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CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia Michael A. McDevitt • Catheriine K. Lea Conference Report DCP-2012-U-002417-Final August 2012 Photo credit line:USN and Phillippine Navy Task Group during CARAT 2012 – A U.S. Navy Photo Approved for distribution: August 2012 Dr. W. Eugene Cobble, Jr., Director Strategic Initiatives Group Strategic Studies This document contains the best opinion of the authors at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Cleared for public release. Specific authority: N00014-11-D-0323. Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technicall Information Center at www.dtic.mil or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright © 2012 CNA This work was created in the performance of Federal Government Contract Number N00014-11-D-0323. Any copyright in this work is subject to the Government's Unlimited Rights license as defined in DFARS 2252.227-7013 and/or DFARS 252.227-7014. The reproduction of this work for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited. Nongoverrnmental users may copy and distribute this document in any medium, either commercially oor noncommercially, provided that this copyright notice is reproduced in all copies. Nongovernmental users may not use technical measures to obstructt or control the reading or further copying of the copies they make or distribute. Nongovernmental users may not accept compensation of any manner in exchange for copies. All other rights reserved. CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia Contents Workshop Overview 1 Michael A. McDevitt Catherine K. Lea Naval Arms Racing and Control in the Asia-Pacific Region. Is There a Problem? 25 Geoffrey Till The Reactions of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force to Evolving PLA Navy Capabilities and Operations 45 Paul S. Giarra Republic of Korea Navy and China’s Rise: Balancing Competing Priorities 61 Terence Roehrig Russian Maritime Interests in Asia 79 Dmitry P. Gorenburg Vietnamese and Philippine Naval Modernization 89 Bernard D. Cole The Role of China’s Civil Maritime Forces in the South China Sea 99 George P. Vance Chinese Views of the Air-Sea Battle Concept: A Preliminary Assessment 115 Peter W. Mackenzie Ian M. Easton Chinese Views on Naval Developments by its Near Neighbors: Two Case Studies 127 Lyle Goldstein Workshop Agenda 137 The views the authors express in this report are their own and do not represent those of the institutions with which they are affiliated. i CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia ii CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia Workshop Overview Michael A. McDevitt CNA Senior Fellow, Strategic Studies Division Catherine K. Lea CNA Research Analyst, Strategic Studies Division Introduction As part of its Maritime Asia project, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) con- ducted a workshop focused on naval developments in Asia. The purpose of this workshop was to explore the interaction between China’s ongoing naval modern- ization and the navy modernization programs that most of China’s neighbors are pursuing. The point was not to revisit the often asked question of whether a naval arms race is underway in East Asia. The entire “arms race” paradigm probably does not make sense: technically speaking, a naval arms race in Asia with China is not really possible, because no other Asian country can keep pace with the scope and sophistication of China’s naval modernization. China simply is too wealthy and has too much capacity. Rather, the hope was to explore what has been called a “capabilities competition.” For example, Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities are triggering an ap- proach that the United States has dubbed the “Air-Sea Battle,” which is intended to field capabilities that will assure access. So what we have are diametrically op- posed concepts based on different sets of capabilities – one set to deny access versus another set intended to assure access. Other Asian countries are responding to dif- ferent aspects of Chinese access denial capabilities, especially its submarine force and its eventual power-projection capabilities (the PLAN aircraft carrier program). Meanwhile, everyone confronts the classic security dilemma. China’s attempt to improve its security is making its Asian neighbors who depend on US maritime power less secure. The combination of China’s expanding overseas economic activities and corre- sponding need for security has created a demand signal for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to protect People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests abroad. This entails supporting United Nations-sanctioned missions, assisting PRC citizens who are in jeopardy or require evacuation, protecting sea lines of communica- tion (SLOCs), and responding to natural disasters. Over the last half decade, the 1 CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia PLAN—more so than China’s other military services—has been seriously involved in integrating distant, prolonged peacetime operations as part of its core mission set. As the PLAN has learned, these new missions require a different mix of naval ca- pabilities than its wartime “counter intervention concept.” It is the submarine force and land-based naval aviation arm which are the central players in what DOD characterizes as area-denial operations. The PLAN’s surface force plays second fid- dle in these scenarios. This role is reversed during peacetime; then, it is the surface navy that has pride of place due to its ability to deploy worldwide. As the PLAN demonstrates genuine competence and professionalism in distant sea operations, Asian littoral states will likely begin to notice that it is becoming more expeditionary—which is another way of saying that it will be able to project power. Clearly, the introduction of modern amphibious ships, and shortly an aircraft carri- er force, provides the PLAN with a credible power-projection capability. The work- shop explored how much this emerging capability is creating a demand by Asian littoral states for naval modernization that in some cases includes area-denial capa- bilities, such as submarines and land-based aircraft with anti-ship cruise missiles. Naval arms race in Asia Noted maritime strategist Professor Geoffrey Till undertook a systematic explora- tion of the naval arms race issue in a paper which was delivered at a different CNA workshop. Since the topic is germane to the focus of this workshop, his paper is included in this report. He addressed the question by positing seven criteria and evaluating the current situation in Asia against those criteria. His criteria are: • A naval arms race must be internationally driven, meaning that it results from countries’ perceptions of their external security environment. • It is a bilateral rivalry between two rival hegemonic states or coalitions. • It is characterized by abnormal intensity with expenditures that go beyond the necessities of pure defense. • It is accompanied by political tension between the protagonists in which the use of lethal force cannot be ruled out as a policy option. • There is a specificoperational focus of the naval acquisitions in that they are aimed at a particular nation or coalition of nations. 2 CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia • Both sides view the naval arms race as having high stakes, in that the outcome could result in a decisive shift of the military balance. • Both parties have the perception that they are involved in a naval arms race with the other. Using these criteria, it seems clear that if applied to the United States and China, or even to Japan and China, some of these considerations are relevant. But when applied to other Asian nations versus one another or versus China, the arms race paradigm does not fit. What is going on is that countries with sound economies are embarking on nor- mal naval modernization, especially in terms of quality at the high end of naval capabilities, as older systems are replaced or new capabilities are added. In both Northeast and Southeast Asia, there also is an element of keeping up with one’s neighbors—South Korean naval modernization is rationalized in part by Japan’s capabilities. In Southeast Asia, both Indonesia and Malaysia appear to be moti- vated in part by what Singapore procures. Arguably, today’s situation actually adds stability to the region as many nations will increasingly be able to defend their mari- time approaches. Maritime strategies of China’s neighbors in Northeast Asia Northeast Asian countries are hedging against China’s rising power by cultivating economic relations with Beijing while at the same time closely monitoring the di- rection of PLA modernization, including its naval developments. Northeast Asian nations have drawn closer to China through dramatic increases in bilateral trade as China’s economy has expanded. While economic ties draw China closer to its Northeast Asian neighbors, its territorial and maritime sovereignty claims in its near seas have resulted in disputes with those same neighbors. Japan and South Korea take umbrage over China’s claims of island territories, its oil and gas explo- ration activities, and the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by its civilian fishing fleet. While Northeast Asian nations certainly want to share in and benefit from China’s meteoric rise, they also want China to accommodate their interests in the maritime domain. 3 CNA Maritime Asia Project Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia Japan’s evolving maritime defensive orientation Japan and China are engaged in a strategic competition in Northeast Asia, but they are not enemies, despite their mutual distrust. As a result of the perceived threat from both North Korea and China, Japan has slowly been shifting its security orien- tation from its northeast and Russia, to its southwest islands.
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