Book Reviews 167

Book Reviews 167 Book Reviews DAVID L. BIGLER and WILL BAGLEY. The Mormon Rebellion: America’s First Civil War, 1857–1858. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011, xv + 392 pp., illustrations, bibliography, index, $34.95 hardcov- er.) Reviewed by Brent M. Rogers One might be surprised at the dearth of history written on the fascinating episode known as the Utah War. Since 1958, only a handful of historical monographs have attempted to understand the struggle between the United States federal government and the Mormon community in the large Great Basin territory.1 In this sprawling narrative account, David L. Bigler and Will Bagley, both independent historians who have pro- duced signifi cant work on Great Basin and Mormon history, offer a reinterpretation of the Utah War by challenging the heroic history of Mormon self-defense that has permeated the topic’s historical memory. The provocative title slightly belies the scope of the book, as much of the story told within its pages occurs before and slightly after the time frame indicated. Nevertheless, the title makes clear the authors’ perspective: a Mormon theocracy breathed defi ance at and ultimately rebelled against the federal government, which resulted in a regional civil war. The authors present innumerable fascinating details and an interesting story. However, they also make many unsubstantiated or confusing claims that mar this study. Bigler and Bagley cast a critical eye on the Mormon world-view and position their narrative in a framework of the Mormon millennial belief system. In fourteen fast-moving chapters they engage numerous topics, large- ly chronologically. Beginning with Joseph Smith’s introduction of theocratic governance, the authors present a multitude of stories and incidents involv- ing Mormon attempts to gain statehood, the handcart disaster, the Mormon 168 Mormon Historical Studies Reformation, Brigham Young’s bombastic and inflammatory rhetoric, Mormon efforts to create alliances with Native Americans, and President James Buchanan’s decision to send the army to establish its presence in Utah— all to build their case and demonstrate Mormon rebellion. Bigler and Bagley masterfully recount details and fascinating stories of violence in the territory, including an entire chapter on the Mountain Meadows Massacre, legal affairs, and military logistics on both sides. They do well to depict the relationship and efforts of the Mormons to curry favor with area Native Americans to establish an alliance (279–80). Since the authors posit that the Utah War was ultimately beneficial to both sides, they are absolutely correct to point out that, following the arrival of the army in Utah, James H. Simpson’s topographical corps developed new transportation and communication routes as the war’s most tangible benefit (328). The overarching theme of this book is the incompatibility of theocratic and republican governing systems (8–9). In this fresh interpretation the authors argue that the two governing systems cannot coexist without conflict. The federal government acquired new territory, like the Great Basin in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, with the intent to make that land part of the Union as a state or several states. Territories were designed to go through a process of tutelage as they became equal states in the Union. However, no new state could gain admittance without a republican form of government under Article IV of the Constitution. Bigler and Bagley indicate that the Mormons, especially their leader and Utah Territory’s governor, Brigham Young, thought they were operating the ideal republican form of government in listening to the will of the territory’s people (142). However, Young’s combined role as civil and religious leader appeared theocratic from the outside and became detrimental to obtaining statehood for Utah. With territorial status, the federal government had the final authority over Indian affairs, land issues, and official appointments. In addition, all territorial legislation ultimately had to gain Congressional approval, which Young labeled “odious and anti-republican” or an “absurd system” of colonialism (82–83). As the Mormon community made efforts to become an equal, sovereign state in the Union, their perceived theocracy prevented them from gaining that status and proved that the two governing systems would not function together. Mormons indeed desired a sovereign position, as Bigler and Bagley posit. However, in chapter 4, “A Terror to All Nations: The Crusade for Sovereignty,” the 1856 Mormon statehood campaign takes center stage and creates confusion as to the type and extent of sovereignty sought. What be- comes muddled in this work is whether the religious community desired sovereignty as a state in the Union or as an independent nation. The authors vacillate between and often conflate Mormon efforts at obtaining statehood Book Reviews 169 with ideas of Mormon universal dominion, or creating the Kingdom of God. Further complicating the matter of designs for Mormon sovereignty is the January 6, 1858 petition from Mormon Utah lawmakers, in the midst of the Utah War, asking for “rights of sovereignty afforded to states,” and their “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS” to remain in the Union. Bigler and Bagley read this as a marker of independence, a document designed to fulfill “God’s purpose in inspiring the Constitution’s framers to establish a land of religious freedom where His Kingdom could be restored and supersede its parent as it prevailed to universal dominion” (268). It seems contradictory to say that this petition seeking inclusion into the Union with state sovereignty was in fact fulfilling the objective of Mormon universal dominion. The authors’ conten- tion leaves the reader to wonder why Young would lead a rebellion in pursuit of total national independence if he and his fellow Church leaders wanted status as a sovereign state. The authors further offer an incongruous claim that “Young had deliberately rebelled against the authority of the United States and intended to adopt a sovereign position as either a state of the Union or an independent nation, even if it took bloodshed to do it” (283). If he led a blood- filled rebellion against the federal government, it seems unlikely that the Mormon community would ever gain state sovereignty. Ultimately, the authors, in their efforts to depict Mormon rebellious objectives, fail to analyze or differentiate between state sovereignty and independent national sovereignty. The Mormon Rebellion occasionally offers insufficient source criti- cism. According to the authors, James Buchanan “intended to assert U.S. sovereignty” in Utah Territory and not provoke a conflict (3). He did want to impose federal authority on a “defiant territory” because of the numerous reports received from Utah federal officials which indicated that a republican form of government was absent in the territory. Bigler and Bagley highlight the various reports received by the federal government which they maintain demonstrated Mormon rebellion. One document in particular is an “unwise and ill-timed” defiant memorial from Utah Territory that lists griev- ances with former territorial officials and supplies a list of approved candi- dates for various government posts. The authors assert that this memorial “did more to bring on the United States Army than all the complaints of federal appointees” (105). They offer this claim, but provide questionable source material and little analysis to back their assertion. In their portrayal, Utah delegate John Bernhisel presented the memorial to the president on March 18, 1857, two weeks after his inauguration, but Buchanan did not read it and instead sent it to Interior Secretary Jacob Thompson. The authors brand this document a “Mormon nullification doctrine,” while Thompson appar- ently indicated it was “a declaration of war.” Thompson appears to have met with Utah’s congressional delegate, Bernhisel, and told him that it “breathed 170 Mormon Historical Studies a defiant spirit,” and allegedly inquired if the Mormons “intended to set up an independent Government” (106–07). The authors, however, do not inform the reader of what Thompson actually said, only what Bernhisel said he said (107). As a source they cite a letter from Bernhisel to Brigham Young that recounts the meeting. Bernhisel’s letter may be the best source available, but the authors have not qualified the source, nor indicated how the meeting between the Utah delegate and the Secretary of the Interior influenced the decision to send the army to Utah. The authors expect the reader to accept their claim, but the reader is left wondering if Thompson ever met with the president on this memorial, or if he had any influence with the president on Utah affairs. From their brief two-page discussion of this seemingly crucial document, it is unclear how this memorial did anything to “bring on the United States Army.” If this is in fact the key document that led to the Utah War, more documentation from the federal perspective and a deeper contextual analysis by the authors is required. In the chapter on the Mountain Meadows Massacre, Bigler and Bagley also make unsubstantiated and contradictory claims. The authors label the massacre a terrorist action and maintain that Brigham Young purposefully directed it “to strike fear into the hearts of intruders,” and to demonstrate his power to sever the transcontinental overland lines of travel and communica- tions. The authors further assert that “at Mountain Meadows, Brigham Young served notice to the rest of the nation that he would defend with arms the sovereignty of God’s Kingdom in the West as it opened its march to universal dominion” (179). This conclusion is contradicted earlier in the text when the authors suggest that Young did not report or investigate the massacre, and “as far as he was concerned, it was a non-event” (155). It makes little sense that Young ordered a massacre to serve as a notice of his power to the rest of the nation and then did not report it to anyone outside Utah and made great efforts to conceal the event.

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