Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of ) ) Modernization of Section 25.117 of the ) RM-11861 Commission’s Rules for Modifications of ) NGSO FSS Systems in the New Space Age )

REPLY COMMENTS OF VIASAT, INC.

John P. Janka Amy R. Mehlman Viasat, Inc. 901 K Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20001

Christopher J. Murphy Viasat, Inc. 6155 El Camino Real Carlsbad, CA 92009 September 1, 2020

1

SUMMARY

The record in this proceeding raises core policy concerns that are common with those in two other NGSO FSS proceedings now before the Commission:

• The need to ensure equitable access to limited radio frequency spectrum, and other orbital resources. • The need to facilitate robust competition in the provision of a wide variety of satellite-based broadband services. • The importance of regulatory certainty to enable investment and innovation.

Viasat urges the Commission to consolidate all of these matters into an omnibus proceeding that also includes the issues Viasat raised in this matter about:

• How certain NGSO FSS operators are trying to misuse the Commission’s existing rules to squelch competition by deploying many more satellites than necessary, including unreliable satellites that present collision risks, to create large numbers of band splitting events that block access to critical spectrum by other NGSO FSS systems, but that barely affect a “mega-constellation.”

• How a given NGSO FSS mission can be accomplished with fewer, and more capable, satellites, which (i) allows more NGSO systems to coexist within the same orbits (i.e., altitudes) and spectrum, (ii) provides consumers with more service options and results in more competition, and (iii) lowers the risk of collisions and orbital debris.

Dis-incentivizing such preclusive behavior by certain NGSO FSS operators would enhance space safety, facilitate innovation and competition, and allow more operators to effectively share the limited physical orbital resource and the limited spectrum resource.

While Viasat agrees with Kuiper’s desire to address Commission rules that “undermine[] the certainty and fairness the Commission envisioned for NGSO FSS operators when it established its processing round and spectrum sharing rules and procedures,”1 Viasat disagrees with those commenters who suggest replacing (i) the longstanding “Teledesic standard,” under

1 Kuiper Systems LLC, Petition for Rulemaking, Modernization of Section 25.117 of the Commission’s Rules for Modifications of NGSO FSS Systems in the New Space Age, RM-11861 (filed July 9, 2020), at 1.

i which the aggregate predicted impact of a modification application on the NGSO FSS interference environment is evaluated in determining whether the application should be considered in a new processing round, with (ii) a new standard that considers only individual contributors to predicted interference, or that considers changes in certain orbital parameters apart from any resulting impact on interference.

For decades, the Commission has taken a holistic view in assessing the potential for interference from an NGSO modification application. This includes grants of two recent modification applications, in which one commenter in this proceeding relied upon dynamic interference-to-noise (“I/N”) analyses in assessing whether the proposed modification, in toto, would result in a significant increase in interference (i.e., more band-splitting events).

In any event, there is no basis for singling out one element of a system design—number of satellites—when determining the procedural treatment of a modification application. If the test were that simple (counting the satellites), then having fewer satellites but causing significantly more interference would not matter. Nor is there any basis for ignoring other potential contributors to likely band-splitting events, such as changes in orbital planes, orbit altitude, inclination, minimum elevation angles employed, or changes in emitted power flux density (PFD). In all cases, the correct answer depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the specifics of the NGSO FSS system design, and the interference mitigation techniques being proposed.

Finally, the “loophole” in the Commission’s orbital debris mitigation rules is not the one raised by one commenter. Rather, the loophole is the ability of large LEO constellations to create undue aggregate collision risk by (i) launching unreliable satellites that pose collision risks, (ii) failing to conduct proper collision risk assessments in FCC applications, (iii) failing to

ii report satellites that do not perform as expected at injection orbit and that must be de-orbited, and (iv) employing a “hide-the-ball” approach that does not assess collision risk at the altitude at which satellites will spend most of their orbital lives.

The Commission should close this loophole by (i) creating incentives to launch reliable satellites that minimize collision risk, and by (ii) denying authority to applicants that do not fulfill their commitments to the Commission and that neglect space safety in order to maximize their own short-term financial gains, even when they are capable of designing and manufacturing sufficiently-reliable satellites.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SUMMARY ...... i A. An Omnibus NGSO FSS Rules Proceeding is Needed to Address Urgent Issues...... 1 B. No Changes to Section 25.117 Are Warranted...... 4 C. Space Safety and the Creation of Undue Collision Risk ...... 12 CONCLUSION...... 14

Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of ) ) Modernization of Section 25.117 of the ) RM-11861 Commission’s Rules for Modifications of ) NGSO FSS Systems in the New Space Age )

REPLY COMMENTS OF VIASAT, INC.

Viasat, Inc. (“Viasat”) submits these reply comments to the Petition for Rulemaking filed by Kuiper Systems LLC on July 9, 2020.2

A. An Omnibus NGSO FSS Rules Proceeding is Needed to Address Urgent Issues.

The Kuiper Petition is one of three proceedings pending before the Commission regarding the development of rules to enable today’s NGSO FSS systems. The first involves the pending 2018 petitions for reconsideration with respect to (among other things) the

Commission’s 2017 band splitting rules, and the adequacy of NGSO EPFD limits to protect GSO systems.3 The second is the SpaceX petition to change the band-splitting rules adopted under the

2 Kuiper Systems LLC, Petition for Rulemaking, Modernization of Section 25.117 of the Commission’s Rules for Modifications of NGSO FSS Systems in the New Space Age, RM-11861 (filed July 9, 2020) (“Kuiper Petition”).

3 See Update to Parts 2 and 25 Concerning Non-Geostationary, Fixed Satellite Service Systems and Related Matters, Report & Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd 7809 (2017) (“2017 NGSO R&O”); Public Notice, Petitions for Reconsideration of Action in IB Docket No. 16-408, Rpt. No. 3084 (rel. Jan. 26, 2018), Petition for Reconsideration of WorldVu Satellites Limited, IB Docket No. 16-408 (filed Jan. 17, 2018) (seeking reconsideration of the band-splitting rule); Petition for Reconsideration of Viasat, Inc., IB Docket No. 16-408 (filed Jan. 17, 2018) (seeking reconsideration of the EPFD limits, and the failure to specify that NGSO applicants may modify their system designs to account for the 2017 rule changes). Also pending is a Petition for Reconsideration of Iridium, EchoStar/HNS and Telesat (seeking reconsideration of the requirement to protect 18 FS stations in the 28.5-29.1 and 29.25-29.5 GHz bands).

2017 order that is under reconsideration.4 The third is the Kuiper Petition regarding the procedural impact on an NGSO FSS modification application of certain proposed system changes.

The record in each of these proceedings raises common, core policy concerns, including:

(i) the need to ensure equitable access to limited radio frequency spectrum, and other orbital resources, (ii) the need to facilitate robust competition in the provision of a wide variety of satellite-based broadband services, and (iii) the importance of regulatory certainty to enable investment and innovation.

Because of the substantial overlap of the issues discussed in these proceedings, Viasat urges the Commission to consolidate these matters into a single proceeding, and, in doing so, to refresh the almost-three-year-old record on the pending petitions for reconsideration of its 2017 decision updating its rules on NGSO FSS systems. Doing so would allow for a much-needed resolution of these related matters, and provide necessary certainty.

In that same consolidated proceeding, Viasat urges that the Commission also examine as a matter of urgency the other related issues raised in this proceeding about NGSO FSS spectrum policy. This should include the types of issues Viasat raised about how certain NGSO FSS operators are trying to misuse the Commission’s existing rules to squelch competition.5 Namely,

• How some NGSO FSS constellations seek to deploy many more satellites than are necessary, including unreliable satellites that present collision risks, to create large numbers of band-splitting events. • How those band-splitting events unduly constrain the coverage and capacity of, and drive up costs for, other NGSO systems that use spectrally-efficient and reliable satellite designs.

4 See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, Petition for Rulemaking, Revision of Section 25.261 of the Commission’s Rules to Increase Certainty in Spectrum Sharing Obligations Among Non-Geostationary Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service Systems, RM-11855 (filed Apr. 30, 2020) (“SpaceX Petition”).

5 See Comments of Viasat, Inc., RM-11861 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) (“Viasat Comments”).

2 • How this approach by some harms the consumer, and creates additional collision risk, while having virtually no impact on the coverage or capacity of the NGSO FSS constellation causing the harms. • How the preclusive effects on spectrum access and effective competition are exacerbated when these NGSO FSS constellation operators advocate for rules that facilitate (i) their wasteful approach to spectrum usage and (ii) their risky approach to satellite design and manufacturing that undermines safe space.

That consolidated proceeding also should address the issues raised in SpaceX’s comments, which urge the Commission to “create incentives” for operators to apply for what SpaceX deems

“spectrally-efficient systems.” 6 Viasat agrees that incentives are needed to achieve certain policy goals, but disagrees with SpaceX’s suggestion that others are the primary culprits in planning systems that are designed to “over-use limited spectrum resources” and “take up extensive spectral real estate.”7 Moreover, SpaceX’s approach8 ignores the substantial public benefits that exist when a given mission can be accomplished with fewer satellites:

• Lower risk of collisions and resulting generation of less orbital debris. • More NGSO systems that can coexist within the same orbits (i.e., altitudes), providing consumers with more service options and resulting in more competition. • Fewer band-splitting events that have a preclusive effect on spectrum access by other NGSO systems.

In fact, SpaceX’s approach would not give appropriate credit to system designs that are both (i) most spectrally-efficient when measured on a per-spacecraft basis, and (ii) able to satisfy the highest standards of space safety.

6 SpaceX Comments at 11.

7 Id.

8 See SpaceX Petition, at 13-14.

3 Stated another way, incentivizing the deployment of more satellites than are necessary results in the consumption of substantially more orbital resources than would be utilized when constellations employ satellites that individually are more capable—when fewer satellites are needed to do the same job.

What SpaceX advocates also creates risks to competition. By way of example, the deployment of many tens of thousands of NGSO FSS satellites would provide effectively ZERO remaining “look angles” for any other NGSO FSS system, blocking access to critical spectrum by those other systems, but barely affecting that “mega-constellation.”

In contrast, dis-incentivizing such preclusive behavior would enhance space safety for others, and also would facilitate innovation and competition, allowing more operators to effectively share the limited physical orbital resource and the limited spectrum resource.

These pressing matters represent one of the loopholes that “undermines the certainty and fairness the Commission envisioned for NGSO FSS operators when it established its processing round and spectrum sharing rules and procedures.”9 If these loopholes successfully are allowed to be exploited, existing rules will lead to unintended consequences and will undermine the goals that the Commission has established for NGSO FSS systems. These are issues that the

Commission also should examine in an omnibus NGSO rules proceeding.

B. No Changes to Section 25.117 Are Warranted.

The Kuiper Petition proposes to replace (i) the longstanding “Teledesic standard,”10 under which the aggregate predicted impact of a modification application on the NGSO FSS

9 Kuiper Petition, at 1.

10 See Teledesic LLC, Minor Modification of License to Construct, Launch and Operate a Non-Geostationary Fixed Satellite Service System, Order and Authorization, 14 FCC Rcd 2261 (IB 1999) (“Teledesic Order”).

4 interference environment is evaluated in determining whether the application should be considered in a new processing round, with (ii) a new standard that considers only individual contributors to predicted interference, and that considers changes in certain orbital parameters apart from any resulting impact on interference.

As Viasat noted in its comments,11 applying the existing Teledesic standard when evaluating modification applications under Section 25.117 has served the Commission, the public, and the satellite industry well. It has allowed licensees to modify their systems to incorporate the latest technology while enabling the Commission to base its evaluation of the modification not on the mere nature or perceived magnitude of specific design changes, but rather on the predicted aggregate interference impact of those changes: whether they would

“create any significant interference problems to other systems or make sharing [with] other

NGSO FSS systems significantly more difficult.”12 Furthermore, the existing Teledesic standard allows the Commission to consider both potential sources of increased interference and potential mitigation as part of an overall interference impact analysis.13

Telesat and SpaceX support Viasat’s position that the Teledesic standard has served the

Commission and the public well. As SpaceX points out, the Teledesic standard allows the

Commission to evaluate the totality of the circumstances presented by a modification application, and to avoid the application of a “rigid set of criteria” that may not anticipate all sources of potential harm from a proposed modification, while also allowing “the applicant to develop mitigation strategies purpose-built to protect the needs of other operators in the same

11 See Viasat Comments at 5.

12 Teledesic Order at ¶ 7.

13 See id. at ¶ 18.

5 processing round.”14 As Telesat explains, the Teledesic standard provides (i) flexibility for satellite operators to modify their system designs at an ever-faster pace, and (ii) employ evolving methodologies for assessing interference.15

As both SpaceX and Telesat note, the Commission has taken a holistic view in assessing the potential for interference from proposed changes to an NGSO FSS system.16 This includes grants of two recent modification applications, in which SpaceX itself relied upon dynamic interference-to-noise (“I/N”) analyses in assessing whether the proposed modification, in toto, would result in a significant increase in interference.17 As the Commission has indicated, that question can be assessed in the NGSO FSS context by considering “the number of times constellations will be required to reduce spectrum”18 (i.e., any greater number of band-splitting events) as a result of the proposed change.

In its comments, SpaceX urges the Commission to reject as “backwards looking,”19

“retrograde,”20 and “stymying innovation”21 Amazon’s proposal to delineate as a “major modification” four categories of changes to an NGSO system, which include changes in orbital parameters separate and apart from any interference-related impact. Then, in a flagrant self-

14 Comments of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, RM-11861, at 7 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) (“SpaceX Comments”).

15 Comments of Telesat Canada, RM-11861, at 3 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) (“Telesat Comments”).

16 See Telesat Comments at 6-8; SpaceX Comments at 3-4.

17 See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083 (Call Sign S2983/3018) (filed Nov. 8, 2018), Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, at 25 (“SpaceX First Modification Application”); Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20190830-00087 (Call Sign S2983/3018) (filed Aug. 30, 2019), Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, Annex 1, at A1-1 (“SpaceX Second Modification Application”).

18 Viasat, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Ruling Granting Access for a Non-U.S.-Licensed Non-Geostationary Orbit Satellite Network, Order and Declaratory Ruling, 35 FCC Rcd 4324 (2020), at ¶ 12 (“Viasat NGSO Authorization”).

19 SpaceX Comments at 2.

20 Id. at 6, 9.

21 Id. at 8.

6 contradiction, SpaceX pivots to urge the Commission to codify that, without regard to whether such a change would significantly increase interference, the Commission should “[c]onsider an application that would increase the number of NGSO FSS satellites under an authorization to be a major modification.”22

As an initial matter, if the test were as simple as SpaceX suggests (counting the satellites), then having fewer satellites but causing significantly more interference would pass the

Commission’s test. But that is not the case under the Teledesic standard.

Moreover, when prosecuting its own application, SpaceX asserted that deploying more satellites in its constellation would help reduce the potential for band-splitting events, and thus reduce interference potential. SpaceX explained that having more satellites meant “more satellite diversity options,”23 and that such satellite diversity would “allow SpaceX to greatly reduce the number of in-line events with GSOs.”24 SpaceX cannot have it both ways—arguing that having more satellites helps resolve interference, while also arguing that having more satellites necessarily results in significant additional interference. The answer depends on the circumstances, including the specifics of the NGSO FSS system design.

Indeed, SpaceX provides no good reason for adopting an a priori determination about how the number of satellites in a constellation affects the procedural status of a modification

22 Id. at 2.

23 See Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, SAT-LOA-20170301-00027 (Call Sign S2992) (filed Mar. 1, 2017), at Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, at 4, n.4 (emphasis added) (“SpaceX V-band Application”) (quoting Establishment of Policies and Service Rules for the Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit, Fixed Satellite Service in the Ka-Band, 18 FCC Rcd 14708 (2003), at ¶ 44 (“With satellite diversity, NGSO FSS systems can avoid an in-line interference event by selecting another visible satellite within their system constellation (performing a hand-over process) whenever the current satellite approaches the in-line event with a satellite operating in another NGSO FSS system constellation.”)).

24 See id. at 32.

7 application.25 In fact, the Teledesic decision provides for an assessment of any interference impact resulting from changes to “orbital configuration,” which is broadly defined to include changes to “the number of satellites, number of orbital planes, orbit altitude, and inclination.”26

That decision concluded that Teledesic’s proposed changes in orbital configuration and other aspects of its authorized system27 did not result in significantly more interference, even though some of those changes could potentially affect spectrum sharing with other NGSO FSS systems.28

In other words, the Commission did not make the type of a priori determination that SpaceX seeks to codify as to just one of four relevant orbital configuration elements.

Indeed, if changes in orbital configuration—particularly number of orbital planes, orbit altitude, and inclination—alone were a defining factor, then SpaceX’s pending third modification application29 necessarily must be considered as part of the March 2020 processing round. As shown by comparing the green values in Table 2 below with the corresponding values in Table

1,30 the orbital configuration of SpaceX’s proposed modification does not even remotely resemble that of its authorized system.

25 SpaceX Comments at 2, 13.

26 Teledesic Order at ¶ 13.

27 The Teledesic case involved indisputably “major” changes to a licensed NGSO FSS system, including changes in orbital configuration (i.e., number of satellites, number of orbital planes, orbital altitude, and inclination), additional carriers on the downlink, and changes in the uplink and downlink power budgets. Id. at ¶ 3.

28 Id. at ¶ 13.

29 Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, SAT-MOD-20200417-00037 (Call Sign S2983/S3018) (filed Apr. 17, 2020), (“SpaceX Third Modification Application”).

30 These tables are copied directly from SpaceX’s pending modification application. See id., Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, at 3.

8

Table 1: Summary of Currently-Authorized SpaceX Orbital Configuration

Table 2: Summary of Proposed SpaceX Orbital Configuration

Nor does SpaceX explain why the Commission should focus on just one orbital configuration factor (number of satellites), and not the myriad other factors that can significantly affect the interference environment. Take, for example, changes in the minimum elevation angles utilized in an NGSO constellation. As Figure 1 below depicts, lowering the elevation angles employed in an NGSO system has the potential to create more band-splitting events with other NGSO systems, because a given earth station can “see” more satellites (that, of course, is the whole point of lowering elevation angles).

9

Figure 1: Lower Elevation Angles Bring More Satellites Into View

Yet, SpaceX does not propose that the Commission “consider an application that would decrease the minimum elevation angle under an authorization to be a major modification.” And it should be apparent why. As shown in Table 3 below, doing so would result in SpaceX’s pending modification application being considered as part of the March 2020 processing round.

Filing Elevation Angles Altitudes

Original Minimum of 40 degrees31 1,110 km License 1,130 km 1,150 km 1,275 km 1,325 km32

33 First and Minimum of 40 degrees, nominally 550 km Second 1,110 km Modification 1,130 km 1,275 km

34 1,325 km

31 Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-LOA-20161115-00118 (Call Sign S2983) (filed Nov. 15, 2016), Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, at 5.

32 Id. at 1.

33 Id. at 5 (“To maintain suitable coverage during the very early stages of initial deployment, SpaceX may periodically use a minimum elevation angle as low as 25 degrees for this initial shell. Then, as further satellites are deployed to populate the remainder of the constellation, SpaceX will revert to a 40 degree minimum elevation angle for all user and gateway beams.”).

34 Id. at 2, 5.

10 Third User beams: minimum of 25 degrees35 540 km Modification 550 km Gateway beams: general minimum of 25 degrees; 560 km minimum of 5 degrees for 560 km and 570 km 570 km37 shells for gateways above 62 degrees latitude36

Table 3: Certain Changes in Critical SpaceX Parameters

As another example, consider changes in power flux density (PFD) emitted by an NGSO constellation, which can affect the interference situation with respect to other NGSO systems, terrestrial services, and GSO networks alike. Increasing emitted PFD can significantly increase delta T/T for another NGSO system, and thus create more band-splitting events.

Yet, SpaceX does not propose that the Commission “consider an application that would increase power flux density levels to be a major modification.” And it also should be apparent why this is the case. As shown in Table 4 below, doing so would result in SpaceX’s pending modification application being considered as part of the March 2020 processing round. The specified maximum PFD values for certain beams significantly exceed previously-specified levels—in one case by more than 20 dB (over a factor of 100 times higher).38

MOD3 Schedule S MOD1 Schedule S39 Increase 0° - 5° -170.4 dBW/m2/4-kHz -174.7 dBW/m2/4-kHz 4.3 dB 5° - 10° -167.0 dBW/m2/4-kHz -173.0 dBW/m2/4-kHz 6.0 dB 10° - 15° -162.1 dBW/m2/4-kHz -171.4 dBW/m2/4-kHz 9.3 dB 15° - 20° -154.1 dBW/m2/4-kHz -170.0 dBW/m2/4-kHz 15.9 dB 20° - 25° -147.5 dBW/m2/4-kHz -169.0 dBW/m2/4-kHz 21.5 dB 25° - 90° -146.0 dBW/m2/4-kHz -146.0 dBW/m2/4-kHz 0.0 dB

Table 4: Comparison of Proposed Versus Authorized SpaceX Maximum PFD Levels

35 See SpaceX Third Modification Application, Technical Attachment, at 4.

36 Id. at 7.

37 Id. at 4.

38 Reply of Viasat, Inc. to Opposition of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20200417- 00037, at 33 (filed Aug. 7, 2020) (“Viasat Reply re SpaceX Third Modification”).

39 See SpaceX First Modification Application, Schedule S.

11 Finally, when doing so suits its interests at the moment, SpaceX eschews focusing on individual factors that can affect the interference environment, in favor of a holistic approach that balances all of the various considerations. Specifically, in arguing that its two prior modification applications40 did not create significant interference, even though they would result in some increased interference, SpaceX relied on a “dynamic, time-varying radio-frequency interference” I/N analysis for “varying percentages of time”41 that takes a multitude of factors into account. SpaceX further emphasized the need to balance the probability of increases in individual I/N values against probable decreases, in order to assess whether the overall interference environment would be significantly worse.42

C. Space Safety and the Creation of Undue Collision Risk

Separate and apart from commenting on the proposal in the Kuiper Petition, SpaceX raises a policy issue regarding space safety that warrants a response.

SpaceX claims that a loophole exists in the Commission’s orbital debris mitigation rules.43

The loophole, however, is not the one SpaceX claims. As evidenced by the grant of authority to

OneWeb last week, non-US flagged NGSO FSS systems are in fact required to make a satisfactory orbital debris showing.44 The loophole that does exist is one that SpaceX is trying to

40 See SpaceX First Modification Application, Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, at 25; SpaceX Second Modification Application, Attachment A, Technical Information to Supplement Schedule S, Annex 1, at A1-1., Attachment A, Annex 1, at A1-3, A1-9.

41 See Consolidated Opposition of Space Exploration Holdings, LLC to Petitions, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD- 20190830-00087, at 7 (filed Oct. 30, 2019) (“SpaceX Consolidated Opposition”).

42 SpaceX Consolidated Opposition at 7-8.

43 See SpaceX Comments at 11.

44 WorldVu Satellites Limited, Debtor-in-Possession, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Granting Access to the U.S. Market for the One Web Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Fixed-Satellite Service V-Band System, IBFS File No. SAT-MPL-20200406-00031, Order and Declaratory Ruling, FCC 20-117 (rel. Aug. 26, 2020), at ¶ 17 (“The conditions adopted will ensure that OneWeb’s debris mitigation plans for its proposed MEO deployment are fully reviewed prior to deployment.”).

12 exploit related to the creation of undue aggregate collision risk by certain large LEO constellations, by:

• Launching unreliable satellites that pose collision risks.45

• Failing to conduct a proper DAS risk assessment in applications to the FCC.46 • Failing to report satellites that do not perform as expected at injection orbit and that must be de-orbited.47

• Employing a “hide-the-ball” approach that assesses collision risk at injection orbit,48 and not at the altitude at which satellites will spend most of their orbital lives, and where collision risk extends over a much longer time.49

This loophole allows the launch of LEO satellites that never should have been launched, and the creation of significant and unnecessary risk for other operators that both drives up the cost of competitive market entry and can preclude effective access to space.50

The Commission should close this loophole by (i) creating incentives to launch reliable satellites that minimize collision risk, and (ii) denying authority to applicants that do not fulfill their commitments to the Commission and that neglect space safety in order to maximize their own short-term financial gains, even when they are capable of designing and manufacturing sufficiently-reliable satellites.

45 See Petition to Deny or Defer of Viasat, Inc., IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20200417-00037, at 13-26 (filed July 13, 2020) (“Viasat Petition re SpaceX Third Modification”); Viasat Reply re SpaceX Third Modification at 4-24.

46 See Viasat Petition re SpaceX Third Modification at 11-18; Viasat Reply re SpaceX Third Modification at 4-8.

47 See Viasat Petition re SpaceX Third Modification at 21-24, 26-29; Viasat Reply re SpaceX Third Modification at 24, 40-42.

48 See, e.g., Letter from William M. Wiltshire, Counsel to Space Exploration Holdings, LLC, to Jose P. Albuquerque, Chief, Satellite Division, FCC, IBFS File No. SAT-MOD-20181108-00083, at 2 (filed Mar. 13, 2019) (providing collision risk assessment at an injection orbit altitude that is substantially lower than the authorized operational altitude of 550 km.).

49 See Viasat Petition re SpaceX Third Modification at 25; Viasat Reply re SpaceX Third Modification at 9.

50 See Viasat Petition re SpaceX Third Modification at 35-37; Viasat Reply re SpaceX Third Modification at 13- 14.

13 CONCLUSION

The record in this proceeding raises core policy concerns, common with those in two other NGSO FSS proceedings now before the Commission: (i) equitable access to limited radio frequency spectrum and other orbital resources, (ii) facilitating competition, and (iii) providing regulatory certainty to enable investment and innovation.

Viasat urges the Commission to consolidate all of these matters into an omnibus proceeding that also addresses the incentives for certain NGSO FSS operators to disregard space safety, impede competition, and attempt to block access by other NGSO FSS systems to the limited physical orbital resource and the limited spectrum resource.

The Commission should not replace the longstanding “Teledesic standard” for assessing the procedural status of an NGSO FSS modification application with a new standard that (i) considers only individual contributors to predicted interference, or (ii) considers changes in certain orbital parameters apart from any resulting impact on interference. Instead, the

Commission should retain its holistic approach to assessing the potential for significant additional interference from an NGSO modification application—an approach it recently has used in granting two NGSO FSS applications of a commenter in this proceeding who now seeks to change the rules as they apply to others.

In any event, there is no basis for singling out one element of a system design—number of satellites—when evaluating an NGSO FSS modification application. Nor is there any basis for ignoring other potential contributors to likely band-splitting events, such as changes in orbital planes, orbit altitude, inclination, minimum elevation angles employed, or changes in emitted power flux density (PFD). In all cases, the correct answer depends on the totality of the

14 circumstances, including the specifics of the NGSO FSS system design, and the interference mitigation techniques being proposed.

The Commission should close the current loophole in its orbital debris mitigation rules that allows certain large NGSO constellations to create undue collision risk. The Commission should do so by (i) creating incentives to launch reliable satellites that minimize collision risk and by (ii) denying authority to applicants that do not fulfill their commitments to the

Commission and that neglect space safety in order to maximize their own short-term financial gains, even when they are capable of designing and manufacturing sufficiently-reliable satellites.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John P. Janka Amy R. Mehlman Viasat, Inc. 901 K Street NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20001

Christopher J. Murphy Viasat, Inc. 6155 El Camino Real Carlsbad, CA 92009 September 1, 2020

15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Christopher J. Murphy, hereby certify that on this 1st day of September 2020, I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing Reply Comments of Viasat, Inc. via first-class mail upon the following:

Julie Zoller Brian Weimer Andrew Keisner Douglas Svor Mariah Dodson Shuman Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP Kuiper Systems LLC 2099 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 100 410 Terry Avenue N Washington, DC 20006 Seattle, WA 98109 Counsel for OneWeb

Suzanne H. Malloy David Goldman Vice President, Regulatory Affairs Director, Satellite Policy O3b Limited Space Exploration Technologies Corp. 1129 20th Street, NW, Suite 1000 1155 F Street, NW, Suite 475 Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, DC 20004

Karis A. Hastings William M. Wiltshire SatCom Law LLC Paul Caritj 1317 F Street, NW, Suite 400 Harris, Wiltshire & Grannis LLP Washington, D.C. 20004 1919 M Street, NW, Suite 800 Counsel for O3b Washington, DC 20036 Counsel for SpaceX Ruth Pritchard-Kelly Vice President of Regulatory Affairs Henry Goldberg OneWeb Joseph A. Godles 1785 Greensboro Station Place, Tower 3 Jonathan L. Wiener McLean, VA 22102 Goldberg, Godles, Wiener & Wright LLP 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1000 Washington, DC 20036 Counsel for Telesat Canada

/s/ Christopher J. Murphy

16