessly reflected the continuity of the Ukrainian state through the authoritarian tendencies during President “national heroes” from the medieval Kievan Rus’ (e.g. the “founder of the state” Volodymyr the Kuchma’s second term in office. Holy or Yaroslav the Wise) to the Cossack era (e.g. “founder of the Cossack state of Ukraine” such as Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi or Hetman Ivan Mazepa) on to the phase of modern attempts at The Oranta Ukraine figure on the Inde- state-building in Ukraine 1917-1921. According to pendence Monument Anatolii Kushch the “Oranta-Ukraine” – similarly to the Pokrova – is supposed to take the “heroes” According to its creator, the figure of a young depicted in the pantheon under her protection (see woman enthroned on the column represents conversation by Wilfried Jilge with Anatolii Kushch the main symbol of the independence of on 20 November 2012). Among other things, this motive plays on the particular significance of the Ukraine. The author claims that it is supposed veneration of the Sheltering-cloak Madonna among to embody the “Oranta-Ukraine”, “Oranta the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. In the 17th and 18th 4 century protonational-Ukrainian colored Pokrova victress” or “Maria Oranta”, which refers to icons originated in Cossack Ukraine – also under the monumental fresco image with the au- Latin-western influence –, which differed from tonomous (i.e. depicted without a child) Oran Russian “Pokrova” icons. For example, in one of the best known Pokrova icons Cossack officers 4 Minutes of the extended meeting of the are taken under protection by the mother of God Art Expert Council on issues of monumental – without the presence of the Orthodox clergy sculpting at the Ministry of Culture No. 1 on 12 or Tsar or Tsaritsa, in order to emphasize the July 2001, handed to the author by “Kyïvproekt” in independence of the Zaporizhzhian Sich towards November 2002. the Russian Tsar. The image of the Sheltering-

Euxeinos 17/2015 51 Wilfried Jilge

Altogether the “Oranta Ukraine” can be seen as one of several examples of how the image of the praying mother of God (and other images of the mother of God) emerges in the context of the tensions between national re-evaluation, the orientation towards religious traditions, and Soviet heritage in post-Soviet Ukraine. For example, the female figure also refers to the Soviet tradition. A lady, who carries a sheaf of wheat with lifted hands, is supposed to symbolize Soviet Ukraine, as is the case for example with the monument erected in 1958 at the “Exposition of the Achievements of the National Economy of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic” in Kiev. The monument of the woman who carries a palm branch with lifted hands – as can be seen on the Square of Glory in the southern Ukrainian city of Kher- son for instance – is a typically Soviet symbol

cloak Madonna, which historically constitutes a formal further development of the autonomous mother of God Orans, and the image of the praying mother of God itself or hybrids provide the basis for monuments, e.g. the “Mother-Ukraine and All Holy Mother Mary”, which were erected after 1991 in cities and villages in various regions of Oranta Ukraine. Photo Carmen Scheide Ukraine. The examples from central, southern and available to the author are mostly dedicated to state independence or the of victory. Ultimately the female figure can veneration of the Sheltering-cloak Madonna as also be associated with the massive monu- a (up to now Ukrainian-nationally connoted) ment of “Mother Homeland” rising from the patron saint of a city or region. In particular the Pokrova, which is linked to Cossack traditions, as shore of the in Kiev. The use of this well as the corresponding festival of the Pokrova type of female figure illustrates the attempt of on 14 October, which is accompanied by national commemoration days, are among the very popular the artist to convert a Soviet monumental tra- and widely accepted national events involving dition into a nationalistic tradition. The refer- symbolic culture, because they vary with regard to ence to the Soviet tradition is underscored by their meaning. For the history and meaning of the Pokrova in Cossack Ukraine, see Serhy Plokhy: Tsars the palm branch in the lady’s hand which was and Cossacks. A Study in Iconography. Cambridge: originally used by the artist. Only during the Harvard Univ. Press 2002 (=Harvard Papers in Ukrainian Studies), p. 21, 65. For the significance revision of the project after the competition of the images of the mother of God Pokrova and did the artists opt for a branch of a snowball Orans during the Maidan protests in late 2013/ bush, which is regarded as the heraldic em- early 2014 Wilfried Jilge: Geschichtspolitik auf dem Majdan. Politische Emanzipation und nationale blem of Ukraine and is supposed to underline Selbstvergewisserung. In: Osteuropa 5-6/2014 (= the national character of the monument. Themenheft „Zerreißprobe. Ukraine: Konflikt, Krise, Krieg“), pp. 239-257, here: 249-250. One main element in the discourse concern-

Euxeinos 17/2015 52 Wilfried Jilge

ing the meaning of the “Ukraine Girl” is the therefore also be viewed as an attempt by the image of the Berehynia (English: protector). church to facilitate the adoption of the cult of The eclectically connoted cult surrounding Mary by means of an iconography already the Berehynia in post-Soviet Ukraine links ar- generally known among the pagan Slavs and chaic-pagan beliefs and values of the “Mother thus to promote the establishment of Christi- of the Moist Earth”, which can be seen as the anity in an environment strongly character- embodiment of the “Great Goddess”, with ized by matriarchic ideas. The creator of the matriarchal myths, the Christian cult of Mary, Independence Monument uses the reference folkloristic motives as well as character traits to the Berehynia in order to place the “Oran- from literary and historical personalities from ta”, which is popular among the Eastern Slavs, the national tradition. The “Mother Earth“ into a Ukrainian connoted pagan-religious symbolizes the feminine representation of the tradition and thus give it a national touch. At nation common not only among the Eastern the same time, the Berehynia associated with Slavs by symbolically linking the mother fig- “Mother Earth” constitutes, on the one hand, ure with one’s roots, nation and homeland.6 an associative link between Soviet notions of Since the end of the 1980s/early 1990s patriotic motherhood and femininity (as reflected in Ukrainian writers, artists and ethnographers the above mentioned monuments) and the (e.g. in novels) have been making efforts to Christian religious and national presentations, popularize the image of a Berehynia in the na- on the other hand. The image of the Berehynia tional Ukrainian colors as part of the “national ultimately serves as a symbolic bridge to the idea” and expression of the Ukrainian matri- Christian traditions revived in the post-social- archy which has existed since ancient times.7 ist era and national re-interpretations of the They drew on the fact already emphasized mother and Mary cult discussed here. by Soviet ethnography and Soviet art histori- The Berehynia thereby stands, on the one ans that in pagan times the female Goddesses hand, for the absolutization of the reproduc- nowadays associated with the Berehynia were tive functions of women as the “guardian of depicted as women standing frontally to- the tribe” and, on the other hand, she is re- wards the beholder with lifted hands and thus garded as the preserver of all spiritual val- demonstrated a strong similarity to the fresco ues of the nation and symbolizes Ukraine par of the praying mother of God in St. Sophia’s excellence.8 The Berehynia cult links a patri- Cathedral in Kiev. The image of the praying archal post-Soviet mother cult with a trans- mother of God which was wide-spread di- national, i.e. starting from a national, cult of rectly after the acceptance of Christianity can Mary, which simultaneously incorporates 6 For the significance of the female Christian and general Eastern Slavic as well as Goddesses in Slavic mythology relevant here, see Soviet elements. President Kuchma stressed Susanne Ramm-Weber: Mit der Sichel in der Hand. Mythos und Weiblichkeit in der sowjetischen Kunst this central meaning of the independence der dreißiger Jahre. Köln, Weimar, Wien 2006, pp. monument when it was erected: the monu- 28-33. ment is reminiscent of the “image of the Oran- 7 For the semantic field of Ukraine in the Ukrainian context and the popularization of the 8 See Oksana Kis’: Modeli konstrujuvannja Berehynja in the early 1990s: see Oksana Kis’: Kogo gendernoї identyčnosty žinky v sučasnij Ukraїni oberegaet Bereginia, ili Matriarkhat kak muzhskoe [Models for constructing a gender identity in izobretenie. In: Zerkalo Nedeli 58.

Euxeinos 17/2015 53 ta as the guardian [Berehynia] of our Ukrai- Further literature recommendations nian roots”, which forms of the “essence of the Agnieszka Gąsior (ed.): Maria in der Krise. national idea”.9 The figure of the “Ukraine” Kultpraxis zwischen Konfession und Politik thus also stands for the Berehynia cult, which in Ostmitteleuropa. With the collaboration of has been popularized by folklore artists and Stefan Samerski. Köln, Weimar, Wien 2014 ethnographically oriented traditionalist writ- (=Visuelle Geschichtskultur, 10). ers and frequently used by politicians since independence. The cult aims to define certain About the Author social values (the patriarchally defined role of Wilfried Jilge, Historian specializing in East- women, ethno-nationally founded interpreta- ern Europe, lecturer at the Universitiy of tion of history as a basis of identification) and Leipzig and associate researcher at the Center to legitimize the nation by means of sacraliza- for Governance and Culture in Europe, Uni- tion. It is therefore not astonishing that the versity St. Gallen. popular depiction of women or the Berehynia e-mail: Wilfried.Jilge [at] web.de in Ukraine nowadays was used in the major- ity of projects submitted in the competition for the Independence Monument.

Translated by Michael Dobbins

9 Cit. in ibid. p. 44.

Euxeinos 17/2015 54 “Being a Church” During Times of Crisis

by Myroslav Marynovych, Ukrainian Catholic University of L’viv

uring the revolution on Maidan Square, Those who have experienced such moments Dthe Ukrainian Churches and religious know what the church is and can essentially communities supported the protesters in un- be,provided it lives the word of the Gospel precedented unity. The author reflects on the relentlessly and without fear: “Come to me, contribution of the churches to this interde- all you who are weary and burdened, and nominational “revolution of dignity”. He calls I will give you rest.” (Matthew 11:28). The for a theological reflection on the events from Maidan paid this service to the people. The the perspective of the social teaching of the most symbolic moment was the night when Opinions church. He voices criticism of the position of the St. Michael Monastery, which belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kiev Patriarchi- Patriarchate and the Roman . ate (UOC–KP), opened its gates to hunted and The theme of our conference, “Religion in persecuted Maidan protesters. Thefaded icons times of crisis,” indirectly contains a ques- suddenly shined anew in the splendorous tion whose answer appears to be obvious to consciousness of the Ukrainians, and one saw the church: “Being a church in times of cri- the church as a protector, a safe haven, and a sis” means remaining true to oneself as a sanctuary. The journalist Kateryna Schtschot- church. Even if the challenges for the church kina aptly wrote in an article on the “night of may change in times of crisis(e.g. due to ma- the open door”: It was revealing to observe how, terial losses), it should above all embody the during those days, the Ukrainian church in general mystery of Christ and, as a social institution, became what it previously was in theoretical and should not agonize about its decline in income, rhetorical terms: namely a part of public life”1 One political influence, or the structural condition had the impression that a tremendous jolt had of its chapels. passed through society, which had shaken off This time of the Holy Spirit which, as the prayer yet another deceptive chain from the commu- Heavenly King states, “frees us from sins,” is a nist era. In the words of the same journalist: trial. When people are caught in a battle be- At critical moments many things are turned up- tween good and evil, it is no time for fancy slo- side down, but many things also keep themselves gans, and it is even less appropriate to deliver upright.” And this obviously applies to the lofty speeches in front of people who are risk- church, which – even if just for a moment –has ing their lives. This is what the experiences of found its true and legitimate place. our clergymen in the field or Maidan Square teach us. There are fateful moments when all The Interdenominational “Revolution of social mantles fall and man stands in front of Dignity” God in all his naked humility. This was also In times of crisis, particularly in conflicts be- the experience of political prisoners in the So- tween society and an anti-social government, viet gulags. In moments of unjust persecution the issue of whose side the church is on be- and undeserved suffering, the human spirit comes more important. A moment comes growls with an inner tension, and the river of when uninvolved third-parties or mere ob- suffering turns into the Jordan River, which servers become co-perpetrators in collabora- washes away our sins. These are the beatitudes tion with the government. However, if one of the Sermon on the Mount promised to those 1 http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/nich- who “are persecuted for the sake of justice.” vidkritih-dverey-_.html.

Euxeinos 17/2015 55 Myroslav Maryonovych

wishes to convey justice with credibility, one their sheep (see RGOW 5-6/2014, pp. 39-41). must side with the sufferers. All confessions in In the presence of an increasingly hostile Ukraine passed this test, but not necessarily all President, Viktor Yanukovych, Patriarch Fi- church jurisdictions. laret (Denisenko) from the UOC-KP has also Ukraine can be proud of the fact that the over- condemned his errors towards the people in whelming majority of its churches and reli- public speeches. What remains in our mem- gious communities have declared a willing- ory are the images of the arrested Protestant ness to commit themselves to the core of their pastors being transported away from Maidan social teachings – to defend the God-given and the Muslim clerics carrying out pastoral dignity of man against attacks by the govern- conversations with their believers. Statements ment. Since the 1990s, church jurisdictions and made by Jewish representatives regarding confessions have asserted claims and have the purportedly anti-Semitic character of the pursued a strategy of confrontation based on Maidan were another notable phenomenon the principle of “my victory will be your loss.” (see RGOW 4/2014, p. 11). Yet, they have now spontaneously come to the In the course of this winter there has been realization that they share common values, and an extraordinary convergence between the have begun to develop a “win-win” strategy slogans of Maidan and religious social teach- amongst themselves. Instead of a “sealing-off” ings, which has been appropriately termed the tactic, driven by a fear of others and potential “Revolution of Dignity.” Nothing like this had conflict, they shown a solidarity based on the existed since the independence of Ukraine, legacy of the Grand Prince of Kiev Volodymyr and it had appeared as though people were Monomakh (1053–1125): “Place yourselves in no longer listening to the church. Suddenly, it front of the powerful whenever they want to became apparent that the seeds that had been demoralize people!” This can only happen if sowed were bearing fruit. And this is precisely the common denominator is human dignity. how it should be: the church sows and God Instead of a fierce rivalry, a certain form of reaps. competition to take courageous positions has emerged among the churches, which has in The Churches Face Criticism turn brought about an unexpected common Now I will change the tone of this essay from stance. apologetic to critical. It cannot be denied that After the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic the churches were unsupportive of Maidan Church (UGCC) received a threatening letter from the beginning and had lagged behind from Yanukovych’s Ministry of Cultural Af- its goals for a while. This has to do with the fairs (see RGOW 2/2014, p. 7), he did not run historical tradition of these churches’ cautious frantically to the Ministry to ask for forgive- restraint, which by no means does credit to ness. Instead the head of the UGCC read the their pastoral mandate. Archimandrite Cyril letter publicly and underscored the church’s Hovorun’s sober analysis (UOC-MP) from right to assist its community--particularly December 11th, 2013 should therefore not go in times of crisis. It was no coincidence that unmentioned: representatives of the UGCC referred to the “With regard to the orientation of its values, Maid- popular words of Pope Francis, which stated an grew […] beyond the Ukrainian churches […], that shepherds are supposed to smell like without exception to all churches. [...] Only in the

Euxeinos 17/2015 56 Myroslav Maryonovych

final phase of Maidan did the Ukrainian churches in his recently published articles (see in this is- reach the moral standard and sense of responsibili- sue, pp. 18-19), there is one, in my estimation, ty which had defined Maidan the entire time. Start- very essential observation, which I previously ing from general appeals for non-violence, people came across in my youth while reading Niko- engaged in solidarity, through words and actions, lai Leskov’s unique justification of a particu- with the values promoted in Maidan Square; they lar, doctrinaire feature of Russian Orthodoxy: had become aware of their spiritual proximity to “Consider at the very least, cherished Lord, the Christian principles. Maidan has demonstrated holy humility of Orthodoxy and understand that numerous examples of altruism, willingness to the spirit of Christ is particularly inherent in those sacrifice, willingness to support one another, etc. who accept everything which is wanted by God”.3 It has deliberately acted as the weak one, despite its The American church historian Yaroslav strength in terms of numbers, and has almost al- Pelikan would say, “How tempting is this justi- ready taken on an eschatological meaning for the fication by tradition?” renewal of the dignity, which God gave to human And the Russian philologist Sergei Averinzev nature.”2 once remarked, “We are striving for the abso- I accept the critique of the Archimandrite lute good while living in devilry...”4 Indeed, who with regard to all churches. But I interpret the would be so foolhardy as to claim that it would remark that “some churches were more in- be agreeable to God to support Yanukovych’s volved, and others less involved” as a hidden presidency? And did not HE, God himself, reference to the UOC-MP, which desired to intervene when it seemed as if all decision- maintain a neutral position at all costs and has makers had already come to terms with Yanu- increasingly come under the crossfire of na- kovych? Who nowadays would dare make the tional critique. In my opinion one can accuse claim that Putin’s presidency is appealing to this church in particular of having “crept into God, if HE, God, has taken away his common a metaphysical hole,” being “blind towards a sense as if to punish him? lawless government,” and having spread ob- The church makes a great mistake when it viously hollow slogans that have put it in a calls for forbearance while ignoring these ad- position of danger, such as, “everybody only ditional points from Matthew 25:43, without wants the best—nobody wants evil.” which its purpose is twisted around: “I was na- The UOC–MP is now exposed to tensions ked and you clothed me, I was sick and you visited coming from contradictory trends, and the me, I was in prison and you came to me.” How can crisis that it is currently experiencing will cer- the servants of the church not only tolerate the tainly change it. Fortunately, there are voices lie, but also become its conveyors and repeat in Ukraine that call the neglect of this church the slander of the Moscow Patriarch directed by its name. One may refer here to a remark at the “United Churches and Schismatics?” It made by theologian Yuri Chornomorets, who has become apparent that the defamation of insisted that the bishops could not justify the United Churches by the Russian Orthodox themselves by saying that, “they did not know what they were doing.” Among all the obser- 3 Leskov, Nikolaj: To the end of the world, vations which Chornomorets tellingly renders available at: http://www.rvb.ru/leskov/01text/ vol_05/021.htm. 2 http://risu.org.ua/ua/index/monitoring/ 4 Quoted in Prokop, J.: Zrozumieć Rosje. society_digest/54600. Kraków 1990, p. 104.

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Church is already an act of pure desperation Theological Reflection – and evidence that it no longer has any argu- If I share the view of Archimandrite Cyril Hov- ments to make. It is the very last card that it is orun that the churches have been somewhat able to play: the word “united” is intended to helpless regarding the Maidan protests, I also have the same propagandistic function as the must accept the question of how critical I have word “fascist.” One cannot reason with them – been towards my own Greek-Catholic church. one can only hate them and, in doing so, aban- In my opinion, it has lacked theoretical reflec- don all moral inhibitions. tion concerning Maidan, and this shortcom- There is an additional church which should ing does not correspond with the theological consider whether it has passed the test of potential of this church. God makes himself Maidan—the Roman Catholic Church of Ukraine. apparent in different events of life, beginning Presently, the Catholic world is commemorat- with the firmaments of heaven—“Let there be ing the 50th anniversary of the Second Vatican lights in the firmament of heaven to divide the Council, which has radically renewed and day from the night” (Genesis 1:14)—and end- strengthened Catholic social teaching. During ing with the smallest blade of grass, whose Maidan, I missed the pastoral services of this wonderful structure reflects that of the uni- Ukrainian church. Active spiritual guidance verse in a certain way Does this not also signi- and the presence of Roman Catholic clergy fy that HE speaks to us through the spectacle during interdenomational prayers at Maidan- of the Maidan? are insufficient to realize the pastoral constitu- Russia’s current aggression towards Ukraine tion Gaudium et Spes. Precisely here is an ap- also requires further theological reflection. peal to the church community to raise its voice This can be felt in an emotional passage by against a criminal government: Otherwise all Kateryna Schtschotkina: “Moscow’s campaign those political forms in various countries which op- against Kiev is an absurd horror for a Russian per- press civic and religious freedom will be rejected, son. It is akin to a Greek tragedy, at the conclu- which increase the number of victims of political sion of which an inexorable Fate appears, and ev- passions and crimes, and abuse the exertion of state erything falls apart. What the Kremlin is presently power for the self-interest of a certain party or even doing with regard to its relations with Ukraine in the rulers themselves, to the detriment of the com- the frame of Russian doctrine (to include Russian mon good.” (GS 73). The head of this church orthodoxy)—whether it be an attempt at patricide, should reflect on whether its silence regarding or whether, as Krotov writes, it is the attempted the relationship between the state and society rape of one’s own mother—it is something so re- in times of general national challenges is not pulsive that the world will not survive it and will, clear proof that it is still acting like the church as a result, collapse.” 5 of a religious and national minority, which is here certainly is a more fitting biblical mo- neither ready, nor willing to bear greater mor- T tive for reflecting on Moscow’s occupation of al responsibility for conditions in the country. Crimea, which draws on the now unpopular It is questionable whether this position is rec- oncilable with the status that this church is 5 http://risu.org.ua/ru/index/ex- striving for in Ukraine. pert_thought/authors_columns/ksh- chotkina_column/57575?fb_action_ ids=10204143334198569&fb_action_types=og. recommends.

Euxeinos 17/2015 58 Myroslav Maryonovych

metaphor of “brotherhood.” Let us remember *** the spiritual wish which was elevated by the Being a church, of course, means practicing Kievan church in the early 11th century to the that which it preaches. However, the magiste- highest level of importance: the magnanim- rium of the church also shares in the prophetic ity Boris and Gleb showed to their murder- role of Christ with its gift of foreseeing the ous brother, Sviatopolk. One thousand years future. This means the ability to see the first have passed and, ever since, the church has glimmer of light when the surroundings are upheld non-violence as the greatest good in still full of darkness. The church is able to bear the consciousness of people. Society may jus- witness to the coming Kingdom of God as part tify an abstinence from violence towards Rus- of the fate of each human life, and thus fore- sians on the Crimean Peninsula by the lack of sees what awaits it after her death. However, proper command structures, the poor state of beware of false prophecies of the end of the the army, or because of the country not letting world. The church has almost lost its ability itself be provoked as Georgia was a few years to feel the breath of the very near future. This earlier. Yet the soldiers indicate yet another has been especially noticeable in these times motive—namely, a deliberate and effective of crisis. taboo. The church should recognize this as an At the beginning of this essay I formulated the essential sign. Over the course of the centu- thesis that “being a church in times of crisis” ries, Ukrainians have lost their grand ancient primarily means being true to oneself, and Kievan principles and have become the poor thus being the church. I can summarize why. relatives of their greater Russian rulers. They Yuri Chornomorets reminded us of the words have recently shown, however, that they have of Maximus the Confessor: “The church dedi- something else in their memory, which is in- cates itself to the same activities as God himself.” fluenced by the heritage of the ancient Kievan This is particularly noticeable in times of crisis spirituality, namely Boris and Gleb’s willing- because this is when epochs and paradigms ness to sacrifice. change; when the omega of the old becomes On the other hand, the Moscow Patriarch the alpha of the new. And this, as we know, is appeals propagandistically to the spiritual the time of the Lord (Rev 22: 13). This is why heritage of Kievan Rus’ and simultaneously the Church must do everything in its power to supports the cursed Sviatopolk in its current ensure that this time of the Lord also becomes Putinesque form. He thereby clearly deprives the time of the Church. himself of the heritage of Boris and Gleb, and his concept of the so-called “Russian World” About the Author (see RGOW 2/2012, pp. 22-24) becomes an ec- Myroslav Marynovych, Vice-Rector of the clesiastically ersatz imperial idea. I do not criti- Ukrainian Catholic University of L’viv, co- cize those self-sacrificing Ukrainians who took -founder of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group and up arms. The cursed Sviatopolk scoffed at them Amnesty International in Ukraine. and gloated over its Blitzkrieg on the Crimean e-mail: marynov [at] ucu.edu.ua Peninsula. Europeans did not understand the passivity of the Ukrainians. They wanted to support Ukraine if only it would protect itself.

Euxeinos 17/2015 59 The Responsibility of Churches During the Ukrainian Crisis

by Yuriy Chornomorets, National Pedagogical Dragomanov University, Kiev

Abstract The churches in Ukraine already reacted in December 2011 to the burgeoning social crisis with a joint appeal for more solidarity and respect for the rule of law. According to the author, a Ukrai- nian “liberation theology” was then developed against the neo-feudal system. However, on the Euro-Maidan square the churches lack the courage to assume concrete political responsibility. They should have done more to prevent the violent escalation of the revolution.

he Churches of Ukraine lay claim to ideo- conventions, any separate civil or, moreover, Tlogical leadership. By not interfering with political initiative will most likely be either politics and striving to avoid the carrying out critical of itself or criticized by external foes. of political legislation, churches are attempt- Third, it is both possible and necessary to reach ing to influence civil society, particularly in out to civil society, especially to Ukraine’s in- an intellectual sense. As a result, they are not tellectual elite, in the hopes of a constructive thrusting a concrete set of actions on the peo- response and the potential self-organization ple, but are proposing ideas and principles for of society as a whole. discussion and possible acceptance. In other Proceeding along these notions, on the 1st of words, the churches in Ukraine are attempting December, 2011, three churches (the UGCC, to apply their “soft power,” to put it in polito- the UOC, and the UOC-KP) signed a general logical terms. address in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy, com- Churches had anticipated a heated phase of memorating the 20th anniversary of the refer- crisis in Ukraine for several years. The final endum of Ukrainian independence. This ad- hope that a life in the opposition would teach dress criticized this entire twenty-year path of Victor Yanukovich to be civilized were dis- Ukraine’s development, which was referred pelled within the first year of his presidency. to as a willful wandering about a desert, a For the first time, towards the end of 2011, I self-prostration before idols of material en- heard a prediction from one of the leading richment for individual groups, and a lack of Ukrainian church officials that a new Maidan knowledge concerning an ascendance to the awaits us, and that should ideologically pre- humanitarian ideals of a life worthy of the free pare ourselves for it. His points were as fol- people. We will notice that, most likely un- lows: consciously, the Catholic theological model of First, one must not depend on the leadership liberation utilized in this address: an exodus of the churches, because the churches must from slavery in Egypt to a state of authentic remain outside of current politics and should freedom in a promised land. This orientation not take on concrete responsibility for new during the exodus is ensured by a recogni- leaders, ideas, forms of organized protest in tion of God’s authority over the history of the society, or policy. people and of the foundational spiritual val- Second, it is also inexpedient to form a separate ues inherent in this freedom. They are more segment of Christian civil society and, what’s necessary to us during this exodus across the more, a Christian party for the advancement desert than the pillars of fire and smoke were of ideas and principles that are necessary to to Israel. The authors of the address formu- the churches. As he explained it, in Ukrainian lated an effectively specialized theology of

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liberation, which differed in purpose, not to- require a basis in tradition. Even if the Ukrai- wards a struggle with social inequality, but nian people had risen up yesterday and they, towards a struggle with the neo-feudal system as well as their elite, were not disparate with in Ukraine, under which the rights and free- regard to their ideals of freedom, the churches doms of the individual could not realistically would still have thrust this exact ideal upon be protected. them. Freedom for society and the individual We will notice that the Soviet period is defini- is required here and now; it legitimizes itself tively characterized as a period of slavery for without the aid of tradition. Freedom, just like individuals and the people at large. There are the Kingdom of God during the liturgy, comes temptations on the path from slavery to free- from the manifestation of freedom—from the dom: 1) the impossibility of achieving such a future, which we will not relinquish to slav- legal state and societal atmosphere, in which ery, but whose liberties we will defend against liberties would have been realized as a matter it. of course; 2) the pursuit of material wealth in Calls for a state of freedom, described in the general, dividing the people as a result of ego- “Address” of the churches (December 1st, tistical motives; 3) nostalgia for the relatively 2011), are not only rife with liberalism, but full slavery of the Soviet-Imperial “Egypt.” So, are also minimalistic: first comes a respect for as we see, this is a very contextual theology God’s law and humanity and, consequently, of liberation, especially if we are to remember a legal government. Second comes a respect that this free Ukraine is like a new Israel, and for the dignity of each person as a model of that the Russian Empire is like a new Egypt God and, as a result, the person’s rights. Third with regard to slavery, from which Ukraine comes societal solidarity. It is interesting that, should sever itself—this is an established mo- during this crisis, the conditions of the future tive of , which calls for have begun to manifest themselves with the social action. Taras Schevchenko, Ivan Franko, appearance of unprecedented solidarity, a and Lesya Ukrainka have naturally made use respect for the dignity of the other, and a le- of this plot, and the main problem they have gal government, which to this point has not encountered is a misunderstanding between been established. This solidarity is possible the national leaders who have prophesied this from below, but perhaps a legal government state of freedom and the nation itself, which, can only be put in place once there is a new in spite of its love for freedom, is quickly authority from above. A respect for the other throwing up its hands and preparing to give and his rights requires joint efforts from both up in the face of difficulties. society and the state. But the fact that this theology of liberation is On the 1st of December, 2011, the churches in keeping with the context of the Ukrainian turned to civil society with the idea of their cultural tradition is not even the main point liberal theology of liberation, but ended up here. The most important thing is that this is alienating themselves as a paradoxical model a liberal theology of liberation. There is not due to the their sensibilities and assertions. a single hint of struggle against capitalism in As a result, the Ukrainian intelligentsia began this initiative, but there is a struggle for capi- a movement on the 1st of December in favor talistic freedoms. Moreover, this condition of the Charter of the free man. Christian and of freedom is self-sufficient and doesn’t even theological motives were done away with, as

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was the discussion of solidarity and the neces- protest, they proved unnecessary. I joined the sity of a legal government. All that remained Maidan before students were attacked by Ber- was a single struggle for human rights. Instead kut. I met many priests and Christians—they of a contextualization of ideals, an appeal came were mostly wearing secular clothing—and about for the replacement of these ideals with none of them were allowed to use the mi- a pure and helpless liberalism, which had died crophone. Before the students were attacked, in the West by the 1960s. To put it crudely, Maidan was generally postmodern, and God this is a liberalism which hung in the air and had no designated place in it from the orga- neither had a solid grasp on tradition nor the nizers’ point of view. Both God and churches, future. And so, for the first time, the churches as well as political parties, were capable of di- dismissed their responsibilities, abandoned viding the movement; therefore Maidan was the ideological seed they had planted in soci- absent of both religiosity and party presence. ety, and alienated themselves. They thought a Everything changed after the attack on the bit about themselves in this instance as they students that Saturday, when the people be- did about the Lord God, who is willing to sew gan to gather in Mikhailovsky square. At his seeds, but all responsibility rests upon us, night, the UOC-KP sheltered wounded pro- upon the people as upon the soil, which must testors in the Mikhailovsky monastery. But grow itself and must afterwards report before as a result, even closer to UOC-KP’s dinner, the church how much fruit it has borne—and, no announcements could be decided upon if nothing has flourished, then it is we who are regarding the situation, which had appar- guilty. The churches’ desire to avoid guilt is ently become completely new. There had not the reason why the liberal Ukrainian theology only been a fear that everything had ended of liberation has not developed and why they and we were already in a new Belarus or Uz- were not prepared for the crisis. bekistan. That morning, we were also recall- Note that this all originated with the church- ing both Minsk and Andizhan as prototypes es, who had experienced the Maidan of 2004. of what had come upon us. There was an ap- Practically from the moment the protests be- prehension that, if protests were to continue gan, the only successful motion was an agree- after blood had been spilled, they would lead ment not to fight with one another during the to a division of the country that would work proceedings, which says a lot about the scheme in Russia’s benefit. And so, that morning, all of the situation: the UGCC is the most radical, we had was the feat of the Mikhailovsky mon- the UOC is for peace, and the UOC-KP is as it astery and Patriarch Svyatoslav’s announce- is inclined, but rests somewhere between the ment of the unacceptability of such violence radicalism of the UGCC and the peacemaking towards the people. The silence was laden attitude of the UOC. And, of course, the All- with sorrow. At this moment, it was burningly Ukrainian council of Churches and religious felt that not only did we need the voice of the organizations as a whole is against the ap- churches, but also help from God. This was an plication of violence and the infringement on experience of human feebleness against the human rights while it supports a resolution of state machine and, in order to liberate our- the crisis through a course of social dialogue. selves from unconfidence, fear, and disbelief It is unsurprising that, in light of the church- in the possibility of change, God was needed. es’ weak position during the first days of the Towards the middle of the day, the people all

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began to converge on Mikhailovsky square three political leaders—the liberal Yatsenyuk, in the thousands, and it became clear that the the nationalist Tyagnibok, and the realist protests had been renewed and that it was up Klychko—not take leadership of the protests, to the church to intercede before God and the but the church leaders also failed to. There state authorities. The UOC-KP put out an ap- were three temptations in this scenario: the peal and the UOC followed suit. And a prayer desire to preserve the purity of the religious, sprang up from the scene of Maidan. a separation from the secular, and especially This moment calls for a separate conceptu- from current politics. This is an obvious mis- alization. This prayer from Maidan had a take. In post-modern times, all demarcations more important unifying influence over the of the modern times are annihilated and, most people—this was immediately apparent fol- of all, this division of the sacred and the pro- lowing the attack on the students. To begin fane exists within the ideals of the Enlighten- with, there were both liberals and national- ment. The borders are eroding, and this was ists as Maidan. It was difficult to find a com- apparent then. It was evident that Maidan had mon patriotic ground because the nationalists been sanctified as a liturgical gathering. only considered themselves to be authentic But, in light of the demonization of state au- patriots. Religion was neutral territory, which thority and eschatological experience of the neither the nationalists nor the liberals could events that had taken place, both the protes- claim as their own. Religion was the terri- tors and the churches maintained political tory of the clergy, and this was the territory realism. Theologists criticized the overt sanc- in which everyone was united, because even tification of Maidan. The churches tried to non-believers found these prayers to be help- approach the authorities then in place with ful and appropriate. This prayer allowed the respect and did everything they could to es- churches to be with the people, but simulta- tablish a social dialogue and to keep Yanukov- neously to avoid responsibility for the events ich at his presidential post. The eschatological taking place. December was a month of ne- perception of events did not signify the ne- glected possibilities on the part of the church- cessity for sanctions, as we see in Duginism, es; they prayed and struggled for the preser- according to which any methods of the holy vation of a peaceful status in the protests, but war are justified in the final battle of good and offered nothing to the people in terms of guid- evil. I would say that, in all eschatologism, ance. They were afraid to step across the bor- the churches and believers at Maidan remem- der between pastoral and political leadership bered that they were fighting for real rights and, as a result, did not take responsibility and freedoms, and the only actions that were upon themselves for the fate of the people. A considered legitimate were those that did not paradoxical situation was being laid down: the annihilate or humiliate human dignity. But it churches were calling for civil responsibility, seems to me, personally, that the UGCC and but were themselves afraid to accept it. No one the UOC-KP should have headed the protest wanted to become the new father Gapon; ev- and approached the authorities with proces- eryone was afraid lead the faithful people by sions, and they should have proposed their Filippov’s example. These hesitations between ideal of a transformed Ukraine with the speci- Fillipov’s example and that of father Gapon is fication of the three principles outlined in the quite tragic. Let’s be honest; not only did the address of December 1st, 2011. This chance

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was neglected, but even if the church had attempted to purge Maidan, the Synod of the overcome the outdated notion of the division UGCC was already on the scene by nighttime of the sacred and the profane, it would still be at the very peak of the crisis. There was espe- a heavy undertaking to assume responsibility cially nothing to lose at this point, but all the for the fate of the protesting people. And this same, the church made no decisions with re- self-organization is capable of working mira- gard to the protest. cles, but comes up against the problem of lead- In January, this passivity towards Maidan ership. In light of weak political leadership in compounded the crisis, which in turn created December, the fact is simply that we also had a crisis of insufficient church presence. The weak church leadership—everyone was afraid state began to threaten the UGCC aloud with to take full responsibility. sanctions, and to threaten the other churches Besides that, Ukrainian churches have a nega- with hints. The churches concerned them- tive experience with confusion between the selves with proving their peaceful intentions, sacred and the political regarding Sunday Ad- the purity of their pastoral work at Maidan, elaja’s leadership and they are deathly afraid and the protest against state intentions to of being compared to him. As Zhirinovsky persecute them. It was a neglected moment in Russia represents the formerly laid-out when most clergy occupied themselves solely discreditation of the usual political state of with church holidays from December 7th to things, so in Ukraine is Adelaja regarding the the 19th. No one organized an effective mass previously manifested discreditation of Chris- change in the monastery, although this could tian political action. I think that, if there had have been done. The minimization of church not been a negative experience with Sunday, presence at Maidan was one of the reason the churches would have resolved not only to for the disappearance of Christian Gandhi- pray on Maidan before the assembly, but also ism and the beginning of a strong resistance to go peacefully to the government district; against Grushevsky. And again, when began or maybe they would not have resolved to do to pelt the police with stones, the protests of anything at all. Our churches have a clearly ex- the churches began. But the churches failed pressed deficit of productive thinking in gen- to propose any alternatives to aggressive at- eral, particularly in the political sphere. Our tack or passive resistance at Maidan; there churches are wonderful, but they are clueless was simply no such charisma in this situation, as to how to build a future for themselves and unfortunately. Resistance in the neutral zone the people. against Grushevsky consisted at first of three And again, this negative influence contained monks from the Desyatinny monastery, and the experience of pro-Russian “political Or- afterwards, a number of clergy that I could thodoxy.” The UOC compared of this phe- not comprehend, even though I myself took nomenon and, during these events, against the part in it. I know that this began with the self- purity of their own Orthodoxy, attempting not willed action made by the monks, and that to release the genie of political activism from their act was not sanction by the pro-Russian those on Russia’s side; and this was justified, head of their monastery. I know that the pro- but I do not understand why the UOC-KP and testors requested to remain neutral, because the UGCC didn’t also bow out of this. Further- they were weakened, and that believers in more, on the 11th of December, when Berkut the neutral zone were effectively sheltering

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the revolutionaries. But I do not understand already collapsed. To put it plainly, the former why, at the same time that they were making state authority was late with its most apparent an appeal for neutrality, they were throwing concessions to the opposition, conducted itself Molotov cocktails over our heads at the po- brutally and confrontationally, and deceived lice. At seven o’clock on the evening of the first the entire world community—this led to an day, when the monks were almost murdered, unfortunate result. I was disappointed by the irrational insanity How does this relate to today’s crisis? As be- which the resistance had degenerated into. If fore, there is no adequate proactive position the hundreds of clergymen and monks in de- for the Ukrainian churches. We have collided fense of the churches had not fled to the neu- with the fact that the ideology of the Russian tral zone, this would have changed history. world has turned into fascist ideology. This But again—nothing was decided upon. The is admittedly more similar to Italian fascism UOC is guilty here, because it could have com- than to the German variety, but the rebirth of manded the church to go to the neutral zone fascist state ideology is a fact. The contribution as a whole, as opposed to only those in favor from Orthodoxy to the birth of this version of doing so. How bitterly they joked about neu- fascism is also a fact; it will suffice to remem- trality and about us, full of monks who had ber how close to fascism Patriarch Cyrill came devoted their lives to God but, in light of the during his speech about the Russian world on crisis, had preferred to save themselves. And the 3rd of November, 2009. Under these con- young men and women stood alongside the ditions, the professed neutrality of the ROC, few servants who remained. In general, our which is being imposed upon the UOC, is re- churches found themselves at that point nei- lated to this fascism. Strangely, although the ther prepared for social leadership, nor for re- Ukrainian churches are not divided from Rus- sponsible and charismatic action. sia’s imperial connotations in general, they are On the other hand, the churches preserved a by no means pleased with this current form of virtual neutrality and were able in a few re- fascism. And they are not protesting this fas- spects to assume the role of mediator in ne- cism or against the use of Christianity (partic- gotiations of state authority and opposition ularly of Orthodoxy) in this fascist ideology. I leaders. At least in this respect, the churches would compare imperialism with pneumonia conducted themselves responsibly. They did and fascism with cancer. We are not saying that not preside over the confrontation, but sin- Russia no longer has pneumonia, but cancer. cerely empathized with all sides. I would say Instead, we are saying that, when your health that this was a neutrality with empathy. And improves, we will make peace with you. The in the cabinet during negotiations, the church- Ukrainian churches made an announcement es were in their element, being used to this about this on the 6th of June, having assured political situation, and were successful in this that they have hopes for peace between the respect. Let it be remembered that, in 1993, the Ukrainian and Russian people in the future. attempt towards mediation during Patriarch Peace in the future would be wonderful, but Aleksei’s political crisis was unsuccessful. In Christian testimony of this criminal ideology, February, the Ukrainian churches were suc- with which it is impossible to have a relation- cessful, and it is no longer their fault that, after ship while maintaining neutrality is what is a couple of days, the political compromise had necessary today, and this is nowhere to be found.

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And so the Ukrainian churches are perma- About the Author nently flawed. They are afraid to pass acer- Yuriy Chornomorets, Ukrainian theologian, tain boundary and, as a result, they do too Dr. phil. at the Institute for Philosophical En- little. If Russia’s problem is the fact that the lightenment and Science (http://www.ifon. ROC administers the alkali of burned-out ide- npu.edu.ua) of National Pedagogical Drago- ologies instead of the salt of Christianity, then manov University. Ukraine’s problem is the fact that they don’t e-mail: palamist [at] gmail.com administer this salt to society in sufficient quantity. This could be the death of Ukraine and her churches if their relations with social leadership does not change and they do not take more responsibility for this nation and its people.

Translated by Charlie Smith

Euxeinos 17/2015 66 Church-State-Relations After Maidan

by Alexander Sagan, National Academy of Science, Kiev

Abstract One crucial demand of the protesters on Maidan Square was a fundamental reform of the public administration. Yet the relationship between the church and state in Ukraine also requires restruc- turing. Due to the confusing allocation of authority, the state’s attempts to influence religious life and the privileging of large churches, the author calls for the abolition of the state department of religious affairs.

he situation after the Euro-Maidan measures (e.g. banning religious masses, the T(2013/14) differs significantly from the reduction of quotas for foreign dignitaries or situation after the Orange Revolution (2004). missionaries, the rejection of humanitarian aid The expectations are much greater now and deliveries, among other things). Ukrainian society is demanding profound The role which a state institution plays in re- reforms of the organizational structure of the ligious matters becomes very clear when com- state. The present state apparatus has to a paring the involvement of the church in the large extent lost its functionality and its justi- Orange Maidan with that observed during the fication under the new political and economic Euro-Maidan: in 2004 the state committee for conditions. The capacities of the post-Soviet religious matters fully exerted its administra- system of public administration have been ex- tive capacities and influence over the church hausted, and the society requires fundamental hierarchy, and therefore succeeded in signifi- changes regarding the areas of activity and ef- cantly restricting the potential of the church fectiveness of its state institutions. This will be during 2004’s Maidan, in particular when illustrated in my exploration of the example of compared to the current one. The All-Ukraini- church-state relations. an Council of Churches and Religious Organiza- tions did not exhibit the same determination it A State Institution for Religious Affairs? is now exhibiting, and therefore even neutral In Ukraine there is currently a rather popular appeals to peacefully solve the conflict in 2004 notion – even at the top of the religious organi- were rejected by some church leaders. Subse- zations – that the reintroduction of a state ad- quently separate appeals were voiced by alter- ministrative apparatus for religious matters (a native church associations, e.g. the Council of committee or even a ministry) is the not wisest Representatives of Christian Churches of Ukraine option. I also categorically reject this idea. In or the Council of Evangelical-Protestant Churches the form currently being proposed in Ukraine, of Ukraine. There were also individual appeals a state institution for religious matters is essen- made by the different heads of the churches. tially a mummified remnant of Stalin’s legacy. In 2013/14 the situation was entirely differ- If we refrain from sugarcoating it, it is basically ent, though. One of the reasons lies in the a comfortable means of controlling and shap- long-term decentralization of state influence ing the religious sphere, and there are diverse on the clergy and their resultantly increasing methods for doing so. They span from the dis- ability to independently coordinate and tackle tributive system (allocation of real estate, state problems of the church and society. This is privileges, the recognition or non-recognition particularly evident in the activities of the All- of legal persons, etc.) to bans and oppressive Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Or-

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ganizations, which has even independently es- given the responsibility modify the identified tablished high-level international diplomatic number of believers in the Ukrainian Ortho- contacts. dox Church – Moscow Patriarchate; it is clear, The current church-state relationship, which though, that this modification may only be is based on a strict separation between the made by the financial authorities. The Col- church, state, and school system, does not lection of Laws “Freedom of Belief and Con- meet the current needs of Ukrainian society. science and Religious Organizations” stipu- The state has continuously attempted to limit lates that state institutions within the realm the churches’ means for action and their in- of their responsibilities “exert state control to fluence on society and to intervene in vari- comply with the freedom of belief and con- ous ways into the internal matters of church science and religious matters.” Yet officials life (e.g. regarding their international activi- from the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of ties and relationships, the training of clergy- the Interior, the Security Service, and other in- men and church employees, as well as their stitutions delegate this authority to the Depart- financial concerns). Therefore, the attempts by ment for Religious Affairs, which evidently can- the state to regulate its relationship with the not make any decisions outside its restricted church down to the last detail are ineffective area of competence. under contemporary circumstances. One of the greatest problems of this current model of church-state relations is also the Muddled Responsibilities and shifting of tasks and double responsibilities. Competence Currently the Department for Religious Affairs There is also no longer a basis for doing so: in in the Ministry of Culture has practically been 2013, the government mandated the Ministry degraded to a secondary dimension and to a of Culture by law to “implement government registry office of religious institutions. Fur- policy in the area of religion” (Collection of thermore, this registration process is duplicat- Laws “Freedom of Belief and Conscience and ed by the State Registry Office in the Ministry Religious Organizations”, see RGOW 1/2013, of Justice to the extent that double registrations p. 7). However, the responsible department of religious associations take place in practice. directors of the Ministry of Culture perceived Yet the existence of a special Department for religious matters to be an unnecessary burden. Religious Affairs by no means guarantees that This in turn undermined the influence of the scandalous registrations do not occur. For ex- government over the needs of the religious ample, in the Cherkasy region a religious con- communities in these regions, and the final gregation was registered, which immediately effective means to sanction insubordination turned itself into a “Church of Satanism” after were lost. Those departments which had pre- registration. Moreover, the heads of several viously dealt with religious matters were re- registered churches were clearly conducting structured (de facto downsized) and merged dubious business by embezzling money and with departments of cultural affairs. real estate from the members of their congre- Therefore, most departments are not respon- gations. sible for cases even remotely having to do with Two additional functions of the Department religion. For example, the new Department for for Religious Affairs have entirely no practical Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Culture was significance. In view of the visa waiver for the

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citizens of most western countries, where most the past few years to use other forms of lever- missionaries come from, the granting of entry age to address such issues. The means of state visas has become entirely obsolete. Although institutions to pass laws or regulations were previously important, the approval of hu- so limited that several churches that had cul- manitarian aid deliveries has become a mere tivated direct contacts with parliamentarians formality. The Ministry of Social Affairs dealt were able to pass bills more effectively and with these approvals in the past few years and quickly than those that first “had to be grind- generally one single official has made the deci- ed by the mills of the Ministry”. The Depart- sion. ment for Religious Affairs, by contrast, must first coordinate all bills with the responsible minis- Privileging Individual Churches try in advance and, in addition, bills are only Why do the heads of certain churches support introduced to parliament by the ministerial the idea of reviving a special governmental cabinet. This process can take three to twelve institution for religious affairs and even the months. And if a proposed law requires mon- extension of its responsibilities? In my view, ey from the state budget, it is delayed from the this not only has to do with tradition. As an ar- very beginning. bitrator, such a central body presides not only over administrative issues and everyday mat- Abolition of the Institution for ters, but above all supports certain churches in Religious Issues their claims to exclusive rights and the protec- As part of the process of European integration tion of representative functions. For example, in Ukraine, national legislative procedures the applied statistical methods undeniably fa- must be adapted to European norms. In my vor the Orthodox Church communities, grant view, this means that an institution at the gov- them financial advantages, and even give them ernmental level that regulates the church-state moral justification for taking advantage of sta- relationship should be abolished. This is by no tistical tricks. In Ukraine there is nothing that means a new insight – a decree by President comes close to an objective statistical model to Yushchenko from 2005 to abolish the State calculate the number of adherents to any given Committee for Religious Matters stated that church. A count is taken of registered commu- the “elimination of the committee is justified nities and communities operating without reg- by the necessity to restructure state agencies istration, some of which were only founded in line with the obligations of Ukraine to- in order to claim not yet restituted churches wards the Council of Europe”. The decision for themselves without there being any ac- to abolish the State Committee for Religious tive community life to support them. The real Affairs was motivated by the President’s view number of believers of communities can vary that the government should not intervene into widely, but in official statistics they appear in religious life, because the practice of religion is the same category. The state authorities rely a private matter. If religious institutions faced on these statistics and privilege the “large” problems, they should turn to the courts. churches. However, due to the situation at that time, the The helplessness of the Department for Religious State Committee for Religious Affairs was instead Affairs of the Ministry of Culture in solving revived. The main reason can likely be seen in problematic issues has forced the churches in the fact that efforts were made to find a fun-

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damentally new regulation for governmental One example of this is the scandalous letter of and penal matters in cases of violations of the the Ministry of Culture from 3 January 2014 freedom of conscience. Ukraine was unable to to the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic systematically document violations against Church demanding it to cease its currently il- the freedom of belief and conscience and to in- legal activities. It was referring to the prayer troduce practical steps beyond administrative tent on Maidan Square (see RGOW 2/2014, p. and penal sanctions. The increasing disputes 7). After the Euro-Maidan it should be clear over real estate and church property, the gov- that administrative sanctions for the sake ernment’s favoritism based on the principle of discipline or for solving problems related of numerical strength and not the principle to citizens’ freedom of belief and conscience of equality before the law, and the churches’ must be abolished. Instead the institution of claim to play an important role in public life an ombudsman for freedom of belief and con- were the main catalysts for reviving a central science should be created, who is vested with State Body for Religious Affairs and National Mi- the necessary authority vis-à-vis the central norities. The governmental apparatus also still and regional government agencies. Essen- wanted to maintain the right to grant the status tially the functions which the state Depart- of a religious organization under strict control, ment for Religious Affairs assumes nowadays which had to do with the granted privileges coincide for the large part with the functions (cheaper electricity and gas supply, cheaper of an ombudsman. The institution of ombuds- credits, etc.). The independent state body for man can be based either within the ministe- religious matters and national minorities was rial cabinet, as is the case with the authorized not abolished until 2010 (see G2W 4/2011, p. representative for national minorities, fighting 11) and subsequently was set up in the Min- corruption, or European integration, or it can istry of Culture as the Department for Religious be based within the presidency as is the case Affairs. with the authorized representative for the pro- The expected transformation of the relation- tection of minors or Crimean Tartar Affairs. ships between the state and church must go An ombudsman for religious matters should, hand in hand with a comprehensive change above all, systematically register violations in how the government agencies deal with against the freedom of belief and conscience religion. When Stalin created the Agency for and react to these violations with practical the Russian Orthodox Church, he gave the steps, which are not based on administra- responsible KGB General Karpov precise in- tive sanctions. Moreover, he should promote structions for how it should be directed. A the churches’ own organizational potential, European-oriented policy regarding religion which can have a positive impact on the gov- must be grounded upon other principles than ernment and on society. Therefore, churches the totalitarian principles introduced during should cease their ongoing efforts to win over Soviet times. This way, there would be no more the Department for Religious Affairs, because such absurd statements as that of the director they are senseless. of the Department for Religious Matters and Na- The introduction of a European procedure for tional Minorities, who refers to tasks entrusted solving problems regarding the freedom of to him by the security service of Ukraine as belief and conscience calls for a legal solution the basis of the activities of this department. instead of administrative-bureaucratic direc-

Euxeinos 17/2015 70 Alexander Sagan

tives; this would also span to church life in the pertains to essentially all areas in the lives of state. In this context, the role of the associations religious minorities. of religious organization increases (which can The autocratic introduction of a so called “ex- already be observed currently). They should panded legal space” for certain religious in- gradually take over the function of coordina- stitutions, which may not even formally con- tors of (inter-)church initiatives and could also tradict the conventional legislation, should assume effective observation functions. definitely be reconsidered and modified if necessary. European experiences show that New Model of Church-State Relations there are different possibilities of solving this Such organized changes are decisive for the in- problem. Besides general legislation which troduction of a fundamentally different model regulates the relationship between the church of church-state relations – for a model which and state, there are also special agreements is based on a partnership between the state, or concordats under the condition that state church and religious organizations. This new requirements are met in one way or another. model would result in severe changes in the Something comparable is now developing relationship between the church and state, e.g. in Ukraine as well, where the All-Ukrainian the transformation of the so called special sta- Council of Churches and Religious Organizations tus of religious institutions to a normal social has de facto obtained the exclusive entitlement establishment. This is certainly a painful path, to represent the rights and claims of religious as the state aid, which is the pleasant side of organizations in the relationships between the the comfortable regulation of church-state church and state. For many years the respon- relations, is extraordinarily practical for the sible parties in Ukraine only conducted talks large churches. with representatives of this organization, and The already ongoing introduction of a part- on socially important occasions the religious nership-like model for the church-state rela- organizations were only represented by rep- tionship in Ukraine has the particularity that resentatives of the All-Ukrainian Council of the current cooperation between both sides Churches and Religious Organizations. It is obvi- forestalls the corresponding legal foundation ous that the legal stipulation of the status of which it should enable in the first place. This certain churches (or their interest associations) also creates problems: the state should above is only a matter of time in Ukraine. all unambiguously determine whether it actu- A system of mutual obligations which is sup- ally ensures the equality of all based ported by law also contributes to gaining a on the equality of all religions before the law. grip on the problem of subversive propa- This detail is decisive. Currently only equal- ganda and agitation, the teaching of religious ity before the law is guaranteed. However, is intolerance towards other religious commu- there really an equal status of religious orga- nities or political (primarily pro-Ukrainian) nizations, thus their equal treatment in terms convictions – which are very evident among of rights, possibilities, and obligations in com- representatives of several churches. parison with other subjects in Ukraine? The answer is no. Irrespective of the demands of About the Author smaller religious organizations, they are not Alexander Sagan, Professor of Religious Stud- treated as equals of the large churches. This ies at the Skovoroda Institute for Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. e-mail: ol.sagan [at] gmail.com Euxeinos 17/2015 71 Bibliography

Krawchuk, Andrii / Bremer, Thomas (eds.): Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Other- ness. Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue. New York, NY 2014.

Naumescu, Vlad: Modes of religiosity in eastern christianity: religious processes and social change in Ukraine, Münster 2007.

Plochij, Serhij/Sysyn, Frank E. (eds.): Religion and nation in modern Ukraine. Edmonton 2003.

Wanner, Catherine: State secularism and lived religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, Washington, D.C 2012.

Gitelman, Zvi Y.: Jewish identities in postcommunist Russia and Ukraine: an uncertain ethnicity. Cambridge 2012.

Bremer, Thomas: Religion and the conceptual boundary in Central and Eastern Europe: encounters of faiths, Basingstoke 2008.

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