"^

ch'f _ j)_ '\lL\kk ^.^

Given By

U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS

THE UNITED STATES SURVEY

Army Air Arsenal AND Navy Air Depots

CORPORATION REPORT NO. XIX (AIRFRAMES AND ENGINES)

Aircraft Division

February 1947

o J1 V

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Army Air Arsenal AND Navy Air Depots

CORPORATION REPORT NO. XIX (AIRFRAMES AND ENGINES)

Aircraft Division

Dates Of Survey:

6 October - 11 November 1945

Date of Publication: February 1947 ^)f

ao-54-

U. 8. SUPERiraENDENT OF DGCUMENrt

APR 8 1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the United States Stra- tegic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more compre- hensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.

II FOREWORD

The Uaitcd States Strategic Bombing Survey military ficgmcnt of the organization was drawn was established by the Secretary of War on 3 from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and November 1944, purusant to a directive from the from the Navy to the extent of 40 perceut. Both President Roosevelt. Its mission was to con- late the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos- duct an impartial and expert study of the efl'ects sible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, trans- of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in port, and mformation. The Survey operated from connection with air attacks on Japan and to estab- headquarters established in Tokyo early in Sep- lish a basis for evaluating the importance and tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, potentialities of air power as an instrument of Osaka, Hiroshuna, and Nagasaki, and with mobile military strategy, for planning the future develop- tearns operating in ment of the JJnited States armed forces, and for other parts of Japan, the detemiinuig future economic policies with respect islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic maiidand. to the national defense. A summary report and It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime some 200 supporting reports contaming the fuid- Japanese military planning and execution, engage- ings of the Survey in Germany have been ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign, published. and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested Japan's economy and war-production, ])lant by that conduct a similar study of the the Survey plant, and mdustry by mdustry. In addition, effects of all types of air attack in the war against i studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-

! Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the tegic plans and the background of her entry into

I Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. the war, the internal discussions and negotiations !The officers of the Survey during its Japanese leading to her acceptance of unconditional sur- phase were: render, the course of health and morale among the Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. civilian popidation, the effectiveness of the Japa- Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, nese civilian defense organization, and the effects Vice Chairmen. of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be Harry L. Bowman, issued covering each phase of the study. J. Kenneth Galbraith, Rensis Likert, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa- Frank A. McNamee, Jr., nese military, Government, and industrial officials. Fred Searls, Jr., It also recovered and translated many documents Monroe E. Spaght, which not only have been usefid to the Survey, but Dr. Lewis R. Thompson, also, will furnish data valuable for other studies. Theoilore P. Wright, Directors. Arrangements have been made to turn over the

Walter Wilds, Secretary. Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group, The Survey's complement provided for 300 through which they will be available for further civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The examination and distribution.

Ill TABLE OF CONTENTS rage

Army and Navy Dkpot Hisport (Corporation Report No. XIX) 1 Thk Depots and Thkir Importance in thio Aircraft Industry 1

Dispersal 1 The Air Attacks 1 Production Statistics 2 Evaluation of Pre-Attack Intelligence 2 Appendices: A. GeoKra])liical Locations of Army Arsenal and Navy Depots 5 B. Air Frame and Engine Production by Army and Navy Depots Face Page 6 First Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-1) 7 Eleventh Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-2) 14 Twenty-First Naval Air Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-3)_. 23 KozA Naval Depot (Depot Report No. XIX-4) 42 Tachikawa .\rmy Air ."Arsenal (.\rniy Arsenal Report No. XIX-5) 46

IV THE DEPOTS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION instance, the engine section of the Army .\ir Arsenal was transferi-ed from Tachikawa to The Japimi'sc Army siiul Navy air depots were Kanazawa, starting in August 1944 before any air •;imilai' to tliosi' t)f this coiuitry in that tlicy haiuUcd attacks in the vicinity. The Twenty-fii-st Naval repair, modification and distril)iition of aircraft. Ail- Depot dispersed in the Omura area begiiining However, one Japanese Army arsenal and four in October 1944, following an attack by China- naval depots were also producers of aircraft and B-29s. although the Eleventh Naval idijother accounted for 3.8 percent of all Japanese based And

aircraft production and 4.4 percent of all combat Air Depot at Hiro did not actually commence aircraft jnoduction over the years 1!)4I through dispersal until Jamiary 1945, elaborate plans for 1945. such a move had been made a year earlier. In addition to airframe production, the Army Except for the transfer of the engine ])roduction arsenal and two of the naval dej)ots produced functions of the Army Air Arsenal fi'om Tachi- 5 percent of ail airplane engines made in Japan kawa to Kanazawa, all dispersals of the (lei)ots from 1941 through 1945. were in the same general location as the original The (lei)ots were widely scattered geographically plants. over the home islands from the island of Kyushu THE AIR ATTACKS to the Tokyo area (A])|)endix A). The Army Air Arsenal at Tachikawa, and later The Twenty-Hrst Naval Air Depot was I he partly at Kanazawa, jjroduced both airframes and first aircraft plant in Japan to be attacked. It engines, as did the Eleventh Naval Air Depot at was struck on 7 July 1944 during the second B-29 Hiro the Twenty-tirst Naval Air Depot at and attack on the Japanese homeland. No damage Omura. The First Naval Air Depot at Kasumi- resulted from this early attack, but the next, on gaura produced aircraft and the rocket-propell(>d 25 October 1944, resulted in heavy damage to suicide l)omb, Baka; and, the Koza Naval Depot the plant and touched oflF dispersal operations near Atsugi produced aircraft only. which, coupled with an efTort to produce newer In addition to these primary military producers, types of aircraft, crippled aircraft production by the First Naval Air Technical Depot at Yokosuka this depot for the remainder of the war. Produc- aircraft construction , conducted experiments in tion never exceeded eight aircraft in any 1 month and built [irototype aircraft. thereafter, and engine production ceased entirely In November 1944, the Army Air Arsenals had after the October attack. a total of

1 The Army Air Arsenal was hit on 4 April, 10 Engine j)roduction was limited to 3 of the mili June, and 2 August 1945, but most of the arsenal tary ])roducers: the Army Air Arsenal, and th had been dispersed prior to the air attacks. Eleventh and Twenty-first Naval Air Depots Production then also suffered more from dispersal In the number of engines produced from 194 than from direct attacks. through 1945, the Eleventh Naval Air Depot le with a total of 2,320 engines, followed by th PRODUCTION STATISTICS Twenty-first Naval Air Depot with 2,132 and th Army Air Arsenal with 1,369. From January 1941 through August 1945 the The trend of total engine production by Arm; Army and Navy Depots produced a total of 2,706 and Navy air depots rose gradually from 20 pe aircraft and 5,821 engines, accounting for 3.8 month in January 1941 to the peak of 301 in Ma percent of total Japanese airframe production and 1944. Thereafter, with minor resurgences, th 5 percent of total engine production. trend declined sharply to 51 in August 194 Airframe production at the depots was low at (Figure 2). The peak of 301 engines constitute the start of the war, totaling 9 in December 1941, appro.ximately 10 percent of the total Japanes but rose during 1942 and 1943, reaching a peak of aircraft engine production for the month of M&\ 138 in December 1943 (Figure 1). The December Engine production declined sharply during th 1943 production constituted 6 percent of the last half of 1944 as a result of defects in the Ha 4 production of the entire mdustry for that month. (Homare) engines produced by the Elevent Thereaft(>r until the end of the war, the trend wa,- Naval Air Depot, the transfer of engine productio

liaited in June with further recovery in July. Intelligence only slightly overemphasized tli

Only 2 aircraft, however, were produced during importance of the depots as aircraft producers i August 1945, the closing month of tlie war. Novcmbci 1944 by estimating their contributio On the basis of total production from 1941 at 4 percent of total combat aircraft productidi through 1945, the Army Air Ai-seual was the most Actually, during 1944 the depots accounted U important military producer, with a production of 3.4 percent of the total combat production, Im

1 ,005 aircraft. The Twenty-first Naval Air Depot this percentage rose to 4.4 on the basis of over-n was the most important Nav-y producer (9f)(i air- production from 1941 through 1945. craft), followed i)y the Eleventh Naval Air Depot Intelligence sources did not reveal the transK (532), Koza (128), and the First Naval Air Depot of engine jiroduction of the Army Ai^- Arsenal froi (75) (Appendix B). Tachikawa to Kanazawa.

718845—47-

APPENDIX B

Airframe and engine production. Army and Navy Depots, January 1941-Auguat 1946

irncBArr fRODCcxioN

FIRST NAVAL AIR DEPOT, KASUMIGAURA (NAVY DEPOT REPORT NO. XIX-1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Pagf

The Depot and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry . . 8

The Air Attacks : - - 8 Production Statistics 9 Evaluation of Pre at tack Intelligence 9

Reference Notes . - 9 Appendices: A. Employment Graph 10 B. Dispersal Map 11

C. Production Graph ^ 12 D. Graph of Air Frame and Engine -Repair 13 THE DEPOT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION (5,869 direct workers); and for August 1945, 12,6' (7,271 direct workers) (Reference Item 1). Cor (Dai-ichi Kaigun The First Naval Air Depot paratively small numbers of students and milita (Migagod in repair of Kokiisho) was primarily personnel wei-e employed (A])pendix A). engines, oidnance, and auto- airframes, aireraft There wer(> two shifts of 12 hours each, fro l)iit also |)ro(luee(l llie Type O:-! motive ('(luipnicnl, 0700 to 1900 and fi'oni 1900 to 0700, with 90 po trainer Willow in s-mall intermediate (KoYl) cent of enq)loyees on the day shift. This sh (|uantilies from January to July 1944, and the had 30 minutes for lunch and for supper, and t\ aireraft Baka 11 for 4 months starting suieide 15-minute rest periods, at 0915 and 1500. T December 1944. Pro all Willow jjroduction and about 80 ])eicent of the night shift. percent of all Baka II ])roduetion. The depot, set up as such in Octohei- 1941, was THE DISPERSAL PROGRAM

,")() percent completed in that month, 60 percent 'J'he first dispersal, from May to Deceml: in June 1943, and 100 percent in August 1944. 1944, involved removing important equipment It was located in Ibaraki prefecture, west of some 17 points in the surrounding count Ivasumigaura and about 2 miles south of Tsuchiura (Appendix B). This program was only 20 perce eitv, adjacent to Ivasumigaura airfield and the completed, and almost no eftect was noticed up buildings of the Ivasumigaura Air Group. In the operation of the depot. addition to the necessary shops, sei'vice buildings, The second dispersal, January to August 19' and storage sheds, the dei)ot jiiiivided six dormi- consisted of a removal to an underground site ji tories and a hospital. outside the dei^ot (aircraft department) and The activities of the depot inelndcd, in addition another near the village of Fukuhara, lying to aircraft production, repaii- to the Type 97 attack the north of the depot (engine departmen plane Kate, the Type 96 attack plane Nell (trans- This move was 55 percent completed, and port version), Willow (in particular, fuel equipment p duct ion dropped about 20 percent. The decli and landing gear), and the Zeke fighter-bomber in both capacity and actual repairs shown by t (in particular, bomb equipment); repairs to engines engine department during this period was ascril: of many types; repaii's to navigational meters and directly to the effects of dispersal. gages, electiical and optical equipment, machine- guns and bombing ("qinpment, and fixed onlnance THE AIR ATTACKS parts; repairs to automobiles, and production of au.xUiarv fuel efpupinent foi' automobiles. DIRECT ATTACKS ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION The depot was attacked on 16 February,

May, 9 June, 10 July, and 13 August 1945, 1 The ilepot maintained a scpai'iite drpai'tmelit duration of attacks being about 10 minutes

for each ty|)e of woi'k; aircraft dei)artnicnt, engine each instance. These were Navy raids except i department, ordnance dej)artment, and (fioni May and June attacks (Twentieth Air Fore

.V[>ril 194.")) an automobile department, as well as The attacks were directed primarily against i the usual sei'vice and administrative departments. airfield or the seaplane base rathei- than the de| The total employment for July 1942 was 3,977, itself. of which 1,607 wcri' direct workers; for July 1943, The ail-craft department was affected m 5,983 (3,504 direct workers); for July 1944. 10.713 heavily, suffering damage to 107,640 scpiare f

8 .

tlic repair shops for larjrcr pianos, as well as frames was in Octoberl!) ) 1 ('.\|)|)eiidi\ I); i{cfcr- the licat licatincnt sliop, jjowcr plant, a blower ence Item 3).

)]), wood piojieller sliop, the small-type plane Ke|)air of damage to faciiilics and i'(|iii|)niciil by lair sh()|), wooden-nianuracturo machine sho]), air attack had no! been nnide by the close of the ntin^, sewinj;;, and metal ])latin<; shoijs, and war. This was ascril)ed to a lack of labor and

1 warehouse for finislunl products, in addition materials. All l)ul one alliicl< occiiri'ed .'iriiT pro- this, 32,292 square feet of the emi)loyee traininjz duction had stopjH'd. bul liie general decline in

1, the materials storaije huildinj; of the accounts repair work accomplished niusl be laid, in i)art.

)artment, the waste oil reprocessing plant, and to this cause, as well as t;) the dis]jersids. assembly hall were damatjed. Casualties from se raids were 21 deaths and 2 injuries, EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK riie air-raid precaution program of the depot INTELLIGENCE vided slit trench shelters for as many as 4,700 War Department Military Intelligence Service sons, and jjlaced greatest emphasis on defense (G-2), recognized the depot as a repair station in inst fire (Reference Item 2). operation, but never published any evidence that

it w-as engaged in aircraft production. PRODUCTION STATISTICS REFERENCE NOTES

'he depot produced, in all, 75 Willows, the The following material is on file with recoi-ds of best production in any 1 month being 20 (June the l^nitpd States Strategic Bombing Survey, Aii- 4). Production of Baka 11 amounted to 600 ciaft Division, at the Office of the Adjutant Gen- lies, of which 197 were made in February 194.5, eral, War Department, Washington, D. C. peak month. The original plan to produce Reference Item 1_^ P^mployment statistics. Willows a month through .March 1945 was not Reference Item 2,. Air raid ))recantions. ried out {Ap])endix C ; Reference Item 3). Peak Ucforence Item 3- Production stati.stics, in- air accomplishments for both engines and air- c'.nding iiian-lioiirs. 000 I JO SllNfl Nl lN3WA01d»»3

10 11

Ocr.«p.toOoOqO "IONooooo

71S845-47 3 13 ELEVENTH NAVAL AIR DEPOT (DEPOT REPORT NO. XIX-2)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Depot and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry 15 The Air Attacks 16 Production Statistics 17 Evaluation of Preattack Intelligence 18 Appendices: A. Plant Expansion January 1942~February 1945 20 B. Location of Depot and Dispersal Plants Face page 20 C. Dispersed Factories and Warehouses 21 D. Bomb Damage, 19 March, 5 May, and 2 July 1945 22 E-1. Bomb Plot, 19 March 1945 Face page 22 (1) E-2. Bomb Plot, 5 May 1945 Face page 22 (2) E-3. Bomb Plot, 2 July 1945 Face page 22 (3) F. Production Statistics Face page 22 (4)

14 THE DEPOT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTELLIGENCE A branch arsenal also was established on 1 April 1945 in Iwakuni, which was located to the west of The Klcvcnlli Naval Air Depot (Dai Juiclii it. This was intended to be used for small air- Ivaiguii Kokusiio) was one of four air depots that craft repau- but later was converted for the pur- were i)ro(lu(iiiji' or were aljout to produce aircraft, pose of aircraft production. The depot luaMufaelured both air frames ami air- Figures for the original floor space of the craft engines. In 1943 and 1944 (fiscal year, Eleventh Naval Air Depot were lacking but ex-

April to March) it completed 150 and 196 aircraft pansion since 1942 amounted to more than respectively, or about 7.5 and 8.3 percent of the 1,300,000 square feet, most of which was above national total production of single-engine bombers ground. About 480,000 square feet of this (from for those years. The principal types of planes September 1944) represented dispersal rather than manufactured were the Type 97 Model 3, Kate 12, expansion of facilities (Appendix A). a single-engine Navy attack plane; and the Suisei, The depot was under the direct jurisdiction of Judy 11, 12, and 33, single-engine Navy dive the Naval Air Headquarters, which planned the hombers. At the close of war it was about to production schedule, supplied and made alloca- produce the Shiden, George 11, an experimental tions for raw materials, and in general had direct land-based fighter using a Homare 21, 18-cylinder supervision. After the formation of the Muni- radial engine. tions Ministry, production schedules and alloca- In aircraft engines the depot manufactured tion of raw materials were coordinated with the principally Kasei Model 15 or Ha 32, a 14-cylinder over-all schedules set up by the Ministry. radial used on the twin-engine bomber engine, EMPLOYEES Betty Model 11 ; and the Homare 21 or Ha 45, an 18-cylinder radial engine. Maximum production The employment for the Eleventh Naval Air of Kasei engines was attained during 1943; 519 Depot for 1945 was 53,200, with 31,920 clas- were completed, or 1.8 percent of the total engine sified as direct or productive workers, consti- production in Japan. Homare engine production tuting 60 percent of the total. The employment percent in for 1944 was 689 or 1 .4 percent of the total Jaj)- in 1939 was 14,000 with 9,400 or 67 anese production for this year. productive work. All these figures seem high for The Eleventh Naval Air Depot was located at the amount of production achieved but it is Hiro on the Inland Sea at the mouth of the Hirose- believed to be due to the fact that it includes the Okawa River aljout 3 miles southeast of Kure. marine engine department which was not con-

Originally it was concerned principally with re- cerned with aircraft manufacture vmtil June 1945 pairs liut did supply aircraft and engines to the when it was combined with the Eleventh Naval Air Force as early as 1930. It was, however, Air Depot. Personnel in 1945 included regular officially established on 1 October 1941. The employees (77 percent), conscripted students depot at the time of its establisliment consisted of (19 percent) and military (4 percent). Students a marine engine department and an aircraft de- were employed from June 1944 and military partment, but the two operated separately. On personnel in June 1945. The multiple-shift (3- 6 June 1945 the two departments were combuied shift) schedule of work was used at the depot but due to the increasing importance and priority the third shift had only a small percentage of given to aircraft production. The marine engine student labor and no other employees. The department was to supply aircraft parts, but by employment schedule therefore was for all prac-

the end of war it had not yet fullv converted itself. tical purposes on 2 shifts. 15 Tlu' relative pereeiitage of each type of labor on eaeh shift was as follows:

Shifts wood-working mat'hinos such as lathes, cuttinc: 1930 to 1945 was 3,141 units. No j)lamie(l (ig-

lU'liini's, etc., which wore destroyed also. In ures were available for this j)eriod but, during Mil ion, some engine parts were destroyed, caus- 1944 and 1945, 1,248 Homare 21 engines were

'j: a (h'op in tl'e niatiufacture of en'j;ines (Ap- manufactured as against 2,110 planned. Total production from 1940 to 1945 was 2,445 engines For air defense the only information avaihble (Appendix F).

•IS that there were tin-ee antiaircraft machine Prior to 1940 the Hikari model 1 and the Koto-

;ins at Kihatayama manned by a crew of three buki aircraft engines were manufactured. An en each. At Hachiroyama there were two anti- average of 60 engines were manufactured annually rcraft machine guns manned by a crew of tiiree with considerable increase in 1938 and 1939 when

I ell. In adtiition, there was a portahh^ smol

I aircraft engines can be seen by the fact that engine) manufacture began in June 1941 and

;i(iut 42 percent of the parts came from cooperat- amounted to 64 for the year. In 1942 production

j, works located in Tokyo, Tamashinia in was devoted exclusively to the Kasei 15, and 240 ^ayama prefecture, and Hiroshima. Of these were completed. Peak production of Kasei,

ppliers 58 percent were destroyed which is however, was reached in August of the following llccted in the fact that parts shortage became year, only to be discontinued after October in

VCl'C. favor of the Homare 21 (1,970-horsepowei', 18- PRODUCTION STATISTICS cylinder radial engine). During 1944 and 1945 only Homare 21 engines were manufactured. Over-all production from 1939 to 1945 was 594 Actual production of aircraft compared to iliames with 92(5 planned or ordered by the planned indicates a lack of coordination from 1944 ivcrnment. From 1930 to 1945, 1,211 aircraft to the end of the year. From 1939 to 1943 there ic completed. Aircraft manufactured between was no divergence at all with 348 aircraft planned

i:i(l and 1939 were of various types, l)ut Navy and completed. In 1944 and 1945 (April 1944- tack planes were manufactured during each of July 1945) 555 Judy were planned as against an

I'se years. actual of 215 (Figure 1). The production of air Between 1939 and 1945 the following types of frames during 1944 and 1945 fluctuatetl greatly

it to rcraft were produced : Type 97 Model 2 (Kate 11), and in July and October 1944 dropped one iigle-cngine bomber; Reisui (Jake), a single- and zero, respectively. The drop in October was igine reconnaissance plane; Type 97 Model 3 noted as being due to bombing but no bombing vate 12), a single-engine Navy attack plane; attacks were recorded in the United States Stra- lisei (Judy 11, 12, and 33), single-engine Navy tegic Bombing Survey Tabulating Section records. vc bombers; and Shiden (George 11), an im- The productive capacity in November 1944 was oved single-engine Navy fighter (Appendix F). only 30 aircraft per month while the plainied was

The Kate 11 was manufactured in 1939 with a- 60 and actual 24. Hence, the ordered production tal of 50 for the year. In 1940 and 1941 was out of line with the capacity and there is anufacture was limited to Jake of which 48 reason to believe that the orders were "hoj)ed for" ere produced. In 1942 and 1943 production figures and not the planned figures made l)y the as exclusively Kate 12 aircraft of which 250 tlepot. ere produced during the 2 years. In the follow- Beginning with the fiscal year April 1945, there g year 30 additional Kate 12s were manu- was a change in type to the modified George. In ctured. Production of the Judy type also order to expedite this change it was planned to •gan and during 1944 and 1945 a total of 215 reduce Judy production to 20 a month. Despite icluding Judy 11, 12 and 33) were produced. this, at the end of the war the change to the At the close of war, the production of the im- fighter George had been just completed and pro- foved George 11 was just beginning and one was duction had not started. The production of the rapleted. fighter George was delayed by a lack of jig equip- Over-all production of aircraft engines from ment. 17 Production in 1945 was directly affected only by the air attack of 5 May when Judy ])iO(hiction declined from 25 in April to 6 in May. Considering the actual and planned engine pro- duction figures, the 2 approximate each other up to December 1944 except for August and Septem- ber. An increasing divergence occurs after this period in which the actual figures take a downward trend while the planned continues to rise (Figure

2) . The planned curve or production figure was to lie raised as a matter of policy to 400 by December.

There is sudden decline in production in August 1944, January and May 1945. The severe drop in January and August was due to technical causes—flaws in the engine which reciuired correc- tion. Januaiy 1945 also was the beginning of the dispersal program and contributed to the decline. The dip in production in May and again after June was due to B-29 l)ombing attacks. Pro- duction in May, as a result of the air attack of

PLANNED a ACTUAL AIRFRAME PRODUCTION APRIL 1944-AUG, 1945

60 COMPARISON OF MIS. ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION

MIS ESTIMATES a ACTUAL KATE 12 PRODUCTION

M.I.S. ESTIMATES 8 ACTUAL JUDY PRODUCTION

Jll£X Pf OIIU(TIOP

^'

M/TEi

n ^

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 I94<

F U t U J JAS ONDJ FMAMJ JA 1944 1945

us STRATEGIC BOMB SURVEY

ELEVENTH NAVAL AIR DEPOT

FIGURE 3

19 APPENDIX A

PUint expansion Eleventh A^dval Air Depol. January 194'2- February 1946

Name BUILDING SUPPLIES DEPARTMENT OF DEPOT AND DISPERSAL PLANTS LOCATION SUPPLY SHOP BOMBS AND GUNPOWDER WAREHOUSE ENGINE SHOP (PARTS) ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (COMMUNICATION ORDNANCE) KURE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (TORPEDO HEADS^ ENGINE PARTS) ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE (ORDNANCE PIECES) BOMBS AND GUNPOWDER WAREHOUSE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE ORDNANCE WAREHOUSE [ORDNANCE PARTS) SUPPLY WAREHOUSE TOKUSHIMA BRANCH SHOP SUPPLY WAREHOUSE NAURO BRANCH OF OSAKA SUPPLY WAREHOUSE SUPPLY WAREHOUSE ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT MATERIALS WAREHOUSE (BULBS. ELECTRIC WIRE. ETC.) RAILWAY TUNNEL USED AIRPLANE PARTS WAREHOUSE RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE (AIRPLANE PARTS AND LIGHT ALLOY) RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE (COAL, OIL, PAPER, COTTON, ETC) RAW MATERIAL WAREHOUSE MATERIALS DEPARTMENT FOUNDRY (ENGINE CASTING)

FORGING SHOP (ENGINE)

KELMET SHOP (BEARINGS) IN PROCESS OF BEING PLAIWED AIRCRAFT ENGINE DEPARTMENT ENGINE SHOP (PARTS)

TEST CELL SHOP FOR ENGINES IN PROCESS OF BEING PLANNED AUTOMOBILE DEPARTMENT

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT ORDNANCE SHOP (GUNS AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT) ORDNANCE AND AUTOMOBILE DEPARTMENT ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT (HEAT TREATMENT) AIRCRAFT DEPARTMENT AIRPLANE SHOP (PARTS)

U S STRATEGIC B0MB1WG SURVEY

ELEVENTH NAVAL AIR DEPOT

- 47 irw* p. lor

. . --

APPENDIX C

Dispersed factories and warehouses

Section Function

(i(il)ara_ Accounting. Airplane jiarts and liiiht alloys stored. Nakakurose. do Do. Yakp.yama. Supply Ordnance parts stored. Yoshiura Engine Parts nmnnfaeturi'. Koyaura Supply Ordnance parts stored. Kamionsaki. do Tnipedij head seclimi stored. Hosogoe do- Engine parl.s sliired. Kaitaichi Armament- Machine ^'luis, hotnbs and optical equipment niarnifacture. Kirigushi Supply Bombs and exiilosives stored. Akizuki do.. - Do, Nomi Raw materials Casting" work (engine) Tokushima Repair of planes. Takuma Supply Supply work and armament parts. Do Airplane. Repair (if large pl;uies. Kaiiunji Sujiply Supply work and armament parts. Imabaru Airplane. Airplane parts manufacture. Mitsugaharaa- Supply... Armament [larts storehouse. Nakashima do Armament parts stored. Wada ._. do Communication i'qnii>ment stored. Matsuyama-.. do.... Supply work and armament parts. Yawatahama.- Engine Manufacture of eneine iiarts, IwakunL Supply Sujiply work and arniament parts. Do-- Repair of planes. Tojo-- Raw materials Kelmet hearings. Atn Engine Running test of motors. Hinoura Supply Bombs and explosives stored.

Nenoura . Raw materials- Forging of raw materials.

Kamagari Accounting.. . Coal, organic resin, pai)er. Yosigasc do.: Electric bulbs and line stored. Kurashiki Supply _ Supply work, arniament jiarts. Hiraeji do Do, Naruo do Do, Osaka do Do, Do Auto plant Repairing of atitos. Do Accounting Received and transferred various materials in Osaka area- Komatsushima. Supply-. Supply works and armament parts. Tokushima do- Do. Uchinoumi Parts manufacture. Kure Supply Parts stored. Hire Main arsenal--. Takehara Raw materials- Foundry shop. Kasaoka Airplane Airplane parts. Mizushima. Supply Parts stored.

718845—47 21 - -.

APPENDIX D

linmh ihimngv tabic, Eleventh Naval Air Depot

' I'J MARCH 1945 ATTACK

M up Shops or buildings that Near Damage caused loca- were dumagt'd I iun

83 Ti'St foundry shop^ Partial damage. Xpar 7U Test call shop 71 Lumber wan-bouse. No damage. Baitt'ry room 09 Boiler house Partial damage of 20 iut- cent. Practically no damage. Xo. 112 shop. - damaged, (10 per- 47 No. 'A machine shop Severely cent. 50 machines: 33 re- j>airabli-, 17 jrre[>airable. Xo. 2 maehine .shop Severely damaged- damaged,

Xo. 1 shop. .. Partial damage. Xo. 11 shop.. Do. Xo. 103 shop Do. Xo. 20 shop.. Severely flamaged. Xo. 50 shop. Partial damage. Xo. 42 shop.. No damage.

Total 23

5 MAY 1945 ATTACK

90 LEGEND

BUILDING LAYOUT

(RAIDS OF 19 MARCH-1945)

@ @ D Q ® LEGEND

BUILDING LAYOUT

(RAIDS OF 5 MAY 1945)

LEGEND

BUILDING LAYOUT (RAIDS OF 2 JULY 1945)

APPENDIX F

Planned and actual airframe and engine production, Eleventh Naval Air Depot, 19S0—45 AIR FRAMES

TWENTY-FIRST NAVAL AIR DEPOT, OMURA (Depot Report No. XIX-3)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Depot and Its Importance in the Aircraft Industry 24 The Air Attacks 28

Production Statistics i 30

Evaluation of Target Intelligence . 32 Appendices: A. Omura Plant Lay-out 39 B. Map of Plant Locations 40 C. Dispersal of Airframe Production from Omura 40 D. Bomb Plot 41

23 THE DEPOT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION (Ha 45), l,795-horse])Ower engine never material- ized. Tlic Twenty-first Naval Air Depot, located Apart from its production functions, the depot al)()ut 10 miles nortlieast of Nagasaki in the town was extensively engaged in repair of all Navy types of Omiira, Kyushu Island, produced hoth aii- (if aircraft and engines. fj-ames and airplane engines. The plant had ap- 4.5 piincipai buildings and a similar proximately EMPLOYMENT number of smaller shops, offices, storehouses, and engine test cells. In addition, there were about Elmployment at the depot rose more or less 25 hangars of various sizes in the area (Appendix gradually throughout the war and reached a total A). A liranch of the depot was at Hiu at the of 23,878 employees in September 1944 prior to the mouth of the Omura Bay near Sasebo in north- first air attack. Student labor was used after western Kyushu. Forging and casting was done June 1944. Fluctuations in the numbers of em- at Hiu. ])loyees beginning in October 1944 were due to the The order establishing the di'pot was issued in varying numbers of students used. Increased March 1939. Construction began in May 1939. employment to 26,391 in October and 28,772 in Prior to completion of the original plan, an expan- November 1944 was due to the use of large num- sion was ordered in July 1941 and construction in bers of students in cleaning up after the heavy line with the expansion plan was begun immedi- October air attack and in assisting in the conse- ately. The depot officially was opened 1 October quent dispersal o|K'rations (Figure 1 and Table 1). 1941, although operations had been commenced Taklk 1. — Total ! Ill 1)1(1!/ niiiil Januaiij 19'il~ August 10'r'> some months earlier. Construction was com- pleted in April 1942. Date The principal aircraft type pioduced was the

Type observation seaplane, Model 1 1, Pete. The depot also produced two types of training fighters, Zeke and Claude, Type O and Type 90 advanced trainers. During the later stages of the war, the depot aliandoned production of its older types in favor of small-scale production of the Aichi- designetl torpedo and dive bomber, Ryusei, Model 11, Grace, and the Kawanishi fighter, Shiden, Model 21, George (Photo 1). Peak production of 73 airplanes per month at the depot was reached in December 1943, representing about 3 percent of the total production of the industry for that month. From 1941 to 1944, tlie depot i)ioduce(l the iVniakaze II (Tempu 11), 9-cylinder, 3Hn-horse- .power radial aii-cooled engine. Peak ])r()(hiction of 170 of these engines in April 1944 constituted

4 percent of the iirodiiction of ll iitire engine industry for tiie inoiiUi. Pi-oiliictioii of this engine type was abandoned in late 1944, but

planned nioduction of the 1 S-cvhiider llomare 'I'ahi.I'; 1.

same <;('ii('ral (Jiuui;i iirca. 'I'lic air-iVaiiic assciii- llie oi'iginal depot site in Omiira. utilizing slietl.s bly functions of the depot wci-c scattci-i'd (lii-out,''li- const riKled underneath the framework of bombed- out the Oiiiuia area, |)iini!iiily in tlic Ivoiigawa out buildings (Photo 2). and .Mizubakai'i disti-icls (Appendix C). In the MiznbakaiM district (if the (Jmura area

'I'll!' managerial and desiu'n functions were dis- was a similai- de\('lci|)nient of dispersed shops pcrsc(l in tlic Ilvcda district in 2S hnildings com- (Photo :{). This development contained 45 builfi- prising a total area of aS.oOO s(|uare feet. Sheet ings with a total Hoor space of I07,5(J0 .square feet, metal working was |)erforiued in seven small devoted to fuselage (Photo 4), wing (Photo 5), and buildings in tli(> Suzuta

Plioto 2: As.sembly slicd.s under skeleton of No. 2 final asscnibly building, Omura 27 I'hotu 3; Three uf 45 dispersed shops at Mizubakari

There was no airplane production ilurina; the machine shops had to be moved, and becan November and Deeeniber 1944 while the dispersal the ])roblem of transplanting the labor suppl}' « was being accomplished. Limited production in avoided. the dispersed locations began in January 194.5, AIR ATTACKS but was insignificant thereafter, ilue as much to the difficulty of operation in the dispersed sites as The first air attack on the Twenty-first N;i\ to the change-over to ])roduction of the newer Air Depot came on 7 July 1944, during the secoi combat types, George and Grace. B-29 attack on the Japanese homeland. Tl Production of Homare engines was planned for attack was of small scale compared to the size tiie dispersed engine plants but, due to the attacks that were to follow. Although 17 B-2! difficulties of obtaining parts and of operating in had the depot, the Sasebo dock area, and tl tiie dispersed locations, all production of new Tabata Iron and .Steel Works for targets, tin engines ceased after the dispersal and the entire were no hits in the de])ot area (Appendix D). capacity of the engini' works was devoted to repair. The ne.xt attack on the dejDot occurred on i The predominant featui-e of the dispersal October 1944. A total of 71 aircraft droppi|l I)rogram of this de[)ot was the geographical 1,50 tons of bom])s on the plant. E.\•tensi^ piD.ximily 111' the new dispersal aieas to the old damage to installations and production resultci location. The dispersal was accomplished over Both the final air frame assembly buildings an a two-nionlh period because of the sliort distances the large machine shop, several tool shops, 28 I I'li-iiiii' shop, Miiil s(()rii,u'(' l)iiil(lin.<;s were dr- ing in ihi' dispersed locations to which Navy

roycd (I'liolo 7). Many oilier Uiiildinns were ollicials fill forced lo move sis a 'result of the incliKliiii; tlic ciiu'luc parts linisliinu' slioj), Octobi'i- allack. I niagi'd

tjiiu' assembly shop and sonic of I lie cnu'inc (est The original Omura plant was a target on several

lis (Photos 8 and (•). occasions thereafter bill wilhout the signal success There were 253 eni])loyees killed and a])])i'o.\i- of the October attack. On 21 November the iilely 250 injnied as a result of the attack, depot was the target for 94 aircraft cariyiMg 202.5 loduetion of enii'ines had ceased at the plant tons of bombs. No bombs fell in the plant area

|i(ir to the attack, lint conversion from the and there was no damage to plant installations.

ii:d

i)^ hailed. The depot produced no engines after On 19 Decembei' 1944, 32 airciaft carrying 51 attack and the subsequent dispersal. ' tons of bombs, had the Omnia dejiot as a target. .Vlso, as a result of the dispei'sal activities A conference building and some dormitoi'ies out- i iih(>(l, off hy this 25 October attack, th(>re was side of the immediate plant area were damaged airframe production by the depot for the 2 and 2 employees were killed. hiiilhs following. Production of aircraft at the Forty-five B-29s dropped 89 tons of bombs on pri-sed locations commenced in January 1945, the depot on 6 January 1945, resulting in some

I never exceeded eight airplanes in any 1 month, hits among the engine test cells and on a seaplane extremely low j)ro(luction during 1945 was maintenance shop. One death resulted from llie

r partly to the effort to pi-oduce newer combat attack.

)es, but also resulted from difficulties of opeiat- Carrier planes of the P^ifth Fleet attacked the

rii.idi 4: Irilericir of disiKThcd Cicnifre fiisfhigo a.s.seinlily shop at IVIiziihakari

Sl.1-47- 29 I'liiito 5: Interior of dispersed George wing assembly shop at Mizuliakari

depot oil IS Alaroh 1945 with sonic damage enormously greater than that infhctetl in i\ rosultiag in the hangar ai-ea of the depot. There subsequent attack. were no casualties. Th(> dispersal instituted as a direct result wasl Following the strike of 18 Alai'ch there were important factor in reducing the production! eight moi-e attacks' on the depot in IVIarcii, May, this depot to insignifieaiiee when compared to| June, and July 1945. The aircraft plant was not earliei- production. the primary target in any of these attacks, l)ut the attacks were against airfield installations or other PRODUCTION STATISTICS targets and the depot was hit only incidentally. No additional damage to productive facilities was From April 1941 through August 1945 the de caused, fasiialties from these later attacks produced a total of 966 aircraft. It had a tc| totaled IS killed and a similar numher wounded. capacity of 1,030 and govenmient orders for 1,

The iiistoi-y of the bombing program on this aircraft. Over the same period, its engine f |)articular- target might well be limited to the duction totaled 2,132 compared with capacity attack of 25 ()ctoi)er 1944. This attack came at 2,224 and orders for 2,615 engines.

;i time when o|)ei-ations were being conducted in During the early months of the operations of a normal fasliion. Lat(>r attacks were directed depot, both capacity and actual production of lif against tlie physical skeleton of the plant after th(s aircraft were small. Airframe production ils bulk of its fiiMctions had been tr'ansferred else- abandoned in October 1941 in favor of product n where. The ))h\'sie!il ihimai;e then caused was of engines and extensive aircraft and engine vcpn'i- 30 I'rodiicl ioii of aii'lVaincs was rcsiiiiicd in .liily P.M.") was al liibulable not only to operations in

l)()lli !)42, and fiipacity and aclnal pr'udncl ion dispeise

rci^iilarly rracliini; 7.'> "cpandrd airplanes pvv newer ly|)es of planes, (he l)ond)er, (Jracc, and I he

lonlli in Dccciiibcr' \\)-i'A (Fiijiiro 2). Durinji: (lie lighter, fleorge.

rsl () nionllis of 1(144, production fell oil', as did Government-plaiuied |)rodiietion followed actual iipacity,

hscrvalion s('a])lan(', Pete, and the conversion of exceeded t)oth capacity and aclii.-il [)roduction

)ii)e facilities lo tiie pi'odiictioii of the iie\\ 1or|)edo during most of 1944 194.'). I and The plans called

[id dive hondxT, (ii-ace. for a larger production of the newer type eonibal Durini;' the last half of 1944, ])r()duetion declined jilaiies than could be I'eali/.ed. iivally due first to abandonment of one (rainei- Numerically, the most important type produceil

I'pe, the sul)se(|uen( complete cessation of Pete was the observation seajjlane Pete, followed by i

'.^). i Iroduction, the first heavy air attack in October the Zeke and Claude trainers (Figure It was not ml the consef|uent dispersal. until late in the war that the depot went into regu- Vs a result of the dispersal activities, there was lar ])roduction of any of the tiewei' cond)at type airframe production during the last 2 months of |)lanes. During 194.5, the depot concentrated •44. Production at dispersed sites had cnni- only on the first-line types Grace and George.

iiiieed during 104.^, but was still small—only The only engine pi'oduced was the Amakaze 1 1. ulit airplanes in July and one in August at the 9-cylinder radial air-cooled i>(i()-horsep()wcr engine.

1(1 of the wai'. Till' low production during Capacity and actual production increased in close

Photo 6: Typical shed used fer final assembly of George at IMizubakari 31 Iiitcriiir vii'W uf (iamage to No. 1 final assembly shop at Omiira

correliition i'lom the start of production in total production; actual produeliun totaled 5!

November 1941 to ;i peuiv of 170 engines per as compared with an estimated 57(). Tlu' highe' montli in April 1944 (Figure 4). From mid-l 944 estimated rate of 40 per month was actual l)ro(luetion fell oi^ in line with a decision on the exceeded during 4 months, and reached 5(1 p part of the navy to abandon production of t!ie month during 3 of those months (Figure 5). Pv Amakaze engine in favor of planned production of actually went out of production 2 moiitlis Ixfo the 1S-cylindei- Homare engine. Engine produc- it was estimateti to have ceased. tion had ceased altogether by October when tlie The ])roduetion rate of the l)omber Grace w; first eH'ective air attack on Omura resulted in the greatly overestimated at 10 ])er month in lii4 dispersal of activities. when the highest production actually achieved After dispersal the i)ianned Homare engine any month was 4 airplanes. Intelligence had i production failed to materialize, as preparations inkling as to planned fightei' production at tli for production wer(> halted by the 25 October depot. attack and prockiction in t!ie dispersed locations Production of Zeke trainers was correctly a was too difficult to maintain. Emphasis was tiibuted to the depot, although actual producti( placed on engine n-jjair aftei' dispersal. of C'lau trainers was missed. EVALUATION OF TARGET INTELLI- Production of the Amakaze 11 engine was fo

GENCE rectly attributed to tlie Twenty-first Naval A

Estimates of pi-oductiun (jf tin reconnaissance Depot by intelligence, but the quantity of pn plane i'etc wore fairly sound from liie angle of duction never was estimated. 32 Pliotci S: Inicnor \ icw ,,t i-iigine adjusting shop; engine as.sembl.y building, in background n

33 ""t..^/\

Photo 9: Horn!) damage to engine test cells

34 t- 36

Q «!? ? Si %9's m > u a J 1 tf) c

^ ! < 5 1^ ?=. a sells nz "* t/) tf) a. ciKgi f 5S ior-(BmOr s!!:s^;

^ tn Z

39

;

Si

KiQ. >

n m 2 I 3j o I ^

>- o cfl „ ^i2q'°'~;?°'2 5^ * I I 5 13 _j Q: s?: tft «* CL I U. U1 Q. c L O 5 •- - < 35t/il-iAu.i;

Tiof-.a>o»5~^^''^«fit5CTiO^'^'^''''^'^'^ c ?i3

41 KOZA NAVAL DEPOT (Depot Report No. XIX-4)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

The Depot and Its Importance in- the Aircraft Industry 43 The Air Attacks 44 Evaluation of Preattack Intelligence 45 Reference Notes 45 Appendices: A. Total Employment, April 19-t4-August 1945 45

B. Map of Dispersal Locations , Face Page 44 C. Planned, Ordered, and Actual Production 45

42 . . —

THE DEPOT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION THE DISPERSAL PROGRAM

Koza Naval Depot (Koza Kaiguii Koslio) j The The dispersal plan was to move the main in of the interceptor ivas engaged the production facilities and equipment (shops, offices, and ware- whicli ighter Raiden (Jack), of 128 were made houses) to four sites near the dei)ot, making the 'rom May 1944 to August 1945, 21 percent best possible use of topography and wooded areas. )f all Jack production. The depot opened on Some of the warehouses were to be dispersed 1 April 1944 and continued in operation to the end elsewhere (Appendix B). jf the war. It was located in Koza county The working area after dispersal was to be prefecture, 4 (Koza-gun), Kanagawa about miles 1,291,680 square feet, separable as follows: In northeast of Atsugi station. The total building shoj)s underground, approximately 645,840 square irea was 2,2t)(),440 scjuare feet (including auxiliary feet; in tunnels, approximately 322,920 square installations) feet; in surface locations, approximately 322,920 square feet. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION The goals were to maintain the same amount of facility Details of production flow at the original site equipment and space, and a monthly production of 120 planes. However, building are not available. The functions of the various shops are recapitulated in the discussion of the space was reduced to 60 percent of the predispersal dispersal locations. area. Plans were made also to economize on The number of employees increased steadily materials and labor, to expedite the dismantling of the original plant, to minimize damage to throughout tlie period of the depot's operation, and prior to dispersal. reaching a peak of 10,548 workers in June 1945 buildings from air attack Easily destroyed material was transferred to the (Appendix A, Table 1). A single 10-hour shift ivas used. dispersed plants. Further plans were made to expand the dis- Table 1. Employment statistics ' persal area in such a way as not to intei'fere with the production of Jack. The contemplated in- Man- Total Increase Dis- number approximately Regular hours over crease in area was to have been Year and month patchei(l of month workers per workers ^ month workers preced- 538,200 square feet. present ing Work on dispersal commenced in November

1944 1944, but because of orders to change plans, lack April. .__ 2,000 2,924 81, 872 4,926 May ._ 2.000 3.708 84.000 5,708 of materials, labor, and transportation, and the June. 2,000 4.496 86,800 6,496 luiy ;;;; 2,000 5.124 89,488 7, 124 628 urgent, demand for Jack, construction of and August 2,000 5.912 94, 7.52 7,912 788 Septembor 5,000 3,000 99, 904 8.000 88 operation in dispersed sites did not come up to October 5,000 3,100 102, 928 8, 100 100

November . . . 5. IKIO 3. 196 106, 962 8, 196 96 expectations. Construction was to have been

December- . s.omj 3,384 103. 824 8,384 188 completed by 15 June 1945, and the operation 1945 entirely transferred to the new site by 10 July, lanuary... 6,000 .3,668 126.888 8,668 184 February 6,000 3.676 143. 472 8,676 108 but at the end of the war, actual progress repre- March 5,000 3.784 166. 636 8,784 108 April..... 3,000 6.000 168. 000 9.000 216 sented about 80 percent of plans (70 percent of May 3,000 7,440 180. 320 10. 440 1, 144 June... " 3,000 7.548 183. 344 10, 648 108 the planned increase). luly 3.000 6,656 186, 368 9,656 -892 August... 3,000 6,688 187, 264 9,688 32 A summary of progress in each of the four sites will also show the physical organization of produc- ' .AIJ employment was of a single, 10-hour, day shift. Haken Koin"—workers sent or borrowed from other factories. tion in the depot. 43 —

Number One plant area was the southernmost on 10 July, 18 July, and 13 August. One sheet destroyed by machine gun fire. of the 3 areas to the west of the original plant, metal shop was a total of 5 deaths and 10 injuries. and its facilities were all in tunnels or underground There was assem])led airframes and airframe shops. It STATISTICS equipment. Monthly production capacity was to PRODUCTION planes (50 percent of the total). Since the 1)6 GO Government orders started in April 1944 an( assembly plants in other areas were delayed, final were well in excess of plans for production, reach area was important from the standpoint of this ing a figure of 70 in March 1945. In the follow production. Temporary roads connected it with ing month this figure was dropped to 30, the leve the original plant. reached by planned production, and from tliei Two plant area was a dispersal inlo Number on the two figures were identical. It was con a ravine just north of Nundier One. It consisted templated that these figures would rise to SO ii of wing and fuselage assembly shops (eai)acity February 1946 (Appendix C, Table 2). planned for 40 a month), a machine shop (300 machine tools in tunnels), a parts shop (welding, T.\BLE 2. Planned (tnd actual producti'oti. April U).',^ August 1945 static, metal plates, etc, above ground), and a sheet metal shop (in tunnels). It had by the end Year and month Requested of the war assembled 10 wings and fuselages. Nundier Three plant area, north of Number 1944 ravine, April Two, was a dispersal into woods and a May June final assembly shop (underground, and included a Jul.v planes a month), fuselage August capacity planned for :iO September- capacity ])lanned October and wing assembly (underground, November- December.. for 40 a month), a parts shop (in tunnels), and a parts warehouse (in tunnels). By the end 194."i ])art the tunnels had January of the war only the major of February.. the remaiuder was in |)rocess of March been completed; April.. -- -May construction. June lay in to the July Number Four plant area woods .\ugust practically east of the original plant. It was Total completed, and at the end of the war was on the point of starting operation. It comprised a final assembly shop (underground, capacity planned for 30 planes a month), fuselage antl wing assembly (above ground, capacity planned for 40 a month), a jig shop, and a wooden parts shop, both above ground. The dispersal plants produced only 10 planes in

all. How much production was lost due to dis- persal itself is difficult to determine, since the move was not completed, and there was, in addi- tion, a shortage of materials and parts. The most serious aspect of the dispersal was that it was not completed according to schedule, since no planning was valid until the facilities were ready. THE AIR ATTACKS

From A|)ril l'J4.5, the de|)ot was uniler attack at various times by carrier-based fighters raiding the Atsugi airfield south of (he arsenal, notM])ly

44

* :

EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK total number made since 'production started to INTELLIGENCE only seven altogether. No estimate of rate of production was made. Military Iiiti'llia;enco Sorviop Var De|)iirtineiit REFERENCE NOTES ( 21, iiiul itl(Mitiii('(l tlio (jppot as a production

1 Inr .laok, and supposed tliat plane ])ro(luction The following material is on file at the office of

\:\ -started in October 1944. This was actually the Adjutant General, War Department, Wash-

sixtli of hut the three ington, D. I niontli i)roduction, C. lines produced duriiiti; that time hrought the Reference Note 1, Hotflencck Parts, 1945.

"RAIDEN" FIGHTER (JACK) TOTAL EMPLOYMENT PLANNED, ORDERED, AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION APRIL 1944 — AUG 1945 APRIL 1944 — JULY 1945

KOZA NAVAL ARSENAL APPEICIX— TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL (Report No. XIX-5)

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The Aksenal and its Importance in the Aircraft Industry ___. 47 Attacks on Plants 48 Production Statistics 49- Evaluation op Pre-attack Intelligence 49 Reference Notes 49 Appendices: A. Ma|) of Dispersion and Plant, Locations . 53 B. Monthly Employment — Airframe Works, 54 C. Monthly Employment— Engine Works 55 D. Direct Man-Hours Worked— Airframe Works 56 E. Direct Man-Hours Worked— Engine Works 57 F. Plan for Underground Engine AVorks at Hayasbi 58 G. Plan for Underground Aircraft Works at Shichisei 59 H. Dispersal of Tachikawa Air Arsenal 60

I. Air Attack Damage 61 J. Monthly Aircraft Production 62 K. Monthly Engine Production 63

46 THE ARSENAL AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

INTRODUCTION was directly under the Commanding General of the Air General Army from whose office all orders The Tacliikawa Army Air ^Vj-senal, locatod 20 were issued. Funds were received from the Army. miles east of Tol^yo on the outskirts of tlie town of Tachikawa, was the only Army arsenal engaged ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION in the production of airframes and ah'craft The commanding officer of this arsenal and its engines. During the period 1941-45 air-frame dispersals was Col. Sliujiro Tanabe. production accounted for 1.4 percent and engine The airframe and engine works employed a total production 1.2 percent of the Japanese total. of 11,940 workers at the war's end. Prior to The principal model produced in the airframe September 1943 the arsenal was operated on a works was the Ki-51, Type 99 single-engine one-shift basis; thereafter, until the end of the reconnaissance aircraft, Sonia. Approximately 22 war, two 11-hour shifts were in effect. One per month were produced for the years 1942 began at 0700 and ended at 1800; the other through 1944 by the Tachikawa Arsenal, which started at 1900 and ended at 0600. The percent- was the sole manufacturer of this model. age of workers on th(> night shift varied from Other aircraft produced by the arsenal included to 40 percent. the Ki-30, Type 97 single-engine light bomber, The engine works had a peak employment of Vnn, and the Ki-43, Type 1 single-engine fighter, 5,640 at the end of the war, while the number of Oscar. Only 49 of the latter model were pro- air-frame workers reached a peak of 6,300 at the duced although it was one of the Army's out- end of the war (Appendices B, C, D, and E). standing single-engine fighters. The production The airframe works loaned the Mitsubishi of Ivi-67, Peggy, was planned to begin in the firm an average of 866 persons per month from latter part of 1945, Init only one was produced April through December of 1944, and the engine before the war ended. works loaned 1,000 workers to Nakajima from In the engine works the principal product was June" through October 1944. the Ha-23, a nine-cylinder, air-cooled radial Labor turnover in the airfranu' works ?ngine of 360 horsepower for trainer aircraft. amounted to approximately 2 percent in 1942, During the years 1941 through 1944 production 1 percent in 1943, and 2 percent in 1944 and 1945. iveraged 26 per month. Other models included There is no information as to turnover in the the 1,050 horsepower, 14-cylinder Ha-31, an engine works. About 40 percent of the workers lir-cooled radial with a two-sjieed supercharger in both of the plants were soldiers. Tor powering the twin-engine Kawasaki fighter Nick, and the 1,970 horsepower Ha-45, an 18- DISPERSAL ylinder radial also ecjuipped with a two-speed mpercharger, used in the singl(>-engine Nakajima The facilities of the Tachikawa Arsenal were ighter Frank. dispersed to two widely separated areas: The In addition to the manufacture of air frames engine works centered around Kanazawa in ind engines, the arsenal engaged in all modifica- Ishikawa prefecture on the west coast, more :ions and major repairs for the Tokyo area. than 200 miles from Tokyo, while the air-frame

In August 1 944 the engine works was moved to works were scattered in the general pi'oximity of

he city of Kanazawa, which is on the Japan Sea Tachikawa within 50 miles of the Imperial Palace ibout 100 miles due north of Nagoya (Appendix (Appendix A). fV). Owned by the Japanese Army, the Arsenal With the capture of the Marianas Islands by

47 the United States forces m June 1944, Army tion of roads and the distance, this transfer was on authorities considered plans for the dispersal of a small scale. At the end of April 1945 compo- the arsenal's engine works to Kanazawa. By nents were in limited production at the new site. August, plans were completed and the dispersal In April 1945 tlu' Army authorities decitled to carried out. construct an underground plant for the air- Early in 1945, following the initial urban area frame works at nearby Shichist-i containing 13,200 attacks, it was decided to disperse further. A feet of tuimels. Average height and width of the program was put into effect hy which the t'acilities tunnels was 10 by 13 feet (Appendix G). In of the engine works were scatteretl to 35 sites in August the Shichisei plant was 80 percent com- Ishikawa prefecture and raw materials to 50 addi- pleted. tional storage sites. In early May it was decided to move one-half

In the meantime, construction of an under- the assembly shop facilities to Takahagi foi- the ground engine works was undertaken in June at assemlily of Sonia reconnaissance aircraft and the Hayashi, 6 miles south of Kanazawa, and was twin-engine medium bomber Peggy, but at the about 30 percent coni[)leted by August when the end of the month construction of a semiuiuler- war ended. This undei'ground plant was to ground woiks at Hanno was undertaken to which include 11,616 feet of tunnels. Approximately it was intended to retransfer the final assembly 800 machine tools eventually were to be installed facilities from the Takahagi site. in the underground plant, which was to have, in The dispersal of the airframe works was aL addition to a machine shop, a raw materials ware- within a 27-niile radius of the Tachikawa arseuai house, components storage, transformer station, (Appendix H). and oil storage (Appendi.x F). After the dispersal of the engine works in ATTACKS ON PLANTS August 1944, the airframe works for a time occu- pied the section in the Tachikawa Arsenal vacated The Tachikawa arsenal suffered from the ett'ect by the engine works. AVith the intensification of of three attacks, only one of which was directc' air attacks toward the end of 1944, plans were against the woi-ks as the primary target. formulated for the dispersal of tlie airframe Diaing the attack of 4 April 1945 on the Tacli works also. However, because of tliificulties in kawa Airi)lane Co.'s main plant, the "spillover obtaining building materials and transportation resulted in hits on the Arsenal. Thiid\ing it wa facilities, dispersal of the works' machine shop to the bombers' targi>t, although damage was ligh

Tokorozawa, 12 miles northeast of Tachikawa, oflicials burned all wooden structures not in us( was not undertaken until 10 March 1945. Alost of the shop facilities had been dispersed, bu During the same periotl the sheet metal shop it was felt that an uncontrolled fire among empt facilities were moved to the Hikawa tuiuid, 27 buildings wouhl spread to the airfield and destro miles west of Tachikawa. the aircraft in the hangars. In the meantime, in early February 1945, ap- On 9 June 1945, during a Twentieth Air Forci proximately 60 warehouses had Ibeen acrjuired in attack directed against the arsenal, 2 airfiel the Tachikawa area, and by the first part of March hangars were destroyed. Twenty-nine B-2[ transfer of easily transported materials took place. attacked the target and dropped 169 tons of G The decision to disperse raw materials stoi-age bombs. Eighteen aircraft bombed visually aiv resulted when the Musashi plant of the Nakajinui 1 1 by radar devices. Damage was light.

Co. was bombed. On 1 August the arsenal was hit during a To cai'ry the dispersion into effect 1,000 vehicles urban area attack on Hachioji. Incendiarie and 10,000 men were employed. During the gutted 4 of the remaining buildings, and there weij

' transfer, since il was necessary temporarily to 29 casualties; 5 dead and 24 injured. expose certain steel and light alloys to the ele- These raids caused damage to only 11 of th ments in outdooi' dumps, a portion of these mate- approximately 75 buildings (Appendix I). rials suffered considerable damage. The urban area attacks on other districts had With the transfer of the sheet metal shop facili- large effect. It was cstimaterl numerous shortage ties to Hikawa, a j)ortion of the components such as oil, coal, and raw material in generf assembly shoj) was moved to Sawai, 25 mil(>s resulted from these attacks. southwest of Tachikawa. Due to the poor eoudi- The Kanazawa Engine Works was not bombec; 48 PRODUCTION STATISTICS works to Kanazawa. From April 1945 to the end, furthci' dis[)ersal and the attemi)t to go From 1941 until tlic ond of tlic war (lie Tnclii- underground held back pioduclion of the IIa-45 kawii ai'scnal Inul the capacity to produce 1,7(J0 ) (Figure 2 . After March 1 945 Ha-45 was the only aircraft. Actual production was 1,004. During engine in production because of the govermnent's the period April 1941 to the end of the war engine attempt to standardize tyix's. The Kanazawa production capacity was 2,730 wliilc actual pro- main works never was bombed but suffei'ed ex- luction was 1,363. tremely from the threat of bombing. The capacity of tli(> airframe works was 20 Actual ])roduction stayed fairly close to capacity aircraft per month in 1041, at which level it until August 1944 when general confusion and lack remained until Marcli 1!)42 when it rose to 30. of supplies together with attempted dispersal In Septemher of 1943 it rose to 40 and remained caused the program to fail (Appendix K). i|iit this level until the end of the war (Figure 1). ()r(h'rs lagged below capacity until August 1942 EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK ivhen the 2 coincided at 30 aircraft per month. INTELLIGENCE From Sc])temhi'r 1942 through March 194.'5 orders 'xceeded capacity, rising to 48 aircraft per month The War Department Military Intelligence n March but dropping sharply to 22 in April Service (G-2), estimate of total production for 1943. In April 1944 orders again reached capacity Sonia was 17 percent over actual (Figure 3). The vhich was 40 per month and stayed at that ap- estimate, although it failed to show all of the )ro.\imate level until February 1945 and dropped fluctuations, did give a very good general trend.

)ft' to zeio in March (Appendi.x J). Over-all production amounted to 913 Sonias while The important production was that of Sonia. MIS estimated 1,068. Intelligence did not have \n 1942 the divergence between planned and actual any estimate of production on othfer aircraft as the vas due to the attempt to establish a program for production was so small it was negligible. )roduction of Oscar to parallel the production of There were no estimates of engine production 5onia. This was abandoned because of the ina- as the only engine produced in appreciable quan- )ility of production engineers to cope with attend- tity was the Ha-23. The Ha-23 was only 360 nt problems. horsepower and Military Intelligence Service The large drop in production in June through made no estimates on low horsepower engines, December 1944 arose from the loan of about 700 although aware of the fact that the arsenal was rorkers to Mitsubishi. In early 1945 planned producing other models. nd actual production fell sharply due to the 'reparation made for the production of Ki 67, a REFERENCE NOTES

!\vo-engine bomber, Peggy (fig. 1). 1. Explanatory table of plans for dispersion and evac- Only one Peggy was made because of the con- uation. jusion arising from dispersal which in turn was 2. Damage to tools and powered machinery during the laused by bombing and the threat of further third raid. ttacks. Production of Sonia rose briefly after 3. Aircraft works organization. 4. Receipt of principal metal materiivls. iispersal and then stopped in July prior to the 5. Component Shops of the engine works. 'nd of the war. 6. Explanation table for engine works di.^persion In the engine works the difficulties encountered program. n production were similar to those in the air- rame works. Low production in the first half Reference items are filed with the records of

f 1943 accompanied the change over from Ha-23 the Aircraft Division, United States Strategic

I Ha-31. In September 1944 capacity as well Bombing Survey, in the office of the Adjutant

s production fell ofi' due to the dispersal of the General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

49 a: O

TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL AIRFRAME WORKS INTELLISENCE ESTIMATE VS ACTUAL PRODUCTION ISOWIA)

FIGURE 3

52 LEGEND ® AIRCRAFT TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL © ENGINE MAP OF DISPERSIONS AND PLANT LOCATIONS

HONSHU ISLAND

53 .

APPENDIX B

Tachikfiii'ii ^\r»ii/ ^\ir Arsrnal nioiithli/ ciiiploiinn til chart, dircrl anil itiilinrl workers, airframe works

Direct . .

Indirect.

1941 Direct APPENDIX C

'nrhikawa Army Air Arsenal monthbi employment clitirt, ilirecl and indireci workers Knnnzawa Engine Works April 1!)',0- Jiily 1945

1940 iri'C'l... direct.

1941 APPENDIX D

Tacliikuwd Army Air ArscKal direct iiitpluyees (man-hours), airframe leorks, April WJ}-J uhj W4'>

APPENDIX F

Other underground installations includir The c^eneral plan for umlororoun.l installation 4. raw materials warehouse, component warehous of the engine worlds at Hayashi. oil storage, etc. 1. Requirements: 8,800-pouncl Diameter, 10 feet. (a) To withstaiifl a direct hit by an bomb. Height, 7 feet. toolt^. Length, 1,320 feet. (b) To accommodate about 800 machine " 5. Communication passages, etc.: 2. Machine shop: Diameter, 13 feet Diameter, 16 feet. "^'gh*' fe'^^; Height, 10 feet. 1° I^ength, 1,15,^ feet. Length, 9,075 feet.

Interval between passage, fifi feet. (]_ Summary:

(feet) lO IG 10 :] Transformer station: Diameter Heiglit (feet) 10 10 7 Diameter 16 feet HeigSiefeef Length (feet) 9,075 66 1,320 1,1 Total, 11,616. Length, (i6 feet.

58 .

APPENDIX G

Tlio jionoral plan for undcrgi'ound installation (1. Medical treatment rooms: f the aircraft vvoi'ks at Sliichisci. Span, 13 feet. 1 Requirements: Height, 10 feet.

(a) Intended to withstiind direct, hits by 1,100- Length, 66 feet. pound bombs.

(6) Intended to accommodate 800 macliine tools. 7. Heat treatment shop:

2. Machine shop: Span, 20 feet.

Span, 13 feet. Height, 10 feet. Heii^ht, 10 feet. Leiigtli, 99 feet. LengMi, 9,240 feet. 8. Miscellaneous undergi'ound installation in- .'5. Jig shop. spection shops, oil filtration shops, oil storage, etc. Sjmn, 13 feet. Height, 10 feet. Span, 13 feet. Length, 908 feet. Height, 10 feet. Length, 2,788 feel. 4. Repair shop:

Span, 13 feet. 9. Summary: Height, 10 feet. Span (feet) Heiglit (feet) Total length (feet) Length, 363 feet. 13 10 13, 035 5. Transformer room: 20 13 66 Span, 20 feet. 20 10 99 Height, 13 feet.

Length, 66 feet. 13, 200

59 TOKOROZAWA

U S STRATEGIC BOMBINC SURVEY TACHIKAWA ARMY AIR ARSENAL DISPERSAL OF TACHIKAWA AIR ARSENAL J

APPENDIX H

60 >UJ tr.D in m Z o CD U (9 UJ t5

H

P I

1

1 r

—,

APPENDIX K

Monliihj engine produclioji

HA-23 HA-31 HA-46 Total Total capacity i Ordered Produced Ordered Produced Ordered Produced Ordered

5 10 ne 10 lly. 15 Tigust 15 Iptember, 15 etober 20 l>vember- 20 pccmbcr,- 20

TotaL 130

1942 huary... Ibruary. lareh fril

Ine.. lly. igust lotembcr_ Itober livember. iceraber..

Total. 436 340 263

luary . Ibruary. prch Iril ty

ly Igust JDteinber. Itober.... Ivember.. Ieember_.

Total. 66

puary... 60 Jjruary. 70 Irch 70 M 70 ly 85 y 85 gust 85 = 80 ptember. tober 10 Ivsmber.. 30 ttber... 50

•Total _ 695 480 416 60

iuary.. 80 pruary. 80 Irch 100 TriK.... 120 '30 70 100 150 Total 730 134 7 Grand totah. 2,730 1,275 1,203 145 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS

The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hildesheim, (iv the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. many Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may lie p\ir- 22 Metallgussgesellsehaft G m b H, Leipzig, Gerniai chased from the Superintendent of Docimients at the 23 Ahaniniumwerk G m b H, Plant No. 2, Bitterfel Government Piinting Office, Washington, D. C. Ciermany 24 Gebruedei Giulini G m b H, Ludwigshafen, Gennai 25 LuftschifTbau Zeppelin C! m b H, Friedrichshafi European War on Boflensee, Germany 2(j Wieland Werke A G, LTlm, Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Soli gen, Germany *1 The I'nited States Strategic Bombing Surve.v: Sum- 28 Lijjpewerke Vereinigte .-Muminiumweike A G, Lime mary Rejjort (European War) Germany *2 The United States Strategic Boml)ipg Survey; Over- 2!) Vereinigte Deutsche Metallweike, Heddemheii all Report (European War) German\' *3 The Effects of Strategic Boml)ing on the German 30 Duerener Nletalhverke A G, Duren Wittenau-Ber War Economv & Waren, German v

AIRCRAFT DIVISION AREA STUDIES DIVISION

( Hy 1 )i\isi(iii and Hran(^li) *3I Area Studies Division Rejrort 32 A Detailed Study of the FIffects of Area liomlji *4 Aircraft Division Industry Report. on 6 Inspection Visits to Various Targets (Special Ki'|iort) 33 A Detaik^d Study of the I'IffecIs of Area Bombi on Wujtpertal Airframes Branch 31 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi on Dusseldorf 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero iMigine \\'urks, I_)essau, 35 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi Germany on Solingen 7 Erla Maschincnwerke (_i ni li II, Ilcitcrlilick, (icr- 30 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bonibr many on Remscheid 8 AT G' Maschinenbau, G m 1) H, Lei]vJg (Mockau), 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi Germany on Darmstadt !l Gothaei Waggonfaliiik, A G, Gotha, Germany 38 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombi 10 Focke Widf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany on Lubeck (Over-all Report 30 A Brief Study of the Effects of .\rea Bombing i 11 Messerschmitt G, Part A A | Beilin, Augsburg, Boclium, Leipzig, Hagen, Do Augsburg, Germaiivl Part B muufl, Oberhausen, , and Bremen Uiipendiccs 1, II, III 12 Dornier Works, Friecirichshafen & Munich, Germany DIVISION 13 Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, German,\ CIVILIAN DEFENSE 11 Wiener Xeustaedter Flugzengwerkc, Wiener Neu- *40 Civilian Defense Division — Final Repoit stadt, Austria 41 Cologne Field Report 42 Bonn Field Report Aero Engines Branch 43 Hanover Field Report 44 Hamburg Field Report— Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhib 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke G m b II, Bruns- 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report wick, Germany 46 Augsburg Field Report Hi Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, 47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany Germany 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, EQUIPMENT DIVISION Germany 18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Electrical Branch Germany ly Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany *48 German F^lectrical Equipment Industry Report 49 Blown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germa Light Metal Branch Optical and Precision Instrument Branch 20 Light Metals Industry (Part I, Aluminum of Germany \Part II, Magnesium 50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Repor

64 Abrasives Branch Submarine Branch 'il Tlie German Abrasive Industry 92 German Submarine Industry Report V2 Mayor and Schmidt, Offenbach on Mjiiii, (ici-iiiany 93 Masehinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnbcrg A G, Augs- burg, Germany Anti-Friction Branch 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 95 Deutschewerke A. G, Kiel, Germany i3 The (iernian Anti-Friction Bearings Industry 90 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, Ger- Machine Tools Branch many 97 Friedrich Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany .1 Machine Tools & IMachineiy as Capital E(|uipmenl 98 Howaldtswerke A. G, Hamburg, Germany i."i Machine Tool Industry in Germany 99 Submarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Gerinany id Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany 100 ]?remer Vulkan, Vege.sack, Germany i7 ('ollet and iMigelhard, Offenbach, Germany iS Naxos Union, I'rankfort on Main, Germany Ordnance Branch MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION *101 Ordnance Industry Keijorl :i The Defeat of the German Air Force 102 Friedrich Krujjp Grusonwerke A. G, , V-\Veapons (Crossbow) Campaign Germany

1 Air Force Rate of Opeiation 103 Bochumer Vereiu fuer Gusstahlfabrikation .\ G, 2 Weather Factors in Combat Hombanlnient Opera- , Germany lions in the iMiiopean Theaire 104 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, (!ermany .! Accuracy, Bombing I'SAAF Heavy and Medium 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany Bombers in the KTO 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallendorf, I Description of RAF Homliing. Germany )a The Impact, of the Allied Air I'lffort on German 107 Hannoverische Maschinenbau, Hanover, Germany Logistics 108 Gusstalilfabrik Friedrich Krujip, Essen, Germany MORALE DIVISION

111 Tlie Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Vol. I & Vol. II) OIL DIVISION

Medical Branch *109 Oil Division, Final Report *110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care *111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet Pro- in Geimany pellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Report #1) MUNITIONS DIVISION 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger- Heavy Industry Branch nrany 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report Team The Coking Industry Report on Germanv 78 Coking Plant Report No. 1, Sections A,"B, C, & D 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals Gutehoffnungshuette, Oberhausen, Germany Fiiedrich-Alfied Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Neunkirchen Eisenwerke A G, Neunkirchen, Ger- Oil Branch many 115 werke Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G, Hallendorf, Ammoniak Mer.seburg G m b H, Leuna, Ger- Germany many—2 Appendices August Thyssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany llfl Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Germany \\'intershall Leutzkendorf, Friedrich Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger- A G, Germany nrany 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenindustrie Dortnmnd Hoerder Huettenverein, AG, Dorlnuuid, A G, Lud\yigshafen, Germany Germany 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger- Hoesch A G, , Germany many, Vol, I, Vol. II 119 Mineraloel werke G, Harburg Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, Rhenania Ossag A Bochum, Germany Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook Motor Vehicles and Tanl