’s March to Shiloh Revisited Harold Lew Wallace*

For two days in the springtime of 1862, near a church named Shiloh, there occurred one of the most controversial campaigns of the Civil War. Fresh from the capture of -the most successful Union victory so far in the West-the Union leaders were optimistically preparing an- other offensive against the Confederates from a base at Pittsburg Landing on the River. Major General Ulysses S. , in charge of the operation, planned to con- solidate the Fort Donelson victory with a decisive campaign to end the Confederate threat in the West. What he did not foresee was that the Confederates, far from collapse, would seek to regain their 1osses.l The Confederates, too, were thinking in terms of offense. The result was Shiloh, a surprise attack by Confederate troops and a near rout of the Union forces the first day. This was an encounter which, after two days of fighting, saw the armies in nearly the same position they had held before with each claiming victory.2 Leaders on both sides were bitterly assailed for blunders made in the confusion of the first day’s fighting. The people of the North condemned Grant, Brigadier General William T. Sherman, and Major General Lew Wallace for their actions at Shiloh.a Grant and Sherman were later to recoup their reputations. Wallace, whose troops had been instrumental in the capture of Fort Donelson, was never to escape the military discredit he had incurred at Shiloh. In the confused movements before the battle, the Union plan had been to strike the Confederates at the railroad junc-

*Harold Lew Wallace is a Lilly Fellow in American History at University and a history teacher at Mooresville High School, Mooresville, Indiana. He is not related to General Lew Wallace. This article is a revision of a paper prepared for a course given by Professor Oscar Osburn Winther at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. 1 J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruc- tion (2d ed., Boston, 1961), 204-205. As much as possible, the military ranks given are those of the individuals at the time they are discussed in this article. This information has been obtained from the official reports and from Mark Mayo Boatner 111, The Civil War Dictionary (, 1959). 2 Randall and Donald, Civil War and Reconstruction, 205-206. 3 Stanley F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee: A Military Histow (New York, 1941), 122. 20 Indium Magazine of History tion of Corinth, Mississippi, twenty-five miles from Pittsburg Landing.( The armies of Grant and Major General were to merge at the region around Pittsburg Landing and from this point move against the enemy. Grant and Major General Henry W. Halleck, the commander of the De- partment of the West, had worked out the battle plan. As district commander, Grant would move his army to Pittsburg Landing. At the same time he would arrange to bring Buell’s forces from Savannah, Tennessee, where Buell soon would arrive with the Army of the Ohio. After the armies merged, Halleck would lead the attack upon the Confederates com- manded by General Albert Sidney John~ton.~ Everything at first looked all right. In March, 1862, the divisions of Grant’s army took up positions in the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing.+I Grant remained at Savannah while awaiting the arrival of Buell. Buell had met delays, and on April 5 it seemed that the attack might have to be made without him. Then, on that day, Brigadier General William Nelson arrived at Savannah with an advance of Buell’s army. Grant learned that Buell would arrive the next day.’ Nelson requested the transportation of his troops to Pittsburg Landing. But Grant saw no need for haste; al- though intermittent skirmishing had taken place recently around Pittsburg Landing, Grant told Nelson that “there will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the rebels are fortified.”* Unfortunately Grant saw unclearly. On the morning of April 6, Johnston with about forty thousand troops struck at Pittsburg Landing, where the main concentration of Union forces was near the Shiloh church three miles from the landing. Shouted Sherman, whose division received the first blow: “My God, we are attacked.”O The Union plan, it developed, had a major flaw-the Confederates had refused to remain at Corinth.

4 Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General (5 vols., New York, 1949-1959), 111, 310. 5Bruce Catton, U. S. Grant and the American Military Tradition (Boston.. 1954). 82. 6 Ulysses k. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, ed. by E. B. Long (Cleveland, Ohio, 1952), 169-170. 7 Ibid., 172. 8J. F. C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (2d ed., Bloomington, Ind., 1958), 105. 9 Ibid. Lew WaUace's March to Shiloh Revisited 21

Some six miles away at Crump's Landing, Wallace, who was in command of the Third Division, heard the heavy firing. He interpreted it as a general Confederate attack. He ordered the three brigades of his division alerted and under arms. Then, anticipating that Grant would soon pass upstream from Savannah, he went to the river bank to await orders.'O Wallace had anticipated correctly. Grant also had heard the firing at Pittsburg Landing and, on the boat Tigress, was moving toward the battle. At Crump's Landing, Grant ordered the boat close enough to shore to speak with Wallace. Un- certain whether the attack was a general one, he directed Wallace to remain in readiness." Grant moved on to Pittsburg Landing. He later placed the hour of his arrival there at about 8:OO A.M.'2 While Grant was moving upstream, Wallace prepared to concentrate his three brigades, which were scattered along the road leading from Crump's Landing toward Adamsville. He ordered the First Brigade, at the landing, and the Third, at Adamsville, to close in on the Second at Stoney Lonesome.Ia Anticipating instructions from Grant, he ordered a horse saddled at Crump's Landing for the expected messenger and then followed the First Brigade to Stoney Lonesome. Here Grant's order reached him. The messenger was Captain A. S. Baxter, a quartermaster on Grant's staff." It was upon reaching Pittsburg Landing that Grant learned the attack was a general Confederate offensive. The battle of Pittsburg Landing, or Shiloh, was underway ; con- sequently, the disposition of forces had to be changed. There was no need for the Third Division to remain at Crump's

10 Horn, Amy of Tennessee, 131. 11 Ibid. 12 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 173. 1S''Some mystery attaches to the inaction of the Third Brigade during the morning. General Wallace states in his report that it was concentrated on the Second, meaning, as he explains to the editors, that the order for the concentration had been sent, and, he presumed, obeyed. Ross delivered the order to Colonel Charles R. Woods, then in command at Adamsville, and Captain Ware, Wallace's second aid carried a repetition of it-both during the morning. . . . Yet Colonei Whittlesey, who during the day, by seniority of commission, succeeded to the command of the brigade, says in his report that three of the four regiments 'received orders to march with their trains about 2 P.M., and to advance toward Pittsburg Landing in advance of the trains at 4 P.M.' " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. by Robert Under- wood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (4 vols., New York, 1884-1888), I, 608. 14 Ibid., 607. . APRIL 6, 1862: THE ROUTES OF NELSON AND WALLACE

Reproduced from Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Fin& a General (6 vols.. New York. 1949-1959). 111, 880 with the permission of The Macmillan Company.

There has always been some controversy about the position from which Wallace began his countermarch. The map which he included in his memorandum of March 14, 1863, to Major General Henry W. Halleck and which is printed in U.S., War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 177 and the one given in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed. by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (4 vols., New York, 1884-1888), I, 608 differ significantly in topography from Williams’ map and from each other. But they agree in placing the point of countermarch farther to the south than does the above map. According to the editors of Battles and Leaders, Wallace had informed them that his “map is incorrect, and that its inaccuracy arose from a prevalent confusion of the names of Snake and Owl creeks. That map, however, faithfully represents General Wallace’s claim that the head of his column advanced to within a mile of what had been the right of the army” (I, 608). On the other hand, Williams insists in Lincoln Finds a General that Wallace “when he went over his route of march with the battlefield historian in November, 1901, . . . had to concede that the point at which he had turned around was four miles short of where, for forty years, he had believed it was” (111, 392). Lew Wallace’s March to Shiloh Revisited 23

Landing. Indeed it was imperative that it join the main army immediately, and Grant directed Captain Baxter to order Wallace to advance.1s Grant gave the order orally, but Baxter, a paper-minded quartermaster, made a copy of it while he was going down the river to Crump’s Landing.lo At Stoney Lonesome, Baxter handed Wallace the unsigned order which, as Wallace later wrote, “directed me to leave a detach- ment to guard the public property at Crump’s Landing, then march my division and form junction with the right of the army; after junction I was to form line of battle at a right angle with the river.”’? Wallace sent two regiments back to the landing and at noon marched from Stoney Lonesome to join the right of the lines as they had existed at the start of the attack.’s He was familiar with the road he was following. Foreseeing that it might become necessary to join the main army, Wallace earlier had ordered his cavalry, now guiding the march, to scout the road to the point where he expected to join the troops of Brigadier General W. H. L. Wallace, a man, whom, although no relative, he knew better than Sherman whose troops also were in the vi~inity.‘~ It was at this juncture that Wallace’s arrangements began to be embarrassing to Grant. While Wallace was marching from Stoney Lonesome, Grant was viewing the battle from the rear of the Union lines. At noon, he realized the right of the was falling back toward Pittsburg Land- ing. Several hours had passed since his order to Wallace, and there was no word of Wallace’s contact with the main army. The situation was getting out of control. Grant sorely needed the Third Division. With its help he might stop the Con- federate advance and perhaps counterattack. About noon he sent Captain William R. Rowley to urge Wallace forward.20 Going via the river road, Rowley went to Crump’s Landing, and then proceeded, he later judged, five or six miles before reaching the rear of Wallace’s divi- sion. Rowley later wrote that he was surprised and disturbed when he found the entire division resting. Moving to the

16 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 173. 16 [Lewis Wallace], Lew Wallace: An Autobiographg (2 vols., New York, 1906), I, 464; hereafter this work will be cited in this article as Wallace, Autobiography. 17 U.S., War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 175; hereafter this work will be cited in this article as Official Records. 1sBattles and Leaders, I, 607. 10 Ibid., 609. 20 Williams, Lincoln Fin& a General, 111, 369. 24 Indianu Magazine of Hiatom head of the column, Rowley found Wallace and gave him, along with Grant’s order, the first information that the Con- federates had driven back the Union forces.*1 Wallace ordered a countermarch and by midafternoon his First Brigade started to move toward the river road along a crossover road.z2 The division seemed incapable of getting to the front. About 3:30 P.M., Colonel John A. Rawlins and Captain James B. McPherson of Grant’s staff arrived at the division crossover.*s Their mission, like Rowley’s, was to hasten Wallace’s advance.24 Approximately seven-and-a-half hours had passed since Grant’s first order to Wallace. The Third Division had been marching for three-and-a-half hours and was still some distance from the main army. The march continued over the crossover toward Snake Creek bridge.25 Before reaching the bridge, Wallace received a report that it was in enemy control. The column halted, and McPherson and Rawlins, with the cavalry, rode ahead to check. They returned an all-clear report. Darkness was near when the Third Division began to cross Snake Creek. By 7:OO P.M., they were finally in position, facing north, their left connecting with Sherman’s right. It was now eleven hours after Grant’s first order. Seven hours had elapsed since the start of the march from Stoney Lonesome. The first day’s fighting had ended shortly before Wallace’s arrival.2e The fat was thereby in the fire. On the basis of one day’s confusion-the confusion of a battlefield in flux-Wallace found his military career virtually at an end. He never forgot this piece of misfortune caused by his failure to arrive in time for the first day’s fighting. In a letter to Grant, he later wrote: “The terrible reflections in your indorsement on my official report of the battle, and elsewhere, go to the world wholly unqualified. It is not possible to exaggerate the mis- fortune thus entailed upon me.”2T This letter, written in 1884, twenty-two years after Shiloh, was one of the hundreds Wallace wrote defending his behavior at Shiloh. The per- sistency of these efforts at vindication which ended only with his death reveals the passion with which he worked to remove the blemish of criticism.

21 Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. XI pt. 1, p. 179. 22Battles and Leaders, I, 608. 2s Zbid. 24 Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, 111, 372. 25Battlea and Leaders, I, 608. 26 Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, 111, 379-381. 2TBattlea and Leadercr, I, 610. Lew WaUace’s March to Shiloh Revkited 25

Shiloh ended a career that until then had been as promis- ing as any in the Union army. At thirty-four years of age, Wallace was the army’s youngest major general. The rank then was the army’s highest.28 Wallace’s original commission had come by political appointment. Feeling that the West Point officers discriminated against political appointees, he took pride in his demonstrated ability as a military strategist and effective commander of troops. Perhaps he was a bit outspoken. There was a romantic side to Wallace’s nature- later revealed in his books but exhibited during the war in colorful battle reports-which led him to view battles in terms of dash and glory. Nor was he hesitant about criticizing his superiors in these reports.29 Shiloh, with its aftermath of criticism, ended all this. There were no formal charges against Wallace. He did not lose his rank, Removed from active duty for a time, he eventually was reinstated but was never again given a battlefield command. He served out the remainder of the war in lesser assignments. As military commander of Cincinnati, he fortified the city and saved it from possible sacking by Confederate He later served as military commander in Maryland, where by cleverly mixing military force and political astuteness he secured ’s votes for Lincoln’s re-election in 1864.31 There was but one relief in the otherwise uneventful commands after Shiloh. This was the , an important engagement. On the probable theory that Con- federate forces were in no position to threaten Washington, the defenses of the capital had been neglected. Then came the unexpected, for in July, 1864, Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early and his army marched into Maryland.3* An attack of the capital seemed imminent. Wallace with his small com- mand moved out from Baltimore to intercept Early’s forces. Having had his command enlarged by piecemeal reinforce- ment, he engaged the Confederate forces on the Monocacy River near Frederick, Maryland. Forced to retreat, he moved slowly back in face of Early’s advance. These delaying tactics were successful : Washington was decisively reinforced during the interval of retreat. Realizing that he had lost the ad- vantage of surprise and superior numbers, Early withdrew.3a

28Irving McKee, “Ben-Hur” Wallace: The Life of General Leu, Wallace (Berkeley, Calif., 1947) , 46. 29 Ibicl., 63. 80 Zbid., 61. 31 Zbid., 68-70. 82 Wallace, Autobiography, 11, 698-701. 88 McKee, “Ben-Hur”Wallace, 72-73. 26 Indium Magazine of History

In time Wallace received credit for his actions at Monocacy. Some measure of his earlier prestige was restored. Before resigning from the army in November, 1865, he participated in two famous war trials: the court-martial of those charged with conspiracy in the assassination of Lincoln and the trial by special military commission of Capain , the notorious keeper of the Andersonville, Georgia, prison.34 The Battle of Monocacy notwithstanding, conspicuously lacking in all this activity was the thing Wallace desired above all others-the chance to recapture the brilliancy of his early career and the esteem he had once enjoyed. Frustration probably accounts for the fact that Wallace, reviewing the Battle of Shiloh years after, changed his mind on what might have happened had he been allowed to complete his original march. For a while he believed his division would have been trapped behind Confederate lines if he had continued.35 Years later, when he realized that only a belated exoneration from Grant could clear his name, he began to speculate about what might have happened had he been able to surprise the Con- federates by coming up behind them.36 Wallace’s letter to Grant in 1884 shows how severe and lasting was the criticism of Wallace’s behavior at Shiloh. But was it just? Grant‘s endorsement, referred to in this letter, was added to Wallace’s report of April 12, 1862. After questioning the accuracy of the report on two points and noting that he had tried to hurry Wallace to the scene of the battle, Grant had written: “This report in some other particulars I do not fully indorse.”37 Grant’s statement was not especially harsh, but it raised doubts about Wallace’s conduct. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton removed Wallace from command in the summer of 1862.38 At first Wallace was unaware that he had been relieved. Because of his part in the second day’s fighting, he believed he had been a success at Shi10h.~~It was almost a year after the battle before he learned of Grant’s damaging endorsement.‘lo

34 Ibid., 76, 83. 36Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 176. 36 Wallace, Autobiography, I, 467-468. 37 Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 174. Grant’s endorsement, dated April 25, 1862, stated that he had given Wallace an order at 8 A.M. on April 6, 1862, to remain in readiness, a fact which Wallace had omitted in his official report. Grant also insisted that the order brought to Wallace by Baxter would have arrived not later than 11 A.M. on April 6. 38 Wallace, Autobiography, 11, 590. 99 McKee, “Ben-Hur” Wallace, 51. 4O Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, pp. 174-176, 188-189. Lew Wallace’s March to Shiloh Revisited 27

Believing the report unfair, Wallace on March 14, 1863, defended himself in a letter to Halleck, the commander of the Department of the West. First he stated that Halleck’s office was prejudiced against him because of his failure to partici- pate in the first day’s fighting at Shiloh. Hoping it would suffice, he then gave a detailed explanation of his acts of April 6, 1862 “to vindicate my conduct from unjust asper- sion~.”~~ Wallace’s letter went to Grant for remarks. Rather than make a detailed report, Grant had Rowley, Rawlins, and McPherson submit statements, but he did not request a report from Baxter, the first messenger. The three men’s statements proved damaging. Their reports charged or im- plied that Wallace failed to follow Grant‘s first order, became lost in the course of his march, and responded slowly to the emergency of Shiloh despite their Grant vouched for the accuracy of these statements and later repeated parts of them in his memoirs.4s Still, one wonders about this indictment. The first point to consider in reviewing the criticism of Wallace is the original order. Grant later wrote that he had given the order “to march immediately to Pittsburg [Landing], by the road nearest the river.”44 If this was the order Wallace received, he failed to follow it. But Wallace claimed the order “directed me to leave a detachment to guard the public property at Crump’s Landing, then march my division and form junction with the right of the army; after junction I was to form line of battle at a right angle with the river.”45 There is reason to believe that Wallace’s recollection of the order was nearer the truth than that of Grant. The state- ments of Rowley, Rawlins, and McPherson gave three dif- ferent descriptions of the order. Although not intended to exonerate Wallace, their reports were more consistent with Wallace’s than with Grant’s version. Grant mentioned nothing of the directive to join the right of the army; yet all three of his aides wrote that Wallace received orders to that effect.46 In addition Rawlins wrote that Wallace’s division was to “form in line at right angles with the river,”47 a point men-

41 Zbid., 176. 42 Zbid., 178-188. 43 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 173-174. 44 Battles and Leaders, I, 468. 45 Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 175. 4.3 Zbid., 179-185. 47 Zbid., 185. 28 Indium Magazine of History tioned by Wallace but omitted from Grant’s account. Rawlins also corroborated Wallace’s statement that orders had been received to leave a small detachment to guard Crump’s Land- ing before starting the Wallace’s actions after Baxter had handed him the order were certainly consistent with his description of it. After sending the detachment to Crump’s Landing, he moved out on a road which would have taken him to the right of the battle line as it had existed in the morning. By all accounts the order was not precise, but this would have been a reason- able interpretation. Confusion over the order was doubtlessly Grant’s error. Wallace’s adjutant general, Captain Frederick Knefler, had misplaced the order delivered by Ba~ter.‘~This was un- fortunate since it would have clarified the matter of content. But it would not have modified the circumstances concerning delivery of the order to Wallace. Grant later recalled that the order was oral but that he understood Baxter had written it down. He conceded that he had never seen Baxter’s memo- rand~m.~O In truth, it is not even certain that Grant saw Baxter. Rowley and Rawlins gave conflicting accounts on this point. Rowley wrote that Grant had given the order directly to Baxter.61 Rawlins wrote that he had taken the oral order from Grant to Baxter.62 No doubt Grant knew where he wanted Wallace’s division to move, but the order-even Grant’s version of it-was not explicit. The oral order, more- over, especially if twice relayed, invited misinterpretation. Grant later said he was not certain what order Wallace had received.68 Nor is there any reason to accept the verdict of Grant’s aides that Wallace was lost. Finding Wallace on a road taking him to a point away from the existing battle line, the aides assumed him lost and wandering aimlessly. They sup- posed Wallace had missed the river road as he marched from Crump’s Landing. Wallace supposed the necessity for the change of direction was due to a bad turn of battle after receipt of the original order.54 Thus, he assumed the aides

48 Zbid. 49 Battles and Leaders, I, 607. 60 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 183. 5l Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 179. 62 Zbid., 186. 53 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 183. 64 Wallace, Autobiography, 466-467. Lew Wallace’s March to Shiloh Revisited 29

knew the reason for his position. The staff officers did not request an explanation, nor did Wallace suspect there was reason to make 0ne.~5 The charge of Rowley, Rawlins, and McPherson that the march was slow merits consideration. Rowley emphasized that he had found Wallace’s division at rest.se Because he knew the seriousness of the situation, this understandably struck him as indifference on Wallace’s part. That Wallace was unaware of the turn of battle before his arrival did not occur to Rowley. Rowley and Rawlins later mentioned that Wallace, in turning toward Pittsburg Landing, counter- marched rather than reversed his divi~ion.~?Countermarch was the slower maneuver, but it showed foresight. Wallace had begun his march in battle formation, with proper displace- ment of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. By countermarching Wallace avoided the probable confusion and delay that would have resulted in reassembling prior to moving into battle. All three of Grant’s staff officers testified that Wallace, at the head of the division, frequently dismounted, often sitting down to rest. This, as Rawlins in particular intimated, seemed to prove the needless deliberation and indifference with which Wallace responded to the urgency of the situation. Even so, such a conclusion seems inaccurate. Wallace’s pauses, executed according to Rawlins’ account with “the utmost coolness and indifferen~e,”~~were not made out of indifference to nor ignorance of the plight of the Union forces at Pittsburg Landing. The context of the three reports reveals that Wallace paused periodically to allow the division to close ranks. Once he halted his division while the cavalry checked a rumor that the Snake Creek bridge, over which his division would march, was under Confederate To insure that his division would not straggle into a pitched battle or become ambushed in territory recently held by Confederates was sound strategy on Wallace’s part. Grant’s officers, moreover, were with Wallace for only part of the fifteen-mile, six-and-a-half-hour march. A com- parison of the speed of Wallace’s march with that of Nelson’s leading brigade from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing in- dicated little difference.e0 It is interesting that Nelson re-

55 Battles and Leaders, I, 610. 66 Official Records, Ser. I, Vol. X, pt. 1, p. 179. KTIbid., 180, 187. 58 Ibid., 188. 59 Zbid., 187. 60 Battles and Leaders, I, 609. 30 Indiana Magazine of History ceived no criticism for lack of haste. Part of Wallace’s march was through swamp lands, too, a fact that the staff officers ignored in their statements.6’ Was Wallace a victim of circumstances at Shiloh? In a sense he was: Grant’s error in the matter of the order was responsible for much of the misunderstanding that formed the basis of the charges by his staff officers. But Wallace, too, made a mistake at Shiloh. Instead of remaining at Crump’s Landing, he anticipated Grant’s order and moved to Stoney Lonesome without informing Grant. According to the situation at the beginning of the battle, this move was sound. Stoney Lonesome marked a central point for the con- centration of Wallace’s scattered brigades. And the road from there which his cavalry had scouted led to the front. After receipt of Grant’s order, if one can assume that the order was as Wallace later described it, there was nothing to suggest that he had anticipated wrongly. Thus, with Grant’s error subtly reinforcing his own, Wallace began his unfortunate march to Shiloh. In conclusion, one must say that Wallace was not guilty of failure to follow orders. He was not lost nor was he need- lessly slow on the march. Ironically he was guilty of the one charge which was not directed against him-he should have remained at Crump’s Landing. Had he stayed there he would have undoubtedly become involved in the first day’s fighting. Grant‘s order, no matter how ambiguous, apparently would have reached him sooner. Striking is the fact that Grant’s officers after leaving Pittsburg Landing started first to Crump’s Landing with their messages. Perhaps after Baxter’s arrival Wallace would have followed the route he ultimately took, but the staff officers sent to hasten him forward would have reached him in time for his division to join in the battle that day. Had Wallace after receiving Grant‘s order begun his march from Crump’s Landing, it would have paralleled the Union retreat and the sounds of firing. These sounds were hard to gauge from the angle of his march out from Stoney Lonesome. Sounds of firing would have alerted him to the turn the battle had taken. If the Union line had held that morning, the route Wallace took would have been shorter than the one along the river road. But the line did not hold. Wallace anticipated wrongly. On this point, then, the case inclines against him.

Wallace, Autobiography, I, 470-473.