2015-01-15 Consolidated Class Action Complaint
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5<25.ex.222;2.NXR.OMO!!!Fqe!$!73!!!Hkngf!12026026!!!Ri!2!qh!685!!!!Ri!KF!25;3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION NEW YORK STATE TEACHERS’ Civil Case No. 14-cv-11191 RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf of All Other Persons Honorable Linda V. Parker Similarly Situated, Jury Trial Demanded Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, DANIEL F. AKERSON, NICHOLAS S. CYPRUS, CHRISTOPHER P. LIDDELL, DANIEL AMMANN, CHARLES K. STEVENS, III, MARY T. BARRA, THOMAS S. TIMKO, and GAY KENT, Defendants. CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 5<25.ex.222;2.NXR.OMO!!!Fqe!$!73!!!Hkngf!12026026!!!Ri!3!qh!685!!!!Ri!KF!25;4 A. Lead Plaintiff.......................................................................................11 B. Defendants...........................................................................................12 Corporate Defendant.................................................................12 Individual Defendants...............................................................12 History Of GM ....................................................................................19 GM’s Initial Public Offering...............................................................21 Moving Shutdowns Are A Serious Safety Defect ..............................26 GM’s Obligation To Identify Safety-Related Defects And Conduct Recalls ........................................................................28 Defects Under The Safety Act Defined By Prior Litigation Involving GM And Other Manufacturers .................................30 The Obvious Danger Of Moving Shutdowns ...........................36 The Valukas Report’s Flawed Conclusions..............................87 GM And NHTSA Recognize Moving Shutdowns As A Safety Defect In 2004-2005......................................................93 The Auto Industry As A Whole Routinely Recognizes Moving Shutdowns Are A Safety Defect ...............................103 GM Recognizes Loss of Power Steering Alone As A Safety Defect In 2010 .............................................................106 i 5<25.ex.222;2.NXR.OMO!!!Fqe!$!73!!!Hkngf!12026026!!!Ri!4!qh!685!!!!Ri!KF!25;5 Limitations At NHTSA Exacerbate GM’s Cover-Up ............112 GM’s Obligation And Failure To Investigate And Accurately Report Liabilities To Its Shareholders And Maintain Effective Internal Controls................................................................................126 1. GM’s Obligation To Investigate And Accurately Report Liabilities ................................................................................127 2. GM’s Obligation To Maintain Effective Internal Controls Over Financial Reporting........................................................137 3. GM’s Primary Enforcement Mechanism: The Audit Committee...............................................................................139 4. GM’s Consistent Failure To Adequately Investigate Liabilities And Maintain Effective Internal Controls.............141 GM Loses Focus On Safety ..............................................................165 Mid-2000s: GM Launches New Small Car Brands In The Midst Of Massive Cost Cutting Efforts.......................................................181 GM Develops And Installs Defective Ignition Switches In Millions Of Its Vehicles ....................................................................185 GM Launches The Ion And Cobalt Car Brands, Markets Them To Very Young Drivers, And Sells Them To Rental Car Companies – Two Demographics Whose Drivers Would Be Inexperienced With The Vehicles In Emergency Situations ............195 GM Becomes Aware Of The Tendency Of Its Cars To Shut Down From Numerous Sources, But Knowingly Or Recklessly Fails To Recall Its Cars Or Record A Sufficient Financial Reserve For Over 9 Years, Exposing The Corporation To Massive Liabilities And Criminal Investigation Exposure...............199 GM Receives Hundreds Of Complaints About The Ion’s Defective Ignition Switch And Ergonomic Placement...........200 GM Launches The Cobalt And Immediately Learns Of ii 5<25.ex.222;2.NXR.OMO!!!Fqe!$!73!!!Hkngf!12026026!!!Ri!5!qh!685!!!!Ri!KF!25;6 Moving Shutdowns Tied To Its Defective Ignition Switch....203 Winter 2004 Through March 2005: While More Reports Of Cobalt Shutdowns Mount, GM Closes The November 2004 PRTS With No Solution.................................................206 Spring 2005: GM Receives Requests From Consumers That The Company Buy Back Their Defective Vehicles .......211 The June 14, 2005 VAPIR Meeting........................................214 June 17, 2005 Ignition Switch Experiments at GM’s Milford Proving Grounds........................................................216 June 19, 2005: GM Receives Negative Media Coverage From The New York Times, But GM Publicly Denies Any Safety Concern........................................................................218 GM Continues To Receive Customer Complaints During 2005, And A GM Design Engineer And Two Other GM Executives Each Personally Experience The Problem ...........221 August And September 2005: GM Takes Steps To Close The May 17, 2005 PRTS And Internally Acknowledges “Inadvertent Ignition Shutoffs”...............................................223 GM Fails To Address Its Own Executives’ Experiences And Continues To Place Short Term Revenue And Costs Concerns Over Customer Safety And Long Term Financial Impact......................................................................226 GM Issues Technical Service Bulletins To Dealers Regarding “Information on Inadvertent Turning of Key Cylinder, Loss of Electric System and No DTCs” .................227 GM Abandons The “Band-Aid” Fix To The Key And Then Issues Updated Technical Service Bulletins..................230 2006: GM Learns Of Crashes And Airbag Non- Deployments In GM Vehicles Used In Rental Car Company Fleets.......................................................................232 iii 5<25.ex.222;2.NXR.OMO!!!Fqe!$!73!!!Hkngf!12026026!!!Ri!6!qh!685!!!!Ri!KF!25;7 May 27, 2006: GM Makes Surreptitious Changes To Its Ignition Switch Design For At Least The Second Time.........235 August 2007: GM And Delphi Settle Claims Concerning The Defective Ignition Switches In Resolving Delphi’s Bankruptcy Liabilities To GM................................................237 March 2009: GM’s CEO Wagoner Reviews Information Reflecting High Cobalt Warranty Expenses That Motivate GM To Belatedly Change The Cobalt Key Design, Returning To The “Band-aid” Solution..................................238 As A Result Of Litigation Against The Company, By 2005 Senior GM Lawyers And Engineers Knew That Turning A Vehicle To Accessory Or Off Also Turned Off Its Airbags, Increasing Safety Concerns...............................................................244 The Connection Between Airbag Failures And The Ignition Switch Is Discovered By Others Outside Of GM.....247 Numerous Accidents Involving Airbag Non-Deployments Result From The Ignition Switch Defects ..............................252 GM Is Warned In October 2010 That The Ignition Switch Defects Could Result In Punitive Damages............................255 July 2011: Senior GM Executives Meet And Acknowledge That The Ignition Switch Problems Are The “Root Cause” Of The Cobalt Airbag Non-Deployments .......256 From Late 2011 Into 2012, GM Continues To Accumulate More Information And Acknowledges The Problem But Still Fails To Take Any Action ...............................................................................260 In 2012, GM Confirms The Obvious Connection Between The Ignition Defect And Airbag Failures, But More Delays Follow ......261 In The Fall Of 2012 And 2013, GM Receives Additional Evidence That The Defective Ignition Switches Pose Serious Safety Risks.......................................................................................271 iv 5<25.ex.222;2.NXR.OMO!!!Fqe!$!73!!!Hkngf!12026026!!!Ri!7!qh!685!!!!Ri!KF!25;8 J. Defendant Akerson “Retires” Under Suspicious Circumstances And Defendant Ammann Is Effectively Removed From His Role As CFO..............................................................................................277 K. GM Urgently Orders 500,000 Replacement Ignition Switches On A Rush Basis Almost Two Months Before Publicly Announcing Its First Recall ...................................................................................280 Numerous Deaths And Mounting Litigation Pressure Must Occur Before GM Finally Announced The Recalls And Increased Its Reported Liabilities......................................................293 In February 2014, The First Recall Wave Begins And GM’s Past Conduct Comes Into Question ..........................................................302 From March 10-11, 2014, GM Comes Under Close Scrutiny From NHTSA, Congress And The DOJ ...........................................307 As Media and Governmental Scrutiny Intensify During March 2014, The Scope And Impact Of The First Recall Wave Expands .............................................................................................313 On March 31 and April 1, 2014, Governmental Pressure Increases Further And GM Updates Its Estimated Recall Costs ......315 On April 9 and 11, 2014, NHTSA Imposes Its Maximum Fine On GM And GM’s Recall Charges Increase To $1.3 Billion...........320 From April Through June 2014, GM Slowly Attempts To Clean Up Its Mess – Firings, Admissions, Fines, The Valukas Report And Compensation For Some Victims .............................................324