Structural Change in Russian Transition
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Gregory: Russian Structural Change 5/28/2004 Structural Change in Russian Transition Paul R. Gregory Professor of Economics University of Houston May 25, 2004 Final Version Gregory: Russian Structural Change 5/28/2004 INTRODUCTION Socialist economies such as the Soviet Union practiced centralized distribution of resources according to what became known as “planner’s preferences”.1 Planner’s preferences were essentially the preferences of the dictatorial government rather than of consumers. The distribution of resources was also affected by special interests such as the military-industrial complex or the heavy industry lobby. In addition, rigidity of material balance planning or “planning from the achieved level,” produced additional deviations from market-like resource allocations. Finally, relative autarky of the socialist economies (primarily limited to intra- COMECON trade) prevented them from realizing their comparative advantages and created additional biases. Consequently, the patterns of resource allocation and structural proportions (as observed in the structure of GDP, consumer budgets, foreign trade, and so on) that emerged in the Soviet period differed significantly from those of market economies at similar levels of development. These structural distortions produced inefficiencies that were in part responsible for inadequate levels and distorted structures of consumption in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union and for the stagnation of these economies in the 1970s and 1980s.2 Transitional economies, including Russia, started their transformation with initial conditions inherited from the pre-existing socialist economies. It is therefore natural to expect that these economies, after the removal of the constraints of planning, should move in the direction of more “normal” proportions of market economies in the process. International openness should also lead to greater role of foreign trade and to deeper international specialization. Indeed studies show that transition “success” varied inversely with the proximity to and duration of the Soviet core model.3 The goal of this report is twofold. First, we study structural change in the Russian economy to compare its starting points with its current makeup. Second, we seek to elicit the structural differences between Russia and various country groups at the start of transition (around 1990), trace the pattern of structural change, and to capture the extent to which Russian structural 1 The term was introduced by Abram Bergson, See, for example: Abram Bergson, The Economics of Soviet Planning, Yale University Press, 1964. 2 Padma Desai, The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects, Blackwell, 1987; Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart, Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed., Addison Wesley, 2001; Steven Rosefielde (ed.), Efficiency and Russia’s Economic Recovery Potential, Ashgate, 1998. 3 Stuart, Robert and Christina Panayotopouolos (1999). “Decline and Recovery in Transition Economies: The Impact of Initial Conditions,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, vol. 40, no. 4. Gregory: Russian Structural Change 5/28/2004 distortions have been reduced since 1991. This exercise accomplishes a number of goals: First, it provides a measure of transition “success” which is grounded in quantitative rather than subjective indicators, such as those of the EBRD. Second, it points the way to future sectoral growth patterns under the assumption that remaining structural distortions will continue to be removed. Third, it points to the type of market economy towards which Russia is moving, given the great uncertainty as to the Russian economy’s “final” shape and form. We know from previous studies that Russia’s (the USSR’s) deviations from “normal” structures of market economies were substantial, such as the greater shares of heavy industry, the low shares of services, the high shares of food, consumption, and the underutilization of foreign trade.4 We also know from previous studies that the pace of change, both structural and institutional, has been rapid since 1990 in Russia.5 What is lacking is a major study of Russian structural change in the comparative context of other countries.6 Our general conclusions are: 1) The changes observed in Russia’s value added and labor force structures appear to be market driven in accordance with productivity differentials. 2) Russia is becoming increasingly similar in terms of sector-of-origin structure to upper-middle income countries and to the lower tier of high-income countries such as Greece, Portugal, and South Korea. This conclusion is remarkable since per capita GDP measures place Russia well below these groups. 4 Ofer, Gur (1973). The Service Sector in Soviet Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Gregory, Paul (1970), Socialist and NonSocialist Industrialization Patterns (New York: Praeger); Kuznets, Simon (1963). “A Comparative Appraisal,” in Abram Bergson and Simon Kuznets (eds.), Economic Trends in the Soviet Union, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); Schroeder, Gertrude and Imogene Edwards (1981), Consumption in the USSR: An International Comparison, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 5 Schroeder, Gertrude (1998), “Dimensions of Russia’s Industrial Transformation, 1992-1998: An Overview,” Post- Soviet Geography and Economics (39, no. 5 (May), 243-271; Shinichiro Tabata (1996), “Changes in the Structure and Distribution of Russian GDP in the 1990s,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 37, no. 3, 129-144; Paul Gregory and Robert Stuart (1998), Russian and Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 6th ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley Longman, chaps. 16-18. See also, World Bank and State Statistics Committee of the Government of the Russian Federation (October 1995), Russian Federation: Report on the National Accounts. 6 The World Bank, From Transition to Development, April 2004, has conducted a “benchmarking” study of Russia’s changing structure of value added, broken down into four major sectors. Gregory: Russian Structural Change 5/28/2004 3) The Russian labor force has been much slower to adjust than output, especially in agriculture. The main labor force adjustments have taken place in terms of movements from manufacturing to market services. The movement out of agriculture was limited to the first few years of transition. There are preliminary signs of renewed movement out of agriculture. 4) The structure of manufacturing still feels the imprint of initial Soviet conditions. Unlike other parts of the economy, Russian manufacturing resembles the structure of high income countries, a fact that works against successful restructuring. The sector of manufacturing that suffered an absolute collapse when confronted with an open economy and market prices was light industry. 5) Russian GDP by end use has adjusted to begin to remove the major distortions of the Soviet period – too high investment shares and too low consumption shares. However, there is a remarkable lack of convergence in the major end-use shares, which we attribute to over adjustments, such as investment shares going from too high to too low. We interpret the extraordinary current account surpluses as a partial attempt by Russian citizens to cushion the decline in real incomes and to guard against uncertainty. 6) International comparison data show that the structure of Russian consumption remains highly distorted due to the lack of price reform in housing, energy, and in health and education. 7) Russia’s participation in trade has increased dramatically, but it remains similar to a low-middle income in its participation in trade. It will retain its “backward” structure of exports (reliance on raw materials) because of its comparative advantages. Russia has also not emulated lower income countries by producing “low tech” manufacturing, which explains its relative lack of manufacturing exports. 8) Long term data show that Russia began to undergo rapid structural change in the late perestroika period after a lengthy period of planning from the achieved level. The mini- restructuring of late perestroika, however, appeared to move the economy away from a market economy. 9) We conclude that Russia’s own estimates of the structure of GDP are more reliable than alternate estimates, such as the substantial adjustments proposed by the World Bank. This report is organized as follows: Part I examines changes in the structure of the Russian economy between 1990 and the present. It examines the changing structure of GDP and labor force by sector of origin and by end use as well as changes in the structure of trade. Part II examines these structural changes in international perspective by comparing Russia with international data of countries grouped by level of economic development. Gregory: Russian Structural Change 5/28/2004 PART I: RUSSIAN DATA AND TRENDS Overview We draw data from the period 1989/1990 to 2001. It should be remembered that the Soviet Union was disbanded in December of 1991 and Gaidar’s liberalization of prices began in January of 1992. Therefore, the years 1989-1991 are used to establish a base point from which transition began. These pre-transition benchmarks are not ideal because of the immense disruptions and upheavals of the Soviet economy in the period 1988 to 1991. The second period that the data covers is the period of transition recession (or depression) from 1992 to 1997, which was also accompanied by near hyperinflation between 1992 and 1994. The third period is the