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OPS-405 - ARREST PROCEDURES [1.2.1, 1.2.5] Amends/Supersedes: OPS-405 (02/27/2019) Date of Issue: 03/26/2021

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Newport News Police Department - Operational Manual OPS-405 - ARREST PROCEDURES [1.2.1, 1.2.5] Amends/Supersedes: OPS-405 (02/27/2019) Date of Issue: 03/26/2021 I. GENERAL A. When making an arrest, the officer: 1. Will take into consideration the safety of bystanders in the area of arrest, the suspect being arrested, and their own safety. 2. Should pick the place, time, and location of the arrest to give the best tactical advantage, as conditions allow. 3. Shall verbally announce the arrest prior to any physical seizure of an individual when reasonably possible. 4. Will be in uniform, and/or shall display their badge of office. 5. Will, prior to placing the arrested individual in a patrol vehicle, conduct a search incident to arrest (see OPS-410 Searching Arrested Persons). The transporting/receiving officer is responsible for searching or observing the search of any detainee placed in their vehicle. A search must be conducted any time care and control of the detainee is transferred from one officer to another. B. While making an arrest based on the execution of any warrant or other legal service: 1. It is mandatory to verify that the person named in the legal document is the person being detained. This includes (but is not limited to): a. Pictorial identification; b. Driver’s license; c. Identification by social security number; or d. Fingerprints prior to arrest for comparison to known fingerprints of the person named in the arresting document. 2. If the identity of the suspect being detained is questionable, or cannot be determined via the prior means, a supervisor should be consulted before any arrest is made. II. PROCEDURE A. Authority of Police Officers to Stop, Question, and Search Suspicious Persons (“Terry Stop”). A police officer may detain a person in a public place who they reasonably suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime. If they have such reasonable suspicion, the officer may require the detainee's name and address, and may conduct a pat- down for a dangerous weapon when they have articulable reasons to fear for their safety. If the detainee illegally possesses a concealed weapon, the officer shall take possession and dispose of it as provided by law. [1.2.4] OPS-405 - 1 of 15 – 03/26/2021 1. A pat-down search does not automatically accompany an investigative detention. The officer must articulate particular facts from which they can reasonably infer that the detainee is armed and dangerous. NOTE: To justify removal, it is only necessary that the officer reasonably believes the object could be a weapon. 2. Reasonable suspicion of narcotics possession and distribution is a stand-alone circumstance that infers dangerousness, thus permitting authority to conduct a pat-down search.] 3. The “Plain Touch Rule” allows an officer to seize an item whose feel is so distinctive that its evidentiary nature is immediately and clearly apparent. 4. An officer may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime or contraband, and there are exigent circumstances that would make obtaining a search warrant impracticable (Carroll Doctrine). [1.2.4] a. Exigency may be created by the mobility of the vehicle, and the likelihood that the vehicle’s occupants will remove or destroy evidence or contraband. b. The scope of a warrantless search is defined by the existing probable cause. Officers may search the entire vehicle, trunk, closed containers, or any place that the items to be seized could be kept. 5. An officer may conduct a warrantless search at the scene of a crime to ensure no unaccounted for victims or suspects exist at the scene, or exigent circumstances that will cause the loss or destruction of evidence. [1.2.4] 6. Use of Force During Investigative Detentions a. If an officer has an articulable suspicion that an individual stopped for an investigative detention (Terry Stop) is armed and/or poses a significant danger to themselves or others, the officer shall be permitted to employ a level of force to protect themselves and neutralize any potential danger posed by the individual stopped (see OPS-110 Use of Force) b. The immediate circumstances must justify the officer’s decision to use a particular level of force during the investigative detention. If the use of force exceeds that which is necessary for the investigative detention, the stop may be deemed a “custodial” detention by the courts, which entitles the subject to certain protections (e.g., Miranda warnings) not required during an investigative detention. B. Service of Criminal Process, Warrant, Capias, and Summons [74.1.1, 74.3.1] 1. In accordance with §15.2-1704 B of the Code of Virginia, an officer has no authority in civil matters except: a. To execute and serve temporary detention orders and any other powers granted to law enforcement officers in §16.1-340, §16.1-340.1, §37.2-808 or §37.2-809 (mentally ill in need); b. To serve an order of protection pursuant to §§16.1-253.1, 16.1-253.4 and 16.1-279.1 (family abuse); or c. To execute all warrants or summons as may be placed in their hands by any magistrate for the locality and to make due return thereof; and OPS-405 - 2 of 15 – 03/26/2021 d. To deliver, serve, execute, and enforce orders of isolation and quarantine issued pursuant to §§32.1-48.09, 32.1-48.012, and 32.1-48.014 and to deliver, serve execute, and enforce an emergency custody order issued pursuant to §32.1-48.02. [74.2.1] 2. When officers serve, or attempt to serve, a criminal process, warrant, or capias, they will complete the attached Warrant Service Tracking Sheet (NNPD Form #64), ensuring that the following information is recorded: [74.1.2, 82.2.2(e)] a. The date and time that service was attempted/made; b. The name of the attempting/serving officer; c. The name of the person on whom the service +was attempted/made; d. The results of the service, or the reason why service was not made; and e. The address or location where service was attempted/made. 3. Officers shall not receive, solicit, or accept any fee or other compensation for the execution of a criminal process other than the salary or expense reimbursement paid by the City. 4. §19.2-80 of the Code of Virginia requires that if an officer does not issue a summons pursuant to §19.2-74 or §46.2-936, the officer making arrest under a warrant or capias shall bring the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer. 5. All warrants which are faxed to other Departments shall only be faxed by members of the Fugitive Apprehension Unit as needed in their day-to-day activities. Records Section personnel may fax warrants, when the subject is in custody. (If an officer requests attempted service Records Section personnel will fax a warrant copy that has been stamped "COPY – DETAINER ONLY".) [ 74.1.3(c)] a. Upon receiving disposition of a faxed warrant copy, personnel will complete a Fax Warrant Cover Sheet (NNPD Form #63) update the computer entry, and place the original warrant in the “fax drawer”. b. Access to the area where warrants are maintained is limited to personnel assigned to the Records Section and Fugitive Apprehension Unit. All warrants removed from Records Section must be signed out in the provided log. 6. If a person is arrested on an outstanding warrant for failing to report to, or going AWOL from, the Virginia National Guard they will be taken before the magistrate (§44-50 of the Code of Virginia). The arresting officer will notify the National Guard officer or Unit Commander of the issuing authority where the accused can be picked up. No arrest card or booking procedure is required. C. Issuance and Service of Summons in Place of Warrants in Misdemeanor Cases [1.2.6; 74.3.1] 1. Pursuant to §19.2-74 of the Code of Virginia, an officer shall release on a summons any person: a. Detained, or in custody for, any violation committed in the officer’s presence which is a violation of any City or Code of Virginia ordinance that is punishable as a misdemeanor (except as otherwise provided in Title §46.2, §18.2-266, §18.2-388, or §18.2-407 of the Code of Virginia). b. Who is arrested on a permitted warrant. c. When specifically authorized by the judicial officer issuing the warrant. OPS-405 - 3 of 15 – 03/26/2021 NOTE: When serving a warrant for which the person arrested is to be released on a summons, the court date will be no more than two weeks from the date of service of the warrant. 2. The officer shall take the name and address of the person charged and issue a summons, providing written notification of the time and place of court appearance to answer to the charges. Upon issuing the summons, the officer shall release the person from custody. 3. An officer may physically arrest a person in accordance with §19.2-74 A1 of the Code of Virginia, if the person: a. Is likely to disregard the summons. b. Is likely to cause harm to themselves or to any other person. c. Refuses to sign the summons. d. Fails or refuses to discontinue the offense. 4. When an officer issues a summons in lieu of an arrest for Juvenile and Domestic Relations (JDR) Court cases, officers shall write the IBR number under “Virginia Uniform Summons.” The officer shall forward the letter of arrest to the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office as soon as possible.
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